As a result of the conclusion of the Kuchuk-Kainardzhi peace between Russia and Turkey in 1774, the final conquest of Crimea became possible. The credit for this belongs to the favorite of the Empress G.A. Potemkin. This event was of key military-political and economic significance.
"GREEK PROJECT"
On July 10, 1774, peace was concluded with the Ottoman Empire in the village of Kuchuk-Kaynarji. The Black Sea cities of Kerch, Yenikali, and Kinburn went to Russia. Kabarda in the North Caucasus was recognized as Russian. Russia received the right to have a military and merchant fleet in the Black Sea. Merchant ships could freely pass into the Mediterranean Sea through the Turkish Bosporus and Dardanelles straits. The Danube principalities (Wallachia, Moldavia, Bessarabia) formally remained with Turkey, but in fact Russia kept them under its protection. Türkiye was obliged to pay a huge indemnity of 4 million rubles. But the most significant loss of the Brilliant Port was the recognition of the independence of the Crimean Khanate.
In 1777-1778 in Russia, Commander-in-Chief G.A. Potemkin, who became the first person in the state after the empress, developed the “Greek project”. This project provided for the expulsion of the Turks from Europe by Russia in alliance with Austria, the liberation of Balkan Christians - Greeks, Bulgarians, the capture of Constantinople and the revival of the Byzantine Empire.
It was no coincidence that both of the empress’s grandsons, born at that time, received “antique” names - Alexander and Konstantin. They hoped to place their second grandson, Konstantin Pavlovich, on the Tsaregrad throne. This project, of course, was utopian. The Ottoman Empire was not yet so weak, and the European powers would not have allowed Russia to create a vassal “Byzantium”.
A truncated version of the “Greek project” provided for the creation of the state of Dacia from the Danube principalities with the same Constantine on the throne. They planned to cede part of the Danube lands to Russia's ally Austria. But they failed to come to an agreement with the Austrians about “Dacia”. Russian diplomats believed that Austrian territorial claims were excessive.
Soon, with the help of Russian troops, the Russian protege Khan Shagin-Girey reigned in Crimea. The former khan Devlet-Girey rebelled, but was forced to flee to Turkey. And on April 8, 1783, Catherine II promulgated a decree on the inclusion of Crimea into Russia. The newly annexed Crimean possessions were called Taurida. The Empress's favorite Grigory Potemkin (Prince Tauride) had to take care of their settlement, economic development, construction of cities, ports, and fortresses. The main base of the newly created Russian Black Sea Navy was to be Sevastopol in Crimea. This city was built on the land of ancient Chersonese, known in Russian chronicles under the name Korsun.
FROM THE MANIFESTO OF CATHERINE II OF APRIL 8, 1783
...In such circumstances, WE were forced, in order to preserve the integrity of the building OUR erected, one of the best acquisitions from the war, to accept the well-meaning Tatars under OUR patronage, give them freedom, elect another legitimate Khan in Sahib-Girey’s place, and establish his rule; for this it was necessary to set OUR military forces in motion, to dispatch the nth corps from them to the Crimea in the most severe times, to maintain it there for a long time, and finally to act against the rebels by force of arms; from which a new war almost broke out with the Ottoman Porte, as it is in everyone’s fresh memory.
Thanks be to the Almighty! Then this storm passed with recognition from the Porte of the legitimate and autocratic Khan in the person of Shagin-Girey. Making this change was not cheap for OUR Empire; but WE at least hoped that the future would be rewarded with security from the neighborhood. Time, and a short one, however, actually contradicted this assumption.
A new rebellion that arose last year, the true origins of which are not hidden from US, forced US again to fully arm itself and to a new detachment of OUR troops to the Crimea and to the Kuban side, which remain there to this day: for without them peace, silence and arrangement among the Tatars, when the active trial of many children already proves in every possible way that just as their previous subordination to the Porte was the reason for coldness and strife between both powers, so their transformation into a free region, with their inability to taste the fruits of such freedom, serves as an everlasting US to the worries, losses and toil of OUR troops...
“DID MORE FOR RUSSIA IN THE SOUTH THAN PETER I IN THE NORTH”
By order of Catherine II, immediately after the annexation of Crimea, the frigate “Caution” was sent to the peninsula under the command of captain II rank Ivan Mikhailovich Bersenev to select a harbor off the southwestern coast. In April 1783, he examined the bay near the village of Akhti-ar, located near the ruins of Chersonese-Tauride. I.M. Bersenev recommended it as a base for ships of the future Black Sea Fleet. Catherine II, by her decree of February 10, 1784, ordered the founding here “of a military port with an admiralty, a shipyard, a fortress and to make it a military city.” At the beginning of 1784, a port-fortress was founded, named Sevastopol by Catherine II - “The Majestic City”. In May 1783, Catherine II sent a returnee from abroad after treatment to Crimea, who brilliantly resolved all the diplomatic and political problems relating to the Russian presence on the Crimean Peninsula.
In June 1783, in Karasubazar, on the top of Mount Ak-Kaya, Prince Potemkin took the oath of allegiance to Russia to the Crimean nobility and representatives of all segments of the Crimean population. The Crimean Khanate ceased to exist. The zemstvo government of Crimea was organized, which included Prince Shirinsky Mehmetsha, Haji-Kyzy-Aga, Kadiasker Musledin Efendi.
The order of G.A. has been preserved. Potemkin to the commander of the Russian troops in Crimea, General de Balmain, dated July 4, 1783: “It is the will of Her Imperial Majesty that all the troops stationed in the Crimean peninsula treat the residents in a friendly manner, without causing offense at all, for which superiors and regimental commanders have an example.” .
In August 1783, De Balmain was replaced by the new ruler of Crimea, General I.A. Igelstrom, who turned out to be a good organizer. In December 1783, he created the “Tauride Regional Board”, which, together with the zemstvo rulers, included almost the entire Crimean Tatar nobility. On June 14, 1784, the first meeting of the Tauride regional board was held in Karasubazar.
By decree of Catherine II of February 2, 1784, the Tauride region was established under the control of the appointed and president of the military college G.A. Potemkin, consisting of the Crimean Peninsula and Taman. The Decree said: “... the Crimean peninsula with the land lying between Perekop and the borders of the Ekaterinoslav governorship, establishing a region under the name of Tauride, until the increase in population and various necessary institutions makes it convenient to establish its province, we entrust it to the management of our general, Ekaterinoslavsky and to the Tauride Governor-General Prince Potemkin, whose feat fulfilled our very assumption and that of all these lands, allowing him to divide that region into districts, appoint cities, prepare for the opening during the current year, and report to us all the details related to this and to our Senate."
On February 22, 1784, by decree of Catherine II, the upper class of Crimea was granted all the rights and benefits of the Russian nobility. Russian and Tatar officials, on the orders of G. A. Potemkin, compiled lists of 334 new Crimean nobles who retained land ownership. On February 22, 1784, Sevastopol, Feodosia and Kherson were declared open cities for all peoples friendly to the Russian Empire. Foreigners could freely come and live in these cities and take Russian citizenship.
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Gorozhanina Marina Yurievna/ Ph.D., Associate Professor
Very interesting material, but it is not clear why not a word is said about the inclusion of the right bank of the Kuban into the Russian Empire along with the Crimean Khanate. This was a very significant event, in many ways it contributed to Russia’s advance into the North Caucasus.
At the end of the 18th century, the right bank of the Kuban was inhabited by nomadic hordes of Nogais, as well as Nekrasov Cossacks. It was urgently necessary to strengthen the southern borders of the Russian Empire. A.V. played an important role in this. Suvorov, under whose leadership the construction of Russian defensive fortifications in the Kuban began. He is also considered the founding father of the city of Ekaterinodar (Krasnodar), which was founded in 1793 on the site of a fortress erected by order of A.V. Suvorov.
An important role in the fate of the Cossacks was played by the main “culprit” of Crimea’s entry into the Russian Empire, gr. G.A. Potemkin. On his initiative, the Black Sea Cossack Army was created in 1787 from the remnants of the former Zaporozhye Cossacks, which earned this name for its brilliant victories on the Black Sea during the Russian-Turkish War of 1787-1791.
The entry of Crimea into the Russian Empire is a brilliant victory of Russian diplomacy, as a result of which the threat of constant invasion or betrayal by the Crimean Khanate was removed.
Russia was regaining the lands where the legendary Tmutarakan principality once stretched. In many ways, the intensification of Russian politics on Wed. XVIII century This region was facilitated by concern for Christian brothers, whose position under the rule of the Muslim Crimea was very difficult. According to the memoirs of Archpriest Trifillius, the closest assistant to the Got[f]o-Kefai Metropolitans Gideon and Ignatius, the life of the Orthodox in these places was extremely difficult: “We suffered great fears from the Tatars; they hid wherever they could, in houses and closets themselves. I hid the Metropolitan in secret places known to me. And the Tatars were looking for us; If they had found it, they would have cut it into pieces.” The burning of the entire Christian village of Rusokhat by the Tatars also testifies to the tragedy of Christians. Acts of oppression of the Greek Christian population were recorded in 1770, 1772, 1774.
In 1778, a mass exodus of Christians from Crimea was organized. Until now, there is no consensus among studies as to why this happened. Some see this as an attempt by the Russian autocracy to remove the Christian population of Crimea from the influence of the Patriarch of Constantinople, while others believe that by providing assistance and land on the territory of the Russian Empire, Catherine II sought, first of all, to economically weaken the Crimean Khanate. In a rescript to Rumyantsev dated March 19, 1778, Catherine II, regarding the issue of resettlement to the Novorossiysk and Azov provinces, wrote that there “under Our protection they will find a calmer life and possible prosperity”22. Prince Potemkin and Count Rumyantsev were ordered to take all measures to provide new subjects with food, supply them with everything they needed locally, as well as privileges. Management of the resettlement process was entrusted to A.V. Suvorov.
As a result of these events, the Christian population in Crimea declined sharply. According to the statistical report compiled for Prince Potemkin, in 1783 there were 80 Orthodox churches in Crimea, including only 33 that were not destroyed. Only 27,412 Christians lived on the peninsula. After Crimea became part of the Russian Empire, the reverse process of restoring Christianity in this region began, but it proceeded at a very slow pace. On this occasion, Archbishop Innocent wrote in a report to the Holy Synod (1851) “... according to the current Code of Laws, it is much more profitable for Mohammedans to remain in Islam than to convert to Christianity; for along with this transition he is immediately subjected to various duties that are new to him, such as recruitment, payment of large taxes, etc. The dignity of the prevailing faith, the most just and sound policy would require the removal of this obstacle, at least to the extent that a Mohammedan, upon conversion to Christianity, if he did not enjoy new rights, would retain the old ones, albeit for life. If Christianity is opened through this door, the benefit of the state itself is obvious: for a Muslim, until he enters the temple, will always turn his eyes and heart to Mecca and consider the foreign Padishah the head of his faith and all devout Muslims.”
Annexation of Crimea to Russia in 2014 - the withdrawal of the Autonomous Republic of Crimea from Ukraine with its subsequent admission to the Russian Federation and the formation of a new subject of the Russian Federation. The basis for Crimea’s entry into the Russian Federation was a referendum of residents of the autonomy, almost 97% voted in favor of joining Russia. This was the first case of the formation of a new subject of the Russian Federation in the modern history of Russia.
Prerequisites for the annexation of Crimea to Russia
For 23 years, Kyiv has not developed a clear policy regarding autonomy. For 23 years, Kyiv subjected Crimea to forced and clumsy Ukrainization, and no matter how much they talked about the “annexation of Crimea,” it all started with an appeal from the parliament of the Autonomous Republic of Crimea, which asked Russia to protect the peninsula from the new bandit Kyiv authorities. Russia provided this protection, despite the expected complications in the international arena. There is plenty of documentary evidence that the population of the peninsula associates itself exclusively with Russia and wants to be a subject of the Russian Federation. However, anyone who has ever been to Crimea understands which Crimea is “Ukraine”.
Background to the annexation of Crimea to Russia
A political crisis erupted in Ukraine at the end of November 2013, when the Cabinet of Ministers announced the suspension of the country's European integration due to enslaving conditions. Mass protests, called “Euromaidan,” took place throughout Ukraine and in January resulted in clashes between armed radicals and law enforcement agencies. The street battles, during which the opposition repeatedly used firearms and Molotov cocktails, resulted in about 100 casualties.
On February 22, 2014, a violent seizure of power took place in the country. The Verkhovna Rada, violating the agreements reached between President Viktor Yanukovych and opposition leaders, changed the constitution, changed the leadership of parliament and the Ministry of Internal Affairs and removed the head of state from power, who was subsequently forced to leave Ukraine, fearing for his life. On February 27, the Ukrainian parliament approved the composition of the so-called “government of people's trust”, Arseniy Yatsenyuk became prime minister, and acting. O. President Alexander Turchinov.
First of all, the new government and parliament adopted the law on the release of Yulia Tymoshenko and the repeal of the law on the fundamentals of state language policy of July 3, 2012, authored by Vadim Kolesnichenko from the Party of Regions. The law provided for the possibility of official bilingualism in regions where the number of national minorities exceeds 10%. And then Sevastopol rebelled.
Subsequently and O. President Turchynov promised that he would veto the law on languages of national minorities, but it was too late. By this time, the revolutionary flames had engulfed the entire peninsula.
The first in Crimea to categorically refuse to obey the new leadership of Ukraine was Sevastopol. A mass rally was held on Nakhimov Square, attended by about 30,000 people. Sevastopol has not remembered such a number of people at a rally since the 1990s.
The residents of Sevastopol removed the mayor of the city, Vladimir Yatsub, from power and elected a mayor from Russia, a local businessman - Alexei Mikhailovich Chaly. The ex-mayor acknowledged his authority, explaining that “the authority that appointed me no longer exists.” It was decided not to carry out orders from Kyiv, not to recognize the new government and not to pay taxes to Kyiv.
Following Sevastopol, the Crimean authorities refused to obey the new leadership of Ukraine. Self-defense units were organized on the peninsula, and armed people were seen at military and civilian targets (Ukrainian sources claimed that they were Russian soldiers, but the Russian authorities denied this). The new Prime Minister of Crimea, leader of Russian Unity, Sergei Aksenov, turned to Vladimir Putin with a request for help in ensuring peace. Soon after this, the Federation Council of the Russian Federation allowed the use of Russian troops on the territory of Ukraine. True, there was no need for this.
Against this background, the new Ukrainian authorities accused Russia of provoking a military conflict and attempting to annex Crimea. The clanging of weapons began: general mobilization was announced, the troops were put on alert, and the “National Guard” was created. Batkivshchyna party deputy Gennady Moskal revealed a military secret in a TV interview: nothing travels and nothing flies in Ukraine. This confirmed the transition to the side of the Crimean authorities of the 204th Fighter Aviation Brigade of the Ukrainian Air Force, which is armed with MiG-29 fighters and L-39 trainers, based at the Belbek airfield. Of the 45 fighters and four training aircraft, only four MiG-29s and one L-39 were operational. The redeployment of Ukrainian Navy ships from Sevastopol to Odessa did not pass without incidents. Two of their 4 ships had to return due to breakdown.
Armed men in military uniforms without identification marks, called “little green men” by the Ukrainian media, together with Crimean self-defense units captured one military unit after another, without firing a single shot or shedding a drop of blood. In the end, all significant objects of the Crimean infrastructure began to be controlled by self-defense units. Ukrainian Rear Admiral Denis Berezovsky was removed from command of the Ukrainian Navy and on the same day took the oath of allegiance to the people of Crimea. Disbanded and humiliated by the new authorities in Kyiv, Berkut, which participated in the Kyiv battles, came to the defense of Crimea, and Crimea to it.
The Ukrainian military had a choice: either take the oath to the Crimean people, or they were given the opportunity to freely travel to Ukraine, but they found themselves abandoned. None of the leaders of the Ukrainian General Staff even tried to contact the commanders of military units on the peninsula to set the task. Of the 19 thousand who served, only 4 agreed to remain in the Ukrainian army.
The situation in Crimea
Unlike Kyiv, where after the Maidan traffic police officers were shot, banks were seized, and law enforcement officers were mocked, the situation in Crimea was quiet and calm. No one like Sasha Bely came to meetings with a Kalashnikov. The only reminders of the revolutionary state of Crimea were the checkpoints at the entrances to Sevastopol. No one fled from Crimea, with the exception of the Crimean Tatars, as Ukrainian media happily reported that 100 families of Crimean Tatars were received in Lviv. By the way, when Catherine II annexed Crimea, the Tatars also fled, but only to Turkey.
An event worthy of attention about the turbulent situation in Crimea was a rally of many thousands (according to various sources, from 3 to 5 thousand) of the Crimean Tatar people in Simferopol with a small scuffle with participants in the pro-Russian rally. The rally participants demanded the early termination of the powers of the Supreme Council of Crimea and early elections. In addition, the Chairman of the Mejlis, Refat Chubarov, said that the Crimean Tatars are giving the authorities of Simferopol ten days to demolish the monument to Vladimir Lenin on the square of the same name and the entire territory of the peninsula. If the demands are not met, he threatened active measures. Earlier, the Chairman of the Mejlis stated that the Tatars are ready to resist the intentions to withdraw Crimea from Ukraine.
After a single rally, the Crimean Tatars quieted down and, moreover, thoroughly. Several peaceful rallies were held in cities. Unlike Kyiv, no tires were burned here and no barricades were erected.
Not a single military man was visible on the entire southern coast of Crimea. In Simferopol, Yalta and other cities, panic was mainly created by various mommy forums on social networks.
Ukrainian media called the Russian military occupiers. But no one fought with the occupiers, no one shed blood, and you had to try very hard to see them.
There were no interruptions in food supplies, gasoline, electricity or gas.
Referendum on the annexation of Crimea to Russia
On February 27, 2014, the parliament of the Autonomous Republic of Crimea set the date for the referendum to May 25, 2014 - the day of the presidential elections in Ukraine. But then the date was postponed twice, first to March 30, then to March 16.
The predictability of the results was obvious. With the exception of the Crimean Tatars (who are only 12% on the peninsula), 96.77% voted to join Russia. 99% of Crimean Tatars ignored the referendum.
Prime Minister of Ukraine Arseniy Yatsenyuk expressed surprise why the local authorities of the autonomy, based on the results of the vote count, the so-called referendum, “demonstrated a result of 96.77% of the votes, and not 101%.”
All foreign correspondents working in Crimea said that nine out of ten residents of the peninsula said that they would vote or had already voted for Russia. International observers who agreed to work in the referendum agreed that the voting was fair - the absolute majority of those who voted chose Russia. There was an explosion of patriotism in the squares of Simferopol, Yalta and especially Sevastopol: such enthusiasm and euphoria with which Crimeans sang the Russian anthem and waved tricolors has probably not been seen since the end of World War II.
Annexation of Crimea to Russia
The Crimean referendum did not receive recognition in the European Union and the United States, nor did its results. But Crimeans are little interested in the reaction of Western leaders and international organizations: March 16, 2014 is a day that went down in history. 23 years after the collapse of the USSR, Crimea is again part of Russia.
The referendum is a starting point, not the end of the struggle for Crimea. Now the irreversibility of this decision must be protected at the international level, making it final and not subject to revision. This will be very difficult to do, because Moscow is practically alone. In the international arena, its actions are at best neutral (China, Iran). The entire Western world is against it. In the forefront, of course, are the United States and Eastern Europe, led by the Baltic countries - the latter immediately and completely denied the right to define Crimea.
For Ukraine, the bitter and difficult truth is that its region of two million simply did not want to live with it any longer. Any reasoning that the leadership of the Autonomous Republic of Crimea did not have the right to call a referendum, especially since “they voted for Russia at gunpoint,” is reasoning from impotent jealousy. By chance, having inherited it for free, the region considered that Ukraine had no prospects and was not capable of becoming different. Over the 23 years of independence, the country has degraded more and more, losing the potential of a great power that it had at the time of leaving the USSR.
Video
The ceremony of signing the agreement on the admission of the Republic of Crimea to the Russian Federation.
A manifesto on the annexation of Crimea to Russia was signed and published...
Catherine's Crimea.
The long-term geopolitical struggle for the possession of Crimea between Turkey and Russia ended in favor of the Russian Empire. This struggle was accompanied by numerous wars for almost a thousand years. At the time of signing the manifesto, the Crimean Khan was forced to abdicate the throne. The Crimean Khanate ceased to exist. Part of the Crimean Tatar nobility fled to the Ottoman Turks, and part, together with the deposed khan, asked for protection from Russia.
The manifesto on the annexation of Crimea was prepared by His Serene Highness Prince Grigory Potemkin, who was secretly married to Catherine. Potemkin is known to history, rather not as the secret husband of the empress, but as a wise statesman and her right hand. As governor of the southern lands of Russia, he oversaw the Crimean issue.
Old Russian history of Crimea.
Although April 19, 1783 was considered to be the official date of the annexation of the Crimean peninsula to Russia, in fact Crimea was Russian long before that, during the times of Ancient Kievan Rus. The Kyiv princes, distributing appanage principalities to rule over their numerous offspring and close relatives, uncles and brothers, also put Tmutarakan on reign, which was conquered in the Khazar campaign by Prince Svyatoslav Igorevich in 965. Prince Svyatoslav Igorevich owns the famous phrase “I’m coming to you.”
According to handwritten chronicles, in 988, the Tmutarakan principality, which included part of the Black Sea region and Crimea, was owned by Prince Mstislav Vladimirovich. The capital, the city of Tmutarakan, was located in the area of present-day Taman. These territories were annexed to Ancient Rus' as a result of its defeat of the Khazar Khaganate in the 10th century. Then Tmutarakan was ruled by Prince Svyatoslav Yaroslavovich and alternately his sons Oleg and Roman. After the reign of Oleg, Russian chronicles mention Tmutarakan as a Russian principality for the last time in 1094. Then it was cut off from main Rus' by the nomadic Polovtsians, who, however, shared their influence on Tmutarakan and the Crimean peninsula with the Byzantines. The Byzantine Greeks and Genoese settled in Crimea and brought the Christian religion with them to the peninsula.
Tatar-Mongols and Russian-Turkish wars.
The next period in the history of Crimea is associated with the Tatar-Mongol conquests, when, after several victorious centuries, Genghis Khan and his descendants crushed most of Asia and Europe. Further, when the Tatar-Mongols split into many states: the Great, White, Blue and Golden Horde, the Tatars settled in Crimea. For several centuries, the Crimean Khanate tried to pursue an independent policy, maneuvering between the interests of its stronger neighbors, sometimes falling under the protectorate of Turkey, sometimes making friends with Moscow against it. For example, under Ivan the Terrible, the Crimean khans either acted together with the Lithuanians and Poles against the Moscow principality, or became allies of the Moscow Tsar, sending him their sons to serve him. Then they suddenly turned 180 degrees and tried to recapture Astrakhan from Moscow. Under Peter the Great, the Crimean Khanate firmly opposed Russia on the side of the Turks. The Russian-Turkish War of 1686 - 1700 most likely began due to the frequent devastating raids of the Crimean Tatars on the southern borders of Russia. The Tatars plundered villages and took Russians captive, then selling them into slavery. The Ottomans filled the ranks of the Janissaries with the strongest Slavic men. A widely known episode of this war is the capture of the Turkish fortress of Azov by Peter the Great. Below is a reproduction of Azov, taken by Peter’s troops:
The war with the Ottoman Empire ended with the Peace of Bakhchisarai, which did not bring a full return to Russia of its ancestral ancient lands. Crimea, Podolia and part of Western Ukraine remained under the Turks, and the other part of Western Ukraine was captured by the Poles. This precarious position of the southern borders of Russia remained for a long time, until the campaigns of Catherine the Great.
The exact date of annexation and modern history of Crimea.
Considering the above, the date of Catherine’s Manifesto on April 19 should be considered not the date of Crimea’s annexation to Russia, but the date of its first reunification with it. It seems that the date of the annexation of Crimea should be considered the year 988, when Tmutarakan was first mentioned in the chronicles as a Russian principality and its appanage prince Mstislav Vladimirovich, or even the date of the defeat of the Khazar kingdom (khaganate) by Prince Svyatoslav Igorevich in 965. That year, Prince Svyatoslav successively conquered the Khazar cities of Sarkel and Samkerts, named after the capture, Belaya Vezha and Tmutarakanya, respectively. Then Semender and the capital of Khazaria Itil were conquered. The modern history of Crimea also has many dramatic twists and turns. First, Crimea, with the voluntaristic stroke of Nikita Khrushchev’s pen, was donated to Ukraine, beloved by this ruler. Then, with the criminal Belovezhsky Treaty, he moved to another state. Finally, in 2014, by the will of the people he returned to Russia, thus restoring historical and humanitarian justice.
About nutrition problems and solutions.
Why was Crimea annexed to Russia? Events developed so rapidly that many Russians did not even have time to blink an eye when the Russian Federation was replenished with two subjects: Crimea and the city of Sevastopol, which has a unique status.
The suddenness and speed of the process caused a mixed reaction from the Russian population. Most Russians to this day have no idea about the true reasons that prompted the Russian government to take this step. What motives were it guided by, and why did Russia decide to regain the Crimean peninsula, deliberately entering into open confrontation with most countries of the world community (the answer to the question: “why did Khrushchev give up Crimea” is no less interesting)?
History of the peninsula
First, you should look deeper into history to understand the full significance of this peninsula.
The history of the conquest of the peninsula dates back to the middle of the 16th century. The purpose of the Crimean campaigns was to ensure the security of the southern borders of the Russian kingdom and access to the Black Sea.
The Russian-Turkish War of 1768-1774 ended with the conquest of the peninsula and the signing of the Kuchuk-Kainardzhi Peace Treaty, according to which the Crimean Khanate, having left Ottoman influence, came under the protectorate of the Russian Empire. Russia received the fortresses of Kinburn, Yenikape and Kerch.
The annexation of Crimea to Russia (completely bloodless) occurred in 1783, after the signing of a historical act between Turkey and Russia. This meant the end of the independence of the Crimean Khanate. The fortresses of Sudzhuk-Kale and Ochakov passed to the Turkish side.
Joining the Russian Empire brought peace to the land, which was the object of continuous armed clashes and strife. In a very short time, large cities (such as Sevastopol and Yevpatoria) were built, trade began to flourish, culture began to develop, and the Black Sea Fleet was founded.
In 1784, the peninsula entered the Tauride region, the center of which was Simferopol.
The next Russian-Turkish war, which ended with the signing of the Iasi Peace Treaty, reaffirmed the Russian ownership of the Crimean Peninsula. The entire territory of the northern Black Sea region was assigned to Russia.
Since 1802, Crimea was part of the Tauride province, which existed until the outbreak of the civil war (1917-23).
When did the merger take place?
The process of annexing the peninsula was preceded by an all-Crimean referendum on April 16, 2014, the results of which eloquently testified to the desire of the overwhelming majority of the local population to become citizens of Russia.
After the completion of the referendum, the Crimean Supreme Council proclaimed the formation of the independent Republic of Crimea on April 17, 2014. The next day, the peninsula (as an independent Republic with the right to personally decide the future of its own territory) became part of the Russian Federation.
How did the general Crimean vote take place?
The highest representative body of the Crimean autonomy did not initially plan for the Republic to secede from Ukraine. It was only intended to discuss the issue of improving the status of autonomy and some expansion of its powers.
However, due to the fact that the unrest in Ukraine became unpredictable, it was decided to speed up the referendum. The general Crimean vote took place on March 16, 2014.
In the first days of March, the results of secret sociological surveys showed that almost the entire population of Crimea was in favor of annexing the autonomy to Russia. It was this fact that finally convinced Russian President V. Putin of the need to return the peninsula.
Two days before the announced vote (March 14), the Ukrainian Constitutional Court declared that the voting results could not have legal force. Thus, the resolution of the Crimean legislature to hold the vote was outlawed.
Active opposition from the Ukrainian government failed to disrupt the vote. Almost 97% of referendum participants voted for the reunification of Crimea and Russia. The turnout was approximately 83-85% of the total number of officially registered persons on the territory of the peninsula who have the right to vote in the referendum based on their age.
How did the Crimean Republic become a subject of Russia?
The day after the voting results were summed up, Crimea was given the status of an independent state and renamed the Republic of Crimea.
The State Council of the Republic approached the Russian government with a proposal for the new state to join Russia as a full-fledged entity while maintaining its republican status.
The decree recognizing the new sovereign state was signed by the head of the Russian Federation V. Putin on March 17, 2014.
Legal basis
The next day (March 18) after signing the decree recognizing the Crimean Republic, the Russian President addressed the Federal Assembly. After this speech, an interstate agreement was signed on the admission of the Republic to the Federation.
On March 18, the Constitutional Court of the Russian Federation, on behalf of V. Putin, began checking the concluded interstate agreement for its compliance with the Constitution. The inspection was completed the next day and found the agreement to comply with the basic law of the Russian Federation.
On March 21, the President of the Russian Federation signed two laws at once: one ratified the adoption of the treaty on the accession of Crimea to the Russian Federation, and the other prescribed the details of the procedure for the entry of new entities into the Federation and the features of the transition stage in the integration process.
On the same day, the establishment of the Crimean Federal District was announced.
Why is a transition period necessary?
All details of the gradual integration period are discussed in the relevant legal documents.
The transition period will be in effect until January 1, 2015. During this time, new entities must undergo a procedure of gradual entry into all government structures of the Russian Federation.
During the transition phase, all aspects of military service and conscription into the Russian army from annexed territories must be resolved.
What explains the speed of the process of incorporating Crimea?
Few people know that in the spring of 2014 the world was on the verge of the third world war. The reunification of Crimea and the Russian Federation stopped the process of its occupation by NATO troops.
As a result of the actions of the puppet government of Ukraine, the peninsula could turn into a central NATO military base. These are precisely the plans hatched by the American military, which secretly controls the political turmoil that led to the outbreak of unrest in Ukraine.
Already in May 2014, Crimea was supposed to be at the disposal of NATO troops. Repair work at many facilities intended to house the infrastructure and personnel of American military units was in full swing.
On May 15, the Ukrainian government, represented by Yatsenyuk, was supposed to announce the termination of the lease agreement for the Sevastopol base (where the Russian Black Sea Fleet is stationed), concluded between Russia and Ukraine in April 2010 for a period of 25 years.
If this treaty were to be denounced, Russia would be forced to withdraw its fleet from the Crimean region. This would mean the irretrievable loss of a strategically important facility.
The creation of a large military base right next to the Russian Federation would mean a constant source of political tension, fraught with many interethnic conflicts.
The actions of the Russian government thwarted the plans of the American military and pushed back the threat of a global military catastrophe.
Reaction of the world community
The opinions of world powers regarding the annexation of the peninsula are divided: some countries respect the right of the local population to freedom of expression and support the actions of the Russian government. Another part considers such behavior a violation of international norms.
TASS Clashes in front of the building of the Supreme Council of Crimea
On February 26, two rallies gathered on the square in front of the Supreme Council building: Tatars against pro-Russian activists, gathered mainly by the Russian Unity movement. It was headed by the then deputy, and now the prime minister of the republic. Some of the protesters were residents of Sevastopol who came to Simferopol to help.
The Crimean Tatars, as former deputies of the Supreme Council told me, violated an unspoken rule: not to organize a rally in the same place as the Russians. But the Russians “clogged” the place earlier.
“Maybe, to some extent, this is really so,” agrees Ilmi Umerov, a member of the Mejlis of the Crimean Tatar people, the ex-head of the Bakhchisaray district, after thinking. —
But we came to defend our state. At the session of the Supreme Council, according to our information, separatist decisions were to be made: an appeal to Putin with a request to accept Crimea into Russia and the appointment of a referendum.”
The situation was alarming and was heating up further - both on the street and inside. The leader of the Majlis, Refat Chubarov, periodically visited the office of the speaker of the Supreme Council - one of the flagships of the pro-Russian movement in Crimea. “He demanded that we not hold the session, otherwise he would not be able to keep people,” says the then deputy of the Supreme Council, and now a senator from Crimea, Sergei Tsekov. “I even called his people provocateurs a couple of times and shouted.”
At some point, fights broke out in the square. The corridor separating the protesters disappeared in the blink of an eye. In the recordings of those events you can see how the crowd turned on the crowd.
Two people died: one in a stampede, the other’s heart gave out.
Some of the protesters from the Crimean Tatars broke into the building of the Supreme Council. Staff members and a number of deputies evacuated through a side entrance.
“I jumped over the fence and injured my leg. Then I was treated for four months,” recalls one of the fugitives.
The police seemed to have disappeared. Chubarov and Aksenov separated the fighters, trying to recreate a corridor between the two groups. It was largely thanks to their efforts that dramatic events were avoided.
The session of the Supreme Council that day did not take place - it was not possible to gather a quorum. Many people's representatives hesitated and simply did not come to the hall.
The Crimean Tatars, being confident that they had won, decided to take the people away. Umerov recalls that when the protesters began to disperse, representatives of the Majlis once again entered Konstantinov’s office: “He assured that he would not hold any session in the near future. We considered that we had prevented separatist decisions, and prevented them for a long time.”
Moscow guests
Moscow has always had plans to return Crimea - a high-ranking Russian official told Gazeta.Ru about this, after the referendum on joining Russia.
These plans, however, were akin to a strategy for action in the event of a nuclear war: it seems necessary to be prepared, but only an emergency situation could force them to be put into practice.
We do not know at what exact moment Moscow’s envoys began secretly arriving in Crimea. Igor Strelkov, who was in Crimea during those events, stated in one of his interviews that he had been on the peninsula since February 21. The SBU of Ukraine named a different date for Strelkov’s arrival—February 26.
According to Gazeta.Ru, Strelkov was on the peninsula as a GRU officer. According to the version voiced to us by Sergei Aksenov, Strelkov headed one of the volunteer units, which was also responsible for weapons seized from the structures of the SBU and the Ministry of Internal Affairs of Ukraine.
RIA Novosti Igor Strelkov
At least from February 26, before the clash between the Russians and the Tatars, the current presidential envoy to the Crimean Federal District was on the peninsula, and at that time the general director of Slavyanka OJSC, which is part of the Ministry of Defense (the same one known in the Serdyukov case), Oleg Belaventsev.
According to unconfirmed reports, Belaventsev, as the third secretary for science and technology at the USSR Embassy in London, was expelled from Great Britain in 1985 for espionage. Later, according to some information, he worked in Germany. He is considered one of the closest associates of Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu.
“Belaventsev was responsible for security issues. After all, the Black Sea Fleet and the Ukrainian military were in Crimea, there could have been clashes, says one of the participants in those events. “He was not involved in political issues.”
However, according to the testimony of our Kremlin interlocutors and Crimean politicians, it was he who was mainly responsible for the operation in Crimea, also acting as a kind of liaison between the local elites and Moscow.
"Little Green Men" take the stage
TASS An armed man near the building of the Supreme Council of Crimea
At 4.30 am on February 27, that is, at dawn the next day after the clashes in the center of Simferopol, the buildings of the Supreme Council and the Council of Ministers of Crimea were seized by unknown armed people, later nicknamed “little green men”. According to Novaya Gazeta, these were Russian military personnel.
“Early in the morning one of the deputies calls me and says that the Supreme Council and the Council of Ministers have been captured,” recalls Sergei Tsekov. “I ask: “Who captured it?” Majlis?" “No, I don’t think so,” he answers. “The police were kicked out, but there was no shooting.”
Members of the Presidium of the Supreme Council and some other deputies gathered at the police station until the circumstances were clarified. Later, Vladimir Konstantinov invited them to “work”, and they went to the building of the Supreme Council.
“We go in, go up to the sixth floor (Konstantinov’s office is located there), and ... Oleg Evgenievich Belaventsev comes out to meet us,” one of the deputies says with a laugh. “Back then I didn’t know who he was.” Only then did I understand. After this, Konstantinov began to closely interact with him. It is clear that they also worked with Moscow, and Konstantinov set tasks for us.”
What was Belaventsev doing in the seized building even before the deputies arrived? There is only one version possible: he led the operation.
“It was a turning point,” a senior Russian official characterizes the clashes that took place in the Crimean capital the day before. The interlocutor does not disclose details, but it seems that it was these events that pushed Moscow to take decisive steps.
If there had not been a confrontation, the command would hardly have been given to occupy the buildings of the Supreme Council and the Council of Ministers.
The need for this in Moscow is motivated by the threat of a possible massacre. Former and current deputies who held a pro-Russian position at that time speak about this: many of them told me that further clashes between Tatars and Russians (and if we call a spade a spade - between those who wanted to join the Russian Federation and those who advocated the preservation of the territorial integrity of Ukraine) were inevitable. And Kyiv, in their opinion, would have done everything possible to suppress the uprising.
What do the Tatars themselves think about this?
“There is now a lot of speculation about whether we did the right thing by leaving the square on the 26th. I think that’s right - otherwise it could have been the same as in Donetsk and Lugansk,” says Umerov. “Russian machine guns would come.”
One way or another, it was not easy to persuade many deputies to come to the meeting. They did not want to come to the session, fearing that sooner or later Kyiv would take control of the situation, and then things would not go well for lovers of Russia.
Those who were undecided were persuaded in different ways. Some - through telephone conversations, others - through non-parliamentary methods. “Armed people came to pick up some deputies at home and work and demanded that they go to the Supreme Council. These were people dressed in Cossack uniforms,” says Ilmi Umerov.
There is every reason to trust his words: Igor Strelkov recently said that some parliamentarians had to be forced into the meeting: “The militia gathered the deputies to force them into the hall. I was one of these militiamen.”
By hook or by crook, they managed to gather a quorum: according to Tsekov, it amounted to 53 people out of 100.
One of the issues that the people's representatives had to resolve was to approve a new head of the Council of Ministers to replace Yanukovych's protege Anatoly Mogilev. According to Gazeta.Ru’s Crimean interlocutors, Mogilev had previously been offered to go over to Moscow’s side, but, according to one version, he refused himself; according to another, they abandoned him, suspecting him of a double game.
When choosing “its” leader for Crimea, Moscow, according to Gazeta.Ru, relied on a veteran of local politics, former Prime Minister Leonid Grach. According to Grach himself, the proposal was conveyed to him on February 26 by Belaventsev and “a couple of admirals” who came with him.
“I was connected to someone via a special connection,” says the politician, refusing to give the name of “someone.” — In the conversation it was voiced that “we are going to return Crimea,” after which I received an offer to head the Council of Ministers. I replied: “Yes, I agree to everything. But can you [return Crimea]? “Without any doubt,” came the answer.”
Grach assures that the words of “someone” that “we are going to return Crimea” sounded exactly like that and nothing else. It is noteworthy that the same phrase is used in the documentary film “Returning to the Homeland”, which will be shown on the anniversary of the referendum on March 16 - our conversation with Hrach took place even before the first announcements appeared.
However, Konstantinov and the deputies from his circle categorically spoke out against Grach’s candidacy. As a result, Aksenov became the main contender for the post of head of the Council of Ministers.
rk.gov.ru Sergey Aksenov and Oleg Belaventsev
“He decisively showed himself when he separated the Crimean Tatars and Russians. Next to him was Belaventsev (according to Gazeta.Ru, Belaventsev and Aksenov knew each other even before the Crimean events and they have friendly relations), who helped. If not for them, it is unknown how it would have ended. Our special services were drinking in the bathhouse at that time. The logic is clear: if everything works out, then they will be great. If not, they, as they say, have nothing to do with it,” says a Russian politician who was in Crimea at that moment. “After that, we started calling Moscow and saying that Aksenov should be made prime minister, not Grach.”
Before this, according to some sources, Moscow did not take him seriously: Aksenov was hampered by his reputation as a person associated with crime.
One way or another, it is obvious that the Kremlin was searching for “its” man under time pressure. This once again confirms that he did not have a clear, pre-prepared plan.
In the end, they had to fight for Aksenov’s appointment. Tsekov claims that there were three or four people against it. But it was precisely because of them that it was not possible to get the required minimum votes. The debate over the prime minister's candidacy lasted for more than five hours.
Konstantinov, from whom the proposal regarding Aksenov officially came, took a tough position. Finally, the problem was resolved: several more deputies were persuaded (or “persuaded”?) to come. Sergei Aksenov was approved as prime minister with only 53 votes in favor.
Crimeans pose the question point blank
But the decision to call a referendum was truly fateful. Moreover, the original formulation, which de jure did not imply Crimea’s secession from Ukraine, de facto implied its independence from Kyiv. It sounded like this: “The Autonomous Republic of Crimea has state independence and is part of Ukraine on the basis of treaties and agreements (yes/no).”
“At that stage, it was exclusively our, Crimean decision,” insists one of the participants in the events, meaning that Moscow was not yet truly involved in the process.
Here, however, a caveat must be made: at some point, according to an informed source, Konstantinov was connected by telephone to Vladimir Putin. And only after this the issue of the plebiscite was put to a vote of deputies.
Apparently, the speaker of the Supreme Council needed to receive guarantees of support from Moscow: the people's representatives were tremblingly afraid that Kyiv would take tough steps. Konstantinov himself claims that until the wording was changed to “joining Russia,” he did not have direct access to the country’s leadership.
The original wording of the referendum was consistent with the 1992 Crimean constitution, which was later repealed. It spelled out a similar status for Crimea: a state that is part of Ukraine and determines its relations with it on the basis of the Treaty and agreements.
However, that Basic Law also presupposed the right of autonomy to independent relations with other states and even organizations.
This could well be the next step: after the announcement of the plebiscite and until the first days of March, a local constitutional commission met in Crimea, discussing the further expansion of the powers of the republic.
“But even then, at meetings, the Crimeans began to demand that I raise the issue head-on (about joining Russia. - Gazeta.Ru). I told everyone: “We are going to Russia anyway. I don’t know how, but we are going there.” I thought this was one of the ways of a soft transition to statehood, without violating international norms, when we [after the referendum] conclude an agreement with Russia,” says Konstantinov.
To whom did Moscow “pass”?
While Crimean lawyers were developing proposals to expand the powers of the republic, Moscow was playing its own big game.
On February 28, the day after Crimea announced a referendum, the leader of A Just Russia, Sergei Mironov, introduced an interesting bill to the Duma. The meaning of the creation was that it was necessary to simplify the procedure for admitting new territories to the Russian Federation. According to current legislation, a new entity can join the Russian Federation only if there is an international agreement with the state from which it “left.”
Mironov proposed expanding the conditions: Russia has the right to include part of another state, even if there is no international agreement. To do this, residents of the “separating lands” only need to vote on joining the Russian Federation in a referendum, or the state authorities of the territory must make a corresponding request.
According to Gazeta.Ru, the bill was not Mironov’s “amateur activity.” It was prepared in the Kremlin.
However, the document stalled in parliament and was not adopted at Stakhanov’s pace, as happens when the country’s leadership urgently needs to change something.
“Mironov’s bill is an element of a big game that can be assessed in different ways,” a high-ranking source in power structures gives a very sparse explanation. “First of all, this was a message to the Crimeans: if you speak out in favor of joining Russia at the referendum, then we can accept you.”
But the wording providing for accession to the Russian Federation officially appeared a week later! The question is, why did the Crimeans wait, even for a very short time?
There can be only one assumption: Moscow did not give a final signal about its readiness to accept Crimea.
An interlocutor in the Russian power structures notes: at the top there was no unity of opinion on what exactly to do with the peninsula - to annex or not to annex.
The Crimean politician says that in May, when the referendum had already taken place, he had a chance to attend one of the closed meetings of Deputy Prime Minister Dmitry Rogozin in Sevastopol:
“He said that supporters of the annexation of Crimea were in the minority. Rogozin himself was among those who advocated annexing Crimea.”
And here is what Konstantinov says to Gazeta.Ru about this: “As we have already understood now, the decision [to join] was not made easily. When we first announced the referendum, there was a decision that we needed to help the Crimeans, that Russia would not abandon them. But how exactly will he “not give up”? No one knew then that in the end there would be exactly such a formulation [about accession].
There were different visions of the status of Crimea. Some people who are at the center of politics (Konstantinov emphasizes that we are not talking about deputies or senators, but refuses to be more specific. - Gazeta.Ru) told me: “You must become a state. Be an independent state to reassure the world community.” I answered: “No way, the Crimeans don’t need this. We are not ready to be a state. This is a pure gamble that will destroy us all.”
However, perhaps the main purpose of Mironov’s bill was to demonstrate to the West and Kyiv what Moscow is ready to do. In fact, at that stage, Russia proposed two scenarios: either Crimea would formally remain part of Ukraine, being, however, practically independent, or it would be annexed.
Bargaining with the West
Putin was obviously forced to move along the second, radical path by the tough position of the West, which was hostile to Moscow’s participation in the affairs of Crimea. Starting from March 1, when the Federation Council promptly gave the president permission to send a limited contingent of troops to Ukraine, and “polite people” appeared in Crimea, the degree of conflict with the West, already high after the Kiev opposition violated the agreements of February 21, increased even more .
There were negotiations between the Russian leadership and the leaders of Western countries. There were bellicose statements.
So, on the night of March 1-2, Putin talked with Barack Obama for 90 (!) minutes. According to the White House, the American president said that further violation of international law will lead to the political isolation of Russia. At the same time, Obama threatened that he might not come to the G8 summit, scheduled for May in Sochi (as you know, in the end no one went there, and the summit itself was held in the G7 format in June in Belgium).
On March 3, speaking at the White House, the American leader said that the United States was considering the entire range of economic and diplomatic measures aimed at isolating Russia: “It cannot violate the basic principles recognized by the world.”
A few hours later (it was early morning on March 4 in Moscow), the agencies reported that Obama held a meeting with advisers, where they also discussed steps “to further isolate Russia” in response to its actions in Crimea. Obviously, even then Moscow was threatened with sanctions, although no one had yet uttered this word publicly.
What was Putin bargaining about with the West, and above all with the United States, which in the Russian leadership was and is considered the main shadow curators of the new Kyiv authorities?
It can be assumed that one of the main demands of the Russian leader was recognition of the legitimacy of the Crimean referendum and guarantees that Kyiv would also recognize the result. This was quite consistent with the concept of federalization of Ukraine (in the case of Crimea, one could even talk about some kind of confederation), which Moscow powerfully insisted on at a certain period.
For Russia, after the victory of Euromaidan, it was extremely important to maintain influence on Ukrainian politics. After the Orange Revolution, this was achieved thanks to guarantees that the Party of Regions would remain in the political field, but in this case nothing like that happened. And the “regionals” themselves, led by Yanukovych, having already come to power, showed themselves to be allies. And it is logical that it was decided to rely not on the center, but on centrifugal tendencies.
But if the West and Kyiv agree to Russia’s demands, the Ukrainian authorities will never see full control over the peninsula. At first, Crimea and Kyiv would be connected by some kind of contractual relationship, and then who knows.
No matter what was discussed in the negotiations, a compromise could not be reached. Moreover, judging by the harsh tone of the statements, there was not even a hint of compromise. For Putin, the sharp reaction of the West meant only one thing: unwillingness to take into account the interests of the Russian Federation.
What options did the Russian president have?
TASS Election campaigning in Crimea
Option one is to pretend that nothing happened, recall the military from Crimea and let the situation take its course. But, according to Putin’s logic, this would be a manifestation of weakness, a surrender of positions under pressure from the West. Putin could not agree to this. In addition, the Black Sea Fleet is located on the territory of Crimea, and the head of state was hardly sure that the agreement on its basing, which was supposed to be valid until 2035, would not be revised, and even in favor of NATO.
Option two is to move according to the original, soft scenario, according to which, as a result of the referendum, Crimea gains “state independence.” What would be the further actions of Moscow, which understands that Kyiv does not recognize the results and will not conclude any agreements with the republic? Defend the legality of the referendum, but at the same time take no steps to legally secure their “guardianship” of the peninsula? In this case, at least one question would arise: what to do with the Ukrainian military units, which, although they were blocked, and the military themselves were demoralized, still continued to remain on the territory of Crimea? Asking to “leave”? On what basis? And most importantly, was there a guarantee that an armed conflict would not occur in the future?
Then, having recognized the legitimacy of the Crimean referendum, should we urgently conclude some kind of agreement with Crimea, including military protection? And then, “at the request” of the Crimean leadership, increase the presence of the Russian contingent and demand that the Ukrainian military leave? But in this case, the West’s reaction would most likely be as harsh as the reaction to the annexation of Crimea.
So we come to the third option - the actual accession. A radical scenario, which, however, allows us to immediately dot all the i's: Crimea is ours, no one will kick out the Black Sea Fleet, the Ukrainian military has nothing to do in a foreign state. Crimeans are happy, there is a patriotic upsurge in Russia. Yes, the West is introducing sanctions, but somehow we will survive, and we have not experienced anything like this.
It’s unfortunate to realize this, but it seems that from the moment Putin got involved in the battle for Crimea and was unable to agree on anything with the West, he had no choice but to go for broke.
Final decision
When exactly the Russian president made the fateful decision that radically changed the course of history, only he himself knows. Officially, the new wording of the referendum, providing for the annexation of Crimea to Russia, was approved by the Supreme Council on March 6. According to people directly or indirectly involved in the process, work on the new formulation began around March 3-4.
Thus, when on March 4, Vladimir Putin, speaking at a press conference, said that Russia was not considering the option of annexing Crimea, work on the legal formalization of the annexation of the peninsula was either already underway or began immediately after the president’s communication with the media.
By the way, at the same time the head of state, recalling the precedent of Kosovo, made a reservation that “no one has yet canceled the right of nations to self-determination.” At the same time, he emphasized that in relation to Crimea, Russia “will not provoke such sentiments and such a decision.” At that moment, no one paid attention to the words about the right of nations to self-determination. Everyone was put to sleep by the statement about the absence of intentions to annex Crimea.
“At a certain stage, we already realized that Kyiv still does not recognize our referendum (with the original wording), and we believed that the question needed to be changed. And people were determined to be in Russia. But we could not show independence until Moscow loomed,” complains one of the Crimean deputies.
And so “the beacon was lit.”
“24-hour meetings have begun. It was a hot, manual job, and it was personally coordinated by the president,” says Gazeta.Ru’s source in Russian federal structures.
From the stories of Crimean parliamentarians, we can conclude that there was complete chaos in the offices there: they deliberated all day long, staff members and lawyers were running around.
“Konstantinov himself periodically went out to call someone. There were also people from the presidential administration here who helped us legally,” says the former deputy. “The task was to find a formula that could legitimize the annexation of Crimea from the point of view of international law,” adds Gazeta.Ru’s interlocutor in Russian diplomatic circles.
TASS Referendum on the status of Crimea
Moscow could not help but understand that the West would not recognize the referendum in any case, primarily because it did not comply with the Ukrainian constitution, which stipulates that a plebiscite on the secession of a region from the state should take place throughout the entire country. But at the same time, it was obvious that Russia would have to defend the legitimacy of the past referendum on international platforms. That is why the search for a legal formula for accession was not an idle question.
The final decision on the wording of the referendum: “Are you for the reunification of Crimea with Russia as a subject of the Russian Federation?” - was taken on the night of March 5-6.
“As I understand it, the decision was made at the highest level, and guarantees were given that there would be no Transnistrian scenario (in 2006, a referendum on joining Russia was held in Transnistria, but it was never accepted into the Russian Federation. - "Gazeta. Ru"). In any case, Konstantinov and Aksenov told us that everything had been decided,” says one of the participants in those events.
“In the Crimean Supreme Council, from the moment the referendum was announced, nothing was decided at all without a call from above,” adds another Gazeta.Ru interlocutor sarcastically.
Konstantinov, however, gives a different version: the wording was not agreed with Moscow, and after its approval he himself was not completely sure that Russia would not change its mind at the last moment: “I believe that night (from March 5 to 6) was the night of decision-making . Even the day before, we understood that all the risks were being assessed at the top and there was no final decision.”
Once, Konstantinov complained, he even had a nightmare: “We come to Moscow, and they tell us: “You know, we won’t take you into Russia.”
The last word really remained with Vladimir Putin: hypothetically, Moscow could not accept Crimea into Russia immediately, but take a break and drag out the game.
Flight to Putin
On March 6, when the Supreme Council of Crimea officially decided to change the wording of the plebiscite, its deadline was also postponed - from March 30 to the 16th (initially it was completely scheduled for May 25, the day of the presidential elections in Ukraine).
Immediately after this, four members of the presidium: Vladimir Konstantinov, Sergei Tsekov, Vladimir Klychnikov and Konstantin Bakharev - went, so to speak, on a “cruise”. From the Kachinsky airfield near Sevastopol, they flew to Anapa on a military Mi-8, under the cover of no less than two combat helicopters. There were still Ukrainian military personnel in Crimea, no one could guarantee that there would be no provocation, hence the precautions, explains one of the “travelers” to Gazeta.Ru.
In Anapa there was a transfer: they were taken to Sochi airport on a Black Sea Fleet plane. The next destination is the presidential residence “Bocharov Ruchey”. True, only one of the four could boast that he “saw Putin” that day: only Konstantinov was called to an audience with the head of state, who demonstrated to the head of state the officially formalized decision of the Supreme Council. The rest were sitting “in some house” drinking tea.
The very next day, March 7, Crimean parliamentarians took part in the rally “People’s Assembly for the Brotherly People,” which took place on Vasilievsky Spusk under the walls of the Kremlin.
On March 16, the referendum took place. According to official data, in Crimea, 96.77% of citizens voted for joining Russia, in Sevastopol, which later became a separate subject of the Federation - 95.6%. On the same day, the Supreme Council of Crimea declared the republic an independent state. A day later, on March 18, Vladimir Putin, at a ceremony in the Kremlin, signed an agreement on the admission of Crimea and Sevastopol to the Russian Federation.
This stroke of the presidential pen finally changed the history of Russia. And not only Russia - the world. For the first time since the end of World War II, one country annexed the territory of another. An unprecedented case. Or, on the contrary, a precedent.
What did Russia gain by “restoring historical justice” and annexing Crimea?
On the one hand, there is an almost complete cessation of dialogue with the West, significant international isolation, and sanctions that sharply aggravated the already growing problems in the Russian economy. Russia’s desire to continue to influence Ukrainian politics and Kyiv’s reluctance to engage in dialogue either with its citizens or with Moscow in the new geopolitical reality led to a full-fledged war in Donbass.
There was a strong split in Russian society, which was and continues to be strengthened by state propaganda. The split has already reached extreme levels, but it seems that it will only grow.
On the other hand, in Russia there was a surge of patriotic sentiment, which led to a sharp increase in Vladimir Putin’s rating, which, despite the current decline in the “Crimean effect” and the first tangible economic problems, continues to remain high: according to various sources, it ranges from 70 almost up to 90%. And finally, the main thing that Russia acquired is, in fact, Crimea.
Was it worth it? Everyone has their own answer.
This material uses video from Reuters, Ruptly