Introduction

Ideological control covers all spheres of spiritual life. The Party actively interferes in the research of not only historians and philosophers, but also philologists, mathematicians, and biologists, condemning some sciences as “bourgeois.” Wave mechanics, cybernetics, psychoanalysis and genetics were subjected to severe defeat. Repressed scientists were not only fired from their jobs and expelled from the Academies, but were also subjected to physical destruction in the camps. At the same time, post-war repressions were not so openly aimed at the immediate physical extermination of dissent - much more often it was about prisons and camps, rather than executions.

On March 5, 1953, Stalin died. And although with his death the fight against the intelligentsia will stop, and many will subsequently be granted amnesty, some will not be able to wait for this. It is difficult to assess the damage caused by Stalinism to Russian science and culture.

Attempts at economic reforms 1953-1964

In August 1953, a new budget was adopted, which provided subsidies for the production of consumer goods and the food industry. At the September 1953 plenum of the Central Committee, a decision was made to increase state purchase prices for collective farms and reduce mandatory supplies, write off debts from collective farms, and reduce taxes on personal plots and sales on the free market. At the February (1954) plenum, a decision was made to develop the virgin lands of Northern Kazakhstan, Siberia, Altai and the Southern Urals. 42 million hectares of arable land were put into circulation, where by the end of the decade up to 40% of all grains were grown. After N. S. Khrushchev’s speech at the January 1955 plenum of the Central Committee, the so-called corn campaign. In two years, 18 million hectares were sown with corn - often in areas completely unsuitable for it.

The beginning of reforms brought encouraging results - over three years, agricultural production increased by 25%. The next step was taken in May 1957, when Khrushchev, at a meeting of representatives of collective farmers, put forward the slogan “Catch up and overtake America!” (mainly in the production of meat and dairy products). 1957-1959 were marked by a series of administrative reforms and campaigns (“corn”, “meat”, “milk records”). In 1957, MTS was liquidated, the equipment of which was transferred to the collective farms through buyout. This led to a reduction in the fleet of agricultural machinery and the withdrawal of significant funds from collective farms. The second reform consisted of a new consolidation of collective farms. Its goal was the formation of large associations that could further promote the industrialization of agriculture. In an effort to fulfill inflated obligations, collective farm leaders begin an attack on household plots - they cut off household plots, force them to sell personal livestock to the collective farm, etc. In March 1962, agricultural management was restructured. Collective and state farm administrations (KSU) appeared in the regions, and similar committees appeared in the regions and republics. Later, in rural areas, party committees were abolished, the functions of which were transferred to party organizations of the KSU.

Certain transformations also affected industry . It was envisaged that the growth in the production of consumer goods should outpace the increase in the output of capital goods. This was the essence of N. S. Khrushchev’s approach to the tasks of industrial development, since the decline in prices for consumer goods created a significant deficit in this area.

The XI Congress of Trade Unions (1954) revealed serious problems in the management of industry and in the position of workers. In the foreground were strengthening supervision over overtime work and control over material incentives. Production meetings were soon revived. The commissions created to improve the work of enterprises and institutions brought together representatives of the administration and specialists. In April 1956, a revision of labor legislation began with the aim of its humanization (the form was not completed). On July 1, 1957, the Union industrial ministries were replaced by economic councils , which were supposed to establish direct connections with each other. This reform brought few positive economic results. “Administrative fever” was increasing, and the rate of economic development of the country was decreasing. However, this began to be felt only in the early 60s. Until that time, Khrushchev enjoyed authority among the working people.

This was facilitated by the regulations adopted in 1955-1959. measures to improve the life of the population, mainly urban. Salaries increased regularly. The issuance of mandatory government bonds has ceased. A law on old-age pensions for workers and employees has been adopted, the duration of maternity leave has been increased, working hours have been reduced, and all types of tuition fees have been abolished. The first housing construction was underway. Early 60s serious problems in the economy, which was largely destructured by ill-considered reforms and storming. The government tried to solve these problems at the expense of the workers. Tariffs on production were reduced by almost a third and food prices increased by almost the same amount. This led to an increase in social tension: spontaneous protests by workers took place, the largest in June 1962 in Novocherkassk.

Main trends in cultural development during the thaw years

In April 1954, the most odious governing body, the MGV, was transformed into the State Security Committee under the USSR Council of Ministers. Some former heads of security agencies were put on trial for falsifying cases.

In 1956-1957 political charges against repressed peoples are dropped, except for the Volga Germans and Crimean Tatars; their statehood is restored.

In September 1953, a review of the decisions of the former boards of the OPTU, NKVD, etc. began. By 1956, a total of 16 thousand people had been rehabilitated. After the 20th Congress of the CPSU (February 1956), rehabilitation acquired a much larger scale.

N. S. Khrushchev’s speech at the 20th Congress of the CPSU and the condemnation of the crimes of senior officials made a great impression and marked the beginning of changes in public consciousness.

The “thaw” was especially noticeable in literature and art. V. E. Meyerhold, B. A. Pilnyak, O. E. Mandelstam, I. E. Babel, G. I. Serebryakova were rehabilitated. Poems by S. A. Yesenin and works by A. A. Akhmatova and M. M. Zoshchenko are beginning to be published again. At an art exhibition in Moscow in 1962, the avant-garde of the 20-30s was presented, which had not been exhibited for many years. The revitalization of the cultural life of society was facilitated by the emergence of a large number of new magazines, both specialized, scientific, and literary and artistic. A real event in cultural life was the publication on the pages of “New World” (chief editor - A. T. Tvardovsky) of A. I. Solzhenitsyn’s story “One Day in the Life of Ivan Denisovich.”

From the second half of the 50s. International ties of Soviet culture are expanding - the Moscow Film Festival is being resumed, and since 1958 the International Competition for Performers has opened. Tchaikovsky; The exhibition of the Museum of Fine Arts is being restored. Pushkin, international exhibitions are held.

Expenditures on science have increased, many new research institutions have been opened. Since the 50s A large scientific center is being formed in the East of the country - the Siberian Branch of the USSR Academy of Sciences.

A reform of higher and secondary schools was carried out. In higher education, evening and correspondence education without interruption of work receives priority. In 1957, new rules for admission to universities were introduced. Applicants with 2 years of industrial experience or demobilized from the ranks of the Soviet Army

had advantages when enrolling, as well as the opportunity to prepare for entrance exams in special preparatory courses. By the end of the 50s. The share of young workers and collective farmers in the student body reached 70%.

In secondary schools, reform began in 1958 under the slogan of “strengthening the connection between school and life.” Compulsory eight-year education on a “polytechnic” basis is being introduced. The duration of study increases to 11 years, and in addition to the matriculation certificate, graduates receive a certificate of specialty. In the mid-60s. Industrial classes are cancelled.

At the same time, the “thaw” in culture was combined with criticism of “decadent tendencies”, “underestimation of the leading role of the party”, etc. Such writers and poets as A. A. Voznesensky, D. A. Granin, V. D. Dudintsev and others, sculptors and artists E. N. Neizvestny, R. R. Falk, humanities scientists R. Pimenov, B. Weil and others. The arrest of the latter begins the first political case against ordinary citizens during the “Thaw”. The expulsion of B. L. Pasternak from the Writers' Union in 1958 for publishing the novel Doctor Zhivago abroad received wide resonance throughout the world. Speaking at the Third Congress of Writers of the USSR in May 1959, Khrushchev said that the bearers of revisionist views were defeated. At the same time, in 1959, the 21st Congress of the CPSU concluded that socialism in the USSR had won a “complete and final victory” and the country had embarked on the path of building communism.

The collapse of Beria. Changes in political leadership

On the eve of Stalin's funeral, a meeting was held in the Kremlin, to which only those most knowledgeable about the state of affairs in the party and state were invited. Malenkov became Chairman of the Council of Ministers. He was nominated for this post by Beria. In turn, Malenkov proposed uniting the Ministry of Internal Affairs and the Ministry of State Security under the leadership of Beria. Other changes were made to the leadership team. At this meeting, Khrushchev managed to achieve a decision on the return to Moscow of G.K. Zhukov, who at that time commanded the Ural Military District. The position of first secretary was not introduced in the party, but Khrushchev actually took control of the cadres of the party apparatus. In addition, he took for himself some important archival documents relating to the top leaders of the party and state.

Thus, the most influential political figures in the leadership became Malenkov, Beria and Khrushchev. The balance was extremely unstable.

Taking advantage of the amnesty announced on the occasion of mourning, Beria ordered the release of many dangerous criminals, which sharply aggravated the situation in the country. Beria needed all this in order to, at the right opportunity, achieve emergency powers for himself and the department subordinate to him and seize power.

Combining cruelty, cynicism and intelligence, Beria even considered the possibility of a sharp change in political course: the dissolution of collective farms, the withdrawal of troops from Eastern Europe, the unification of Germany.

At Zhukov’s request, a large group of military personnel returned from prison. But the Gulag continued to exist, the same slogans and portraits of Stalin hung everywhere.

Each of the contenders for power sought to seize it in their own way. Beria - through control over state security agencies and troops. Malenkov - declaring his desire to pursue a popular policy of improving the well-being of the people, “to take care of the maximum satisfaction of their material and cultural needs,” calling for “in 2-3 years to achieve the creation in our country of an abundance of food for the population and raw materials for light industry.”

But Beria and Malenkov did not have connections among senior military leaders, who did not trust them. The main thing was in the mood of the party apparatus, which wanted to preserve the regime, but without repression against the apparatus. Objectively, the situation turned out favorably for Khrushchev.

For many years, Khrushchev treated Stalin with genuine adoration, accepting everything he said as the highest truth. Stalin trusted Khrushchev, promoting him to responsible positions in Moscow and Ukraine. While in high positions, Khrushchev was involved in Stalin’s repressions, signed sentences, and denounced “traitors.” But there was something in his activities that distinguished him from others. In the hungry year of 1946, he was not afraid to ask Stalin to reduce the grain procurement plan for Ukraine, although to no avail. When the opportunity arose, he tried to make life easier for ordinary people; he could talk for a long time with ordinary collective farmers. Under Stalin, as a rule, he pretended to be a simple-minded, dutiful person.

And now it was Khrushchev who took the initiative to unite members of the leadership for an action against Beria. By cunning and persuasion, threats that he would not spare anyone, Khrushchev achieved his goal. In mid-June 1953, at one of the meetings in the Kremlin, which was chaired by Malenkov, Khrushchev made accusations against Beria of careerism, nationalism, and connections with the English and Musavatist (i.e. . bourgeois Azerbaijani) intelligence services. As soon as they started voting, Malenkov pressed the hidden bell button. Several high-ranking officers arrested Beria. The other side of this action was led by G.K. Zhukov. On his orders, the Kantemirovskaya and Tamanskaya tank divisions were introduced into Moscow, occupying key positions in the city center. The Kremlin security was completely replaced, and Beria's closest employees were arrested.

Of course, this action was carried out by force. However, the then leadership simply did not know any alternative to them.

The level of political consciousness of both the leadership and the majority of ordinary party members is demonstrated by the content of the “closed letter” for members of the CPSU on the Beria case. In this letter, he was accused, among other things, of seeking to suspend the construction of socialism in the GDR, to unite Germany and make it neutral, and of proposals for reconciliation with Yugoslavia.

In September 1953, Khrushchev was elected First Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee. Articles about the dangers of the cult of personality began to appear in the press. The paradox was that their authors often referred to the works of Stalin, declaring that he was an opponent of the cult. The revision of the Leningrad Case began. The Kremlin was open to free visits. But at the same time, at the end of 1953, prisoner strikes were brutally suppressed in the mines of Vorkuta, which were under the jurisdiction of the still existing Gulag.

In 1954, Khrushchev made several trips around the country, which was an innovation in political life. His popularity grew. Malenkov retreated into the shadows.

At the beginning of 1955, Malenkov made a public statement about his “mistakes” and his unpreparedness for a high position in the government. It should be noted that one of the accusations brought against Malenkov at a closed meeting of the party leadership was that he declared the impossibility of winning a nuclear war and the inevitability of universal destruction if it occurred. He was replaced as Chairman of the Council of Ministers by N.A. Bulganin, a man from Stalin’s inner circle, who, however, knew how to navigate the situation in time and played a certain role in organizing the arrest of Beria.

The most important thing is that on the initiative of N.S. Khrushchev and under his personal control, the Gulag was liquidated. Millions of innocently repressed people were given the opportunity to return home. It was a great humanistic act, an important step in the process of de-Stalinization of Soviet society.

But powerful forces stood in this way. Such political leaders as Molotov, Kaganovich, Malenkov, Voroshilov, tainted not just by their participation, but also by their leadership of mass repressions, united against Beria in fear for their lives in the face of his cruelty and treachery, and did not at all want to go further.

Choosing a new political path required a change in economic guidelines. However, at that time no one in the country's political leadership questioned the principles of the command-administrative system. It was about overcoming its extremes, such as the almost complete absence of material incentives for workers, the lag in the mass introduction of scientific and technological achievements into production. Rejection of the market and commodity-money relations continued to prevail, and the advantages of socialism were considered as something given once and for all, capable of in itself ensuring development and prosperity.

Agricultural production took first place among the national economic problems. Khrushchev, by origin and also by interests, was always closer to the needs of the peasants than any of the other top political leaders. In September 1953, he made a series of proposals for the development of agriculture that were important for that time. From today's perspective they may seem insufficient, but back then they were of considerable importance. Purchase prices for agricultural products were increased, advance payment for the labor of collective farmers was introduced (before this, payments to them were made only once a year), etc.

Peasants began to be somewhat encouraged to raise poultry and small livestock. Many farms now have cows, which was unthinkable for a collective farmer just a year ago.

The ideas expressed could bear fruit only a few years later. And grain farming needed to be improved immediately. A solution was found in the development of virgin and fallow lands. This was a clearly expressed extensive development option. Suitable lands were located in Kazakhstan, Southern Siberia, the Volga region, the Urals, and the North Caucasus. Among them, Kazakhstan, the Urals and Siberia looked the most promising. The very idea of ​​developing these lands was not new. Thoughts about the possibilities of their use were raised at the beginning of the century.

At the end of 1953, the discussion of issues was heated. Voroshilov, who had recently visited some Smolensk villages, expressed his doubts about the need to develop virgin lands. He was amazed by the poverty he saw. The then leaders of Kazakhstan protested, believing that plowing the land would undermine traditional sheep breeding. Doubting leaders were replaced.

A feature of the mid-50s was the revival of mass enthusiasm, especially among young people. A favorable moment had been created, from a socio-psychological point of view, when mass enthusiasm, supported by material incentives and attention to social and everyday problems, could have a long-term economic and political effect. However, the outburst of youth enthusiasm was perceived by the leadership as a constant, unchanging and always manageable force in the future.

The pioneers of the virgin lands had to live in tents, in conditions of no roads, alternating between severe cold and sweltering heat. Round-the-clock work during the sowing and harvesting period was replaced by a period of relatively short rest with construction work. The first results of the virgin lands epic could not but inspire optimism. In 1954, virgin lands accounted for over 40% of the gross grain harvest. The production of meat and milk has increased. All this made it possible to somewhat improve the food supply of the population.

However, there were successes only in the first years. The yield of grain crops on the newly developed lands remained low; land development took place in the absence of a scientifically based farming system. Traditional mismanagement also had its effect. The granaries were not built on time, and reserves of equipment and fuel were not created. It was necessary to transfer equipment from all over the country, which increased the cost of grain, and consequently, meat, milk, etc.

The development of virgin lands delayed the revival of the old arable agricultural regions of Russia.

The reasons for the lag were still seen in the fact that there was “weak leadership” on the part of ministers and leaders; it was proposed to create new departments to introduce new technology. But the principle of a planned, centralized, command-bureaucratic system was not questioned.

The world in the Cold War. The emergence of atomic weapons radically changed the military-strategic situation in the world. The initial stage of G. Truman's presidency in the United States was still characterized by an outward expression of sympathy for our country. However, already in November 1945, 20 large objects on the territory of the USSR were designated for atomic bombing.

In the 80s In Truman's archive, they found sketches of an ultimatum that was supposed to be presented to the Soviet Union to be carried out within 10 days. Attached to it was a list of cities that were to be destroyed if the USSR failed to comply with the terms of the ultimatum.

In the second half of the 40s. The situation for the Soviet Union was such that ensuring its security depended on the rapid creation of its own weapons as a counterweight to US atomic blackmail.

“Finest Hour” by N. S. Khrushchev. At the end of February 1956, the XX Congress of the CPSU took place. Preparations for it were carried out in the traditional spirit of that time - with numerous reports, watches, and obligations. Portraits of Stalin still hung in institutions, and his monuments rose in squares. However, in some articles in central newspapers and in political brochures, still cautiously, the “cult of personality” began to be mentioned and it was emphasized that the exaltation of one figure of the leader was contrary to the spirit of Marxism-Leninism. Gradually, facts of illegal and falsified trials became known. Open court hearings were held in Leningrad, Tbilisi, and Baku, during which the executioner “activities” of Beria’s most odious henchmen were exposed. True, the main visitors to these processes were specially selected party workers and activists. And yet, in the minds of millions of people, propaganda stereotypes remained, linking all “victories and achievements” with the name of Stalin. In the political leadership, connections with the crimes of the Stalin era distinguished the majority of its representatives, who did not want decisive changes. The peculiarity of the situation was that the exposure of Stalinism could only occur as a result of the initiative of the first person in the party, who took upon himself enormous personal and political responsibility. There was inevitable struggle, misunderstanding, and distrust of whoever decided to take this step. It is unlikely that N.S. Khrushchev was fully aware of the deep contradictions that he would have to face.

Khrushchev was deeply convinced that, in the main, the system created in the USSR was fair and historically justified, capable of demonstrating true miracles to all humanity in the economy, social sphere, and spiritual life. It is only necessary to rid it of repressive perversions directed primarily against the party-state and economic apparatus.

Even during the preliminary discussion of the Central Committee’s report to the congress, Khrushchev proposed including a special section on Stalin’s personality cult, but did not find support from the majority of the Presidium of the Central Committee. I had to submit to party discipline. This topic was not included in the open report of the Central Committee. However, it also contained many provisions that ran counter to the dogmas of the Stalin era. First of all, this related to the assessment of the international situation. Khrushchev stated that the peaceful coexistence of states is not a temporary tactical move, but an unchangeable political line. An important conclusion was the possibility of preventing wars in the modern era. True, this opportunity was associated exclusively with the increased military power of the Soviet Union and the “world camp of socialism.” The report also argued that there may be situations where communist parties come to power through peaceful parliamentary means.

In the internal political part of the report, the tasks of improving the national economy, introducing a seven-hour working day in industry, carrying out pension reform, and increasing the pace of housing construction were put forward. Along with this, Khrushchev, on behalf of the political leadership, reiterated the need to fulfill the “historic task” put forward by Stalin at the 18th Party Congress - to catch up and surpass the main capitalist countries in the production of the most important types of industrial products per capita.

Finally, Khrushchev, to the applause of those gathered, declared that the calculations of the enemies of socialism on the confusion of the party at the moment when “death tore Joseph Vissarionovich Stalin from our ranks” had failed, the CPSU Central Committee stopped the activities of the “seasoned agent of the imperialists” Beria. The report continued to denounce “enemies of the people.”

It seemed that the congress would proceed according to a typical scenario; there were endless speeches by delegates with self-reports and assurances of unconditional support for the lines of the political leadership. At this moment, at a closed meeting of the congress, Khrushchev stated that with the beginning of its work, the powers of the old composition of the Central Committee would lose force until the election of a new one, and therefore no one had the right to prohibit him as an ordinary delegate of the congress; speak at one of the meetings with a special report on his understanding of “Stalin’s cult of personality.” Khrushchev's opponents were forced to accept this demand. However, it was decided that the report would be made at a closed meeting of the congress and only after the election of a new composition of the Central Committee of the party and on its behalf. The fact is that many members of the then political leadership feared that if elections were held after the report, they would find themselves outside the Central Committee.

Khrushchev had very little time to prepare such an important speech. Many facts were still unknown even to him. But he already had a fairly clear idea of ​​the scope of the repressions, managed to talk with some of the repressed party members released from the Gulag, and got acquainted with the first results of the work of the rehabilitation commissions. Naturally, Khrushchev did not raise the issue of his personal involvement in repressive actions with the congress delegates. In general, he sought to show the destructiveness of repression against the party-state apparatus, to free the current apparatus from the deeply rooted fear of repression, and to create conditions for other, non-repressive forms of strengthening apparatus discipline. Khrushchev's speech took place at the morning meeting of the congress on February 25, 1956.

In his report, Khrushchev actually justified the trials against “Trotskyists, Bukharinites, Zinovievites of 1937,” saying that only after them did repressions against “honest communists” begin. But at the same time he made a reservation that the defeated opponents of Leninism did not deserve physical destruction. “We are confident,” he said, “that if Lenin had been the leader, such extreme measures would not have been taken against many of them.”

Khrushchev revealed the “mechanics” of falsification of NKVD cases, said that those under investigation were subjected to torture, condemned to death by lists, their “confessions” were prepared by the organ workers themselves. However, listening or reading the report, it was difficult to imagine the scale of the repression. This was done deliberately. At that time, the shock may have been too great, and the reaction of the people unpredictable. Khrushchev placed the blame for the repressions solely on Stalin, and even on Yezhov and Beria. He deliberately removed Stalin’s inner circle, his “comrades-in-arms,” to whom he himself belonged, from responsibility. The congress delegates approved the decision to hide the report from the people.

However, it was not possible to keep the report secret. Within a few days, many newspapers around the world published its full text and vyingly broadcast it to radio stations. The Soviet media remained silent. The political leadership decides to send the text of the report to party organizations for reading at meetings of party members and Komsomol members with the invitation of active workers and employees. But rumors spread uncontrollably throughout the country. People, shackled for decades by the propaganda of Stalin's personality cult, for the most part refused to believe the information discrediting Stalin.

At that time, only the resolution of the CPSU Central Committee “On the cult of personality and its consequences” was prepared, which established the official limits of criticism of Stalin’s cult of personality and was supposed to counter the danger of the spread of criticism to the party and the socialist system. It lacked the concrete facts, examples and names that gave the Report its emotional power.

Events in Hungary seriously worried conservative forces in the political leadership. And N.S. himself Khrushchev showed hesitation in consistently assessing the role of Stalin and the system he created. The processes of public democratization were fiercely resisted by Molotov, Malenkov, Kaganovich and other members of the Presidium of the CPSU Central Committee. Experienced in political intrigue, they persistently carried out the processing of wavering members and candidates for membership in the Presidium of the CPSU Central Committee, trying to put together an arithmetic majority with its help to make personal changes in the leadership and change the political course of the country. Khrushchev, with his impulsiveness and boundless faith in the unlimited possibilities of socialism, himself gave reasons for accusing him of adventurism.

At the beginning of June 1957, the majority of the Presidium of the Central Committee demanded that Khrushchev be removed from the post of First Secretary of the Central Committee and appointed Minister of Agriculture. However, he managed to enlist the support of Defense Minister G.K. Zhukov, who stated that the army would not support Khrushchev’s removal. The KGB leadership also took Khrushchev's side. The majority supported Khrushchev, approving his proposal to declare Molotov, Malenkov, Kaganovich an “anti-party group.” Everyone, including members of the “anti-party group,” voted to approve the decisions of the June 1957 Plenum. Only one, V. M. Molotov, abstained from voting.

After the June Plenum, extremely large party and state power was concentrated in the hands of Khrushchev. He immediately became both the head of the party and the head of the government. The course of social and political reforms launched by the 20th Congress of the CPSU received a guarantee for its continuation. However, he was now directly connected with the personality of Khrushchev and depended on the fluctuations of his individual policy. Khrushchev’s authoritarian qualities were especially evident in October 1957, when Defense Minister G. K. Zhukov was removed from office and convicted of “adventurism.” Having received support from Zhukov during the June Plenum, Khrushchev was forced to allow the latter’s influence to increase in the army and the country. Khrushchev experienced constant discomfort from this and was only looking for a reason to remove Zhukov.

A few months later, at the initiative of Khrushchev, there was a change in the leadership of the KGB. The change of leaders of the army and the KGB clearly showed that the stage of the struggle for power in the top political leadership ended with the complete victory of Khrushchev.

List of sources used

1 A short reference book for schoolchildren in grades 5-11. - M.: 1997 - 624s.

2 V.P. Ostrovsky. A. I. Utkin History of Russia 11th grade. - M.: 1995 - 512 p.

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Abstract on the history of Russia

In October 1952, the 19th Congress of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks took place, at which it was renamed CPSU. The report was given by Malenkov, and Khrushchev made a report on changes in the Charter. After the congress, Stalin proposed electing a narrow bureau of the Presidium, which did not include either Molotov or Mikoyan. Then a non-statutory five were created within the Bureau - Stalin, Malenkov, Beria, Bulganin, Khrushchev. A new round of repression was being prepared. Molotov, Voroshilov, and even Beria felt the disgrace. However, in January 1953, Stalin's health deteriorated. He died on March 5, 1953.

Difficulties in the economic sphere, ideologization of socio-political life, increased international tension - these were the results of the development of society in the first post-war years. During this period, the regime of Stalin's personal power became even stronger, and the administrative-command system became tougher. During these same years, the idea of ​​the need for change in society became more and more clearly formed in the public consciousness. The death of Stalin facilitated the search for a way out of the contradictions that entangled all spheres of public life.

Where could the country go after Stalin's death? Was it possible either a temporary continuation of Stalinism, which created a serious threat to the lives and well-being of millions of people and entire nations, or some softening of it while maintaining the general political course, or a turn to de-Stalinization? De-Stalinization did not mean the elimination of the totalitarian regime. We could only talk about an initial cleansing from the legacy of Stalinism: the liberation of the repressed, a turn to solving the most pressing agrarian problems, and a weakening of the dogmatic pressure in culture. The first option was associated with the prospect of Beria coming to power; Molotov and Bulganin would probably take part in the implementation of the second; in practice, the third option began to be implemented. And N.S. Khrushchev associated himself with him.

The most influential political figures in the leadership were Malenkov, Beria and Khrushchev. The balance was extremely unstable.

New management policy spring 1953 was controversial. Each of the contenders for power sought to seize it in their own way. Beria - through control over state security agencies and troops. Malenkov - declaring his desire to pursue a popular policy of increasing the well-being of the people, “to take care of the maximum satisfaction of their material needs,” calling for the creation in our country of an abundance of food for the population and raw materials for light industry in 2-3 years. At a closed meeting in the Kremlin, Malenkov was elected Chairman of the Council of Ministers, the MGB and the Ministry of Internal Affairs were united under the leadership of Beria. The main thing in the mood of the ruling elite was that it wanted to preserve the regime, but without repression against the apparatus. Objectively, the situation turned out favorably for Khrushchev, who showed extraordinary activity these days. Khrushchev, as the only one of the Central Committee secretaries included in the Presidium, took control of the party cadres. Since he had good connections with the military high command, the situation worked out in his favor. Zhukov and Khrushchev prepared an action against Beria and in July 1953 he was arrested. The court sentenced Beria and his assistants to death. In September 1953, Khrushchev was elected first secretary of the CPSU Central Committee. The process of de-Stalinization began.

The first steps towards restoring the rule of law in the country were taken in April 1953. The investigation into the “Doctors’ Case” was stopped. Participants in the “Mingrelian case” were released from prison. The Leningrad case was revised.

One of the central places in the activities of the new leadership was occupied by the work of liberating society from the most monstrous forms of the command-administrative system, in particular overcoming the personality cult of Stalin. A reorganization of the structure and renewal of personnel in the internal affairs and state security bodies was carried out. Work was carried out to rehabilitate innocent victims of repression, for which a special commission was created under the chairmanship of Pospelov (by the beginning of 1956, about 16 thousand people were rehabilitated).

In the second half of the 50s. continued the policy aimed at restoration of legality in the socio-political sphere. To strengthen law and order, reform of the justice system was carried out. New criminal legislation was developed and approved. At the end of the 50s. Unfounded charges against the deported peoples were dropped. Chechens, Kalmyks, Ingush, Karachais and Balkars evicted from their native places received the right to return to their homeland. The autonomy of these peoples was restored. Charges of aiding the German occupiers were dropped against the Soviet Germans. The repatriation of citizens of Poland, Hungary, Bulgaria and other countries in special settlements has begun.

However, the policies pursued were inconsistent. Rehabilitation did not affect many major Soviet and government figures of the 30s, in particular Rykov and Bukharin - leaders of the opposition to Stalin. The deported Volga Germans were denied return to their former places of residence. Rehabilitation did not affect those repressed in the 30s. Soviet Koreans and the Tatar population evicted from Crimea during the Patriotic War.

The de-Stalinization policy pursued by Khrushchev and numerous restructurings in the political and economic spheres caused growing discontent among parts of the party and state apparatus. In 1957, a group of party leaders led by Malenkov, Molotov and Kaganovich tried to remove Khrushchev from the post of First Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee. They accused Khrushchev of violating the principles of “collective leadership” and establishing his own cult, of arbitrary and thoughtless foreign policy actions, and of economic voluntarism. However, the open resistance of some party and state leaders to the reform policy ended in failure. A significant part of the party and Soviet leaders at this moment supported Khrushchev. The June (1957) Plenum of the CPSU Central Committee found the group of Malenkov, Molotov and Kaganovich guilty of opposing the political course of the party. The group members were expelled from the highest party bodies and removed from their positions.

The first ruler of the young Country of Soviets, which arose as a result of the October Revolution of 1917, was the head of the RCP (b) - the Bolshevik Party - Vladimir Ulyanov (Lenin), who led the “revolution of workers and peasants”. All subsequent rulers of the USSR held the post of general secretary of the central committee of this organization, which, starting in 1922, became known as the CPSU - the Communist Party of the Soviet Union.

Let us note that the ideology of the system ruling the country denied the possibility of holding any national elections or voting. The change of the highest leaders of the state was carried out by the ruling elite itself, either after the death of their predecessor, or as a result of coups, accompanied by serious internal party struggle. The article will list the rulers of the USSR in chronological order and highlight the main stages in the life path of some of the most prominent historical figures.

Ulyanov (Lenin) Vladimir Ilyich (1870-1924)

One of the most famous figures in the history of Soviet Russia. Vladimir Ulyanov stood at the origins of its creation, was the organizer and one of the leaders of the event, which gave rise to the world's first communist state. Having led a coup in October 1917 aimed at overthrowing the provisional government, he took the post of chairman of the Council of People's Commissars - the post of leader of a new country formed from the ruins of the Russian Empire.

His merit is considered to be the peace treaty of 1918 with Germany, which marked the end of the NEP - the government's new economic policy, which was supposed to lead the country out of the abyss of widespread poverty and hunger. All the rulers of the USSR considered themselves “faithful Leninists” and in every possible way praised Vladimir Ulyanov as a great statesman.

It should be noted that immediately after the “reconciliation with the Germans,” the Bolsheviks, under the leadership of Lenin, unleashed internal terror against dissent and the legacy of tsarism, which claimed millions of lives. The NEP policy also did not last long and was canceled shortly after his death, which occurred on January 21, 1924.

Dzhugashvili (Stalin) Joseph Vissarionovich (1879-1953)

Joseph Stalin became the first General Secretary in 1922. However, right up to the death of V.I. Lenin, he remained in the secondary leadership role of the state, inferior in popularity to his other comrades, who also aimed to become the rulers of the USSR. Nevertheless, after the death of the leader of the world proletariat, Stalin quickly eliminated his main opponents, accusing them of betraying the ideals of the revolution.

By the early 1930s, he became the sole leader of nations, capable of deciding the fate of millions of citizens with the stroke of a pen. His policy of forced collectivization and dispossession, which replaced the NEP, as well as mass repressions against people dissatisfied with the current government, claimed the lives of hundreds of thousands of USSR citizens. However, the period of Stalin's reign is noticeable not only in its bloody trail; it is worth noting the positive aspects of his leadership. In a short time, the Union turned from a country with a third-rate economy into a powerful industrial power that won the battle against fascism.

After the end of the Great Patriotic War, many cities in the western part of the USSR, destroyed almost to the ground, were quickly restored, and their industry became even more efficient. The rulers of the USSR, who held the highest position after Joseph Stalin, denied his leading role in the development of the state and characterized his reign as a period of the cult of the leader’s personality.

Khrushchev Nikita Sergeevich (1894-1971)

Coming from a simple peasant family, N.S. Khrushchev took the helm of the party shortly after Stalin’s death, which occurred. During the first years of his reign, he waged a behind-the-scenes struggle with G.M. Malenkov, who held the post of Chairman of the Council of Ministers and was the de facto leader of the state.

In 1956, Khrushchev read a report on Stalin’s repressions at the 20th Party Congress, condemning the actions of his predecessor. The reign of Nikita Sergeevich was marked by the development of the space program - the launch of an artificial satellite and the first human flight into space. His new one allowed many citizens of the country to move from cramped communal apartments to more comfortable separate housing. The houses that were built en masse at that time are still popularly called “Khrushchev buildings.”

Brezhnev Leonid Ilyich (1907-1982)

On October 14, 1964, N. S. Khrushchev was removed from his post by a group of members of the Central Committee under the leadership of L. I. Brezhnev. For the first time in the history of the state, the rulers of the USSR were replaced in order not after the death of the leader, but as a result of an internal party conspiracy. The Brezhnev era in Russian history is known as stagnation. The country stopped developing and began to lose to the leading world powers, lagging behind them in all sectors, excluding military-industrial.

Brezhnev made some attempts to improve relations with the United States, which were damaged in 1962, when N.S. Khrushchev ordered the deployment of missiles with nuclear warheads in Cuba. Agreements were signed with the American leadership that limited the arms race. However, all the efforts of L.I. Brezhnev to defuse the situation were canceled out by the introduction of troops into Afghanistan.

Andropov Yuri Vladimirovich (1914-1984)

After Brezhnev's death on November 10, 1982, his place was taken by Yu. Andropov, who had previously headed the KGB - the USSR State Security Committee. He set a course for reforms and transformations in the social and economic spheres. His reign was marked by the initiation of criminal cases exposing corruption in government circles. However, Yuri Vladimirovich did not have time to make any changes in the life of the state, as he had serious health problems and died on February 9, 1984.

Chernenko Konstantin Ustinovich (1911-1985)

Since February 13, 1984, he held the post of General Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee. He continued the policy of his predecessor to expose corruption in the echelons of power. He was very ill and died in 1985, having held the highest government post for just over a year. All past rulers of the USSR, according to the order established in the state, were buried with K.U. Chernenko was the last on this list.

Gorbachev Mikhail Sergeevich (1931)

M. S. Gorbachev is the most famous Russian politician of the late twentieth century. He won love and popularity in the West, but his rule evokes ambivalent feelings among the citizens of his country. If Europeans and Americans call him a great reformer, many people in Russia consider him the destroyer of the Soviet Union. Gorbachev proclaimed domestic economic and political reforms, carried out under the slogan “Perestroika, Glasnost, Acceleration!”, which led to massive shortages of food and industrial goods, unemployment and a drop in the standard of living of the population.

It would be wrong to assert that the era of M. S. Gorbachev’s rule had only negative consequences for the life of our country. In Russia, the concepts of a multi-party system, freedom of religion and the press appeared. For his foreign policy, Gorbachev was awarded the Nobel Peace Prize. The rulers of the USSR and Russia, neither before nor after Mikhail Sergeevich, were awarded such an honor.

Atmosphere of fear and insanity

“Lenta.ru”: You said in an old interview that the events of 1953 after Stalin’s death became an important milestone in Soviet history. Why?

Pihoya: When Stalin died, it was clear to the country's leadership that the policies he had pursued had completely exhausted themselves. There were many reasons to draw this conclusion. The peasantry, which then made up the majority of the population of the USSR, did not receive the expected relief after the war. The hopes of the peasants that Stalin would abolish collective farms after the victory over Germany did not materialize. Moreover, if in the 1930s the number of workdays for collective farmers was 90 per year, then during the war this norm was increased to 230 workdays (that is, the peasant was obliged to work for free on the collective farm almost every day).

In the second half of the 1940s, military standards for the production of workdays were preserved, and criminal liability was imposed for failure to complete the mandatory minimum. In one workday, a peasant received up to 300 grams of bread daily, while the norm for human physiological survival is 800 grams per day. Therefore, even the rations of Gulag prisoners engaged in hard work were never less than this threshold. Evidence of the crisis in the village was the mass desire to leave the collective farms and obtain a passport, since collective farmers did not have passports and, therefore, could not leave the village of their own free will.

Frame: the film “Kuban Cossacks” (1949)

The downside of this state of agriculture was the shortage of agricultural products in state stores. Things got to the point that at the end of the 1940s, the Politburo considered the issue of supplying Moscow with potatoes! On the shelves were caviar, crabs, ham - goods as beautiful as they were inaccessible to the vast majority of buyers, while in stores in cities across the country there were problems with sugar, vegetable oil, and bread, especially white.

How then did the peasants survive?

At the expense of subsidiary farming, but under late Stalin it also became the object of the most severe taxation. Therefore, a significant part of the population of the USSR after the end of the war found itself in an extremely dire situation. In 1946-1947, severe famine again occurred in the agricultural regions of the Soviet Union (primarily in Moldova and Ukraine). They ate quinoa and nettles and baked bread and potatoes. During these same years, mortality increased sharply, mainly among children.

In order to pay taxes in money, peasants had to bring to the city markets what could be grown in the garden, on their farm - eggs, milk, sour cream, meat. Hence the stories about the cheapness of the markets at that time. Every livestock and every fruit tree were subject to taxation. Taxes were supposed to be collected both in money and in kind - skins, milk, and so on. The fact that savage taxation was undermining agriculture was also understood in Stalin’s inner circle. Mikoyan and Molotov allowed themselves to object to the leader, but everything remained unchanged.

In other words, people lived very hard, but Stalin preferred not to notice this. He set a course for the accelerated development of heavy (primarily defense) industry. This meant pumping all state investments into the military-industrial complex. To compensate for the labor shortage, they began to actively attract prison labor. The Gulag became not so much a punitive-correctional institution, but rather an economic institution, with the help of which all the grandiose Stalinist construction projects were carried out: the Transpolar and Baikal-Amur railways, the tunnel to Sakhalin, the Main Turkmen Canal, many hydroelectric power stations. In addition, the country had to maintain a huge army of five million and an extensive state security apparatus.

All this accumulated tension not only within society, but also within the authorities. Even in Stalin’s closest circle there was an understanding: this can no longer be done, something needs to be changed. In the last years of Stalin’s life, deep dissatisfaction with the policies he pursued grew among the ruling elite, which combined unbearable tax oppression for the population with new insane repressions against the elite like the notorious “Leningrad Affair.”

Wasn’t the Soviet elite accustomed to this after the Great Terror?

Of course, the Leningrad Affair and other post-war Stalinist repressions clearly recalled the Great Terror, which did not arouse any enthusiasm in her. In addition, the elite of 1948-1949 was noticeably different from the pre-war one. These people had the experience of a difficult war behind them - many of them had self-esteem and knew their worth.

But after the destruction of the “Leningraders,” Stalin went even further. After the 19th Party Congress in October 1952, the leader launched an attack on his inner circle. He seriously accused Molotov and Voroshilov of working for foreign intelligence services. As part of the “doctors’ case,” the head of his own security, General Vlasik, was arrested, and an extremely complicated “Mingrelian case” swirled around Beria. All this created an atmosphere of not only fear, but also outright insanity. Therefore, Stalin’s stroke on the night of March 1, 1953 for his closest associates happened at the right time.

Reformer Beria

Beria's political career in Moscow both began with short-term liberalization after the Yezhovshchina and ended with an attempt to loosen the screws after Stalin's death. Why in our history did he become the ominous and gloomy symbol of Stalin’s terror?

For the Soviet regime throughout its existence, it was very important to find a person on whom they could blame all the responsibility for their crimes. The first such figure was Beria's predecessor in the Lubyanka department. During the Great Terror of 1937-1938, official propaganda glorified the “iron gloves” and excitedly talked about his irreconcilable and merciless fight against the “enemies of the people”, and after the arrest of the former “Iron Commissar” in 1939, the term “Yezhovshchina” was immediately coined. which you just mentioned. When Yezhov was shot, he was blamed for all the repressions of the second half of the 1930s, although he was an obedient executor of Stalin’s will.

Caricature of Beria by the Chairman of the USSR State Planning Committee V. Mezhlauk (1937). In 1938, Mezhlauk was shot

Beria had the same fate, who was subsequently given all the blame for the state terror of the 1930s, 1940s and early 1950s. This was very convenient for his former colleagues in Stalin’s inner circle (Malenkov, Khrushchev, Mikoyan), who themselves had blood on their hands up to their elbows. Moreover, Beria was blamed even for crimes to which he had nothing to do. He is traditionally considered the head of Soviet state security in the post-war years, although in fact Beria was removed from the post of People's Commissar of Internal Affairs in December 1945. As is known, he returned to Lubyanka only in March 1953, after Stalin’s death.

And in this capacity he launched vigorous reform activities...

The need for large-scale reforms after Stalin’s death was understood by many of his former comrades, but it was Beria who found himself at the forefront of this activity, which subsequently destroyed him. Many of his suggestions were quite reasonable. He advocated the separation of the party and state apparatus with the dominant role of the latter. That is, only supervision over ideology and propaganda would remain. At the instigation of Beria, a mass amnesty was announced and most of the high-profile criminal cases of the late Stalin era began to be reviewed. By the way, few people here remember now that the main wave of mass rehabilitation occurred precisely in the first years after Stalin’s death, even before the famous 20th Party Congress.

Beria zealously began to liberalize his own department. He officially banned torture and transferred all the “great construction projects of communism” from the Gulag to the industrial ministries, and the Gulag itself proposed to be subordinated (which was carried out only in 1998). Beria persistently proposed to ease the tax burden on peasants. Then they blamed him for publicly speaking about the ineffectiveness of the collective farm system.

Now some researchers claim that Beria went even further and was going to dismantle the Soviet system altogether.

There is no reason to say so. This is all speculation.

Although at the trial he was accused of this.

He has been accused of many things, but this does not mean that these accusations should be taken seriously. We can’t, for example, actually consider Beria an English spy?

Beria was later reproached for actively interfering not only in domestic but also in foreign policy. For example, his initiatives on the Korean and Hungarian issues and proposals to “refuse the accelerated construction of socialism in the GDR.”

Initially, it was not even about accelerated tempos, but about a much more important and fateful decision. In May 1953, Beria submitted to the Presidium of the Council of Ministers of the USSR a draft resolution proposing to “abandon the construction of socialism in the GDR” altogether. He was a supporter of the unification of the GDR with the Federal Republic of Germany, the demilitarization and “Finlandization” of Germany - that is, turning it into a neutral and friendly state (exactly the same thing two years later, Khrushchev did with Austria).

At the meeting of the Government Presidium, where this issue was considered, no one dared to object to Beria and everyone resignedly signed the draft resolution. And only the experienced and cunning Molotov added one word to the text that radically changed its meaning: “from accelerated course towards the construction of socialism." This is how German reunification was postponed until 1990, when it took place in a completely different international environment and under completely different circumstances.

Not the all-powerful marshal

But why exactly did Beria become, as you said, in the vanguard of the post-Stalin thaw?

There were many reasons for this. Firstly, Beria, in terms of his personal qualities, was a very decisive person. But for the apparatus struggle this is not the most valuable property - inside the apparatus it is not the most determined people who survive, but the most cautious and prudent people. But Beria was too strong-willed a person, and this is largely why immediately after the end of the war he began to have troubles, which led to his resignation from the post of People's Commissar of Internal Affairs in December 1945. I think that he survived then only because in the areas of work entrusted to him he proved to Stalin his effectiveness and indispensability.

Secondly, compared to other people close to Stalin, Beria had a decent education. Even before the revolution, he received a special technical education and then defended his diploma as an architect. Thirdly, Lavrenty Pavlovich was an experienced organizer, which was noted by one of the “fathers” of the Soviet atomic bomb, Academician Yuli Khariton.

Frame: film “The Death of Stalin” (2017)

All these qualities allowed him to initially become an informal leader in the post-Stalin Soviet leadership. It is characteristic that he was the first to enter Stalin's office after his death. And therefore, in those conditions, Beria could afford to choose the post of Deputy Chairman of the Council of Ministers and the post of Minister of Internal Affairs.

On the initiative of Beria, in March 1953 it was merged with the Ministry of State Security created in 1946. It turns out that after Stalin’s death, Beria became the sole head of all Soviet intelligence services and the most powerful man in the country?

Formally this was true, but in reality it was not. The united ministry turned out to be weak because it united within itself two competing and warring punitive departments. In both of them, apparatus groups were formed that were in no way connected with Beria, for which he was a stranger.

Well, yes, he left Lubyanka back in 1945.

Of course, by the time he returned, he did not have his proven personnel there. In addition, Beria pulled out of the dungeons people arrested in 1951-1952 in the “Abakumov case” and placed them in key positions in the new ministry, which gave rise to envy, intrigue and conflicts within the department. Therefore, the united Ministry of Internal Affairs was not a monolithic structure and, by definition, could not become a reliable support for Beria.

“Ensure the presence of Western Ukrainians in the management team”

Beria still tried to influence national policy in the USSR.

And in the most radical way. And it was then that the first contradictions between him and Stalin’s other associates appeared. Beria prepared a certificate for his government colleagues stating that in the territory of Western Ukraine, Western Belarus and the Baltic states there is rejection by the local population of Soviet power for reasons that lie in the organization of Soviet power itself. In May 1953, on the initiative of Beria, the Presidium of the CPSU Central Committee adopted a devastating resolution “Issues of the Western Regions of the Ukrainian SSR,” which revealed “facts of gross distortion of the Lenin-Stalin national policy.”

And further in the document these facts were honestly and openly listed: an insignificant percentage of local personnel in the leading Soviet-party activists, distrust of the local intelligentsia, a ban on teaching in Ukrainian in Western Ukrainian universities. The resolution announced the change of the first secretary of the Ukrainian Communist Party (Ukrainian instead of Russian Leonid Melnikov) and ordered “to ensure the presence of Western Ukrainians in the leadership of the Communist Party of Ukraine and in the government of the Ukrainian SSR.” On the same day, a similar resolution was adopted in relation to Lithuania, where a sluggish civil war also continued.

Frame: uraz beketov / YouTube

But what were Beria’s government colleagues unhappy with? Did they really suspect him of sympathizing with Bandera or the “forest brothers”?

Of course not. It simply became obvious to them that the Minister of Internal Affairs in the most unceremonious way began to interfere in the personnel policy of the party nomenklatura, which was completely outside the scope of his powers. Having climbed into someone else's garden, Beria did not notice how he immediately turned the party apparatus against himself.

So, Beria’s overly bold attempts to resolve national contradictions in the USSR and interference in personnel issues set the party apparatus and the Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee Khrushchev against him, who in this situation found himself out of work. But why did his long-time comrade Malenkov oppose Beria?

Beria constantly raised the issue of repression. He, no less than others, tried to find the last one on whom he could blame all the responsibility for mass state terror. Investigating all these crimes, Beria contacted the former head of the Ministry of State Security, Semyon Ignatiev, who held this position from August 1951 to March 1953. But Ignatiev was a protege of Malenkov, who immediately felt a threat to himself. On June 25, 1953, Beria sent a note about “Ignatiev’s crimes” to the Presidium of the Council of Ministers, and the very next day he himself was arrested at a government meeting.

How Beria did not live up to trust

How serious were Beria's reform plans?

More than serious. But his main problem was that he was an outsider to the Soviet party apparatus and therefore did not have the resources to put his ideas into practice. Many of them were continued or implemented after his arrest: easing the tax burden on the peasantry, rehabilitation of victims of Stalin's repressions, international détente and normalization of relations with neighboring countries.

This was already carried out by Malenkov, and then by Khrushchev, who overthrew Beria.

This often happens in history: one person starts transformations, another continues, and all the laurels go to the third. We all know about Khrushchev’s thaw, but we have completely forgotten about the activities of Malenkov and especially Beria. Khrushchev essentially did the same thing, only more carefully and more carefully. But as soon as he himself lost caution and opposed himself to the Soviet party apparatus, it immediately got rid of him.

By the way, the weakening of fiscal oppression on peasants, which Stalin did not want to hear about in the post-war years, produced colossal results in the mid-1950s. From the beginning of tax reform in 1954 to 1957, livestock production in the USSR increased by 20 percent! This is an absolutely incredible number! And this is in the conditions of an ineffective collective farm system!

What were the consequences of Beria’s defeat in the internal struggle?

One of the results of Beria’s fall was a long, three-year struggle for supremacy between the party and Soviet apparatus, between the CPSU Central Committee and the Council of Ministers. As a result, as we know, the victory in this confrontation was won by the party apparatus, in relation to which from 1957 (when Khrushchev defeated the so-called “anti-party group”) and until the end of the Soviet era, the government occupied a subordinate position.

And yet, what exactly destroyed Beria - an insatiable reform itch or, rather, an underestimation of his opponents?

It so happened that the discontent of the entire Soviet elite was focused on Beria, with all his apparent power. Too many people couldn't stand him. I have already said why he could not rely on the special services and why the party apparatus was afraid of him. But Beria was openly hated in the army, where the “special officers” were always disliked. The military elite identified all the repressions of the senior command staff of the late 1930s - early 1950s with Beria. It is no coincidence that on June 26, 1953, he was arrested by a group of army generals led by Marshal Zhukov. As a result, Beria turned out to be the weakest link in Stalin's entourage.

It turns out that Beria became the first victim in the ferocious battle for power that unfolded after Stalin's death. Don’t you think that the then leadership of the USSR resembled the “flock of comrades” from the famous Soviet joke? After all, in the end they all tore each other down, and this struggle ended only in the mid-1960s, when the younger generation, led by Brezhnev, emerged.

Unfortunately, this is a common situation in a state where there are no elections. In the absence of legitimate mechanisms for changing power, a situation always arises of a “terrarium of friends” fiercely fighting among themselves through intrigue and repression. But the whole problem is that this order of things is ineffective, harmful and leads the country to a dead end.

With the death of Stalin - the “father of nations” and the “architect of communism” - in 1953, a struggle for power began, because the one he established assumed that at the helm of the USSR there would be the same autocratic leader who would take the reins of government into his own hands.

The only difference was that the main contenders for power all unanimously advocated the abolition of this very cult and the liberalization of the country’s political course.

Who ruled after Stalin?

A serious struggle unfolded between the three main contenders, who initially represented a triumvirate - Georgy Malenkov (Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the USSR), Lavrentiy Beria (Minister of the United Ministry of Internal Affairs) and Nikita Khrushchev (Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee). Each of them wanted to take a place in it, but victory could only go to the candidate whose candidacy was supported by the party, whose members enjoyed great authority and had the necessary connections. In addition, they were all united by the desire to achieve stability, end the era of repression and gain more freedom in their actions. That is why the question of who ruled after Stalin’s death does not always have a clear answer - after all, there were three people fighting for power at once.

The triumvirate in power: the beginning of a split

The triumvirate created under Stalin divided power. Most of it was concentrated in the hands of Malenkov and Beria. Khrushchev was assigned the role of secretary, which was not so significant in the eyes of his rivals. However, they underestimated the ambitious and assertive party member, who stood out for his extraordinary thinking and intuition.

For those who ruled the country after Stalin, it was important to understand who first of all needed to be eliminated from the competition. The first target was Lavrenty Beria. Khrushchev and Malenkov were aware of the dossier on each of them that the Minister of the Ministry of Internal Affairs, who was in charge of the entire system of repressive bodies, had. In this regard, in July 1953, Beria was arrested, accusing him of espionage and some other crimes, thereby eliminating such a dangerous enemy.

Malenkov and his politics

Khrushchev's authority as the organizer of this conspiracy increased significantly, and his influence over other party members increased. However, while Malenkov was the Chairman of the Council of Ministers, key decisions and policy directions depended on him. At the first meeting of the Presidium, a course was set for de-Stalinization and the establishment of collective governance of the country: it was planned to abolish the cult of personality, but to do this in such a way as not to diminish the merits of the “father of nations.” The main task set by Malenkov was to develop the economy taking into account the interests of the population. He proposed a fairly extensive program of changes, which was not adopted at the meeting of the Presidium of the CPSU Central Committee. Then Malenkov put forward these same proposals at a session of the Supreme Council, where they were approved. For the first time after Stalin’s autocratic rule, the decision was made not by the party, but by an official government body. The CPSU Central Committee and the Politburo were forced to agree to this.

Further history will show that among those who ruled after Stalin, Malenkov would be the most “effective” in his decisions. The set of measures he adopted to combat bureaucracy in the state and party apparatus, to develop the food and light industry, to expand the independence of collective farms bore fruit: 1954-1956, for the first time since the end of the war, showed an increase in the rural population and an increase in agricultural production, which for many years decline and stagnation became profitable. The effect of these measures lasted until 1958. It is this five-year plan that is considered the most productive and effective after the death of Stalin.

It was clear to those who ruled after Stalin that such successes would not be achieved in light industry, since Malenkov’s proposals for its development contradicted the tasks of the next five-year plan, which emphasized the promotion

I tried to approach problem solving from a rational point of view, using economic rather than ideological considerations. However, this order did not suit the party nomenklatura (led by Khrushchev), which practically lost its predominant role in the life of the state. This was a weighty argument against Malenkov, who, under pressure from the party, submitted his resignation in February 1955. His place was taken by Khrushchev's comrade-in-arms, Malenkov became one of his deputies, but after the 1957 dispersal of the anti-party group (of which he was a member), together with his supporters, he was expelled from the Presidium of the CPSU Central Committee. Khrushchev took advantage of this situation and in 1958 removed Malenkov from the post of Chairman of the Council of Ministers, taking his place and becoming the one who ruled after Stalin in the USSR.

Thus, he concentrated almost complete power in his hands. He got rid of the two most powerful competitors and led the country.

Who ruled the country after the death of Stalin and the removal of Malenkov?

Those 11 years that Khrushchev ruled the USSR were rich in various events and reforms. The agenda included many problems that the state faced after industrialization, war and attempts to restore the economy. The main milestones that will remember the era of Khrushchev’s reign are as follows:

1. The policy of virgin land development (not supported by scientific study) increased the number of sown areas, but did not take into account climatic features that hampered the development of agriculture in the developed territories.
2. The “Corn Campaign,” the goal of which was to catch up and overtake the United States, which received good harvests of this crop. The area under corn has doubled, to the detriment of rye and wheat. But the result was sad - climatic conditions did not allow for a high yield, and the reduction in areas for other crops provoked low harvest rates. The campaign failed miserably in 1962, and its result was an increase in the price of butter and meat, which caused discontent among the population.
3. The beginning of perestroika was the massive construction of houses, which allowed many families to move from dormitories and communal apartments to apartments (the so-called “Khrushchev buildings”).

Results of Khrushchev's reign

Among those who ruled after Stalin, Nikita Khrushchev stood out for his unconventional and not always thoughtful approach to reform within the state. Despite the numerous projects that were implemented, their inconsistency led to Khrushchev's removal from office in 1964.