12 June 1812 - the beginning of the Patriotic War of 1812. War was declared in advance, but the time and place of the attack were not reported. Having crossed the Neman, Napoleon invades Russian territory. But the Russian army avoids a general battle and retreats with rearguard battles. The main blow fell on Bagration's army. The 1st and 2nd armies planned to unite first in the Vitebsk area, but it was not possible. At first, Alexander I was the commander-in-chief, and then Mikhail Bogdanovich Barclay de Tolly became the commander-in-chief. The partisan movement begins.
4 – 6 August 1812 - Battle of Smolensk. It was bloody - 120 thousand Russians against 200 thousand French. Neverovsky's detachment prevented the French from bypassing Smolensk. The corps of Dokhturov and Raevsky held back the onslaught of the French for 2 days, covering the withdrawal of the main forces of the army. Smolensk was abandoned
8 August 1812 - appointment of Kutuzov as commander-in-chief of the Russian army. Alexander did this despite personal hostility, taking into account Kutuzov's combat experience, talent and enormous popularity in the Russian army. On August 17, Kutuzov arrived in the active army. The retreat to Moscow continues, as the army needs to be put in order and prepared for a general battle.
24 August 1812 - the battles for the Shevardinsky redoubt made it possible to prepare fortifications.
26 August 1812 - Battle of Borodino. It became the main battle of the War of 1812. The position on the Borodino field was not chosen by chance:
Two roads leading to Moscow were covered - the new and old Smolensk.
The rugged nature of the terrain made it possible to place artillery at the heights, to hide part of the troops, and made it difficult for the French to maneuver. The right flank is covered by the Kolocha River.
Each side set as its goal to defeat the enemy.
The battle was characterized by extreme tenacity and bitterness. Napoleon tried to break through the Russian fortifications in the center, on the left flank. Raevsky's battery, located on Kurgan Heights, changed hands several times. As darkness fell, the battle ended and the French withdrew their troops to their original positions. The battle ended in a draw, as neither side achieved its goals. Napoleon lost 50 thousand people, but did not bring the old guard into battle. The Russians lost 40 thousand. Kutuzov gives the order to retreat.
Meaning of the battle:
Napoleon's army received a strong blow and suffered significant losses.
Kutuzov's army survived.
An example of Russian heroism.
September 1, 1812 - Council in Fili, where the decision was made to leave Moscow in order to preserve the army. Having left Moscow along the Ryazan road, the army crossed country roads to the Kaluga road and set up camp near the village of Tarutino, preparing for new battles.
September 2, 1812 - Napoleon's troops occupy Moscow. Moscow greets with a grandiose fire - it lasted 6 days, ¾ of the city burned down, priceless monuments, books. There are different versions of the fire - the French are to blame, patriots, probably a joint decision of Kutuzov and Moscow Governor General Rostopchin. 3 times Napoleon suggested that Alexander the First begin negotiations. The situation for the French army is rapidly deteriorating - there is no food, no housing, the partisans are causing great damage (peasant detachments of Chetvertakov, Gerasim Kurin, Vasilisa Kozhina and under the leadership of officers Denis Davydov, Figner are operating), the army is decomposing, and winter is ahead.
October 6, 1812 - Napoleon's troops leave Moscow. The reason is that the city, like a besieged fortress, becomes a trap. Napoleon is trying to break into the southern provinces.
October 12, 1812 – battles for Maloyaroslavets. The city changed hands 8 times. Result - Napoleon is forced to return to the old Smolensk road, and the retreat begins. The initiative completely passes to the Russian army. The Russian army pursues Napoleon on a parallel course, all the time threatening to get ahead and cut off the route of retreat.
November 14 -16, 1812 - heavy French losses when crossing the Berezina River - 30 thousand, but retained the generals, the old guard. Soon he secretly leaves the army and leaves for Paris.
December 25, 1812 - manifesto about the end of the Patriotic War. Only the pitiful remnants of the great army crossed the border. The Patriotic War ended with the complete defeat of the enemy.
Reasons for victory:
The fair nature of the war, defended the Fatherland.
The role of Kutuzov and other commanders.
Partisan movement.
Heroism of soldiers and officers.
National assistance - creation of a people's militia, fundraising.
Geographical and natural factors (vast spaces and cold winters).
Results of the Patriotic War. Historical significance of the victory.
1 . Russia defended its independence and territorial integrity. She won the war.
2 . Huge damage:
Thousands of people died.
Great damage to the western provinces.
Many cities were damaged - old historical and cultural centers (Moscow, Smolensk, etc.).
3 . The war united the nation, as they defended their homeland and their independence.
4 . The war strengthened the friendship of the peoples of the country, the Slavs in the first place.
5 . The war elevated Moscow as the spiritual center of Russia. The official capital of St. Petersburg found itself on the sidelines of events.
6 . The heroism of the Russian people inspired cultural figures to create patriotic works about this war. The war had a strong influence on the development of culture and social thought.
1813 -1815 - foreign campaign of the Russian army. Kutuzov's troops crossed the Neman and entered European territory. Other states are joining the fight against France, and a new anti-French coalition is being created (Russia, Prussia, Austria, Sweden, England). In 1813, Kutuzov died.
1813, October 16 -19 - Battle of Leipzig. In the "Battle of the Nations" Napoleon is defeated. Allied troops enter Paris. Napoleon abdicates power and exiles to the island of Elba, but flees and returns to power for 100 days.
1815 – Battle of Waterloo. The final defeat of Napoleon. He is exiled to St. Helena Island in the Atlantic Ocean. Russia played a decisive role in the defeat of Napoleonic France. The Russian army was the core of the Allied military forces.
Historical significance of the foreign campaign:
Europe is liberated from Napoleonic tyranny.
Reactionary monarchical regimes are being installed.
1814 – 1815 – The Vienna Congress of the victorious powers determined the principles of the post-war structure of Europe. Russia received the territory of the Duchy of Warsaw. To protect the relations established at the Vienna Congress and to fight the revolutionary movement, the Holy Alliance (Russia, Prussia, Austria) was created.
Thus, Russian foreign policy at the beginning of the 19th century was active. The main direction is western. Victory in the war with France strengthened the country's international authority.
Decembrist movement.
The first revolutionaries to create a fairly powerful secret organization and openly oppose the autocracy were the Decembrists. These were young nobles, officers - Alexander Muravyov, Sergey Trubetskoy, Nikita Muravyov, Matvey and Sergey Muravyov - Apostles, Ivan Kushkin, Pavel Pestel, Evgeny Obolensky, Ivan Pushchin, Kakhovsky, Lunin and others. Based on the name of the month in which they openly opposed the tsar, they began to be called Decembrists.
Reasons for the speech of the Decembrists:
1 . - growth of national self-awareness in connection with the War of 1812. Many of the Decembrists took part in the war, knew the way of life and order in Europe, and had the opportunity to compare. They saw the destructiveness of serfdom and the fact that the people who fought against the Napoleonic invasion received nothing to make their lives easier.
2 . - strengthening of the reaction in the country - attack on the achievements of education - defeat of the Kazan and St. Petersburg universities, deterioration of the situation of the peasantry - again the landowners could exile the peasants to Siberia, the creation of military settlements, refusal of reforms.
3. – the influence of revolutionary ideology – the ideas of French thinkers (Locke, Montesquieu, Diderot) and Russian enlighteners (Novikov, Radishchev).
4. – revolutionary processes in Europe – a wave of revolutionary uprisings, bourgeois revolutions.
Decembrists- these are supporters of a military coup with the aim of carrying out bourgeois reforms in Russia only by the forces of the army without the participation of the people.
Since the Decembrists were military men, they hoped to use the military forces at their disposal for the coup. The formation of secret societies began, uniting the most radically thinking representatives of the nobility.
Secret organizations of the Decembrists:
1. "Union of Salvation" 1816 - 1818, created in St. Petersburg, included about 30 people. The charter “Statute” was adopted, a new name was given, “Society of True and Faithful Sons of the Fatherland.” The main goal is the introduction of a constitution and civil liberties, the abolition of serfdom. Specific activity is preparing public opinion for the upcoming reforms. The organization was created on the basis of the Semenovsky regiment. They published translations of the works of French enlighteners. The question of regicide arose. They proposed presenting their demands at the time of the change of monarch on the throne.
2. “Union of Welfare”, 1818 – 1821, included about 200 people. The Green Book program set the task of convincing public opinion of the need for reforms within 15–20 years. The ultimate goals - a political and social revolution - were not declared, since the program was intended for wide dissemination. They sought to attract public attention to the situation of serfs and military villagers in order to eliminate arbitrariness. Members of the organization, by their example, sought to promote the ideas of educating the people - they created schools on estates and actively participated in the activities of legal scientific, educational and literary societies.
The union was led by the root council in St. Petersburg, there were branches in Moscow, Tulchin, Poltava, Tambov, Kyiv, Chisinau, and the Nizhny Novgorod province.
In January 1821, the Union of Welfare was dissolved because:
Possibility of screening out unreliable people.
Disagreements regarding future activities.
The uprising in the Semenovsky regiment, where most of the Decembrists served, led to the deportation of officers to different garrisons. The regiment was disbanded and recruited again.
3. "Southern Society" 1821 – 1825, founded in Ukraine, in the city of Tulchin. Led by Pavel Pestel. Entered S. Muravyov - Apostol, M. Besstuzhev - Ryumin. In 1825, the Society of United Slavs, created in 1823, joined it. The program was called “Russian Truth”.
4 . "Northern Society" 1821 – 1825, founded in St. Petersburg. The society's program - "Constitution" was compiled by N. Muravyov. included S. Trubetskoy, E. Obolensky, K. Ryleev, Pyotr Kakhovsky.
Program documents of the Decembrists:
General: liquidate estates, introduce civil liberties - freedom of speech, press, assembly, religion, liquidate military settlements and recruitment, introduce universal military service.
Both programs opened up ways for the further development of Russia.
The greatest activity of the Decembrist societies occurred in 1824–1825: preparations were made for an armed uprising, and hard work was carried out to coordinate political programs. A military coup was planned for the summer of 1826. But the uprising happened earlier. On November 19, 1825, Alexander I dies in Taganrog. The troops and population swore allegiance to Emperor Constantine, but he abdicated the throne back in 1823, but this was kept secret. On December 14, 1825, the re-oath was scheduled for his brother Nikolai. The Decembrists decided to take advantage of this situation. The final plan for the uprising was adopted on December 13 at Ryleev’s apartment - to withdraw troops to Senate Square in order to prevent the oath of office of the Senate and the State Council, to publish the “Manifesto to the Russian People”, to proclaim the abolition of serfdom, the code of the press, conscience, and the introduction of universal military service. The government is declared deposed and power is transferred to a provisional government until the convened Great Council makes a decision on the form of government in Russia. The royal family should be arrested, the Winter Palace and the Peter and Paul Fortress should be captured with the help of troops. Trubetskoy was appointed dictator of the uprising.
December 14, 1825 At 11:00 a.m., officers brought their loyal units to Senate Square in St. Petersburg:
Moscow Life Guards Regiment (Bestuzhev - Ryumin and D. Shchepin - Rostovsky)
Grenadier Regiment (Panov)
Guards Fleet Crew (Bestuzhev)
Only 3 thousand soldiers, 30 officers, no artillery. The king had 12 thousand people, cavalry, 36 guns.
From the very beginning the uprising did not go according to plan:
Trubetskoy did not appear on the square; another leader, Obolensky, was elected on the spot.
The Senate and State Council had already sworn allegiance to the Tsar early in the morning.
Yakubovich, who was supposed to command the guards naval crew and the Izmailovsky regiment, refused to seize the Winter Palace and arrest the royal family, because he was afraid of regicide.
The rebels in the square were inactive, but the king was active. They are trying to persuade the rebels to disperse (Kakhovsky kills Miloradovich, the governor of St. Petersburg), and at this time the loyal units are gathering. Two cavalry attacks were repulsed, and a decision was made to use artillery. By 6 o'clock in the evening the uprising was defeated (1271 people died, of which 900 were curious people in the square). Arrests and searches began.
December 25, 1825 - uprising of 5 companies of the Chernigov regiment (970 soldiers and 8 officers, led by Muravyov - Apostol). Defeated by tsarist troops near the village of Ustinovka.
Causes of defeat:
1. disruption of the original plan of the uprising.
2. numerical superiority of the royal troops
3. wait-and-see tactics
4. fear of addressing the people
The investigative commission worked in St. Petersburg from December 17, 1825 to June 17, 1826. At the same time, commissions worked in Bila Tserkva, Minsk, Bialystok, and Warsaw. The investigation was led by the tsar, 579 officers were involved, 280 of them were found guilty. The trial proceeded without the presence of the Decembrists.
5 people were executed on July 13, 1826, hanged in the Peter and Paul Fortress - Ryleev, Pestel, Kakhovsky, Muravyov - Apostol, Bestuzhev - Ryumin.
88 people were sentenced to hard labor.
19 people were exiled to Siberia.
15 people were demoted to soldiers.
120 people were punished by personal order of Nicholas I without trial.
The rest were sent to the active army in the Caucasus.
Soldiers and sailors were tried separately.
The significance of the Decembrist movement:
2. their demands reflected the urgent needs of transformation in Russia.
3. great importance for the development of advanced social thought (ideology, tactics, experience of struggle)
4. Their speech influenced the tsar’s internal policy.
Related information.
Patriotic War of 1812 (French Campagne de Russie pendant l "année 1812) - the war between Russia and Napoleonic France on Russian territory in 1812.
The reasons for the war were Russia’s refusal to actively support the continental blockade, in which Napoleon saw the main weapon against Great Britain, as well as Napoleon’s policy towards European states, carried out without taking into account the interests of Russia.
At the first stage of the war (from June to September 1812), the Russian army fought back from the borders of Russia to Moscow, fighting the Battle of Borodino in front of Moscow.
At the second stage of the war (from October to December 1812), Napoleonic army first maneuvered, trying to go to winter quarters in areas not ravaged by war, and then retreated to the borders of Russia, pursued by the Russian army, hunger and frost.
The war ended with the almost complete destruction of Napoleonic army, the liberation of Russian territory and the transfer of hostilities to the lands of the Duchy of Warsaw and Germany in 1813 (see War of the Sixth Coalition). Among the reasons for the defeat of Napoleon's army, the Russian historian N. Troitsky names popular participation in the war and the heroism of the Russian army, the unpreparedness of the French army for combat operations in large spaces and in the natural and climatic conditions of Russia, the leadership talents of the Russian commander-in-chief M. I. Kutuzov and other generals.
Background to the conflict
After the defeat of Russian troops in the Battle of Friedland, on July 7, 1807, Emperor Alexander I concluded the Treaty of Tilsit with Napoleon, according to which he undertook to join the continental blockade of Great Britain, which was contrary to the economic and political interests of Russia. According to the Russian nobility and army, the terms of the peace treaty were humiliating and shameful for the country. The Russian government used the Treaty of Tilsit and the years that followed it to accumulate strength for the upcoming fight against Napoleon.
As a result of the Peace of Tilsit and the Congress of Erfurt, Russia took Finland from Sweden in 1808 and made a number of other territorial acquisitions; It gave Napoleon a free hand to conquer all of Europe. French troops, after a series of annexations, carried out mainly at the expense of Austrian possessions (see War of the Fifth Coalition), moved close to the borders of the Russian Empire.
Causes of the war
From France
After 1807, Great Britain remained Napoleon's main and, in fact, only enemy. Britain seized France's colonies in America and India and interfered with French trade. Given that England dominated the sea, Napoleon's only real weapon in the fight against it was a continental blockade, the effectiveness of which depended on the willingness of other European states to comply with sanctions. Napoleon persistently demanded that Alexander I more consistently implement the continental blockade, but was faced with Russia's reluctance to sever relations with its main trading partner.
In 1810, the Russian government introduced free trade with neutral countries, allowing Russia to trade with Britain through intermediaries, and adopted a protective tariff that increased customs rates, mainly on imported French goods. This caused the indignation of the French government.
Napoleon, not being a hereditary monarch, wanted to confirm the legitimacy of his coronation through marriage with a representative of one of the great monarchical houses of Europe. In 1808, a marriage proposal was made to the Russian royal house between Napoleon and the sister of Alexander I, Grand Duchess Catherine. The proposal was rejected under the pretext of Catherine's engagement to the Prince of Saxe-Coburg. In 1810, Napoleon was refused a second time, this time regarding a marriage with another Grand Duchess - 14-year-old Anna (later Queen of the Netherlands). Also in 1810, Napoleon married Princess Marie-Louise of Austria, daughter of Emperor Franz II of Austria. According to the historian E.V. Tarle, the “Austrian marriage” for Napoleon “was the greatest security for the rear in case he had to fight with Russia again.” Alexander I's double refusal to Napoleon and Napoleon's marriage to an Austrian princess caused a crisis of confidence in Russian-French relations and sharply worsened them.
At the beginning of 1811, Russia, constantly fearing the restoration of Poland, pulled several divisions to the borders of the Duchy of Warsaw, which was perceived by Napoleon as a military threat towards the duchy.
In 1811, Napoleon told his ambassador in Warsaw, Abbé de Pradt: “In five years I will be master of the whole world. There is only Russia left, I will crush it...”
From Russia
According to traditional ideas in Russian science, Russian landowners and merchants suffered from the consequences of the continental blockade, to which Russia joined under the terms of the Treaty of Tilsit in 1807, and, as a result, the state finances of Russia. If before the conclusion of the Treaty of Tilsit in 1801-1806 Russia exported 2.2 million quarters of grain annually, then after - in 1807-1810 - exports amounted to 600 thousand quarters. The reduction in exports led to a sharp drop in bread prices. A pound of bread, which cost 40 kopecks in silver in 1804, was sold for 22 kopecks in 1810. At the same time, the export of gold accelerated in exchange for luxury goods supplied from France. All this led to a decrease in the value of the ruble and the depreciation of Russian paper money. The Russian government was forced to take measures to protect the country's economy. In 1810, it introduced free trade with neutral countries (which allowed Russia to trade with Great Britain through intermediaries) and increased customs rates on imported luxury goods and wine, that is, precisely on French exports.
However, a number of researchers argue that the welfare of the main tax-paying classes, which included the merchants and peasants, did not undergo significant changes during the blockade. This, in particular, can be judged by the dynamics of arrears in payments to the budget, which shows that these classes even found the opportunity to pay increased taxes during the period under review. These same authors argue that restricting the import of foreign goods stimulated the development of domestic industry. An anonymous contemporary of those events characterizes the consequences of this forced protectionism as follows: “Cloth factories could never have arisen. Trapes, silk fabrics, canvas, linens and other fabrics that have barely begun to multiply, as well as being suppressed by English needlework. They began to recover with difficulty after stopping bargaining with them. Calico and printed factories suffered the same fate.” In addition, the goods, the obtaining of which was difficult due to the blockade of England, were not essential items: sugar and coffee had not yet come into widespread use; salt, which is also often listed among the missing goods, was produced in excess in Russia itself and was imported from abroad. borders only in the Baltic provinces. The reduction in customs duties, observed during the blockade, did not have much impact on the domestic budget, since duties were not its significant item, and even at the time of reaching their maximum value in 1803, when they amounted to 13.1 million rubles, they accounted for accounted for only 12.9% of budget revenues. Therefore, according to this point of view, the continental blockade of England was for Alexander I only a reason to sever relations with France.
In 1807, from the Polish lands that were part of Prussia and Austria according to the second and third partitions of Poland, Napoleon created the Grand Duchy of Warsaw. Napoleon supported the dreams of the Duchy of Warsaw to recreate an independent Poland up to the borders of the former Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth, which was possible to do only after separating part of its territory from Russia. In 1810, Napoleon took possessions from the Duke of Oldenburg, a relative of Alexander I, which caused indignation in St. Petersburg. Alexander I demanded that the Duchy of Warsaw be transferred as compensation for the taken possessions to the Duke of Oldenburg or that it be liquidated as an independent entity.
Contrary to the terms of the Tilsit Agreement, Napoleon continued to occupy the territory of Prussia with his troops, Alexander I demanded that they be withdrawn from there.
From the end of 1810, European diplomatic circles began to discuss the impending war between the French and Russian empires. By the autumn of 1811, the Russian ambassador in Paris, Prince Kurakin, reported to St. Petersburg about signs of an imminent war.
Diplomacy and intelligence on the eve of the war
On December 17, 1811, in Paris, agreements were reached between Napoleon and the Austrian Empire, represented by Ambassador Schwarzenberg, on the basis of which the Franco-Austrian military alliance was concluded. Austria pledged to field a 30,000-strong corps against Russia under Napoleon's command, and Napoleon agreed to return to Austria the Illyrian provinces that he had taken from it in the Treaty of Schönbrunn in 1809. Austria received these provinces only after the end of Napoleon's war with Russia, and, moreover, Austria was obliged to cede Galicia to Poland.
On February 24, 1812, Napoleon also concluded a treaty of alliance with Prussia. The Prussians agreed to provide 20 thousand soldiers and provide the French army with the necessary supplies, in exchange for this the Prussian king demanded something from the conquered Russian lands (Courland, Livonia, Estland).
Before the start of the campaign, Napoleon studied the political, military and economic situation in Russia. The French carried out extensive reconnaissance. Since 1810, spies entered Russia under the guise of artists, monks, travelers, traders, and retired Russian officers. Intelligence used the French and other foreigners - tutors, doctors, teachers, servants. Polish intelligence, headed by the chief of staff of the troops of the Grand Duchy of Warsaw, General Fischer, was also active. Even Prussia, officially friendly to Russia, had informants at its embassy in St. Petersburg. Shortly before the war, the French managed to obtain engraving boards of the “stolist” Russian map. Its inscriptions were translated into French, and it was this map that the French generals used during the war. Ambassadors of France to Russia L. Caulaincourt and J.-A. Lauriston were "resident No. 1 of French intelligence." The command of the French army knew the composition and number of Russian troops.
In preparation for the war, Russia also engaged in active diplomacy and intelligence. As a result of secret negotiations in the spring of 1812, the Austrians made it clear that they would not be zealous for the benefit of Napoleon and their army would not go far from the Austro-Russian border.
Two proposals were made to the Swedish Crown Prince (former Napoleonic Marshal) Bernadotte. Napoleon offered the Swedes Finland if they opposed Russia, and Alexander offered Norway if they opposed Napoleon. Bernadotte, having weighed both proposals, leaned towards Alexander - not only because Norway was richer than Finland, but also because Sweden was protected from Napoleon by the sea, and from Russia by nothing. In January 1812, Napoleon occupied Swedish Pomerania, pushing Sweden into an alliance with Russia. On March 24 (April 5) of the same year, Bernadotte concluded an alliance treaty with Russia.
On May 22, 1812, the commander-in-chief of the Moldavian army, Kutuzov, ended the five-year war for Moldova and made peace with Turkey. In the south of Russia, the Danube Army of Admiral Chichagov was released as a barrier against Austria, which was forced to be in an alliance with Napoleon.
Napoleon subsequently said that he should have abandoned the war with Russia at the moment when he learned that neither Turkey nor Sweden would fight with Russia.
As a result of the successful actions of Russian intelligence, the command of the Russian army knew in detail the state of the Great Army. Every 1st and 15th day of the month, the French Minister of War presented to the Emperor the so-called “Report on the status” of the entire French army with all changes in the number of its individual units, with all changes in its quartering, taking into account new appointments to command posts, etc. etc. Through an agent at the French main headquarters, this report immediately went to Colonel A.I. Chernyshev, seconded to the Russian embassy in Paris, and from him to St. Petersburg.
On the side of France
By 1811, the French Empire with its vassal states numbered 71 million people out of a population of 172 million in Europe. At the initial stage, Napoleon was able to gather, according to various sources, from 400 to 450 thousand soldiers for a campaign against Russia, of which the French themselves made up half (see Grand Army). There is evidence (in particular, General Berthesen (French) Russian) that the actual strength of the 1st line of the Grand Army was only about half of its payroll, that is, no more than 235 thousand people, and that the commanders when submitting reports hid the true composition of their units. It is noteworthy that the Russian intelligence data of that time also gave this number. 16 different nationalities took part in the campaign: the most numerous were Germans and Poles. On the basis of alliance agreements with France, Austria and Prussia allocated 30 and 20 thousand troops, respectively. After the invasion, units of up to 20 thousand, formed from residents of the former Grand Duchy of Lithuania, were added to the Great Army.
Napoleon had reserves: from 130 to 220 thousand soldiers in the garrisons of Central Europe (of which 70 thousand in the 9th (Victor) and 11th (Augereau) reserve corps in Prussia) and 100 thousand of the French National Guard, which by law was not could fight outside the country.
In anticipation of the military conflict, the French command created large artillery and food warehouses along the Vistula River from Warsaw to Danzig. Danzig became the largest supply center for troops, where by January 1812 there was a food supply for 50 days for 400 thousand people and 50 thousand horses.
Napoleon concentrated his main forces in 3 groups, which, according to the plan, were supposed to encircle and destroy piece by piece the armies of Barclay and Bagration. The left (218 thousand people) was headed by Napoleon himself, the central (82 thousand people) - his stepson, Viceroy of Italy Eugene Beauharnais, the right (78 thousand people) - the younger brother in the Bonaparte family, King of Westphalia Jerome Bonaparte . In addition to the main forces, Jacques MacDonald's corps of 32.5 thousand people was positioned against Wittgenstein on the left flank. , and in the south - on the right flank - the allied corps of Karl Schwarzenberg, numbering 34 thousand people.
The strengths of the Great Army were its large numbers, good material and technical support, combat experience, and belief in the invincibility of the army. The weak point was its very diverse national composition.
On the side of Russia
Army size
The population of Russia in 1811 was more than 40 million people. The blow of Napoleon's army was taken by the troops stationed on the western border: the 1st Army of Barclay de Tolly and the 2nd Army of Bagration, a total of 153 thousand soldiers and 758 guns. Even further south in Volyn (northwest of present-day Ukraine) was located the 3rd Army of Tormasov (up to 45 thousand, 168 guns), which served as a barrier from Austria. In Moldova, the Danube Army of Admiral Chichagov (55 thousand, 202 guns) stood against Turkey. In Finland, the corps of the Russian General Shteingel (19 thousand, 102 guns) stood against Sweden. In the Riga area there was a separate Essen corps (up to 18 thousand), up to 4 reserve corps were located further from the border.
According to the lists, the irregular Cossack troops numbered 117 thousand light cavalry, but in reality 20-25 thousand Cossacks took part in the war.
Armament
Arms factories annually produced 1200-1300 guns and more than 150 thousand pounds of bombs and cannonballs (cf. French factories produced 900-1000 guns). The Tula, Sestroretsk and Izhevsk arms factories produced from 43 to 96 thousand guns per year, in addition, the arsenals could repair almost the same number of weapons, while in all French - about 100 thousand guns per year. Russian weapons of that time were of relatively high quality and, in terms of tactical and technical data, were not inferior to French ones. However, the capacity of Russia's own production was not enough to meet all the needs of the army. Some regiments and even divisions were armed with English or Austrian rifles. The Russian infantry was armed mainly with smoothbore rifles; only a few shooters had rifled fittings or screw guns. The artillery had 6- and 12-pounder cannons, as well as unicorns, which fired grenades weighing ½ and ¼ pounds. The predominant type of field artillery was the 6-pounder, as was the case in most European countries at the time.
By the beginning of the war, the warehouses of the Russian army contained a stockpile of several hundred guns, as well as up to 175 thousand guns, 296 thousand artillery and 44 million gun charges. Artillery depots supplying the Russian army were located along 3 lines:
Vilna - Dinaburg - Nesvizh - Bobruisk - Polonnoye - Kyiv
Pskov - Porkhov - Shostka - Bryansk - Smolensk
Novgorod - Moscow - Kaluga
According to technical and military data, the Russian army did not lag behind the French army. The weak side of the Russian army was the theft of “commission agents” and quartermaster ranks, the embezzlement of many regimental, company and other ranks who profited from allowances, which abuses, according to the figurative remark of a contemporary, were “half legalized.”
Army management reform
In March 1811, in Russia, under the leadership of Minister of War Barclay de Tolly, a reform of army management began - the “Commission for the Drawing up of Military Charters and Codes” was created. The commission took into account the experience of different countries - the military regulations of Austria of 1807-1809, the military regulations of Prussia of 1807-1810, much attention was paid to the latest regulations and instructions of the French army.
According to the new regulations, command of the army was entrusted to the commander-in-chief, who also controlled it through the main headquarters. The army's main headquarters was divided into four sections: the chief of the main staff; engineering; artillery; quartermaster's. The heads of the main headquarters departments were directly subordinate to the commander-in-chief. The chief of the main staff had predominant importance among them. The chief of the main staff was the second person in the army; all orders of the commander-in-chief were transmitted through him; he took command of the army in the event of illness or death of the commander-in-chief. The department of the chief of the main staff consisted of two parts: the quartermaster and the army duty department. The quartermaster general led the operational part of the army; the general on duty was in charge of issues related to the combat, logistics, military sanitary, military police and military judicial services.
In February 1812, the War Ministry formed the 1st and 2nd Western Armies from the troops located on the western border. In March, printed copies of the regulations were sent to the armies, and the formation of their headquarters began.
Allies
On July 18, 1812, Russia and Great Britain signed the Peace of Orebro, which ended the sluggish Anglo-Russian war that began after Russia joined the continental blockade. The Peace of Orebro restored friendly and trade relations based on the principle of “most favored nation” and provided for mutual assistance in the event of an attack by a third power. The English army was involved in battles with the French in Spain. Spain, having tied up 200-300 thousand French soldiers with partisan resistance, indirectly provided assistance to Russia. On July 8 (20), 1812, in Velikiye Luki, the plenipotentiary representative of the Russian government, R. A. Koshelev, signed an alliance agreement with the representative of the Spanish Supreme Junta, Zea de Bermudez.
Strategic plans of the parties before the start of hostilities
The goals of the Russian campaign for Napoleon were:
first of all, the tightening of the continental blockade of England;
the revival, in contrast to the Russian Empire, of the Polish independent state with the inclusion of the territories of Lithuania, Belarus and Ukraine (initially, Napoleon even defined the war as the Second Polish);
concluding a military alliance with Russia for a possible joint campaign in India.
Counting on Alexander to be the first to attack the Grand Duchy of Warsaw, Napoleon planned to quickly end the war by defeating the Russian army in a general battle on Polish-Lithuanian territory in the area of Vilna or Warsaw, where the population was anti-Russian. Napoleon's calculation was simple - the defeat of the Russian army in one or two battles would force Alexander I to accept his conditions.
On the eve of the Russian campaign, Napoleon declared to Metternich: “Triumph will be the lot of the more patient. I will open the campaign by crossing the Neman. I will finish it in Smolensk and Minsk. I'll stop there." Unlike the policies pursued in Europe, Napoleon did not set goals to change the political structure of Russia (in particular, he did not intend to free the peasants from serfdom).
After analyzing secret reports from the beginning of 1812, historian O.V. Sokolov concluded that Napoleon expected to quickly end the campaign by winning a large border battle. The retreat of the Russian army deep into Russia took him by surprise, forcing him to stay in Vilna for 18 days in indecision: the emperor had never allowed such hesitation before.
In memoirs written years, sometimes decades later, grandiose plans for the conquest of Moscow began to be attributed to Napoleon. Thus, they say that in a conversation with the French ambassador in Warsaw Pradt on the eve of the invasion, Napoleon said: “I am going to Moscow and in one or two battles I will finish everything. Emperor Alexander will be on his knees to ask for peace. I will burn Tula and disarm Russia.” Another statement of Napoleon is cited: “If I take Kyiv, I will take Russia by the feet; if I take possession of St. Petersburg, I will take her by the head; Having occupied Moscow, I will strike her in the heart.”
Strategic plans for a war with France - both defensive and offensive in nature (the latter included the capture of the Duchy of Warsaw and, possibly, Silesia, as well as Prussia (in other plans Prussia was considered a likely ally) - began to be developed in the Russian Empire from February 1810; on Currently, more than 30 different names of authors are known (only a few of whom, however, were directly involved in the development of strategic plans) and more than 40 documents of varying degrees of detail.
Long before the start of the war, the Russian command foresaw the possibility of a long, organized retreat in order to avoid the risk of losing the army in a decisive battle. The general principles of the retreat strategy were developed by the Prussian military theorist D. G. Bülow; in August 1810, the plan of Ludwig von Wolzogen, drawn up a year earlier at the suggestion of Eugene of Württemberg, was presented to Prince P.M. Volkonsky for consideration, which recommended the creation of a system of fortified strong points and a strategy for the retreat of two armies in diverging directions. In May 1811, Emperor Alexander I explained his attitude towards the upcoming battle to the French Ambassador to Russia, Armand Caulaincourt:
If Emperor Napoleon starts a war against me, then it is possible and even probable that he will beat us if we accept the battle, but this will not yet give him peace. ... We have an immense space behind us, and we will maintain a well-organized army. ... If the lot of arms decides the case against me, then I would rather retreat to Kamchatka than cede my provinces and sign treaties in my capital that are only a respite. The Frenchman is brave, but long hardships and bad climate tire and discourage him. Our climate and our winter will fight for us.
From the defensive plans presented to Russian Emperor Alexander I, the plan of General Pfuel was chosen. According to Pfuel's plan, it was supposed to conduct combat operations with three armies, one of the armies was supposed to hold the enemy from the front, and the others were to act from the flank and rear. It was planned that if the French launched an offensive against the 1st Army, it should retreat and defend from the Drissky fortified camp, while at that time the 2nd Army attacked the flank and rear of the advancing French. Active defensive actions of both armies on the French lines of communication were supposed to force the enemy to retreat, since, according to the author of the plan, he could not remain in the devastated territory for a long time. The 3rd Army, according to this plan, covered the flanks of the 2nd Army and the Kiev direction. During the war, Pfuel's plan was rejected as impossible in the conditions of modern maneuver warfare.
Other proposals regarding war strategy were also put forward. In particular, the commander of the 2nd Western Army, General Bagration, proposed an offensive plan against Napoleon, which provided for the advance of Russian troops to the Vistula line in the spring of 1812 with the capture of Warsaw. The Tsar did not approve of this plan, since by that time Napoleon had already concentrated 220 thousand soldiers in fortifications along the Russian border.
Napoleon's offensive (June - September 1812)
On May 9, 1812, Napoleon left Saint-Cloud for Dresden, where he met with the “allied” monarchs of Europe. From Dresden, the emperor went to the Great Army on the Neman River, which separated Prussia and Russia. On June 22, Napoleon addressed the troops with an appeal, in which he accused Russia of violating the Tilsit Agreement and called the attack on Russia the second Polish war. The appeal was included in the 2nd Bulletin of the Grand Army - these propaganda issues were published throughout the war.
On the evening of June 11 (23), 1812, a patrol of the Life Guards Cossack Regiment three miles up the Neman River, not far from Kovno (Lithuania), noticed a suspicious movement on the opposite bank. When it became completely dark, a company of French sappers crossed the river from an elevated and wooded bank to the Russian bank on boats and ferries, and the first shootout took place. After midnight on June 24, 1812, the crossing of French troops across the border Neman began across four bridges built above Kovno.
At 6 o'clock in the morning on June 12 (24), 1812, the vanguard of the French troops entered the Russian fortress of Kovno. On the evening of June 24, Emperor Alexander I was at Bennigsen’s ball in Vilna, where he was informed about Napoleon’s invasion.
The crossing of 220 thousand soldiers of the Great Army near Kovno took 4 days. The river was crossed by the 1st, 2nd, 3rd infantry corps, guards and cavalry.
The first clash with the Russian army (the Russian rearguard with Murat's cavalry attacking it) took place on June 25 near the village of Barbarishki (modern Babrishkes). The same skirmishes occurred at Rumšiški (modern Rumšiškės) and Poparcy (modern Papartsyai).
On June 17 (29) - June 18 (30), near Prena south of Kovno, another group (67 thousand soldiers: 4th and 6th infantry corps, cavalry) under the command of the Viceroy of Italy Eugene Beauharnais crossed the Neman. Almost simultaneously, on June 18 (30), even further south, near Grodno, the Neman crossed 4 corps (78-79 thousand soldiers: 5th, 7th, 8th infantry and 4th cavalry corps) under the overall command of the King of Westphalia, Jerome Bonaparte.
In the northern direction near Tilsit, the Neman crossed the 10th Corps of Marshal MacDonald. In the southern direction, from Warsaw across the Bug, a separate Austrian corps of General Schwarzenberg (30-34 thousand soldiers) began to invade.
On June 16 (28), Vilna was occupied. Napoleon, having arranged state affairs in occupied Lithuania, left the city following his troops only on July 4 (16).
From Neman to Smolensk
Northern direction
Napoleon aimed the 10th Corps (32 thousand) of Marshal MacDonald at St. Petersburg. First, the corps had to occupy Riga, and then, connecting with the 2nd Corps of Marshal Oudinot (28 thousand), move on. The basis of Macdonald's corps was the 20,000-strong Prussian corps under the command of General Gravert (later York).
Marshal MacDonald approached the fortifications of Riga, however, lacking siege artillery, he stopped at the distant approaches to the city. The military governor of Riga, General Essen, burned the outskirts and locked himself in the city with a strong garrison (18 thousand). Trying to support Oudinot, Macdonald captured the abandoned city of Dinaburg on the Western Dvina River and stopped active operations, waiting for siege artillery from East Prussia. The Prussians of MacDonald's corps avoided active combat clashes in this foreign war.
Marshal Oudinot, having occupied the city of Polotsk, decided to bypass from the north the separate corps of General Wittgenstein (25 thousand), allocated by the commander-in-chief of the 1st Army Barclay de Tolly during the retreat through Polotsk to defend the St. Petersburg direction. Fearing Oudinot's connection with Macdonald, Wittgenstein on July 18 (30) attacked Oudinot's corps near Klyastitsy, which was not expecting an attack and weakened by the march, threw it back to Polotsk and tried to capture the city on August 5 (17) - August 6 (18), but the corps of General Saint Syrah, promptly dispatched by Napoleon to support Oudinot's corps, helped repulse the attack and restore balance.
Marshals MacDonald and Oudinot were stuck in low-intensity fighting, remaining in place.
Central (Moscow) direction
Units of the 1st Western Army were scattered from the Baltic to Lida, the headquarters was in Vilna. The commander of the 1st Army was Infantry General Barclay de Tolly, his chief of staff was Major General A.P. Ermolov; Quartermaster General - Colonel of the Quartermaster Unit K.F. Tol.
Due to Napoleon's rapid advance, the scattered Russian corps faced the threat of being defeated piecemeal. Dokhturov's corps found itself in an operational environment, but was able to escape and arrive at the Sventsyany assembly point. The French cut off Dorokhov's cavalry detachment, which joined Bagration's army. After the 1st Army united, Barclay de Tolly began to gradually retreat to Vilna and further to Drissa.
On June 26, the army left Vilna and on July 10 arrived at the Drissky fortified camp, in which, according to Pfuel’s plan, the Russian army was supposed to exhaust the enemy. The generals managed to convince the tsar of the absurdity of this plan, and on July 17 the army retreated through Polotsk to Vitebsk, leaving Wittgenstein’s 1st Corps to defend St. Petersburg.
In Polotsk, the harm from Alexander I’s stay with the army became so obvious that at the beginning of July, the tsar’s closest confidants (A.S. Shishkov, A.A. Arakcheev and A.D. Balashov) convinced him to leave under the pretext of the need to be present in the capital for preparation of reserves.
The 2nd Western Army (up to 45 thousand) at the beginning of the invasion was located near Grodno (in the west of Belarus) about 150 km from the 1st Army. The 2nd Western Army was headed by P.I. Bagration, the position of chief of staff was held by Major General E.F. Saint-Prix, adjutant general of Alexander I; Quartermaster General - Major General M. S. Vistitsky 2nd.
Bagration tried to connect with the main 1st Army, but upon reaching Lida (100 km from Vilno), he realized that the French would not allow this. The 2nd Army retreated south. The Cossacks of Ataman Platov, covering the rear of the retreating army, successfully detained the French in the battles of Grodno and Mir. To cut off the 2nd Army from the main forces and destroy it, Napoleon sent Marshal Davout with a force of up to 50 thousand soldiers. Davout moved from Vilna to Minsk, which he occupied on July 8. Jerome Bonaparte with 4 corps also attacked Bagration from the west. Bagration, with rapid marches and successful rearguard battles, broke away from Jerome's troops and through Novogrudok, Nesvizh and Slutsk, bypassing Minsk from the south, moved to Bobruisk.
On July 19, the 2nd Army was in Bobruisk on the Berezina River, while Davout's corps on July 21 positioned its forward units in Mogilev. Bagration, approaching the Dnieper 60 kilometers below Mogilev, sent Raevsky’s corps on July 23 with the goal of pushing Davout away from Mogilev and taking a direct road to Vitebsk, where according to plans the Russian armies were to unite. As a result of the battle near Saltanovka, Raevsky delayed Davout’s advance east to Smolensk, but the path to Vitebsk was closed. Bagration was able to cross the Dnieper in the town of Novoye Bykhovo without interference on July 24-25 and headed towards Smolensk. Davout had no strength left to pursue the 2nd Army, while the group of Jerome Bonaparte (who had been removed from command by that time), hopelessly lagging behind the 2nd Army, was redirected by Napoleon to other directions.
On July 23, the 1st Army arrived in Vitebsk, where Barclay de Tolly wanted to wait for the 2nd Army. To prevent the advance of the French, he sent the 4th Corps of Osterman-Tolstoy to meet the enemy vanguard. On July 25-26, 26 versts from Vitebsk, a battle took place near Ostrovno. On July 27, Barclay de Tolly retreated from Vitebsk to Smolensk, having learned about the approach of Napoleon with the main forces and the impossibility of Bagration breaking through to Vitebsk.
On August 3, the 1st and 2nd Russian armies united near Smolensk, thus achieving their first strategic success. There was a short respite in the war; both sides were putting their troops in order, tired of continuous marches.
Upon reaching Vitebsk, Napoleon made a stop to give rest to the troops, upset after 400 km of advance. On August 13, after much hesitation, Napoleon set out from Vitebsk to Smolensk.
South direction
The 7th Saxon Corps under the command of General Rainier (17-22 thousand) was supposed to cover the right flank of Napoleon's main forces from the 3rd Russian Army under the command of General Tormasov (46 thousand people with 164 guns). Rainier took up a position along the Brest-Kobrin-Pinsk line, spreading out an already small body over 170 km. On July 27, Tormasov was surrounded by Kobrin, the Saxon garrison under the command of Klengel (up to 5 thousand) was completely defeated. Brest and Pinsk were also cleared of the French garrisons.
Realizing that the weakened Rainier would not be able to hold Tormasov, Napoleon decided not to attract General Schwarzenberg’s Austrian Corps (30 thousand) to the main direction and left it in the south against Tormasov. Rainier, having gathered his troops and linked up with Schwarzenberg, attacked Tormasov on August 12 at Gorodechny, forcing the Russians to retreat to Lutsk. The Saxons are mainly fighting in this direction, the Austrians are trying to limit themselves to artillery shelling and maneuvers.
Until the end of September, low-intensity fighting took place in the southern direction in a sparsely populated swampy area in the Lutsk region.
In addition to General Tormasov, in the southern direction there was the 2nd Russian reserve corps of General Ertel, formed in Mozyr and providing support to the blocked garrison of Bobruisk. To blockade Bobruisk, as well as to cover communications from Ertel, Napoleon left the Polish division of General Dombrowski (8 thousand) from the 5th Polish Corps.
From Smolensk to Moscow
After the unification of the Russian armies, the generals began to persistently demand from the commander-in-chief Barclay de Tolly a general battle. Taking advantage of the scattered position of the French corps, Barclay de Tolly decided to defeat them one by one and marched on August 8 to Rudnya, where Marshal Murat’s cavalry was quartered.
However, Napoleon, taking advantage of the slow advance of the Russian army, gathered his corps into a fist and tried to go to Barclay de Tolly’s rear, bypassing his left flank from the south, for which he crossed the Dnieper River west of Smolensk. On the path of the vanguard of the French army was the 27th division of General Neverovsky, covering the left flank of the Russian army near Krasnoye. Neverovsky's stubborn resistance gave time to transfer General Raevsky's corps to Smolensk.
By August 16, Napoleon approached Smolensk with 180 thousand. Bagration instructed General Raevsky (15 thousand soldiers), into whose 7th corps the remnants of Neverovsky’s division joined, to defend Smolensk. Barclay de Tolly was against a battle that was unnecessary in his opinion, but at that time there was actual dual command in the Russian army. At 6 a.m. on August 16, Napoleon began the assault on the city with a march. The stubborn battle for Smolensk continued until the morning of August 18, when Barclay de Tolly withdrew his troops from the burning city to avoid a big battle without a chance of victory. Barclay had 76 thousand, another 34 thousand (Bagration’s army) covered the retreat route of the Russian army to Dorogobuzh, which Napoleon could cut with a roundabout maneuver (similar to the one that failed at Smolensk).
Marshal Ney pursued the retreating army. On August 19, in a bloody battle near Valutina Gora, the Russian rearguard detained Marshal Ney, who suffered significant losses. Napoleon sent General Junot to go behind the Russian rear in a roundabout way, but he failed to complete the task, and the Russian army left in perfect order towards Moscow to Dorogobuzh. The battle for Smolensk, which destroyed a large city, marked the development of a nationwide war between the Russian people and the enemy, which was immediately felt by both ordinary French suppliers and Napoleon’s marshals. Settlements along the route of the French army were burned, the population left as far as possible. Immediately after the Battle of Smolensk, Napoleon made a disguised peace proposal to Tsar Alexander I, so far from a position of strength, but did not receive an answer.
Reorganization of command and control of the Russian army
Having left the army, the emperor did not bother to appoint a general commander-in-chief. Relations between Bagration and Barclay de Tolly after the retreat from Smolensk became more and more tense every day. The lack of unity of command could lead to catastrophic consequences. To resolve the issue, an Emergency Committee was established, and on August 17, at its meeting, Infantry General Kutuzov was unanimously approved as Commander-in-Chief. On August 17 (29), Kutuzov received the army in Tsarevo-Zaimishche. On this day the French entered Vyazma. Kutuzov formed his headquarters using the headquarters of the Western armies. Cavalry General Bennigsen was appointed to the post of chief of the main headquarters of Kutuzov, Vistitsky became the quartermaster general of all armies, Tol became his assistant, and Colonel P. S. Kaisarov became the general on duty.
Borodino
Continuing the general strategic line of his predecessor, Kutuzov could not avoid a general battle for political and moral reasons. By September 3, the Russian army retreated to the village of Borodino. Further retreat meant the surrender of Moscow. Kutuzov decided to give a general battle. To gain time to prepare fortifications on the Borodino field, Kutuzov ordered General Gorchakov to detain the enemy near the village of Shevardino, where a pentagonal redoubt was erected. The battle for the Shevardinsky redoubt lasted all day on September 5, only by midnight Kompan's division broke into its ramparts.
On August 26 (September 7) near the village of Borodino (125 km west of Moscow), the largest battle of the Patriotic War of 1812 took place between the Russian and French armies. The numbers of armies were comparable - 130-135 thousand for Napoleon versus 110-130 thousand for Kutuzov. The Russian army lacked weapons - there were no guns to arm 31 thousand militia from Moscow and Smolensk. The warriors were given pikes, but Kutuzov did not use people as “cannon fodder” (the warriors performed auxiliary functions, for example, carrying out the wounded).
In fact, the battle was an assault by French troops on a line of Russian fortifications (flashes, redoubts and lunettes). On both sides, both in defense and in attacking fortifications, artillery was widely used. Around noon, during the eighth attack of Bagration's flushes, Napoleon moved 45 thousand of his soldiers and 400 guns against 18 thousand soldiers and 300 guns of Bagration - on a front of 1.5 km, which in total on both sides gives 470 guns on 1 km of front. As M. Adams notes, “Borodino marked the beginning of the era of artillery.”
After a bloody 12-hour battle, the French, at the cost of 30 - 34 thousand killed and wounded, pushed back the left flank and center of the Russian positions, but were unable to develop the offensive. The Russian army also suffered heavy losses (40 - 45 thousand killed and wounded). There were almost no prisoners on either side. On September 8, Kutuzov ordered a retreat to Mozhaisk with the firm intention of preserving the army.
Military Council in Fili
On September 1 (13), the Russian army camped in front of Moscow: the right flank of the army was near the village of Fili, the center between the villages of Troitsky and Volynsky, the left flank in front of the village of Vorobyov. The rearguard of the army was located on the Setun River. The length of the front line was about four kilometers. Communication between army units was greatly hampered by impassable ravines and the Karpovka River. Having examined this position from Poklonnaya Hill, the commander-in-chief and other military leaders declared it unacceptable for battle.
At 5 o'clock on the same day, the Military Council met in the house of the Filyov peasant A. Frolov, the exact number of participants of which is unknown. According to the recollections of war participants, the following generals were invited to the council: M. B. Barclay de Tolly, L. L. Bennigsen, D. S. Dokhturov, A. P. Ermolov, P. P. Konovnitsyn, A. I. Osterman -Tolstoy, N.N. Raevsky, F.P. Uvarov and Colonel K.F. Tol. The duty general P.S. Kaisarov was also present at the council. One question was discussed - to give battle near Moscow, or to leave the city without a fight.
M.B. Barclay de Tolly pointed out the necessity of leaving Moscow to save the army: “Having saved Moscow, Russia will not be saved from a cruel, ruinous war. But saving the army does not yet destroy the hopes of the fatherland.” L. L. Bennigsen insisted on the battle, and the majority of the meeting participants leaned towards his side. The final decision was made by M.I. Kutuzov: “As long as the army exists and is able to resist the enemy, until then we will retain the hope of successfully completing the war, but when the army is destroyed, Moscow and Russia will perish. I order you to retreat." Kutuzov interrupted the meeting and ordered a retreat through Moscow along the Ryazan road.
After Kutuzov’s advice, according to the recollections of those close to him, he slept poorly, walked for a long time and said the famous: “Well, I’ll bring the damned French... they will eat horse meat.” Towards the evening of September 14, Napoleon entered empty Moscow.
Surrender of Moscow
On September 14, Napoleon occupied Moscow without a fight. Marshal Mortier was appointed military governor, Duronel was appointed commandant of the fortress and city, and Lesseps was appointed “intendant of the city of Moscow and the Moscow province” (civil authority). Lesseps “chose”, and Napoleon approved, 22 people from the Russian population, who received the name of the municipality, which had no power.
Already on the night of September 14-15, the city was engulfed in fire, which by the night of September 15-16 intensified so much that Napoleon was forced to leave the Kremlin.
Up to 400 lower-class townspeople were shot by a French court-martial on suspicion of arson.
There are several versions of the fire:
organized arson when leaving the city (usually associated with the name of the Governor General of Moscow Rostopchin);
arson by Russian spies (several Russians were shot by the French on such charges) and criminals deliberately released from Moscow prisons by Rostopchin;
uncontrolled actions of the occupiers, an accidental fire, the spread of which was facilitated by the general chaos in the abandoned city.
The fire had several sources, so it is possible that all versions are true to one degree or another.
The fire raged until September 18 and destroyed most of Moscow. Of the 30 thousand houses that were in Moscow before the invasion, “hardly 5 thousand” remained after Napoleon left the city.
Three attempts by Napoleon to achieve peace
Napoleon viewed the capture of Moscow as the acquisition, first of all, of an important political, rather than military, position. From here Napoleon discusses the further plan of the military campaign, in particular the campaign against St. Petersburg. This campaign was feared at the St. Petersburg court and in the royal family. But Napoleon’s marshals objected; they considered this plan impracticable - “to go towards winter, to the north” with a reduced army, having Kutuzov in the rear, was unthinkable. Napoleon did not defend this plan.
Also from Moscow, Napoleon made attempts to make peace with Alexander I.
On September 18, Napoleon, through the head of the Orphanage, Major General Ivan Akinfievich Tutolmin, conveyed that he respected Alexander in the old way and would like to make peace. Napoleon, as before, intended to demand the annexation of Lithuania, confirmation of the blockade and a military alliance with France.
September 20. The next attempt was made two days later. A letter offering peace was delivered to Alexander through I. A. Yakovlev (father of A. I. Herzen). There was no response to Tutolmin’s report or Napoleon’s personal letter to Alexander.
On October 4, Napoleon sent General Lauriston to Kutuzov in Tarutino for passage to Alexander I with a peace proposal: “I need peace, I need it absolutely at any cost, save only honor.” On October 5, Lauriston had a half-hour meeting with Field Marshal Kutuzov, after which Prince Volkonsky was sent to Alexander I with a report about Napoleon’s proposal, to which Napoleon did not wait for an answer from Alexander.
People's War against Napoleon
Initially, with the news of the offensive of Napoleonic troops, this information was received ambiguously among the common people. In particular, serious collaborationist sentiments arose, mainly among serfs and courtyard people. Rumors spread that Napoleon wanted to free the peasants, give them freedom and give them land. Already during the military campaign, there were frequent attacks by peasant detachments on Russian government troops; in many areas, the serfs themselves caught the landowners hiding in the forests and brought them to the French camp.
The advance of the French army deep into Russia, the increase in violence against the population, fires in Smolensk and Moscow, the decline in discipline in Napoleon’s army and the transformation of a significant part of it into a gang of marauders and robbers led to growing resistance from the Russian population. Guerrilla warfare and the organization of militia began.
Army partisan units
From June to August 1812, Napoleon's army, pursuing the retreating Russian armies, covered about 1,200 kilometers from the Neman to Moscow. As a result, her communication lines were greatly stretched. The command of the Russian army decided to create flying partisan detachments to operate in the enemy’s rear and communication lines, in order to impede his supply. The most famous, but far from the only commanders of the flying squads were Denis Davydov, Alexander Seslavin, Alexander Figner. Army partisan detachments received full support from the peasants.
Peasant partisan units
Russian soldiers who escaped from captivity and volunteers from among the local population took the initiative to organize self-defense and form partisan detachments. Patriotism as a sense of belonging to a nation was alien to the peasants, but violence and robbery by Napoleonic troops caused guerrilla warfare. Ermolai Chetvertakov, Semyon Shubin, Gerasim Kurin and Yegor Stulov, Vasilisa Kozhina, Samus, Praskovya and other commanders from among the peasants, nobles and townspeople were able to form combat-ready partisan detachments. The guerrilla war was accompanied by unprecedented violence and atrocities on both sides. During its stay in Moscow alone, the French army lost more than 25 thousand people from partisan actions.
The course of the war was significantly influenced by the refusal of the peasants to supply the enemy with provisions and fodder. In the fall of 1812, the chief of police of the Berezinsky subprefecture, Dombrovsky, wrote: “I am ordered to deliver everything, but there is nowhere to take it from... There is a lot of grain in the fields that was not harvested due to the disobedience of the peasants.” Peasant resistance led to interruptions in supplies to the Great Army, whose supply system was based largely on local food procurement.
Militia formation
The partisans formed, as it were, the first ring of encirclement around Moscow, occupied by the French. The second ring consisted of militias. Back on July 6, 1812, Alexander I issued a manifesto ordering the nobles to form a militia from their serfs, join it themselves and choose a commander over themselves. On the same day as the manifesto, an appeal was issued to “Our Mother Capital, Moscow,” containing an appeal to Muscovites to organize a militia. In total, during the War of 1812, more than 400 thousand militias were deployed, of which three districts were formed: the 1st - for the defense of Moscow, the 2nd - for the defense of St. Petersburg and the 3rd - reserve. The militia warriors were organized into foot and horse regiments and squads, divided into battalions, hundreds and dozens.
After the surrender of Moscow, Kutuzov obviously avoided a major battle, the army accumulated strength. During this time, the people collected 60 million rubles to wage the war. In the Russian provinces (Yaroslavl, Vladimir, Tula, Kaluga, Tver and others) a militia of 205 thousand was recruited, in Ukraine - 75 thousand. Only 90 thousand guns were found to arm the militia, and about 50 thousand guns were purchased in England. Partisans and militias surrounded Moscow in a tight ring, threatening to turn Napoleon's strategic encirclement into a tactical one.
Tarutino maneuver
On September 2 (14), while the French were entering Moscow (at about 5 o'clock in the afternoon), Miloradovich's rearguard was leaving Moscow. Sebastiani's French cavalry stopped at Miloradovich's request and allowed the last Russian troops and convoys to pass without a fight. On September 4 (16), the army retreated to the Borovsky transport and moved to the right bank of the Moscow River. In addition to the army, more than 40 thousand convoys and crews of Moscow residents crossed through the Borovsky transportation. The army's main headquarters was located in Kulakovo. On September 5 (17), Kutuzov, moving along the right bank of the Pakhra, crossed the Kashirskaya road, on the 6th he reached Podolsk, and on the 9th - the village of Krasnaya Pakhra on the old Kaluga road. Until September 14 (26), Napoleon did not know where the Russian army was. The Cossacks, retreating along the Ryazan road, deceived and carried away Murat's detachment along two marches, to Bronnitsy. The French lost sight of the Russian army, and only the appearance of the Cossacks on the Mozhaisk road prompted Napoleon to send Józef Poniatowski’s corps to Podolsk on the night of September 10 (22).
The location of the Russian army near Krasnaya Pakhra was covered by: Miloradovich's vanguard - near the village of Desna, Raevsky's corps - near the village of Lukovnya, between the Kaluga and Tula roads, Vasilchikov's cavalry - near Podolsk.
From Krasnaya Pakhra, by October 2, Kutuzov withdrew the army further south to the village of Tarutino, closer to Kaluga. Being on the old Kaluga road, the Russian army covered Tula, Kaluga, Bryansk and the grain-producing southern provinces, and threatened the enemy rear between Moscow and Smolensk.
The English General R. Wilson, who was at the headquarters of the Russian army, pushed the Russian command to a decisive battle. Not yielding to pressure, Kutuzov, in a conversation with L. L. Benningsen, directly stated: “We will never, my dear, agree with you. You think only about the benefit of England, but for me, if this island goes to the bottom of the sea today, I won’t groan.”
In Moscow, Napoleon found himself in a trap; it was not possible to spend the winter in a city devastated by fire: foraging outside the city was not going well, the extended communications of the French were very vulnerable, and the army was beginning to disintegrate. Napoleon began to prepare to retreat to winter quarters somewhere between the Dnieper and Dvina.
On October 18, Russian troops attacked a French barrier under the command of Marshal Murat near Tarutino, which was monitoring the Russian army. Having lost up to 4 thousand soldiers and 38 guns, Murat retreated. The Tarutino battle became a landmark event, marking the transition of the initiative in the war to the Russian army.
Napoleon's retreat (October - December 1812)
Napoleon's main army cut deep into Russia, like a wedge. At the time when Napoleon entered Moscow, the army of General Wittgenstein, held by the French corps of Marshals Saint-Cyr and Oudinot, hung over his left flank in the north in the Polotsk region. Napoleon's right flank trampled near the borders of the Russian Empire in Belarus. The army of General Tormasov connected with its presence the Austrian corps of General Schwarzenberg and the 7th corps of General Rainier. French garrisons along the Smolensk road guarded the communication line and Napoleon's rear.
Strategic plans of the parties after the retreat from Moscow
There are no surviving documents with Napoleon's exact plans for continuing the campaign. All plans are limited to vague phrases that the army will winter somewhere between “Smolensk, Mogilev, Minsk and Vitebsk. ... Moscow no longer represents a military position. I’m going to look for another position from where it will be more profitable to launch a new campaign, the action of which will be directed towards St. Petersburg or Kyiv.”
Kutuzov assumed that Napoleon would most likely retreat to the south or along the Smolensk road. The southwestern direction increasingly appeared in the testimony of prisoners and deserters. Kutuzov placed under surveillance all possible escape routes for Napoleon's army from Moscow. At the same time, the defense of the northern borders of the Volyn, Kyiv, Chernigov and Kaluga provinces was strengthened.
In December 1812, Kutuzov presented a report to Alexander I, in which he gave a strategic overview of the campaign from the day the army retreated to the Tarutino camp until the expulsion of enemy troops from Russia. Referring to Napoleon’s plans after speaking from Moscow, Kutuzov wrote that he was going to “go along the Borovskaya road to Kaluga, and would he be able to defeat us at Maly Yaroslavets, knocking us over the Oka, and settle down in our richest provinces for winter quarters.” Kutuzov's foresight was manifested in the fact that with his Tarutino maneuver he anticipated the movement of French troops to Smolensk through Kaluga.
From Moscow to Maloyaroslavets
On October 19, the French army (110 thousand) with a huge convoy began to leave Moscow along the Old Kaluga Road. Napoleon planned to get to the nearest large food base in Smolensk through an area not devastated by the war - through Kaluga.
The road to Kaluga was blocked by Napoleon's army, positioned near the village of Tarutino on the Old Kaluga Road. Due to the lack of horses, the French artillery fleet was reduced, and large cavalry formations practically disappeared. Not wanting to break through a fortified position with a weakened army, Napoleon turned around the village of Troitsky (modern Troitsk) onto the New Kaluga Road (modern Kiev Highway) to bypass Tarutino. However, Kutuzov transferred the army to Maloyaroslavets, cutting off the French retreat along the New Kaluga Road.
On October 24, the battle of Maloyaroslavets took place. The city changed hands eight times. In the end, the French managed to capture Maloyaroslavets, but Kutuzov took a fortified position outside the city, which Napoleon did not dare to storm. By October 22, Kutuzov's army consisted of 97 thousand regular troops, 20 thousand Cossacks, 622 guns and more than 10 thousand militia warriors. Napoleon had up to 70 thousand combat-ready soldiers at hand, the cavalry had practically disappeared, and the artillery was much weaker than the Russian one. The course of the war was now dictated by the Russian army.
On October 26, Napoleon ordered a retreat north to Borovsk-Vereya-Mozhaisk. In the battles for Maloyaroslavets, the Russian army solved a major strategic problem - it thwarted the plan for the French troops to break through to Ukraine and forced the enemy to retreat along the Old Smolensk Road, which they had destroyed. From Mozhaisk, the French army resumed its movement towards Smolensk along the road along which it advanced on Moscow.
From Maloyaroslavets to Berezina
From Maloyaroslavets to the village of Krasnoye (45 km west of Smolensk), Napoleon was pursued by the vanguard of the Russian army under the command of General Miloradovich. General Platov's Cossacks and partisans attacked the retreating French from all sides, greatly complicating the supply of the army. The main army of Commander-in-Chief Kutuzov moved south parallel to Napoleon.
On November 1, Napoleon passed Vyazma. On November 3, the Russian vanguard severely battered the closing corps of the French in the battle of Vyazma.
On November 8, Napoleon entered Smolensk, where he spent 5 days waiting for the stragglers. Napoleon had 40-45 thousand soldiers with 127 guns at his disposal in Smolensk, and about the same number of unfit soldiers who were wounded and lost their weapons. Units of the French army, thinned out on the march from Moscow, entered Smolensk for a whole week with the hope of rest and food. There were no large supplies of food in the city, and what there was was plundered by crowds of uncontrollable soldiers. Napoleon ordered the shooting of the army quartermaster Sioff, who encountered resistance from the peasants and failed to organize the collection of food. The second intendant, Villeblanche, was saved from execution only by the story about the elusive partisan leader Praskovya and the disobedience of the peasants.
On November 9, the combined forces of the partisan detachments of Denis Davydov, Seslavin, Figner and the Orlov-Denisov cavalry detachment of 3,300 people with 4 guns defeated the French brigade of General Augereau in the battle of Lyakhovo, 60 officers and about 1.5 thousand Napoleonic soldiers surrendered.
Napoleon's strategic position was deteriorating: Admiral Chichagov's Danube Army was approaching from the south, General Wittgenstein was advancing from the north, whose vanguard captured Vitebsk on November 7, depriving the French of the food reserves accumulated there.
On November 14, Napoleon and the guard moved from Smolensk following the vanguard corps. Marshal Ney's corps, which was in the rearguard, left Smolensk only on November 17. The column of French troops was greatly extended. Kutuzov took advantage of this circumstance, sending the vanguard under the command of Miloradovich to cut across the corps of Eugene Beauharnais, Davout and Ney in the area of the village of Krasnoye. On November 15-18, as a result of the battles near the Red Army, Napoleon’s troops managed to break through, losing many soldiers and most of the artillery.
The Danube Army of Admiral Chichagov (24 thousand) liberated Minsk on November 16, depriving Napoleon of its largest rear center. Moreover, on November 21, Chichagov's vanguard liberated the city of Borisov, where Napoleon planned to cross the Berezina River. The vanguard corps of Marshal Oudinot drove Chichagov from Borisov to the western bank of the Berezina, however, the Russian admiral with a strong army guarded possible crossing points.
On November 24, Napoleon approached the Berezina, breaking away from the pursuing armies of Wittgenstein and Kutuzov.
From Berezina to Neman
On November 25, through a series of skillful maneuvers, Napoleon managed to divert the attention of Admiral Chichagov to the city of Borisov and south of Borisov. Chichagov believed that Napoleon intended to cross in these places in order to take a shortcut to the road to Minsk and then head to join the Austrian allies. Meanwhile, the French built 2 bridges north of Borisov, along which on November 26-27 Napoleon crossed to the right (western) bank of the Berezina River, discarding the weak Russian guards.
Realizing the mistake, Admiral Chichagov unsuccessfully attacked Napoleon with his main forces on November 28 on the right bank. On the left bank, the French rearguard, defending the crossing, was attacked by the approaching corps of General Wittgenstein. The main army of Commander-in-Chief Kutuzov fell behind.
Without waiting for the entire huge crowd of French stragglers, consisting of the wounded, frostbitten, those who had lost their weapons and civilians, to cross, Napoleon ordered the bridges to be burned on the morning of November 29. The main result of the battle on the Berezina was that Napoleon avoided complete defeat in conditions of significant superiority of Russian forces. In the memories of the French, the crossing of the Berezina occupies no less place than the largest Battle of Borodino.
Having lost 21 thousand people at the crossing, Napoleon, with 9 thousand soldiers remaining under arms, moved towards Vilna, joining along the way French divisions operating in other directions. The army was accompanied by a large crowd of unfit people, mainly soldiers from the allied states who had lost their weapons.
On December 5, Napoleon left the army to Murat and Ney and went to Paris to recruit new soldiers to replace those killed in Russia. On December 16, the last, 29th bulletin of the Grande Armée was published, in which Napoleon was forced to indirectly acknowledge the scale of the losses, attributing them to the premature onset of unusually severe frosts. The bulletin caused shock in French society.
In fact, unusually severe frosts hit only during the crossing of the Berezina. Continuing in the following days, they finally exterminated the French, already weakened by hunger. The better-equipped Russian troops continued the pursuit, despite the cold. The vanguard of Kutuzov's troops, under the command of Ataman Platov, approached Vilna the day after the French entered there. Unable to defend the city and having lost about 20 thousand people in Vilna, Ney and Murat continued their retreat to the Neman River, which divided Russia with Prussia and the Duchy of Warsaw.
The size of the Napoleonic army when moving into Russia (beige) and back (black stripes). The width of the stripes reflects the size of the army. The bottom of the graph shows the behavior of air temperature on the Reaumur scale after the Great Army left Moscow (from right to left).
On December 14, in Kovno, the pitiful remnants of the Great Army, numbering 1,600 people, crossed the Neman River to the Duchy of Warsaw, and then to Prussia. Later they were joined by remnants of troops from other directions. The Patriotic War of 1812 ended with the almost complete destruction of the invading Great Army.
The last stage of the war was commented on by the impartial observer Clausewitz:
The Russians rarely got ahead of the French, although they had many opportunities for this; when they managed to get ahead of the enemy, they released him every time; in all battles the French remained victorious; the Russians gave them the opportunity to accomplish the impossible; but if we sum it up, it turns out that the French army ceased to exist, and the entire campaign ended in complete success for the Russians, with the exception that they failed to capture Napoleon himself and his closest collaborators...
Northern direction
After the 2nd battle for Polotsk (October 18-20), which took place 2 months after the 1st, Marshal Saint-Cyr retreated south to Chashniki, bringing General Wittgenstein’s advancing army dangerously closer to Napoleon’s rear line. These days Napoleon began his retreat from Moscow. Marshal Victor's 9th Corps, which arrived in September as Napoleon's reserve from Europe, was immediately sent to help from Smolensk. The combined forces of the French reached 36 thousand soldiers, which approximately corresponded to the forces of Wittgenstein (30 thousand people). A counter-battle took place on October 31 near Chashniki, as a result of which the French retreated to the south.
Vitebsk remained unprotected; a detachment from the army of General Wittgenstein took the city by storm on November 7, capturing 300 garrison soldiers and food supplies prepared for Napoleon’s retreating army. On November 14, Marshal Victor, in the area of the village of Smolyany, tried to push Wittgenstein back across the Dvina River, however, to no avail, and the parties maintained their positions until Napoleon approached the Berezina River. Then Marshal Victor, joining the main army, retreated to the Berezina as Napoleon's rearguard, holding back Wittgenstein's pressure.
In the Baltic states near Riga, a positional war was fought with rare Russian forays against the corps of Marshal MacDonald. The Finnish corps of General Steingel (12 thousand) came on September 20 to help the garrison of Riga, however, after a successful sortie on September 29 against the French siege artillery, Steingel was transferred to Wittgenstein in Polotsk to the theater of the main military operations. On November 15, Marshal MacDonald, in turn, successfully attacked Russian positions, almost destroying a large Russian detachment.
Marshal MacDonald's 10th Corps began to retreat from Riga towards Prussia only on December 19, after the remnants of Napoleon's main army had left Russia. On December 26, MacDonald's troops had to engage in battle with the vanguard of General Wittgenstein. On December 30, Russian General Dibich concluded an armistice agreement with the commander of the Prussian corps, General York, known at the place of signing as the Taurogen Convention. Thus, Macdonald lost his main forces, he had to hastily retreat through East Prussia.
South direction
On September 18, Admiral Chichagov's 38,000-strong army approached the southern front near Lutsk from the Danube. The combined forces of Admiral Chichagov and General Tormasov (more than 60 thousand) attacked the Austrian General Schwarzenberg (40 thousand), forcing him to retreat to the Duchy of Warsaw in mid-October. Admiral Chichagov, who took over the main command, gave the troops a 2-week rest, after which on October 27 he moved from Brest-Litovsk to Minsk with 24 thousand soldiers, leaving General Saken with a 27 thousand-strong corps against the Austrians.
General Schwarzenberg tried to pursue Chichagov, bypassing the positions of Sacken and hiding from his troops with the Saxon corps of General Rainier. Rainier was unable to hold off Saken's superior forces, and Schwarzenberg was forced to help him. With their joint forces, Rainier and Schwarzenberg forced Sacken to retreat south of Brest-Litovsk, however, as a result, Chichagov’s army broke through to Napoleon’s rear and occupied Minsk on November 16, and on November 21 approached the city of Borisov on the Berezina, where the retreating Napoleon planned to cross.
On November 27, Schwarzenberg, by order of Napoleon, moved to Minsk, but stopped in Slonim, from where on December 14 he retreated through Bialystok to the Duchy of Warsaw.
Results of the Patriotic War of 1812
Immediate results of the war
The main result of the Patriotic War of 1812 was the almost complete destruction of Napoleon's Grand Army.
According to the calculations of the military historian Clausewitz, the army of the invasion of Russia, together with reinforcements during the war, numbered 610 thousand soldiers, including 50 thousand soldiers from Austria and Prussia. According to the Prussian official Auerswald, by December 21, 1812, 255 generals, 5,111 officers, 26,950 lower ranks had passed through East Prussia from the Great Army, “all in a very pitiful condition.” To these 30 thousand must be added approximately 6 thousand soldiers (returned to the French army) from the corps of General Rainier and Marshal MacDonald, operating in the northern and southern directions. Many of those who returned to Königsberg, according to Count Segur, died of illness upon reaching safe territory.
The surviving officers formed the backbone of Napoleon's new army, recruited in 1813.
Thus, Napoleon lost about 580 thousand soldiers in Russia. These losses, according to T. Lenz’s calculations, include 200 thousand killed, from 150 to 190 thousand prisoners, about 130 thousand deserters who fled to their homeland (mainly from among the Prussian, Austrian, Saxon and Westphalian troops, but there were also examples among French soldiers), about 60 thousand more fugitives were sheltered by Russian peasants, townspeople and nobles. Of the 47 thousand guards who entered Russia with the emperor, six months later only a few hundred soldiers remained. Over 1,200 guns were lost in Russia.
The historian of the mid-19th century Bogdanovich calculated the replenishment of the Russian armies during the war according to the statements of the Military Scientific Archive of the General Staff. The total loss by December 1812 was 210 thousand soldiers. Of these, according to Bogdanovich, up to 40 thousand returned to duty. The losses of the corps operating in secondary directions and the militias could be approximately the same 40 thousand people. In general, Bogdanovich estimated the losses of the Russian army at 210 thousand soldiers and militias.
In January 1813, the “Overseas Campaign of the Russian Army” began - the fighting moved to the territory of Germany and France. In October 1813, Napoleon was defeated in the Battle of Leipzig, and in April 1814 he abdicated the throne of France (see War of the Sixth Coalition).
Reasons for Napoleon's defeat
Among the reasons for Napoleon's defeat in his Russian campaign, the most often cited are:
popular participation in the war and mass heroism of Russian soldiers and officers;
the length of Russia's territory and harsh climatic conditions;
military leadership talent of the commander-in-chief of the Russian army Kutuzov and other generals.
The main reason for Napoleon's defeat was a nationwide upsurge in defense of the fatherland. As D. Lieven shows, the people's war was not only spontaneous, but also ideologically justified “from above” (and even before the start of the war). In the unity of the Russian army with the people we must look for the source of its power in 1812.
The Russian army's abandonment of a pitched battle on the border and retreat deep into the vast territories of the Russian Empire led to "a change in plans that forced Napoleon to advance further, beyond the effective limits of his supply system." The stubborn resistance of the Russian troops and the ability of the Russian commanders M.B. Barclay de Tolly and M.I. Kutuzov to preserve the army did not allow Napoleon to win the war by winning one big battle.
As they moved away from the Niemen, Napoleonic army was forced to rely more and more on foraging rather than on a system of pre-prepared stores. In conditions of the large stretch of supply lines, the decisive role was played by the indiscipline of the French foraging teams, staffed with low-quality recruits and conscripts, and the resistance of the Russian people to the enemy by concealing food and fodder, the armed struggle of partisans with French foragers and the interception of enemy convoys (the so-called asymmetrical war) . The combination of these reasons led to the collapse of the French system of supplying troops with food and fodder and ultimately to famine and the transformation of most of the army into an incapable crowd in which everyone dreamed only of personal salvation.
At the final stage of the war, in December immediately after the Berezina, this depressing picture was aggravated by frost below −20 ° C, which completely demoralized Napoleon’s army. The defeat was completed by the Russian army, which, as Clausewitz put it, continued its retreat and finally brought the enemy to the border again:
In Russia, you can play “cat and mouse” with your enemy and, thus, continuing to retreat, in the end you can again bring the enemy to the border. This figurative expression... reflects mainly the spatial factor and the benefits of gigantic extensions, which do not allow the attacker to cover the traversed space with a simple advance and strategically take possession of it.
Long-term consequences of the war
The defeat of Napoleon in Russia allowed the international coalition, in which Russia played the main role, to crush the French Empire. The victory over Napoleon raised the international prestige of Russia as never before, which played a decisive role at the Congress of Vienna and in the following decades exercised a decisive influence on European affairs. At the same time, the strengthening of Russia's foreign policy was not supported by the development of its internal structure. Although the victory inspired and united the entire Russian society, military successes did not lead to a change in the socio-economic structure of Russian life. Many peasants who were soldiers and militiamen in the Russian army marched victoriously across Europe and saw that serfdom was abolished everywhere. The peasantry expected significant changes, which did not materialize. Russian serfdom continued to exist after 1812. Some historians are inclined to believe that at that time all the socio-economic conditions that would immediately lead to its collapse were not yet present. However, a sharp surge in peasant uprisings and the formation of political opposition among the progressive nobility, which followed immediately after the hostilities, refute this view.
It is impossible not to pay attention to the fact that, in fact, the victory over Napoleonic France led to the restoration of reactionary regimes in Europe and the abolition of many democratic initiatives in social life. And feudal imperial Russia played a key role in all this. The Holy Alliance, which arose soon after the war, created on the initiative and under the patronage of Emperor Alexander I, began to actively suppress any manifestations of national independence, civil and religious freedom in European states.
The victory in the Patriotic War caused not only a rise in the national spirit, but also a desire for free thought, which ultimately led to the Decembrist uprising in 1825. A. A. Bestuzhev wrote to Nicholas I from the Peter and Paul Fortress: “... Napoleon invaded Russia, and then the Russian people first felt their strength; It was then that a feeling of independence, first political, and subsequently popular, awakened in all hearts. This is the beginning of free thought in Russia.”
Not only the Decembrists are linked with 1812; the idea was expressed long ago: “without the twelfth year there would have been no Pushkin.” The entire Russian culture and national identity received a powerful impetus in the year of the Napoleonic invasion. According to A.I. Herzen, from the point of view of the creative activity of broad layers of society, “the true history of Russia is revealed only by 1812; everything that happened before was just a preface.”
Many former prisoners of war from Napoleonic Grand Army after the Patriotic War of 1812 remained on Russian territory and accepted Russian citizenship. An example is the several thousand “Orenburg French” who were enrolled in the Cossacks of the Orenburg Army. V. D. Dandeville, the son of the former French officer Désiré d’Andeville, subsequently became a Russian general and ataman of the Ural Cossack army. Many of the captured Poles who served in Napoleon's army were enlisted in the Siberian Cossacks. Soon after the end of the campaigns of 1812-1814. these Poles were given the right to return to their homeland. But many of them, having already married Russians, did not want to take advantage of this right and remained among the Siberian Cossacks forever, later receiving the ranks of police officers and even officers. Many of them, possessing a completely European education, were appointed teachers at the Cossack military school that opened soon after (the future cadet corps). Later, the descendants of these Poles completely merged with the rest of the population of the army, becoming completely Russian, both in appearance and language, and in faith and the Russian spirit. Only surviving surnames like: Svarovsky, Yanovsky, Kostyletsky, Yadrovsky, Legchinsky, Dabshynsky, Stabrovsky, Lyaskovsky, Edomsky, Zhagulsky and many others show that the ancestors of the Cossacks bearing these surnames were once Poles.
The Patriotic War of 1812 became part of the historical memory of the Russian people. According to the Russian historian, literary critic and publisher P. I. Bartenev: “One has only to read the description of the Patriotic War, so that not only those who love Russia will love it, but those who love it will love it even more passionately, even more sincerely and thank God that such is Russia.”
During the Great Patriotic War of 1941-1945, the memory of the heroes of 1812, among other things, helped to overcome the loss of morale in the troops during the defeats and retreats at the initial stage of the invasion of Nazi Germany and its European allies in the fascist bloc on the Soviet Union.
Memory of the War of 1812
On August 30, 1814, Emperor Alexander I issued the following manifesto: “December 25, the day of the Nativity of Christ, will henceforth be a day of thanksgiving celebration under the name in the church circle: the Nativity of our Savior Jesus Christ and the remembrance of the deliverance of the Church and the Russian Power from the invasion of the Gauls and with them the twenty tongues " Until 1917, the holiday of the Nativity of Christ was celebrated in the Russian Empire as national Victory Day.
The Patriotic War of 1812 occupies a significant place in the historical memory of Russian and other peoples; it is reflected both in scientific research and in works of architecture and art, in other cultural events and phenomena, below are some examples:
The Patriotic War of 1812 is the subject of the greatest number of studies compared to any other event in the thousand-year history of Russia until 1917. More than 15 thousand books and articles have been written specifically about the war.
To commemorate the victory in the Patriotic War of 1812, many monuments were erected, of which the most famous are:
Cathedral of Christ the Savior (Moscow);
ensemble of Palace Square with the Alexander Column (St. Petersburg).
The Winter Palace has a Military Gallery, which consists of 332 portraits of Russian generals who participated in the Patriotic War of 1812. Most of the portraits were done by the Englishman George Dow.
Every year on the first Sunday of September on the Borodino field, more than a thousand participants recreate episodes of the Battle of Borodino during a military-historical reconstruction.
One of the most famous works of world literature was L. N. Tolstoy’s novel “War and Peace.”
Based on the novel by Tolstoy in the USSR, the film directed by S. Bondarchuk “War and Peace” won an Oscar in 1968; its large-scale battle scenes are still considered unsurpassed.
S. S. Prokofiev wrote the opera “War and Peace” on his own libretto together with Mira Mendelssohn-Prokofieva (1943; final edition 1952; first production 1946, Leningrad).
100th anniversary of the Patriotic War
In 1912, the year of the centenary of the Patriotic War of 1812, the Russian government decided to search for living participants in the war. In the vicinity of Tobolsk, Pavel Yakovlevich Tolstoguzov (illustrated), an alleged participant in the Battle of Borodino, who was 117 years old at that time, was found.
200th anniversary of the Patriotic War
Internet project of the Russian State Library “The Patriotic War of 1812: The Epoch in Documents, Memoirs, Illustrations.” Provides access to full-text resources - electronic copies of publications related to that era and published in the 19th - early 20th centuries.
The RIA Novosti Internet project “1812: War and Peace” became the winner of the Runet Prize - 2012.
From August 12 to October 19, 2012, a detachment of Don Cossacks on horses of the Don breed repeated Platov’s campaign “to Paris” (“Moscow-Paris March”). The purpose of the campaign was also to worship the graves of Russian soldiers along the route.
The date of Napoleon's invasion of Russia is one of the dramatic dates in the history of our country. This event gave rise to many myths and points of view regarding the reasons, plans of the parties, the number of troops and other important aspects. Let's try to understand this issue and cover Napoleon's invasion of Russia in 1812 as objectively as possible. Let's start with the background.
Background to the conflict
Napoleon's invasion of Russia was not a random or unexpected event. This is in the novel by L.N. Tolstoy’s “War and Peace” it is presented as “treacherous and unexpected.” In fact, everything was natural. Russia brought disaster upon itself through its military actions. At first, Catherine the Second, fearing revolutionary events in Europe, helped the First Anti-French Coalition. Then Paul the First could not forgive Napoleon for the capture of Malta, an island that was under the personal protection of our emperor.
The main military confrontations between Russia and France began with the Second Anti-French Coalition (1798-1800), in which Russian troops, together with Turkish, English and Austrian troops, tried to defeat the army of the Directory in Europe. It was during these events that the famous Mediterranean campaign of Ushakov and the heroic transition of the thousands of Russian army through the Alps under the command of Suvorov took place.
Our country then first became acquainted with the “loyalty” of the Austrian allies, thanks to whom Russian armies of thousands were surrounded. This, for example, happened to Rimsky-Korsakov in Switzerland, who lost about 20 thousand of his soldiers in an unequal battle against the French. It was the Austrian troops who left Switzerland and left the 30,000-strong Russian corps alone with the 70,000-strong French corps. And Suvorov’s famous campaign was also forced, since the same Austrian advisers showed our commander-in-chief the wrong path in the direction where there were completely no roads or crossings.
As a result, Suvorov found himself surrounded, but with decisive maneuvers he was able to get out of the stone trap and save the army. However, ten years passed between these events and the Patriotic War. And Napoleon's invasion of Russia in 1812 would not have taken place if not for further events.
The Third and Fourth Anti-French Coalitions. Violation of the Tilsit Peace
Alexander the First also started a war with France. According to one version, thanks to the British, a coup d'état took place in Russia, which brought young Alexander to the throne. This circumstance may have forced the new emperor to fight for the British.
In 1805, the Third was formed. It included Russia, England, Sweden and Austria. Unlike the previous two, the new alliance was framed as defensive. No one was going to restore the Bourbon dynasty in France. England needed the alliance most of all, since 200 thousand French soldiers were already stationed near the English Channel, ready to land on the island, but the Third Coalition prevented these plans.
The culmination of the alliance was the “Battle of the Three Emperors” on November 20, 1805. It received this name because all three emperors of the warring armies - Napoleon, Alexander the First and Franz the Second - were present on the battlefield near Austerlitz. Military historians believe that it was the presence of “dignitaries” that created complete confusion for the allies. The battle ended with the complete defeat of the Coalition troops.
We try to briefly explain all the circumstances, without an understanding of which Napoleon’s invasion of Russia in 1812 will be incomprehensible.
In 1806, the Fourth Anti-French Coalition emerged. Austria no longer took part in the war against Napoleon. The new union included England, Russia, Prussia, Saxony and Sweden. Our country had to bear the entire brunt of the fighting, since England helped mainly only financially, as well as at sea, and the other participants did not have strong ground armies. In one day everything was destroyed at the Battle of Jena.
On June 2, 1807, our army was defeated near Friedland and retreated beyond the Neman - the border river in the western possessions of the Russian Empire.
After this, Russia signed the Treaty of Tilsit with Napoleon on June 9, 1807 in the middle of the Neman River, which was officially interpreted as equality of the parties when signing the peace. It was the violation of the Peace of Tilsit that became the reason why Napoleon invaded Russia. Let us examine the contract itself in more detail so that the reasons for the events that occurred later are clear.
Terms of the Peace of Tilsit
The Tilsit Peace Treaty implied Russia's accession to the so-called blockade of the British Isles. This decree was signed by Napoleon on November 21, 1806. The essence of the “blockade” was that France was creating a zone on the European continent where England was prohibited from trading. Napoleon could not physically blockade the island, since France did not have even a tenth of the fleet that the British had at their disposal. Therefore, the term “blockade” is conditional. In fact, Napoleon came up with what today are called economic sanctions. England traded actively with Europe. From Russia, therefore, the “blockade” threatened the food security of Foggy Albion. In fact, Napoleon even helped England, since the latter quickly found new trading partners in Asia and Africa, making good money on this in the future.
Russia in the 19th century was an agricultural country that sold grain for export. The only major buyer of our products at that time was England. Those. the loss of the sales market completely ruined the ruling elite of nobles in Russia. We are seeing something similar today in our country, when counter-sanctions and sanctions have hit the oil and gas industry hard, resulting in the ruling elite incurring colossal losses.
In fact, Russia joined the anti-British sanctions in Europe, initiated by France. The latter itself was a large agricultural producer, so there was no possibility of replacing a trading partner for our country. Naturally, our ruling elite could not fulfill the conditions of the Tilsit Peace, as this would lead to the complete destruction of the entire Russian economy. The only way to force Russia to comply with the demands of the “blockade” was by force. That is why the invasion of Russia took place. The French emperor himself did not intend to go deep into our country, wanting to simply force Alexander to fulfill the Peace of Tilsit. However, our armies forced the French emperor to advance further and further from the western borders to Moscow.
date
The date of Napoleon's invasion of Russian territory is June 12, 1812. On this day, the enemy troops crossed the Neman.
The Invasion Myth
There is a myth that Napoleon's invasion of Russia happened unexpectedly. The emperor held a ball, and all the courtiers had fun. In fact, balls for all European monarchs of that time occurred very often, and they did not depend on political events, but, on the contrary, were an integral part of it. This was an unchanging tradition of monarchical society. It was there that public hearings on the most important issues actually took place. Even during the First World War, magnificent celebrations were held in the residences of nobles. However, it is worth noting that Alexander the First Ball in Vilna nevertheless left and retired to St. Petersburg, where he stayed throughout the entire Patriotic War.
Forgotten heroes
The Russian army was preparing for the French invasion long before this. War Minister Barclay de Tolly did everything possible to ensure that Napoleon's army approached Moscow at the limit of its capabilities and with huge losses. The Minister of War himself kept his army in full combat readiness. Unfortunately, the history of the Patriotic War treated Barclay de Tolly unfairly. By the way, it was he who actually created the conditions for the future French catastrophe, and the invasion of Napoleon’s army into Russia ultimately ended in the complete defeat of the enemy.
Tactics of the Minister of War
Barclay de Tolly used the famous “Scythian tactics”. The distance between Neman and Moscow is huge. Without food supplies, provisions for horses, or drinking water, the “Grand Army” turned into a huge prisoner of war camp, in which natural death was much higher than losses from battles. The French did not expect the horror that Barclay de Tolly created for them: peasants went into the forests, taking livestock with them and burning food, wells along the army’s route were poisoned, as a result of which periodic epidemics broke out in the French army. Horses and people were dying of hunger, mass desertion began, but there was nowhere to run in unfamiliar terrain. In addition, partisan detachments from peasants destroyed individual French groups of soldiers. The year of Napoleon's invasion of Russia is a year of unprecedented patriotic upsurge of all Russian people who united to destroy the aggressor. This point was also reflected by L.N. Tolstoy in the novel “War and Peace”, in which his characters demonstratively refuse to speak French, since it is the language of the aggressor, and also donate all their savings to the needs of the army. Russia has not seen such an invasion for a long time. The last time our country was attacked by the Swedes was almost a hundred years ago. Not long before this, the entire secular world of Russia admired the genius of Napoleon and considered him the greatest man on the planet. Now this genius threatened our independence and turned into a sworn enemy.
The size and characteristics of the French army
The size of Napoleon's army during the invasion of Russia was about 600 thousand people. Its peculiarity was that it resembled a patchwork quilt. The composition of Napoleon's army during the invasion of Russia consisted of Polish lancers, Hungarian dragoons, Spanish cuirassiers, French dragoons, etc. Napoleon gathered his “Great Army” from all over Europe. She was diverse, speaking different languages. At times, commanders and soldiers did not understand each other, did not want to shed blood for Grand France, so at the first sign of difficulty caused by our “scorched earth” tactics, they deserted. However, there was a force that kept the entire Napoleonic army at bay - Napoleon's personal guard. This was the elite of the French troops, who went through all the difficulties with the brilliant commanders from the first days. It was very difficult to get into it. The guardsmen were paid huge salaries and were given the best food supplies. Even during the Moscow famine, these people received good rations, when others were forced to look for dead rats for food. The Guard was something like Napoleon's modern security service. She watched for signs of desertion and brought order to Napoleonic's motley army. She was also thrown into battle in the most dangerous sectors of the front, where the retreat of even one soldier could lead to tragic consequences for the entire army. The guards never retreated and showed unprecedented perseverance and heroism. However, there were too few of them in percentage terms.
In total, about half of Napoleon's army were French themselves, who showed themselves in battles in Europe. However, now this was a different army - aggressive, occupying, which was reflected in its morale.
Army composition
The Grand Army was deployed in two echelons. The main forces - about 500 thousand people and about 1 thousand guns - consisted of three groups. The right wing under the command of Jerome Bonaparte - 78 thousand people and 159 guns - was supposed to move to Grodno and divert the main Russian forces. The central group led by Beauharnais - 82 thousand people and 200 guns - was supposed to prevent the connection of the two main Russian armies of Barclay de Tolly and Bagration. Napoleon himself moved towards Vilna with renewed vigor. His task was to defeat the Russian armies separately, but he also allowed them to unite. Marshal Augereau's 170 thousand men and about 500 guns remained in the rear. According to the calculations of the military historian Clausewitz, Napoleon involved up to 600 thousand people in the Russian campaign, of which less than 100 thousand people crossed the border river Neman back from Russia.
Napoleon planned to impose battles on the western borders of Russia. However, Baclay de Tolly imposed a game of cat and mouse on him. The main Russian forces all the time avoided battle and retreated into the interior of the country, drawing the French further and further from Polish supplies, and depriving them of food and supplies on their own territory. That is why the invasion of Napoleon's troops into Russia led to the further catastrophe of the Grand Army.
Russian forces
At the time of the aggression, Russia had about 300 thousand people with 900 guns. However, the army was divided. The First Western Army was commanded by the Minister of War himself. Barclay de Tolly's group numbered about 130 thousand people with 500 guns. It stretched from Lithuania to Grodno in Belarus. Bagration's Second Western Army numbered about 50 thousand people - it occupied a line east of Bialystok. Tormasov's third army - also about 50 thousand people with 168 guns - was stationed in Volyn. There were also large groups in Finland - not long before there was a war with Sweden - and in the Caucasus, where Russia traditionally waged wars with Turkey and Iran. There was also a group of our troops on the Danube under the command of Admiral P.V. Chichagov in the amount of 57 thousand people with 200 guns.
Napoleon's invasion of Russia: the beginning
On the evening of June 11, 1812, a patrol of the Life Guards Cossack Regiment discovered suspicious movement on the Neman River. With the onset of darkness, enemy sappers began to build crossings three miles up the river from Kovno (modern Kaunas, Lithuania). Crossing the river with all forces took 4 days, but the French vanguard was already in Kovno on the morning of June 12. Alexander the First was at a ball in Vilna at that time, where he was informed about the attack.
From Neman to Smolensk
Back in May 1811, suggesting a possible invasion of Napoleon into Russia, Alexander the First told the French ambassador something like the following: “We would rather reach Kamchatka than sign peace in our capitals. Frost and territory will fight for us.”
This tactic was put into practice: Russian troops rapidly retreated from the Neman to Smolensk in two armies, unable to unite. Both armies were constantly pursued by the French. Several battles took place in which the Russians openly sacrificed entire rearguard groups in order to hold the main French forces for as long as possible in order to prevent them from catching up with our main forces.
On August 7, a battle took place at Valutina Mountain, which was called the battle for Smolensk. Barclay de Tolly had by this time united with Bagration and even made several attempts to counterattack. However, all these were just false maneuvers that made Napoleon think about the future general battle near Smolensk and regroup the columns from the marching formation to the attacking one. But the Russian commander-in-chief well remembered the emperor’s order “I have no more army,” and did not dare to give a general battle, rightly predicting future defeat. The French suffered huge losses near Smolensk. Barclay de Tolly himself was a supporter of further retreat, but the entire Russian public unfairly considered him a coward and a traitor for his retreat. And only the Russian emperor, who had already fled from Napoleon once at Austerlitz, continued to trust the minister. While the armies were divided, Barclay de Tolly could still cope with the wrath of the generals, but when the army was united near Smolensk, he still had to launch a counterattack on Murat’s corps. This attack was needed more to calm the Russian commanders than to give a decisive battle to the French. But despite this, the minister was accused of indecisiveness, procrastination, and cowardice. His final discord with Bagration emerged, who was zealously eager to attack, but could not give an order, since formally he was subordinate to Barcal de Tolly. Napoleon himself expressed annoyance that the Russians did not give a general battle, since his ingenious outflanking maneuver with the main forces would have led to a blow to the Russian rear, as a result of which our army would have been completely defeated.
Change of commander in chief
Under public pressure, Barcal de Tolly was nevertheless removed from the post of commander-in-chief. Russian generals in August 1812 already openly sabotaged all his orders. However, the new commander-in-chief M.I. Kutuzov, whose authority was enormous in Russian society, also gave the order for further retreat. And only on August 26 - also under public pressure - he finally gave a general battle near Borodino, as a result of which the Russians were defeated and left Moscow.
Results
Let's summarize. The date of Napoleon's invasion of Russia is one of the tragic ones in the history of our country. However, this event contributed to a patriotic upsurge in our society and its consolidation. Napoleon was mistaken that the Russian peasant would choose the abolition of serfdom in exchange for support for the occupiers. It turned out that for our citizens, military aggression turned out to be much worse than internal socio-economic contradictions.
With this, he created his own outpost at the Russian borders, hostile to Russia, which participated in the divisions of the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth. Despite the protests of St. Petersburg, Napoleon gave the Poles hope for the restoration of their state, which increased the danger of a new redistribution of borders in Eastern Europe. Bonaparte continued to seize the lands of the German principalities, including the Duchy of Oldenburg, where the husband of the sister of the Russian emperor (Catherine Pavlovna) ruled. A serious breakdown in Franco-Russian relations occurred after Napoleon's unsuccessful matchmaking with the sister of Alexander I, Grand Duchess Anna. This was facilitated by court circles and the king’s family, who were, in general, sharply opposed to an alliance with Bonaparte. Trade and economic contradictions were no less acute. The French emperor demanded that St. Petersburg strictly implement the Continental blockade, as a result of which the turnover of Russian foreign trade fell by almost 2 times. The blockade affected, first of all, landowners - grain exporters, and the nobility who bought expensive imports. The alliance with Alexander I was only a temporary maneuver for Napoleon, making it easier for France to achieve world domination. Having achieved power over almost all of continental Europe, the French emperor no longer needed Russian support. By now she had already become an obstacle to the implementation of his further plans. “In five years,” he said, “I will be the master of the world; only Russia remains, but I will crush it.” By the beginning of 1812, Napoleon persuaded most European countries and even its former ally, Prussia, to an alliance against Russia. Moreover, the Prussian king demanded Courland and Riga for participation in the future campaign. The only state that continued the fight against Napoleon was England. But she was then in hostile relations with St. Petersburg. In short, on the eve of the invasion, the Russian Empire found itself faced with a united and hostile Europe. True, the defeat of Sweden and Turkey, as well as the art of Russian diplomacy, prevented Napoleon from attracting these countries to his camp and with their help organizing formidable flank attacks on the north- and south-western borders of the empire.
Balance of power. To invade Russia, Napoleon concentrated a group of about 480 thousand people, huge for those times, near the Russian border. Along with the French, Poles, Italians, Belgians, Swiss, Austrians, Dutch, Germans and representatives of other European nations, who made up about half of Napoleon's army, also took part in the campaign. She focused on a 700-kilometer front from Galicia to East Prussia. On the right flank of Napoleonic troops, in Galicia, the main force was the army of Prince Schwarzenberg (40 thousand people). On the left, in East Prussia, stood the army of Marshal MacDonald (30 thousand people), consisting mainly of Prussians. Napoleon's central forces were located in Poland, in the region of Polotsk and Warsaw. Here, in the direction of the main attack, there were three armies with a total number of about 400 thousand people. There were also rear troops (approximately 160 thousand people) who were in reserve between the Vistula and Oder. The trip was carefully prepared. It was taken into account, for example, that in a sparsely populated and vast theater of military operations a huge army would not be able to feed itself solely through requisitions. Therefore, Napoleon created large commissary warehouses on the Vistula. Danzig alone contained a 50-day supply of food for 400 thousand people. There were two main plans for the Napoleonic campaign. One of them was nominated by the Poles. They proposed a stage-by-stage fight against Russia - first to push back the Russian army to the eastern borders of the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth in 1772, and then, having strengthened and reorganized Poland, to conduct further military operations. But Napoleon still chose his traditional version of a “lightning” war using general battles to defeat the main forces of the enemy. His huge, multilingual army was not designed for protracted campaigns. She needed quick and decisive success. The Napoleonic army on the western borders of Russia was opposed by approximately half as many forces, with a total number of about 240 thousand people. The 1st Army under the command of General Barclay de Tolly (127 thousand people) covered the Russian border along the Neman. To the south, between the Neman and the Bug, in the Bialystok region, the 2nd Army was located under the command of General Bagration (45 thousand people). In the Lutsk area, in Western Ukraine, there was the 3rd Army under the command of General Tormasov (45 thousand people). In addition, the Riga direction was covered by the corps of General Essen (about 20 thousand people). A large contingent of Russian troops (approximately 50 thousand people) was then in the southwest, where the war with Turkey had just ended. Some of the troops remained in the Caucasus, where military operations against Persia continued. In addition, troops were stationed in Finland, Crimea and the interior of Russia. In general, the number of Russian armed forces at that time was not inferior to Napoleonic ones. Based on the situation on the western borders, the Russian command rejected the idea of an offensive and chose a defensive plan of action. However, at first he did not envisage a protracted war. Thus, according to the accepted plan of the German theorist Fuhl, the main military actions took place on the territory of Belarus. According to the Ful strategy, the 1st Army retreated, luring Napoleon's troops to the Western Dvina, where the so-called. Drissa fortified camp. At that time, the 2nd Army was striking from the south at the flank and rear of Napoleonic formations that had gone deep into Russian borders. This plan suffered from schematism. He did not take into account the real balance of forces, the characteristics of the theater of military operations and Napoleon's possible countermeasures. Despite the weak tactical elaboration of the campaign plan, the Russian armed forces were, in general, ready for decent resistance. The Russian army had high fighting qualities, strong command and rank and file personnel, who had rich military experience behind them. Over the past years, the Russian armed forces have grown both quantitatively and qualitatively. Thus, the number of ranger regiments increased significantly, and the composition of the guard increased significantly. New types of troops appear - lancers (light cavalry armed with pikes and sabers), engineering troops, etc. The number of field artillery increased and its organization improved. On the eve of the war, new regulations and instructions also appeared in the Russian army, reflecting modern trends in the art of war. The armament of the Russian army was provided by the military industry, which was quite developed at that time. Thus, Russian factories annually produced up to 150-170 thousand guns, 800 guns, and over 765 thousand pounds of shells. The quality of Russian weapons, in general, was not inferior to, and in some cases even superior to, their European counterparts. For example, the service life of a Russian cannon of those years (in terms of the number of shots) was 2 times higher than the French one. Nevertheless, the coalition created by Bonaparte surpassed Russia both in population (almost 2 times) and in economic potential. For the first time, the West managed to unite on such a large scale and move its best forces to the east. Defeat promised Russia territorial losses, political and economic dependence on France, and one-sided development as an agricultural and raw materials appendage of Europe. In addition, taking into account the experience of the development and conquest of America by Europeans, it can be assumed that if the Napoleonic campaign was successful, the Old World opened up a new vast direction of colonization - the east. For the Russian people, this was the first such major invasion since the time of Batu. But if then the enemy was confronted by scattered principalities, now he was dealing with a single empire capable of worthy resistance.
Progress of the war. Napoleon's forces crossed the Russian border without declaring war on June 12, 1812. The French emperor presented this treacherous aggression to everyone as a struggle for the revival of Poland, calling his invasion the “Second Polish War.” The Warsaw Sejm announced the restoration of the Kingdom of Poland and announced the mobilization of Poles into Napoleonic army (this also applied to those who served in the Russian armed forces). The course of the Patriotic War of 1812 can be roughly divided into a number of stages. 1st stage: Belarusian-Lithuanian operation. This period covers June and July, when the Russians managed to avoid encirclement in Lithuania and Belarus, repel the onslaught in the St. Petersburg and Ukrainian directions and unite in the Smolensk region. Stage 2: Smolensk operation. It includes military operations in the Smolensk area. Stage 3: March on Moscow, or the culmination of the Napoleonic invasion. Stage 4: Kaluga campaign. It represents Napoleon's attempt to break out from Moscow in the Kaluga direction. Stage 5: Expulsion of Napoleonic troops from Russia.
Belarusian-Lithuanian operation
Soon after the invasion, the inconsistency of the Fule plan was revealed. The 1st and 2nd armies were cut off from each other by French corps, which immediately tried to seize the main highways in order to cut off the escape routes for both armies and defeat them individually. The Russian armies did not have a single command. Each of them had to act according to the circumstances. Avoiding defeat individually, both armies began to retreat to the east.
Battle of Peace (1812). The most difficult situation arose for the 2nd Army. After the invasion began, on June 18 she received an order to join the 1st Army. Bagration went to Nikolaev and began crossing the Neman to go to Minsk. But the city was already occupied by Marshal Davout. Meanwhile, the French vanguards appeared in the rear of the 2nd Army, near Slonim. It became clear that Napoleonic troops had already bypassed the 2nd Army from the north, and now they were trying to bypass it from the south. Then Bagration quickly turned south, to Nesvizh, and then headed east to Bobruisk, moving parallel to Marshal Davout, who was advancing to the north. Before this, Bagration’s rearguard under the command of the Don Ataman Matvey Platov gave battle on June 27-28 near the town of Mir to the vanguard of the French army of the Westphalian king Jerome Bonaparte. Platov left one Cossack regiment in Mir, and hid his main forces (7 regiments with artillery) in the nearby forest. The French cavalry, suspecting nothing, burst into the town, on the streets of which a fierce battle broke out. Then Jerome sent fresh Uhlan regiments to reinforce the attackers. They were attacked by Platov from the rear, surrounded and killed. In two days of fighting near Mir, 9 Uhlan regiments of Napoleonic army were defeated. This was the first major success of the Russians in the Patriotic War. He ensured the withdrawal of Bagration's army from Western Belarus.
Battle of Saltanovka (1812). Having reached the Dnieper at Novy Bykhov, Bagration received orders to again try to break through to join the 1st Army - now through Mogilev and Orsha. To do this, he sent an avant-garde under the command of General Nikolai Raevsky (15 thousand people) to Mogilev. But Marshal Davout’s corps was already standing there. His units (26 thousand people) advanced to the village of Saltanovka and blocked Raevsky’s path. He decided to fight his way to Mogilev. On July 11, Russian attacks were repelled by superior French forces. Davout then tried to bypass Raevsky’s detachment from the right flank, but the marshal’s plan was thwarted by the steadfastness of General Ivan Paskevich’s division. In this hot battle, Raevsky personally led the soldiers into the attack along with his 17-year-old son. The French lost 3.5 thousand people in the battle of Saltanovka. The Russians lost 2.5 thousand people. The next day, Davout, having strengthened his positions, expected a new attack. But Bagration, seeing the impossibility of breaking through Mogilev, transported the army across the Dnieper at Novy Bykhov and moved with a forced march to Smolensk. Napoleon's plan to encircle the 2nd Army or force a general battle on it failed.
Battle of Ostrovno (1812). After the outbreak of hostilities, the 1st Army, according to the drawn up disposition, began to retreat to the Dris camp. Having reached it on June 26, Barclay de Tolly gave his soldiers a six-day rest. In the current situation, the Dris position turned out to be unsuccessful. The defense in the Drissa camp, pressed against the river, could have ended in the encirclement and death of the 1st Army. Moreover, communication with the 2nd Army was interrupted. Therefore, Barclay left this camp on July 2. Having allocated a 20,000-strong corps under the command of General Peter Wittgenstein to protect the St. Petersburg direction, Barclay with the main forces of the 1st Army moved east to Vitebsk, which he reached on the day of the battle of Bagration’s troops near Saltanovka. Two days later, vanguard French units under the command of Marshals Ney and Murat approached Vitebsk. On July 13, their path near the village of Ostrovno was blocked by the 4th Corps of General Osterman-Tolstoy. Despite their advantage in artillery, the French, after several hours of continuous attacks, were unable to overcome the Russian resistance. When Osterman was informed that the losses in the corps were great and asked what to do, he, phlegmatically sniffing tobacco, replied: “Stand and die!” These words of the Russian general went down in history. The corps held its position until it was replaced by fresh units of General Konovnitsyn, who heroically held back the attacks of the superior French forces for another day. Losses on both sides in this hot affair amounted to 4 thousand people. Meanwhile, Barclay was waiting for Bagration's 2nd Army to approach him from the south (via Mogilev and Orsha). Instead, on July 15, Napoleon’s main forces approached Vitebsk from the west, threatening to give a general battle. On the night of July 16, Barclay finally received news from Bagration that he could not get through to him through Mogilev and was going to Smolensk. That same night, Barclay, leaving burning fires to disorient the French, quietly withdrew the army from its positions and moved on a forced march to Smolensk. On July 22, both armies united in Smolensk. General Barclay de Tolly took overall command of them. Napoleon's plan to dissect and destroy one by one the Russian armies in Belarus failed.
Klyastitsy (1812). If in the central direction the Russian troops had to retreat almost non-stop, then on the flanks the enemy’s advance was stopped. The greatest success was achieved by the corps of General Wittgenstein (17 thousand people), which on July 18-20 in the Klyastits area (a village in Belarus, north of Polotsk) defeated the French corps of Marshal Oudinot (29 thousand people). The battle began with a dashing attack by a hussar detachment led by General Kulnev, who drove the French vanguard back to Klyastitsy. The next day, the main forces from both sides entered the battle. After a fierce battle, the French retreated to Polotsk. On July 20, inspired by success, the indomitable Kulnev began an independent pursuit of the retreating. His detachment broke away from its own and in a battle with the main forces of the French corps suffered heavy losses (Kulnev himself died in the skirmish). Despite this local failure, the battle of Klyastitsy generally stopped the French advance towards St. Petersburg. In addition, Napoleon had to strengthen Oudinot’s defeated northern group by transferring Saint-Cyr’s corps to it from the central Moscow direction.
Battle of Kobrin (1812). Another success was achieved on the left flank of the Russian forces. Here the 3rd Army of General Tormasov distinguished itself. On July 10, Tormasov moved north from the Lutsk region against the Saxon corps of General Rainier, which threatened the southern flank of Bagration’s army. Taking advantage of the scattered nature of the Saxon corps, Tormasov sent his cavalry vanguard against the brigade of General Klingel (4 thousand people). On July 15, the Russians quickly attacked this brigade and surrounded it. After the approach of the Russian infantry, the Saxons laid down their arms. Their losses amounted to 1.5 thousand killed, the rest surrendered. The Russians lost 259 people in this case. After the battle of Kobrin, Rainier stopped threatening Bagration's army and retreated to join the corps of General Schwarzenberg.
Battle of Gorodechna (1812). On July 31, near Gorodechna, a battle took place between units of the 3rd Russian Army under the command of General Tormasov (18 thousand people) with the Austrian corps of Schwarzenberg and the Saxon corps of Rainier (40 thousand people in total). After the battle at Kobrin, Schwarzenberg’s corps came to the rescue of the Saxons. Having united, both corps attacked units of the 3rd Army at Gorodechnya. Due to a successful regrouping of forces, Tormasov threw back Rainier’s corps, which was trying to bypass the Russian left flank. Having held their positions until nightfall, the units of the 3rd Army, in full battle formation, retreated south to Lutsk. The corps of Schwarzenberg and Rainier followed him there. After the battle of Gorodechna, there was a long lull on the left flank of the Russian army, in Western Ukraine. So, in the Belarusian-Lithuanian operation, Russian troops, by skillful maneuver, managed to avoid encirclement and a disastrous general battle in Belarus. They retreated to Smolensk, where the forces of the 1st and 2nd armies united. On the flanks, the Russians stopped attempts to expand Napoleonic aggression: they repelled the French offensive in the St. Petersburg direction and did not allow them to intensify actions on the left flank. Nevertheless, during the Belarusian-Lithuanian operation, Napoleon managed to achieve major political success. In less than two months, Lithuania, Belarus and Courland fell into his hands.
Smolensk operation
After the 1st Army left Vitebsk, Napoleon stopped the offensive and began to put his forces in order. Having covered more than half a thousand kilometers in a month, the French army was stretched across communications, discipline fell within it, looting spread, and supply interruptions arose. In the 20th of July, both French and Russian troops remained in place and recovered after a long and difficult transition. The first to take offensive actions from Smolensk on July 26 was Barclay de Tolly, who moved the forces of the united armies (140 thousand people) in the direction of Rudnya (northwest of Smolensk). Without accurate information about the enemy, the Russian commander acted cautiously. Having walked a 70-kilometer route to Rudnya, Barclay de Tolly stopped the troops and stood in place for five days, clarifying the situation. The attack turned out to be directed into emptiness. Having learned about the Russian movement, Napoleon changed his disposition and with his main forces (180 thousand people) crossed the Dnieper south of the location of the Russian army. He moved towards Smolensk from the southwest, trying to occupy it and cut off Barclay's path to the east. The first to rush towards Smolensk was the equestrian vanguard of Marshal Murat (15 thousand people).
Battle of Krasnoye (1812). In the area through which Murat was breaking through, the Russians had only one 27th Infantry Division under the command of General Dmitry Neverovsky (7 thousand people). It consisted entirely of recruits. But it was they who stood up on August 2 near the village of Krasnoye as an insurmountable wall on the path of Murat’s cavalry. Neverovsky took a position on the road, on the sides of which there was a birch forest, which prevented the cavalry from making a flanking move. Murat was forced to attack the Russian infantry head-on. Having lined up the soldiers in one column, Neverovsky addressed them with the words: “Guys, remember what you were taught. No cavalry will defeat you, just take your time when firing and shoot accurately. No one dare start without my command!” Bristling with bayonets, the Russian infantry repelled all attacks of the French cavalry. During the break between fights, Neverovsky encouraged his soldiers, conducted battle analysis and divisional exercises with them. The division did not allow a breakthrough by Murat's corps and retreated to Smolensk in an orderly manner, covering itself with unfading glory. According to Napoleonic general Segur, "Neverovsky retreated like a lion." The damage to the Russians amounted to 1 thousand people, the French (according to their data) - 500 people. Thanks to the steadfastness of the 27th Division, the 1st and 2nd Armies managed to retreat to Smolensk and take up defense there.
Battle of Smolensk (1812). On August 3, the Russian army retreated to Smolensk. Bagration considered it necessary to fight a general battle here. But Barclay de Tolly insisted on continuing the retreat. He decided to give a rearguard battle in Smolensk and withdraw the main forces beyond the Dnieper. The first to enter the battle for Smolensk on August 4 was the corps of General Raevsky (15 thousand people), which repelled the attacks of the French corps of Marshal Ney (22 thousand people). On the evening of August 4, Barclay’s main forces (120 thousand people) arrived at Smolensk from near Rudnya. They are located north of the city. The weakened corps of Raevsky was replaced by the corps of Dokhturov, divisions of Neverovsky and Konovnitsyn (20 thousand people in total). They were supposed to cover the retreat of the 1st and 2nd armies to the Moscow road. All day on August 5, the Russian rearguard heroically held back the brutal onslaught of the main forces of the French army (140 thousand people). On the night of the sixth, the Russians left Smolensk. The bitterness of the soldiers was so great that they had to be taken by force to the rear, since they did not want to carry out the order to retreat. The division of General Konovnitsyn was the last to leave the burning city, conducting rearguard battles on August 6. While retreating, she blew up powder magazines and a bridge across the Dnieper. The Russians lost 10 thousand people in this battle, the French - 20 thousand people.
Battle at Valutina Mountain (1812). After the Battle of Smolensk, on August 7, Napoleon once again tried to cut off the retreat routes of the 1st Army, which had not yet managed to cross the Dnieper and retreat to Dorogobuzh. To capture the Dnieper crossing, Napoleon sent forward Ney's corps (40 thousand people). To contain the French, Barclay advanced a rearguard under the command of General Pavel Tuchkov (over 3 thousand people) to the village of Valutina Gora (10 km east of Smolensk). Ney intended to immediately crush the small Russian detachment that had taken up positions near the village, but Tuchkov’s soldiers stood unshakably and valiantly repelled the onslaught of the French. By evening, due to reinforcements that arrived in time, the number of Russian troops at Valutina Gora was increased to 22 thousand people. The fierce battle lasted here until late at night. During the last attack in the moonlight, Tuchkov, wounded by bayonets, was captured. By that time, the main forces of the 1st Army had already managed to cross the Dnieper. The Russian losses in this battle amounted to 5 thousand people, the French - over 8 thousand people. The Battle of Valutina Gora ended the two-week Smolensk operation, as a result of which the “key to Moscow” fell and the Russians retreated again without fighting a general battle. Now the French army, gathered into one fist, moved towards Moscow.
March on Moscow
It is known that after his first walk through the destroyed Smolensk, Napoleon exclaimed: “The campaign of 1812 is over!” Indeed, the large losses of his army, fatigue from a difficult campaign, the stubborn resistance of the Russians, who managed to preserve their main forces - all this forced the French emperor to think deeply about the advisability of further moving forward. It seemed that Napoleon was inclined to the original Polish plan. However, after 6 days of deliberation, the French emperor nevertheless set out on a campaign against Moscow. There were good reasons for this. Having failed to inflict a decisive defeat on the Russian army in Belarus, Napoleon never achieved a fundamental turning point during the campaign. Meanwhile, his army in Smolensk was cut off by almost a thousand kilometers from the main supply bases on the Vistula. She was in a hostile country, whose population not only did not supply the invaders with food, but also began an armed struggle against them. If supply interruptions arose, wintering in Smolensk became impossible. For normal life support for the army during the cold period, Napoleon would have to retreat to his bases on the Vistula. This meant that the Russian army could recapture most of the territories they occupied from the French in winter. Therefore, it seemed extremely important for Napoleon to defeat the Russian armed forces before the onset of cold weather. Based on these considerations, he nevertheless decided to use the last month of summer to march on Moscow. His calculation was based on the fact that the Russians would definitely fight a general battle at the walls of their ancient capital, the success of which Napoleon had no doubt. It was a convincing victory in the campaign of 1812 that could save him from the difficult problems of the upcoming winter and would greatly facilitate his victorious conclusion of the war. Meanwhile, Barclay de Tolly continued to retreat, forcing Napoleon into a protracted war in which space and time became Russia's allies. The retreat from Smolensk aroused open hostility towards the “German” Barclay in society. He was accused of cowardice and almost treason. Although the accusations were unfair, Alexander I, on the advice of those close to him, nevertheless appointed a new commander-in-chief. It was Mikhail Illarionovich Kutuzov. He arrived in the army on August 17, when Barclay was already preparing, under pressure from society and the military, to give a general battle at Tsarev Zaimishche. Kutuzov considered the chosen position unsuitable and ordered the retreat to continue. Kutuzov, like Barclay, understood that the battle was needed primarily by Napoleon, since each new step to the east moved the French army away from sources of life support and brought its death closer. The new commander was a resolute opponent of a general battle. But, as at Austerlitz, Kutuzov had to fight to please the opinion of the country’s leadership and its society, excited by failures. True, now Kutuzov himself made decisions on tactical issues. Therefore, not wanting to take risks, he chose a purely defensive option for the upcoming battle. The Russian strategist intended to achieve victory in this war not only on the battlefields.
Battle of Borodino (1812). The Battle of Moscow between the French and Russians took place near the village of Borodino on August 26, 1812, the day of the Vladimir Icon of the Mother of God. Napoleon brought only a third of the army that started the war (135 thousand people) to Borodino. The rest were absorbed like a sponge by the spaces from the Neman to Smolensk. Some died, some remained to guard extended communications, some settled in hospitals or simply deserted. On the other hand, the best have arrived. The French were opposed by a 132,000-strong Russian army, which included 21,000 unfired militias. Kutuzov positioned his forces between the New and Old Smolensk roads. The right flank of his army was covered by the Koloch and Moskva rivers, which excluded the possibility of envelopment. On the left flank, south of the Old Smolensk Road, this was prevented by wooded areas. Thus, a frontal battle was imposed on Napoleon in a 3-kilometer space between the villages of Gorki and Utitsa. Here Kutuzov built a defense in depth (its total depth, including reserves, was 3-4 km) and placed the main fortifications. In the center there was a battery at Kurganaya heights. It was defended by the 7th Corps of General Raevsky (that’s why this place was called “Raevsky’s battery”). On the left flank, near the village of Semenovskoye, field fortifications - flushes - were erected. Initially, the combined grenadier division of General Mikhail Vorontsov and the fearless 27th Infantry Division of General Dmitry Neverovsky from Bagration's 2nd Army were located here. To the south, in the forest near the village of Utitsa, Kutuzov stationed the 3rd Corps of General Nikolai Tuchkov. He was given the task of striking the flank of the attacking French units. Actually, the main events of the Battle of Borodino unfolded in these three areas: at the Kurgan Battery, Semenovsky flashes and Utitsa. Napoleon, eager for a general battle, was ready for any options. He accepted Kutuzov's challenge to a frontal collision. He even abandoned Davout’s plan to bypass the Russians on the left, through Utitsa, because he was afraid that then they would not accept the battle and would retreat again. The French emperor planned to break through the Russian defenses with a frontal attack, press them to the Moscow River and destroy them. The battle was preceded by a battle on August 24 near the village of Shevardino (Shevardinsky redoubt), in which General Gorchakov’s 8,000-strong detachment held off attacks from superior French forces (40,000 people) all day long. This gave Kutuzov the opportunity to take the main positions. On August 25, the troops prepared for the battle, which began the next day at 5 a.m. The French launched their first diversionary attacks on the Russian right flank. They pushed the Russian units behind the Koloch River. But the French attempts to cross the river were repulsed. Then, at 6 o’clock in the morning, Marshal Davout’s strike force launched the first attack against the Russian left flank, where the Semenov flashes were located. Almost simultaneously, to reach the rear of the Semyonov flushes, the Polish corps of General Poniatovsky tried to break through to the village of Utitsa, where they entered into a counter battle with Tuchkov’s soldiers. The decisive battle in the first half of the day broke out over the Semenov flushes, where Napoleon planned to make the main breakthrough. Both commanders threw their main reserves here. “The picture of that part of the Borodino field near the village of Semenovskoye was terrible, where the battle was boiling, as if in a cauldron,” recalled officer F.I. Glinka, a participant in the battle. “Thick smoke and bloody steam obscured the midday sun. Some dim, uncertain twilight lay over field of horrors, above the field of death. In this twilight nothing was visible except formidable columns, advancing and broken... The distance presents a view of complete chaos: broken, broken French squadrons crash, worry and disappear in the smoke... We have no language , to describe this dump, this crash, this crash, this last struggle by a thousand! Everyone grabbed the fatal scales to pull them to their side...” At the cost of huge losses, after the eighth attack, the French managed to knock out the Russians from the flushes by 12 o'clock. In this battle, General Bagration, who personally led the defense of the flushes (they received a second name: “Bagration’s”), was mortally wounded. At the same time, the French furiously attacked the center of the Russian army - Kurgan Heights. At 11 o'clock, during the second attack of Raevsky's battery, General Bonamy's brigade managed to break into the heights. The situation was saved by General Ermolov, the chief of staff of the 1st Army, who was passing by. Having assessed the situation, he led a counterattack of the nearby battalions of the Ufa Infantry Regiment and recaptured the heights. General Bonamy was captured and his soldiers fled. Inspired Ufa residents began pursuing the French. We had to send Cossacks to bring back the attackers. At this time, a hot battle was raging near Utitsa between Poniatovsky’s units and the 3rd Corps, which was now led (instead of the mortally wounded Tuchkov) by General Alsufiev. The ferocity of both sides during the battle was extraordinary. “Many of the combatants threw down their weapons, grappled with each other, tore each other’s mouths apart, strangled each other and fell dead together. The artillery galloped over the corpses as if on a log pavement, squeezing the corpses into the ground, soaked in blood... The screams of the commanders and cries of despair in 10 different languages were drowned out by gunfire and drumming. The battlefield then presented a terrible sight. A thick black cloud of smoke mixed with blood vapor hung over the left wing of our army... At the same time, day, evening and night appeared before our eyes,” recalled N.S. Pestrikov, a participant in that battle. After Bagration, command of the left flank was received by the senior General Konovnitsyn (then Kutuzov sent General Dokhturov to lead the left flank). He began to withdraw the defeated units behind the Semenovsky ravine, where he organized a new line of defense. After the surrender of the flushes, fearing an attack in the rear, the 3rd Corps also retreated to new positions ". The critical moment of the battle had arrived. The positions of the defeated units at the Semenovsky ravine were not strengthened, and the reserves had not yet arrived. In this situation, Kutuzov organized a counterattack on the left flank of the Napoleonic army with the forces of the cavalry regiments of Uvarov and Platov. Their attack caused confusion in the ranks of the French. This two-hour the delay gave Kutuzov time to bring up his reserves. At 2 p.m., the French transferred the main attack to the Raevsky battery. After the 3rd attack, they managed to break into the heights by 5 p.m. In the battle for it, almost the entire division of General Likhachev, abandoned from the reserve, was killed. But the attempts of the French cavalry to build on their success were stopped by the Russian cavalry regiments, which were led into battle by General Barclay de Tolly. The marshals demanded that Napoleon deliver the final blow to the Russians who had been knocked down from all fortifications, throwing the guard into battle. Then the emperor himself went to the line of fire to assess the situation. He looked around at the new positions of the Russians, and “it was clear how they, without losing courage, closed their ranks, entered the battle again and went to die,” recalled General Segur, who was with the emperor at that moment. Napoleon saw an army that did not run away, but was preparing to fight to the end. He no longer had enough strength to crush her. "I cannot risk my last reserve three thousand leagues from Paris." Having abandoned this historical phrase, Napoleon went back. Soon he withdrew his troops to their original positions. The Battle of Borodino is over. The Russians lost 44 thousand people in it, the French - over 58 thousand. The Battle of Borodino is sometimes called the “battle of the generals.” During it, 16 generals died on both sides. Europe has not seen such losses in generals for 100 years, which indicates the extreme ferocity of this battle. “Of all my battles,” Bonaparte recalled, “the most terrible one was the one I fought near Moscow. The French showed themselves worthy of victory in it, and the Russians acquired the right to be invincible.” For Borodino, Kutuzov received the rank of field marshal. The main result of the Battle of Borodino was that it did not give Napoleon the opportunity to defeat the Russians in a general battle. This was the collapse of his strategic plan, which was followed by defeat in the war. In general, two military leadership concepts collided here. One involved an active onslaught and victory over the enemy, in a general battle with forces gathered into one fist. The other gave preference to skillful maneuver and imposing on the enemy a variant of the campaign that was obviously unfavorable for him. Kutuzov’s maneuver doctrine won on the Russian field.
Tarutino maneuver (1812). Having learned about the losses, Kutuzov did not resume the battle the next day. Even in the event of success and the advance of his army, the position of the Russians remained precarious. They did not have any reserves in the area from Moscow to Smolensk (all warehouses were made in Belarus, where the war was initially supposed to be waged). Napoleon had large human reserves outside Smolensk. Therefore, Kutuzov believed that the time to go on the offensive had not yet come, and ordered a retreat. True, he hoped to receive reinforcements and did not exclude the possibility of giving a new battle already near the walls of Moscow. But hopes for reinforcements did not materialize, and the position chosen for the battle near the city turned out to be unfavorable. Then Kutuzov took upon himself the responsibility to surrender Moscow. “With the loss of Moscow, Russia is not yet lost... But if the army is destroyed, both Moscow and Russia will perish,” Kutuzov told his generals at the military council in Fili. Indeed, Russia did not have another army capable of coping with Napoleon. So, the Russians left their ancient capital, which for the first time in 200 years found itself in the hands of foreigners. Leaving Moscow, Kutuzov began to retreat in a south-eastern direction, along the Ryazan road. After two crossings, Russian troops approached the Moscow River. Having crossed at the Borovsky transportation to the right bank, they turned west and moved in a forced march to the Old Kaluga Road. At the same time, the Cossack detachment from the rearguard of General Raevsky continued to retreat to Ryazan. By this, the Cossacks misled the French vanguard of Marshal Murat, who followed on the heels of the retreating army. During the retreat, Kutuzov introduced strict measures against desertion, which began in his troops after the surrender of Moscow. Having reached the Old Kaluga Road, the Russian army turned towards Kaluga and set up camp in the village of Tarutino. Kutuzov brought 85 thousand people there. available personnel (together with the militia). As a result of the Tarutino maneuver, the Russian army escaped the attack and took an advantageous position. While in Tarutino, Kutuzov covered the southern regions of Russia, rich in human resources and food, the Tula military-industrial complex, and at the same time could threaten the communications of the French on the Smolensk road. The French could not freely advance from Moscow to St. Petersburg, having the Russian army in the rear. Thus, Kutuzov actually imposed the further course of the campaign on Napoleon. In the Tarutino camp, the Russian army received reinforcements and increased its strength to 120 thousand people. In 1834, a monument was erected in Tarutino with the inscription: “In this place, the Russian army, led by Field Marshal Kutuzov, saved Russia and Europe.” The capture of Moscow did not bring Napoleon to a victorious conclusion to the campaign. He was greeted by a city abandoned by its inhabitants, where fires soon began. At this tragic moment in Russian history, Alexander I declared that he would fight with the people in Siberia, but would not make peace until at least one armed invader remained on Russian soil. The emperor's firmness was important, since many influential people at court (the king's mother, his brother, Grand Duke Konstantin, General Arakcheev, etc.) did not believe in the success of the fight against Napoleon and advocated peace with him. Kutuzov, at a meeting with the French envoy Lauriston, who arrived for peace negotiations, philosophically said that the real war was just beginning. “The enemy could destroy your walls, turn your property into ruins and ashes, impose heavy shackles on you, but he could not and cannot win and conquer your hearts. Such are the Russians!” - these words of Kutuzov addressed to the people marked the beginning of the people's Patriotic War. The entire population of the country, regardless of class or nationality, rises to fight the invaders. National unity became the decisive force that crushed Napoleonic army. In less than two months, the peoples of Russia deployed 300 thousand new militias to help their army and collected more than 100 million rubles for it. In areas occupied by the enemy, a guerrilla war unfolds, in which Denis Davydov, Vasilisa Kozhina, Gerasim Kurin, Alexander Figner and many other heroes became famous. The year 1812 fully demonstrated the talents of M.I. Kutuzov, a commander and wise national strategist who managed to organically combine the actions of the army with the patriotic struggle of the nation.
Battle of Chernishna (1812). Having strengthened himself, Kutuzov moved on to decisive action; on October 6, his troops under the command of generals Miloradovich and Bennigsen attacked Murat’s corps (20 thousand people) at Chernishni (a river north of Tarutino), which was monitoring the Tarutino camp. The strike was prepared secretly. The plan for reaching Murat’s positions involved a night march through the forest of Bennigsen’s main detachment. It was not possible to complete the maneuver successfully. In the darkness, the columns got mixed up, and by morning only Cossack regiments led by General Orlov-Denisov reached the given place. In accordance with the letter of the plan, he resolutely attacked the French, overthrew the cuirassier division and captured the convoys. But other columns, having wandered through the forest, reached the battlefield later and were unable to support the onslaught of their cavalry in time. This gave Murat the opportunity to recover from the unexpected attack and have time to organize a defense. Bennigsen's units finally emerged from the forest and came under fire and suffered losses (in particular, the commander of the 2nd Corps, General Baggovut, was killed). Nevertheless, under the onslaught of the Russians, Murat was forced to retreat to join the Napoleonic army. The inconsistency of the Russian actions allowed him to avoid encirclement. The French lost 2.5 thousand killed and 2 thousand captured. Russian losses amounted to 1.2 thousand people. The defeat of Murat's corps accelerated the departure of Napoleon's army from Moscow. It caused a moral upsurge in Kutuzov’s army, which won its first major victory after leaving Moscow.
Kaluga campaign
On the evening of October 6, Napoleon set out from Moscow to meet Kutuzov’s army, leaving Marshal Mortier’s 10,000-strong corps in the city. But soon (apparently, under the impression of the sight of an army overloaded with looted goods, more reminiscent of a camp than a professional army), he abruptly changed his plan. Napoleon decided not to engage in battle with Kutuzov, but to turn onto the New Kaluga Road and retreat west through the southern regions that were not devastated by the war. Mortier received orders to also speak from Moscow. Before leaving, Napoleon ordered him to blow up the Kremlin. As a result, the most valuable historical and architectural ensemble was partially destroyed. The Kaluga campaign was perhaps Bonaparte's most inconsistent operation, during which he changed his decisions several times within a week. Apparently, he did not have a clear plan of action at all. The French emperor resembled an overplayed gambler who kept raising the stakes, not wanting to see himself defeated.
Battle of Maloyaroslavets (1812). Having learned about Napoleon's movement along the New Kaluga Road, Kutuzov sent the vanguard corps of General Dokhturov (15 thousand people) to cross the French army. He was supposed to block her path to Kaluga, where the Russians had huge reserves of weapons and food. On the morning of October 12, Dokhturov approached Maloyaroslavets and knocked out the French units that had occupied the city the night before. But a corps that soon arrived under the command of Prince Eugene of Beauharnais drove the Russians out of Maloyaroslavets. Subsequently, the battle unfolded as new forces approached from both sides, successively recapturing the city from each other. During the day, Maloyaroslavets changed hands 8 times. The fierce battle was ended by the 15th Italian division of General Pino, which arrived in the evening, thanks to which the city remained with the French for the night. They lost 5 thousand people that day, the Russians - 3 thousand people. The Battle of Maloyaroslavets was Napoleon's last offensive success in the campaign of 1812. It was not for nothing that the French fought so hard. They occupied an important strategic point, from where the fork of two roads began - to Kaluga (to the south) and Medyn (to the west). At night, Kutuzov’s army strengthened south of Maloyaroslavets. After much hesitation, Napoleon finally decided to attack it in the last hope of a victorious outcome of the campaign. But after an unsuccessful attempt on October 13 by the corps of General Poniatowski to break through to the west at Medyn, where he was repulsed by the cavalry detachment of General Ilovaisky, the emperor was afraid of a trap and did not dare to fight again with the Russian army. By the way, on this day, when leaving to inspect positions, Napoleon was almost captured by the Cossacks. Only the French squadrons that arrived in time saved the emperor and his retinue from the attacking horsemen. Nevertheless, the appearance of Cossack detachments near Napoleonic headquarters was an ominous sign of the weakening of the French army. The roads to Medyn and Maloyaroslavets were closed to them. On October 14, Napoleon gave the order to turn north and take the Smolensk road. In turn, Kutuzov, deciding that Poniatovsky wanted to go to his rear through Medyn, also began a retreat and took his army to the village of Detchino, and then to the Linen Plant. The Battle of Maloyaroslavets also had a deeper historical meaning. Here, in the words of Napoleonic general Segur, “the conquest of the world stopped” and “the great collapse of our happiness began.”
Expulsion of Napoleonic troops from Russia
Now the roles have changed. Napoleon avoided battles in every possible way and quickly went west along the Smolensk road, ravaged by the war and attacked by partisans. Given the complete absence of food warehouses here, the French logistics supply system finally collapsed, turning the retreat of Napoleon's army into a disaster. Kutuzov did not seek to attack the enemy. He walked with his army to the south, preventing a possible French breakthrough into the southern regions. The Russian commander took care of his soldiers, believing that now hunger and winter would complete the defeat of the Great Army better than any battles. At that time, a plan had already been developed to encircle Napoleon beyond the Dnieper with the forces of the corps of General Peter Wittgenstein from the north and the 3rd and Danube armies, which came from the south, led by Admiral Pavel Chichagov.
Battle of Polotsk and Chashnikov (1812). Wittgenstein's corps (50 thousand people) received reinforcements and went on the offensive against the corps of Marshal Saint-Cyr (30 thousand people) defending Polotsk. In the battle of October 8-11, the Russians took Polotsk. Then, having crossed the Western Dvina, they began to pursue the defeated French formations. The victory at Polotsk created a flank threat to Napoleon's army. This forced him to send the corps of Marshal Victor, who had arrived from Poland, to help Saint-Cyr, which was initially intended to reinforce Napoleonic troops on the Kaluga road. On October 19, Wittgenstein continued the offensive and attacked Saint-Cyr's corps in the Chashniki area, on the Ulla River. The Russians managed to push back the French. But having learned about the approach of Victor’s new corps to Saint-Cyr, Wittgenstein stopped the onslaught. Saint-Cyr and Victor were also inactive. But soon they received Napoleon's order to push the Russians back beyond the Dvina. Thus, the French emperor sought to clear another, safer escape route for his army through Polotsk and Lepel. On November 2, the corps of Saint-Cyr and Victor (46 thousand people) attacked the corps of Wittgenstein (45 thousand people). They managed to push the Russian vanguard back to Chashniki. But in a stubborn battle near the village of Smolnya, which changed hands more than once, the French were stopped. Having lost 3 thousand people, Saint-Cyr and Victor were forced to retreat to join the main forces of Napoleonic army. The victory at Chashnikov provided Wittgenstein with the opportunity to cut off the communications of the Great Army retreating from Russia.
Battle of Vyazma (1812). The first major battle of the Russians with Napoleon's retreating army was the battle of Vyazma on October 22. Here, detachments of the Russian army under the command of General Miloradovich and Don Ataman Platov (25 thousand people) defeated 4 French corps (37 thousand people in total). Despite the overall numerical superiority of the French, the Russians had superiority in cavalry (almost twice). The fighting spirit of the Russian soldiers, who wanted to expel the invaders from their native land as quickly as possible, was also significantly higher. Having cut off the retreat of Davout’s corps at Vyazma, Miloradovich and Platov tried to destroy it. The corps of Beauharnais and Poniatowski came to the aid of their own, which allowed Davout to break through the encirclement. The French then retreated to the heights near the city, where Ney’s corps was located, and tried to organize a defense. But in a battle with the Russian vanguard they were defeated. In the evening, the burning Vyazma was taken by storm. Here, partisan detachments under the command of captains Seslavin and Figner distinguished themselves, who were among the first to break into the burning city. The French lost 8.5 thousand people in the battle of Vyazma. (killed, wounded and captured). The damage to the Russians is about 2 thousand people. The defeat of the best French formations caused a moral breakdown of Napoleonic troops and forced them to accelerate their withdrawal from Russia.
Battle of Red (1812). On October 27, Napoleon's main forces reached Smolensk, where they plundered the remaining warehouses. Due to the threat of encirclement and the complete disorganization of his army, the number of which had been reduced to 60 thousand people, Napoleon decided to leave Smolensk on October 31. Leaving the city, the French army stretched for almost 60 km. Its vanguard was approaching Krasnoye, and its rearguard was just leaving Smolensk. Kutuzov took advantage of this. On November 3, he sent the vanguard of General Miloradovich (16 thousand people) to Krasny. He fired artillery fire at the French troops marching along the Smolensk road, then attacked them and, cutting off the rear columns, captured up to 2 thousand people. The next day, Miloradovich fought all day with the Beauharnais corps, capturing 1.5 thousand prisoners from him. In this battle, Miloradovich, pointing out the grenadiers of the Pavlovsk regiment to the approaching French, uttered his famous phrase: “I give you these columns!” On November 5, the main forces of both armies entered the battle of Krasnoye. Kutuzov’s plan was to gradually cut off French units on the road with attacks from the south and destroy them piece by piece. For this purpose, two strike groups were allocated under the command of generals Tormasov and Golitsyn. During a fierce battle, in which Miloradovich’s detachment also took part, the Russians inflicted heavy damage on the Young Guard and the corps of Davout and Ney. Nevertheless, it was not possible to completely eliminate the French army. Part of it, led by Napoleon, managed to break through and continued to retreat to the Berezina. The French lost 32 thousand people in the battle of Krasny. (of which 26 thousand were prisoners), as well as almost all of their artillery. Russian losses amounted to 2 thousand people. This battle became the largest success of the Russian army since the beginning of the campaign. For Red Kutuzov received the title of Prince of Smolensk.
Battle of the Berezina (1812). After Red, the ring around Napoleonic troops began to shrink. Wittgenstein's corps (50 thousand people) approached from the north, and Chichagov's army (60 thousand people) approached from the south. At the Berezina they were preparing to close ranks and cut off Napoleon’s escape route from Russia. On November 9, Chichagov’s units approached the Berezina and occupied the city of Borisov. But they were soon knocked out of there by the French corps of Marshal Oudinot. The Russians retreated to the right bank of the river and blew up the bridge. Thus, the crossing on the main road along which Napoleon’s army was retreating was destroyed. The Berezina had not yet frozen, and the French were trapped. On November 13, Napoleon’s main forces approached the Berezina, which, with the added corps of Victor, Saint-Cyr and a number of other units, numbered up to 75 thousand people. In this critical situation, when every minute mattered, Napoleon acted quickly and decisively. South of Borisov there was another crossing. Napoleon sent Oudinot's corps there. The French emperor sought to make the Russian commander believe that he would cross there to retreat to Minsk. Meanwhile, Kutuzov’s main army, marching towards Minsk, was moving to the area south of Borisov. A meeting with her could have ended in disaster for Napoleon. He sought to go northwest of Minsk, to Vilna. To do this, 15 km north of Borisov, near the village of Studenka, the Polish lancers found a ford, where French sappers built temporary bridges. Napoleon began crossing along them on November 14. The demonstration of Oudinot's body was a success. Chichagov, leaving part of his troops at Borisov, set off with the main forces down the river. For two days, the French crossed, repelling the attacks of scattered detachments of Wittgenstein and Chichagov. On November 15, vanguard pursuit units sent by Kutuzov under the command of Ataman Platov and General Ermolov burst into Borisov. Kutuzov himself was in no hurry to the Berezina, hoping that even without him there would be enough forces there to eliminate the French army. When Chichagov finally returned to Borisov, Napoleonic troops had already entrenched themselves on the right bank of the river. On November 16, a fierce battle began on both sides of the Berezina. Chichagov tried to push back the French units covering the Studenko crossing on the right bank. Wittgenstein attacked the corps of Marshal Victor, who was staunchly covering the crossing on the left bank. The wooded area impeded the maneuverability of the cavalry. All day until 11 o'clock at night there was a stubborn frontal rifle battle, which cost heavy losses for both sides and became the culmination of the battle. Due to the low capacity of the built bridges, the huge concentration of people and convoys, panic and the increasing onslaught of the Russians, only one third of the troops (25 thousand people) managed to break through to the west, towards Vilna. The rest (about 50 thousand people) died in battle, froze, drowned or were captured. Fearing that the crossing would be captured by the Russians, Napoleon ordered its destruction, abandoning a mass of his troops on the left bank. Contemporaries noted that in some places the river was filled to the brim with corpses of people and horses. The Russians lost 4 thousand people in this battle. After the Berezina, the main forces of Napoleonic army in Russia ceased to exist.
During the campaign of 1812, the personnel of the French army, which France could subsequently only dream of, disappeared. In 1813-1814, the veterans of the Moscow campaign who escaped on the Berezina accounted for less than 5% of Napoleon’s army (a considerable part of them were blocked in the Danzig fortress, which surrendered in December 1813). After 1812, Napoleon had a completely different army. With her he could only delay his final downfall. Soon after the Berezina, Napoleon left the remnants of his army and went to France to gather new troops. At this time, severe frosts struck, accelerating the liquidation of Napoleonic troops. Marshal Murat, abandoned by the commander-in-chief, transferred only the pitiful remnants of the Great Army across the frozen Neman in mid-December. This is how Napoleon’s attempt to defeat Russia ended ingloriously. History does not know many examples of such military disasters. In his report, M.I. Kutuzov summed up the results of the campaign this way. “Napoleon entered with 480 thousand, and withdrew about 20 thousand, leaving at least 150,000 prisoners and 850 guns.” The death toll in Russian troops was 120 thousand people. Of these, 46 thousand were killed and died from wounds. The rest died of disease, mainly during the period of Napoleon's persecution.
In Russian history, the Patriotic War became the most intense in terms of the number of battles. On average, there were 5 battles every month. On December 25, the day of the Nativity of Christ, the Tsar issued a Manifesto on the expulsion of the enemy and the victorious end of the Patriotic War of 1812. This day, like the date of the Battle of Poltava, also became an official religious holiday in memory of “the deliverance of the Russian Church and Power from the invasion of the Gauls and with them there are twelve tongues."
"From Ancient Rus' to the Russian Empire." Shishkin Sergey Petrovich, Ufa.
And invaded Russian lands. The French rushed to the offensive like a bull during a bullfight. Napoleon's army included a European hodgepodge: in addition to the French, there were also (forcedly recruited) Germans, Austrians, Spaniards, Italians, Dutch, Poles and many others, totaling up to 650 thousand people. Russia could field approximately the same number of soldiers, but some of them, along with Kutuzov was still in Moldova, in another part - in the Caucasus. During Napoleon's invasion, up to 20 thousand Lithuanians joined his army.
The Russian army was divided into two lines of defense, under the command of General Peter Bagration And Michael Barclay de Tolly. The French invasion fell on the latter's troops. Napoleon's calculation was simple - one or two victorious battles (maximum three), and Alexander I will be forced to sign peace on French terms. However, Barclay de Tolly gradually, with small skirmishes, retreated deeper into Russia, but did not enter the main battle. Near Smolensk, the Russian army almost fell into encirclement, but did not enter the battle and eluded the French, continuing to draw them deeper into its territory. Napoleon occupied the empty Smolensk and could have stopped there for now, but Kutuzov, who arrived from Moldova to replace Barclay de Tolly, knew that the French emperor would not do that, and continued his retreat to Moscow. Bagration was eager to attack, and he was supported by the majority of the country's population, but Alexander did not allow it, leaving Peter Bagration on the border in Austria in case of an attack by France's allies.
All along the way, Napoleon received only abandoned and scorched settlements - no people, no supplies. After the “demonstrative” battle for Smolensk on August 18, 1812, Napoleon’s troops began to get tired of Russian campaign of 1812, since the conquest was somehow negative: there were no large-scale battles or high-profile victories, there were no captured supplies and weapons, winter was approaching, during which the “Great Army” needed to winter somewhere, and nothing suitable for quartering was captured.
Battle of Borodino.
At the end of August, near Mozhaisk (125 kilometers from Moscow), Kutuzov stopped in a field near a village Borodino, where he decided to give a general battle. For the most part, he was forced by public opinion, since a constant retreat did not correspond to the sentiments of either the people, the nobles, or the emperor.
On August 26, 1812, the famous Battle of Borodino. Bagration approached Borodino, but still the Russians were able to field just over 110 thousand soldiers. Napoleon at that moment had up to 135 thousand people.
The course and result of the battle are known to many: the French repeatedly stormed Kutuzov’s defensive redoubts with active artillery support (“Horses and people mixed up in a heap…”). The Russians, hungry for a normal battle, heroically repelled the attacks of the French, despite the latter’s enormous superiority in weapons (from rifles to cannons). The French lost up to 35 thousand killed, and the Russians ten thousand more, but Napoleon only managed to slightly shift Kutuzov’s central positions, and in fact, Bonaparte’s attack was stopped. After a battle that lasted all day, the French emperor began to prepare for a new assault, but Kutuzov, by the morning of August 27, withdrew his troops to Mozhaisk, not wanting to lose even more people.
On September 1, 1812, a military incident took place in a nearby village. council in Fili, during which Mikhail Kutuzov with the support of Barclay de Tolly, he decided to leave Moscow to save the army. Contemporaries say that this decision was extremely difficult for the commander-in-chief.
On September 14, Napoleon entered the abandoned and devastated former capital of Russia. During his stay in Moscow, sabotage groups of the Moscow governor Rostopchin repeatedly attacked French officers and burned their captured apartments. As a result, from September 14 to 18, Moscow burned, and Napoleon did not have enough resources to cope with the fire.
At the beginning of the invasion, before the Battle of Borodino, and also three times after the occupation of Moscow, Napoleon tried to come to an agreement with Alexander and sign peace. But from the very beginning of the war, the Russian emperor adamantly prohibited any negotiations while enemy feet trampled Russian soil.
Realizing that it would not be possible to spend the winter in devastated Moscow, on October 19, 1812, the French left Moscow. Napoleon decided to return to Smolensk, but not along the scorched path, but through Kaluga, hoping to get at least some supplies along the way.
In the battle of Tarutino and a little later near Maly Yaroslavets on October 24, Kutuzov repelled the French, and they were forced to return to the devastated Smolensk road along which they had walked earlier.
On November 8, Bonaparte reached Smolensk, which was ruined (half of it by the French themselves). All the way to Smolensk, the emperor constantly lost person after person - up to hundreds of soldiers a day.
During the summer-autumn of 1812, a hitherto unprecedented partisan movement was formed in Russia, leading the war of liberation. Partisan detachments numbered up to several thousand people. They attacked Napoleon's army like Amazonian piranhas attacking a wounded jaguar, waited for convoys with supplies and weapons, and destroyed the vanguards and rearguards of the troops. The most famous leader of these detachments was Denis Davydov. Peasants, workers, and nobles joined the partisan detachments. It is believed that they destroyed more than half of Bonaparte's army. Of course, Kutuzov’s soldiers did not lag behind, they also followed Napoleon on his heels and constantly made forays.
On November 29, a major battle took place on the Berezina, when admirals Chichagov and Wittgenstein, without waiting for Kutuzov, attacked Napoleon’s army and destroyed 21 thousand of his soldiers. However, the emperor was able to escape, with only 9 thousand people left at his disposal. With them he reached Vilna (Vilnius), where his generals Ney and Murat were waiting for him.
On December 14, after Kutuzov’s attack on Vilna, the French lost 20 thousand soldiers and abandoned the city. Napoleon fled to Paris in a hurry, ahead of the remnants of his Great Army. Together with the remnants of the garrison of Vilna and other cities, a little more than 30 thousand Napoleonic warriors left Russia, while at least about 610 thousand invaded Russia.
After the defeat in Russia French Empire started to fall apart. Bonaparte continued to send envoys to Alexander, offering almost all of Poland in exchange for a peace treaty. Nevertheless, the Russian emperor decided to completely rid Europe of dictatorship and tyranny (and these are not big words, but reality) Napoleon Bonaparte.