Attack on Pearl Harbor article history. Result of the attack on Pearl Harbor

Oahu, Hawaiian Islands

Opponents

Commanders of the forces of the parties

Strengths of the parties

Pearl Harbor attack- a sudden combined attack by Japanese carrier-based aircraft from the carrier formation of Vice Admiral Chuichi Nagumo and Japanese midget submarines, delivered to the site of the attack by submarines of the Imperial Japanese Navy, on American naval and air bases located in the vicinity of Pearl Harbor on the island of Oahu (Hawaii islands), which occurred on Sunday morning, December 7, 1941.

Prerequisites for the war

In 1932, large-scale exercises were held in the United States, during which the defense of the Hawaiian Islands from attack from sea and air was practiced. Contrary to the expectations of the “defenders,” Admiral Yarmouth left the cruisers and battleships behind and moved towards Hawaii with only two high-speed aircraft carriers - USS Saratoga And USS Lexington. Being 40 miles from the target, he raised 152 aircraft, which “destroyed” all aircraft at the base and gained complete air supremacy. However, the chief negotiator concluded that “a major air strike on Oahu in the face of strong air power defending the island is highly questionable. The aircraft carriers will be hit, and the attacking aircraft will suffer heavy losses." The American command was not convinced by the results of similar exercises in 1937 and 1938, when carrier-based aircraft conditionally destroyed shipyards, airfields and ships.

The fact is that in the 30s the battleship was considered the main weapon at sea (and even in the political arena). The country that had this class of ships forced even such major powers as the USA and Great Britain to reckon with itself. Both in the USA and even in Japan, which was inferior to the potential enemy in battleships, the prevailing idea was that the fate of the war would be decided in a general battle, where this class would play the main role. Aircraft carriers had already appeared in the fleets of these countries, but both sides assigned them, although an important, but secondary role. Their task was to nullify the advantage of the enemy's battle fleet.

November 11, 1940 planes from an English aircraft carrier HMS Illustrious struck, located in the harbor of Taranto. The result was the destruction of one and the disabling of two battleships.

It is not known exactly when the Japanese came up with the idea to attack Pearl Harbor. So, in 1927-1928, then a captain of the 2nd rank, who had just graduated from the naval staff college, Kusaka Ryunosuke, the future chief of staff of the 1st aircraft carrier fleet, began to work out an attack on a base in the Hawaiian Islands. Soon he was to teach a course on aviation to a group of 10 important people, among whom was Nagano Osami, for which he wrote a document in which he argued that the basis of the strategy of the war with the United States had so far been a general battle with the entire American fleet. But if the enemy refuses to go to the open sea, Japan needs to seize the initiative, so a strike on Pearl Harbor is necessary, and it can only be carried out by air forces. This document was printed in an edition of 30 copies and, after excluding direct references to America, it was sent to the command staff. It may well be that Yamamoto saw this document, and in his head the idea took on clearer forms, the results of the American exercises convinced him, and the Taranto attack convinced even his sworn opponents

And although Yamamoto was against the war in general, and the conclusion of the Tripartite Pact in particular, he understood that the fate of Japan depended on how it entered the war and how it would conduct it. Therefore, as commander, he prepared the fleet, especially the carrier fleet, as much as possible for combat operations, and when war became inevitable, he implemented a plan to attack the US Pacific Fleet in Pearl Harbor.

But it is worth understanding that not a single Yamamoto “had a hand” in this plan. When war with the United States became all but certain, he turned to Rear Admiral Kaijiro Onishi, chief of staff of the 11th Air Force. However, he had at his disposal land-based aircraft, mainly Zero fighters and G3M and G4M medium torpedo bombers, whose range was not sufficient to operate even from the Marshall Islands. Onishi advised to contact his deputy, Minoru Genda.

In addition to being a superb fighter pilot whose unit became widely known as the "Genda Magicians", Genda was a superb tactician and expert in the use of aircraft carriers in battle. He comprehensively studied the possibilities of attacking the fleet in the harbor and came to the conclusion that in order to destroy the US Pacific Fleet in its main base, it was necessary to use all 6 heavy aircraft carriers, select the best aviators and ensure complete secrecy to ensure surprise, on which the success of the operation largely depended.

One of the leading officers of the headquarters of the United Fleet, Kuroshima Kameto, took up the detailed development of the plan. He was, perhaps, the most eccentric staff officer: as soon as inspiration struck him, he locked himself in his cabin, battened down the portholes and sat down completely naked at the table, burned incense and chain-smoked. It was Kuroshima Kameto who developed the plan at the tactical level, taking into account the slightest nuances.

The plan was then presented to the Naval General Staff, where it met with strong opposition. This is explained by the fact that the naval general staff intended to use aircraft carriers in the south, because few believed that base aircraft could support operations to capture the southern regions as effectively. In addition, many doubted the success of the proposed attack, because much depended on factors that the Japanese could not influence: surprise, how many ships would be in the base, etc. Here it is worth turning to the personality of the commander-in-chief himself - Yamamoto was known for his love of gambling, and was ready to take this risk, hoping to win. Therefore, he was unshakable and threatened to resign. With this formulation of the issue, the Chief of the Naval General Staff, Nagano, had to agree with Yamamoto’s plan. But since Admiral Nagumo also doubted success, Yamamoto said that he was ready to personally lead the aircraft carrier force into battle if Nagumo did not decide on this operation.

What forced Japan to go to war with such a powerful industrial country as the United States of America? In 1937, the Sino-Japanese War began. The fighting moved south until Japanese forces established themselves in northern Indochina in September 1940. At the same time, Japan entered into a military alliance with Germany and Italy, which greatly influenced its relations with the United States. And when Japan invaded southern Indochina in July 1941, the United States, Great Britain and Holland dealt a crushing economic blow - an embargo on oil exports to Japan. It is not difficult to understand how important oil was for Japan: the fleet's fuel reserves amounted to 6,450,000 tons, with the most economical use they would last for 3-4 years, after which the country would be forced to comply with any demand of the above-mentioned powers. Therefore, it was decided to seize the oil-rich areas of Southeast Asia. But the question arose: how would the United States react to this? We also had to take into account the fact that at the beginning of 1941 the Pacific Fleet was transferred to Pearl Harbor. The admirals discussed 2 options for the development of events - first, begin to capture areas of Southeast Asia, and then, when the American fleet goes to sea, destroy it in a general battle; or preventively destroy a potential threat, and then concentrate all forces on the occupation. The second option was chosen.

Strengths of the parties

USA

Fire Support Group (Rear Admiral D. Mikawa): third battleship brigade: battleships IJN Hiei And IJN Kirishima; 8th Cruiser Brigade: heavy cruisers IJN Tone And IJN Chikuma .

Patrol Squad (Captain 1st Rank K. Imaizumi):

Submarines I-19 , I-21 , I-23 .

Auxiliary ships for the Strike Force:

8 tankers and transports. Midway Atoll Neutralization Squad(Captain 1st Rank K. Konishi):

Destroyers IJN Akebono And IJN Ushio .

Attack

The strike force left the Kure naval base in successive groups and passed through the Inland Sea of Japan between November 10 and 18, 1941. On November 22, the task force assembled in Hitokappu Bay (Kuril Islands). Canvas covers were loaded onto the ships to protect the guns in stormy weather, aircraft carriers accepted thousands of barrels of fuel, and people were given warm uniforms. On November 26 at - 06:00, the ships left the bay and headed in different routes to the assembly point, where they were supposed to receive the last instructions, depending on whether the war should have started or not. On December 1, it was decided to start a war, which was reported to Admiral Nagumo the next day: Yamamoto, from the flagship stationed in the Inland Sea, transmitted a coded order: “Climb Mount Niitaka,” which meant that the attack was scheduled for December 7 (local time).

There were also 30 submarines of various types operating in the Pearl Harbor area, of which 16 were long-range submarines. 11 of them carried one seaplane, and 5 carried “dwarf” submarines.

At 00:50 on December 7, being only a few hours away from the aircraft take-off point, the formation received a message that there were no American aircraft carriers in the harbor. The message, however, stated that the battleships were at Pearl Harbor, so Vice Admiral Nagumo and his staff decided to proceed as planned.

At 06:00, the carriers, being only 230 miles north of Hawaii, began scrambling aircraft. The takeoff of each aircraft was precisely synchronized with the pitching of the aircraft carriers, which reached 15°.

The first wave included: 40 Nakajima B5N2 carrier-based torpedo bombers (type “97”), armed with torpedoes, which were equipped with wooden stabilizers specifically for attacking in a shallow harbor; 49 aircraft of this type carried an 800 kg armor-piercing bomb, specially developed by deeply modernizing the battleship's shell; 51 Aichi D3A1 dive bombers (type “99”), carrying a 250 kg bomb; 43 Mitsubishi A6M2 fighters (type “0”).

As Japanese aircraft approached the islands, one of five Japanese mini-submarines was sunk near the harbor entrance. At 03:42, the commander of one of the US Navy minesweepers spotted the submarine's periscope approximately two miles from the harbor entrance. He reported this to the destroyer USS Aaron Ward, who unsuccessfully searched for it until this or another mini-submarine was discovered from the Catalina flying boat. The submarine tried to make its way into the harbor, following the repair ship Antares. At 06:45 USS Aaron Ward sank her with artillery fire and depth charges. At 06:54, the commander of the 14th naval region was told from the destroyer: “We attacked, fired and dropped depth charges on a submarine cruising within our territorial waters.” Due to a delay in decoding, the duty officer received this message only at 07:12. He handed it over to Admiral Block, who ordered the destroyer USS Monaghan come to the rescue USS Aaron Ward.

At 07:02, the approaching aircraft were detected using a radar station, which Privates Joseph Lockard and George Elliott reported to the information center. Duty Officer Joseph MacDonald relayed the information to 1st Lt. C. Tyler. He, in turn, reassured the rank and file, saying that reinforcements were coming to them. The radio station, which broadcast music that pilots usually used as a bearing, also spoke about this. The B-17 bombers were indeed about to arrive, but the radar spotted the Japanese. Ironically, numerous signals of an attack were, if not ignored, then left without due attention.

Futida in his memoirs is rather inaccurate in describing the signal for the start of the attack. He actually gave it at 07:49, but back at 07:40 he fired one black flare, which meant that the attack was going according to plan (i.e. a surprise attack). However, Lieutenant Commander Itaya, leading the fighters, did not notice the signal, so Fuchida fired a second missile, also black. It was also noticed by the commander of the dive bombers, who understood this as a loss of surprise, and in this case the dive bombers should go on the attack immediately. But smoke from bomb hits could interfere with torpedoing, so the torpedo bombers were also forced to hurry.

Despite the explosions and the ensuing chaos, at exactly 08:00 on the battleship USS Nevada Military musicians, led by conductor Auden MacMillan, began performing the US anthem. They got a little confused only once, when a bomb fell next to the ship.

The main target of the Japanese, undoubtedly, were American aircraft carriers. But they were not in the harbor at the time of the attack. Therefore, the pilots concentrated their efforts on the battleships, since they were also a significant target.

The main striking force was 40 torpedo bombers. Because There were no aircraft carriers, 16 aircraft were left without a main target and acted at their own discretion, which also brought some confusion into the actions of the Japanese. The light cruiser was the first to be torpedoed. USS Raleigh(CL-7) and target ship USS Utah(an old battleship, but some pilots mistook it for an aircraft carrier). My brother was the next to be hit. USS Raleigh, light cruiser Detroit (CL-8).

At this time, Commander Vincent Murphy spoke on the phone with Admiral Kimmel about the destroyer's report USS Aaron Ward. The messenger who came to the commander reported the attack on Pearl Harbor (“this is not an exercise”), after which he informed the admiral about it. Kimmel relayed the message to the Commanders of the Navy, Atlantic Fleet and Asiatic Fleet, as well as all forces on the high seas. The message was sent at 08:00 and read: “The air raid on Pearl Harbor is not a training exercise.”

Rear Admiral W. Furlong, who was on board the minelayer USS Oglala(CM-4), seeing the planes over the harbor, immediately realized what was happening and ordered a signal, which went up on the minelayer’s mast at 07:55 and contained the following: “All ships leave the bay.” Almost at the same time, one of the torpedoes passed under the bottom USS Oglala and exploded on board a light cruiser USS Helena(CL-50). It would seem that the minelayer was lucky, but, ironically, the explosion literally tore off the plating of the minesag’s starboard side, causing it to sink.

USS Oklahoma was moored to the battleship USS Maryland and took a powerful blow. The battleship was hit by 9 torpedoes, causing it to capsize.

Almost simultaneously the battleship was attacked USS West Virginia, moored to USS Tennessee. Despite the fact that he is just like USS Oklahoma received 9 torpedo hits, and an additional 2 bomb hits, thanks to the efforts of 1st Lieutenant Claude W. Ricketts and his first mate Ensign Billingsley, who carried out counter-flooding, the battleship did not capsize, which made it possible to restore it.

At 08:06 the battleship received the first torpedo hit USS California. In total, the battleship received 3 torpedo hits and one bomb hit.

Battleship USS Nevada was the only battleship that set sail. Therefore, the Japanese concentrated their fire on it, hoping to sink it in the fairway and block the harbor for many months. As a result, the ship received one torpedo and 5 bomb hits. The Americans' hope of bringing the battleship to the open sea did not materialize, and it was grounded.

Hospital ship USS Vestal, moored to USS Arizona, reported a torpedo hit the battleship. After the attack, the ship was examined and no traces of torpedo hits were found, but veteran Donald Stratton, who served on USS Arizona, and after the war continues to claim that there was a hit.

This battleship was attacked by bombers at 08:11, and one of the bombs caused the main caliber of the bow magazines to explode, which destroyed the ship.

The airfield on Ford Island, the US Air Force bases Hickam and Wheeler, and the seaplane base were attacked by bombers and fighters.

Japanese fighters attacked the B-17s, which were unable to fight back. They then attacked Dontlesses (American carrier-based dive bombers) from an aircraft carrier USS Enterprise. Several American planes were shot down after the attack by their own anti-aircraft guns.

The second echelon consisted of 167 aircraft: 54 B5N2, carrying 250 kg and 6-60 kg bombs; 78 D3A1 with 250 kg bomb; 35 A6M2 fighters. It is easy to notice that there were no torpedo bombers in the second wave, because the emphasis was placed on the first wave, and fighter cover was also reduced.

However, it was at this time that the American pilots were able to provide some decent resistance. Most of the planes were destroyed, but several pilots managed to take off and even shoot down some of the enemy planes. Between 8:15 a.m. and 10 o'clock, two sorties were made from the unattacked Haleiwa airfield, in which 4 P-40 aircraft and one P-36 each took part. They shot down 7 Japanese aircraft at the cost of losing one aircraft. From Bellows Airfield until 9:50 a.m. Not a single plane was able to take off, and the first plane took off from Hickam airfield only at 11:27 a.m.

Among the numerous tragic and heroic episodes, there were also curious ones. This is a story about a destroyer USS Dale. Ernest Schnabel said after the war that a young boatswain named Fuller, during the respite between the first and second waves, was clearing the deck of wooden objects. He came across a box of ice cream and decided to throw it overboard. However, he was stopped, the box was opened and the ice cream was distributed among the entire crew. If on that day someone could impartially observe the events, he would have seen a destroyer going into the canal, and the crew sitting at combat posts and eating ice cream!

Bottom line

Japan was forced to attack the United States because... negotiations, despite the efforts of Japanese diplomats, did not lead to anything, and she could not afford to stall for time, because. resources were very, very limited.

The attack was planned by the best specialists of the Japanese fleet, and highly qualified aviators were trained.

Japan expected the American fleet to be destroyed and the American nation to lose heart. If the first task was completed, although not completely, then the second was failed. The Americans went through the entire war under the slogan: “Remember Pearl Harbor!”, and the battleship USS Arizona became for them a symbol of the “Day of Shame.”

But to say that the entire American, and even the US Pacific Fleet, went down is incorrect. The absence of aircraft carriers in the harbor helped America win the Battle of Midway, considered the turning point in the Pacific War. After it, Japan lost the opportunity to conduct major offensive operations.

Nagumo was careful and did not strike at the infrastructure of the base, and even the Americans do not deny that this would have played no less, and perhaps a greater role, than the destruction of the fleet. He left oil storage facilities and docks intact.

Success could be developed. But they decided to use the aircraft carriers for conquest in Southeast Asia, where they were supposed to suppress airfields and fight enemy aircraft, which were an order of magnitude inferior to the Japanese. Only the Doolittle Raid prompted them to take active action, which ultimately led to Japan's defeat.

Notes

Grand Joint Exercise No. 4
So, when dreadnoughts entered the Brazilian fleet Minas Geraes And Sao Paulo, American diplomats immediately remembered “American unity.”
This is approximately how wars proceeded in the age of sail, which indicates the “novelty” of this idea.

Strengths of the parties Losses Audio, photo, video on Wikimedia Commons

Pearl Harbor attack(“Pearl Harbor”) or, according to Japanese sources, Hawaiian operation- a sudden combined attack by Japanese carrier-based aircraft from the carrier formation of Vice Admiral Chuichi Nagumo and Japanese midget submarines, delivered to the site of the attack by submarines of the Imperial Japanese Navy, on American naval and air bases located in the vicinity of Pearl Harbor on the island of Oahu (Hawaii islands), which occurred on Sunday morning December 7, 1941.

The attack consisted of two air raids, in which 353 aircraft took off from 6 Japanese aircraft carriers. The attack resulted in the sinking of four US Navy battleships (two of which were recovered and returned to service at the end of the war), and four more were damaged. The Japanese also sank or damaged three cruisers, three destroyers, and one minelayer; destroyed 188-272 aircraft (according to various sources); human casualties - 2403 killed and 1178 wounded. The power plant, shipyard, fuel and torpedo storage facilities, piers, as well as the main control building were not damaged by the attack. Japanese losses were small: 29 aircraft, 5 small submarines, along with 64 dead and 1 captured military personnel.

The attack was a preventive measure against the United States, aimed at eliminating the American navy, gaining air supremacy in the Pacific region and subsequently conducting military operations against Burma, Thailand, and the western possessions of the United States in the Pacific Ocean. This goal was only partially achieved, since modern US surface ships - aircraft carriers - were at that time in a different place and were not damaged. The affected battleships were of obsolete types dating back to the First World War. In addition, the importance of battleships as the main striking force of the fleet in the era of aviation dominance sharply declined.

On the same day, the United States declared war on Japan, thereby entering the war. Because of the attack, particularly because of its nature, public opinion in America changed dramatically from an isolationist position in the mid-1930s to outright participation in the war effort. On December 8, 1941, US President Franklin Roosevelt spoke at a joint meeting of both houses of Congress. The President demanded that as of December 7, “a day that will go down in history as a symbol of shame,” a declaration of war on Japan. Congress adopted a corresponding resolution.

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Preparing for war

The attack on Pearl Harbor was intended to neutralize the US Pacific Fleet, and therefore protect Japan's gains in Malaya and the Dutch East Indies, where it was seeking access to natural resources such as oil and rubber. The possibility of war between Japan and the United States had been considered by both nations since 1921, although tensions began to rise in earnest only in 1931, when Japan invaded Manchuria. Over the next decade, Japan continued to expand its influence in China, leading to all-out war in 1937. Japan spent a lot of effort to isolate China and achieve resource independence enough to achieve victory on the mainland; conquests in the south were supposed to help this.

Since December 1937, events such as the Japanese attack on the USS Panay and the Nanjing Massacre (over 200,000 dead) sharply worsened public opinion of Japan in the West and increased fears of Japanese expansion, prompting the United States, Britain, and France provide loans to China for military supplies.

In July 1941, following Japanese expansion into French Indochina following the fall of France, the United States stopped exporting oil to Japan (due in part to new American restrictions on domestic oil consumption). This, in turn, prompted the Japanese to begin seizing the oil-rich Dutch East Indies. The Japanese were faced with a choice: either leave China and lose face, or seize sources of raw materials in the European colonies of Southeast Asia.

Preliminary planning for an attack on Pearl Harbor to protect advances into the "Southern Resource Region" (the Japanese term for the Dutch East Indies and Southeast Asia in general) began early in 1941 under the auspices of Admiral Isoroku Yamamoto, then commander of the Japanese Combined Fleet. . He received approval to formally plan and prepare for the attack from the Imperial Japanese Navy General Staff only after much wrangling with the naval command, including a threat to resign. Full-scale planning took place in the early spring of 1941, primarily by Captain Minoru Genda. Japanese strategists carefully studied the British air attack on the Italian fleet at Taranto in 1940. This was quite useful to them when planning the attack on the US naval forces at Pearl Harbor.

It would not be superfluous to mention that in 1932 and 1937 the American fleet conducted major exercises, during which they practiced striking aircraft from aircraft carriers at Pearl Harbor. In both cases, the attacking aircraft were successful. However, the American command did not take the results of these exercises seriously enough, believing that in reality the enemy would not be able to carry out an effective attack on the base. The Japanese, on the contrary, rated the idea as very promising.

Over the next few months, pilots were trained, equipment was adapted, and intelligence was collected. Despite these preparations, the attack plan was not approved by Emperor Hirohito until November 5, after the third of four imperial conferences called for consideration of the issue. Final permission was not given by the Emperor until December 1, after most of the Japanese leaders informed him that the Halla Note would "destroy the fruits of the China Incident, threaten Manchukuo, undermine Japanese control of Korea."

By the end of 1941, many observers believed that hostilities between the United States and Japan were inevitable. A Gallup poll shortly before the attack on Pearl Harbor found that 52% of Americans expected war with Japan, 27% did not expect war, and 21% had no opinion. While US Pacific bases and installations were put on alert several times, the US military doubted that Pearl Harbor would be the first target. They expected the Philippines to be attacked first. This assumption was due to the threat that air bases throughout the country and the naval base in Manila posed to shipping lanes as well as supplies to Japan from the south. In addition, they mistakenly believed that Japan was unable to carry out more than one major naval operation at a time.

Pearl Harbor before the attack

Back in mid-1941, Roosevelt wrote to Churchill: “It is possible that I will never declare war, but simply start it. If I asked Congress to declare war, the debate on this issue could drag on there for three months.”

In early October, two months before the “surprise” attack, Soviet intelligence officer Richard Sorge reported to Moscow that Pearl Harbor would be attacked within 60 days; this data, according to American sources, was brought to the attention of Washington by the Kremlin.

From recently declassified documents in America, it became known about the meeting that the German envoy to China Hans Thomsen arranged for New York businessman Malcolm Lovell in mid-November 1941. A German diplomat, knowing about the businessman's connections with the White House, told him about the upcoming Japanese attack. In turn, Lovell immediately reported this to one of the chiefs of American intelligence, William Donovan, who on the same day conveyed the information received personally to the president. Less than three weeks remained before the attack on Pearl Harbor.

On the evening of December 6, a Japanese note was intercepted and decrypted in Washington - a response to the American ultimatum of November 26. Although the lengthy document did not directly speak of a declaration of war, its entire meaning and indication of the exact hour of delivery - 1 o'clock in the afternoon on December 7 - spoke for themselves, but no warning was sent to Hawaii, where the entire Pacific Fleet was based. On December 6 at 21:30 (Washington time), the Japanese note was delivered to Roosevelt. After reading it, the president remarked: “This is war.”

The main events of December 7, 1941 unfolded around Fr. Ford Island, a small island in the center of the East Loch of Pearl Harbor Bay. There was a naval airfield on the island, and there were ship moorings around it.

Off the southeastern shore of the island. Ford is located so-called “Battleship Row” - 6 pairs of massive concrete piles designed for mooring heavy ships. The battleship is moored simultaneously to two piles. A second ship can moor alongside it.

At the time of the Japanese attack, 7 of the 9 battleships of the US Pacific Fleet were in the battleship row.

50 minutes before the attack, the planes of the Empire of Japan were detected by the American radar SCR-270, located in the north of the island, but the Americans considered these planes to be theirs, so the alarm was not raised.

Japanese aviation

In total, three types of aircraft were based on the Japanese aircraft carriers that participated in the attack on Pearl Harbor, widely known by the code names given to them in the American Navy: Zero fighters, Kate torpedo bombers and Val dive bombers. Brief characteristics of these aircraft are given in the table.

Type	American title	Speed, km/h	Flight range, km	Armament	Crew	Purpose
Aichi D3A 1, type 99	Val	450	1400	250 kg bomb under the fuselage, two 60 kg bombs under the wings, three 7.7 mm machine guns	2	Dive bomber
Mitsubishi A6M 2, model 11	Zero	545	1870	two 20-mm cannons and 7.7 mm machine guns, two 60-kg bombs under the wings	1	Fighter
Nakajima B5N 2, type 97 model 12	Kate	360	1100	457 mm torpedo or more than 500 kg bombs or 800 kg bomb, 7.7 mm machine gun	2-3	Torpedo bomber, high-altitude bomber

Aircraft of the first wave

Group number	Aircraft carrier	Qty	Planned goals
Weapon: 800 kg armor-piercing bomb
1c	"Akagi"	15	"Maryland", "Tennessee", "Zap. Virginia"
2v	"Kaga"	14	"Arizona", "Tennessee", "Zap. Virginia"
3v	"Soryu"	10	"Nevada", "Tennessee", "Zap. Virginia"
4v	"Hiryu"	10	"Arizona", "California"
	TOTAL:	49
Torpedo bombers "Kate" Weapon: Mk91 aircraft torpedo
1t	"Akagi"	12	"Zap. Virginia", "Oklahoma", "California"
2t	"Kaga"	12	"Zap. Virginia", "Oklahoma", "Nevada"
3t	"Soryu"	8	"Utah", "Helena", "California", "Rayleigh"
4t	"Hiryu"	8	"Zap. Virginia", "Oklahoma", "Helena"
	TOTAL:	40

1p	"Shoukaku"	26	Hickam
2p	"Zuikaku"	25	Weller
	TOTAL:	51
Zero fighters Armament: 20 mm cannon and 7 mm machine guns
1i	"Akagi"	9	Hickam, Eva, Fr. Ford
2i	"Kaga"	9	Hickam, Fr. Ford
3i	"Soryu"	8
4i	"Hiryu"	6	Weller, Eva, planes at Cape Barbers
5i	"Shoukaku"	6	Kaneohe, Bellows
6i	"Zuikaku"	5	Kaneohe
	TOTAL:	43
	TOTAL in the first wave:	183

Note

Aircraft of the second wave

Group number	Aircraft carrier	Qty	Planned goals
Kate high altitude bombers Armament: 250 kg aerial bomb and 6 60 kg aerial bombs
1c	"Shoukaku"	9	Seaplane base o. Ford
2v	"Shoukaku"	18	Kaneohe
3v	"Zuikaku"	27	Hickam
	TOTAL:	54
Val dive bombers Weapon: 250 kg aerial bomb
1p	"Akagi"	18	Tanker "Neosho", o. Ford, Maryland
2p	"Zuikaku"	17	Navy shipyard
3p	"Soryu"	17	Navy shipyard, docks, battleships
4p	"Kaga"	26	Navy shipyard, docks, battleships
	TOTAL:	78
Zero fighters Weapon: 20 mm cannon
1i	"Akagi"	9	Hickam Aerodrome
2i	"Kaga"	9	Hickam Airfields Ford, Weller
3i	"Soryu"	9	Kaneohe Airfield
4i	"Hiryu"	8	Airfields Kaneohe, Bollows
	TOTAL:	35
	TOTAL in the second wave:	167

Note. Group numbers are conditional for designation on diagrams.

Japanese fleet attack

On November 26, 1941, a strike force of the Imperial Japanese Navy under the command of Vice Admiral Chuichi Nagumo, on the orders of Fleet Commander Isoroku Yamamoto, left the base in Hitokappu Bay (now Killer Whale) on Iturup Island (Kuril Islands) and headed for Pearl Harbor. The Japanese force included six aircraft carriers: Akagi, Kaga, Hiryu, Soryu, Shokaku and Zuikaku, which carried 414 aircraft, including fighters, torpedo bombers and dive bombers. The aircraft carriers were escorted by 2 battleships, 2 heavy and 1 light cruiser and 9 destroyers (2 more destroyers had separated earlier to conduct a separate operation to shell Midway Atoll). The operation against Oahu also involved 6 submarines, delivering midget submarines to the attack site and later patrolling around the Hawaiian Islands.

The purpose of the attack on Pearl Harbor was to neutralize the US Pacific Fleet in order to ensure freedom of action for the Japanese army and navy in Southeast Asia. This goal could not be achieved, since the modern types of ships of the Pacific Fleet - aircraft carriers and submarines - were not damaged. Of the 8 American battleships, mostly obsolete, from the First World War, that were parked in Pearl Harbor, the Arizona (the ammunition exploded) and the Oklahoma (overturned, raised and sent for disposal) were irretrievably lost. Pennsylvania and Maryland received minor damage and returned to service at the end of the month. Tennessee and Nevada suffered more serious damage and were repaired by February and October 1942, respectively. "California" and "West Virginia" were restored only in 1944.

On the morning of December 7, aircraft from Japanese aircraft carriers attacked airfields on the island of Oahu and ships anchored in Pearl Harbor. The most convenient moment for the attack was chosen - it was Sunday, some of the teams and personnel of the coastal defense batteries were on leave. Of the 32 coastal defense batteries, only 8 opened fire on the attackers, of which 4 were quickly suppressed. As a result of the attack, 4 battleships, 2 destroyers, and 1 minelayer were sunk. Another 4 battleships, 3 light cruisers and 1 destroyer were damaged. American aviation losses amounted to 188 aircraft destroyed, another 159 were seriously damaged. 2,403 Americans were killed (1,102 on board the USS Arizona) and 1,178 were wounded. The Japanese lost 29 aircraft, and another 74 were damaged. 5 midget submarines were lost due to various reasons. Losses in people amounted to 64 people killed (55 pilots, 9 submariners). Another one, Lieutenant Kazuo Sakamaki, was captured. He washed ashore after his midget submarine hit a reef.

Notes

The battleships West Virginia (BB-48) and California (BB-44) were sunk at Pearl Harbor and subsequently raised and returned to service.
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Pearl Harbor is the largest US naval base in the Pacific Ocean, located on the island of Oahu, Hawaii.

During World War II, on December 7, 1941, Pearl Harbor was subjected to a surprise attack by the Japanese army, which destroyed most of the American Pacific Fleet within two hours. This elaborate attack by Japanese naval forces was called the Hawaiian Operation of 1941.

The Hawaiian operation was carried out by an aircraft carrier strike force under the command of Vice Admiral Chuichi Nagumo, consisting of 33 ships, including six heavy aircraft carriers (with 420 aircraft on board), two battleships, three cruisers, 11 destroyers, three submarines and eight tankers and a formation of 27 submarines with five midget submarines on board. The overall leadership of the forces was carried out by the commander of the Japanese Combined Fleet, Admiral Isoroku Yamamoto.

The American Pacific Fleet, under the command of Admiral Husband Kimmel, located at the Pearl Harbor naval base, consisted of 93 ships, including nine battleships (one training), eight cruisers, 29 destroyers, five submarines, nine destroyers and minelayers, 10 minesweepers. There were 390 aircraft located at the airfields on Oahu, including 167 naval aircraft.

The base's air defense consisted of 188 anti-aircraft guns, more than 100 machine gun installations and five radar stations. The garrison, under the command of General William Short, numbered 42,959 men.

Japan began preparations for the operation in January 1941 with the strictest secrecy. Even Japan's allies - Germany and Italy - were not aware of its goals and date. The ships' route practically excluded encounters with commercial and fishing vessels and was beyond the range of American patrol aircraft. During the transition, radio silence was strictly observed; at the same time, radio exchange was carried out in the Inland Sea of Japan using the call signs of those ships that were heading to the Hawaiian Islands in order to disorient the enemy.

On the evening of December 6, Japanese submarines took up their initial positions on the nearest approaches to the island of Oahu and at 23:00 they began launching midget submarines. On December 7, a Japanese aircraft carrier force entered the area located 275 miles (about 450 km) north of the island.

It was Sunday. Some of the personnel of the American ships were on the shore. The entrance to Pearl Harbor was not closed with booms (floating barriers), and there was also no anti-torpedo net barrier for the battleships. The disposition of the ships did not change for a long time. The planes at the airfields were crowded together; on the approaches to the Hawaiian Islands, aerial reconnaissance was carried out only sporadically.

The Japanese General Staff, on the contrary, had comprehensive data on the disposition of American ships and the state of the base’s defense.

On December 7, at 6:15 a.m. Hawaiian time, 40 torpedo bombers, 49 bombers, 51 dive bombers, and 43 fighters took off from Japanese aircraft carriers. The raid on the base began at 7:55 am. At 9:15 a.m. the second group of aircraft struck (54 bombers, 78 dive bombers, 35 fighters). The entire raid on the base lasted 2 hours 5 minutes.

Four battleships, a cruiser, two destroyers, several auxiliary ships and 188 aircraft were destroyed. Four battleships, three light cruisers, a destroyer, two auxiliary vessels and over 100 aircraft were damaged. American casualties amounted to 3,581 people.

The Japanese lost 29 aircraft and six submarines (of which five were midgets), and over 70 aircraft were damaged.

As a result of the Hawaiian operation and the subsequent Philippine and Malayan operations of 1941-1942. Japan gained supremacy at sea and gained freedom of action in the Pacific Ocean.

With a surprise attack on an American military base, Japan started a war against the United States. On December 8, the USA, Great Britain, Canada and a number of other countries declared war on Japan.

The success of the Hawaiian operation was due to the careful preparation of the Japanese command for the operation, the precise organization of the covert passage of ships and the surprise of the attack. The American command made mistakes in organizing the defense of the main fleet base and assessing the situation as a whole.

The operation showed the high combat capabilities of aircraft carriers, while midget submarines did not justify themselves.

US President Franklin Roosevelt called December 7, 1941 “a day of indelible shame.” The slogan “Remember Pearl Harbor” became the leading one in the American war against Japan.

After 1945, the Pearl Harbor naval base was reconstructed and again began to serve as the main base of the US Pacific Fleet.

A memorial dedicated to the battleship Arizona, sunk by Japanese aircraft, has been opened.
(Additional

Strengths of the parties Losses Audio, photo, video on Wikimedia Commons

The attack consisted of two air raids, in which 353 aircraft took off from 6 Japanese aircraft carriers. The attack resulted in the sinking of four US Navy battleships (two of which were recovered and returned to service at the end of the war), and four more were damaged. The Japanese also sank or damaged three cruisers, three destroyers, and one minelayer; destroyed 188-272 aircraft (according to various sources); human casualties - 2403 killed and 1178 wounded. The power plant, shipyard, fuel and torpedo storage facilities, piers, as well as the main control building were not damaged by the attack. Japanese losses were light: 29 aircraft, 5 small submarines, along with 64 dead and 1 captured military personnel.

The attack was a preventive measure against the United States, aimed at eliminating the American navy, gaining air supremacy in the Pacific region and subsequent military operations against Burma, Thailand, and the US's western possessions in the Pacific Ocean. This goal was only partially achieved, since modern US surface ships - aircraft carriers - were at that time in a different place and were not damaged. The affected battleships were of obsolete types dating back to the First World War. In addition, the importance of battleships as the main striking force of the fleet in the era of aviation dominance sharply declined.

On the same day, the United States declared war on Japan, thereby entering the war. Because of the attack, especially its nature, public opinion in America changed dramatically from an isolationist position in the mid-1930s to direct participation in the war effort. On December 8, 1941, US President Franklin Roosevelt spoke at a joint meeting of both houses of Congress. The President demanded that as of December 7, “a day that will go down in history as a symbol of shame,” a declaration of war on Japan. Congress adopted a corresponding resolution.

Preparing for war

The attack on Pearl Harbor was intended to neutralize the US Pacific Fleet, and therefore protect Japan's gains in Malaya and the Dutch East Indies, where it was seeking access to natural resources such as oil and rubber. The possibility of war between Japan and the United States had been considered by both nations since 1921, although tensions began to rise in earnest only in 1931 with Japan's invasion of Manchuria. Over the next decade, Japan continued to expand its influence in China, leading to all-out war in 1937. Japan spent a lot of effort to isolate China and achieve resource independence enough to achieve victory on the mainland; conquests in the south were supposed to help this.

From December 1937, events such as the Japanese attack on the USS Panay and the Nanking Massacre (over 200,000 dead) sharply worsened public opinion of Japan in the West and increased fears of Japanese expansion, prompting the United States, Britain and France provide loans to China for military supplies.

In July 1941, following Japanese expansion into French Indochina following the fall of France, the United States stopped exporting oil to Japan (due in part to new American restrictions on domestic oil consumption). This in turn prompted the Japanese to begin seizing the oil-rich Dutch East Indies. The Japanese were faced with a choice: either leave China and lose face, or seize sources of raw materials in the European colonies of Southeast Asia.

According to John Coster, a certain role may have been played by the Soviet intelligence operation called Operation Snow, carried out in April 1941, as a result of which, through a very influential employee of the US Treasury Department, Harry Dexter White, information about Japan's preparations for war against the United States was brought to President Roosevelt. In this regard, the idea arose to put pressure on Japan. The United States demanded that Japan immediately stop its aggression in China and withdraw troops from all Chinese territories except Manchukuo, withdraw from the Tripartite Pact with Germany and Italy, and neutralize Manchukuo.

Preliminary planning for an attack on Pearl Harbor to protect advances into the "Southern Resource Region" (the Japanese term for the Dutch East Indies and Southeast Asia in general) began very early in 1941 under the auspices of Admiral Isoroku Yamamoto, then commander of the Japanese Combined Fleet. . He received approval for formal planning and preparations for the attack from the Imperial Japanese Navy General Staff only after much dispute with the naval command, including a threat to resign. Full-scale planning took place in the early spring of 1941, primarily by Captain Minoru Genda. Japanese strategists carefully studied the British air attack on the Italian fleet at Taranto in 1940. This was quite useful to them when planning the attack on the US naval forces at Pearl Harbor.

Pearl Harbor before the attack

In early October, two months before the "surprise" attack, Soviet intelligence officer Richard Sorge reported to Moscow that Pearl Harbor would be attacked within 60 days; this data, according to American sources, was brought to the attention of Washington by the Kremlin.

From recently [ When?] documents declassified in America, it became known about the meeting that the German envoy to China Hans Thomsen arranged for New York businessman Malcolm Lovell in mid-November 1941. A German diplomat, knowing about the businessman's connections with the White House, told him about the upcoming Japanese attack. In turn, Lovell immediately reported this to one of the chiefs of American intelligence, William Donovan, who on the same day conveyed the information received personally to the president. Less than three weeks remained before the attack on Pearl Harbor.

At the time of the Japanese attack, 7 of the 9 battleships of the US Pacific Fleet were in the battleship row.

Japanese aviation

Type	American title	Speed, km/h	Flight range, km	Armament	Crew	Purpose
Aichi D3A 1, type 99	Val	450	1400	250 kg bomb under the fuselage, two 60 kg bombs under the wings, three 7.7 mm machine guns	2	Dive bomber
Mitsubishi A6M 2, model 11	Zero	545	1870	two 20-mm cannons and 7.7 mm machine guns, two 60-kg bombs under the wings	1	Fighter
Nakajima B5N 2, type 97 model 12	Kate	360	1100	457 mm torpedo or more than 500 kg bombs or 800 kg bomb, 7.7 mm machine gun	2-3	Torpedo bomber, high-altitude bomber

Aircraft of the first wave

Group number	Aircraft carrier	Qty	Planned goals
Weapon: 800 kg armor-piercing bomb
1c	"Akagi"	15	"Maryland", "Tennessee", "Zap. Virginia"
2v	"Kaga"	14	"Arizona", "Tennessee", "Zap. Virginia"
3v	"Soryu"	10	"Nevada", "Tennessee", "Zap. Virginia"
4v	"Hiryu"	10	"Arizona", "California"
	TOTAL:	49
Torpedo bombers "Kate" Weapon: Mk91 aircraft torpedo
1t	"Akagi"	12	"Zap. Virginia", "Oklahoma", "California"
2t	"Kaga"	12	"Zap. Virginia", "Oklahoma", "Nevada"
3t	"Soryu"	8	"Utah", "Helena", "California", "Rayleigh"
4t	"Hiryu"	8	"Zap. Virginia", "Oklahoma", "Helena"
	TOTAL:	40

1p	"Shoukaku"	26	Hickam
2p	"Zuikaku"	25	Weller
	TOTAL:	51
Zero fighters Armament: 20 mm cannons and 7 mm machine guns
1i	"Akagi"	9	Hickam, Eva, Fr. Ford
2i	"Kaga"	9	Hickam, Fr. Ford
3i	"Soryu"	8
4i	"Hiryu"	6	Weller, Eva, planes at Cape Barbers
5i	"Shoukaku"	6	Kaneohe, Bellows
6i	"Zuikaku"	5	Kaneohe
	TOTAL:	43
	TOTAL in the first wave:	183

Note

Aircraft of the second wave

Group number	Aircraft carrier	Qty	Planned goals
Kate high altitude bombers Armament: 250 kg aerial bomb and 6 60 kg aerial bombs
1c	"Shoukaku"	9	Seaplane base o. Ford
2v	"Shoukaku"	18	Kaneohe
3v	"Zuikaku"	27	Hickam
	TOTAL:	54
Val dive bombers Weapon: 250 kg aerial bomb
1p	"Akagi"	18	Tanker "Neosho", o. Ford, Maryland
2p	"Zuikaku"	17	Navy shipyard
3p	"Soryu"	17	Navy shipyard, docks, battleships
4p	"Kaga"	26	Navy shipyard, docks, battleships
	TOTAL:	78
Zero fighters Weapon: 20 mm cannon
1i	"Akagi"	9	Hickam Aerodrome
2i	"Kaga"	9	Hickam Airfields Ford, Weller
3i	"Soryu"	9	Kaneohe Airfield
4i	"Hiryu"	8	Airfields Kaneohe, Bollows
	TOTAL:	35
	TOTAL in the second wave:	167

Note. Group numbers are conditional for designation on diagrams.

Japanese fleet attack

On November 26, 1941, a strike force of the Imperial Japanese Navy under the command of Vice Admiral Chuichi Nagumo, on the orders of Fleet Commander Isoroku Yamamoto, left the base in Hitokappu Bay (now Kasatka Bay) on Iturup Island (Kuril Islands) and headed for Pearl Harbor. The Japanese formation included six aircraft carriers: Akagi, Kaga, Hiryu, Soryu, Shokaku and Zuikaku, which carried 414 aircraft, including fighters, torpedo bombers and dive bombers. The aircraft carriers were escorted by 2 battleships, 2 heavy and 1 light cruiser and 9 destroyers (2 more destroyers had separated earlier to conduct a separate operation to shell Midway Atoll). The operation against Oahu also involved 6 submarines, delivering midget submarines to the attack site and later patrolling around the Hawaiian Islands.

Losses

As a result of the attack, 4 battleships, 2 destroyers, and 1 minelayer were sunk. Another 4 battleships, 3 light cruisers and 1 destroyer were damaged. American aviation losses amounted to 188 aircraft destroyed, another 159 were seriously damaged. 2,403 Americans were killed (1,102 on board the USS Arizona) and 1,178 were wounded. The Japanese lost 29 aircraft, and another 74 were damaged. 5 midget submarines were lost due to various reasons. Losses in people amounted to 64 people killed (55 pilots, 9 submariners). Another one, Lieutenant Kazuo Sakamaki, was captured. He washed ashore after his midget submarine hit a reef.

Event in world culture

Notes

The battleships West Virginia (BB-48) and California (BB-44) were sunk at Pearl Harbor and subsequently raised and returned to service.
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Literature

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Pearl Harbor. Ed. N. Anichkin. - M.: Eksmo, 2010. - ISBN 978-5-699-39244-5
Yakovlev N. N. Pearl Harbor, December 7, 1941. Fact and fiction. - Moscow: Politizdat, 1988.
Parillo, Mark (2006), ISBN 978-0-8131-2374-5 ,
Buranok S. O. Pearl Harbor in the assessments of US military and political figures 1941-1945. - Samara: As Gard, 2009. - 238 p. - ISBN 978-5-91715-033-8
Buranok S. O. The Pearl Harbor tragedy and the American press // New and recent history. 2010. No. 5. - M.: Nauka, 2010. - P. 210-220.
Buranok S. O.“Report on the Actions of December 7, 1941” by Admiral H. Kimmel: research, publication of the text and translation. - Samara: As Gard, 2011. - 156 p. - ISBN 978-5-4259-0027-2
Barnhart, Michael A. (1987) Japan prepares for total war: the search for economic security, 1919–1941, Cornell University Press, ISBN 978-0-8014-1915-7 ,
Bix, Herbert P. (2000), Hirohito and the Making of Modern Japan, Diane Pub Co, ISBN 978-0-7567-5780-9
Borch, Frederic L. & Martinez, Daniel (2005), Kimmel, Short, and Pearl Harbor: the final report revealed, Naval Institute Press, ISBN 978-1-59114-090-0 ,
Conn, Stetson; Fairchild, Byron & Engelman, Rose C. (2000), "7 – The Attack on Pearl Harbor", Guarding the United States and Its Outposts, Washington D.C.: Center of Military History United States Army ,
Gailey, Harry A. (1997), War in the Pacific: From Pearl Harbor to Tokyo Bay, Presidio, ISBN 0-89141-616-1
Gilbert, Martin (2009), The Second World War, Phoenix, ISBN 978-0-7538-2676-8 ,
Goldstein, Donald M. (2000), Goldstein, Donald M. & Dillon, Katherine V., eds., The Pearl Harbor papers: inside the Japanese plans, Brassey's, ISBN 978-1-57488-222-3 ,
Hakim, Joy (1995), A History of US: Book 9: War, Peace, and All that Jazz, Oxford University Press, U.S., ISBN 978-0-19-509514-2 ,
Hixson, Walter L. (2003), The American Experience in World War II: The United States and the road to war in Europe, Taylor & Francis, ISBN 978-0-415-94029-0 ,
Hoyt, Edwin P. (2000), Pearl Harbor, G. K. Hall, ISBN 0-7838-9303-5 ,
Morison, Samuel Eliot (2001), History of United States Naval Operations in World War II: The rising sun in the Pacific, 1931 – April 1942, University of Illinois Press, ISBN 0-252-06973-0
Ofstie, Ralph, A., RADM USN, Naval Analysis Division, United States Strategic Bombing Survey (Pacific) (1946), The Campaigns of the Pacific War, United States Government Printing Office
Peattie, Mark R. & Evans, David C. (1997) Kaigun: Strategy, Tactics, and Technology in the Imperial Japanese Navy, Naval Institute Press, ISBN 0-87021-192-7 ,
Peattie, Mark R. (2001), Sunburst: The Rise of Japanese Naval Air Power, 1909–1941, Naval Institute Press, ISBN 1-59114-664-X
Parillo, Mark (2006), "The United States in the Pacific", in Higham, Robin & Harris, Stephen, Why Air Forces Fail: the Anatomy of Defeat, The University Press of Kentucky, ISBN 978-0-8131-2374-5 ,
Prange, Gordon William. December 7, 1941: The Day the Japanese Attacked Pearl Harbor / Gordon William Prange, Goldstein, Dillon. - McGraw-Hill, 1988. - ISBN 978-0-07-050682-4.
Smith, Carl (1999), Pearl Harbor 1941: The Day of Infamy; Osprey Campaign Series #62, Osprey Publishing, http://www.ibiblio.org/pha/pha/congress/part_2.html
Edwin T. Layton, Roger Pineau, and John Costello (1985), And I Was There: Pearl Harbor and Midway-Breaking the Secrets, New York: Morrow. Layton, Kimmel's Combat Intelligence Officer, says that Douglas MacArthur was the only field commander who had received any substantial amount of Purple intelligence.
George Edward Morgenstern. Pearl Harbor: The Story of the Secret War. (The Devin-Adair Company, 1947). Conspiracy theory.
James Dorsey. "Literary Tropes, Rhetorical Looping, and the Nine Gods of War: "Fascist Proclivities" Made Real," in The Culture of Japanese Fascism, ed. by Alan Tansman (Durham & London: Duke UP, 2009), pp. 409–431. A study of Japanese wartime media representations of the submarine component of the attack on Pearl Harbor.
McCollum memo A 1940 memo from a Naval headquarters staff officer to his superiors outlining possible provocations to Japan, which might lead to war (declassified in 1994).
Gordon W. Prange At Dawn We Slept(McGraw-Hill, 1981) Pearl Harbor: The Verdict of History(McGraw-Hill, 1986), and December 7, 1941: The Day the Japanese Attacked Pearl Harbor(McGraw-Hill, 1988). This monumental trilogy, written with collaborators Donald M. Goldstein and Katherine V. Dillon, is considered the authoritative work on the subject.
Larry Kimmett and Margaret Regis, The Attack on Pearl Harbor: An Illustrated History(NavPublishing, 2004). Using maps, photos, unique illustrations, and an animated CD, this book provides a detailed overview of the surprise attack that brought the United States into World War II.
Walter Lord Day of Infamy(Henry Holt, 1957) is a very readable, and entirely anecdotal, re-telling of the day's events.
W. J. Holmes Double-Edged Secrets: U.S. Naval Intelligence Operations in the Pacific During World War II(Naval Institute, 1979) contains some important material, such as Holmes" argument that, had the U.S. Navy been warned of the attack and put to sea, it would have likely resulted in an even greater disaster.
Michael V. Gannon Pearl Harbor Betrayed(Henry Holt, 2001) is a recent examination of the issues surrounding the surprise of the attack.
Frederick D. Parker Pearl Harbor Revisited: United States Navy Communications Intelligence 1924–1941(Center for Cryptologic History, 1994) contains a detailed description of what the Navy knew from intercepted and decrypted Japan's communications prior to Pearl.
Henry C. Clausen and Bruce Lee, Pearl Harbor: Final Judgment, (HarperCollins, 2001), an account of the secret "Clausen Inquiry" undertaken late in the war by order of Congress to Secretary of War Henry L. Stimson.
Robert A. Theobald Final Secret of Pearl Harbor(Devin-Adair Pub, 1954) 0-425-09040-X (186 KB) (undefined) . Retrieved January 5, 2017. Archived July 13, 2007. (Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments) contains a passage regarding the Yarnell attack, as well as reference citations.
Roberta Wohlstetter Pearl Harbor: Warning and Decision, (Stanford University Press: 1962). The most cited scholarly work on the intelligence failure at Pearl Harbor. Her introduction and analysis of the concept of "noise" persists in understanding intelligence failures.
- Roberta Wohlstetter, "Cuba and Pearl Harbor: Hindsight and Foresight." Foreign Affairs 43.4 (1965): 691-707. online
John Hughes-Wilson Military Intelligence Blunders and Cover-Ups. Robinson, 1999 (revised 2004). Contains a brief but insightful chapter on the particular intelligence failures, and a broader overview of what causes them.
Douglas T. Shinsato and Tadanori Urabe, "For That One Day: The Memoirs of Mitsuo Fuchida, Commander of the Attack on Pearl Harbor." (eXperience: 2011) ISBN Resurrection-Salvaging the Battle Fleet at Pearl Harbor. U.S. Naval Institute Press. 2003. Highly readable and thoroughly researched account of the aftermath of the attack and the salvage efforts from December 8, 1941 through early 1944.
Takeo, Iguchi, Demystifying Pearl Harbor: A New Perspective From Japan, I-House Press, 2010, ASIN: B003RJ1AZA.
Haynok, Robert J. How the Japanese Did It. - United States Naval Institute, 2009. - Vol. 23.
Melber, Takuma, Pearl Harbor. Japans Angriff und der Kriegseintritt der USA. C.H. Beck, Munich 2016, . A concise introduction with a good focus oo what came before the attack and on the Japanese perspective.
Moorhead, John J. 1942 "Surgical Experience at Pearl Harbor", The Journal of the American Medical Association. An overview of different surgical procedures at the hospital at the scene of the event.

Pearl Harbor is a US naval base in the central Pacific Ocean on the island. Oahu, where the main forces of the American Pacific Fleet were located. With the attack on Pearl Harbor on December 7, 1941, Japan started the war in the Pacific. The fighting in the Pearl Harbor area was an integral part of the Hawaiian operation of the Japanese naval forces (Operation Pearl Harbor - Aleutian Islands).

The idea of this operation was to covertly approach and launch a sudden massive attack by aviation from the aviation association on American ships, coastal structures and aircraft in Pearl Harbor. Simultaneously with aviation operations, it was planned to use three ultra-small submarines, delivered to the combat area on submarines - wombs. They received the task of infiltrating Pearl Harbor the night before an air strike and attacking battleships with torpedoes. (Soviet Military Encyclopedia. T.6. M., 1978. P. 295-296.) For a diversionary strike, two destroyers from the aircraft carrier formation were tasked with shelling the air base on the island. Midway.

By December 7, there were 93 ships and support vessels in Pearl Harbor. Among them are 8 battleships, 8 cruisers, 29 destroyers, 5 submarines, 9 minelayers and 10 minesweepers of the US Navy. The air force consisted of 394 aircraft, and air defense was provided by 294 anti-aircraft guns. The base garrison numbered 42,959 people (ibid.).

Ships in the harbor and planes at the airfield were crowded together, making them a convenient target for attack. The base's air defense was not ready to repel attacks. Most of the anti-aircraft guns were not manned, and their ammunition was kept under lock and key. (Second World War. Two views. M., 1995. P. 466.)

To attack Pearl Harbor, the Japanese command allocated an aircraft carrier force under the command of Vice Admiral Chuichi Nagumo, consisting of 23 ships and 8 tankers. The formation consisted of a strike group consisting of six aircraft carriers (1st, 2nd and 5th aircraft carrier divisions), a covering group (2nd detachment of the 3rd battleship division), two heavy cruisers (8th cruiser division) , one light cruiser and nine destroyers (1st Destroyer Squadron), an Advance Detachment of three submarines and a Supply Detachment of eight tankers. (Futida M., Okumiya M. The Battle of Midway Atoll. Translated from English. M., 1958. P. 52.) The aviation group of the formation consisted of a total of 353 aircraft.

The operation, which was carefully planned and prepared, was led by the commander of the combined Japanese fleet, Admiral Isoroku Yamamoto. Particular importance was attached to achieving surprise in the attack. On November 22, 1941, the task force gathered in the strictest secrecy in Hitokappu Bay (Kuril Islands) and from here, observing radio silence, headed for Pearl Harbor on November 26. The transition took place along the longest (6300 km) route, characterized by frequent stormy weather, but least visited by ships. For camouflage purposes, a false radio exchange was made, which simulated the presence of all large Japanese ships in the Inland Sea of Japan. (Soviet military encyclopedia. T.6. P. 295.)

However, for the American government, the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor was not so unexpected. The Americans deciphered the Japanese codes and read all Japanese messages for several months. The warning about the inevitability of war was sent on time - November 27, 1941. The Americans received a clear warning about Pearl Harbor at the last moment, on the morning of December 7, but the instruction about the need to increase vigilance, sent via commercial lines, reached Pearl Harbor only 22 minutes before the Japanese attack began, and was transmitted to the messengers only at 10:45 minutes when it was all over. (See: History of the War in the Pacific. T.Z.M., 1958. P. 264; The Second World War: Two Views. P. 465.)

In the predawn darkness of December 7, Vice Admiral Nagumo's aircraft carriers reached the aircraft lifting point and were 200 miles from Pearl Harbor. On the night of December 7, 2 Japanese destroyers fired on the island. Midway, and 5 Japanese midget submarines launched at Pearl Harbor began operating. Two of them were destroyed by American patrol forces.

At 6.00 on December 7, 183 aircraft of the first wave took off from aircraft carriers and headed for the target. There were 49 attack aircraft-bombers of the 97 type, each of which carried an 800-kilogram armor-piercing bomb, 40 attack torpedo bombers with a torpedo suspended under the fuselage, 51 dive bombers of the 99 type, each carrying a 250-kilogram bomb. The covering force consisted of three groups of fighters, numbering a total of 43 aircraft. (Futida M., Okumiya M., op. cit. p. 54.)

The skies over Pearl Harbor were clear. At 7:55 am, Japanese planes attacked all large ships and aircraft at the airfield. There was not a single American fighter in the air, and not a single gun flash on the ground. As a result of the Japanese attack, which lasted about an hour, 3 battleships were sunk and a large number of aircraft were destroyed. Having finished bombing, the bombers headed for their aircraft carriers. The Japanese lost 9 aircraft.

The second wave of aircraft (170 aircraft) took off from the aircraft carriers at 7:15 am. In the second wave there were 54 attack bombers of the "97" type, 80 dive bombers "99" and 36 fighter jets, which covered the actions of the bombers. The second strike by Japanese planes met stronger American resistance. By 8.00 the planes returned to the aircraft carriers. Of all the aircraft that took part in the air raid, the Japanese lost 29 (9 fighters, 15 dive bombers and 5 torpedo bombers). Manpower losses amounted to a total of 55 officers and men. In addition, the Americans sank one submarine and 5 midget submarines, whose actions turned out to be ineffective.

As a result of the Japanese airborne attack on Pearl Harbor, the strategic goal of preventing the US Pacific Fleet from interfering with Japanese operations in the south was largely achieved. 4 American battleships were sunk and 4 more were badly damaged. 10 other warships were sunk or disabled; 349 American aircraft destroyed or damaged; among the killed or wounded Americans - 3,581 military, 103 civilian. (World War II: Two Views. P. 466.)

The Japanese victory could have been even more significant. They failed to cause the slightest harm to the enemy aircraft carriers. All 4 American aircraft carriers were absent from Pearl Harbor: 3 of them went to sea, one was being repaired in California. The Japanese made no attempt to destroy the huge American oil reserves in Hawaii, which in fact were almost equal to the entire Japanese reserves. The Japanese formation, with the exception of the ships that were part of a specially organized formation, which consisted of the 2nd division of aircraft carriers, the 8th division of cruisers and 2 destroyers, headed for the inland Sea of Japan. On December 23, it arrived at the anchorage near the island. Hasira.

Thus, by 10 a.m. on December 7, the American fleet in the Pacific actually ceased to exist. If at the beginning of the war the ratio of the combat power of the American and Japanese fleets was equal to 10: 7.5 (History of the War in the Pacific. T.Z. P. 266), now the ratio in large ships has changed in favor of the Japanese naval forces. On the very first day of hostilities, the Japanese gained supremacy at sea and gained the opportunity to conduct extensive offensive operations in the Philippines, Malaya and the Dutch Indies.

Materials used from the book: “One Hundred Great Battles”, M. “Veche”, 2002

Literature

1. History of the War in the Pacific Ocean: In the 5th volume / General. ed. Usami Seijiro. - T.Z. - M., 1958.

2. History of the Second World War. 1939-1945: In the 12th volume / Ed. count A.A. Grechko (chief editor) - T.4. - M., 1975.

3. Campaigns of the War in the Pacific: Materials for the study of strategic bombing by United States aircraft. - M., 1956.

4. Soviet military encyclopedia: In the 8th volume / Ch. ed. commission N.V. Ogarkov (prev.) and others - M., 1978. - T.6. - pp. 294-295.

5. What happened at Pearl Harbor. Documents about the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor. -M., 1961.

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Beginning of World War II(chronological table)