The partisan movement of 1812 (partisan war) was an armed conflict between Napoleon's army and detachments of Russian partisans that broke out during the times with the French.
The partisan troops consisted mainly of Cossacks and regular army units located in the rear. Gradually they were joined by released prisoners of war, as well as volunteers from the civilian population (peasants). Partisan detachments were one of the main military forces of Russia in this war and offered significant resistance.
Creation of partisan units
Napoleon's army moved very quickly into the country, pursuing Russian troops, who were forced to retreat. As a result of this, Napoleon's soldiers soon spread out over a large territory of Russia and created communication networks with the border through which weapons, food and prisoners of war were delivered. To defeat Napoleon, it was necessary to interrupt these networks. The leadership of the Russian army decided to create numerous partisan detachments throughout the country, which were supposed to engage in subversive work and prevent the French army from receiving everything it needed.
The first detachment was formed under the command of Lieutenant Colonel D. Davydov.
Cossack partisan detachments
Davydov presented to the leadership a plan for a partisan attack on the French, which was quickly approved. To implement the plan, the army leadership gave Davydov 50 Cossacks and 50 officers.
In September 1812, Davydov’s detachment attacked a French detachment that was secretly transporting additional human forces and food to the camp of the main army. Thanks to the effect of surprise, the French were captured, some were killed, and the entire cargo was destroyed. This attack was followed by several more of the same kind, which turned out to be extremely successful.
Davydov's detachment began to gradually be replenished with released prisoners of war and volunteers from the peasants. At the very beginning of the guerrilla war, peasants were wary of soldiers carrying out subversive activities, but soon they began to actively help and even participated in attacks on the French.
However, the height of the partisan war began after Kutuzov was forced to leave Moscow. He gave the order to begin active partisan activity in all directions. By that time, partisan detachments had already been formed throughout the country and numbered from 200 to 1,500 people. The main force consisted of Cossacks and soldiers, but peasants also actively participated in the resistance.
Several factors contributed to the success of guerrilla warfare. Firstly, the detachments always attacked suddenly and acted secretly - the French could not predict where and when the next attack would occur and could not prepare. Secondly, after the capture of Moscow, discord began in the ranks of the French.
In the middle of the war, the guerrilla attack was in its most acute stage. The French were exhausted by military operations, and the number of partisans had increased so much that they could already form their own army, not inferior to the troops of the emperor.
Peasant partisan units
Peasants also play an important role in the resistance. Although they did not actively join the detachments, they actively helped the partisans. The French, deprived of food supplies from their own, constantly tried to get food from the peasants in the rear, but they did not surrender and did not conduct any trade with the enemy. Moreover, peasants burned their own warehouses and houses so that the grain would not go to their enemies.
As the guerrilla war grew, the peasants began to participate more actively in it and often attacked the enemy themselves, armed with whatever they could. The first peasant partisan detachments appeared.
Results of the partisan war of 1812
The role of the partisan war of 1812 in the victory over the French is difficult to overestimate - it was the partisans who were able to undermine the enemy’s forces, weaken him and allow the regular army to drive Napoleon out of Russia.
After the victory, the heroes of the partisan war were duly rewarded.
Protracted military conflict. Detachments in which people were united by the idea of the liberation struggle fought on a par with the regular army, and in the case of a well-organized leadership, their actions were highly effective and largely decided the outcome of the battles.
Partisans of 1812
When Napoleon attacked Russia, the idea of strategic guerrilla warfare arose. Then, for the first time in world history, Russian troops used a universal method of conducting military operations on enemy territory. This method was based on the organization and coordination of rebel actions by the regular army itself. For this purpose, trained professionals - “army partisans” - were thrown behind the front line. At this time, the detachments of Figner and Ilovaisky, as well as the detachment of Denis Davydov, who was lieutenant colonel Akhtyrsky, became famous for their military exploits
This detachment was separated from the main forces longer than others (for six weeks). The tactics of Davydov’s partisan detachment consisted in the fact that they avoided open attacks, attacked by surprise, changed directions of attacks, and probed for the enemy’s weak points. The local population helped: the peasants were guides, spies, and participated in the extermination of the French.
In the Patriotic War, the partisan movement was of particular importance. The basis for the formation of detachments and units was the local population, who were familiar with the area. In addition, it was hostile to the occupiers.
The main goal of the movement
The main task of guerrilla warfare was to isolate enemy troops from its communications. The main blow of the people's avengers was aimed at the supply lines of the enemy army. Their detachments disrupted communications, prevented the approach of reinforcements and the supply of ammunition. When the French began to retreat, their actions were aimed at destroying ferries and bridges over numerous rivers. Thanks to the active actions of army partisans, Napoleon lost almost half of his artillery during his retreat.
The experience of waging partisan warfare in 1812 was used in the Great Patriotic War (1941-1945). During this period, this movement was large-scale and well organized.
Period of the Great Patriotic War
The need to organize a partisan movement arose due to the fact that most of the territory of the Soviet state was captured by German troops, who sought to make slaves and liquidate the population of the occupied areas. The main idea of partisan warfare in the Great Patriotic War is the disorganization of the activities of the Nazi troops, causing them human and material losses. For this purpose, fighter and sabotage groups were created, and the network of underground organizations was expanded to guide all actions in the occupied territory.
The partisan movement of the Great Patriotic War was two-sided. On the one hand, the detachments were created spontaneously, from people who remained in enemy-occupied territories, and sought to protect themselves from mass fascist terror. On the other hand, this process took place in an organized manner, under leadership from above. Sabotage groups were thrown behind enemy lines or pre-organized in the territory that they were supposed to leave in the near future. To provide such detachments with ammunition and food, they first made caches with supplies, and also worked out issues of their further replenishment. In addition, issues of secrecy were worked out, the locations of detachments based in the forest were determined after the front retreated further to the east, and the provision of money and valuables was organized.
Movement leadership
In order to lead the guerrilla war and sabotage struggle, workers from among the local residents who were well acquainted with these areas were sent to the territory captured by the enemy. Very often, among the organizers and leaders, including the underground, were the leaders of Soviet and party bodies who remained in the territory occupied by the enemy.
Guerrilla warfare played a decisive role in the victory of the Soviet Union over Nazi Germany.
“For us Russians, guerrilla warfare will always be extremely necessary and useful,” wrote Denis Davydov. The most famous hussar in Russia tried to convince his contemporaries that it was he who developed the methods of guerrilla warfare, was the first to apply them comprehensively and became the best partisan in the Patriotic War of 1812. Can you believe this? What was the military path of the famous poet and his role in the Russian partisan movement of 1812?
“Born for royal service”
Denis Davydov was destined to become a military man. His father was an associate of Suvorov, Nikolai Raevsky and Alexei Ermolov were his relatives, and he spent his childhood on the Borodino estate, next to which the main battle of the Patriotic War would take place in 1812. Born in 1784, Denis Davydov absorbed the military spirit from childhood and prepared to become an officer.
However, there were many obstacles on the way of young Davydov, the main ones being his poverty and freethinking. In 1801, he joined the ranks of the prestigious Cavalry Regiment, but found it difficult to maintain the lavish lifestyle of a capital officer. In addition, the authorities disliked the young cornet for his satirical poems, in which the young man ridiculed influential people. For these two reasons, Davydov did not stay in St. Petersburg and was transferred out of sight to the Belarusian Hussar Regiment, stationed in Zvenigorodka, Kyiv province. From then on, his reputation as a freethinker followed him until the end of his life.
Denis Davydov. Artist – J. Doe
Source – dic.academic.ru
The vicissitudes of the transfer to a new duty station prevented the young officer from taking part in the Austerlitz campaign of 1805, in which his former fellow cavalry guards distinguished themselves. Only in 1807 did he have the opportunity to smell gunpowder. Thanks to the support of influential persons at court, Davydov managed to obtain the position of adjutant under Lieutenant General Pyotr Bagration. During the fighting against the French, the impetuous adjutant initiated several skirmishes with the enemy - more curious than successful. The Swedish campaign of 1808 became a real partisan school for Davydov, during which he ended up in the detachment of Colonel Yakov Kulnev, a famous hussar, whom Napoleon himself called the best Russian cavalry commander. With Kulnev, Davydov took an “outpost service course”: he was engaged in reconnaissance, pickets, patrols, and vanguard contacts. In wooded Finland, both the Swedes and the Russians had to act in small units and fight like a guerrilla. Mastering the wisdom of guerrilla warfare in practice, Davydov turned into an experienced cavalry commander.
"The War I Was the Creator"
Denis Davydov tried to convince everyone that it was he who developed the methods of guerrilla warfare, proposed its use, and was the best partisan in the Russian army. However, all of these statements are most likely false. A short excursion into the history of partisan warfare will help to better understand Davydov’s place in the theory and practice of guerrilla warfare.
In the 18th–19th centuries, the word “partisans” meant professional soldiers who participated in the so-called “small war” - skirmishes, raids on convoys, reconnaissance, and so on. The Austrians and Russians were the first to use “small war” methods. Among the subjects of the Habsburgs and Romanovs there were many people who were accustomed to waging war “in a non-European way.” In the first case, we were talking about Hungarians, Romanians, Serbs and Croats, and in the second, about Cossacks. During the First Silesian War of 1740–1742, the Prussian king Frederick the Great was given a lot of trouble by the elusive Hungarian hussars and Croatian pandurs who ruled in his rear. The Great Powers hastened to copy this Austrian discovery. In the atmosphere of the emerging philosophy of the Enlightenment with its sympathies for the image noble savage(noble savage) to be a hussar became a very attractive fate, and the sons of the best European families began to grow mustaches and dress up as “barbarians.” It is no coincidence that we see jackets of the Hungarian style, luxuriously embroidered with cords, on the Russian hussars of 1812 - including on Denis Davydov.
General Nadasty's Hungarian hussars attack the Prussian camp during the Battle of Soor. Artist – D. Morier
Source – britishbattles.com
In 1756, a treatise by Philippe Augustin Thomas de Grandmaison was published La petite guerre ou traité du service des troupes légères en campagne(“The Little War, or a Treatise on the Field Service of Light Troops”). Unfortunately, we do not know whether Davydov read this work, but it became a reference book for many subsequent generations of partisans, theoretically formalizing the partisan experience of the era of Frederick the Great.
But it is known for sure that Grandmaison’s treatise was translated into Spanish in 1780 and was very useful to the inhabitants of the Pyrenees, who in 1808 faced the invasion of Napoleonic troops. A popular war against the invaders broke out in Spain, during which the stars of several guerrilla commanders rose, the most famous of whom was Juan Martin Diaz, or El Empesinado ("The Undaunted"). Russian society, dissatisfied with the forced alliance with Napoleon, followed the events in Spain with sympathy and hope.
Juan Martin Diaz is Davydov’s Spanish “colleague”. Artist – F. Goya
Source – ruralduero.com
By the beginning of 1812, the inevitability of a new conflict with Napoleon became obvious, and Alexander I was bombarded with various notes with plans for war against the “Corsican monster.” Historian V. M. Bezotosny especially notes the note of Lieutenant Colonel Pyotr Chuykevich, an employee of the Special Chancellery of the War Ministry, in which he proposes that in a future war against Napoleon “to undertake and do something completely opposite to what the enemy wants”. Chuykevich lists the necessary measures:
“Evasion of general battles, guerrilla warfare by flying detachments, especially in the rear of the enemy’s operational line, avoidance of foraging and determination to continue the war”
Chuikevich did not rule out that the people would have to be used in the war, « which should be stolenlive and set up, as in Gishpania, with the help of the Clergy.”
“I was born for the fateful year of 1812”
In June 1812, Napoleon invaded Russia. Lieutenant Colonel Denis Davydov began the war in the 2nd Army, which was led by his patron, Prince Bagration. According to the poet’s memoirs, he himself volunteered to organize a partisan detachment. On August 22, 1812, on the eve of the Battle of Borodino, a fateful explanation took place with Bagration, in which Denis Davydov argued in favor of his proposal:
“The enemy is going one way. This path has gone beyond measure in its length; transports of the enemy's vital and combat food cover the space from Gzhat to Smolensk and beyond. Meanwhile, the vastness of the part of Russia lying in the south of the Moscow route contributes to the twists and turns of not only parties, but also the entire army. What are crowds of Cossacks doing at the vanguard? Having left a sufficient number of them to maintain the outposts, it is necessary to divide the rest into parties and send them into the middle of the caravan following Napoleon."
Bagration approved this plan and reported it to Kutuzov. The commander-in-chief was skeptical about the hussar's idea, but gave him a small detachment for testing. Modern historians agree that Denis Davydov distorted the history of the creation of partisan detachments. In particular, P. P. Grunberg noticed indirect evidence in Davydov’s memoirs that he had some oral instructions from Prince Bagration. It seems that, rather, Bagration explained the problem to Davydov, and not Davydov to Bagration. Between August 19 and 22, several parties were created, and not just Davydov’s party. A.I. Popov, who studied the actions of partisan detachments in 1812, dates their first appearance back to July. Finally, the detachments of Seslavin and Figner, two other famous partisan commanders, were created not on their own initiative, but by the decision of the command. Most likely, Davydov took credit for the initiative to create partisan detachments, which actually came from the main headquarters.
Partisans of Denis Davydov. Artist – A. Nikolaev
The bright figure of the partisan poet Denis Davydov obscured other partisan commanders of that time from us. In the days when Davydov was just receiving a detachment under command, Baron Ferdinand von Winzengerode made a daring raid on Vitebsk. Captain Alexander Seslavin and his squad were the first to discover Napoleon's movement from Moscow to Maloyaroslavets, thanks to which Kutuzov revealed the enemy's plan at the decisive moment of the 1812 campaign. Alexander Benckendorff liberated the Netherlands with a flying detachment in 1813, sparking an anti-French uprising. The British historian D. Lieven writes that strategically, the most important partisan raid was the invasion of Alexander Chernyshev’s detachment into Prussian territory at the beginning of 1813, which prompted the Prussian king to switch to the side of Russia.
So, Denis Davydov was neither the father of guerrilla warfare, nor the first partisan, nor, most likely, the most successful partisan of the Napoleonic era. However, this man did something more for the guerrilla wars of the future - he gave them a beautiful legend and a theory tested in practice. Let's turn to the last one.
Poet, hussar and partisan Denis Davydov among his fellow soldiers. Artist – E. Demakov
Source – golos-epokhi.ru
"A field full of poetry"
« Partisan- This fish, the population is the sea in which he swims", wrote Mao Zedong. Denis Davydov could not have known this aphorism, but he perfectly understood the importance of popular support. In his memoirs, Davydov colorfully describes his first meeting with the peasants after his detachment left the active army at the end of August 1812. The peasants mistook the Russian hussars for the French and almost killed them. “Then I learned from experience that in a people’s war one must not only speak the language of the mob, but adapt to it, to its customs and clothing,”– recalled the famous partisan.
According to Davydov’s recollections, he put on peasant clothes, grew a beard, hung the image of St. Nicholas the Wonderworker on his chest and was accepted by the peasants as one of their own. Did he really have to resort to such a masquerade? P. P. Grunberg, who is skeptical of Davydov, believes that the ardent poet-partisan came up with this episode, and points out that none of the Russian partisans needed icons and army jackets. One way or another, Davydov immediately tried to enlist the support of the population, distributing weapons taken from the French to the peasants and ordering them to kill "enemies of Christ's Church". With the help of the energetic district leader of the nobility Semyon Yakovlevich Khrapovitsky, Davydov gathered a militia, which was joined by 22 landowners with their peasants.
Denis Davydov considered the enemy’s supply system to be the main target of the partisan detachments. Consequently, the main actions of the parties should have been attacks on foragers, carts and warehouses. Knowing full well that a small detachment would not be able to attack large enemy forces or a well-fortified supply base, Davydov hoped to interrupt the connection between this base and the enemy army. The more extensive Napoleon's communications were, the easier this task became. By September 1812, food, ammunition and reinforcements were reaching Napoleon along a long line from Vilna through Smolensk to Moscow. When Kutuzov’s army carried out the Tarutino maneuver and hung over this line from the south, an almost ideal situation developed for Davydov’s detachment.
Davydov was not one of the armchair strategists who at that time enthusiastically assessed the pros and cons of the relative positions of the opposing armies. He was a practitioner and well understood the importance of the moral side of military affairs. For Davydov, partisanship is a formidable psychological weapon:
“What consequences will we not witness when the successes of the parties will turn to their side the entire population of the regions located in the rear of the enemy army, and the horror sown on its routes of communication will be revealed in its ranks?”
At first, Kutuzov gave Davydov only 50 hussars and 80 Cossacks - with such forces it was not easy to “spread terror” in the enemy’s rear. However, the party gradually grew due to reinforcements, captured prisoners and the aforementioned militia - at the peak of its activity, Davydov could put about 2,000 people under arms. He could, but he didn't want to. His detachment had to be as mobile as possible, so more than half a thousand people rarely took part in partisan operations. The rest (primarily peasants) continued to live a peaceful life and helped the partisans, giving them shelter, guarding prisoners and serving as guides.
The partisans' way of life was extraordinary. The day usually began at midnight, in the light of the moon the partisans had a hearty breakfast, saddled their horses and set out on a campaign around three o’clock in the morning. The party always marched together, having a small vanguard, a rearguard and security, marching from the side of the road at a minimum distance from the main forces. They walked until dusk and then settled down for the night. The camp was organized in such a way as to eliminate the likelihood of a surprise attack - pickets were set up around it, long- and short-range patrols were arranged, and in the camp itself there was always a detachment of twenty people in full combat readiness. Davydov borrowed this system from his teachers Bagration and Kulnev. Bagration said: “The enemy can beat me, but he won’t find me sleepy.”. Kulnev explained to his people: "I don't sleep so you can sleep".
Denis Davydov at the head of the partisans in the vicinity of Lyakhov. Artist – A. Telenik
Source – pro100-mica.livejournal.com
Davydov's detachment most often attacked from an ambush. A collection point was designated four or five miles from the ambush site, where the horsemen were to retreat in case of failure (if possible, scattered and in roundabout ways). Thus, the party was difficult to destroy even if the operation failed. Only part of the detachment attacked the convoy - Davydov was convinced that even if the guards outnumbered the attackers, it could always be defeated by choosing the right moment and using the factor of surprise. If this was successful, then the spoils went to only those who participated in the attack. Sometimes the attackers had to be reinforced, in which case the spoils went to the reserve, and the first wave received nothing.
Denis Davydov's ashtray, made from a horse's hoof. From the collection of the State Historical Museum
Source – vm1.culture.ru
In 1812, Russian partisans caused a lot of trouble for the French. On October 28, the combined forces of Vasily Orlov-Denisov, Denis Davydov, Alexander Seslavin and Alexander Figner forced the entire division of Jean-Pierre Augereau to lay down their arms - this happened after the battle at Lyakhov, near Smolensk. When the following year, 1813, the Russian army entered the territory of the German states, a real “competition” began between the partisans to liberate kingdoms, principalities and their capitals. In this quite serious struggle for laurels and ranks, Denis Davydov received the keys to Dresden as a prize. The partisan poet ended the war in Paris with the rank of major general.
“And the lyre grows numb, and the saber does not cut...”
In 1815, the Russian military began a new life and a completely different service. Like many other military officers, Davydov could not adapt to peacetime for a long time. “A boring time has come for our soldier brother!”, he writes to Pavel Kiselev. The wayward partisan had difficult relations with both Alexander I and many influential people from the royal circle. This predetermined Davydov’s resignation in 1823. Having retired from business, he “set up a bivouac” on the Verkhnyaya Maza estate near Syzran and plunged into a quiet family life. Only at the beginning of the reign of Nicholas I, Denis Davydov briefly returned to duty, fought in the Caucasus and participated in the suppression of the Polish uprising of 1830–1831 - however, without gaining new fame.
Denis Davydov. Portrait fragment. Artist – V. Langer
Source – museumpushkin-lib.ru
The partisan experience of 1812 remained almost unclaimed after the Napoleonic Wars. This is not surprising, since partisanship was a desperate means - distributing weapons to the civilian population and inciting hatred in them was considered not only impermissible from the point of view of the unwritten rules of European war, but also dangerous for social foundations. No one could guarantee that the peasant would direct his weapon against the enemy, and not against his landowner. Figuratively speaking, there was a very visible danger of not being able to hold the “club of the people’s war” in one’s hands. In the papers of Denis Davydov there are orders to shoot peasants who killed nobles and robbed churches. And the partisans themselves did not always comply with the laws of war, since they could not burden themselves with prisoners.
There were other difficulties as well. If on the territory of “indigenous” Russia Davydov met with complete sympathy from the population, then after his detachment crossed the Dnieper near the village of Kopys (now in the Vitebsk region of Belarus), he was forced to request reinforcements:
“While I was robbing the middle of Russia, I was content with first 130, and then 500 people; but now with 760 people in enemy land, where everything is hostile to us, I am too weak and therefore I ask your Excellency to ask His Grace for an order to attach the 11th Jaeger Regiment with two guns to my detachment and leave it with me until further order, than do me a favor"
Fighting near Moscow and Smolensk, the partisans enjoyed the support of the peasants and easily found a common language with them. In the German lands, the population also welcomed the Russians cordially, but the language barrier was already felt. It is no coincidence that during this period partisans of German origin came to the fore - Benckendorff, Winzengerode and others. In France, the Russian partisans did not meet with either cordiality or a common language, and therefore could not mark themselves with significant deeds. Following the results of the Napoleonic Wars, the prevailing belief among the Russian military was that guerrilla warfare was a means only for internal use. In his writings, Davydov argued the opposite, but did not explain how he intended to wage an offensive guerrilla war on foreign territory. As Colonel Sergei Gershelman wrote about Davydov at the end of the 19th century, “He elevated the norms derived from observation during the Patriotic War into a general norm.”
The problem was that guerrilla warfare required completely different cavalry training. The horse party must be on the move all the time, so emphasis is needed on the endurance of the horse composition, and not on its strength. The partisans could rarely count on the help of infantry and artillery, which means they had to be able to conduct firefights themselves - both in the saddle and on foot. All this did not correspond to the cavalry traditions of the early 19th century.
The fighting of the Russians in the Caucasus and the French in Algeria in the 1830s and 1840s forced the military to think hard about protecting communications from raids. In the Caucasus, reinforced columns were formed that accompanied valuable cargo (the so-called “occasions”), and the highlanders did not risk attacking them. A similar system was introduced in Algeria by the French Marshal Thomas-Robert Bugeaud, who emphasized the superiority of columns over individual posts that did not protect anything except the ground on which they stood. It seemed that a recipe for reliable protection of communications had been found, and that soon only memories and poetic lines would remain about the partisans. Although attempts to create partisan detachments were made in Tsarist Russia, it took the exceptional circumstances of the Civil and Great Patriotic Wars for Russian partisanship to truly revive.
Bibliography:
- D. Davydov. Partisan diary of 1812 // Terrible weapon: Small war, partisanship and other types of asymmetric warfare in the light of the heritage of Russian military thinkers. M., 2007
- D. Davydov. Experience in the theory of partisan action // Formidable weapons: Small war, partisanship and other types of asymmetric warfare in the light of the heritage of Russian military thinkers. M., 2007
- F. Gershelman. Guerrilla warfare // Formidable weapons: Small war, partisanship and other types of asymmetric warfare in the light of the heritage of Russian military thinkers. M., 2007
- Patriotic War of 1812. Encyclopedia. M., 2004
- Bezotosny V. M. Russia in the Napoleonic Wars: 1805–1815. M., 2014
- Lieven D. Russia Against Napoleon: The Battle for Europe, 1807 to 1814. (2014)
- Kravchinsky Yu. Behind enemy lines and ahead of the troops: partisans, but not those // http://ria.ru/1812_parallels/20121002/764467735.html
- Grunberg P. P. Some features of the memoirs of D. V. Davydov “Diary of partisan actions of 1812” // The era of the Napoleonic wars: people, events, ideas. M., 2008
- Popular Resistance in the French Wars: Patriots, Partisans and Land Pirates. Ed. by Charles J. Esdaile. (Palgrave Macmillan, 2005)
- D. Davydov. About guerrilla warfare // Formidable weapons: Small war, partisanship and other types of asymmetric warfare in the light of the heritage of Russian military thinkers. M., 2007
Patriotic War of 1812. Guerrilla movement
Introduction
The partisan movement was a vivid expression of the national character of the Patriotic War of 1812. Having broken out after the invasion of Napoleonic troops into Lithuania and Belarus, it developed every day, took on more active forms and became a formidable force.
At first, the partisan movement was spontaneous, consisting of performances by small, scattered partisan detachments, then it captured entire areas. Large detachments began to be created, thousands of national heroes appeared, and talented organizers of the partisan struggle emerged.
Why did the disenfranchised peasantry, mercilessly oppressed by the feudal landowners, rise up to fight against their seemingly “liberator”? Napoleon did not even think about any liberation of the peasants from serfdom or improvement of their powerless situation. If at first promising phrases were uttered about the emancipation of the serfs and there was even talk about the need to issue some kind of proclamation, then this was only a tactical move with the help of which Napoleon hoped to intimidate the landowners.
Napoleon understood that the liberation of Russian serfs would inevitably lead to revolutionary consequences, which is what he feared most. Yes, this did not meet his political goals when joining Russia. According to Napoleon's comrades, it was “important for him to strengthen monarchism in France and it was difficult for him to preach revolution to Russia.”
The purpose of the work is to consider Denis Davydov as a hero of the partisan war and a poet. Work objectives to consider:
1. Reasons for the emergence of partisan movements
2. Partisan movement of D. Davydov
3. Denis Davydov as a poet
1. Reasons for the emergence of partisan detachments
The beginning of the partisan movement in 1812 is associated with the manifesto of Alexander I of July 6, 1812, which supposedly allowed the peasants to take up arms and actively participate in the struggle. In reality the situation was different. Without waiting for orders from their superiors, when the French approached, residents fled into the forests and swamps, often leaving their homes to be looted and burned.
The peasants quickly realized that the invasion of the French conquerors put them in an even more difficult and humiliating position than they had been in before. The peasants also associated the fight against foreign enslavers with the hope of liberating them from serfdom.
At the beginning of the war, the struggle of the peasants acquired the character of mass abandonment of villages and villages and the movement of the population to forests and areas remote from military operations. And although this was still a passive form of struggle, it created serious difficulties for the Napoleonic army. The French troops, having a limited supply of food and fodder, quickly began to experience an acute shortage of them. This immediately affected the deterioration of the general condition of the army: horses began to die, soldiers began to starve, and looting intensified. Even before Vilna, more than 10 thousand horses died.
The actions of peasant partisan detachments were both defensive and offensive in nature. In the area of Vitebsk, Orsha, and Mogilev, detachments of peasant partisans made frequent day and night raids on enemy convoys, destroyed their foragers, and captured French soldiers. Napoleon was forced to remind the chief of staff Berthier more and more often about the large losses in people and strictly ordered the allocation of an increasing number of troops to cover the foragers.
2. Partisan detachment of Denis Davydov
Along with the formation of large peasant partisan detachments and their activities, army partisan detachments played a major role in the war. The first army partisan detachment was created on the initiative of M. B. Barclay de Tolly.
Its commander was General F.F. Vintsengerode, who led the united Kazan Dragoon, Stavropol, Kalmyk and three Cossack regiments, which began to operate in the area of Dukhovshchina.
After the invasion of Napoleonic troops, peasants began to go into the forests, partisan heroes began to create peasant detachments and attack individual French teams. The struggle of the partisan detachments unfolded with particular force after the fall of Smolensk and Moscow. The partisan troops boldly attacked the enemy and captured the French. Kutuzov allocated a detachment to operate behind enemy lines under the leadership of D. Davydov, whose detachment disrupted the enemy’s communication routes, freed prisoners, and inspired the local population to fight the invaders. Following the example of Denisov’s detachment, by October 1812, 36 Cossacks, 7 cavalry, 5 infantry regiments, 3 battalions of rangers and other units, including artillery, were operating.
Residents of the Roslavl district created several mounted and foot partisan detachments, arming them with pikes, sabers and guns. They not only defended their district from the enemy, but also attacked the marauders making their way into the neighboring Elny district. Many partisan detachments operated in Yukhnovsky district. Having organized defense along the Ugra River, they blocked the enemy’s path in Kaluga and provided significant assistance to the army partisans of Denis Davydov’s detachment.
The detachment of Denis Davydov was a real threat for the French. This detachment arose on the initiative of Davydov himself, lieutenant colonel, commander of the Akhtyrsky Hussar Regiment. Together with his hussars, he retreated as part of Bagration’s army to Borodin. A passionate desire to bring even greater benefit in the fight against the invaders prompted D. Davydov to “ask for a separate detachment.” He was strengthened in this intention by Lieutenant M.F. Orlov, who was sent to Smolensk to clarify the fate of the seriously wounded General P.A. Tuchkov, who was captured. After returning from Smolensk, Orlov spoke about the unrest and poor rear protection in the French army.
While driving through the territory occupied by Napoleonic troops, he realized how vulnerable the French food warehouses, guarded by small detachments, were. At the same time, he saw how difficult it was for flying peasant detachments to fight without a coordinated plan of action. According to Orlov, small army detachments sent behind enemy lines could inflict great damage on him and help the actions of the partisans.
D. Davydov asked General P.I. Bagration to allow him to organize a partisan detachment to operate behind enemy lines. For a “test,” Kutuzov allowed Davydov to take 50 hussars and -1280 Cossacks and go to Medynen and Yukhnov. Having received a detachment at his disposal, Davydov began bold raids behind enemy lines. In the very first skirmishes near Tsarev - Zaimishch, Slavkoy, he achieved success: he defeated several French detachments and captured a convoy with ammunition.
In the fall of 1812, partisan detachments surrounded the French army in a continuous mobile ring.
A detachment of Lieutenant Colonel Davydov, reinforced by two Cossack regiments, operated between Smolensk and Gzhatsk. A detachment of General I.S. Dorokhov operated from Gzhatsk to Mozhaisk. Captain A.S. Figner with his flying detachment attacked the French on the road from Mozhaisk to Moscow.
In the area of Mozhaisk and to the south, a detachment of Colonel I.M. Vadbolsky operated as part of the Mariupol Hussar Regiment and 500 Cossacks. Between Borovsk and Moscow, the roads were controlled by a detachment of captain A. N. Seslavin. Colonel N.D. Kudashiv was sent to the Serpukhov road with two Cossack regiments. On the Ryazan road there was a detachment of Colonel I. E. Efremov. From the north, Moscow was blocked by a large detachment of F.F. Wintsengerode, who, separating small detachments from himself to Volokolamsk, on the Yaroslavl and Dmitrov roads, blocked access for Napoleon’s troops to the northern regions of the Moscow region.
The partisan detachments operated in difficult conditions. At first there were many difficulties. Even residents of villages and villages at first treated the partisans with great distrust, often mistaking them for enemy soldiers. Often the hussars had to dress in peasant caftans and grow beards.
The partisan detachments did not stand in one place, they were constantly on the move, and no one except the commander knew in advance when and where the detachment would go. The partisans' actions were sudden and swift. To swoop down out of the blue and quickly hide became the main rule of the partisans.
The detachments attacked individual teams, foragers, transports, took away weapons and distributed them to the peasants, and took dozens and hundreds of prisoners.
Davydov’s detachment on the evening of September 3, 1812 went to Tsarev-Zamishch. Not reaching 6 versts to the village, Davydov sent reconnaissance there, which established that there was a large French convoy with shells, guarded by 250 horsemen. The detachment at the edge of the forest was discovered by French foragers, who rushed to Tsarevo-Zamishche to warn their own. But Davydov did not let them do this. The detachment rushed in pursuit of the foragers and almost burst into the village together with them. The convoy and its guards were taken by surprise, and an attempt by a small group of French to resist was quickly suppressed. 130 soldiers, 2 officers, 10 carts with food and fodder ended up in the hands of the partisans.
3. Denis Davydov as a poet
Denis Davydov was a wonderful romantic poet. He belonged to the genre of romanticism.
It should be noted that almost always in human history, a nation that has been subjected to aggression creates a powerful layer of patriotic literature. This was the case, for example, during the Mongol-Tatar invasion of Rus'. And only some time later, having recovered from the blow, having overcome pain and hatred, thinkers and poets think about all the horrors of the war for both sides, about its cruelty and senselessness. This is very clearly reflected in the poems of Denis Davydov.
In my opinion, Davydov’s poem is one of the outbursts of patriotic militancy caused by the invasion of the enemy.
What did this unshakable strength of the Russians consist of?
This strength was made up of patriotism not in words, but in deeds of the best people from the nobility, poets and simply the Russian people.
This strength consisted of the heroism of the soldiers and best officers of the Russian army.
This invincible force was formed from the heroism and patriotism of Muscovites who leave their hometown, no matter how sorry they are to leave their property to destruction.
The invincible strength of the Russians consisted of the actions of partisan detachments. This is Denisov’s detachment, where the most needed person is Tikhon Shcherbaty, the people’s avenger. Partisan detachments destroyed Napoleonic army piece by piece.
So, Denis Davydov in his works depicts the war of 1812 as a people’s war, a Patriotic War, when the entire people rose to defend the Motherland. And the poet did this with enormous artistic power, creating a grandiose poem - an epic that has no equal in the world.
The work of Denis Davydov can be illustrated as follows:
Who could cheer you up so much, my friend?
You can hardly speak from laughter.
What joys delight your mind, Or do they lend you money without a bill?
Or a happy waist has come to you
And did the pair of trantels take the endurance test?
What happened to you that you don’t answer?
Ay! give me a rest, you know nothing!
I'm really beside myself, I almost went crazy:
Today I found Petersburg completely different!
I thought that the whole world had completely changed:
Imagine - with debt<арышки>n paid;
There are no more pedants and fools to be seen,
And even wiser<агряжск>oh, S<вистун>ov!
There is no courage in the unfortunate rhymers of old,
And our dear Marin does not stain papers,
And, deepening into the service, he works with his head:
How, when starting a platoon, shout at the right time: stop!
But what I was more delighted by was:
Co.<пь>Ev, who pretended to be Lycurgus,
For our happiness he wrote laws for us,
Suddenly, fortunately for us, he stopped writing them.
A happy change has appeared in everything,
Theft, robbery, treason have disappeared,
No more complaints or grievances are visible,
Well, in a word, the city took on a completely disgusting appearance.
Nature gave beauty to the ugly,
And L himself<ава>did he stop looking askance at nature,
B<агратио>became an inch shorter on the nose,
I D<иб>I frightened people with my beauty,
Yes, I, who myself, from the beginning of my century,
It was a stretch to bear the name of a person,
I look, I’m happy, I don’t recognize myself:
Where the beauty comes from, where the growth comes from - I look;
Every word is bon mot, every look is passion,
I’m amazed how I manage to change my intrigues!
Suddenly, oh the wrath of heaven! suddenly fate struck me:
Among the blissful days Andryushka woke up,
And everything I saw, what I had so much fun with -
I saw everything in a dream, and lost everything in the dream.
In a smoky field, on a bivouac
By the blazing fires
In the beneficial arak
I see the savior of people.
Gather in a circle
Orthodox is all to blame!
Give me the golden tub,
Where fun lives!
Pour out vast cups
In the noise of joyful speeches,
How our ancestors drank
Among spears and swords.
Burtsev, you are a hussar of hussars!
You're on a crazy horse
The cruelest of frenzy
And a rider in war!
Let's hit cup and cup together!
Today it’s still too late to drink;
Tomorrow the trumpets will sound,
Tomorrow there will be thunder.
Let's drink and swear
That we indulge in a curse,
If we ever
Let's give way, turn pale,
Let's pity our breasts
And in misfortune we become timid;
If we ever give
Left side on the flank,
Or we'll rein in the horse,
Or a cute little cheat
Let's give our hearts for free!
Let it not be with a saber strike
My life will be cut short!
Let me be a general
How many I have seen!
Let among the bloody battles
I will be pale, fearful,
And in the meeting of heroes
Sharp, brave, talkative!
Let my mustache, the beauty of nature,
Black-brown, in curls,
Will be cut off in youth
And it will disappear like dust!
Let fortune be for vexation,
To multiply all troubles,
He will give me a rank for shift parades
And "Georgia" for the advice!
Let... But chu! This is not the time to walk!
To the horses, brother, and your foot in the stirrup,
Saber out - and cut!
Here is another feast God gives us,
And noisier and more fun...
Come on, put the shako on one side,
And - hurray! Happy day!
V. A. Zhukovsky
Zhukovsky, dear friend! Debt is rewarded by payment:
I read the poems you dedicated to me;
Now read mine, you are smoked in the bivouac
And sprinkled with wine!
It's been a long time since I chatted with either the muse or you,
Did I care about my feet?..
.........................................
But even in the thunderstorms of war, still on the battlefield,
When the Russian camp went out,
I greeted you with a huge glass
An impudent partisan wandering in the steppes!
Conclusion
It was not by chance that the War of 1812 received the name Patriotic War. The popular character of this war was most clearly manifested in the partisan movement, which played a strategic role in the victory of Russia. Responding to accusations of “war not according to the rules,” Kutuzov said that these were the feelings of the people. Responding to a letter from Marshal Bertha, he wrote on October 8, 1818: “It is difficult to stop a people embittered by everything they have seen; a people who for so many years have not known war on their territory; a people ready to sacrifice themselves for their Motherland... ". Activities aimed at attracting the masses to active participation in the war were based on the interests of Russia, correctly reflected the objective conditions of the war and took into account the broad opportunities that emerged in the national liberation war.
During the preparation for the counteroffensive, the combined forces of the army, militia and partisans constrained the actions of Napoleonic troops, inflicted damage on enemy personnel, and destroyed military property. The Smolenskaya-10 road, which remained the only guarded postal route leading from Moscow to the west, was constantly subject to partisan raids. They intercepted French correspondence, especially valuable ones were delivered to the main apartment of the Russian army.
The partisan actions of the peasants were highly appreciated by the Russian command. “The peasants,” wrote Kutuzov, “from the villages adjacent to the theater of war inflict the greatest harm on the enemy... They kill the enemies in large numbers, and deliver those captured to the army.” The peasants of the Kaluga province alone killed and captured more than 6 thousand French.
And yet, one of the most heroic actions of 1812 remains the feat of Denis Davydov and his squad.
Bibliography
1. Zhilin P. A. The death of Napoleonic army in Russia. M., 1974. History of France, vol. 2. M., 2001.-687p.
2. History of Russia 1861-1917, ed. V. G. Tyukavkina, Moscow: INFRA, 2002.-569 p.
3. Orlik O. V. Thunderstorm of the twelfth year.... M.: INFRA, 2003.-429 p.
4. Platonov S.F. Textbook of Russian history for secondary school M., 2004.-735p.
5. Reader on the History of Russia 1861-1917, ed. V. G. Tyukavkina - Moscow: DROFA, 2000.-644 p.