Cobalt Ministry of Internal Affairs of the USSR. Secret police operations in Afghanistan

"Cobalt" was aimed at operational search and combat work in seven zones. Having headquarters in Kabul, personnel were deployed in teams in key provinces (the DRA territory is divided into 26 provinces), from where they traveled to districts as part of operational combat groups.

In total, from August 1980 to April 1983, three Cobalt trains were replaced in Afghanistan. The commander of the first two was the deputy head of the Main Directorate for Criminal Investigation of the USSR Ministry of Internal Affairs, Police Major General Beksultan Beslanovich Dziov.

Under his leadership there were constantly 23 operational combat groups and one reserve unit in Kabul. The staff of each group included seven people, who, in addition to small arms, were armed with an armored personnel carrier, a Niva vehicle and a field radio station.

They were based, as a rule, in the military garrisons of the 40th combined arms army of the TurkVO, participated in intelligence support for its combat operations, controlled checkpoints and migration flows of the local population, taught the Afghan police (tsaranda) the organization and tactics of solving crimes and methods of their investigation.
The war in Afghanistan provided the first significant experience in the use of operational search activities in order to ensure the preparation and conduct of operations and battles against irregular armed groups in a civil war. Particular weight is given to the operational developments of those years by the fact that guerrilla, or so-called “small” war, has become the main type of armed conflict on the planet today.

Considering that internal affairs bodies are active subjects of internal ethnic and regional conflicts, the need to generalize the historical experience of their operational activities in local wars for the purpose of effective practical use in the future is obvious.
It is now generally accepted that not only the Ministry of Defense, but also the Ministry of Internal Affairs of the USSR played a significant role in organizing the confrontation with the armed opposition formations of the DRA.

The international mission of our specialists, including the special squad "Cobalt", was to provide assistance in the creation and development of the Afghan police - Tsarandoy.

The armed confrontation between the warring parties in the DRA was initially of a focal nature, mainly around large settlements and along transport communications. However, many units, including the Tsarandoy battalions, were not ready to carry out combat missions. The personnel showed cowardice, were prone to panic and defection to the enemy’s side.

The direct participation of the Cobalt special squad in the unfolding events began in March 1980 and continued until April 1983. This period is characterized by the most active military operations against the armed opposition, including large-scale ones, together with Afghan formations and units, work on the reorganization and strengthening the armed forces, state security agencies and the Ministry of Internal Affairs of the DRA.

The special detachment "Cobalt" carried out the most important tasks of identifying the locations of bandit formations using intelligence methods, obtaining and clarifying intelligence data, as well as their implementation. Therefore, Cobalt consisted mainly of employees of the criminal investigation apparatus and other operational services, and for their force cover, snipers and drivers of internal troops.

A special feature of the operational-search activities of the first Cobalt detachment was the recruitment of an intelligence network in Afghanistan. The operatives of the next two detachments, as a rule, were already working with the agents assigned to contact. It should also be noted that communication with agents took place in the presence of an interpreter and often in premises specially designated for operational needs, located in the locations of the OKSV.

The "Cobalt" detachment was initially subordinate to the commander of another special unit - "Cascade" from the KGB of the USSR - Major General A.I. Lazarenko, since one of the tasks assigned to him was also the creation of Tsarandoy.
However, the operational staff of "Cobalt", unlike their colleagues from "Cascade", already had experience in operational investigative work against gangs.

They generously shared this experience with state security soldiers, adopting, in turn, their rich combat experience in participating in various security operations. Why did it become necessary to include the criminal police in intelligence? Because no other department had the kind of experience in operational investigative work that was necessary for Tsaranda, whose units needed to be trained in operational investigative activities in order to quickly support combat activities and solve crimes committed by civilians.

In addition, "Cascade" needed to be unloaded to combat foreign intelligence services, which were very active, freely collecting the necessary data throughout Afghanistan. Military advisers of the USA, Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, Great Britain and China not only trained the Mujahideen in training camps and equipped them with the latest types of weapons, but also took part in sabotage actions.

In addition, the subordination of "Cobalt" to the KGB structure strengthened its operational capabilities, provided its employees with the necessary operational cover documents, which optimized relationships with the military administration and officers of the commandant's offices implementing the corresponding regime for the movement of military personnel, including during curfew.

To assess the experience of the operational-search work of the "Cobalt" special squad in wartime conditions, it is necessary to characterize its enemy and the features of the operational-search work with him.

The Mujahideen militia included dozens of different associations - from tribal groups to enthusiastic adherents of the revolution in Iran. Most opponents of the regime had bases located in Pakistan, but some of them operated from bases in Iran.

The ranks of the rebels were actively replenished by new armed units trained in Afghan refugee camps in Pakistan and Iran, and by the rural population of Afghanistan, dissatisfied with the results of land and water reform.

Soviet troops fought actively together with government Afghan formations and units. The armed forces of the opposition, having suffered a number of defeats, switched to guerrilla warfare tactics. Their main groups moved to mountainous areas where military equipment could not reach.
Most of the militants did not stand out in any way from the mass of the civilian population, they led the usual lifestyle of respectable citizens, however, when the appropriate order was received, they took up arms and went to fight. They were well trained, fully provided for and, most importantly, enjoyed the sympathy of the population.

One of the most significant features in the organization of operational search work and the conduct of combat operations in Afghanistan was that the fight against the rebels was focal in nature, and in this war there was no division into the front and rear.

The enemy could appear in any place and from any direction, using kariz (artificial underground water communications), mandekhs (dried river beds), automobile and caravan routes known only to them in seemingly impassable sands, mountain passes and river fords. In an effort to achieve surprise in their actions, the rebels conducted active reconnaissance and had an extensive network of informants and observers.

At the same time, to transmit urgent information, in addition to means of communication, signals were used with smoke, mirrors laid out on hills and roads, signs made of stones, and so on.

The tactics of the rebels and the difficult terrain predetermined in these conditions the high importance of reconnaissance activities, including the operational search activities of the Cobalt special detachment, starting with the analysis of the military-political situation in the areas of responsibility, forecasting enemy actions and ending with identifying the numerical composition of enemy gang groups, their locations location, degree of combat readiness, sources of supply of weapons, ammunition and food.

If at the time of the entry of Soviet troops into Afghanistan the share of reconnaissance units and subunits in the 40th Army did not exceed 5%, then subsequently it increased 4 times.

The collection of intelligence data was carried out by the intelligence departments of the headquarters of divisions, brigades and regiments, as well as two intelligence points and the 797th intelligence center.

The military intelligence arsenal included a wide range of tools - from aerial photography and space reconnaissance to daily surveillance and intelligence work. However, as combat practice has shown, these forces were often not enough to obtain comprehensive information.

According to Directive of the General Staff of the Armed Forces of the USSR N 314/3/00105, in order to coordinate the efforts of forces and means of various types of military intelligence and departments (KGB of the USSR - "Cascade", "Omega", Ministry of Internal Affairs of the USSR - "Cobalt"), as well as with The intelligence agencies of the DRA took measures to fully develop their interaction. All military and human intelligence data, including operational information from the Cobalt special squad, were accumulated in the intelligence department of the 40th Army headquarters.

“For prompt decision-making on newly received intelligence data at the Combat Control Center every day,” recalls Colonel General B.V. Gromov, “even under the first commander of the 40th Army, General Tukharinov, it was established to regularly hold morning meetings. The meeting began at seven hours from the report of the chief of intelligence. Based on the information received, the situation was analyzed and tasks were set. Representatives of all intelligence agencies of our missions present in Afghanistan gathered.

They came: from the Main Intelligence Directorate of the General Staff (from Moscow) - this was mainly data on Pakistan, Iran, US plans, supplies from China and Saudi Arabia, about the plans of the “Alliance of Seven” (that was the name of the coalition of seven leaders of the Afghan opposition parties located in Pakistan); from the intelligence department of the headquarters of the Turkestan Military District, which had intelligence centers, carried out radio interception, etc.; from the intelligence agencies of the Soviet representative offices of the KGB, the Ministry of Internal Affairs (from Cobalt) in Afghanistan; from the Soviet embassy; from the intelligence center of the 40th Army; from subordinate troops - divisions, brigades, individual regiments, as well as from the Afghan General Staff, MGB, Ministry of Internal Affairs, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, which were represented by our Soviet advisers.

Considering that new data, new goals, including especially important ones, appeared within a day, and decisions had to be made on them in real time, all this work was carried out quite effectively. There were, as they say, some hiccups when decisions were not made quickly enough by the relevant military commanders, which resulted in a disruption in the implementation of the received information, including bombing strikes on already empty positions and resting places, from which the dushmans had already left, or even on their own units that had already moved out to the search location.

Late management decisions sometimes resulted in irrevocable losses. Thus, on October 21, 1980, during a joint operation of OKSV units with the participation of the Cobalt and Cascade detachments against the gangs of Ahmad Shah Massoud in the area of the village of Shivaki, officers of Cascade-1 Alexander Puntus (previously fought in members of the Zenit-2 group), Yuri Chechkov, Vladimir Kuzmin, Alexander Petrunin, Alexander Gribolev.

Together with them, two officers of the Cobalt special forces unit died in this battle: senior lieutenant Rusakov from Orel, wounded in the legs, blew himself up with a grenade, and police major Viktor Yurtov from the Belarusian city of Grodno was mortally wounded.

From the first days of operational work in Afghanistan, Cobalt officers faced many difficulties. Difficult military-political situation, rebellions in the provinces, including in certain parts of the Afghan army. Low combat and intelligence-operational capabilities of Tsarandoy. The predominance of the rural population, which forms the basis of the rebellious movement, intimidated by the terror of the gangs, refusing help and facilitating the bandits.

In addition, the language barrier constantly interfered; there were few employees at Cobalt who knew the traditions, life and customs of the country, its social and ethnic structure. All this had to be made up during operational combat work, learned in practice, sometimes at the cost of blood.

The hardships of the highlands were complemented by heat, dust and an acute shortage of water. At first, more people died from infectious diseases in Afghanistan than from combat.

Against opposition armed groups operating by guerrilla methods, it was necessary to use equally unpredictable and unconventional tactics. And already the first clashes showed that creative improvisation in local conflicts is a necessary condition for achieving victory in battle.

According to retired Major General A.A. Lyakhovsky, a former assistant to the head of the Operational Group of the USSR Ministry of Defense, it was the intelligence information supplied by the Cobalt groups that was of particular value when planning operations.

This is a great merit of the leaders of the detachment Dziov, Komar, Karpov, Kuchumov, as well as the deputy head of the Representative Office of the USSR Ministry of Internal Affairs Klyushnikov. The price of information in that war was life. Military intelligence, police officers, state security, police - everyone worked to obtain it. Soon, the Cobalt detachment was redirected to foreign intelligence and was practically freed from the need to collect counterintelligence data. The planned system did not become obsolete in this war either.

Each Cobalt soldier was required to provide at least three effective air sorties per month with the application of ground control attacks on concentrations of Mujahideen, including populated areas. In addition, the destruction of bandit groups was carried out by joint actions of Soviet and government troops, coordinated in tasks, place and time, with the participation in certain cases of the Cobalt special squad.

In August 1980, employees of internal affairs bodies and military personnel of internal troops who were part of Cobalt-1 underwent additional training at the Tashkent Higher School of the Ministry of Internal Affairs of the USSR. There they were taught the basics of explosives, how to use a grenade launcher, a machine gun, a machine gun, i.e. provided the necessary initial combat training. The teachers could not teach operational-search work in the conditions of the war in Afghanistan to the required extent, since they themselves did not know the situation in this country.

By decree of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR of November 4, 1980, the title of Hero of the Soviet Union was awarded to the only employee of the internal affairs bodies during the entire long-term Afghan war. His name among the Heroes of the Soviet Union and the Russian Federation is engraved on the marble slabs “Heroes of the Fatherland” located in the Ministry at the entrance to the assembly hall.

In total, 5 thousand employees of internal affairs bodies and military personnel of the internal troops participated in the Afghan war in separate formations of the USSR Ministry of Internal Affairs. Of these, 28 were killed in action, including 25 officers, 2 sergeants and 1 civilian specialist. In the spring of 1983, the Cascade group of the KGB of the USSR ceased operational combat work in Afghanistan. Following this, the special squad "Cobalt" was withdrawn to their homeland and disbanded.

The increase in the combat capability of the Afghan army and Tsarandoy with the participation of "Cobalt" made it possible, with the help of Soviet troops, to deliver serious blows to the armed counter-revolution. As a result of the measures taken, a number of opposition groups stopped fighting against the government.

Today we have to admit that the experience of operational-search work in war conditions, which was gained by the Cobalt fighters in Afghanistan, remained only in the memory of the participants in the Afghan war, is not analyzed in specialized literature, is not studied or taught in educational institutions of the Russian Ministry of Internal Affairs.

Many wonderful detectives have passed through Cobalt. These are his first commander - Deputy Head of the Main Directorate for Criminal Investigation of the Ministry of Internal Affairs of the USSR Beksultan Dzioev and Viktor Karpov, who later headed the Internal Affairs Directorate of the Arkhangelsk Region, and Nikolai Komar, one of the leaders of the Moscow Transport Police. The commander of the Cobalt group, based in Kabul, was the future Minister of Internal Affairs of the Russian Federation, Army General Viktor Erin; Hero of Russia Ivan Golubev, who became Deputy Minister of Internal Affairs, also attended the Cobalt school.
From the memoirs of an employee of the Cobalt group, Hero of the Soviet Union Mikhail Isakov:

— I arrived in Kabul on September 4, 1980. This was the first recruitment of law enforcement officers into the Cobalt reconnaissance detachment. Priority was given to operatives who had completed criminal investigation school and snipers from among the military personnel of the internal troops. We met each other during the training camp in Uzbekistan. In addition to the Baltic states, I met colleagues from Belarus, Arkhangelsk and other cities.

The ninth detachment, in which I found myself, was stationed on the edge of the airfield in Kabul. He had to serve the area around the capital of Afghanistan. A few days after arriving in Kabul, we started working. It turned out to be somewhat similar to the usual operational search unit. However, there were many additional difficulties: a foreign country, an unfamiliar language, customs, new climatic conditions, mountains. And then there is the psychological barrier. After the introduction of our limited military contingent, the Soviet people, from desired assistants and allies of the people's power, turned into occupiers in the eyes of many Afghans.

From the memoirs of fighters of the Separate 2nd Termez (Tashkurgan) motorized maneuver group of the KGB USSR PV, April 1982:

The first very large operation, Tashkurgan. Great forces are involved. Two mangroups of border troops, three or four border air assault groups and a considerable number of units of the 201st division of the 40th army. At the same time we surround the city from all sides. In the hills where equipment cannot pass, air assault groups (airborne assault groups) are landed. According to intelligence data, a large number of Basmachi (as we then called dushmans) accumulated in the city. The encirclement ring closed in time; they were unable to escape.

About a kilometer away from us, the Basmachi are trying to break through the ravine between the hills. We observe the work of the DS from the side, listen to the walkie-talkie, we are on the same wavelength, and can listen to their conversations. A tough, quick firefight, and the Basmachi surrendered, quite a large group. In our area around the city, a mortar battery is actively operating. And from the other end the artillery of the 201st division is hitting the city. Units of the Afghan army are trying to enter the city and begin a combing operation, but no such luck. There are really a lot of militants, they defend themselves brutally.

A BRDM with a loudspeaker approaches, a propaganda machine. The Tajik translator begins to broadcast into the city, calling on civilians to go to its outskirts. Whoever doesn’t come out will be considered Basmachi. And the city has a population of about thirty thousand. They fell together, in large crowds. Mostly women with children and old people, few men.

A filter point is being urgently organized to check people leaving the city. Translators and the Afghan State Security (HAD) begin working with them.

This is a surprise for us, a non-Soviet way of interrogating prisoners, although we understand that there is no other way, the enemy is the enemy. “Kobaltovtsy” quickly calculate ten active Basmachi among the detained people. At the same time, they teach us how to examine our right shoulder to see if there are any marks from the belt and butt, how to detect a callus from the trigger on the index finger or singed hair on the temple.

Three young Afghans were identified by local residents; they were trained in Pakistan and are active militants. In the evening we were ordered to put these three on the ground away from the main body of detainees. Give them the opportunity to run, and when they run, shoot to kill. They are irreconcilable militants, and there is no reason to hand them over to the Afghans; they will soon find themselves in a gang again. We waited all night like at a shooting gallery. They didn’t run: either they didn’t have the strength, or they guessed our intentions.

Another prisoner, an old man, had a bloody Soviet uniform found during a search in his house. Neighbors said that a wounded Soviet soldier was kept in his house and then brutally killed. During interrogation, he admitted this, and also said with pride that his son was the leader of one of the gangs.

In addition to units and institutions of the Soviet Army, there were separate units of border troops and bodies of the KGB and the Ministry of Internal Affairs of the USSR in Afghanistan. An important role in those conditions was called upon to play - and played - the special forces detachment of the USSR Ministry of Internal Affairs "Cobalt", the first detachment of which began operational combat work in Afghanistan in the summer of 1980. "Cobalt" was aimed at operational search and combat work in seven zones. Having headquarters in Kabul, personnel were deployed in teams in key provinces (the DRA territory is divided into 26 provinces), from where they traveled to districts as part of operational combat groups.

The staff of each group included seven people, armed with, in addition to small arms, an armored personnel carrier, a Niva vehicle and a field radio station. They were based, as a rule, in the military garrisons of the 40th combined arms army of the TurkVO, participated in intelligence support for its combat operations, controlled checkpoints and migration flows of the local population, taught the Afghan police (tsaranda) the organization and tactics of solving crimes and methods of their investigation.

The war in Afghanistan provided the first significant experience in the use of operational search activities in order to ensure the preparation and conduct of operations and battles against irregular armed groups in a civil war. Particular weight is given to the operational developments of those years by the fact that guerrilla, or so-called “small” war, has become the main type of armed conflict on the planet today. Considering that internal affairs bodies are active subjects of internal ethnic and regional conflicts, the need to generalize the historical experience of their operational activities in local wars for the purpose of effective practical use in the future is obvious.

It is now generally accepted that not only the Ministry of Defense, but also the Ministry of Internal Affairs of the USSR played a significant role in organizing the confrontation with the armed opposition formations of the DRA.

The international mission of our specialists, including the Cobalt special squad, was to provide assistance in the creation and development of the Afghan police - Tsarandoy. The armed confrontation between the warring parties in the DRA was initially of a focal nature, mainly around large settlements and along transport communications. However, many units, including the Tsarandoy battalions, were not ready to carry out combat missions. The personnel showed cowardice, were prone to panic and defection to the enemy’s side.

The special detachment "Cobalt" carried out the most important tasks of identifying the locations of gangs by intelligence methods, obtaining and clarifying intelligence data, as well as their implementation. Therefore, Cobalt consisted mainly of employees of the criminal investigation apparatus and other operational services, and for their force cover, snipers and drivers of internal troops.

In the eight security zones created in Afghanistan, Tsarandoy battalions were formed with the participation of Cobalt. Already from the second half of 1981, with the support of Cobalt, they actively opposed local gangs in the provinces and effectively interacted with government army units and units of the 40th Army during large-scale or local operations. A special feature of the operational-search activities of the first Cobalt detachment was the recruitment of an intelligence network in Afghanistan. The operatives of the next two detachments, as a rule, were already working with the agents assigned to contact. It should also be noted that communication with agents took place in the presence of an interpreter and often in premises specially designated for operational needs, located in the locations of the OKSV.

However, the Kobalt operational staff, unlike their colleagues from Cascade, already had experience in operational investigative work against gangs. They generously shared this experience with state security soldiers, adopting, in turn, their rich combat experience in participating in various security operations. Why did it become necessary to include the criminal police in intelligence? Because no other department had the kind of experience in operational investigative work that was necessary for Tsaranda, whose units needed to be trained in operational investigative activities in order to quickly support combat activities and solve crimes committed by civilians. In addition, “Cascade” needed to be unloaded to combat foreign intelligence services, which were very active, freely collecting the necessary data throughout Afghanistan. Military advisers of the USA, Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, Great Britain and China not only trained the Mujahideen in training camps and equipped them with the latest types of weapons, but also took part in sabotage actions.

In addition, the subordination of “Cobalt” to the KGB structure strengthened its operational capabilities, provided its employees with the necessary operational cover documents, which optimized relationships with the military administration and officers of the commandant’s offices implementing the corresponding regime for the movement of military personnel, including during curfew.

To assess the experience of operational investigative work of the Cobalt special squad in wartime conditions, it is necessary to characterize its enemy and the features of operational investigative work with him. The Mujahideen militia included dozens of different associations - from tribal groups to enthusiastic adherents of the revolution in Iran. Most opponents of the regime had bases located in Pakistan, but some of them operated from bases in Iran. The ranks of the rebels were actively replenished by new armed units trained in Afghan refugee camps in Pakistan and Iran, and by the rural population of Afghanistan, dissatisfied with the results of land and water reform.

Most of the militants did not stand out in any way from the mass of the civilian population, they led the usual lifestyle of respectable citizens, however, when the appropriate order was received, they took up arms and went to fight. They were well trained, fully provided for and, most importantly, enjoyed the sympathy of the population.

One of the most significant features in the organization of operational search work and the conduct of combat operations in Afghanistan was that the fight against the rebels was focal in nature, and in this war there was no division into the front and rear. The enemy could appear in any place and from any direction, using kariz (artificial underground water communications), mandekhs (dried river beds), automobile and caravan routes known only to them in seemingly impassable sands, mountain passes and river fords. In an effort to achieve surprise in their actions, the rebels conducted active reconnaissance and had an extensive network of informants and observers. At the same time, to transmit urgent information, in addition to means of communication, signals were used with smoke, mirrors laid out on hills and roads, signs made of stones, and so on.

The tactics of the rebels' actions and the difficult terrain predetermined in these conditions the high importance of reconnaissance activities, including the operational search activities of the Cobalt special detachment, starting with the analysis of the military-political situation in the areas of responsibility, forecasting enemy actions and ending with identifying the numerical composition of enemy gang groups, their locations location, degree of combat readiness, sources of supply of weapons, ammunition and food.

If at the time of the entry of Soviet troops into Afghanistan the share of reconnaissance units and subunits in the 40th Army did not exceed 5%, then subsequently it increased 4 times. The collection of intelligence data was carried out by the intelligence departments of the headquarters of divisions, brigades and regiments, as well as two intelligence points and the 797th intelligence center. The military intelligence arsenal included a wide range of tools - from aerial photography and space reconnaissance to daily surveillance and intelligence work. However, as combat practice has shown, these forces were often not enough to obtain comprehensive information. According to Directive of the General Staff of the Armed Forces of the USSR N 314/3/00105, in order to coordinate the efforts of forces and means of various types of military intelligence and departments (KGB of the USSR - “Cascade”, “Omega”, Ministry of Internal Affairs of the USSR - “Cobalt”), as well as with The intelligence agencies of the DRA took measures to fully develop their interaction. All military and human intelligence data, including operational information from the Cobalt special detachment, were accumulated in the intelligence department of the headquarters of the 40th Army. “For prompt decision-making on newly received intelligence data in the Combat Control Center every day,” recalls Colonel General B.V. Gromov, - even under the first commander of the 40th Army, General Tukharinov, it was established to regularly hold morning meetings. The meeting began at seven o'clock with a report from the intelligence chief. Based on the information received, the situation was analyzed and tasks were set. Representatives of all intelligence agencies of our missions in Afghanistan gathered. They came from the Main Intelligence Directorate of the General Staff (from Moscow) - this was mainly data on Pakistan, Iran, US plans, supplies from China and Saudi Arabia, about the plans of the “Alliance of Seven” (that was the name of the coalition of seven leaders of the Afghan opposition parties located in Pakistan); from the intelligence department of the headquarters of the Turkestan Military District, which had intelligence centers, carried out radio interception, etc.; from the intelligence agencies of the Soviet representative offices of the KGB, the Ministry of Internal Affairs (from Cobalt) in Afghanistan; from the Soviet embassy; from the intelligence center of the 40th Army; from subordinate troops - divisions, brigades, individual regiments, as well as from the Afghan General Staff, MGB, Ministry of Internal Affairs, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, which were represented by our Soviet advisers.

Considering that new data, new goals, including especially important ones, appeared within a day, and decisions had to be made on them in real time, all this work was carried out quite effectively. There were, as they say, some hiccups when decisions were not made quickly enough by the relevant military commanders, which resulted in a disruption in the implementation of the received information, including bombing strikes on already empty positions and resting places, from which the dushmans had already left, or even on their own units that had already moved out to the search location. Late management decisions sometimes resulted in irrevocable losses. Thus, on October 21, 1980, during a joint operation of OKSV units with the participation of the “Cobalt” and “Cascade” detachments against the gangs of Ahmad Shah Massoud in the area of the village of Shivaki, officers of “Cascade-1” Alexander Puntus (previously fought in members of the Zenit-2 group), Yuri Chechkov, Vladimir Kuzmin, Alexander Petrunin, Alexander Gribolev.

Together with them, two officers of the Kobalt special forces unit died in this battle: senior lieutenant Rusakov from Orel, who was wounded in the legs, blew himself up with a grenade; police major Viktor Yurtov from the Belarusian city of Grodno was mortally wounded. From the first days of operational work in Afghanistan, Cobalt officers faced many difficulties. Difficult military-political situation, rebellions in the provinces, including in certain parts of the Afghan army. Low combat and intelligence-operational capabilities of Tsarandoy. The predominance of the rural population, which forms the basis of the rebellious movement, intimidated by the terror of the gangs, refusing help and facilitating the bandits.

In addition, the language barrier constantly interfered; there were few employees at Kobalt who knew the traditions, life and customs of the country, its social and ethnic structure. All this had to be made up during operational combat work, learned in practice, sometimes at the cost of blood.

The hardships of the highlands were complemented by heat, dust and an acute shortage of water. At first, more people died from infectious diseases in Afghanistan than from combat.

According to retired Major General A.A. Lyakhovsky, a former assistant to the head of the Operational Group of the USSR Ministry of Defense, it was the intelligence information supplied by the Cobalt groups that was of particular value when planning operations. This is a great merit of the leaders of the detachment Dziov, Komar, Karpov, Kuchumov, as well as the deputy head of the Representative Office of the USSR Ministry of Internal Affairs Klyushnikov. The price of information in that war was life. Military intelligence, police officers, state security, police - everyone worked to obtain it. Soon the Cobalt detachment was redirected to foreign intelligence and was practically freed from the need to collect counterintelligence data. The planned system did not become obsolete in this war either. Each Cobalt soldier was required to provide at least three effective air sorties per month with the application of ground control attacks on concentrations of Mujahideen, including populated areas. In addition, the destruction of bandit groups was carried out by joint actions of Soviet and government troops, coordinated in terms of tasks, place and time, with the participation in certain cases of the “Cobalt” special squad.

The first Cobalt group spent about seven months on a business trip in Afghanistan, gaining some experience from which others later learned. Many employees were deservedly awarded orders and medals, promoted ahead of schedule to the next special and military ranks. And police captain M.I. Isakov, a graduate of the Leningrad Higher Political School of the USSR Ministry of Internal Affairs named after. On the 60th anniversary of the Komsomol, who previously served in the Airborne Forces and the criminal investigation department in the transport police, a participant in the mentioned battle near the village of Shivaki, by the Decree of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR of November 4, 1980, he was awarded the title of Hero of the Soviet Union, the only employee of the internal affairs bodies for the entire many years Afghan war. His name among the Heroes of the Soviet Union and the Russian Federation is engraved on the “Heroes of the Fatherland” marble slabs located in the Ministry at the entrance to the assembly hall.

In total, 5 thousand employees of internal affairs bodies and military personnel of the internal troops participated in the Afghan war in separate formations of the USSR Ministry of Internal Affairs. Of these, 28 were killed in action, including 25 officers, 2 sergeants and 1 civilian specialist. In the spring of 1983, the “Cascade” group of the KGB of the USSR ceased operational combat work in Afghanistan. Following this, the special squad “Cobalt” was withdrawn to their homeland and disbanded.

In total, in Afghanistan, the Cobalt special detachment carried out operational support for over a thousand planned and private operations, during which a large number of armed opposition forces were neutralized and the security of the southern borders of the USSR was ensured. With the participation of Cobalt, the increase in the combat capability of the Afghan army and Tsarandoy made it possible, with the help of Soviet troops, to deliver serious blows to the armed counter-revolution. As a result of the measures taken, a number of opposition groups stopped fighting against the government.

Today we have to admit that the experience of operational-search work in war conditions, which was gained by the Cobalt fighters in Afghanistan, remained only in the memory of the participants in the Afghan war, is not analyzed in the specialized literature, is not studied or taught in educational institutions of the Russian Ministry of Internal Affairs.

Many wonderful detectives have passed through Cobalt. This includes his first commander - Deputy Head of the Main Directorate for Criminal Investigation of the Ministry of Internal Affairs of the USSR Beksultan Dzioev and Viktor Karpov, who later headed the Internal Affairs Directorate of the Arkhangelsk Region, and Nikolai Komar, one of the leaders of the Moscow Transport Police. The commander of the Cobalt group, based in Kabul, was the future Minister of Internal Affairs of the Russian Federation, Army General Viktor Erin; Hero of Russia Ivan Golubev, who became Deputy Minister of Internal Affairs, also attended the Cobalt school.

From the memoirs of an employee of the Cobalt group, Hero of the Soviet Union Mikhail Isakov:

I arrived in Kabul on September 4, 1980. This was the first recruitment of law enforcement officers into the Cobalt reconnaissance detachment. Priority was given to operatives who had completed criminal investigation school and snipers from among the military personnel of the internal troops. We met each other during the training camp in Uzbekistan. In addition to the Baltic states, I met colleagues from Belarus, Arkhangelsk and other cities. The ninth detachment, in which I found myself, was stationed on the edge of the airfield in Kabul. He had to serve the area around the capital of Afghanistan. A few days after arriving in Kabul, we started working. It turned out to be somewhat similar to the usual operational search unit. However, there were many additional difficulties: a foreign country, an unfamiliar language, customs, new climatic conditions, mountains. And then there is the psychological barrier. After the introduction of our limited military contingent, the Soviet people, from desired assistants and allies of the people's power, turned into occupiers in the eyes of many Afghans.

From the memoirs of fighters of the Separate 2nd Termez (Tashkurgan) motorized maneuver group of the KGB USSR PV, April 1982:

About a kilometer away from us, the Basmachi are trying to break through the ravine between the hills. We observe the work of the DS from the side, listen to the walkie-talkie, we are on the same wavelength, and can listen to their conversations. A tough, quick firefight, and the Basmachi surrendered, quite a large group. In our area around the city, a mortar battery is actively operating. And from the other end the artillery of the 201st division is hitting the city. Units of the Afghan army are trying to enter the city and begin a combing operation, but no such luck. There are really a lot of militants, they defend themselves brutally.

A filter point is being urgently organized to check people leaving the city. Translators and the Afghan State Security (HAD) begin working with them.

The detachment became one of the most secret police units; an extremely limited circle of people in the Ministry of Internal Affairs and the KGB knew about its existence. According to the official version, Cobalt was tasked with training employees of Afghan security forces - tsarandoy (literally “protector”, “intercessor”). In fact, the main function of the detachment was reconnaissance: collecting and analyzing information about armed groups and their leaders, establishing caravan routes for the delivery of weapons, their quantities and storage locations.

Each of the groups of “Cobalt workers” began to adapt to operational work in a foreign country in its own way. Some of the policemen, such as those stationed in the city of Mazar-i-Sharif (the capital of Balkh province), began their acquaintance with the population from the local prison.

Both captured dushmans and criminals sat in it. But there were also many who were treated harshly and unfairly by the authorities. Some ended up behind bars due to slander, others fell under the hot hand of the security forces. It was with them that the operatives agreed to cooperate. The Afghans reinforced their verbal commitment to supply the Shuravi (Soviet) with information with a subscription.

A few days later, the Kobalt members, through a party adviser, contacted the provincial governor with a proposal to hold an amnesty for prisoners whom, in their opinion, criminal cases had been fabricated. The initiative was approved, and soon a certain number of prisoners were released from the city prison. Similar actions later took place in all provinces of the country. Most informants turned out to be useless or completely disappeared from view. But there were also those who obtained valuable information. Thus, in a conversation with operatives, one of the Afghans let slip that his relative was a member of a large gang. Its core consisted of approximately 350–400 people. But if necessary, the ranks of the Mujahideen could be replenished with up to two thousand bayonets. The armament of this group consisted of mortars, heavy machine guns and various small arms delivered from Pakistan. The guy was persuaded to cooperate, after which a legend was invented, with which he infiltrated the gang. The young Afghan told the Mujahideen that he wanted revenge on those who abused him in prison. They believed him, and soon the agent entered the circle of close associates of the field commander. After this, the operatives knew everything about the gang’s weapons, its composition, planned attacks, and even the location of the training camp. Based on the results of the intelligence data, a military operation was carried out, during which the rebel base was destroyed. Dozens fell into the hands of the military

Prisoners, a large number of weapons and ammunition. When working with informants, Cobalt employees were guided by an unspoken rule: the informant is responsible for his reports with his head. And therefore, the operatives always took the agent with them to their operations. In this way they tried to stop possible betrayal. The Afghan knew that if he led the group into an ambush, he himself would also die. Using women as sources of information was extremely difficult in an orthodox Islamic country. And yet, Cobalt operatives managed to recruit Afghan women. And sometimes their connections brought police intelligence to the very top of the Dushman hierarchy. The brother of one of the women collaborating with the officers was a nafar (minister) under the head of a large rebel unit, Ahmad Shah, who received the nickname Masud (happy). His group occupied the strategically important Panjshir Gorge, which cut Afghanistan into two parts and stretched from the western borders of the country almost to China. The female agent managed to convince her brother to tell her everything that was happening at Masood’s headquarters, and every week she went many kilometers to visit a relative. From him she brought news from the headquarters of the Panjshir Lion (as Ahmad Shah was also called). This information was very useful when in 1980 the command of the 40th Soviet Army negotiated a truce with Ahmad Shah.

From the agent, the operatives learned what Masud's further diplomatic bargaining would be like. The information was immediately transmitted to army headquarters. This made it possible to adjust the negotiating line of military advisers from the GRU, as a result of which a secret agreement was concluded with Ahmad Shah. He took upon himself the obligation not to carry out hostile actions against Soviet and government troops. In response, they promised him not to carry out air strikes on Panjshir and to allow his caravans to enter and leave the valley. The term of the agreement is until May 1982. And before the designated date, the fighting in the province actually stopped. It has also become calmer on the Salang-Kabul highway. But trouble was not to be expected from the Mujahideen alone in Afghanistan. The enemy sometimes lurked nearby: among “comrades and associates.” It happened that military operations failed miserably, since information about them was passed on to the dushmans in advance. Afghan officers were suspected of leaking data. But how to calculate them? Somehow, one of the Cobalt employees managed to obtain information that the head of finance of the Panjshir front had arrived in his native village for a visit. To detain him, troops were landed on the approaches to the populated area, but they failed to capture the rebel. But in the house destroyed after the battle, valuable documents were discovered: accounting books with the names of government officials and senior army officers and tsarandoi, who received rewards for their services from the Mujahideen. After this operation, several high-ranking officers of the Afghan Army General Staff were arrested in Kabul. Thus, for some time it was possible to return the classification of secrecy to military affairs.

Military operations in Afghanistan with the participation of Soviet troops lasted almost ten years. In February 1989, by decision of the Politburo of the CPSU Central Committee, army units left a foreign country in an organized manner, thus completing their international peacekeeping mission. By that time, the special units of the KGB and the Ministry of Internal Affairs no longer existed. "Cobalt" and "Cascade" were withdrawn from Afghanistan and disbanded in the spring of 1983. The history of the units ended, but the history of their fighters continued. Many of the officers of the former freelance detachment of the Ministry of Internal Affairs soon returned to the mountainous republic, but as advisers. Some of them continued to work there after the withdrawal of Soviet troops, until 1992.

The Afghan war became a special stage in the development of the USSR Ministry of Internal Affairs. It was during that period that internal affairs bodies gained the opportunity to conduct covert operational activities on the territory of a foreign state. And the experience gained abroad was later useful at home. More than 3,900 police officers went on business trips abroad. For military services, many of them were awarded orders and medals. And police captain Mikhail

Isakov was awarded the title of Hero of the Soviet Union. In the fall of 1980, when near the village of Shivaki (east of Kabul) a group of ten Cobalt employees was ambushed and almost completely died (seven killed, two wounded), the captain fought alone all night, not allowing the dushmans to finish off the wounded and abuse over the bodies of the dead.

Many in our country received the news of the revolution in Afghanistan with a sense of satisfaction. In yet another neighboring state in the East, forces have awakened seeking to establish justice and form a society where the Labor Man would dominate.

The situation that was developing around Afghanistan, as it was seen then, and is even more clearly manifested now, decades later, was a kind of intensified continuation of the struggle between two worlds - capitalist and socialist. After all, not only the USSR, Pakistan, Iran, the USA and a number of European, Asian powers, and countries of the Arab world were directly related to the events in Afghanistan.

No matter how current politicians and publicists evaluate the participation of the Soviet Union in Afghan affairs, it is difficult with common sense to escape a simple and clear view of this participation. History has decreed that our country and Afghanistan are neighbors. For a long time, under different regimes of government, the most friendly relations and close economic ties were maintained between them. Long before the April Revolution, the USSR provided practical assistance to Afghanistan in many areas. Our specialists were sent there, who, together with Afghan business circles, solved the problems of developing comprehensive cooperation. With the help of the Soviet Union, hundreds of important economic facilities were built. Among them: the Jalalabad irrigation complex, a number of large chemical enterprises, plants and factories for processing agricultural raw materials. Assistance was provided in personnel training and military construction.

Our support for both the revolution itself and the new government was natural. Since 1978, various ties have strengthened. Along with other areas of cooperation, contacts in the law enforcement field also expanded. Close cooperation was established between the Ministries of Internal Affairs. A group of advisers to the USSR Ministry of Internal Affairs appeared in Kabul. Before the introduction of a limited contingent of our troops, the apparatus of advisers to the Ministry of Internal Affairs was quantitatively strengthened. It was headed by Alexander Mikhailovich Kosogovsky, an experienced general who knew military and police affairs well.

The features of cooperation between the USSR Ministry of Internal Affairs and the DRA Ministry of Internal Affairs during the deployment of armed confrontation in the country (and it was a very difficult time) are described in the memoirs of a number of advisers of that period, including Alexander Sergeevich Klyushnikov. He initially worked with senior adviser to the Ministry of Internal Affairs N.S. Veselkov, then in the team of A.M. Kosogovsky, and with the organization of the Representative Office - already as deputy head.

The entry of our troops into the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan was preceded by events that seriously affected the military-political situation in the country. These, first of all, must include the murder of the President, leader of the revolution, founder of the People's Democratic Party of Afghanistan Nur Muhammad Taraki. Power ended up in the hands of the organizer of the murder, the closest “ally” of the head of state, Hafizullah Amin. The subsequent adventurist actions, terror and repression against many prominent representatives of the People's Democratic Party of Afghanistan, as well as business and religious authorities, caused discord in the party itself, as well as a sharp increase in the offensive of the armed counter-revolutionary forces.

As is known, with the direct participation of the Soviet side and its special armed units, measures were taken to eliminate Amin. The party and the state were headed by Babrak Karmal, the leader of one of the two wings of the PDPA - Parcham.

In a few words, it should be explained that the People's Democratic Party of Afghanistan was formed from two wings - movements: the right - "Parcham" (banner) and the left - "Khalq" (people). The main provisions of both movements were practically the same. Although, it must be said, the left wing was more determined to support the radical, socialist course of the revolution. The right is more moderate, preferring only national-democratic transformations. However, the differences between these movements in practice manifested themselves more along the lines of estate and class affiliation of members, and not because of programmatic contradictions.

The Parcham wing consisted mainly of representatives of the intelligentsia, the elite of society. "Khalq" was formed from the lower and middle layers. Shortly before the revolution, these movements united; the party, and after the revolution the state, was headed by Taraki, a Khalqist known to the people as a progressive political figure and writer of a democratic orientation. His associate, Amin, was also a Khalqist. Babrak Karmal, as already noted, was the leader of the other wing of the party. He occupied the position of second person in the party.

By the end of 1980, it was already clear that the change of leader, and at the same time the reorientation in general towards the Parchami, elite part of the party, as well as the deployment of our troops, could not turn the situation around and provide an effective solution to the fundamental problem of the revolution - its defense. The strength of the party and its support among the bulk of the population, among the peasants, turned out to be too weak. In order to save the situation, reliably resist the armed actions of the counter-revolution and expand the influence of the new government, all-out mobilization was needed, primarily of internal forces. Active and widespread organizational, propaganda and other vital measures were required on the part of the party, its activists in the midst of the people, in villages, counties, provincial centers...

In this vein, the Soviet side gave the necessary recommendations and provided comprehensive assistance. Among the measures of this order, a decision was made to create an extensive Representative Office of the USSR Ministry of Internal Affairs at the Ministry of Internal Affairs of the DRA. His main task was to provide practical assistance in the formation of a kind of internal troops - operational units of the tsarandoy.

It was assumed that such units, stationed in counties, volosts and provincial centers, would be able to take on the task of actively protecting the new government, as well as reliable protection of the most important communications and enterprises.

Since the beginning of the revolution, these local functions have been performed by armed detachments of party members. But the party was small in number. In mid-1980, it numbered only about 15 thousand people in its ranks. At the same time, a significant part of it was located in the military units of the Ministry of Defense, the Ministry of Internal Affairs and the State Information Service (SGI).

I began to understand all this after, at the end of November 1980, the Department of Administrative Bodies of the CPSU Central Committee and the Ministry of Internal Affairs told me that I needed to head the Representative Office that was being created and organize our assistance as best as possible in the urgent formation of operational units of Tsarandoy. From conversations in the Central Committee, I remember the main thing: the faster and better we complete the task, the less the burden in combat work will fall on the units of the Limited Contingent of our troops, the fewer losses there will be.

This was also due to the fact that as they were recruited, equipped and increased in combat training, these tsarandoy units should be included, in the order of interaction, in military operations.

Why did you choose me? I didn't think much about it. I was known to the Central Committee from my previous work in the Department of Administrative Bodies; before that I had to hold various positions in Komsomol and party committees in Turkmenistan and Kazakhstan. In the Ministry of Internal Affairs for ten years he was the head of the centralized police organization in transport.

All this, apparently, was taken into account by the leadership of the Central Committee Department and the Ministry.

I’m talking about this only because both then and later many people asked me the question: why were you appointed head of the Representative Office?

My former supervisor Boris Alekseevich Viktorov, a smart lawyer and a wonderful soul, was especially interested in this. By that time, he had already retired from his post as deputy minister. These questions had to be answered with jokes. I understood that everyone who asked them expected confirmation of their opinion, and these opinions, I think, were different. Some comrades thought that the new position was a demotion, because... The Main Directorate of the Ministry is much more respectable than the Representative Office. However, such appointments, it seems to me, should be perceived differently: as trust and a responsible assignment, behind which stand not only your honor and conscience, but, to a certain extent, the authority and prestige of the people and departments that vouch for you. I took this appointment as a sign of great trust. Moreover, proposals for it came from my respected Minister Nikolai Anisimovich Shchelokov and the leadership of the Department of Administrative Bodies of the Central Committee.

Interest in this Representation arose among many, apparently, due to the fact that, perhaps for the first time in the entire history of our state, such a kind of “embassy” was established, which was entrusted with dealing with some purely internal problems of another country, and even during the civil war.

However, this was justified by the desire to help the revolutionary authorities of Afghanistan during a difficult period in its history.

One of the main tasks of the Representative Office was to provide assistance to the Ministry of Internal Affairs of the DRA in bringing to the end of 1981

Tsaranda forces up to 50 thousand armed fighters, and after another year, maximum two, up to 80-90 thousand.

It must be borne in mind that by the beginning of 1981 there were less than 30 thousand people in Tsarandoy of Afghanistan.

It was clear that the task was not easy. Moreover, it must be resolved in conditions of civil war. This means that it is necessary to create a team of the Representative Office that could truly lend a helping hand to the Afghan Ministry and its divisions in the provinces.

The Main Personnel Directorate of the USSR Ministry of Internal Affairs began an urgent selection of experienced, established specialists for key positions in the Representation. Without delay, Alexander Sergeevich Klyushnikov was appointed deputy head of the Representative Office. He went through a good police school in Moscow and worked as the head of a large regional department of internal affairs. He earned respect and authority in the central apparatus of the USSR Ministry of Internal Affairs, heading a responsible area of work there. He also managed to prove himself in Afghanistan, in the advisory apparatus.

The experience and good business qualities of Alexander Sergeevich were very useful during the formation and development of the Representative Office’s work in many areas. But what was especially valuable was that he skillfully organized operational intelligence work.

Along with the creation of the Representative Office by the Ministry of Internal Affairs of the USSR, by that time a special reconnaissance detachment "Cobalt" had been formed. He played an important role in identifying gangs in the provinces, clarifying data from other intelligence services, and using them in the development and implementation of combat operations, incl. and general military character.

The Representative Office and Cobalt had extensive reconnaissance capabilities in Afghanistan, because they wisely and purposefully relied on an extensive system of tsarandoy. And who, if not the local residents, employees of the internal affairs bodies, could know the situation in their area better...

Igor Evlampievich Lozhkin is a military man. In the USSR Ministry of Internal Affairs, under him, as Deputy Chief of Staff, the role and importance of this link in organizing the work of the entire ministry was truly highlighted. The culture and content of the most important documents have risen to a new level.

The central and urgent task of the Representation, as I understood it, was to help not only in the formation of Tsarandoy companies, regiments and battalions, but also to prepare them for combat functions. Military

I-il- 1L.-.JL.

The knowledge and staff organizational skills of this exceptionally experienced and businesslike person would be very useful in Afghanistan.

We had to fight for Lozhkin. In a conversation on this topic, N.A. Shchelokov said that he was reducing how suitable his experience and knowledge were for the Representation, but without him it would be bad for the headquarters of the ministry... And this link, we all knew well, was the favorite brainchild of our minister.

Nevertheless, General Lozhkin was approved as deputy leader in this combat direction.

It is known that in a revolutionary situation, political, agitation, and propaganda work is of particular importance. Rna is extremely important in combat formations. General Dolbilov G.S., who had extensive experience in Komsomol and political-educational work, was well suited to provide assistance in this area of activity of the Ministry of Internal Affairs of the DRA. For a long time, Grigory Sergeevich headed the political department in the Main Directorate of Correctional Labor Institutions of the USSR Ministry of Internal Affairs, and worked as deputy secretary of the party committee of the ministry. An exceptionally communicative, accessible public worker.

There was no one better for the role of secretary of the party organization and the team of the Representative Office (and the staff number is almost one and a half thousand people) than Eduard Vasilyevich Kalachev. I knew him from working together at the Main Directorate of Internal Affairs for Transport. A very energetic, organized and active person, he does not stop at any difficulties. With his powerful onslaught, Kalachev overcomes any obstacles.

Later, we managed to win over Anatoly Vasilyevich Anikiev from the Department of Foreign Relations of the USSR Ministry of Internal Affairs. He was appointed deputy head of the Representative Office for personnel work.

Alexander Ivanovich Glukhikh proved himself well as a logistics adviser even before the establishment of the Representative Office. He was sent to Afghanistan from the Main Directorate of Material, Technical and Military Supply of the ministry. The Negro, already as the head of the department, was entrusted with the logistical support of the newly formed operational units of Tsarandoy through the supply of clothing and weapons from the Soviet Union.

By agreement with the Department of Administrative Bodies of the Central Committee, the leadership of our ministry selected promising personnel from the reserve for promotion to Afghanistan. It was firmly agreed that after the successful completion of a two-year assignment, returnees were appointed to positions, as a rule, with promotion. This made it easier to talk with local authorities when selecting and deploying the right employees.

In the provinces, as a rule, deputy heads of the departments of internal affairs of territories and regions of the USSR were appointed as leaders of groups of advisers (they were classified as senior operational officers).

This principle was maintained almost the entire time of our participation in the Afghan events, especially in the first years of the Mission’s activities.

After the official appointment, I had the opportunity to familiarize myself in the apparatus of the First Main Directorate (PTU) of the KGB of the USSR with the peculiarities of the situation in Afghanistan. Conversations with the deputy heads of the PGU Vadim Alekseevich Kirpichenko, Yakov Prokofyevich Medyannik, Ivan Alekseevich Markelov and the head of the Main Directorate himself, Vladimir Aleksandrovich Kryuchkov, made it possible in a short time, albeit in general terms, to imagine the complexity of the situation in this country and understand how difficult there will be an upcoming mission. It was also possible to sort out a little of the confusion of our newspaper and other publications, in which it was possible to read at the same time that socialist construction is already in full swing in Afghanistan and that in this country everything rests, as before, on feudal orders, in which Each tribe has its own armed forces, zones of settlement and influence, as well as its own hierarchy of power.

The curator and guardian of the Representative Office in the Ministry of Internal Affairs of the USSR was Deputy Minister Boris Kuzmich Elisov, an experienced leader who, for his part, tried a lot to ensure that our mission was completed successfully. He persistently and authoritatively supported us in difficult moments both in the Ministry of Internal Affairs of the USSR and in the Central Committee of the CPSU, defended the Representation from various kinds of biased assessments, often coming from our Embassy in Afghanistan.

First impressions, first difficulties. Apparently, everyone who comes to a country for the first time, which in many respects is noticeably different from their place of permanent residence, has their own feelings and impressions. They are etched in my memory forever. This is how it was when, back in 1958, in January, after freezing Moscow, I found myself in Ashgabat. The Komsomol Central Committee sent me to Turkmenistan for Komsomol work. That year, January was especially warm here. The temperature in the capital during the day sometimes exceeded twenty degrees. Not only the unusual temperature surprised me after landing the plane, but also everything around me: the bare earth, its whitish-gray color, a mountain range in a blue haze and a kind of silence that seemed to have been established for centuries, filling the gaps between the emerging noises of civilization at the airport. This whole sudden change was simply fascinating.

I also remembered some unique impressions upon my arrival in Afghanistan. A completely different world! Everything is unusual! And the desolation of the nature surrounding Kabul, and the multi-stage terraces of clay buildings on the slopes of steep hills and mountain spurs, and the colorful squares of continuous rows of dukan benches, and decorated trucks and cars scurrying around in the city crowd and disorder.

Asia is also felt in everything, although - winter, snow, frost. Our group arrived in Kabul in January 1981.

At an altitude of almost 2000 meters, at which this city is located, it can be cold even in the thirties latitudes. But the lying snow and winter do not at all resemble Moscow or Russia. The unusual surroundings and impressions are unsettling and seem to call you to quickly learn, at least in general terms, how your life and work will develop here. And in the first days doubts creep in: what can you do with your weak forces in this unfamiliar corner of the planet? What ways can we find so that the aspirations of the employees of our ministry both in Kabul and in the provinces find a response among the Afghan comrades, in the unknown soul of the Pashtun, Hazara, Tajik, and other representatives of the nations and ethnic groups inhabiting this harsh region?...

They took up residence in different places, as determined by the Adviser for the Home Front of the Deaf. But mostly in a microdistrict built in cooperation with the help of the Soviet Union. By that time it was already filled with representatives of numerous Soviet organizations.

The next day - meeting with the Minister of Internal Affairs of the DRA Said Muhammad Gulyabzoy. Of average height, slender and handsome young man. I knew the main milestones of his party biography and the underground revolutionary work in the ranks of the Afghan army. They aroused respect for this gifted organizer, active and fearless party member - an aviation combat officer. In the April armed conflict, Gulyabzoy was seriously wounded, but soon returned to the ranks of the responsible figures of the revolution. Became N. M. Taraki's closest assistant.

Joint work, many other meetings after his departure from the post of minister, when he headed the Embassy in the Soviet Union, as well as during the years of his emigrant position, did not confirm Yulko’s first impressions, but also significantly strengthened them.

Unusually receptive to justice and truth, he always and in everything showed himself to be exclusively devoted to revolutionary convictions. Caring for his people and fatherland is his main calling in life. „ „

This young man was old enough to be my son, but I did not feel that he needed fatherly instructions. Frankly speaking, I admired how, in incredibly difficult conditions of struggle on two fronts (within the party and with the armed opposition), he was able to cut off and neutralize intrigues and encroachments aimed at eliminating him from the revolutionary arena, even to the point of physical liquidation.

Of course, in a number of cases youth took its toll and, as they say, there were some deviations. But they further strengthened the impression of him as a brave, uncompromising fighter.

I remember such a case. SGI, the agency headed by Dr. Najibullah, sharply increased pressure on the Ministry of Internal Affairs and its head. Gulyabzoy was under continuous surveillance. It was clear that the leadership of the DRA had set the task of challenging him to compromising actions.

One day, while traveling to the rear base of the ministry, located on the outskirts of Kabul, he could not stand the annoying “tutelage” and abruptly stopped his car, forcing those who openly “accompanied” him to do the same. Jumping out of his limousine, the Minister pulled the SGI operatives out of their Vehicle, disarmed them and took them to his ministry.

The appointment of Gulyabzoy as Minister of Internal Affairs took place at one time under pressure from the Soviet side in order to create at least the appearance of balance between “Parcham” and “Khalq” in the power structures. Of course, both the SGI and the Parchamist wing of the party that stood behind it did not expect such an incident from the Minister of Internal Affairs. They wanted to sooner or later bring the matter to a major clash between the two departments and, on this basis, decisively remove the leader who was inconvenient to them.

Gulyabzoy told me in detail about this incident, and I praised him for the fact that in this way it was necessary to repel the insolent people.

However, what a fuss was made about this! The case was presented like this: the minister was completely unhinged. Being in a drunken state, he caused a scandal, beat up innocent citizens... One accusation of drunkenness is worth something in a Muslim society!

The incident was actively discussed in the Politburo, among the entire elite. Fikryat Akhmedzhanovich Tabeev, officially as an ambassador, apparently in connection with Babrak Karmal’s complaint, began to scold the advisers of the Ministry of Internal Affairs about this. His opinion, of course inspired by the leadership of the SGI and other Parchamists, that Gulyabzoy was an immature boy who had no place in leading the ministry, in this case received, as it were, additional reinforcement. Our employees took a completely different position. The Ambassador was repeatedly expressed his categorical rejection of such assessments of the Minister of Internal Affairs and his activities. And I had to remind myself more than once that in Moscow, in the central competent authorities, it was fundamentally agreed that we would solve the problem of the urgent formation of operational units of Tsarandoy with Gulyabzoy. The ambassador was forced to retreat.

However, throughout the entire period of my business trip, until my departure, the ambassador and I continued to have a confrontation on this issue, which sometimes reached a critical point. At another point in the story I will dwell on this topic.

Acquaintances with the heads of other departments, as well as with the secretaries of the PDPA Central Committee and the Chairman of the Council of Ministers were mostly formal. I got to know many of the then leaders of the party and state well later. Among them there were many whose unfriendly attitude towards Gulyabzoy was reflected in the work of the Representation.

The meeting with the Ambassador of the Soviet Union Fikryat Akhmedzhanovich Tabeev was memorable for the fact that despite his cheerfulness and optimism in the conversation, although not particularly significant for an ambassador, there was no visible firm and confident line that could be unconditionally accepted as a guide to action for our Representation. I already knew that with regard to the Minister of Internal Affairs Gulyabzoy, Tabeev, one might say, completely took the side of those Parchamists who did not want to see this Khalqist, who was gaining experience and authority, at the head of such an important department.

In Afghan conditions, we attached great importance to the issue of interaction with the Representative Office of the KGB of the USSR. It was clear that special difficulties might arise here. Before the organization of the Representative Office of the Ministry of Internal Affairs, our small advisory apparatus was under the wing of the Representative Office of the KGB, in fact, within its composition. The autonomy and independence of our new organization were not entirely ordinary. Nevertheless, my acquaintance with General Viktor Nikolaevich Spolnikov, who then headed this Representation, was encouraging for me. I I felt that this respectable, seemingly overly straightforward security officer could be a support in our work. You just need to be able to find ways to mutual understanding and successful cooperation. Behind departmental interests, both in the first conversation and in the course of further joint work, his broader views on the Afghan revolution, the situation in the country and the leadership of the party and state were visible.

In order not to unnecessarily inflate the volume of my story, I will not describe in detail the organizational period, the features of the formation of our Representative Office. I think that all participants in the memoirs will touch on these issues little by little, and the overall picture will become clear.

Only to justify our shortcomings and explain the considerable difficulties that the arriving employees faced, it is necessary to dwell on some moments from the life of that period.

A small group flew with me to Kabul: Lozhkin, Dolbilov and several other people. And immediately, without delay, it was necessary to become familiar with the work of the ministry, its leadership and services, and I had to deal with the whole range of internal, organizational and everyday problems. Replenishments are arriving in batches. He must be met, accommodated, informed on issues of security, prudent behavior, told about the current situation in the country, Kabul...

We distribute newcomers (taking into account previous work experience) by position and province. The Kabul, central part of the Representation is just being staffed, and in an unfamiliar environment it is already necessary to ensure the dispatch of operational groups to provincial centers, to negotiate through the Afghan side about their deployment and arrangement. Everything is on the move, everything is new. There are enough worries. However, the energetic actions of experienced employees of the Representative Office (A.I. Glukhikh, V.V. Bezuglova), as well as the interested attitude of newly arriving employees, little by little overcome the difficulties that arise.

Systematic, mandatory instructive meetings are being introduced for all employees who have arrived and have already been appointed to the central office of the Representation. At these meetings, as at planning meetings, they stand out from the “routine” and discuss emerging problems. Reports on the execution of instructions and previously made decisions are also reviewed here.

How to complete the main task? It should be noted that the staff of the Representative Office took part in all areas of activity of the Ministry of Internal Affairs of the DRA. He also dealt with the problems of fighting crime, especially with the flows of drug trafficking that were beginning to emerge along the line between Afghanistan and the Central Asian republics of the Union. Practical assistance was provided in organizing the work of the fire service, traffic police (traffic), in training personnel at the educational institution of the Ministry - the Tsarandoy Academy, etc.

At the same time, we understood that the Representative Office was created primarily to provide comprehensive support to the DRA Ministry of Internal Affairs in the formation, equipment and training of armed units, which were entrusted with the task of actively defending the revolutionary authorities on the ground. This direction of work was the main and determining one for us.

Traditionally, in Afghanistan, police organizations were staffed in the same way as the army - by conscripting young men for this type of public service. And in our time, one could often see how, according to tradition, young peasants, water-carriers, dukan-makers go to the army, carrying trestle beds on their shoulders.

Previously, before the revolution, a soldier in a military unit or a tsarandoy employee served his duty, being completely dependent on his immediate superior. The conscript often had to take care of his daily life himself. The officer received money for the maintenance of the soldiers, but often spent it at his own discretion and, it happened, not so much for these state needs as for his own personal interests. It was believed that for some high-ranking officials, officer service provided a comfortable subsequent life not only for him, an enterprising retiree, but also for his descendants. Of course, this rumor is an exaggeration. But there is no smoke without fire. We saw that in the first years of the revolution, both in the army and in Tsarandoy, these traditions were not completely eliminated. A solution naturally suggested itself: in order to speed up the creation of operational units and make them combat-ready, it is necessary to ensure, not in words, but in deeds, a more attractive social and living status for the soldier. Such an approach would be in tune with revolutionary tasks and would attract young people to the side of serving the proclaimed ideas.

By the time the civil war engulfed the entire republic, it became clear that the fundamental problems of the new government, among other circumstances, were and would continue to be who the youth, especially the peasants, would follow. Whose side will she fight on?

But how to break traditions? How to solve, in wartime conditions, the major task of equipping those created from scratch

In Kabul itself, by the end of 1981, there were several battalions and two regiments were being formed. The units were well armed and full of blood. Companies number one hundred, and battalions number five hundred or more.

Of course, the defense of cities and provinces was not based solely on the forces of Tsarandoi. However, the Ministry of Internal Affairs of the DRA skillfully relied on the direct interest of local authorities in recruiting its units. At the same time, the main advantage in attracting conscripts to serve in Tsaranda was achieved, as I have already said, through comprehensive attention to the life of the soldiers and a friendly attitude towards them on the part of the officers.

The big difference that existed in these matters between the units of the Ministry of Defense of the DRA and Tsarandoy was known in all corners of Afghanistan. And if the forces of the Defense Ministry were often replenished by “catching” conscripts, sometimes even in specially planned operations, then many went to Tsaranda voluntarily.

I remember that in the fall of 1981, due to the widespread deterioration of the situation, all the attention of the PDPA Central Committee, the Revolutionary Council of the Republic, power ministries and, of course, representative apparatuses was focused on conscription. Difficulties in recruiting military units were great. At one of the extended meetings of the Revolutionary Council, the Chief Military Advisor, Army General Alexander Mikhailovich Mayorov, spoke rudely and disrespectfully to Gulyabzoy regarding the fact that he was allegedly interfering with the replenishment of units of the Ministry of Defense. During the Council meeting, I hardly managed to keep Gulyabzoy from making completely justified retaliatory insulting accusations.

According to elementary concepts of ethics, not to mention diplomatic rules, harsh complaints against the minister of the host country, especially those expressed in an official setting, are unacceptable. The consequences of such behavior must be either a sincere official apology or departure from the country. However, Maiorov, unfortunately, did not have such concepts at that time.

Somewhat deviating from the line of this story, I would like to note that Mayorov’s behavior, as it seemed to me then, showed signs of not only excessive self-confidence, but also a desire to “crush” under himself that part of the leadership of the armed forces of Afghanistan that fell under his influence as the Chief military advisor. This was sometimes perceived by the Afghan side as an attempt to dictate, to create a regime of relations that could be called occupational.

It is good that such behavior on the part of our representatives was a rare exception. However, in that situation, isolated instances of disrespectful attitude, especially those committed by those at the top of interstate cooperation, undermined trust in us. They created among those who were interested and closely watching the work of the shuravi in Afghanistan a misconception about our true intentions.

So, large-scale recruitment work began. It was necessary to supplement the regiments and divisions of the Afghan Ministry of Defense, which in many cases were not combat-ready. By that time, according to available data, the total number in the Moscow Region did not exceed 120-130 thousand. At the same time, the armed forces were burdened with cumbersome rear and headquarters formations. Many soldiers, although unofficially, served as servants and orderlies.

The goal was to increase the number of Defense Ministry troops to approximately 150 thousand people. Members of the Revolutionary Council, party activists and command staff took up the organization of conscription.

The Ministry of Internal Affairs did not yawn either. He needed to form his units, increase the number of Tsarandoi according to the staffing schedule approved by the government to 75 thousand.

And soon, on one quiet autumn day, strings of young people reached the Kabul district departments of Tsarandoy, who voluntarily asked to enroll them in the Kabul garrison and other units of the Ministry of Internal Affairs.

Gulyabzoy and the ministry apparatus demanded from the city administration the organized reception and distribution of incoming replenishment.

It was before the weekend. I went to the Embassy for negotiations with Moscow, and we agreed with Gulyabzoy that he would inform me about the results of that day later. Before sunset the minister calls. He says that in one day more people signed up for military formations in Kabul than the entire population of the Tsaranda of the capital had previously been. And by that time it numbered about 8 thousand people.

This result was unexpected. For one day! I thought there was something dangerous hidden here. I ask Gulyabzoy to invite his deputies and other reliable comrades with whom I can hold advice.

I'm leaving immediately for the Ministry. Eight people had already gathered in the minister’s office, among them Vatanjar, a famous hero of the revolution, who was working as the Minister of Communications at that time.

One of Gulyabzoy’s deputies reports:

“Indeed, there is information about an impending attack by gangs on Kabul from several directions simultaneously.”

Those present speculate about the possibility of sending Tsaranda to the district administrations under the guise of conscripted bandits, in order to disarm the Tsaranda from within during the attack on Kabul and try to capture the city in one night.

This is quite possible. This means we need to act immediately. The minister urgently sent his faithful comrades to all units with instructions: under the pretext of difficulties encountered in providing normal overnight accommodation and food for the arrivals, everyone, without exception, should be released on parole to their homes, and from the next day, they say, the registration of conscripts into regiments will begin and battalions.

Everything was done that way. Combat readiness was increased everywhere in the Tsarandoy units of Kabul. Officers and non-commissioned officers were left on night duty.

Intense gunfire could be heard all night on the outskirts of Kabul. However, the offensive of serious bandit forces, in all likelihood, that night was either not planned or was thwarted by the above-mentioned actions of the Ministry.

The expulsion of conscripts from district administrations brought some losses; fewer were registered in the city units than arrived that day. But it was dangerous to take risks in that current situation.

The rivalry between the Ministries of Defense and the Interior over conscription has escalated to the extreme. The chief military adviser raised the question bluntly with Babrak Karmal - the entire conscript contingent should go to replenish the military units of the DRA Defense Ministry. And only after they are staffed are they called up for service in Tsaranda.

This was fundamentally at odds with traditions, and most importantly, it went against the guidelines of Soviet authorities to ensure the accelerated formation of operational military units of the Ministry of Internal Affairs of the republic. This means we need to convince Mayorov that things cannot be done this way. However, conversations on this matter that were held with him by F.A. Tabeev, the head of the group of party advisers S.V. Kozlov, did not give any results. Having secured support from the Central Committee

PDPA, the Chief Military Adviser instructed his representatives in the provinces not to allow the transfer of conscripts until the Ministry of Defense units located in their zone of influence are fully staffed.

This was already beyond measure. We decided that the entire “leading five” (that was the name of the permanent coordination meeting with the ambassador, which was attended by the leaders of the party advisory apparatus, as well as the Ministry of Defense, the KGB and the Ministry of Internal Affairs) gathered and convinced A. M. Mayorov of the error of the confrontation. Let me remind you that, despite the significant number (about 130 thousand), the armed forces of the DRA Ministry of Defense were weak. The real problem with army units was desertion. The command of our 40th Army was often more willing to take Tsarandoy battalions into combat operations than units of the Defense Ministry. Moreover, as I have already said, the Tsarandoi forces were indispensable for the constant defense of local power and the consolidation of territories under revolutionary control. Under the pressure of these circumstances, it was clear to everyone that the right thing to do would be to simultaneously solve the problems of strengthening the combat capability of both the Ministry of Defense and the Ministry of Internal Affairs. You can't do one at the expense of the other.

It was not difficult to understand: Babrak Karmal did not want the Ministry of Internal Affairs to gain more and more serious power and become dangerous in matters of distribution of actual power in the country. I AM. Mayorov received, although unofficially, strong support from the PDPA Central Committee.

The whole “four” arrived at the residence of the Chief Military Adviser. The Ambassador asked for attention to the issue that Tsygannik wants to highlight. I briefly reported the essence of the matter.

Then everyone sitting at the table spoke and supported me on the main thing - not to oppose the Ministry of Internal Affairs in solving the important task of forming the operational units of Tsarandoy. It was emphasized that by introducing these additional forces into combat operations, we are reducing the losses of our Soviet troops. And we are more fully using Afghan resources to protect the revolutionary government.

However, A. M. Mayorov pointedly did not accept our arguments and convictions and, to emphasize this, got up from the table around which we were all seated, and, taking a chair, left and sat down in the farthest corner of his huge office.

What could we do? Shrugging our shoulders and looking at each other in bewilderment, we left the inhospitable owner of the residence.

On the same day, a serious and substantiated telegram on this matter was sent to the Center from the Representative Office. It seems that she also had some influence on the fact that soon a new Chief Military Advisor, Army General Mikhail Ivanovich Sorokin, arrived in Kabul.

With the change of adviser, the conflict was resolved. We continued to provide active assistance to the DRA Ministry of Internal Affairs in building up and activating its armed forces. And in this we found the necessary understanding and support from the new Chief Military Advisor.

Revolution or coup? Many who write about Afghan events assess what happened there in April 1978 as an ordinary armed coup. There was no revolution there, they say. In my opinion, this is a simplified approach to assessment, an erroneous perception of a historical phenomenon. Of course, a revolution took place, although it was achieved thanks to the selfless actions of that part of the members of the People's Democratic Party of Afghanistan who were in the armed forces. However, at the origins of the event there was a party consisting of representatives of all major segments of the population, a party that had a political program and a goal of radical changes in the structure and form of power. A revolution took place, the development of which was marked by a sharp transition from authoritarian-bourgeois and formal parliamentary methods of government (where there was practically no place for representatives of the main working strata of the population) to government by introducing people's democratic foundations for decisive political, social and economic changes in the interests of majority, in the interests of workers.

Another thing is that the party that took the liberty of taking this step, as time has shown, was not sufficiently prepared and united. It had weak support primarily among the peasantry, which in Afghanistan constitutes over eighty-five percent of the total population and which was and remains to this day the foundation of the life of the state. The country's economy is mainly based on agricultural production.

Both before and after the revolution, the party did not do enough work to attract progressively minded intelligentsia, students, as well as the petty-bourgeois stratum to the proclaimed truly democratic idea. The line of relations with religion was extremely erroneous. In a country where Sharia law reigned, in its broad plans for social reforms the party had to highlight a special direction - cooperation with religious authorities. However

The word revolution comes from the Latin Revolutio, which means revolution.

Instead of a thoughtful, loyal position, disdain for the Islamic elite and aksakal elders prevailed.

The role of a special sounding board in the bitterness of the opposition was played by Hafizullah Amin, who was initially the right hand of the head of the party and state, Nur Muhammad Taraki. His unjustified repressions against representatives of other political movements and his party comrades, as well as merchants, religious and other figures, became a serious factor in the sharp increase in armed resistance to the revolutionary authorities and the outbreak of a large-scale civil war.

Regarding assessments of the activities of the revolutionary forces of Afghanistan during the 1980s, one cannot help but say that the People’s Democratic Party has emerged and entered the forefront of a heterogeneous political struggle, actually consisting of two factions-wings, significantly different in their social composition , and on approaches to many problems of the structure of Afghan society.

The left, Khalqist wing, consisting mainly of representatives of the working environment, was more consistent in its aspirations to bring revolutionary changes to their logical conclusion, in the interests of the working people. Many of the Khalqists studied in the Soviet Union, in military schools and civilian universities. They imbued with the spirit of true friendship for the Soviet people and saw the prospects for the development of their state in a progressive direction. For them, power was a means to achieve these goals.

The Parchamist part of the party, especially its leaders, seemed to adhere to the same ideas and program guidelines, but were in no hurry to make changes. Having come to power, this elite did not become an active and effective engine for restructuring society and rallying forces to protect and deepen revolutionary gains. From the very beginning, she confined herself to the internal party struggle, believing that the Soviet armed forces and representative offices should bear the brunt of defending the revolution and power. One got the impression that their main goal was power. And everything else - revolutionary phrases, slogans and intentions - is mere appearance and obvious playing along with our Soviet political leaders, who provided the Parchamist leaders with all possible attention, material and military assistance. Hence the ongoing struggle against the Khalqist wing, with its bright leaders, including our friend, Minister of Internal Affairs Said Muhammad Gulyabzoy.

After the death of Taraki and the dangerous period of Amin’s power, the leaders of Parcham did not even allow the thought that the Khalqists would again rule the state on an equal basis with them, or hold any levers of power in their hands. Babrak Karmal and others clearly understood that on the part of the USSR, after the removal of Amin, the line of transfer of power to “moderate” figures from among the Parchamists was taken as a basis in the hope that they would more skillfully consolidate Afghan society and extinguish the already blazing war.

It is surprising how our leaders could send in troops, make human sacrifices (not to mention the reaction of the world community to this, as well as huge moral and material losses), realizing that the head of the state will be people who have no support in the working environment, far from the true needs of their people and who, like an umbilical cord, are tied to the traditions and wealth of their ancestors.

Babrak Karmal. The son of a very wealthy father - Colonel General, former head of the financial department of the Ministry of Defense, Governor General of the province of Paktia.

Stands next to him Najibullah, also comes from a wealthy family. His father held the position of Consul General in Pakistan for a long time and was a large real estate owner.

A frantic and treacherous fighter against the Khalqists, a permanent member of the Politburo, in fact, the second person in the party and state, Noor Ahmad Noor - landowner. Despite the fact that the province of Kandahar in the early 80s was practically in the hands of the Mujahideen, according to Tsarandoy, he continued to regularly receive income from his vast lands, on which the peasants of this province worked their backs in semi-slave labor.

And here are the representatives of Khalq.

Said Muhammad Gulyabzoy - representative of an ordinary Pashtun family. My father was a warrior in his youth, then worked as a shepherd. In the family, all the brothers and sisters worked their way out of poverty. Said himself received officer training in the Soviet Union, where he became acquainted with the socialist system and attracted many of his military friends into the ranks of the PDPA.

Saleh Mohammed Zirai - Secretary of the PDPA Central Committee (as a demonstration of party unity, on special instructions from the Central Committee, he and Nur were always supposed to appear together in public). Zirai grew up in a family that lost its father early. To feed the children, the mother was forced to work as a laundress for a long time. Almost all my life I have bent my back on the rich.

Examples of this kind are typical of both wings of the party. I remember that by mid-1981, I managed to understand more or less the relationship between the Ministry of Internal Affairs and the SGI, as well as their leaders - Gulyabzoy and Najibullah. These relations, without exaggeration, can be characterized as hostile. It was obvious that such a situation gave rise to confrontation and interfered with the establishment of the necessary interaction between departments. All sorts of provocations and even bloodshed can be expected at any moment.

Fortunately, by that time, good relations and mutual understanding had already developed with the head of the USSR KGB Representative Office, Viktor Nikolaevich Spolnikov, and his deputies, Vladimir Aleksandrovich Chuchukin and Stepan Pavlovich Dzyuba. Together we understood that a detente was needed, an elimination of tension between these ministries. We agreed that we will make every effort on both sides, as well as exchange information in order to influence the situation in a timely and proactive manner. Don't let events take us by surprise.

In the meantime... We decided to use elementary approaches - to bring these figures together in a bathhouse. Soon the “event” took place. I remember they joked that in the bathhouse everyone is equal, because when naked it is difficult to figure out what rank and origin he is. A good, friendly atmosphere was created. It also contained a serious conversation about the revolutionary cause, the fight against the Mujahideen, and that this requires the friendly and coordinated work of departments such as the Ministry of Internal Affairs and the State Security Service. There were also warm assurances that this is how relationships will be built, because it is clear that without good cooperation and trust the desired results will not be achieved. As if the result was a semi-serious definition: since a representative of the richest family and a shepherd’s son are sitting next to each other on a bathhouse bench, it means that the revolution has already brought serious changes to relations between people. And who else, if not members of the same party, can demonstrate coordinated combat work, despite social differences in their origins? It seemed that agreement had been reached... Further events indicated the opposite.

Attempts to mouth wounded WITH. M. Gulyabzoya. Along with the development of the Ministry of Internal Affairs of the DRA, a significant increase in its combat power, the experience of the young minister quickly grew, and the ability to see the main thing in his work was honed. In the provinces and the capital of the state, not only those who belonged to the Khalqist wing of the party began to take into account his opinion, as well as decisions concerning the activities of the internal affairs bodies and other problems. Gulyabzoy's authority in the Pashtun provinces among the tribal elite rose noticeably.

All this was to a certain extent facilitated by the qualified work of advisers to the USSR Ministry of Internal Affairs in the provinces. Along with the Tsarandoi commanders, they bore a significant part of the burden in the formation, training and combat training of Tsarandoi companies and battalions. Experienced senior operational officers, as plenipotentiaries of the USSR Ministry of Internal Affairs, actively and knowledgeably helped provincial party organizations organize work to consolidate revolutionary power. Analyze and competently use intelligence data received from the Afghan line and through our Cobalt detachments about gangs and their plans. Thanks to this, along with units of the Soviet Army and the Ministry of Defense, the internal affairs bodies became a serious support for provincial governors and administrations in the regions and cities of the republic. In many cases, Tsaranda independently held the defense against attacks by opposition units, and during military operations, his companies and battalions participated in combat operations together with units of the 40th Army and units of the DRA Defense Ministry.

In many provinces, and especially in such provinces as Herat, Nangarhar, Balkh, Juzjan, Faryab, Helmand, Kunduz Laghman, as well as in Kabul itself and the Kabul province, strong teams of Representation employees were formed, who skillfully handled the matter and in a short time helped to raise the authority of tsarandoy, ensure the organization of effective combat operations through a significant increase in the power of operational units.

However, there is no good without bad. We all worked enthusiastically and did not pay much attention to the fact that these good changes and achievements, it turns out, do not please either the Secretary of the PDPA Central Committee Babrak Karmal, or the Chairman of the Council of Ministers Keshtmandu, or many other high government officials. As before, they showed not only unfriendliness towards the Minister of Internal Affairs and those who help him from the Soviet side, but also direct attacks and threats against Gulyabzoy. It got to the point that, on the basis of fake data allegedly obtained by the SGI, under the guise of suppressing a coup attempt, capture groups of the state information service were sent to the territory where the Ministry of Internal Affairs building was located in order to “timely” stop the actions of the minister.

Here's another example. In the fall of 1981, after receiving a narrow circle of leaders from the Afghan and Soviet sides at the Soviet Embassy, when everyone went out into the fresh air, the very tipsy Secretary of the Central Committee Nur Ahmad Nur became so embittered for no apparent reason in relation to Gulyabzoy that he grabbed a pistol and, jerking the bolt, wanted shoot him. And only thanks to the decisive intervention of others was it possible to prevent a serious incident. Subsequently, an action was planned to compromise the Minister of Internal Affairs at the PDPA conference. It was planned to discuss the issue of deepening revolutionary changes and strengthening the protection of people's power. As we learned, the following scenario was outlined: to ensure that mainly Parchamists were elected as delegates to the conference; in the report and pre-prepared speeches of Parcham representatives, criticize the inactivity of the Ministry and its local bodies and, on this basis, adopt a resolution to relieve Gulyabzoy from his post.

However, the plan failed. Due to the fact that the bulk of party members both in parts of the Ministry of Defense and in the bodies of the Ministry of Internal Affairs belonged to the Khalq wing, almost only Khalqists were elected delegates here. Taking into account the proportion of party members from these departments in the total number of members of the PDPA throughout the country, it turned out that the overwhelming majority of the conference delegates represented the Khapist wing. In addition, a meaningful speech about the work done by Gulyabzoy himself knocked the weapons previously prepared against him out of the hands of the Parchamists. An attempt to rectify the situation by making a harsh speech against Gulyabzoy by the head of the SGI Najibullah was no longer successful. The sympathies of the conference were clearly on the side of the Minister of Internal Affairs.

We have noticed that Najibullah is becoming an increasingly influential leader of the Parchami wing of the party. The leadership of the PDPA Central Committee, receiving from his hands information about the situation in the country and the peculiarities of the political situation, fell more and more under the influence of this very capable, but secretive and insidious figure. Failures in attempts to reprisal and eliminate the authoritative and increasingly powerful leader of the Khalqist wing inflamed the desire of Najibullah, and through him the leadership of the PDPA, to overcome any obstacles and deal with this Jadran. It was clear that there was even some kind of excitement in this matter.

I would not like to pay too much attention to these issues. There are topics closer to our plan - to publish a book of memories about interesting events and people who met us in

’ Jadran is a Pashtun warrior tribe. Gulyabzoy comes from this tribe.

Afghanistan. But I think that I have no right to ignore the phenomena that, together with many other mistakes and shortcomings in the activities of the revolutionary leadership, ultimately brought down both the efforts of the PDPA and our comprehensive assistance and support for the April Revolution. It seemed that all our Soviet representative offices, the Central Committee of the PDPA, and the Council of Ministers of the Republic should rejoice at the successes of the Ministry of Internal Affairs and in every possible way support Gulyabzoy, who was one of the organizers of the party and revolutionary actions. But it was not there. Everything was done just the opposite.

It is clear why Babrak Karmal and those who are in league with him do not want the strengthening of Gulyabzoy. He could be a power rival! But why is he, Gulyabzoy, undesirable to the Ambassador of the Soviet Union? The ambassador of the country who is helping this minister to organize combat work, to form armed forces to protect people's power? The ambassador's position is difficult to understand and justify.

A few months after the PDPA conference, the Bureau of the Central Committee once again meets to discuss, along with others, the same issue - strengthening the defense of the revolution. Our Representation learned that at its meeting it is again planned to come to a decision on the dismissal of Gulyabzoy from the post of minister. As usual, the Bureau is attended by the USSR Ambassador, the Chief Military Adviser, the leaders of a group of party advisers and representative offices of the KGB and the Ministry of Internal Affairs of the USSR. Judging by the nervousness of Babrak Karmal and Fikryat Akhmedzhanovich Tabeev, we feel that our information is being confirmed. And indeed! For the umpteenth time, groundless claims are being made against the Ministry of Internal Affairs and the minister is being accused of all grave sins.

Gulyabzoy, with our help, prepared well for this meeting. In his speech, he consistently breaks down the arguments and heaps of accusations made against the Ministry of Internal Affairs. There is... confusion at the Bureau. At this time, the ambassador is invited to the apparatus of our government communications (HF).

Soon, clearly embarrassed, he returns to the Bureau meeting room. After a short conversation with the ambassador, Karmal reports: “We will consider it advisable to limit ourselves to discussing the issue of the work of the Ministry of Internal Affairs.” We moved on to other routine problems.

But the fact was that shortly before the meeting of the Bureau, we, knowing about the next intention to deal with Gulyabzoy, sent a desperate and harsh telegram to the authorities of the USSR about the position of our Embassy in support of the persecution of the Minister of Internal Affairs, about the position,

which contributes to the disorganization of the armed forces of Afghanistan. They indicated that this could lead to extremely undesirable consequences.

According to a number of comrades who knew the essence of these vicissitudes, the ambassador was warned in time about the inappropriateness of supporting the actions of the Afghan side to discredit Gulyabzoy.

In 1982, it was already clear that the situation in Afghanistan “with our Soviet help” was reaching a dead end. And taking this into account, it was clear why the leadership of the DRA and our ambassador were so persistent in seeking the removal of Gulyabzoy. It was necessary to find some kind of “scapegoat” and blame him for at least part of the failures in the development of the revolutionary process, the failures in the fight against the Mujahideen. Added to this was still the fear: what if, given the growing authority of this young Pashtun, the mood towards the current ruling figures would change.

What does a change of people in power mean? This is an admission of mistakes and of those who, on our part, supported these individuals in every possible way.

Soviet "contribution" to the tragedy of Afghanistan. Over time, from the standpoint of today, it is possible to more or less correctly assess the “contribution” of our Soviet side to the Afghan events.

Some authoritative figures are trying to convince the inexperienced reader that neither the State Security Committee, nor the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, nor the Central Committee of the CPSU knew or knew that a revolution was brewing in Afghanistan, and everything happened in April 1978 suddenly, by chance, unexpectedly and unexpectedly. And moreover, a very narrow circle of people, just a few people, took part in deciding the issue of bringing in our troops, and under the active pressure of the General Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee L. I. Brezhnev, that the KGB had nothing to do with this important step.

It is quite obvious that those who try to present the matter in this way are seriously sinning against the truth or want to avoid the judgment of conscience in this way. Those who think this way and describe events are either naive or defending someone’s interests rather than the truth.

The real truth, I think, is that this kind of issue could not be considered in the power structures of our country without the participation and recommendations, first of all, of the State Security Committee. Representatives of this department had the most complete information about events abroad. On the basis, first of all, of this information, the views of our political leadership on the events in Afghanistan were formed and “informed” decisions were prepared to respond to them.

The truth about who played first fiddle on our side in Afghan issues is too expensive. Not to mention the tragedy that the people of Afghanistan are still experiencing, our intervention in the affairs of this country was paid for with life and blood, the grave suffering of thousands and thousands of our sons, and the unhealed spiritual wound of the entire people. It, this true truth, cannot be hushed up or obscured, because it is immoral.

According to my convictions, the convictions of many comrades, with whom I had to help the Afghans in their difficult struggle, one cannot condemn only the PDPA, its active elite for the fact that, without objectively assessing the prospects of their revolutionary actions, they decided to take power and lead the country, their people along the path of progress. Perhaps those on our side deserve more blame, who in advance could give a scientifically based and objective answer to the questions: is the situation ripe, are the party’s forces sufficient for such a responsible historical step? Those who could and should have given answers to these questions did not do so, but in every possible way encouraged the revolutionary aspirations of the PDPA and encouraged its activists that they would receive proper support and comprehensive assistance.

It seems that there are many reasons for such an assessment of our complicity in the Afghan revolutionary upheavals.

Indeed, help and support were provided. Our state had to not only send its armed forces there, but also supply weapons, military equipment, clothing, bread, sugar, other food resources, as well as fuel for military and civilian needs to revolutionary Afghanistan almost free of charge. Every day of our presence there cost the Soviet treasury significant expenses.

However, neither this assistance nor active armed support for the fight against the Mujahideen ensured victory or consolidated the revolutionary gains.

In addition to the weakness of the PDPA, among many other reasons that more or less influenced the final outcome of events, the most important, in my deep conviction, was the erroneous orientation of the Soviet political leadership towards representatives of the small wing of Parcham. An orientation that was recklessly established at the second stage of the revolution, after the removal of Amin. There were serious discrepancies between the goals of the revolution, the efforts of all Soviet departments that assisted in the establishment of power, and the actual actions of the Parchamist elite, for which the main thing was not the good of the working people of this long-suffering country, but to remain in power. Using our help and armed support, we will be able to fight within the party for the neutralization and elimination of the Khalqists.

The struggle of the Parchamist wing for power for the sake of power was clearly visible to the Afghan people, who received practically nothing from the revolutionary changes except declarations, slogans and promises.

At first, the victory of the revolution caused an explosion of enthusiasm. There were noisy rejoicings of the people, rallies and processions, bright hopes. However, after a while - after a year, two, three - it became clear to many that nothing, in essence, was changing, with the exception of ever-increasing repression, the incessant fight between the two wings of the party and the expansion of the civil war.

The proclaimed land reform, as the most important factor in revolutionary social changes, ultimately turned into a farce.

Transferring land into the hands of peasants in a country where private, feudal property reigns is an extremely difficult matter. Such an action requires breaking centuries-old traditions and overcoming the most brutal, bloody resistance of those who are losing their land. To implement such reforms requires enormous efforts on the part of the revolutionary authorities. Declarations on fundamental changes in land use must be supported not only by broad explanatory measures and other various forms of influence on people's consciousness, but also by reliable armed defense of the new order of ownership of natural lands - the main source of human life.

By the time the reform was announced, not all of the country was dominated by revolutionary power. After all, the party was small in number, and the state structures that were being formed on the fly could not yet ensure the implementation of such major decisions. They had nothing to rely on.

At the first stage of the revolution, under Taraki, armed committees and detachments for the defense of the revolution were created from landless poor peasants and party activists in many regions and settlements. They were then the main power force with the help of which the Land Reform was carried out. However, with the coming to power of the Parchamists, committees and detachments, under all sorts of pretexts and due to the fact that they allegedly formed under Amin, began to disarm and liquidate. At the same time, landowners began to adapt to the protection of the Parcham wing, who sought to preserve their possessions at all costs.

Many figures of the second stage of the revolution were large feudal lords. Among them, in addition to Nur Ahmad Noor already mentioned in this regard, Minister of Nationalities (Tribal Affairs) Suleiman Laek, Minister of Culture Majid Sarboland, Chief Prosecutor Zirmal, Commander of the Second Army Corps Ulumi and others.

From the very beginning of the proclamation of reforms, peasants, the bulk of the country's population, did not feel or see decisive action on the part of the authorities in order to transfer the land for their use. In many places they were forced to take a wait-and-see attitude, especially since the dushmans soon began bloody repressions against those who received land and who rushed to take advantage of the fruits of the revolution. The leadership of the Ministry of Internal Affairs had information that large landowners who held various government posts and controlled local power were taking all sorts of measures to hinder the implementation of land reform, including armed resistance. There was information that the same member of the Politburo, Secretary of the PDPA Central Committee Nur Akhmad Nur, through appropriate connections, instructed the armed opposition to take punitive measures against peasants who encroached on his land holdings in the provinces of Kandahar and Logar. And these instructions were carried out properly.

11.01.2012 15:05 2 (11512)

The former head of the Chelyabinsk Region Internal Affairs Directorate headed the legendary Cobalt squad

On December 29, Russia celebrates a day of memory and mourning. 33 years ago, it was officially announced that a “limited contingent” of our troops would be sent to Afghanistan. Very little is known to this day about that undeclared war, which lasted a long nine years, one month and 19 days. It remains a mystery what lessons we all learned from this war.

There is also unusually little information about the highly secret special forces detachment of the Ministry of Internal Affairs of the USSR “Cobalt”, which was actively operating in Afghanistan in Afghanistan and carried out the most important tasks of identifying the locations of bandit formations through intelligence methods, obtaining and clarifying intelligence data, as well as their implementation. Even in the collection “Ministry of Internal Affairs 1902 - 2002. Historical Sketch,” published for the 200th anniversary of the department, there is no proper information about this legendary unit.

The Afghan campaign, according to experts, has once again completely confirmed the harm of underestimating the role of effective intelligence in war. If at the time of the entry of Soviet troops into Afghanistan the share of reconnaissance units and subunits in the 40th Army did not exceed five percent, then subsequently it was forced to quadruple. The collection of intelligence data on gangs was carried out by the intelligence departments of the headquarters of divisions, brigades and regiments, as well as two intelligence points and the 797th intelligence center. The military intelligence arsenal included a wide range of tools - from aerial photography and space reconnaissance to daily surveillance and intelligence work. The unified intelligence center in Kabul began to provide information to Soviet troops in January 1980, consistently deploying operational intelligence groups in large centers, which were soon to begin operating in almost all provinces of Afghanistan.

The detectives turned out to be more prepared than the intelligence services

But it just so happened that against the backdrop of the well-known Afghan special operations of the top-secret units of the KGB of the USSR and the USSR Ministry of Defense “Alpha”, “Cascade”, “Zenith” and “Omega”, the role of the modest Soviet police officers sent across the river was completely undeservedly hushed up all these years. And few people know what more than 3,900 employees of the USSR internal affairs bodies, sent on business trips to Afghanistan from 1978 to 1992, actually did during that strange war...

Although, it would seem, the era of the so-called Afghan war was a completely special stage in the development of the country's internal affairs bodies. It was then that for the first time the Ministry of Internal Affairs had the opportunity to have its own representative office and conduct covert operational activities on the territory of a foreign state. In the distant eighties of the last century, only an extremely limited circle of the country’s leaders knew about the foreign reconnaissance and sabotage detachment of the police special forces “Cobalt”.

It so happened that it was the operational police officers in those years who turned out to be the most prepared to conduct intelligence work on the numerous illegal armed groups of rebellious Afghanistan. That is why there was a need to include police detectives in intelligence activities in wartime conditions. Today it can be said with a high degree of probability that at that time not a single law enforcement structure or special service of the state had such experience in operational work and organizing the fight against gangs that our police had accumulated. And it turns out that ordinary police detectives, who lived every day with hard and real operational investigative work, turned out to be more prepared for the hardships of a bloody counter-guerrilla war than representatives of the elite special services, which for decades were staffed mainly by the children of prominent party officials and released secretaries of Komsomol organizations...

That is why, taking into account the specifics of the tasks being solved, the freelance special forces detachment of the USSR Ministry of Internal Affairs “Cobalt”, numbering up to 600 employees, was staffed mainly by officers who had at least 10 years of experience in operational work with the “secret apparatus”. Priority when recruiting into a secret special unit was given to operational employees, as well as for their force cover - snipers from among the military personnel of the internal troops of the USSR Ministry of Internal Affairs who had good physical training.

The Cobalt squad was formed in the strictest secrecy, and each of its employees had their own legend and operational cover. As a rule, police special forces sent to Afghanistan were listed as civilian advisers in various areas of activity, in particular in agriculture, youth organizations...

The secret was revealed after death

I learned only shortly after his mysterious death that the former head of the Chelyabinsk Region Internal Affairs Directorate, Police Major General Valery Valentinovich Smirnov, was the deputy commander of the legendary “Cobalt” during the most intense years of the Afghan war. It so happened that at the Airborne Forces training ground in the Ryazan Seltsy there was a unique opportunity to chat in full with the Hero of the Soviet Union, Lieutenant General at that time, head of the Ryazan School of Airborne Forces Albert Slyusar. Authoritative people brought us together, and therefore our conversation turned out to be quite frank.

From 1981 to 1984, Albert Evdokimovich was part of a limited contingent of Soviet troops in Afghanistan, where he commanded the 103rd Airborne Division. Under his command, this unit successfully carried out a number of major military operations. Including the cascade operation included in foreign military textbooks to defeat Dushman gangs in the Panjshir Valley, while suffering, by the way, minimal losses in personnel and equipment. Military operations carried out under the leadership of General Slyusar were distinguished by deep thoughtfulness, high effectiveness, and minimal casualties. The irreconcilable opposition of the Afghan Mujahideen promised a prize of 500 thousand dollars for the capture of General Slyusar and his head.

As it turned out, it was in Afghanistan that the front-line friendship between paratrooper general Albert Slyusar and lieutenant colonel of the Chelyabinsk police Valery Smirnov arose. For a year and a half, Valery Valentinovich personally carried out intelligence work on advanced militant bases near Kabul, in which approximately half of the population at that time clearly supported jihad. His people personally followed all the goat paths, compiled detailed operational maps, and only after that Slyusar and Smirnov launched airborne aircraft into the sky. The bloodiest battles then lasted a week. For a week, the Chelyabinsk policeman fought hand in hand with the “Rexes” from the special forces of the GRU and the Airborne Forces, literally answering with his head for the impeccability of his information. For this most important operation, the army command nominated Valery Valentinovich to the title of Hero of the Soviet Union. But Smirnov, of course, did not receive the deserved reward. We limited ourselves to the Order of the Red Star. Power has changed in Moscow once again. Following the Secretary General, the Minister of Defense also left. And the new marshal had no time for some “strange” police lieutenant colonel from provincial Chelyabinsk. Valery Valentinovich himself did not remind of his merits. This was not his rule.

It was after that Kabul operation that Airborne General Albert Slyusar changed his opinion about the employees of the Soviet criminal investigation department for the rest of his life. How many of his paratrooper officers and cadets did he tell about his friend Lieutenant Colonel Smirnov... About how many of the best - the flower of the nation - owed their lives to the highest professionalism of the seasoned military intelligence officer Valery Smirnov...

Who made the scouts?

What was the unusual reconnaissance police special forces created by Colonel of the Astrakhan police Gennady Verzhbitsky and his deputy from Chelyabinsk Valery Smirnov in the conditions of the Middle East war? The freelance team of the Ministry of Internal Affairs "Cobalt" in those difficult years consisted of 23 reconnaissance groups stationed in remote Afghan provinces and one reserve unit in Kabul; if necessary, its employees promptly went on a mission to any point in the warring country. Each reconnaissance group usually had seven people, an armored personnel carrier and a radio station. The scouts were based in houses abandoned by their owners. Directly participated in the collection and processing of intelligence data. Directly among the local population, they developed and helped Tsarandoy to carry out multi-stage operations to introduce agents into gangs and refugee camps. As a result, they were often able to obtain information that made it possible to predict the actions of one or another gang leader and to find out where the detachments were meeting. To our deepest regret, the planned system of socialism did not become obsolete even in this war. Each Cobalt soldier, in addition to his main job, had to provide at least three effective air sorties per month with bombing strikes against concentrations of Mujahideen, including populated areas.

An ordinary bomb attack was usually carried out like this: a couple of fire support helicopters flew in, and a “gunner” agent was placed on one of them, who indicated the target. Each helicopter dropped, as a rule, at least two bombs on an object confirmed by a Cobalt employee. And then the companies moved to the bombing site, if this was, of course, possible...

In the theory taught in military academies, there was a common belief that people living in the border regions of the USSR, attracted and trained by local military intelligence agencies, would solve reconnaissance tasks independently on enemy territory. The practice of the Afghan war showed the opposite. These people were unable to become intelligence officers due to a lack of moral readiness for such activities rather than intelligence qualifications. The real intelligence officers were police officers who did not know a single language of Afghanistan, but had good special training and sufficient experience in intense operational work. And those local residents who had been trained for years to become intelligence officers became just translators for them.

According to retired Major General Alexander Lyakhovsky, former assistant to the head of the operational group of the USSR Ministry of Defense, it was the intelligence information supplied by the Cobalt groups that was of particular value when planning military operations in Afghanistan.

At the same time, however, today we have to admit that the experience of operational-search work in war conditions, which was gained by the Cobalt fighters in Afghanistan, remained only in the memory of the participants in the forgotten Afghan war, is not analyzed in the specialized literature, is not studied or taught in educational institutions of the Ministry of Internal Affairs of Russia. Now, looking at the actions of our special forces in certain regional conflicts, you involuntarily notice: it does not seem that in our special theory the lessons of Afghanistan have been truly worked out and taken into account.

The 40th Army, no matter how our enemies slandered it, left Afghanistan with unfurled battle flags and a sense of fulfilled military duty.

In accordance with the Treaty of Friendship, Good Neighborhood and Cooperation, at the end of 1979, a Soviet military group was introduced into the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan (DRA) in order to stabilize the situation in the neighboring country, which at that time was already tired of the struggle of the ruling elites for power. Soviet troops brought into the country were involved in an internal military conflict on the side of the government.
In addition to units and institutions of the Soviet Army, there were separate units of border troops and bodies of the KGB and the Ministry of Internal Affairs of the USSR in Afghanistan. An important role in those conditions was called upon to play - and played - the special forces detachment of the USSR Ministry of Internal Affairs "Cobalt", the first detachment of which began operational combat work in Afghanistan in the summer of 1980. "Cobalt" was aimed at operational search and combat work in seven zones. Having headquarters in Kabul, personnel were deployed in teams in key provinces (the DRA territory is divided into 26 provinces), from where they traveled to districts as part of operational combat groups.
In total, from August 1980 to April 1983, three Cobalt trains were replaced in Afghanistan. The commander of the first two was the deputy head of the Main Directorate for Criminal Investigation of the USSR Ministry of Internal Affairs, Police Major General Beksultan Beslanovich Dziov. Under his leadership there were constantly 23 operational combat groups and one reserve unit in Kabul.
The staff of each group included seven people, armed with, in addition to small arms, an armored personnel carrier, a Niva vehicle and a field radio station. They were based, as a rule, in the military garrisons of the 40th combined arms army of the TurkVO, participated in intelligence support for its combat operations, controlled checkpoints and migration flows of the local population, taught the Afghan police (tsaranda) the organization and tactics of solving crimes and methods of their investigation.

The war in Afghanistan provided the first significant experience in the use of operational search activities in order to ensure the preparation and conduct of operations and battles against irregular armed groups in a civil war. Particular weight is given to the operational developments of those years by the fact that guerrilla, or so-called “small” war, has become the main type of armed conflict on the planet today. Considering that internal affairs bodies are active subjects of internal ethnic and regional conflicts, the need to generalize the historical experience of their operational activities in local wars for the purpose of effective practical use in the future is obvious.

It is now generally accepted that not only the Ministry of Defense, but also the Ministry of Internal Affairs of the USSR played a significant role in organizing the confrontation with the armed opposition formations of the DRA.
The international mission of our specialists, including the special squad "Cobalt", was to provide assistance in the creation and development of the Afghan police - Tsarandoy. The armed confrontation between the warring parties in the DRA was initially of a focal nature, mainly around large settlements and along transport communications. However, many units, including the Tsarandoy battalions, were not ready to carry out combat missions. The personnel showed cowardice, were prone to panic and defection to the enemy’s side.
The direct participation of the Cobalt special squad in the unfolding events began in March 1980 and continued until April 1983. This period is characterized by the most active military operations against the armed opposition, including large-scale ones, together with Afghan formations and units, work on the reorganization and strengthening the armed forces, state security agencies and the Ministry of Internal Affairs of the DRA.

The special detachment "Cobalt" carried out the most important tasks of identifying the locations of bandit formations using intelligence methods, obtaining and clarifying intelligence data, as well as their implementation. Therefore, Cobalt consisted mainly of employees of the criminal investigation apparatus and other operational services, and for their force cover, snipers and drivers of internal troops.
In the eight security zones created in Afghanistan, Tsarandoy battalions were formed with the participation of Cobalt. Already from the second half of 1981, with the support of Cobalt, they actively opposed local gangs in the provinces and effectively interacted with government army units and units of the 40th Army during large-scale or local operations. A special feature of the operational-search activities of the first Cobalt detachment was the recruitment of an intelligence network in Afghanistan. The operatives of the next two detachments, as a rule, were already working with the agents assigned to contact. It should also be noted that communication with agents took place in the presence of an interpreter and often in premises specially designated for operational needs, located in the locations of the OKSV.
The "Cobalt" detachment was initially subordinate to the commander of another special unit - "Cascade" from the KGB of the USSR - Major General A.I. Lazarenko, since one of the tasks assigned to him was also the creation of Tsarandoy.
However, the operational staff of "Cobalt", unlike their colleagues from "Cascade", already had experience in operational investigative work against gangs. They generously shared this experience with state security soldiers, adopting, in turn, their rich combat experience in participating in various security operations. Why did it become necessary to include the criminal police in intelligence? Because no other department had the kind of experience in operational investigative work that was necessary for Tsaranda, whose units needed to be trained in operational investigative activities in order to quickly support combat activities and solve crimes committed by civilians. In addition, "Cascade" needed to be unloaded to combat foreign intelligence services, which were very active, freely collecting the necessary data throughout Afghanistan. Military advisers of the USA, Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, Great Britain and China not only trained the Mujahideen in training camps and equipped them with the latest types of weapons, but also took part in sabotage actions.

In addition, the subordination of "Cobalt" to the KGB structure strengthened its operational capabilities, provided its employees with the necessary operational cover documents, which optimized relationships with the military administration and officers of the commandant's offices implementing the corresponding regime for the movement of military personnel, including during curfew.
To assess the experience of the operational-search work of the "Cobalt" special squad in wartime conditions, it is necessary to characterize its enemy and the features of the operational-search work with him. The Mujahideen militia included dozens of different associations - from tribal groups to enthusiastic adherents of the revolution in Iran. Most opponents of the regime had bases located in Pakistan, but some of them operated from bases in Iran. The ranks of the rebels were actively replenished by new armed units trained in Afghan refugee camps in Pakistan and Iran, and by the rural population of Afghanistan, dissatisfied with the results of land and water reform.
Soviet troops fought actively together with government Afghan formations and units. The armed forces of the opposition, having suffered a number of defeats, switched to guerrilla warfare tactics. Their main groups moved to mountainous areas where military equipment could not reach.
Most of the militants did not stand out in any way from the mass of the civilian population, they led the usual lifestyle of respectable citizens, however, when the appropriate order was received, they took up arms and went to fight. They were well trained, fully provided for and, most importantly, enjoyed the sympathy of the population.

One of the most significant features in the organization of operational search work and the conduct of combat operations in Afghanistan was that the fight against the rebels was focal in nature, and in this war there was no division into the front and rear. The enemy could appear in any place and from any direction, using kariz (artificial underground water communications), mandekhs (dried river beds), automobile and caravan routes known only to them in seemingly impassable sands, mountain passes and river fords. In an effort to achieve surprise in their actions, the rebels conducted active reconnaissance and had an extensive network of informants and observers. At the same time, to transmit urgent information, in addition to means of communication, signals were used with smoke, mirrors laid out on hills and roads, signs made of stones, and so on.
The tactics of the rebels and the difficult terrain predetermined in these conditions the high importance of reconnaissance activities, including the operational search activities of the Cobalt special detachment, starting with the analysis of the military-political situation in the areas of responsibility, forecasting enemy actions and ending with identifying the numerical composition of enemy gang groups, their locations location, degree of combat readiness, sources of supply of weapons, ammunition and food.

If at the time of the entry of Soviet troops into Afghanistan the share of reconnaissance units and subunits in the 40th Army did not exceed 5%, then subsequently it increased 4 times. The collection of intelligence data was carried out by the intelligence departments of the headquarters of divisions, brigades and regiments, as well as two intelligence points and the 797th intelligence center. The military intelligence arsenal included a wide range of tools - from aerial photography and space reconnaissance to daily surveillance and intelligence work. However, as combat practice has shown, these forces were often not enough to obtain comprehensive information. According to Directive of the General Staff of the Armed Forces of the USSR N 314/3/00105, in order to coordinate the efforts of forces and means of various types of military intelligence and departments (KGB of the USSR - "Cascade", "Omega", Ministry of Internal Affairs of the USSR - "Cobalt"), as well as with The intelligence agencies of the DRA took measures to fully develop their interaction. All military and human intelligence data, including operational information from the Cobalt special squad, were accumulated in the intelligence department of the 40th Army headquarters. “For prompt decision-making on newly received intelligence data at the Combat Control Center every day,” recalls Colonel General B.V. Gromov, “even under the first commander of the 40th Army, General Tukharinov, it was established to regularly hold morning meetings. The meeting began at seven hours from the report of the chief of intelligence. Based on the information received, the situation was analyzed and tasks were set. Representatives of all intelligence agencies of our missions existing in Afghanistan gathered. They came: from the Main Intelligence Directorate of the General Staff (from Moscow) - this is mainly data on Pakistan, Iran, plans of the United States, supplies from China and Saudi Arabia, about the plans of the “Alliance of Seven” (that was the name of the coalition of seven leaders of opposition Afghan parties located in Pakistan); from the intelligence department of the headquarters of the Turkestan Military District, which had intelligence centers, conducted radio interceptions, etc. .; from the intelligence agencies of the Soviet representative offices of the KGB, the Ministry of Internal Affairs (from Cobalt) in Afghanistan; from the Soviet embassy; from the intelligence center of the 40th Army; from subordinate troops - divisions, brigades, individual regiments, as well as from the Afghan General Staff, MGB, Ministry of Internal Affairs, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, which were represented by our Soviet advisers.

Considering that new data, new goals, including especially important ones, appeared within a day, and decisions had to be made on them in real time, all this work was carried out quite effectively. There were, as they say, some hiccups when decisions were not made quickly enough by the relevant military commanders, which resulted in a disruption in the implementation of the received information, including bombing strikes on already empty positions and resting places, from which the dushmans had already left, or even on their own units that had already moved out to the search location. Late management decisions sometimes resulted in irrevocable losses. Thus, on October 21, 1980, during a joint operation of OKSV units with the participation of the Cobalt and Cascade detachments against the gangs of Ahmad Shah Massoud in the area of the village of Shivaki, officers of Cascade-1 Alexander Puntus (previously fought in members of the Zenit-2 group), Yuri Chechkov, Vladimir Kuzmin, Alexander Petrunin, Alexander Gribolev.
Together with them, two officers of the Cobalt special forces unit died in this battle: senior lieutenant Rusakov from Orel, wounded in the legs, blew himself up with a grenade, and police major Viktor Yurtov from the Belarusian city of Grodno was mortally wounded. From the first days of operational work in Afghanistan, Cobalt officers faced many difficulties. Difficult military-political situation, rebellions in the provinces, including in certain parts of the Afghan army. Low combat and intelligence-operational capabilities of Tsarandoy. The predominance of the rural population, which forms the basis of the rebellious movement, intimidated by the terror of the gangs, refusing help and facilitating the bandits.
In addition, the language barrier constantly interfered; there were few employees at Cobalt who knew the traditions, life and customs of the country, its social and ethnic structure. All this had to be made up during operational combat work, learned in practice, sometimes at the cost of blood.
The hardships of the highlands were complemented by heat, dust and an acute shortage of water. At first, more people died from infectious diseases in Afghanistan than from combat.
Against opposition armed groups operating by guerrilla methods, it was necessary to use equally unpredictable and unconventional tactics. And already the first clashes showed that creative improvisation in local conflicts is a necessary condition for achieving victory in battle.

According to retired Major General A.A. Lyakhovsky, a former assistant to the head of the Operational Group of the USSR Ministry of Defense, it was the intelligence information supplied by the Cobalt groups that was of particular value when planning operations. This is a great merit of the leaders of the detachment Dziov, Komar, Karpov, Kuchumov, as well as the deputy head of the Representative Office of the USSR Ministry of Internal Affairs Klyushnikov. The price of information in that war was life. Military intelligence, police officers, state security, police - everyone worked to obtain it. Soon, the Cobalt detachment was redirected to foreign intelligence and was practically freed from the need to collect counterintelligence data. The planned system did not become obsolete in this war either. Each Cobalt soldier was required to provide at least three effective air sorties per month with the application of ground control attacks on concentrations of Mujahideen, including populated areas. In addition, the destruction of bandit groups was carried out by joint actions of Soviet and government troops, coordinated in tasks, place and time, with the participation in certain cases of the Cobalt special squad.
In August 1980, employees of internal affairs bodies and military personnel of internal troops who were part of Cobalt-1 underwent additional training at the Tashkent Higher School of the Ministry of Internal Affairs of the USSR. There they were taught the basics of explosives, how to use a grenade launcher, a machine gun, a machine gun, i.e. provided the necessary initial combat training. The teachers could not teach operational-search work in the conditions of the war in Afghanistan to the required extent, since they themselves did not know the situation in this country.
The first Cobalt group spent about seven months on a business trip in Afghanistan, gaining some experience from which others later learned. Many employees were deservedly awarded orders and medals, promoted ahead of schedule to the next special and military ranks. And police captain M.I. Isakov, a graduate of the Leningrad Higher Political School of the USSR Ministry of Internal Affairs named after. On the 60th anniversary of the Komsomol, who previously served in the Airborne Forces and the criminal investigation department in the transport police, a participant in the mentioned battle near the village of Shivaki, by the Decree of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR of November 4, 1980, he was awarded the title of Hero of the Soviet Union, the only employee of the internal affairs bodies for the entire many years Afghan war. His name among the Heroes of the Soviet Union and the Russian Federation is engraved on the marble slabs “Heroes of the Fatherland” located in the Ministry at the entrance to the assembly hall.

In total, 5 thousand employees of internal affairs bodies and military personnel of the internal troops participated in the Afghan war in separate formations of the USSR Ministry of Internal Affairs. Of these, 28 were killed in action, including 25 officers, 2 sergeants and 1 civilian specialist. In the spring of 1983, the Cascade group of the KGB of the USSR ceased operational combat work in Afghanistan. Following this, the special squad "Cobalt" was withdrawn to their homeland and disbanded.
In total, in Afghanistan, the Cobalt special detachment carried out operational support for over a thousand planned and private operations, during which a large number of armed opposition formations were neutralized and the security of the southern borders of the USSR was ensured. The increase in the combat capability of the Afghan army and Tsarandoy with the participation of "Cobalt" made it possible, with the help of Soviet troops, to deliver serious blows to the armed counter-revolution. As a result of the measures taken, a number of opposition groups stopped fighting against the government.
Today we have to admit that the experience of operational-search work in war conditions, which was gained by the Cobalt fighters in Afghanistan, remained only in the memory of the participants in the Afghan war, is not analyzed in specialized literature, is not studied or taught in educational institutions of the Russian Ministry of Internal Affairs.
Many wonderful detectives have passed through Cobalt. This includes his first commander - Deputy Head of the Main Directorate for Criminal Investigation of the Ministry of Internal Affairs of the USSR Beksultan Dzioev and Viktor Karpov, who later headed the Internal Affairs Directorate of the Arkhangelsk Region, and Nikolai Komar, one of the leaders of the Moscow Transport Police. The commander of the Cobalt group, based in Kabul, was the future Minister of Internal Affairs of the Russian Federation, Army General Viktor Erin; Hero of Russia Ivan Golubev, who became Deputy Minister of Internal Affairs, also attended the Cobalt school.

From the memoirs of an employee of the Cobalt group, Hero of the Soviet Union Mikhail Isakov:
- I arrived in Kabul on September 4, 1980. This was the first recruitment of law enforcement officers into the Cobalt reconnaissance detachment. Priority was given to operatives who had completed criminal investigation school and snipers from among the military personnel of the internal troops. We met each other during the training camp in Uzbekistan. In addition to the Baltic states, I met colleagues from Belarus, Arkhangelsk and other cities. The ninth detachment, in which I found myself, was stationed on the edge of the airfield in Kabul. He had to serve the area around the capital of Afghanistan. A few days after arriving in Kabul, we started working. It turned out to be somewhat similar to the usual operational search unit. However, there were many additional difficulties: a foreign country, an unfamiliar language, customs, new climatic conditions, mountains. And then there is the psychological barrier. After the introduction of our limited military contingent, the Soviet people, from desired assistants and allies of the people's power, turned into occupiers in the eyes of many Afghans.

From the memoirs of fighters of the Separate 2nd Termez (Tashkurgan) motorized maneuver group of the KGB USSR PV, April 1982:

A filter point is being urgently organized to check people leaving the city. Translators and the Afghan State Security (HAD) begin working with them.

Some of our group appears in a uniform without shoulder straps and without insignia, all officers appear to call themselves “Cobalt” (later they will tell us that this is a special unit of the USSR Ministry of Internal Affairs, but I still don’t know whether this is true or not). They are interrogating prisoners. We set up a separate tent for them. They bring suspicious Afghan detainees into it for interrogation and interrogate them harshly.
This is a surprise for us, a non-Soviet way of interrogating prisoners, although we understand that there is no other way, the enemy is the enemy. “Kobaltovtsy” quickly calculate ten active Basmachi among the detained people. At the same time, they teach us how to examine our right shoulder to see if there are any marks from the belt and butt, how to detect a callus from the trigger on the index finger or singed hair on the temple.