Conflict with Georgia. Truce and end of the conflict

Five-day war (8-12 August 2008)

The Russian special operation “to enforce peace in the area of responsibility of the peacekeepers,” which was carried out on the territory of Georgia and the unrecognized republics of Abkhazia and South Ossetia from August 8 to 12, 2008, went down in history under the name “Five-Day War.” This was the first military operation of the Russian Federation outside its own territory.

Further, the escalation only increased: one cannot fail to mention Russia’s role in the defeat of L. Chibirov in the 2001 presidential elections in South Ossetia, the accelerated passportization (issuance of Russian passports) of the population of South Ossetia and Abkhazia, the introduction of troops and the construction of a military base in Java, and sabotage.

By 2006, the peaceful settlement was finally buried by the Russian Federation, even at the public level. “One cannot apply one set of rules to Kosovo and another to Abkhazia and South Ossetia,” the Russian President believed.

At the beginning of 2008, there was an increase in tension in the South Ossetian conflict zone, as well as in relations between Russia and Georgia. Russia is withdrawing from the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe, thereby removing the quota of flank restrictions on the deployment of offensive weapons in the North Caucasus Military District.

On March 6, 2008, it was announced that Russia had withdrawn from the ban on trade, economic and financial ties with Abkhazia; Moscow's decision was regarded by the Georgian Foreign Ministry as "encouraging separatism in the Abkhaz region and an open attempt to encroach on the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Georgia."

At the beginning of April 2008, the first units of the 7th Airborne Division of the Russian Armed Forces entered Abkhazia, positioned near the Georgian border.

On April 16, 2008, the Russian Foreign Ministry reported that Russian President V. Putin gave the government instructions on the basis of which Moscow would build special relations with Abkhazia and South Ossetia.

Starting from August 1, on the initiative of the Prime Minister of South Ossetia, Yuri Morozov, the residents of Tskhinvali were evacuated.

Since the beginning of August, the South Ossetian Ministry of Defense has reported about the concentration of Georgian troops near the border of the unrecognized republic.

In an interview with the Krasnaya Zvezda newspaper, an officer of the 135th motorized rifle regiment of the 58th Army of the North Caucasian Military District said: “On August 7, the command came to advance to Tskhinvali. They alerted us and set out on the march. We arrived, settled down, and already on August 8 there was a fire there.” . The newspaper later clarified that the date in question was August 8. Some Russian media also claimed that on August 7, the dispatch of a number of units of the 58th Army to South Ossetia began; a month later, the Georgian side began to announce this, publishing its intelligence information in September 2008. The Georgian side published recordings of the conversation, which it claims belong to South Ossetian border guards.

A number of evidence published in the media indicate the presence on the territory of South Ossetia before the official entry of Russian troops, in addition to the peacekeepers, of other Russian military units. In particular, this is confirmed by the death of contract soldier of the 22nd separate GRU special forces brigade Evgeniy Parfenov on the first day of the conflict on August 8 in Tskhinvali.

Izvestia newspaper correspondent Yuri Snegirev stated that in June-July, military exercises of the 58th Army took place in North Ossetia, and after their completion, the equipment did not go into the pits, but remained in front of the entrance to the Roki tunnel (on Russian territory). Yuri Snegirev said: “After the tunnel there was no equipment. I saw this myself. This can be confirmed by my other colleagues, who, after the shelling of Tskhinvali on August 2, began to visit South Ossetia every day.” .

The Kozaev brothers (one of them is an employee of the Ministry of Internal Affairs of North Ossetia, the other is a hero of Abkhazia and South Ossetia) claimed that the President of South Ossetia E. Kokoity knew in advance about the upcoming military events and left Tskhinvali for Java in advance. However, according to Anatoly Barankevich, the President of South Ossetia left for Java only on August 8 at about two in the morning.

Points of view regarding responsibility for the start of the war

Georgia's position

According to the official version of the Georgian side, the start of hostilities was a reaction to South Ossetian provocations and the immediate threat of a Russian attack. Georgia allegedly had reliable information, obtained as a result of intercepting a telephone conversation, that on the morning of August 7, “the Russians had already passed through the Roki tunnel” and therefore invaded South Ossetia.

Russia's position

Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov said that the reasons for the entry of Russian troops into the conflict zone were Georgia’s aggression against the territories of South Ossetia not under its control and the consequences of this aggression: a humanitarian catastrophe, the exodus of 30 thousand refugees from the region, the death of Russian peacekeepers and many residents of South Ossetia. Lavrov qualified the actions of the Georgian army against civilians as genocide. He noted that the majority of the population of South Ossetia are citizens of Russia, and that “not a single country in the world would remain indifferent to the murder of its citizens and expulsion of them from their homes.” According to Lavrov, “Russia’s military response to the Georgian attack on Russian citizens and soldiers of the peacekeeping contingent was completely proportionate.”

Position of the Tagliavini Commission

On September 30, 2009, the official text of the report of the International Independent Commission of Inquiry into the conflict in the South Caucasus was distributed. The Commission worked under the auspices of the EU. The group of experts was led by Swiss diplomat Heidi Tagliavini.

According to the Russian side, an international investigation found Georgia responsible for the war in the Caucasus in August 2008. The text of the report stated that Georgia, using heavy artillery, launched an attack on Tskhinvali on the night of August 8, 2008 and, accordingly, started the war. However, this attack, as noted in the text, was the result of long-term provocations in the conflict zone. Russia, according to the report's authors, was also responsible for numerous violations of international law.

Progress of hostilities

August 7

In the morning, information appeared in the Georgian media that the South Ossetian leader Eduard Kokoity had left the capital and was preparing to lead large-scale military operations from Java, where detachments of volunteers from Russia had already arrived.

On the afternoon of August 7, 2008, Secretary of the South Ossetian Security Council Anatoly Barankevich stated: “Numerous Georgian military formations are heading to the border (of South Ossetia). The village of Khetagurovo has been shelled from 152-mm guns for two hours. The village is on fire. 27 Grad installations are concentrated in the Gori area. The activity of Georgian troops is observed along the entire border with South Ossetia "All this suggests that Georgia is beginning large-scale aggression against our republic" .

In the afternoon, Georgian President Mikheil Saakashvili ordered the Georgian military to unilaterally cease fire. Then an appeal from the Georgian leader was shown on TV, in which he agreed to negotiations in any format and invited Russia to become the guarantor of the broadest possible autonomy for South Ossetia within Georgia. At the same time, Saakashvili offered an amnesty to all members of the armed forces of the unrecognized republic. An agreement was reached between Georgia and South Ossetia for both sides to cease shelling - pending negotiations, which were decided to be held on August 8 at the peacekeepers' headquarters in Tskhinvali.

The commander of the Joint Peacekeeping Forces (JPKF) in the zone of the Georgian-Ossetian conflict, Marat Kulakhmetov, said that the parties ceased fire, however, according to the Georgian side, after Saakashvili’s statement, the fire on Georgian villages from South Ossetia sharply intensified. The Rustavi 2 television company reported about ten dead Georgian citizens.

The head of the analytical department of the Georgian Ministry of Internal Affairs, Shota Utiashvili, reported that 10 people were killed and 50 were injured when Georgian villages were shelled in the zone of the Georgian-Ossetian conflict.

At 23.30 Georgian artillery opened heavy fire on Tskhinvali. The commander of the JPKF, Marat Kulakhmetov, announced the beginning of the war. The shelling began from the Georgian-controlled villages of Ergneti and Nikozi. The Georgian government stated that it was forced to abandon the previously announced unilateral moratorium on firing and return fire due to the ongoing shelling of Georgian villages by South Ossetian formations.

8 August

On the night of August 8 (about 00.15 Moscow time), Georgian troops subjected Tskhinvali to fire from Grad rocket launchers, and at about 03.30 Moscow time they began an assault on the city using tanks. The locations of Russian peacekeepers were also attacked. According to the Georgian authorities, the capital of South Ossetia has been surrounded. Georgian media reported that the Znauri region of South Ossetia had come under the control of Georgian troops. News agencies reported that Georgian troops occupied six villages in South Ossetia - Mugut, Didmukha, Dmenisi, Okona, Akots and Kokhat.

At 00.30 Moscow time on August 8, the commander of operations of the Georgian Armed Forces, General Mamuka Kurashvili, announced on the Rustavi-2 TV channel that, due to the Ossetian side’s refusal to engage in dialogue to stabilize the situation in the conflict zone, the Georgian side "decided to restore constitutional order in the conflict zone". Mamuka Kurashvili called on Russian peacekeepers stationed in the conflict zone not to interfere in the situation.

At 4 a.m., Russia demanded an emergency convening of a meeting of the UN Security Council and alerted units of the 58th Army of the North Caucasus Military District. The alarm was also declared in Abkhazia.

At 02.00 Moscow time, due to the sharp aggravation of the situation in South Ossetia, an emergency meeting of the Security Council of Abkhazia was held in Sukhum. As a result, it was decided to move a number of units of the Abkhaz army to the borders of the weapons limitation zone in the Ochamchira region of the republic.

By noon, three battalion tactical groups from the 429th and 503rd motorized rifle regiments of the 19th motorized rifle division and the 135th separate motorized rifle regiment of the 58th Army of the North Caucasus Military District entered South Ossetia through the Roki tunnel, which deployed into battle formations in Java and Gufta districts. Georgian planes tried to destroy a bridge near the village of Gufta in order to block the advance of Russian troops, but missed and hit residential buildings. Meanwhile, fighting took place all over Tskhinvali.

The 76th Pskov Airborne Division was transferred to the combat area.

In addition to the transfer of additional units to South Ossetia, Russia deployed airborne units and marines to Abkhazia.

Russian ships entered Georgian territorial waters and began combat patrols.

President of Abkhazia Sergei Bagapsh decided to forcibly oust the Georgian Armed Forces from the upper part of the Kodori Gorge. There is a concentration of troops in the zone of the Georgian-Abkhaz conflict. According to the plenipotentiary representative of the President of Abkhazia in the Gali region bordering Georgia, Ruslan Kishmaria, Georgia is introducing additional military contingent and armored vehicles into the security zone. Units of the Abkhaz army are stationed at the borders of the peacekeepers' zone of responsibility.

In South Ossetia, Russian troops reached the administrative border with Georgia along almost its entire length, continuing to push the few remaining combat-ready Georgian units to the south.

Evidence and findings of war crimes during the conflict

Russia and South Ossetia on the one hand, and Georgia on the other hand, accuse each other of crimes and ethnic cleansing. Journalists, human rights activists and others have also alleged war crimes during the conflict.

In November 2008, the human rights organization Amnesty International published a report according to which:

During the assault on Tskhinvali, the Georgian army carried out indiscriminate attacks, as a result of which dozens of South Ossetian civilians were killed and many were injured, as well as significant damage to infrastructure (public buildings, hospitals, schools);
The main destruction of Tskhinvali was caused by the Grad multiple launch rocket systems used by the Georgian army, the missiles of which have low accuracy.
During the conflict, Russian aviation carried out more than 75 air raids, most of which targeted the positions of the Georgian army. Villages and towns were hit by airstrikes, with damage “limited to a few streets and individual houses in some villages.”
There is evidence that some Russian attacks on Georgian towns and roads have resulted in civilian injuries and deaths, with "perhaps no distinction being made between legitimate military targets and civilians." As the report writes, “if this is indeed the case, then such attacks qualify as indiscriminate attacks and constitute a violation of international humanitarian law.”
As the report states, “according to eyewitnesses, the disciplined behavior of Russian military personnel differed sharply from the actions of Ossetian fighters and militia groups, who were seen in looting and robberies.” Georgians interviewed by Amnesty International noted that Russian military personnel "generally behaved decently towards Georgian civilians and showed proper discipline."
South Ossetian units and paramilitary forces committed serious crimes against Georgians in South Ossetia and adjacent territories. Eyewitnesses reported unlawful killings, beatings, threats, arson and robbery carried out by armed groups on the South Ossetian side.

On January 23, 2009, the international human rights organization Human Rights Watch released a report, Up in Flames, which concluded that Russian, Georgian and South Ossetian armed forces had committed numerous violations of humanitarian law resulting in the deaths of civilians; the authors of the report call on Moscow and Tbilisi to investigate the crimes and punish the perpetrators. The report accused the Georgian side of indiscriminate use of weapons during the shelling of Tskhinvali, neighboring villages and during the ensuing offensive, as well as beating detainees and looting. The South Ossetian side was accused of torture, murder, rape, robbery and ethnic cleansing. The Russian side was accused of robbery. HRW also stated that numerous accusations by the Russian side of the Georgian army of genocide and massacres were not confirmed during verification, and HRW did not receive answers to a request to the Investigative Committee under the Prosecutor's Office. According to the organization, individual facts of cruelty by the Georgian army, published in the Russian media, can be qualified as independent serious crimes, but not as an attempt at genocide.

Casualties during the conflict

South Ossetia

Official data

By the evening of August 8, preliminary data on casualties appeared: as the President of the Republic Eduard Kokoity stated in an interview with the Interfax news agency, over 1,400 people became victims of the attack by Georgian troops on South Ossetia. On the morning of August 9, the official representative of the South Ossetian government, Irina Gagloeva, reported 1,600 dead. On the evening of August 9, Russian Ambassador to Georgia Vyacheslav Kovalenko said that at least 2,000 residents of Tskhinvali (about 3% of the population of South Ossetia) had died. On August 16, the Minister of Internal Affairs of South Ossetia, Mikhail Mindzaev, said that the final death toll was still unclear, but it was already clear that more than 2,100 people had died. Final official data were reported on August 20; According to Irina Gagloeva, in total, South Ossetia lost 1,492 people killed during the conflict. On September 17, the Prosecutor General of South Ossetia, Taimuraz Khugaev, said in an interview that 1,694 died in the war, including 32 military personnel and an employee of the Ministry of Internal Affairs of the republic.

At the same time, the South Ossetian prosecutor's office reported on August 20 that “as a result of the armed aggression of the Georgian army,” the deaths of 69 residents of South Ossetia, including three children, were “established and documented.” According to prosecutors, this list will grow because it does not include those killed in rural areas. On July 3, 2009, the head of the Investigative Committee under the Russian Prosecutor's Office (SKP), A. Bastrykin, stated that 162 civilians became victims of the conflict and 255 were injured. However, according to him, this is not final data.

Unofficial data

On September 4, 2008, the Public Commission for the Investigation of War Crimes in South Ossetia and Assistance to the Affected Civilian Population published a list of those killed, indicating their full name, age, cause of death and place of burial. As of August 8, 2012, the number of deaths on this list is 365 people. This list is not final and is updated as accurate information is established about persons whose fate has not been reliably established, or there is hope that the people are alive.

On November 10, 2008, the American magazine Business Week reported that, according to estimates by the human rights organization Human Rights Watch (HRW), between 300 and 400 civilians in South Ossetia were killed as a result of the Georgian attack.

Russia

Official Russian data

On September 3, the chief military prosecutor of the Russian Federation, S. Fridinsky, published data according to which the losses of Russian military personnel amounted to 71 people killed and 340 wounded. The list of killed Russian military personnel by the Russian agency Regnum includes 72 people.

In February 2009, Deputy Minister of Defense General of the Army Nikolai Pankov stated that 64 servicemen were killed (according to the list of surnames), three were missing and 283 were injured. However, in August, Deputy Foreign Minister Grigory Karasin reported 48 dead and 162 wounded. The reasons for this discrepancy in numbers are unknown.

Data from the Georgian side

According to Georgian data, Russia significantly underestimated its losses. Thus, on August 12, Georgian President Saakashvili stated that the Georgian Armed Forces destroyed 400 Russian soldiers.

The Georgian news agency Medianews disseminated information about losses among Russian military personnel and equipment, many times higher than the losses voiced by both the Russian side and Georgian officials: “As a result of the fighting in the Tskhinvali region, the Russian 58th Army lost 1,789 soldiers, 105 tanks, 81 combat vehicles, 45 armored personnel carriers, 10 Grad devices and five Smerch devices.

Georgia

Official data

Ministry of Defense - 133 dead, 70 missing, 1,199 wounded;
Ministry of Internal Affairs - 13 dead, 209 wounded;
Civilians - 69 dead, 61 wounded.

On September 15, the data on losses was clarified: the deaths of 154 military personnel of the Ministry of Defense, 14 employees of the Ministry of Internal Affairs and 188 civilians were reported; In addition, the bodies of 14 dead servicemen have not been found.

Georgia has officially published a list of killed civilians, indicating their first and last name, and locality. There are a total of 228 people on the list; opposite 62 names there is a sign that says “information is being verified.” A list of dead military and police officers has also been published: a total of 169 people. As new information becomes available, the lists are updated. This brings the total number of those killed according to official death tolls to 397, with 62 deaths not officially confirmed. Data on some of those killed cannot be cross-checked due to the lack of opportunity for Georgian officials to work in the territory controlled by the de facto authorities of South Ossetia and the Russian military.

Russian data

Journalists from the Russian newspaper Kommersant, who were in Tbilisi on August 11, quoted an unnamed Georgian army officer, according to whom his unit delivered almost 200 killed Georgian soldiers and officers from South Ossetia to the hospital in Gori alone.

Some Russian sources accused Georgia of significantly understating the losses suffered. According to the assumptions of Russian military experts, expressed in the Vesti news program on the Rossiya TV channel on August 15, the losses of the Georgian army could amount to 1.5-2 thousand people killed and up to 4 thousand wounded. On September 15, an unnamed Russian intelligence source stated that Georgia had lost about 3,000 security personnel during the war. Unconfirmed by independent sources, these reports remain mere speculation.

Diplomatic settlement

On August 12 at 12.46 pm, Russian President Dmitry Medvedev announced that he had decided to complete the operation to force Georgia to peace.

After this, during the meeting of the EU Chairman, French President Nicolas Sarkozy, with Russian President Dmitry Medvedev and Prime Minister Vladimir Putin, six principles for a peace settlement were agreed upon (the “Medvedev-Sarkozy Plan”):

Refusal to use force.
The final cessation of all hostilities.
Free access to humanitarian aid.
Return of the Georgian Armed Forces to their places of permanent deployment.
The withdrawal of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation to the line preceding the start of hostilities.
The beginning of an international discussion on the future status of South Ossetia and Abkhazia and ways to ensure their lasting security.

According to N. Sarkozy, “a six-point text cannot answer all questions. It does not completely solve the problem.”

On August 16, Russian President Dmitry Medvedev signed a plan for a peaceful settlement of the Georgian-Ossetian conflict. Prior to this, the document was signed by the leaders of the unrecognized states of South Ossetia and Abkhazia, as well as the President of Georgia M. Saakashvili. The signing of this document by the parties to the conflict finally marked the end of hostilities.

results

In the period from August 14 to August 16, 2008, the leaders of the states involved in hostilities signed a plan for the peaceful settlement of the Georgian-South Ossetian conflict (“Medvedev-Sarkozy Plan”). However, the confrontation between the parties to the conflict did not end with the ceasefire, but acquired a political and diplomatic character, largely moving into the sphere of international relations.

According to the OSCE, which was expressed on August 9, 2008 by Finnish Foreign Minister Alexander Stubb, who chairs the OSCE, Russia has ceased to be a mediator in the South Ossetian settlement and instead has become one of the participants in the conflict.

The immediate consequence of the conflict was Georgia's secession from the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS). On August 12, Mikheil Saakashvili announced that Georgia was leaving the CIS; on August 14, this decision was approved by the Georgian parliament.

On August 26, 2008, Russian President Dmitry Medvedev announced the signing of decrees “On recognition of the Republic of Abkhazia” and “On recognition of the Republic of South Ossetia”, according to which the Russian Federation recognizes both republics “as a sovereign and independent state”, and undertakes to establish with each of these, diplomatic relations and conclude an agreement of friendship, cooperation and mutual assistance.

In which it recognized the territorial integrity of Georgia. On March 31, 2014, the Georgian Foreign Ministry reported that the state of Tuvalu had also canceled the decision to recognize the separatist republics.

Residents of Georgia and South Ossetia remember the victims of the “Five-Day War”

In South Ossetia and Georgia, mourning events are held annually in memory of the victims of the conflict. On August 7 and 8, 2017 in Georgia, the leaders of the opposition parties “United National Movement” and “European Georgia” laid wreaths at the graves of Georgian soldiers who died in combat in August 2008. In Tskhinvali, authorities and local residents took part in laying wreaths and flowers at the “Symbol of Sorrow” monument, and photographs of victims of the conflict were laid out and candles were lit on the steps of the republic’s parliament. Funeral rallies were also held in three South Ossetian villages.

International Criminal Court

For 10 years now, investigations into the conflict have been ongoing at the International Criminal Court (ICC). Both Georgia and the Russian Federation applied there.

On January 27, 2016, the ICC announced that it had authorized the prosecutor's office to begin an investigation into crimes that may have been committed during this conflict in and near the Tskhinvali region of Georgia from July 1 to October 10, 2008. The court concluded that there were “reasonable grounds to believe that crimes within the jurisdiction of the ICC had been committed.”

The ICC field office in Georgia was opened in 2018.

According to human rights activists who gathered in The Hague on April 12, 2018, investigators of the International Criminal Court for ten years have not achieved results in the investigation of the armed conflict in South Ossetia; much evidence has been lost during this time. Victims of the conflict remain in dire straits and have no faith in justice as Russia and South Ossetia refuse to cooperate with the investigation, human rights activists said.

Notes:

Russian-Georgian war and features of national memory // Information and analytical portal “Caucasus Online”, August 27, 2013
Putin: Same rules regarding Kosovo, Abkhazia and South Ossetia // Rosbalt news agency, September 13, 2006
Russia has emerged from the ban on trade, economic and financial ties with Abkhazia // “Echo of Moscow”, 03/06/2008.
More than 2.5 thousand people left the Georgian-Ossetian conflict zone // Korrespondent.net, 04.08.2008.
There is no place for this president in South Ossetia // Kommersant, 12/04/2008.
The Dictionary of Modern Geographical Names edited by Academician Kotlyakov and the Big Encyclopedic Dictionary recommends using “Tskhinvali” as the main one (“Tskhinvali” or “Tskhinvali” - linguists do not agree // RIA Novosti, August 20, 2008)
This is not a conflict, this is a war // Nezavisimaya Gazeta, 08.08.2008.
NYT: Georgia has found facts that Russia “started first.” The West is not convinced, but understands // NEWSru, 09/16/2008.
A contract soldier from Kazan died in South Ossetia // Komsomolskaya Pravda, 08/12/2008.
My name is Snegirev. Yuri Snegirev // Izvestia, November 20, 2008.
South Ossetia does not extradite its citizens to Russia // Kommersant, 01.09.2008.
Media: Russian troops entered South Ossetia even before the start of hostilities // NEWSru 09/11/2008.
Why Russia's actions in Georgia were correct. - S. Lavrov // InoSMI (The Financial Times), 08/13/2008.
Georgia has begun large-scale aggression, Tskhinvali declares // RIA Novosti, 08/07/2008.
Five-day war // Kommersant Power, 08/18/2008.
Georgia launched a tank attack on the southern outskirts of Tskhinvali // Lenta.ru, 08.08.2008.
Georgia “made a decision to restore constitutional order” in South Ossetia // LIGA.news, 08.08.2008.
Georgia presents new evidence of the beginning of the war // Foreign Media (The New York Times), 09/16/2008.
The Russian army will "force Georgia to peace." - NEWSru.UA, 08/09/2008
Throw to Gori. Colonel A.L. Krasov // Official blog of the site "For the Fatherland", 01/22/2010.
The Black Sea Fleet is regrouping off the coast of Abkhazia // Lenta.ru, 08/09/2008.
Chronicle of the war in South Ossetia: day four. - Lenta.Ru, 08/11/2008
A state of complete combativeness // Kommersant, 01/24/2009.
Kokoity stated that more than 1,400 people died in the republic // Interfax, 08.08.2008.
1600 people were killed in Tskhinvali // Gazeta.ru, 08/09/2008.
Russian Ambassador to Georgia: at least two thousand people died in Tskhinvali // Interfax, 08/09/2008.
Ministry of Internal Affairs of South Ossetia: the death toll exceeds 2100 people // Gazeta.ru, 08/16/2008.
The losses of South Ossetia in the war with Georgia amounted to 1492 people // REGNUM, 08.20.2008.
Victims of Georgian aggression // Interfax, 08/17/2008.
List of dead citizens of South Ossetia on the website of the “Public Commission for the Investigation of War Crimes in South Ossetia and Assistance to the Affected Civilian Population” // Osetinfo.ru, 10.28.2008.
As of September 3, as a result of Georgian aggression, 71 Russian peacekeepers were killed and 340 were injured // Vedomosti, 09/03/2008.
List of peacekeepers killed in South Ossetia // REGNUM, 08/12/2008.
The conflict in South Ossetia has claimed the lives of 64 Russian soldiers. – Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation // Interfax, 02.21.2009.
The General Staff announced anti-Russian preparations for the Georgian army // Kommersant, 08/05/2009.
Georgia convinces itself of victory over Russia // Kommersant, 08/13/2008.
The 58th Army of the Russian Federation lost 1,789 soldiers during the events in the Tskhinvali region // Our Abkhazia, 09/08/2008.
Georgia claims 215 deaths as a result of military actions. Media: Russian peacekeepers are again in Poti // NEWSru, 08/19/2008.
Moscow counted almost 20 times more killed Georgian soldiers than Tbilisi // Polit.ru, 09/15/2008.
Official list of dead civilians in Georgia // Ministry of Health of Georgia.
Compilation of combat calculations // Kommersant, 08/11/2008.
About 3 thousand Georgian soldiers died in the war unleashed by Tbilisi // RIA Novosti, 09/15/2008.
Russia and France agreed on the principles of resolving the conflict in Georgia // Lenta.ru, 08/12/2008.
Sarkozy and Saakashvili approved six principles for resolving the conflict // Polit.ru, 08/13/2008.
Georgia accepted the settlement plan presented by Sarkozy // Korrespondent.net, 08/13/2008.
Kvirikashvili discussed the investigation into the 2008 war with the ICC prosecutor // NewsTbilisi.info, February 17, 2018
Georgia will provide the ICC with all the materials necessary for the investigation of the 2008 war // Information and analytical portal “Georgia Online”, February 18, 2017
The head of the Georgian government, during meetings in Munich, discussed the country’s defense capability and investment potential // Sputnik International News Agency, February 18, 2017

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This is one of the best texts about the Russian-Georgian war of 2008.

Six years ago, the Russian-Georgian war broke out. It certainly created a new reality - in Georgia, Russia, the post-Soviet space and in the world in relation to Russia. But most of us know about it from myths created by massive Russian propaganda. Here are the most common ones

Myth No. 1: Saakashvili started the war

War is started by those who prepare for it in advance.

Who prepared for it and who tried to prevent it?

In June-July 2008, various information sources reported that a political decision on an imminent (presumably in August) war with Georgia had already been made in Moscow, with Putin personally overseeing the preparations. The official news agency Osinform will publish the formula for a future war: “a peacekeeping operation to force the aggressor to peace.”

On July 5, large-scale maneuvers of the North Caucasus Military District (NCMD) "Caucasus-2008" begin. 8,000 military personnel, 700 armored vehicles, and ships of the Black Sea Fleet are taking part in them. The official purpose of the exercise is to prepare for a “peace enforcement operation.” The troops are distributing the leaflet “Warrior, know your probable enemy!” - with a description of the armed forces of Georgia.

The best airborne units of the Russian army from different regions of the country are being transferred to the border with Georgia. They replace the motorized rifle units previously stationed there. At the Terskoye training ground of the 58th Army in the south of North Ossetia, a field military hospital is being set up, capable of treating 300 wounded per day.
After the end of the maneuvers, the field hospital is not dismantled. The troops participating in them do not return to their places of permanent deployment. Some of them seep into South Ossetia. Fortunately, just these days (coincidentally) the construction of a military base in Java was completed.

By the beginning of the war (that is, before 08/08/08 - the official date of the entry of Russian troops into hostilities), about 200 units of armored vehicles and advanced units of the 135th and 693rd regiments of the 58th Army - over 1,200 people - were concentrated in Java. Russia still does not recognize this (how can one admit that Russian troops were stationed in South Ossetia before the start of the aggression to repel Georgian aggression?), but the testimony of the soldiers and officers of the 58th Army themselves, which appeared in the media, does not leave this doubts (see, for example, selection).

Simultaneously with military training, information training took place. On July 20, hacker attacks began on Georgian government and information sites. This was the second known case of cyber warfare against a state in history. (The first was recorded in 2007, when, after the aggravation of relations between Russia and Estonia due to the relocation of a monument to Soviet soldiers in the center of Tallinn, the websites of Estonian government agencies were destroyed.) The final attack occurred on the morning of August 8 - against Russian-language information websites of Georgia.

But from August 1, Russian journalists began to arrive from Vladikavkaz to Tskhinvali in an organized manner. Soon their number increased to 50 people, but not a single foreigner (with the exception of a correspondent for the Ukrainian TV channel Inter) was among them. The Russian authorities established a strict access system: accreditation had to be obtained from both the Ministry of Defense and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Only the most trusted and trusted could pass through this double sieve.

This ensured that the conditions were not only for a massive invasion, but also that only what needed to be reported about it was ensured.

The most significant thing in this multi-step combination is that the war has actually begun
July 29, 2008.

It was on this day that hostilities began. And they were started, in accordance with plans from Moscow, by South Ossetian armed formations completely controlled by Russia.

They began massive and systematic shelling of villages in South Ossetia under Georgian jurisdiction and the positions of the Georgian peacekeeping contingent. The fire came from mortars and 120-mm guns, which are generally prohibited in the conflict zone. People died.

This is not a separate escalation in the long-standing confrontation between the separatists and the central government. This is a blatant prelude to war. Deliberate provocation with the aim of causing a response. So the city punks send a youngster to pick on a passer-by, only to then jump out from around the corner and pile on him shouting: “Don’t touch the kid!”

The Tbilisi authorities understood perfectly well what was expected of them. But it is impossible to bear the blows for long. By the evening of August 1, the Georgians begin returning artillery fire on militant positions in the vicinity of Tskhinvali. The Ossetians are responding by expanding the shelling zone of Georgian villages and increasing the intensity of fire. Large-caliber mortars and 122-mm guns are already in use.

Mass evacuation of the population to Russia begins from Tskhinvali. Over the course of several days, more than 20 thousand people were taken out. This is estimated to be half the actual population of the self-proclaimed republic. Tskhinvali becomes an almost deserted city.

And through the Roki tunnel - the only way for heavy equipment to pass from North Ossetia to South Ossetia - Russian armored vehicles and troops are moving.

The Georgian authorities are trying to the last to resolve the matter peacefully. Saakashvili's personal representative T. Yakobashvili arranges a meeting with the South Ossetian leadership in Tskhinvali on August 7 through the mediation of the Russian Ambassador-at-Large Yu. Popov.

He's coming. Popov is not there. It turns out that the tire got flat on the way. "So put on the spare tire!" - the Georgian minister advises the Russian ambassador. “And the spare tire is punctured,” the ambassador replies. Such a disaster. The representative of South Ossetia refuses to negotiate without a Russian mediator.

Yakobashvili is negotiating with whoever he has - the commander of the peacekeeping forces, General Kulakhmetov. He admits that he is “no longer able to control the Ossetian units.” What to do? “Announce a unilateral ceasefire,” Kulakhmetov advises.

Within an hour, Yakobashvili resolved the issue. At 17:00 he announces to Kulakhmetov that the Georgian government has agreed to a unilateral ceasefire. At 17:10 the Georgian guns fell silent. At 19:10 Saakashvili announces this in a live television address in Georgian and Ossetian and calls for negotiations.

The response is to intensify shelling of Georgian villages. By 23:00 they reached their peak. And at the same time, a column of Russian troops with 100 units of armored vehicles emerges from the Roki tunnel. The invasion has begun.
In half an hour, Saakashvili will give the order to start a military operation.

Could he have done anything differently? Of course he could.

But to do this, you had to forget that you are the president of a sovereign country, that you are a man and that you are Georgian. And if he had done this, he would not have been one, or the other, or the third.

It was a Zugzwang situation: the rulers of Russia skillfully brought him into the war, leaving no other way out.
The one who wants war, the one who starts the war is the one who prepares for it, the one who does not give the enemy a chance to avoid it. It was Russia.

Myth No. 2: Russia started the war to stop the genocide of Ossetians

Where did this come from?

Already on August 8, the President of South Ossetia E. Kokoity reported that as a result of shelling and military operations in Tskhinvali alone, 1,400 people were killed - the figure is not final. The next day, August 9, the official representative of the Ministry of Internal Affairs of the republic announced that 2,100 civilians had died in Tskhinvali.
This figure - more than 2,000 dead - appeared everywhere later: in reports, in media reports, and in online forums.

The number of victims was supplemented by examples of the atrocities of the Georgian military: direct fire from tanks at houses where civilians were hiding, targeted fire from machine guns at children and the elderly, burning of houses along with living people, decapitated corpses of girls...

But when they began to count, it turned out that everything was not quite like that. During the entire fighting in the city, the Tskhinvali hospital, where all the wounded and dead Ossetians were admitted, received 273 wounded and 44 killed, 90% of the victims were South Ossetian militias. The head of the Investigative Committee under the Russian Prosecutor's Office, A. Bastrykin, announced that 134 civilians of South Ossetia had died during the entire war, according to Yulia Latynina, “resurrecting 1,866 people in one fell swoop.”

But even after the official count, the number “2000” remained in the public consciousness, and even in speeches and interviews with officials, including Putin.

Although it is initially unrealistic. The official number of residents of Tskhinvali before the war was 42 thousand. After the evacuation in early August, half of them should have remained. The usual ratio of killed to wounded in military conflict zones is 1:3. This means, statistically, for every 2,000 killed there should have been another 6,000 wounded. That is, almost every second Tskhinvali resident would have been wounded or killed after the Georgian assault. And if it were so, would such a brave arithmetician as Kokoity be able to keep silent about it? But he didn't say.

How did 2,000 dead appear on the second day? And so - what genocide without thousands of victims! "Thousands" is at least two. So it turned out to be 2000. Modestly - to the minimum.

As for the Georgian atrocities, not a single fact was confirmed even after verification by such a demanding organization as Human Rights Watch. Not a single eyewitness account - only retellings of what was told. That's how rumors spread. Judging by their abundance and drama, these were deliberately spread rumors. Professional disinformation.

But ethnic cleansing of Georgians by South Ossetian armed forces is not a rumor. The Georgian population in South Ossetia, where Georgian villages interspersed with Ossetian ones almost in a checkerboard pattern, no longer exists. Robbed, expelled, killed - some Georgian villages were simply razed to the ground. This was done by the hands of the brave warriors of Kokoity. They did not distinguish themselves in battles and almost did not participate (and the warlike president himself, at the first reports of the advance of Georgian troops to Tskhinvali, fled from the capital under the shadow of Russian tanks to Java, and returned with them), but they took their souls in reprisals against civilians and looting.

Thanks to their efforts, there are no more Georgians in South Ossetia. But on the territory of Georgia, outside of South Ossetia, more than 60 thousand Ossetians lived and continue to live peacefully. What would happen to them if the Georgians really started genocide? Remember the Armenians in Baku during the Karabakh crisis.

But the fact is that there was no genocide of Ossetians in Georgia or by Georgians either before the war, during it, or after it. There was no reason.

Myth No. 3: Russia went to war to protect its peacekeepers

The last thing the Georgians wanted was to fight with Russian peacekeepers.

The first thing they did when starting hostilities was to warn the Russian peacekeeping contingent.
At 23.35, President Saakashvili gives the order to begin the operation, and at 23.40, the commander of the Georgian peacekeeping forces, Brigadier General Mamuka Kurashvili, reports the advance of the troops to the commander of the Russian peacekeepers, General Kulakhmetov, and asks not to interfere.

“It’s not that simple,” the Russian general answered the Georgian.

Even before this, at the initial stage of hostilities, Ossetian artillerymen and mortarmen fired at Georgian villages near the peacekeepers’ deployment sites, using them as cover, or even using direct assistance to direct fire. Kulakhmetov did not consider it necessary to deny this in conversations with Georgian officials. During the offensive of the Georgian troops, key figures of the South Ossetian command hid in the main headquarters. According to international standards, this made it a legitimate target.

However, in the target map issued to Georgian artillerymen during artillery preparation, the peacekeepers' targets were marked as prohibited for fire.

In order to protect its peacekeepers, the Russian leadership did not have to send troops and spend money on the war. It was enough to prohibit Kokoity from using them as cover - and everyone would have remained safe. But the goal was different.

Myth #4: Russia started the war to protect its citizens

The Russian authorities themselves created their own artificial diaspora in South Ossetia, issuing Russian citizenship and Russian passports to thousands of residents of the self-proclaimed republic on Georgian territory. Legally, this is regarded as interference in the internal affairs of another state. As it turned out - and in fact. The artificial diaspora created an artificial reason for intervention: protecting our citizens is nothing like the newly minted ones, everyone is dear to us.
Ingenious, of course: this can provide justification for an invasion of any country.
But not original: in the same way, Hitler created a pretext for the annexation of Czechoslovakia in 1938 under the pretext of protecting the rights of the Sudeten Germans and for making territorial claims to Poland. Milosevic tried to do the same thing in the 90s in dismembered Yugoslavia.
First of all, good company. Secondly, we know how this defense of their “oppressed compatriots” ultimately turned out.
Who really benefited from the virtually uncontrolled issuance of Russian passports to residents of South Ossetia is the corrupt elite of the republic. The Georgians found hundreds of Russian passports without the signatures of the owners in captured Tskhinvali - pensions and benefits from the Russian treasury were probably accrued to these “dead souls”.

Myth 5: Georgia bombed Tskhinvali

When Georgian troops approached Tskhinvali on the night of August 8, they only conducted barrage fire and shelled administrative buildings. There was no need for anything else. The Georgians entered an intact and half-empty city, which was abandoned not only by the majority of residents, but also by the main forces of the militia. Kokoity with the color of his army fled to the Russian military base in Java. The Georgian troops were opposed by a few scattered groups of partisans with small arms. They could only run away from the tanks.

Bombing and shelling of the city from "Grads" were needed in the next two days, when the Georgians were driven out of the city by Russian troops who arrived to help their Ossetian brothers. These were their bombs and shells. It is on their conscience that most of the dead civilians (see Myth No. 2) and the destroyed city are responsible.

Myth No. 6: Georgians fled shamefully

Most of us get an idea of the course of modern wars from television pictures. From the picture of the August war, the viewer could remember how “timid Georgians fled,” leaving equipment and barracks with their beds made. And I couldn’t see what wasn’t shown.
For example, the defeat of a Russian column of armored vehicles by Georgian special forces on August 8. Then, out of 120 tanks and armored personnel carriers, more than half were destroyed, and the commander of the 58th Army, General Khrulev, was seriously wounded. According to Saakashvili, this episode delayed the advance of Russian troops for two days. And then the Russian command brought up such forces that in the event of a direct confrontation, the Georgian army would have been completely destroyed. And he gave the order to retreat so that there would be something to defend Tbilisi. You can't break the butt with a whip.
It is clear that the balance of forces between the Russian and Georgian armies is so disproportionate that there can be no talk of any real confrontation. But this rather relates to Myth No. 1 - about whether the Georgians wanted war.

Myth No. 7: The war ended in peace

Georgia lost 20% of its territory - lands that most Georgians consider theirs. Not a single Georgian president will dare to abandon them forever. And no one can guarantee that any of them will not dare to return what was lost - including by force.

Russia acquired two formally independent quasi-states as satellites, which, besides itself, were recognized only by such influential powers as Nicaragua, Venezuela and Nauru - for 50 million dollars, and Vanuatu is still bargaining, and Hamas, which itself is not a state. In fact, these are two forever subsidized regions of Russia, doomed to be black holes of the Russian budget, oases of wild corruption and crime. There will never be prosperity or even peace there, but there will always be the possibility of criminal and national conflicts.

Russia has regained its Soviet image of a brutal aggressor, which, of course, pleases national pride, but only harms business, diplomacy and, ultimately, the security of the country.

Russia and Georgia have become and will remain irreconcilable enemies. This will last a long time. After the war, a real “cold war” began between the two states, and as recent past experience shows, in a “cold war” the one who has more weapons and a stronger army does not always win.

Myth No. 8: South Ossetia is the land of Ossetia, not Georgia

The territory of South Ossetia is the original part of Georgia, as even the geographical names indicate. The same Tskhinvali, after the war in the Russian press and official documents was renamed Tskhinvali, did not become less Georgian because its root is from the ancient Georgian word meaning “hornbeam”. Ossetians in the capital of South Ossetia became the national majority only in 1990. Before the interethnic conflicts of the decline of the USSR and the wars of sovereignty caused by it, there was practically no antagonism between Georgians and Ossetians. This is not even the situation of Kosovo, where an overwhelming Albanian majority was formed on primordially Serbian soil. The ethnic cleansing carried out by Kokoity with the support of Putin in 2008 is too deep and too fresh a wound for it to heal and for Georgians to come to terms with it.

And finally, a lot of photos of destroyed Georgian villages

The Russian military operation, taking place from 08/08/2008 to 08/12/2008, was called the “Five-Day War”. This operation was of a peacekeeping nature and was a response to Georgian aggression towards South Ossetia. This military operation was the first in the history of the Russian Federation to take place outside its territory.

The war in South Ossetia began on the night of August 7–8. That night, Georgian artillery struck Tskhinvali with a powerful blow, marking the beginning of the Russian-Georgian conflict. Immediately after the unprovoked artillery strike by Georgia, Russian troops located on the border and territory of South Ossetia began active operations that lasted for 5 days.

Increasing conflict in early 2008

The conflict between Georgia and South Ossetia has been escalating since the late 1980s. The first bloody battles between Georgia and the self-proclaimed republic of South Ossetia took place back in 1991-1992. Then Georgia imposed a complete economic blockade of South Ossetia, which led to the mass death of children and elderly people in the winter months. As a result of this conflict, a huge number of refugees tried to get into Russian territory, often being attacked by the Georgian military along the way.

In 2004, the conflict between Georgia and South Ossetia escalated again. The Georgian side began a large-scale campaign to restore the integrity of the country, considering the territory of South Ossetia to be its original territory. In 2004, Georgian troops were introduced into the territory of South Ossetia, and subsequently the systematic bombing of Ossetian cities and villages began. Only Russian intervention saved the young republic from the seizure of its territory by Georgia. At the same time, this strained Russian-Georgian relations.

In 2008, when tensions in the South Ossetian region reached the limit, Russia lifted the flank quota restrictions on the deployment of military forces in the North Caucasus. Already in April 2008, some units of the 7th Airborne Division were introduced into the territory of Abkhazia and located near the Georgian border.

At the end of May 2008, Russian railway troops, totaling about 400 people, entered Abkhaz territory. This deployment of troops caused real hysteria among the Georgian authorities, who declared to the whole world that Russia was preparing for a full-scale invasion of Georgian territory, under the guise of providing assistance to South Ossetia.

The second half of July was marked by joint exercises between the United States and Georgia, at which, according to military experts, the attack and seizure of the territory of South Ossetia was practiced. At the same time, Russia conducted the Caucasus-2008 exercises, in which units of various military and security forces took part. In addition to the exercises, Russian railway troops completely restored the railway tracks on the territory of Abkhazia.

Exacerbation of the military conflict in the Georgian-Ossetian region at the end of the summer of 2008

Starting from the end of July, various shootouts and raids began to systematically occur on the territory of South Ossetia, which the Georgian government diligently denied. As a result of instability, civilians quickly began to leave the region. Since the final target of all the raids was the city of Tskhinvali, the Prime Minister of South Ossetia Yuri Morozov signed documents on the mass evacuation of residents of this city.

In early August 2008, the concentration of military forces of the Georgian army on the border with South Ossetia reached a critical limit. Although both Georgia and Russia deny the presence of their regular troops on the territory of South Ossetia before the conflict began, some events indicate that both Georgian and Russian special forces military units were already in South Ossetia. The death of some contract soldiers from both sides on the first day of the conflict (August 8) indirectly testifies to this.

Who started this conflict, the opinions of the warring parties

To this day, the conflicting parties blame each other for starting this conflict. To figure out who is really to blame, you need to hear all sides of the conflict and draw conclusions from this:

The opinion of the Georgian government is unequivocal and unshakable. They claim that this conflict was started by the South Ossetian side, which entered into a conspiracy with Russia and carried out a series of provocations. According to Georgia, their invasion of the territory of South Ossetia was due to the fact that the Georgian military managed to intercept a secret telephone conversation in which information “came up” that Russian troops had already invaded the territory of South Ossetia on August 7;
Russia's position on this issue was clearly voiced by Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov. He stated that the only reason for the entry of Russian troops into the territory of South Ossetia was Georgia's military aggression against South Ossetia. The consequences of Georgian aggression were 30 thousand refugees, the death of civilians in South Ossetia, and the death of Russian peacekeepers. All actions of the Georgian army on the territory of South Ossetia were qualified by the Russian side as full-scale genocide. According to Russia, not a single country in the world will remain indifferent after an attack on its peacekeepers and civilians who find themselves on the territory of South Ossetia, therefore the entry of Russian troops into the territory of South Ossetia is natural and justified;
Since Europe was also interested in finding out who is to blame for the Russian-Georgian conflict, an International Independent Commission was created, headed by Swiss diplomat Heidi Tagliavini. This commission found Georgia guilty of starting the conflict in South Ossetia, since it was Georgia that began the bombing of Tskhinvali. It was noted that the Georgian attack was launched after multiple acts of provocation on the part of South Ossetia. The Russian side has also been accused of numerous violations of international rights.

Progress of hostilities from August 7 to 10, 2008

In order to trace the entire chronology of the military conflict, called the “five-day war,” it must be studied starting one day before the official start and ending a day later, after the end of the conflict.

On August 7, all Georgian media published information that the leader of South Ossetia Eduard Kokoity had prepared to conduct massive military operations to seize Georgian territories. Since the attack of a small South Ossetian army on Georgia sounded absurd, the media reported that, together with the South Ossetian army, numerous detachments of Russian volunteers, who are in fact regular units of the Russian army, would march against Georgia. The leader of South Ossetia himself is in Java, from where he will lead the military operation.

The afternoon of August 7 was devoted to a televised address by Georgian President Mikheil Saakashvili, who called on the Georgian military to cease fire unilaterally, and called on Russia to become a guarantor of negotiations between Georgia and South Ossetia, in which he guaranteed to give South Ossetia the widest possible autonomy within Georgia.

At the same time, Saakashvili guaranteed a complete amnesty to all armed forces of South Ossetia, to which he included the army. As a result of these negotiations, both sides agreed to cease fire until negotiations were scheduled for August 8.

At 23.30 Georgia opened massive fire on Tskhinvali. The Georgian government stated that it was forced to open fire because South Ossetia did not stop shelling Georgian villages during the truce.

On the night of August 8, Tskhinvali was subjected to massive shelling from Grad multiple launch rocket launchers. At 3.30 am, Georgian troops began to storm Tskhinvali with the help of tanks. As a result of this assault, the capital of South Ossetia was surrounded, and 6 South Ossetian villages were captured by Georgian troops.

On the same day, a meeting of the UN Security Council was held in New York at the request of Russia. The representative of Georgia said that the blame for the shelling lies entirely with South Ossetia. Although the UN Security Council expressed extreme concern about the situation in South Ossetia, it was not satisfied with the solution proposed by Russia.

By 21.00, according to official information from the Georgian media, the entire territory of South Ossetia, except for the settlement of Java, was under the control of Georgian troops. By this time, 7 thousand volunteers from North Ossetia were sent to help South Ossetia. Another 3 thousand volunteers, gathered at the headquarters of Vladikavkaz, were waiting to be sent. By the end of the day, Russian troops reached the western outskirts of the city of Tskhinvali.

On the night of August 9, the UN Security Council did not make any decisions regarding the situation in South Ossetia. While the UN was trying to come up with a solution to this conflict, Russian troops took active action. While the Georgian army was bombing and shelling Russian and Ossetian positions, Russian aircraft carried out targeted bombing of various military and strategic targets in Georgia. Russian artillery fired at Georgian firing points in the Tskhinvali area.

At the same time, Russian ships began patrolling Georgian territorial waters.

On August 10, the fighting in South Ossetia was in full swing. The Georgian army systematically bombed the populated areas of South Ossetia and the positions of Russian and Ossetian troops. Russian aviation, in turn, continued air strikes on the following targets in Georgia:

All known locations of Georgian anti-aircraft missile systems;
Military radars;
Various military bases throughout Georgia;
Sea ports;
Aerodromes;
Bridges throughout the country, in order to limit the mobility of military units of the Georgian army.

Although the Georgian side still insists that Russia carried out numerous attacks on populated areas of Georgia. In fact, all the losses that occurred among the civilian population of Georgia were accidental, since such losses are always inevitable during military operations. The Russian side completely refutes all talk that its air strikes were directed against the civilian population of Georgia.

In the evening of that day, Russian aviation launched a powerful air strike on a military airport, which was located on the outskirts of Tbilisi.

The Russian side increased the number of its troops in South Ossetia to 4 regiments, in addition, significant aviation and artillery forces were involved. The total number of Russian troops officially participating in this conflict has approached the 10 thousand mark. In response to this, the Georgian side urgently began transferring its infantry brigade, which was in Iraq.

On the same day, the troops of Abkhazia decided to take advantage of this situation and moved into the Kodori Gorge. By mid-day, Abkhaz troops took up positions on the Ingur River. Concerned by the latest events, the Georgian government handed the Russian consul a note informing the Georgian side that all military operations in South Ossetia had ceased. Despite this, firefights from the Georgian side continued throughout the next night.

Progress of hostilities from August 11 to 13

On the night of August 11, the Russian Air Force launched a powerful air strike on a military base that was located near Tbilisi. This was reported by the Ministry of Internal Affairs of Georgia. In addition, according to the Georgian Ministry of Internal Affairs, on the same night the Russian Air Force carried out a massive raid on a number of Georgian cities:

Batumi;
Tbilisi;
Poti;
Zugdidi.

According to the Georgian Foreign Ministry, Russia carried out a massive attack on peaceful Georgian cities on the night of August 11, using at least 50 bombers in this operation. Russia, in turn, denies the fact of air strikes on civilians, stating that all attacks were aimed at destroying Georgian military facilities.

The Russian Ministry of Defense stated that as a result of ongoing military operations, the number of Russian military deaths continues to increase, reaching 18 people. In addition, Russia officially announced that it had lost 4 combat aircraft. According to the Georgian side, their military shot down 19 military aircraft belonging to Russia. Given the tendency towards exaggeration that characterizes official sources, it can be assumed that in reality Russia lost 8-10 aircraft, although this information cannot be verified.

On the same day, Georgian President Saakashvili signed an official ceasefire document. However, throughout South Ossetia, fighting continued with detachments of the Georgian military, who were cut off from the main forces of Georgia and did not hear anything (or did not want to hear) about the signing of such an important document.

On August 11, the capital of South Ossetia was completely cleared of the presence of Georgian military forces. Fighting continued with the use of heavy artillery and aircraft by both sides. Georgian troops continued to fire at Tskhinvali from a distance with long-range artillery and mortars.

During these same days, Ukrainian nationalists became seriously active and announced a gathering of volunteers in support of the Georgian army. Official authorities in Kyiv stated that they do not support this movement. In addition, the nationalists do not even have enough funds to buy tickets to Georgia for those who want to fight there.

All communications between Russia and Georgia were interrupted. In the evening, fighting between the Russian and Georgian sides took place within a radius of 25 km from Tbilisi. Russian President Dmitry Medvedev said that the main part of the operation to force Georgia to a peaceful settlement of the South Ossetian conflict has been completed.

On the morning of August 12, the armed forces of Abkhazia went on the offensive. Their goal was to completely oust the Georgian armed forces from the Condor Gorge. Prior to this, for 2 days, Abkhaz artillery and the Air Force attacked Georgian military installations located in the upper part of the Kodori Gorge. This offensive involved not only Abkhaz regular troops, but also reservists of the Abkhaz Armed Forces.

At the same time, the Russian Air Force launched a powerful bomb attack on Gori. Georgian television managed to film this blow and show it on television.

On the afternoon of August 12, Russian President Dmitry Medvedev announced that he had decided to complete the military operation to force Georgia to peace. On the same day, a rally was held in Tbilisi, at which President Saakashvili announced that Georgia was leaving the CIS, and South Ossetia and Abkhazia were being declared occupied territories.

On August 13, Russian ships that were in the Poti area were suddenly attacked by boats belonging to Georgia. This act provoked the entry of Russian warships into the port, which destroyed 3 Georgian coast guard ships. At the same time, no one offered any resistance to the Russian military.

On the same day, Russia and Georgia declared mourning for those killed during this military operation.

Throughout the day, Georgian media and officials repeatedly reported that the Russian army continued to bomb Georgian populated areas, captured Gori, and Russian tanks were moving at an accelerated pace towards Tbilisi. In response to these statements, the Russian Ministry of Defense stated that all movements of Russian troops across the territory of Georgia are connected only with the withdrawal of Russian troops from South Ossetia and Abkhazia.

In addition, the head of the Foreign Ministry said that a number of Russian army troops remain on Georgian territory in the Gori and Senaki regions. This is due to the fact that the Georgian military abandoned warehouses of military equipment and ammunition to the mercy of fate, which could be plundered by looters or various gangs of separatists. In addition, Russian troops are providing all possible humanitarian assistance to the local population.

War crimes committed during the conflict in South Ossetia

Since the Russian and Georgian authorities accuse each other of various crimes and ethnic cleansing, one should listen to the opinions of independent experts, since each side will protect itself while denigrating the actions of the enemy.

The human rights organization Amnesty International became seriously interested in this conflict; in 2008, while all the consequences of the military conflict were still visible and fresh in the memory of the local population. Already in November 2008, this association published an official report, which detailed a large part of the war crimes. Here are the main findings from this report:

When the Georgian army stormed Tskhinvali, its soldiers carried out numerous attacks on civilians, leaving dozens of them dead and hundreds seriously injured. In addition, the city's infrastructure was significantly damaged, which was not a military facility (schools, hospitals, etc.);
Tskhinvali suffered the most extensive destruction from the use of Georgian Grad multiple launch rocket systems, which have an extremely low accuracy parameter;
During the military conflict, Russian aviation carried out about 75 combat missions. It is these sorties that the Georgian side accuses of causing enormous harm to the civilian population. According to the results of the inspection, villages and towns suffered little damage as a result of air strikes; several streets and some individual houses were destroyed. Naturally, the people who were in them also suffered;
Sometimes the Russian military, attacking Georgian settlements, caused harm to civilians. To this, the Russian side responds that all attacks on civilians are provoked by their aggressive behavior;
The report noted that the discipline of Russian military personnel differed significantly from the behavior of Ossetian fighters and militias, who often behaved like looters. Georgian civilians interviewed confirm that the Russian military rarely behaved undisciplinedly;
South Ossetian soldiers were seen committing serious war crimes on Georgian territory. These are illegal killings, arson, beatings, threats, rape and robberies that were committed by units and militias of South Ossetia.

Amnesty International calls on parties to investigate every war crime and punish those responsible.

The military campaign in Georgia in 2008 showed that the Russian army is in urgent need of reform, since many branches of the military were unable to act coherently within the framework of a separate combat operation. Russia's combat losses were incomparable with the scale of this military conflict.

This is one of the best texts about the Russian-Georgian war of 2008.

Seven years ago, the Russian-Georgian war broke out. It certainly created a new reality - in Georgia, Russia, the post-Soviet space and in the world in relation to Russia. But most of us know about it from myths created by massive Russian propaganda. Here are the most common ones

Myth No. 1: Saakashvili started the war

War is started by those who prepare for it in advance.

Who prepared for it and who tried to prevent it?

This ensured that the conditions were not only for a massive invasion, but also that only what needed to be reported about it was ensured.

The most significant thing in this multi-step combination is that the war has actually begun
July 29, 2008.

It was on this day that hostilities began. And they were started, in accordance with plans from Moscow, by South Ossetian armed formations completely controlled by Russia.

And through the Roki tunnel - the only way for heavy equipment to pass from North Ossetia to South Ossetia - Russian armored vehicles and troops are moving.

Could he have done anything differently? Of course he could.

Myth No. 2: Russia started the war to stop the genocide of Ossetians

Where did this come from?

But even after the official count, the number “2000” remained in the public consciousness, and even in speeches and interviews with officials, including Putin.

How did 2,000 dead appear on the second day? And so - what genocide without thousands of victims! "Thousands" is at least two. So it turned out to be 2000. Modestly - to the minimum.

But the fact is that there was no genocide of Ossetians in Georgia or by Georgians either before the war, during it, or after it. There was no reason.

Myth No. 3: Russia went to war to protect its peacekeepers

The last thing the Georgians wanted was to fight with Russian peacekeepers.

“It’s not that simple,” the Russian general answered the Georgian.

However, in the target map issued to Georgian artillerymen during artillery preparation, the peacekeepers' targets were marked as prohibited for fire.

Myth #4: Russia started the war to protect its citizens

Myth 5: Georgia bombed Tskhinvali

Myth No. 6: Georgians fled shamefully

Myth No. 7: The war ended in peace

Russia has regained its Soviet image of a brutal aggressor, which, of course, pleases national pride, but only harms business, diplomacy and, ultimately, the security of the country.

Myth No. 8: South Ossetia is the land of Ossetia, not Georgia

And finally, a lot of photos of destroyed Georgian villages

This material was published in The New Times. It was called "Chronicle of the Five-Day War", and its subtitle was "Report from the front line and from the city of the dead." On the night of August 8, 2008, a war began between Russia and Georgia, which took place on the territory of South Ossetia, then part of Georgia, and now by no one except Russia and a couple of marginal states, an unconscripted entity, where the majority of the 53 thousand population have Russian passports, and the enclave is a Russian province. On the day the war began, a freelance correspondent found himself in Tskhinvali NT Mikhail Romanov - he, and at the height of the fighting, the then editor of the politics department flew there NT Ilya Barabanov, who in subsequent years returned to Tskhinvali, which became Tskhinvali. This war almost ended in a full-scale disaster: Russian troops were moving at full speed towards the capital of Georgia, Tbilis, and yet sober heads in the administration of then President Dmitry Medvedev convinced both Medvedev and Prime Minister Putin to abandon the idea of a full-scale occupation of Georgia. Not the least role was played by the fact that, in fact, this war convinced the authorities of the need for full-scale army reform. A lot of NT wrote and who were forced to abandon their homes in Georgian villages near Tskhival.

Machine guns to the wall, we are starting to rebuild everything anew,” Lieutenant General and head of the Security Council of South Ossetia Anatoly Barankevich stands on Tskhinvali Square between the buildings of the former Alan Hotel and the former railway station and gives orders to the volunteers gathered around.

“I don’t even carry a machine gun anymore, I just have a pistol just in case,” Tskhinvali Mayor Robert Guliev jokes. “The Ministry of Emergency Situations is already setting up camps, we are organizing the supply of humanitarian aid.”

The favorite story of Ossetian volunteers now is about how, on the night of the first assault on Tskhinvali, General Barankevich, remembering his Afghan experience, personally knocked out two Georgian tanks. Their wreckage near the former university building still interferes with traffic. The cars were torn apart in such a way that it is difficult to imagine how this was done by Barankevich alone, but the story has already become a common legend, and the correspondent of The New Times met at least two dozen “eyewitnesses” of this historical event.

"You should have seen..."

The Ministry of Emergency Situations set up its camp between the former hospital building and the former maternity hospital. “Former” - because all these buildings were actually destroyed. Above what used to be the front door, the sign “Republican Hospital” remains. Next to what was once the reception area, the sign “Exit the hospital after 10 pm through the emergency department” remains. Doctor Dina Zakharova opens her notes and says that 217 wounded people have passed through their hospital in recent days, of which 22 could not be saved. “Almost everyone has already been taken out, there is no place to keep them here now, but if you had arrived yesterday, the situation would have been completely different,” says the doctor. - On the outskirts of Tskhinvali, Georgian artillery covered a group of fighters. They made a stop and thought about getting something to eat. Four died immediately. 12 people were brought to us. The legs are torn off, the veins are sticking out. The fire continued for a long time, and they were not immediately able to be taken out. Blood loss."

Zakharova shows the basements of the hospital, where during the most fierce battles the victims were hidden. “Look at these conditions and decide for yourself whether we were ready for war or not,” she says. - Here we sort of operated, here we kind of had a surgical department. Now there is almost no one here anymore, only our midwife is still lying there. She saw a Georgian tank through the window and managed to run before it fired at the house. She’s already coming to her senses, but we’re afraid to touch her, and she herself is afraid.”

The morgue building 100 meters from the hospital also did not survive. The corpses are piled directly on the floor. True, only those who have no one to bury end up here. The cemetery is inoperative, and the heat causes the bodies to quickly decompose. People bury their relatives almost in their gardens. “Take into account all this, take into account those who are under the rubble, which is unclear when they will begin to dismantle it, keep in mind that we cannot even imagine how many might be killed and wounded in the villages, and understand for yourself that it is unlikely that it will be possible to determine the exact number of victims,” - say the doctors.

According to doctors, 70% of wounds are shrapnel, 30% are bullet wounds. This is confirmed by the employees of “Disaster Medicine” at the Dzau1 hospital, the temporary capital of South Ossetia. More than 200 wounded passed through them during the first days of the war. “We operated non-stop,” doctors say. “First aid - and we send people to Vladikavkaz.” One of them says: “I ask young guys, volunteers, if they have any idea where they are going. They answer: “Yes, everyone has seen films about the war.” They believe that, as in the movies, they will either die heroically or win heroically. They don’t understand that it won’t work out heroically. There can be no heroism when shit, guts and brains are mixed or when a leg is torn off and the bone sticks out.”

Episodes of anticipation

The whole war is a protracted wait. The wounded are waiting for treatment, refugees are waiting for evacuation, the military is waiting for a long time for an order, but it still doesn’t come, journalists are waiting for something, doctors are waiting, columns of armored vehicles are blocking the roads, stopping traffic, and they are also waiting. At the entrance to the Roki tunnel, connecting North and South Ossetia, the New Times correspondent spent several hours driving his car through a traffic jam of tanks, armored personnel carriers, and other equipment that had been standing at the border for more than a day, waiting for something. The armored vehicles move, stop, suddenly turn around and go back. The meaning of the maneuvers, decisions about which are taken by high authorities, is not clear to ordinary officers. They just shrug their shoulders tiredly: “With such discipline, it’s difficult to win a war.” A few kilometers from Dzau, soldiers of the 42nd division transferred from Chechnya stopped. In peacetime they are based in Khankala. “They announced the alarm when I was at the market. At first I decided that, as usual, it was educational. But no, they collected them and transferred them here,” says one. Another got married a day before his business trip to Ossetia. They lie on the side of the road, drink beer from two-liter bottles and are also waiting for something. They only say that the losses are much higher than officially reported: “Our 1st and 3rd battalions no longer exist.” Another day later, VGTRK correspondents who brought Vladikavkaz to Vladikavkaz will say: “Over the past 24 hours, the Khanka residents have been completely crushed.” In the meantime, they leave home addresses, ask to send them photographs, and then suddenly offer: “Do you want to go to Tskhinvali? Can anyone drive? Let us give you our Ural, get it quickly.”

However, it’s impossible to get anywhere quickly in this war. The road from Tskhinvali to Vladikavkaz took the correspondent of The New Times almost 9 hours (in peacetime this journey takes 2–3 hours). Where they were going, why they were going, and whether the armored vehicles were going anywhere at all in huge numbers remained unclear. The military created chaos on the road.

Passing through a Georgian village from Tskhinvali to Dzau, a bus carrying refugees, in which a correspondent for The New Times was traveling, appeared to come under fire. Elderly Ossetians, who had suffered a lot during the days of the storming of the capital of the republic, sat motionless. Only one young man fell to his knees, grabbed the handrail with his hands and seemed to be praying, looking somewhere on the street with crazy eyes. Where they shoot. Then it turned out that this was not shelling - some Ossetians mistook other Ossetians for Georgians and fired at each other. But he was scared. Maybe a couple of days ago he wouldn’t have been so scared, but too much has changed in these days.

Fear sits in people, even those who have escaped from the war zone. Children from 6 months to 7 years old were placed with their mothers in a children's boarding school on Telman Street in Vladikavkaz. 74 people. Women in the hall watch television without stopping. Children play in the yard. The children are smiling, they have already forgotten, it seems, all the worst things. The mothers remember and, despite the security, they are afraid that even here, in Vladikavkaz, they will be attacked by Chechens or Ingush. The policeman guarding the boarding school somehow sadly shakes his head as he listens to them and asks: “Understand their condition.” In his voice there is compassion, a request, and justification at the same time.

This was not included in the official television news, but Prime Minister Vladimir Putin was also frightened. The head of government rushed to Vladikavkaz from Beijing and held an urgent meeting in the administration building, making many belligerent statements. Information about the prime minister's arrival spread throughout the city instantly. Several hundred women gathered in the square in front of the building. Refugees, mothers of those who fight, simply those who have relatives in Tskhinvali. They cried quietly and waited. A police cordon did not allow them to approach the building. They were waiting for their former president, and now prime minister, to come out to them and say something, to somehow reassure them. The prime minister came out, the women screamed, Putin, under the cover of FSO soldiers, ran to the car. A few days later, in the same way, under the cover of his guards, Mikheil Saakashvili ran to Gori from a mythical threat, and Russian television chronicles savored these images for a long time. Only the Georgian leader fell and his bodyguards covered him with bulletproof vests, and the FSA officers pushed Putin into a car, after which the motorcade sped off from the square. The women began to sob loudly.

End or beginning?

The war seems to be over. The information and diplomatic wars continue and will last for many more months. Perhaps the Russian Investigative Committee under the Prosecutor General's Office will complete its investigation. Maybe parliament will recognize the independence of South Ossetia and even Abkhazia. Maybe the UN Security Council at its 38th meeting will finally be able to develop its position. Maybe Mikheil Saakashvili will someday understand that territorial conflicts cannot be resolved with “hail” installations and the total destruction of civilians. Maybe diplomats will finally be able to draw up a document with a complete list of 5, 8 or 11 conditions for resolving the conflict. The situation is changing so quickly that anything can happen. Perhaps someday even Russian state television will stop cutting out the refugee’s phrase from the story: “Neither one nor the other cares about us. Their territories are of concern. Earth. Geopolitics".

1 Georgian name is Java.

And this is how a freelance correspondent heard and saw the very beginning of the war - then still - in Tskhivnali, under the volleys of Grads and air bombing NT Mikhail Romanov:

The war began half an hour before 08/08/08. From that day on, the shooting of wolves was allowed: too many of them had bred in the mountains. All Thursday there were local battles, but on the outskirts of Tskhinvali. And even more so, no one used Grad missiles. At approximately 9 pm, the city began to be targeted with automatic weapons and grenade launchers, but even then no one believed that full-scale hostilities would begin. Mortar fire came from the villages of Nikozi and Eredvi. Journalists filmed the burning Government House and the Detsky Mir store. By 11 pm on August 8, they gathered in the basement of the Alan Hotel: Su-25s of the Georgian Air Force appeared in the sky.

Cannon fodder

At night, the excited assistant to the commander of the SSPM1, Vladimir Ivanov, comes running: “Journalists! Everyone urgently go to headquarters!” General Marat Kulakhmetov is going to make an urgent statement. At first, Kulakhmetov intended to perform on the street, where the stands had huge maps of the area. But they start hitting with hail, and this is no longer a joke. Everyone falls to the floor. The shelling is carried out by the Georgian military from a strategic position - they have captured the Priski Heights, from where the whole of Tskhinvali is visible at a glance. General Kulakhmetov was stingy in his comments: “This is war.” Everyone understood this without him. Time - 23.40.

The city is already full of corpses: mostly Ossetian militias, young men in camouflage and armbands who marched against tanks with machine guns to protect basements full of relatives. The meaning of the expression “cannon fodder” becomes clear.

At 6 a.m., everyone was urgently evacuated to the peacekeepers’ base, again under Grad bombing. As it turned out later, it was on time. Half an hour later, the three remaining colleagues saw Georgians running around the hotel with machine guns and rifles. The journalists barely escaped in a Channel One car. By this time, 80 percent of the city no longer existed.

At the base, everyone is ordered to go down to the bunker - this is a room 15x3 meters, littered with large boxes. Residents of nearby houses and many peacekeeper boys have already taken refuge here: there is no room. Peacekeepers are also cannon fodder: what can they do with their machine guns against the Grads? Journalists are literally forced into the shelter. It is impossible to sit down; the men in the center are forced to stand. There is no light in the bunker, as in the whole city. It's unbearably hot. Sometimes people run out into the street to wring out their T-shirts, and soldiers tear open boxes to fan themselves with cardboard. Does not help.

During the day, the Georgians took the city for the first time: they are a few hundred meters away from us, you can hear it. We wrap a white T-shirt around the mop so we can stick it through the hopper bars. Reporters suggest placing microphones from federal TV channels on the fishing rods. After a heated argument, we decide not to stick out our T-shirt or microphones.

A few hours ago, Masha served us at Farne, the only working cafe in the city. A citizen of Belarus, she came to visit her father and work as a waitress. Valentina Ivanovna also came to visit her mother. We have four children in the bunker. Two boys, 2 and 3 years old, behave like real men. A two-year-old girl cries incessantly. 8-year-old Zalina says to her mother Alla: “If school No. 3 was bombed, does that mean I won’t go to school anymore?” Ossetian men are silent. The women take soothing drops and twist each other in Ossetian style: it all ends in collective crying. Women scream even more if one of the journalists forgets to turn off their mobile phone and take out the battery: the military explained to them that this is how the target is targeted for attack. We first try to explain to them that on the street, three meters away, journalists are constantly talking on their phones, and TV crews even have satellite dishes on the roofs of their cars. In vain. “Where are the Russians? Did they abandon us? - they ask us endlessly. In total there are 30 journalists and about 150 civilians. We have water that we drink from one ladle, passing it around. Nobody wants to eat, although the cook, nicknamed Kuzya, offers to go up to the dining room and taste the boiled pasta.

Slot with overlap

As the military explained, the bunker is more of a decoration. A direct hit from a shell would have torn everyone to shreds: the hole was only covered with a 20-centimeter layer of earth. In military jargon it is a “gap with overlap.” In the zone of the 20-year conflict, at the base of Russian peacekeepers, there is not a single real shelter. The head of the Security Council of South Ossetia, Lieutenant General Anatoly Barankevich, yells into his mobile phone: “Tell Medvedev: we are holding on with all our strength! Georgian troops are in the city! We are waiting for reinforcements!”

The next day, the military starts the generator, and the journalists can work normally. TV crews do stand-ups against the backdrop of a burning university and fire department building. Only NTV producer Pyotr Gaseev dares to move around the city in a Niva: he was repeatedly shot at by snipers, his whole car is full of holes from shrapnel. As a result, they were injured. Petya’s filming with a portable camera is the first footage of the ruined city that the country has seen: an order came from Moscow to “dissolve”, that is, to share the picture with colleagues from other TV channels. Gaseev shows footage: a damaged tank 20 meters from our fence. Next to the car lies a Georgian, or rather, what’s left of him. Inside the tank, Petya finds two sheets of paper. Instructions written in English and Georgian. You are required to submit thumb and toe prints and blood type for identification.

Georgian troops stormed the city at least three times. At these moments, you can go outside for a couple of hours, because since there is a contact battle in Tskhinvali, it means that shells are no longer falling from above. Newly arriving residents tell terrible stories: Georgians open the basements and, without understanding who is inside, throw grenades inside. In front of eyewitness Zaur Pliev, a Georgian tank crushes a woman with a small daughter. The hospital is bombed. The hotel was damaged by tanks: the skeleton is still standing, but the 4th floor is completely destroyed.

Moments of silence are insidious. Many Ossetians go to their homes to return with food and water and change clothes (almost everyone was in slippers and dressing gowns). The woman who was sitting next to the peacekeepers, like everyone else, decided to go out and see what had become of her house. Half an hour later, an employee of the press department returned to the base and said that the unfortunate woman had received a sniper bullet right in the head before his eyes.

We spend the night on the bare floor of the bathhouse: it’s not stuffy here, and you can at least stretch your legs. At midnight and three o'clock in the morning - the most terrible hail strikes.

On Saturday, August 9, at five o’clock in the evening, Boris Chochiev, Deputy Prime Minister of Kokoity, makes his way to us. He went out into the street to call from the basement, and three minutes later a rocket hit his house with direct fire, destroying the neighboring ones as well. “There is no 58th Army in the city. Russia has betrayed you, journalists. And all Ossetians,” he says, although for almost a day now the military has been reporting that the Russians are fighting directly in the city. A new wave of panic begins. Women are crying. The peacekeeping guys begin to write farewell letters to relatives. Some of them suggest throwing down their weapons and running through the forests. One of the contract soldiers shows an SMS message from a fellow soldier, whose battalion was in the so-called Shanghai area near the village of Khetagurovo. There were fierce battles there in the first hours of the war. The message is: “We don’t even have bullets.” Peacekeepers say an entire battalion was killed in Shanghai. The battalion is approximately 400 people.

The head of the Southern Bureau of Channel One, Olga Kiriy, is crying. And from horror, and also from the fact that she repeatedly transmitted news to Moscow about the triumphant entry into the city of the Russians. The opinions of television people are divided: some want to get out even under air attack before dark, others want to wait out the active phase of the fighting. NTV journalist Ruslan Gusarov puts the point: in a commanding voice, he orders journalists to get into cars with the inscription “TV”. We take small children with their mothers. Ruslan himself does not have enough space in the car... The film crews of Anton Stepanenko from Channel One, Evgeniy Poddubny from TVC and Yuri Romanyuk from the Ukrainian channel Inter remain in the city voluntarily. Cars move at high, maximum possible speed. There are corpses all around, but through the dust we cannot distinguish whether they are Ossetians or Georgians. The journalist convoy was fired upon twice with mortars, however, not a single vehicle was damaged.

As we leave the city we finally see the 58th Army. The tanks' barrels have been uncovered. On one trunk it is written: “To Berlin.” The equipment moves at a speed of 20 km/h. BMPs are constantly breaking down, and the entire impressive column is standing behind one vehicle. Several infantry fighting vehicles turned back before reaching there - there was not enough diesel fuel. Someone is fleeing a dead city, someone is rushing to the aid of the living. The longest tunnel in the country - 4 kilometers - is filled with smoke and fumes from the exhaust of armored vehicles. Visibility is one meter. But this no longer bothers anyone. The worst is behind us.

Materials in NT about the Georgian-Ossetian conflict and the war between Russia and Georgia: