Major General Alexander Vladimirov answers questions about military reform (section closed)

Alexander Ivanovich Vladimirov - reserve major general, vice-president of the College of Military Experts of Russia, member of the National Strategy Council, candidate of political sciences.

Born April 17, 1945. Graduated from the Moscow Suvorov Military School, Moscow Higher Combined Arms Command School (1966), Military Academy named after. M.V. Frunze, Military Academy of the General Staff of the USSR Armed Forces.

He served in the Far East, in the Group of Soviet Forces in Germany, in Belarus, in Vietnam. Recipient of 20 state awards.

He took part in the development of the “Fundamentals of the Military Doctrine of the Russian Federation”, the laws of the Russian Federation “On Defense”, “On Security”, “On the Status of Military Personnel” and other legislative acts.

21.03.2012 Nakhimov School
Good afternoon. Alexander Vladimirovich. We are not a military family, my son is growing up, I want to send him to the Nakhimov School. I am making every effort to be smart, athletic, in general, everything that a real Nakhimovite should be. I want him to begin the life of a naval officer. But they don’t take civilians. What should we do then? Thanks in advance. Author of the question: Safiulina Elena Yurievna

27.06.2009 Reform
What will operational commands be like and their features in relation to the Navy. Author of the question: Saik A.P.

25.05.2009 Training after 5 years of institute
Dear Alexander Vladimirov! Answer this question. Is it possible to study at naval institutes (or any other) if you have previously received a higher education? If yes, in which institutions and what is required for this.
Thank you in advance. Posted by: Vladimir

24.05.2009 Hydrography
Are we needed (who, why, how, where, where) if not, then why? Posted by: Sasha

29.04.2009 regarding the arrival of girls
Hello, Alexander Vladimirovich!
This year I heard that girls can apply to you! This is true?!
If this is so, then what is needed for this?!
I live in Vladivostok, I study at college, at VGUES. For a marketer. I'm getting my diploma this year! and now I have a great desire to join you!!!
please tell me how... Author of the question: Julia

25.04.2009 about military pensioners
Why did they forget about military pensioners during the military reform? I, senior midshipman of the Northern Fleet, am currently receiving a pension in the amount of 5,600 rubles in my hands - and already taking into account the “northern interest”. Perhaps the Ministry of Defense does not know that not all pensioners of the Armed Forces are colonels? Author of the question: Viktor Sushkov

22.04.2009 Distribution
Dear Alexander Ivanovich!
This year, 2009, my son is finishing his internship in surgery at the Military Medical Academy named after. S.M.Kirova (St. Petersburg), lieutenant of medical service. I would like to ask you: will he be employed in the military (he has a naval faculty)? Since there are rumors that military doctors will be removed from the staff and transferred to the reserve from the RF Armed Forces without signing a contract with them.
With respect, reserve major, participant in combat operations in the DRA, Vasily Nikolaevich Gubin. Author of the question: Gubin Vasily Nikolaevich

18.04.2009 Personal
Dear Alexander Vladimirovich, I am writing to you with a personal request. In the 90s, my husband and I served in the West Group under the command of Nikolai Sidorov. Unfortunately we lost contact with him. We know that some time ago he served as Commander of the Coastal Forces of the Pacific Fleet. We really ask, we just beg you, to help us contact him. At one time we were very friendly and retained the best memories of him. Please pass on our address: Vyborg, Leningrad region Leningradskoe highway, building 12, sq.2
E-mail: K [email protected]
[email protected]
Mobile phone: 8 921 64 99882
Sincerely
Kosyak Elena Alekseevna
Author of the question: Kosyak Elena

17.04.2009 Reform
Hello Alexander Vasilievich.
I would like to ask this: does the Minister of Defense of the Russian Federation have any relation to the management of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation or is it simply or “looking” from the Supreme Commander-in-Chief? And if so, what kind of service experience (commanding units, formations, associations.....) does Syurdyukov have, what academies did he graduate from?
A lieutenant platoon commander was trained for four years at a military school (under Catherine the Great, a nobleman was enrolled in the service even before birth and he was born with the experience of a ready-made platoon commander - maybe we can introduce this in the reform process)), and how much did they train the Ministry of Defense and where? I am a captain of the 2nd rank of the reserves, but I wouldn’t be able to sell furniture - even if I really wanted to - I don’t have enough education and experience, and here on the scale of the Armed Forces one-sixth of the landmass - so it begs the question - do these Armed Forces of the Russian Federation exist, which have been reforming for fifteen years now? ?Or maybe they have already been reformed to the point of complete disappearance, and they are fooling us and cheating us out of taxes?
With respect, captain 2nd rank reserve Chukhontsev Sergey Vasilievich. Author of the question: Sergey Vasilievich

03.04.2009 Responsibility for reformation
Alexander Ivanovich, hello!
There have been reports in the press about the possible removal of Mr. Serdyukov from the post of Minister of Defense of the Russian Federation. The reason is obvious – overzealousness in “reformism”. It is clear that ambiguity could not exist forever, in which the President declares one thing about reform, and the “would-be reformers” do who knows what in troubled waters. It would be good if this “breaking wood” stops, but again, most likely, no one will answer for their outrages. At the same time, reform of the Army is needed, and real reform.
Theoretically, it is clear that the reform should have specific and well-known authors, who should bear responsibility for its outcome. But what, in your opinion, is NECESSARY AND SUFFICIENT to be done in practice so that this responsibility this time is real, tangible, i.e. one that would guarantee a competent, professional, comprehensive, patriotic approach to the development and implementation of such a necessary reform for the country’s Armed Forces?
Thank you.
2.04.09
Author of the question: Captain 2nd rank reserve Shevchenko V.A.

28.03.2009 Economic aspect
Hello, Alexander Ivanovich.

In general, it is clear that defense spending is classified information.
But, if possible, please clarify whether there are “in nature” serious (or at least not very) calculations of the cost of this or that option for reforming the RF Armed Forces, if, of course, there are “in nature” the options for carrying out the reform.

Thanks in advance,
Vymorkov I.F., captain 2nd rank reserve. Author of the question: Vymorkov I.F.

27.03.2009 mercenaries
Are mercenaries really better than an armed people (meaning a conscript army) and isn’t this a danger for the citizens themselves and the state? Can civic duty be a profession? Author of the question: Sergey Vasilievich

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Major General Alexander Vladimirov: ENOUGH “NIGHTMARE” THE ARMY! The vice-president of the College of Military Experts answers questions from the newspaper “Zavtra”

"TOMORROW". Alexander Ivanovich, we have repeatedly heard the phrase “father of Soviet military reform” addressed to you. This is true?

Alexander Vladimirov. It is impossible to say that I am the “father” of military reform, since there was no reform. Therefore, on the one hand, since nothing was born, then there cannot be a “father,” however, the “fathers” of the destruction of the Soviet Union and its army are absolutely known.

On the other hand, this is still true, because I was indeed the first who, in 1986, wrote a large work on military reform, “Reflections of a Combined Arms Commander,” and being the commander of the 35th Motorized Rifle Division of the Group of Soviet Forces in Germany, I proposed the main directions for reform of the Armed Forces USSR forces.

In my opinion, the provisions of this work are as relevant today as they were twenty years ago.

This work, despite the objections of the USSR Minister of Defense, Marshal of the Soviet Union Dmitry Yazov, was published in 1988 in the magazine "Military Thought" No. 10.

It caused a whole discussion in the army and society for two years, close attention from the authorities to my personality, then my secondment “to improve my spirit” to Vietnam, and subsequent dismissal “for health reasons.” Nobody did anything, and it all ended in the “democratic collapse” of the nation.

It must be said that later I tried to initiate military reform from greater heights than the 28th Combined Arms Army of the BVI. First, from the heights of the USSR Assistant Minister of Defense for Military Reform, this after the 1991 putsch, and then from the heights of the Administration of the President of the Russian Federation, and... - all to no avail, since the then highest authorities simply did not want any reforms. As a result, today we have what we have.

In general, if I talk about myself, I graduated from the Moscow Suvorov Military School, the Moscow Higher Combined Arms Command School, the M.V. Frunze Military Academy, the Military Academy of the General Staff, and all this with honors or a medal. I had the honor of commanding: a motorized rifle platoon for four years - 30 soldiers; motorized rifle company for two years - 100 people; motorized rifle battalion 3 years - 500 people; as a separate part of the fortified area for 2 years - 800 people, as a motorized rifle regiment for 2 years - 2200 people; headquarters of a motorized rifle division for 3 years - 6,000 people (all this in the Far East); 35th Motorized Rifle Division in the GSVG 4 years - 15,000 people; the headquarters of the 28th Combined Arms Army in Belarus for 4 years - almost 50,000 people; for one year he commanded a group of troops not ours in an even more not our country; worked as an assistant to the USSR Minister of Defense, Air Marshal Yevgeny Ivanovich Shaposhnikov, on military reform.

Unfortunately, all these glorious and mighty regiments, divisions and armies no longer exist, just as the Armed Forces of the great Soviet Union and the great victorious Soviet military style no longer exist.

"TOMORROW". They say that you were almost an adviser to Yeltsin, or are these rumors?

A.V. This is true. I headed the Department of Problems of the Armed Forces and the Military-Industrial Complex in the Analytical Directorate of the Administration of the President of Russia and for several years was a member of its expert council, and in this capacity participated in the development of almost all doctrinal documents in the field of defense and national security of the Russian Federation from 1991 to 2001 .

"TOMORROW". Alexander Ivanovich, today the number one topic in society and especially in the Armed Forces is rumors about new initiatives by Defense Minister Anatoly Serdyukov for a radical reform of the Russian army - the reduction of two hundred thousand officers, the liquidation of the institution of midshipmen and warrant officers, the sale of army property, corruption in the Ministry of Defense and so on. ...What's happening to the army?

A.V. Let me note that the questions that concern Russian society are absolutely legitimate; they also concern us, professionals, since we know better how another unsuccessful military reform could end for Russia.

But first let me say a few words about the previous "reforms".

I remember 1991, when various kinds of “democrats - human rights activists”, who themselves had never served and had never done anything good for the nation with their own hands, attacked the army with the goal of destroying it, the authorities condoned them, and the army barely survived .

Their activities ended with the collapse of all the country's security forces, the expulsion of professionals from the army and the victory of the “loyal” ones, and each new composition of the Ministry of Defense began its own “army reform” and only worsened the general state of affairs. By the way, Defense Minister Sergei Borisovich Ivanov and his Chief of the General Staff officially declared the military reform in Russia happily and successfully completed. And the Minister of Defense Serdyukov himself stated a year ago that there would be no more “experiments” on the army and that the military reform was completed, now the army needs to be rearmed and given combat training.

What suddenly happened that made the minister suddenly turn around one hundred and eighty degrees?

In fact, it is clear to any professional that military reform is certainly necessary. And there are several obvious reasons and grounds for it.

Firstly. The Russian army has been deteriorating for twenty years, each successive defense minister has unsuccessfully reformed it, and today the combat ability of the army is illusory, which Russia cannot afford.

Therefore, today there is the will of the state authorities to carry out military reform.

Secondly. Our victorious five-day war in Ossetia showed that only soldiers, sergeants, company and battalion commanders who actually won this war can fight normally, that is, successfully.

All control bodies above the brigade, including the 58th Army, the District Headquarters and, especially the General Staff, were in complete failure. In addition, it turned out that in the field of weapons we had nothing to fight with, and all we had was equipment and weapons at the level of the Second World War.

Third. Finally, Russia has money for military reform.

Fourthly. There is still a “security window” of 5-7 years, when no one will dare to attack us yet, since our strategic nuclear potential will still be powerful. It is during this period that we are obliged to make our army modern, prestigious and invincible.

What if we don’t make it in time?

Then the “pipe” is complete, we will be doomed to geostrategic defeat and will be a powerless colony of our geopolitical opponents, since in our world only and exclusively real armed force matters.

The Russian Army today is the only, real and most powerful human rights organization in the country, which, by the very fact of its existence and power, constantly, day and night, ensures the right of every Russian citizen to existence, peace and a dignified life, ensures the state’s right to national security and guarantees its sovereign existence and respect in the world.

Only the army produces its main product “security”, without which the nation cannot exist and society must pay for this product.

The Russian army will be powerful and successful, and the great Russia will be powerful, successful and historically eternal.

It is with this hope in the army that the concern of Russian society with the proposed reforms is connected.

"TOMORROW". Alexander Ivanovich, what is the point of replacing divisions with brigades? What is a brigade anyway? How will it differ from the division? Where is its place in modern combat?

A.V. I would answer this question somewhat more broadly, since I think it is important to talk not only about the brigade, but also about the proposed new three-tier system of military command, the slogan about “units of constant combat readiness,” a radical reduction in the officer corps and the strategic reserves of the Armed Forces..

I believe that the transition from a four-tier command system (regiment-division-army-district) to a three-tier system (brigade-group of troops-district) is in no way justified and, on the whole, an erroneous decision.

The transition to a three-tier military command and control system will not improve the controllability of troops, but will significantly reduce their combat capability, destroy professional motivation for military service and violate the centuries-old traditions of Russian military development.

The unjustification of these decisions lies in several serious professional issues, the essence of which, in our opinion, is not understood by those who propose these very innovations.

Firstly, no one explained to us why a brigade is better than a division and what composition does the brigade mean? Because the US brigade and the brigade in the Russian army are completely different in tasks, structure and meaning.

For example, in the US Army, with which we are trying to copy this experience, divisions exist and are the main combat tactical operational units, from which brigades are staffed for each specific battle in each specific war.

By the way, when the “civilian” US Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld wanted to destroy the divisions as such and leave only mobile brigades in the troops, well, just like we have today, he was simply and quietly “left”, since they considered that various kinds of “Iraqs” America still has a long way to go, and for victorious wars it is divisions, not Rumsfelds, that are needed.

Each U.S. Army division has three brigade headquarters that are fully staffed and ready to command troops in combat. The brigade is commanded by a brigade (one-star) general. When receiving a combat mission, the division commander (two-star general) determines which brigade and with what combat strength will carry out the assigned combat mission. Moreover, the division itself consists of a set of several (up to one and a half dozen) independent tactical combat units (motorized infantry and tank battalions, artillery and air defense divisions, reconnaissance, engineering and other battalions and military logistics units, and so on), each of which is an independent part with their own banner and they are usually commanded by colonels.

All brigades in the US Army are formed from a selection of these battalions, according to a specific combat mission for the duration of a specific combat operation. And when the brigade is “assembled” for the duration of the battle from ready-made elements, then the command has in its hands an extremely mobile combat organization, since everything that it needs to be transported for the battle: fuel, ammunition, food, and so on, is all given to it from the division’s warehouses and groups. Such a brigade itself practically does not have its own military personnel.

Our brigade in its proposed form today is simply an ugly overgrown regiment, in which there will be many battalions, many soldiers and the same bloated military rear. Therefore, the brigade in the form in which we are trying to make it will not be any more mobile or more combat-ready than an existing regiment of normal strength, say, in wartime. It will be formed as an enlarged regiment, and hence its mobility and combat qualities will not be any better.

It seems that in the Ministry of Defense simply no one has heard of Serdyukov’s model, that there is a military economy in the troops, and they don’t know what to do with it.

But on the other hand, the rear of the Armed Forces is already successfully transforming into various kinds of holdings, for example, “Oboronservis”, which generally looks like a new outright feeding trough for the rear people who are hastily removing their shoulder straps, and, together with the trillion-dollar property of the army, is being corporatized. Despite the fact that no one gives a damn about the troops and labor collectives, that is, those who actually serve, fight and work.

The total value of assets that can be transferred to the balance sheet of Oboronservice OJSC, according to representatives of the Ministry of Defense, is a “military secret”, and they will be assessed not at market value, but at book value, but, for example, in April of this year, the Ministry of Defense held the first auction for the sale of military property and earned 3 billion 745 million rubles, and the fate of this money is unknown to the public.

Secondly, the very fact that we are planning not to make the position of brigade commander a general position destroys the professional motivation of combined arms officers for career growth. There is simply no point in serving as a senior officer.

After all, if there are no divisions (divisional generals), and brigades will be commanded by colonels, then where do we get generals from? At the same time, it does not occur to any of the reformers to think about the fact that if we are destroying the division level, then we are thereby destroying the link that trains command personnel at the operational level; If our armies are destroyed, then the link capable of developing senior command personnel at the strategic level is destroyed. Where will trained military leaders come from in the army without going through all these basic command levels (regiment-division-army-district), each of which is a mandatory stage in the professional maturation and training of the country's senior officers.

According to Serdyukov’s reform, we will have generals only at the level of troop grouping, that is, only at the third “level” of the military organization being created. But I wonder how the generals for this unit will be raised? It turns out that from the brigade level, “foremen” - colonels - immediately step up to the level of “commanders”, lieutenant generals?

What Serdyukov and his closest advisers are saying is that the senior command staff of the Armed Forces is not taken from anywhere, is not trained, is not cultivated, but literally appears out of thin air at the end of an unknown service and for an unknown merit. However, if you examine the careers of these advisers and secretaries, this is exactly how a layer of these “military leaders” was formed, who had never seen a living soldier, who had never commanded anything, “asphalt” commanders.

In essence, this is a criminal and illogical sequence. And we already went through it in the early forties of the last century, when, after repressions in the army, former commanders of regiments and squadrons were appointed army commanders. It all ended in the drama of 1941.

We believe that the professional degradation of the Russian army began from the moment when negative personnel selection began, that is, when not honored professionals, but loyal mediocrities, who grew up not from responsible commanders of single commanders, but from irresponsible guarantors, began to be appointed to the highest positions in the Armed Forces and assistants. Probably, it was precisely these military leaders who proposed or agreed to such a reform.

Thirdly, the planned destruction of regiments, divisions and armies, which have proven their effectiveness over the centuries, is due to the fact that our top state and military leadership does not understand the specifics of Russia, its army and military service.

In Russia, a regiment was initially formed as a regimental family of officers, soldiers, military groups and garrisons, and our historical regimental and divisional combat traditions go back hundreds and hundreds of years.

At the same time, any brigades formed from individual battalions that have no kinship and traditions in history immediately destroy any historical tradition and continuity of the Russian army as a whole. This invariably leads to the loss of historical military traditions, loss of spirit, loss of self-awareness, pride, patriotism, and so on, and, ultimately, to defeat in the war.

In addition, in order to “be in time for war,” for example, in the Far East, troops must already be there, and not delivered there with the outbreak of hostilities; this is a strategic axiom.

"TOMORROW". So, should two hundred generals be fired, as Serdyukov plans, or not?

A.V. The answer may not be simple.

First of all, you need to understand that the general is not a character for jokes, not a position or a whipping boy, and not a target for human rights activists, and not a reserve for layoffs.

Generals are the highest command staff of the army. Without them, the Armed Forces cannot exist. Without generals, not a single war was fought or won, and the more professional the generals were, the less bloodshed the victory was.

A General of the Russian Armed Forces is a person who initially chose to serve his Fatherland in the military field as his destiny; took the Military Oath; received special vocational education; proved his own professionalism, that is, his ability to effectively manage large masses of people, equipment and funds; He made a career in the army through long and blameless service, which earned him this high military rank.

Moreover, I know from myself: to become a general, you have to “pull the strap” all your life, proving to yourself and others that you are the best. In this tough competition of the worthy, not everyone wins - only a few and, as a rule, the best ones become generals.

A general is a person who, having sole command, is obliged to personally make decisions and give orders to his subordinates. Including those whose implementation is associated with the inevitability of their death, and demand their implementation in the name of completing the assigned task, in any situation. Therefore, a general is a person who knows how to organize and manage, that is, a highly qualified manager, which was gradually acquired by many years of experience in the practical leadership of military teams, from several dozen to many tens and hundreds of thousands of people subordinate to him.

A general is a person with a specific task, every day, in addition to issues of combat readiness and combat training, he resolves issues of life support for his troops. From my own experience I know that resolving issues of economic and business plans take up to 80% of the time of commanders at all levels, since personnel must be accommodated, warmed, fed three times a day in any conditions, treated, entertained, and so on, which in the current market era is not easy.

All of the above is not an exhaustive list of general (officer) merits, but basic qualities, without which there cannot be a “general”.

We must understand well that good generals are only made from officers. This means that the entire system of national military professional education, from the Suvorov Military School to the General Staff Academy, and the very system of military service for Russian officers must educate and select them in such a way that the best generals are produced from the best officers.

Establishing the number of generals as a percentage of the number of soldiers or officers, relying on some foreign experience, is complete incompetence, nonsense and sabotage.

The normal number of generals depends only on:

On the tasks of the army, and therefore on its structure and the number of full-time general positions in it;

On the scale and expediency of military representative functions and pedagogical tasks.

For example, it is impossible, solely for the sake of economy, to make the position of the head of the Suvorov military school not a general position (now it is a colonel), since for hundreds of Suvorov boys, the head of the school is Dad: a clear example of a successful, well-deserved and glorious military fate, something to strive for .

It is necessary to save on generals wherever possible, including the Ministry of Internal Affairs, the Ministry of Emergency Situations, the Prosecutor's Office, Customs, Justice and so on, but not in the army, that is, not in the troops, since their total service load is not comparable.

So whether we have a lot of generals or not enough of them, we need to look carefully and make decisions thoughtfully. The point is not how many generals we have, but what merit they receive their titles for and, most importantly, how professionally they are trained?

"TOMORROW". What kind of structure is this - “operational command”, which controls the brigades? Where did it come from and most importantly, what is its meaning?

A.V. The “operational command” is practically the same combined arms army, but it has neither continuity nor its own troops, and is formed to carry out specific operational tasks in any area of ​​​​operation.

Such commands have long been created in the United States. And using their example it’s easy to explain everything. These are the same headquarters free of troops, but at the level of a specific theater of military operations. The leadership of the American armed forces makes a political decision on the creation of the next command in a particular theater of operations. Based on this decision, a headquarters is formed, equipped with all organizational means and begins to work out the use of troops located in these regions on maps and with the help of special computer programs. These programs already contain the composition of the group down to the unit, that is, up to the soldier, officer, warrant officer, cartridge, uniform, weapon, set of ammunition, and so on. And in peacetime, this command has nothing at all except computers, powers and a combat mission.

But, when a political decision is made to deploy a new group in a specific region, then, according to the schedule for implementing the political decision and the war plan, the United States of America strategic transportation means by air and sea are sent there, that is, to the selected area, combat units fully ready for battle , and this command can only accept them into its control. For example, as was done in Iraq or Afghanistan.

Most often, these groups are formed not only from units of the regular army, but also from contingents of the National Guard and the Organized Reserve, which are independent and full-fledged components (components) of the US national armed forces.

"TOMORROW". How will this happen for us?

A.V. Nobody knows how it will be for us. Since there are no documents yet that somehow define the activities of such structures. And it turns out completely absurd. The operational command is formed unclearly how, unclearly from whom, unclearly when and for how long. At the same time, it is immediately equipped with a set of brigades that are stationed in this region, and at the same time it must be ready to receive brigades from other regions, which, again, will then somehow and somehow have to be transferred to the theater of military operations. And what will happen to this structure next, where it will develop, what kind of connection it will form - no one can explain or understand.

At the same time, none of the reformers comes up with the simplest thought: the United States needs these commands because its army has been fighting wars exclusively far from its territory, on other continents, for the last hundred years. We, unlike the US Army, in the next quarter century will fight not in Africa, not in America, not in Southeast Asia, but on our own territory. And therefore we are obliged to have stationary regional groupings of troops that are maximally organizationally and technically adapted to war in these specific regions. And these groups have long been created in the form of military districts, but now it is they who are subject to vague reconstruction.

"TOMORROW". What can you say about “units of constant combat readiness”?

A.V. The transition of the country's military organization exclusively to “units of constant combat readiness,” that is, units capable of starting and conducting combat operations “immediately upon a signal,” will lead to the fact that the state will be doomed to start and end the war with peacetime troops. From the point of view of strategy and theory of war, this is either stupidity or a criminal strategic miscalculation.

A peacetime army, having completed the task of the initial period of the war: to ensure the transition of the country to a wartime regime and the mobilization of the wartime army, that is, the army that should victoriously end the war, as a rule, perishes. The deployment of a wartime army is possible only on the basis of units and bases of reduced strength, which requires the presence of a ready reserve of the officer corps.

In other words, a victorious wartime army is formed from the masses, that is, from the nation. But it is precisely this strategic possibility (and necessity) that is practically excluded by the declared decision to have only permanently ready units in the Armed Forces, and to destroy all reduced-strength units.

Thus, our base for mobilization training and the base for mobilization deployment of the wartime army are being destroyed, that is, we are preparing in advance to be unable to wage a war of any size larger than the counter-terrorism operation in Chechnya or a local one, like the last war with Georgia.

Unlike the US Army, our Army currently does not have an Organized Reserve or a National Guard that is part of the military and constitutes a strategic reserve.

In the United States, each branch of the armed forces has its own Organized Reserve, consisting of regular units and subunits. This reserve functions in peacetime as regular units (training bases) for the training and retraining of its main personnel, that is, pilots, sailors, and so on.

What does it mean? This means that officers and specialists of the armed forces leave for civilian life, but once a year, under an agreement with the army, they train for a month as part of their reserve units and units of the National Guard, formed into squadrons, battalions, brigades, ships, or squadrons in the navy, etc. They work there, and the state pays them for this time, and if a political decision is made, they go to war in entire formations, as was the case quite recently in Iraq, where more than a hundred thousand additional reservists were called up.

The state specifically pays these military personnel and reserve officers for their ongoing training for combat. In wartime, these units form part of troop groups and fight as regular army formations. Today, about 200 thousand organized reservists and national guardsmen participate in US wars.

The lack of trained strategic reserves of the armed forces, with the virtual absence of their mobilization component and means of strategic inter-theater maneuver in forces and means, excludes the possibility for Russia to wage a successful war of any scale and level, even on its own territory.

It is extremely important that our highest authorities understand that the Russian army and the US army cannot be identical in structure, since they are intended to solve completely different strategic problems.

America will always wage an aggressive war on foreign territories using its expeditionary armed forces, while ensuring the security of its national territory with two oceans, friendly neighbors and its army. This is where all these missile defense areas in Japan and Europe and the “Gulf War” come from. America cannot and will not live any other way.

We have a different historical and military destiny: we will fight seriously only on our own territory, with huge empty unprotected spaces and borders, in an always hostile environment.

Therefore, our task is to provide ready groups of troops in theaters of war within our borders, and to ensure the strategic vulnerability of the US national territory.

"TOMORROW". So, maybe it makes sense to create such an Organized Reserve?

A.V. Certainly. You see, such an idea appeared in your mind almost immediately, but, unfortunately, we have been proposing to do this for 15 years already, and to all defense ministers, but all to no avail, since it seems that there are no longer people left in the General Staff and the Ministry of Defense who can understand , what are we talking about?

Today there is a unique opportunity to create an Organized Reserve of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation, to use all 300 thousand redundant officers and warrant officers for this, and the state has no right not to use this opportunity.

"TOMORROW". You anticipated the next question. What can you say about the destruction of the institution of warrant officers?

A.V. This is criminal stupidity! Because by destroying one institution of junior commanders, nothing can replace it, and it is junior commanders who are the backbone of the army.

The destruction of the institution of warrant officers is not the destruction of “characters in jokes,” but the destruction of the main layer of technical specialists who are capable, and in war are destined, to occupy officer positions.

It is impossible to create a modern army without qualified specialists.

By the way, in the US Army there is such a similar institution, and it is called warrant officers, let’s translate this as “sub-officers”.

"TOMORROW". But Serdyukov and his reformers say that they want to make them sergeants and sergeants for the same money.

A.V. There is no harm in wanting to, but doing it in practice quickly and efficiently is impossible.

Replacing warrant officers with contract sergeants is impossible simply because “contract officers” capable of replacing warrant officers in terms of their level of training and education practically do not exist in the troops, and almost none of the warrant officers serving today would want to worsen their social status. We will get it “as always” again. We will very soon lose warrant officers and midshipmen, but we will never create a “professional sergeant corps”.

"TOMORROW". Perhaps now is the time to ask a question about military professional education. There is information that 65 military schools are being cut, only a few military academies will remain and some training centers will appear, formed on a territorial basis, and so on, in general, the most incredible rumors.

A.V. Let me talk not about the number of reduced or relocated higher educational institutions, but about the essence of the reform of military professional education itself.

I believe that military professional education is the most important link in military reform, which, if implemented correctly, can give the Russian army a new victorious quality.

This reform is conceived broadly and revolutionary, and I am well aware of all the objections to it: mainly, these are protests against the removal of academies from cities - in particular, from Moscow - and the possibility of losing “military scientific schools”.

Now I will say something “seditious”. I responsibly tell you that in our army we have always had brilliantly educated officers and generals, but there was no high-quality professional military education. Now is not the time to argue about this, believe me as an excellent student of all the best military schools and academies of the Soviet Army.

Today the situation is many times worse than in Soviet times, since the world and military affairs have changed, and our national military thought is dead: Soviet military thought is over, and there is simply no Russian military thought.

Of course, we still have applied military scientific schools: for example, in aviation, among engineers, chemists and rocket scientists, and so on - but today even they should not have a departmental-specific, but a national affiliation and other, federal scales.

In addition, the main funds of military schools are so old that they do not meet any modern requirements for the normal study and life of their students, everything is simply rotten. We need a new infrastructure for professional military education.

I believe that schools and academies should be removed from big cities, especially Moscow, since today all megacities are a breeding ground for moral infection. But schools and academies must be moved gradually, and not to an open field, but to new modern infrastructure. This is a necessary matter, but not a quick one, which everyone should understand.

Of course, we are obliged to create excellent conditions for the life and work of teaching staff in the new locations of schools and training centers.

The planned training centers should provide training and retraining for officers of the armed forces - for example, all branches of the military who conduct combined arms combat on land, and this is the right direction.

It is also important that verticals of military professional education will appear, forming the command staff of the Army. For example, Suvorov schools, higher military schools and military academies will have specific differentiation, which will make it possible to train officers from childhood. This is how the Motherland prepared, for example, me and the Suvorovites of my first post-war generation, raising us from the age of ten in Honor, Valor, Goodness and Beauty.

It is also important here that the Suvorov military schools, fortunately for us, have already been transferred by order of Anatoly Serdyukov to a 7-year training cycle (by the way, not a single “military minister” has done this, despite our constant requests and demands), give their students receive not only high-quality secondary education and cadet education, but also initial professional military training - for example, upon graduation, qualifications as a sergeant-commander of a squad or deputy commander of a motorized rifle platoon. This would allow graduates to immediately enter the second year of the corresponding military school without exams and would form a real military professional corporation of Russian officers.

Of course, this requires different educational standards, different educational officers, a different training base and other requirements for schools, but all this can already be done.

But the most important thing is that we need fundamentally different curricula, plans and approaches to professional military education, and, of course, a developed state ideology of military service and ethics of the army officer corps.

Our highest authorities must understand that officers are an entire state patriotic and professional corporation, and it is impossible to humiliate officers with distrust, inattention and their own militant unprofessionalism, but the authorities do this every day. I just want to remind our government and our society that historically the “humiliated and insulted” were only capable of rebellion, but never won a war.

Why and who needs a humiliated army and officers who can only click their heels and say “that’s right,” but are not capable of fighting? The answer is simple - only to our enemies.

In peacetime, it is necessary to patiently, professionally and lovingly cultivate a national officer corps, because if a war breaks out, and Russia obviously still has one, there will be no officers and generals capable of winning, and there will be nowhere to take them from. Today, no one is involved in this most important matter in Russia.

"TOMORROW". But who is the ideologist of the reform being carried out today?

A.V. I don't have an answer to this question.

In any case, it is impossible to start a reform in the absence of a meaningful and accepted Military Doctrine, which alone provides the sum of the official tasks of the Russian Armed Forces, being the basis for any structural and personnel changes.

Today, in the Ministry of Defense and the General Staff, there is even physically no one to write the Russian Military Doctrine - there are simply no strategic minds, and the General Staff has long been not the “brain of the army”, but something else, which is why everything is done according to the “finger-to-ceiling” principle.

Today, no one really knows anything about these decisions; everyone only refers to some new “promising appearance of the Armed Forces,” although its “prospect” is completely incomprehensible. But the matter may end in failure, for which again no one will bear responsibility, and the authors of the “project” will again be moved - for example, “to save the Olympics in Sochi” or to another place.

Moreover, these decisions and plans, which were made without serious discussion, are not discussed anywhere today. For example, this is not discussed at the Academy of Military Sciences, and the Russian Security Council is generally silent.

Everyone is tormented by rumors and leaks, but the General Staff and the Ministry of Defense are silent, “like fish on ice” - probably because there is nothing to say, and it is impossible to explain what is happening to professionals, and there is no one to do it. As a result, it seems that the authors of the reforms simply do not understand the essence of the words with which they operate, and the army is already in a fever.

I am sure that the President of Russia can hardly imagine what such a reform of the Russian army could lead to, since before our eyes the motivation for military service is negatively changing, its moral state patriotic service core is being destroyed. Without which an army is unnecessary and even dangerous, since such an army has never won anything.

In addition, it seems to me important that the President and Prime Minister understand: the economy and business in Russia can flourish only and exclusively in an atmosphere of security, the basis of which is the country’s powerful army.

"TOMORROW". What can you, Alexander Ivanovich, say about the sale of military property?

A.V. I can only say that it is happening today, it is happening on a large scale and in secret from the public. Since no one is simply telling the truth, all this awakens all sorts of - perhaps false, but terrible - rumors, such as that the main building of the General Staff is being sold to VTB-24 bank, and for this purpose the main departments of the General Staff, operational and mobilization, are practically expelled from their jobs and resettled, which is true, and the Chief of the General Staff does not explain anything even to his officers.

But the worst thing is that the very manner of conducting these sales has a clear flavor of tyranny and corruption, and this naturally unnerves the army public.

Of course, such a massive sale should not be the main business of the Ministry of Defense, since the state has the money, but in fact, this is the only thing A. Serdyukov’s team is effectively doing.

The most alarming thing in this matter is that it is completely unclear why, to whom, how, at what prices and for what property worth trillions of rubles is being sold, what the army and the state benefit from this, and where is this money anyway.

It seems that if we ask for at least a list of the property they sold to the army, then it is likely that we will be faced with the second phase of the criminal privatization of state property. It's scary to think that this could be true.

All this has nothing to do with military reform, and this is already a matter for the Chief Prosecutor’s Office and the Accounts Chamber, and they seem to be waiting for some kind of command, but it is impossible to wait for a new galaxy of oligarchs from the Ministry of Defense to appear.

It’s even strange that there has not yet been a single deputy request on this matter, and numerous statements in the press with information about clearly criminal facts remain unanswered.

It must be said that the blatant silence of this problem reduces the confidence of the Russian public and especially the Russian officer corps in the purity of the thoughts of the highest state power and its state capacity. We hope that now, with the Russian Parliament vested with control functions, anti-corruption work in the Ministry of Defense will begin actively.

"TOMORROW". What do you think about the directive prohibiting the military from any dissemination of information about the progress of military reform?

V.A. This is a mistake made by people who are not confident in their competence and correctness.

In practice, this decision reveals their understanding that they are acting incorrectly and harmfully. But this decision also reveals that its authors consider as their “enemies” all those who criticize their actions in any way. That is, the interests of a group of officials are placed above the state ones. And this can turn into a tragedy for the state, since mistakes are not looked for and corrected, but honest, knowledgeable and courageous people who have the courage to speak openly about problems and shortcomings are looked for and punished, and militant and base dullness wins.

"TOMORROW". So what to do?

A.V. Correct the main mistake that our highest state power constantly makes - army reform is entrusted to the military department itself, and within it - exclusively to amateurs, and is carried out absolutely voluntaristically and uncontrollably.

It was this strategic mistake that did not give Russia the opportunity to create a modern army, and its current continuation could put an end to the army altogether.

The most stupid thing is to engage in structural changes and bare reduction of troops, since the quality of the army depends only and exclusively on the general benevolent and demanding attention to it from the nation and the authorities, on the quality of the officer corps and the corps of junior commanders, as well as the quality of national military thought and technological level of weapons.

The President of Russia, as Supreme Commander-in-Chief, must deal with military reform personally. He is obliged to listen to military professionals, know the opinions of the troops and independent military experts, and make a balanced decision on military reform.

It will not be Anatoly Serdyukov who will be responsible to the nation for the failure of military reform, but the highest state power of the country, that is, Dmitry Medvedev personally and Vladimir Putin personally, and they should know this.

Military reform is necessary, the army is ready for reforms and is waiting for them, since its current situation is terrible. The officers sincerely want to help the Minister of Defense carry out the reform completely and effectively, but they require reason and professionalism in its implementation, respect for themselves, for the traditions of the Russian army and its ethics.

Carrying out a radical military reform without a Military Doctrine, without a plan clear and known to the officer corps, through a massive reduction in the professional base of the army, officers and warrant officers, as well as through the sale of military property, is criminal and will inevitably lead to the collapse of the army and Russia’s loss of the opportunity to develop normally and safely.

All reform measures and all reductions should improve the combat capability of the Russian Armed Forces, and not worsen the living conditions, service and professional activities of the troops and officer corps.

The process of military reform needs to be managed. This means that, among other things, it is necessary to have feedback from the state and the troops. In other words, it is necessary to create an analogue of the People's Control Committee, which would be authorized to respond to information about the progress of reforms and the fight against corruption directly from military units and production teams. Without engaging the creative potential of the Russian public and its control over the progress of reforms, we risk being left, literally, with nothing.

If everything is left as it is, then huge amounts of money will be wasted, but Russia will not receive a new army of the highest quality, and our defeat will be inevitable.

This means that in 3-5 years the Russian army as a real global and even regional combat force will disappear; it will be able to conduct only individual anti-terrorist operations, create peace and “scare the population with its remaining nuclear power,” which is hardly the goal of the announced next military reform .

And in another 5-7 years, Russia will remain defenseless in the face of aggression of any kind.

This means that we will lose the fourth world war to ourselves, which is what is expected of us and what our geopolitical opponents hope for.

Military reform should become a National Project of Russia and the Supreme Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces, President of Russia Dmitry Anatolyevich Medvedev, should be personally responsible for it. What is necessary?

First of all, stop "nightmare" the army! You can’t take officers for a “moron” whose opinion no one cares about, whose fate is determined without any consultation with him, demanding only silence and mute obedience from the military. It is necessary to begin an open and transparent discussion of the proposed reforms, to reassure the public and the officer corps, not to be afraid of criticism and one’s own incompetence, to honestly deal with the problem and make the necessary amendments to reform decisions and related plans.

Secondly, it is necessary to withdraw the troops from market relations, force them not to cut to fit the budget and survive at any cost, but to engage in professional combat training.

Thirdly, save the officer corps and change the service system and the system of professional military education.

Fourthly, do not dismiss anyone without creating conditions and opportunities for social adaptation, and make the most of the possibilities of the process of reducing the size of the army.

Fifthly, start the fight against corruption with the Ministry of Defense and the Military Prosecutor's Office, since there are many who want to “cut off a small candle factory” to the sound of reform.

Sixth, to create a state Center for Strategic Analysis, which would have the ability and right to analyze the strategic situation, create draft independent strategic documents on a national scale, make strategic generalizations, give professional answers to complex issues of national and military development, could make our national military work thought. This Center can be subordinated directly to the Minister of Defense or the President of Russia and enter as an independent structure into the Security Council of the Russian Federation.

Seventh, a special body should be created in the Russian Government to carry out military reform, which should be headed personally by the Chairman of the Government.

Eighth, the Russian parliament should create a special commission on military reform, monitor its progress and deal with this problem on a daily basis.

Ninth, the Security Council of the Russian Federation must specifically address issues of military reform as its main task of ensuring Russia’s national security.

Tenth, the Accounts Chamber of Russia should deal with financial flows and structural changes in the Ministry of Defense, and not wait until there is no money left for reform.

This list, of course, is not exhaustive, but absolutely necessary, since without organizing and carrying out military reform in exactly this way, its success can simply be forgotten.

There is another serious danger. It may happen as it always has for the last twenty years.

Let’s say that the army’s concerns and aspirations reach the President and he will demand answers to these and other questions from the Minister of Defense. The Minister of Defense and the Chief of the General Staff will come and say that everything is fine, everything has been calculated correctly, all decisions have been thought out, and all the questions are asked by “incompetent losers who do not understand the greatness and depth of your brilliant plan for military reform, Comrade Supreme Commander-in-Chief, and they are disturbing us.” “I myself have heard such speeches more than once.

After this, the President calms down, continues to believe the Ministry of Defense and the General Staff, no one changes anything, and the collapse increases: everyone who is against is fired, polemics in the army and society are suppressed, everything is cut to the quick, no one is responsible for anything, and in the meantime, theft continues and the condition of the Russian army is deteriorating. This is how things have gone for the last twenty years.

The announced military reform is, of course, revolutionary and vitally necessary for Russia, which means that losses and casualties in it are almost inevitable.

Our common task is to make sure that it is carried out as efficiently as possible, and for the fate of hundreds of thousands of military personnel as painlessly as possible. The task of civil society is to force the authorities to listen and hear its voice and to prevent a catastrophic “drift of gravity” in the reform, when its mistakes are not corrected, but are replicated.

If we want to create a great Russia, we must create an army worthy of its greatness. But those who know how to do all this are becoming fewer and fewer every day, and the coming reduction may even finish off the last ones.

"TOMORROW". Would you like, Alexander Ivanovich, to say something to the officers of the Russian army?

A.V. I'll be honored. I wish the Russian officer corps optimism, health, patience and good luck. When I had the honor of commanding the 35th Motorized Rifle Division in Germany, the Commander of my 20th Army, Lieutenant General Albert Makashov, said the imperishable phrase at the Army Military Council: “Comrade officers, stop being pessimistic!”

And today these words ring especially true.

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VLADIMIROV ALEXANDER IVANOVICH
Major General of the Reserve.
Born on April 17, 1945 in the family of a military man. Hereditary, over many generations, officer. Russian.
Education:
Moscow Suvorov Military School (1963);
Moscow Higher Combined Arms Command School - with gold medal
medal (1966);
Military Academy named after. M.V. Frunze – diploma with honors (1977);
Military Academy of the General Staff of the USSR Armed Forces – diploma with honors (1984).
Specialty - higher operational-strategic management.
Candidate of Political Sciences.
He served in the Far East, in the GSVG, in Belarus, and in Vietnam.
During his service in the ranks of the Armed Forces of the USSR, he passed all command and staff positions from the commander of a motorized rifle platoon, to the chief of staff - first deputy commander of the combined arms army, constantly serving in deployed combat units.
For outstanding achievements in service:
twice received regular military ranks ahead of schedule (“captain”, “lieutenant colonel”);
in 1979, for success in combat and political training and skillful command of the 411th motorized rifle regiment of the 5th Combined Arms Army of the Far Eastern Military District during the strategic maneuvers “Vostok-79” (which were in the nature of the USSR’s reaction to Chinese aggression against the Republic of Vietnam), he was awarded the Order “For Service to the Motherland in the Ranks USSR Armed Forces" III class;
in 1985, at the end of the year, the 35th motorized rifle division of the 20th Combined Arms Army of the GSVG, which he commanded, was recognized as the best in the USSR Armed Forces and the division was awarded the Challenge Red Banner of the Commander-in-Chief of the Ground Forces of the USSR Armed Forces;
in 1988, following the results of the strategic exercises “Autumn - 88”, the 28 Combined Arms Army of the BVI and its Army Headquarters, by order of the USSR Minister of Defense, Marshal D. T. Yazov, were recognized as the best in the USSR Armed Forces.
Awarded 20 state, departmental and foreign awards.
Worked as: Assistant to the USSR Minister of Defense on military reform; Military Advisor to the Supreme Council of the Russian Federation; Head of the Department for Analysis of Problems of the Armed Forces and the Military-Industrial Complex of the Analytical Directorate of the President of the Russian Federation; Advisor to the International Fund for Economic and Social Reform (Reform Fund); General Director of the publishing house "Military Parade"; senior researcher at the Institute of USA and Canada, Russian Academy of Sciences.
Currently - Vice-President of the College of Military Experts of Russia, Vice-Chairman of the All-Russian Union of Cadet Associations "Open Commonwealth of Suvorov, Nakhimov and Cadets of Russia", Chairman of the Moscow Suvorov-Nakhimov Commonwealth, Member of the National Strategy Council, Senior Researcher of the Institute of Economics of the Russian Academy of Sciences, Chairman National Council of the Party “For Our Motherland!”, Member of the Public Chamber of Education in Moscow.
Participated in the development of the “Fundamentals of the Military Doctrine of the Russian Federation”, the Laws of the Russian Federation “On Defense”, “On Security”, “On the Status of Military Personnel”, “On Conversion”, “On Veterans”, Messages of the President of the Russian Federation to the Federal Assembly of the Russian Federation on National Security, the Concept of National security of the Russian Federation, “Fundamentals of the strategy for national security and development of Russia 2050”.
Author of more than 120 works and publications on the problems of the national state idea, military reform, reform of the Armed Forces, civilian control over the security forces of the state, on problems of international, regional and national security, national strategy, on problems of state building and management, as well as five monographs : “On the national state idea of ​​Russia”, “Military reform in Russia”, “Strategic studies”, “Theses on the strategy of Russia”, “Conceptual foundations of the national strategy of Russia. Political aspect"; six almanacs “Cadet Bulletin of Russia”.
Today: Leads the cadet movement in Moscow and Russia, leads the fight to save the national Suvorov military school, works to create a system of cadet education in Russia; actively participates in the construction of the party “For Our Motherland!”; conducts active journalistic, patriotic educational work and scientific work, works on the fundamental work “Fundamentals of the General Theory of War”.
Married, has four children and three grandchildren.
***

FOR REFERENCE

Major General Alexander Ivanovich Vladimirov is the first officer of the Soviet Army who:
in 1986, while still the commander of the 35th motorized rifle division of the 20th Combined Arms Army of the GSVG, he formulated general approaches and specific directions for military reform in the USSR;
contrary to the wishes of the USSR Minister of Defense, Marshal D. T. Yazov, he achieved their publication in the magazine “Military Thought” No. 10, 1988, in the article “Reflections of a combined arms commander” and an all-army discussion of his ideas in the USSR;
then, his main ideas for military reform were published in the book “Army and Society” in 1990;
for which in 1990, from the post of Chief of Staff-First Deputy Commander of the 28th Army BVO, he was sent “to correct the spirit” to Vietnam, where for a year he successfully commanded a group of Soviet military advisers and a group of national troops in one of the neighboring countries.
After arriving from Vietnam in the spring of 1991 and his personal conversation with the USSR Minister of Defense, Marshal D.T. Yazov, in July of the same year he was dismissed from the ranks of the USSR Armed Forces without announcing the reasons.
After the putsch, Major General Alexander Vladimirov was reinstated in the army and served as Assistant Minister of Defense of the USSR (Air Marshal E.I. Shaposhnikov) for military reform.
At the end of 1991, he made a report and initiative to reform the Armed Forces of the USSR, implementing his ideas through the creation of a new military organization of the country, as the strategic basis of the United Armed Forces of the Commonwealth of Independent States (similar to NATO), for which in 1992, at the age of 47, he was dismissed from the CIS Armed Forces (!) due to illness.
In 1993, he personally presented his report “Fundamentals of the Military Policy of the Russian Federation” to the first President of Russia B.N. Yeltsin, which was highly appreciated by the President of Russia, after which he accepted A.I. Vladimirov into his Administration.
Attempts to reform the Armed Forces of Russia from the heights of the Administration of the President of Russia, in which A.I. Vladimirov worked as the Head of the Department of Problems of the Armed Forces and the Military-Industrial Complex of the Analytical Directorate and a member of the Expert Council under the President of the Russian Federation, did not lead to positive results; in the late 90s he was fired “due to staff reduction”, but then, until 2006, he worked as an adviser to the Secretary of the Security Council of the Russian Federation.
Today, that is, almost twenty years after the publication of his ideas and the ideas of other outstanding military experts, such as Vitaly Vasilyevich Shlykov, military reform has begun in Russia, corresponding to their approaches and ideas.
This one concerns: the idea of ​​teams; military police; legal and economic independence of units and formations; optimization and standardization of military uniforms and military equipment; reducing the mobilization burden on the economy and troops; creating units of constant combat readiness; issues of training junior commanders; creating the institution of officers' meetings of units; issues of the new personnel policy in the army and the new Regulations on military service for officers; a new calculation of the salary of military personnel and solutions to their housing problems; tasks and composition of the Branches of the Armed Forces, the Organized Reserve and the Commands of the troops of strategic directions; issues of civilian control and demilitarization of the country; issues of state ideology and ethics of military service; formation of a new quality of professional military education, and so on.
In his opinion, today's reformers are almost exactly copying what he wrote twenty years ago, but the work is being conducted so unprofessionally and with such idiotic methods that even a necessary and useful work turns into its opposite.

***
Dear Colleagues!
I am grateful to the editors of this respected publication for discussing the most pressing issue in the life of our Armed Forces and for inviting me to this round table, as the “unnamed father” of military reform in Russia.
It seems to me that today it is important not so much to talk about the oddities of the ongoing reform and its glaring shortcomings, but to try to understand why it began and is being carried out in this way and not otherwise, and also to think about what we should all do to ensure that the situation the army and the country would improve, our suffering would not have been in vain, and Russia would have received an Army worthy of its greatness.

Now to the heart of the matter.
It seems to me that it is very important for the Russian public to know and understand the background of this military reform.
We must admit to ourselves that by the time the military reform began, that is, by 2008, the Russian Armed Forces were practically incapacitated, ineffective and practically uncontrollable military organization, the real state of which no one knew.
The absolute number of military organisms were completely uncombat-ready units, our arsenals were filled with old equipment and ammunition that could never be used, the bulk of the officer corps was not concentrated in combat units, and the general paradigm of “total mobilization” of military development was focused on so that in a new war we can try to defeat the new quality of the enemy with our old numbers.
Our armed forces were simply poorly armed, and their personnel not only did not engage in combat training, but simply professionally degraded, moreover, this applied to both soldiers and sergeants, and officers and generals.
The domestic industry was not able to produce military equipment even of old models. Since the “kickback” to officials when placing a state order amounted to 50% of the amounts allocated for its production, the Russian military-industrial complex practically stopped fighting even for the state defense order.
Our lag behind the United States and NATO in the military sphere has become catastrophic and almost irreversible.
All military ministers of defense of Russia who worked in this position before A.E. Serdyukov were practically unable to take effective steps to eliminate this situation and, being bogged down in political and corporate “squabbles,” did not even make such attempts.
We practically could not wage a war of any level, which was only confirmed by the war with Georgia.
The need for military reform became obvious to everyone, as well as the fact that it must be radical and comprehensive, and it became impossible to delay its implementation any further.
By this time, it turned out that there were no plans for reforming the military sphere in the state, and the personnel of the leading military personnel were so incapacitated and had no idea what and how to do, that it was impossible to entrust them with carrying out a radical military reform, since this Over time, the armed forces, as a system, rotted “from the head and from the inside.”
This was the general background of the beginning of the reform of the Russian Armed Forces and, as we see, it was absolutely catastrophic.
Therefore, the political leadership of the country chose the option of a civilian minister and the civilian Ministry of Defense of Russia, which, in our opinion, was absolutely correct.
At the same time, the model of the US armed forces was immediately chosen as the main model to follow.
That is why an absolutely civilian person was appointed Minister of Defense - A. E. Serdyukov, who received complete carte blanche to carry out the reform from the highest political leadership of the state, and N. E. Makarov was appointed Chief of the General Staff of the Russian Federation, who immediately and forever began to share all the views of his minister.
***
It seems to me that from the point of view of correctness and completeness of coverage of the problem of the military reform ongoing in Russia and answers to the questions posed at the round table, it is advisable to expand on this topic somewhat more broadly.
Therefore, let me begin with a thesis listing and disclosure of some theoretical issues and existing basic approaches to reform that identify systemic errors and difficulties of this process.
Firstly. Today in Russia there is not a military reform, but a reform of its Armed Forces.
There is a fundamental difference and a fundamental difference in this.
Military reform, by definition, involves obtaining a new quality in the entire sphere of national defense and the military organization of the state, that is, all law enforcement agencies of Russia, the entire military-industrial complex, the information and social components of the military aspect of the nation’s existence, and so on.
Military reform is carried out on the scale of the entire country and all spheres of the state’s existence, being its most important national task.
Reform of the armed forces is only part of the military reform of the state, as reform directly and only of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation themselves, that is, only those elements of the military organization and national defense of the country that structurally belong to the Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation.
Moreover, this is also a matter for the entire nation, which must be carried out with all its might and under its control.
Secondly. The most important and strategic mistake of the political leadership of the state was the provision of complete carte blanche to carry out the reform of the armed forces to the Ministry of Defense itself, which, by definition, is unacceptable, since the nation, that is, the state, and not the department, must reform its security sector.
Unfortunately, this decision was made deliberately by our senior political leadership. Therefore, only it bears full responsibility for the progress, quality and effectiveness of reforms, and only it can radically change the situation.
Third. The complete lack of civilian control over the actions of the reformers, the complete lack of control and anonymity of the activities carried out led to the complete irresponsibility of its anonymous leaders and executors, which, in turn, created an atmosphere of permissiveness and a corrupt environment even in the troops.
Fourthly. The entire national military sphere and even the troops themselves are being purposefully and rapidly traded, which has a disastrous effect on their morale and combat readiness. The leaders of military organizations try to squeeze the greatest personal benefit out of the powers and opportunities available in the service, and general and merciless everyday corruption has become a condition of service for officers and sergeants of the armed forces.
Fifthly. The depressingly low professional level of the authors and implementers of the reform has become clear, and sometimes the complete disregard for the Army, its traditions and the genetic foundations of military service, simply and deliberately demonstrated by officials of the Ministry of Defense, is simply a tragedy.
At sixth. The reform is being carried out in conditions of complete theoretical emptiness and the deliberate killing of national military thought, as well as the complete collapse of the system of national professional military education.
Evidence of this is the new Military Doctrine of the Russian Federation, which only confirmed that today in government there are neither new ideas nor new people capable of developing a strategic document at the national level.
We have practically nothing to teach our officer corps, since we have neither fundamental nor applied military theories, and modern American, really interesting developments, sound in our reality only like science fiction.
A general theory of war is not developed or studied.
With the artificial destruction of the divisional and army level, the “operational art” has practically been curtailed, since there are no longer any combat subjects and there is no one to carry it out.
Since a modern brigade is nothing more than an overgrown regiment, then modern “tactics”, as part of the art of war, remains nothing more than attempts to find a place for these brigades in the system of combat operations, which again returns it back to the regiment.
In institutions of higher professional military education there are no fundamentally new programs and curricula, and not a single higher educational institution that trains commanders even briefly studies such subjects of humanitarian education as, for example, “Ethics”, “Logic”, “Philosophy”, “ Political Science" and "Fundamentals of World Culture", although only these subjects directly develop a person’s ability to think correctly, instill the general culture of the officer and allow him to correctly position himself in the world.
There simply is no translated foreign military literature, since buying and translating foreign books and magazines is expensive, and there are no military translators anymore, although even in the 50s of the last century such literature was bought, translated and studied.
There is simply no domestic military literature, just as there are no special military publications devoted to the theory and practice of war.
The Internet as a basis for scientific work is not used in any educational institution of the Ministry of Defense, including the Suvorov military schools, and all this is for reasons of maintaining secrecy, which is completely insanity.
Unfortunately, no one is engaged in this general cultural and actually information-scientific component of our military professional education and military science and does not even understand its necessity, although without this there will be no science, and we will continue to train obviously low-quality officers.
We have practically no one to teach our officer corps, since the experience of recent wars, world military experience and even the practice of troops are not studied today, and in military universities they are taught by officers who do not know what a deployed battalion or regiment is, and, moreover, a division or army.
We have practically no place to train our officer corps, since we do not have a modern training, training or training ground base, and the old one is simply, mediocrely and rapidly being sold out.
Seventh. The personnel potential of the Soviet military school turned out to be completely exhausted, and negative personnel selection triumphed in personnel policy.
In other words, people began to come to leadership of the troops who had proven not their ability to competently command troops, but only their personal loyalty to their superiors and economic flexibility.
Today, almost the entire officer corps does not believe its senior military and political leaders, since the truth of life is that the life of an officer in the army is getting worse every day, that the state does not need the Army, no one is going to take care of the officers, and “everyone’s economic survival is the work of everyone."
Eighth. The educational, spiritual and moral component completely disappeared from the training and life of troops.
Today in Russia there is no state ideology of military service, the institution of “educators” turned out to be unsuitable from the very beginning, since no one knows what and how to educate the army today.
An attempt to create a Code of Officer Ethics is a move in the right direction, but in the absence of an accepted state ideology and in the context of feverish attempts by a significant part of the officer corps to survive, preserve and not become lumpen, in the complete absence of at least some meaning and prospects for service, as well as complete unprincipledness military leadership and its desire to enrich itself at the expense of the troops - the rapid effectiveness of this measure is questionable.
As an example, we can state that even the correct thought and desire of the President of the Russian Federation - to pay prize money to officers according to the quality of their service, did not lead to an improvement in its quality, but to its complete opposite, since this huge presidential money is distributed among officers not by the officer assembly of the unit according to their real successes in service, as I suggested, and the unit commander himself divides it among the loyalists.
Ninth. There is no professional military expert community in Russia. There is no independent military-scientific publication in the country (while, for example, there are hundreds of them in the USA), which means there is no platform for military thought, which is one of the reasons for its degeneration.
Without the creation of an independent expert community, any government actions in the direction of state building, military reform and the development of the country's national defense are doomed to failure in advance.
Tenth. Unfortunately, today’s Ministry of Defense and state leadership considers itself to be completely self-sufficient in military matters, that is, sufficiently theoretically prepared and practically skillful to resolve issues of Russia’s direct survival in the modern world alone, that is, without the involvement of independent professionals, which there is an obvious mistake.
Eleventh. Carrying out radical military reform has not become a priority national project. This means that its financing is not of a special nature, and the required 5% of the country’s GDP is still not allocated for the needs of national defense, and there is simply not enough money for reform.
In addition, the funds allocated for the construction of the Army are spent ineffectively and are mercilessly stolen.

***
Based on what has been said, that is, from objective assessments of the origins and real foundations of the ongoing reform, we can talk about its preliminary results and the effectiveness of the measures being taken.

I must state that the Russian public and even the national military expert community still do not have a clear idea of ​​the general intent, scale and depth of the ongoing reform, while its “anonymous fathers” remain unknown.
Society feeds on fragmentary information “from the sites of pogroms,” rare and vague statements by the Chief of the General Staff, with complete and special silence from the Minister of Defense, as well as rumors about what will happen.
The most frequently used term in any official information about military reform is the term “new look of the armed forces”, which is the main goal of the reforms, and which is increasingly not a concept filled with real and understandable content and meaning, but is perceived rather as a kind of “mantra” "
However, upon professional analysis, this “new look” is generally a “vague” concept.
Let's touch only on some of its aspects.
Issues of mobilization. In the “new look,” for example, the mobilization component of the Armed Forces is practically not spelled out in any way.
This means that the army must begin and victoriously end the war with the forces of units (brigades) of constant combat readiness in peacetime, for which they are actually so persistently created, and which, by definition, is impossible even in theory.
At the same time, the new and just signed Military Doctrine already talks about the second - the mobilization component of the armed forces.
There is complete inconsistency in all this, since the mobilization component, in its current understanding, can only consist of all kinds of framed (reduced) units and bases for storing military equipment, deployed to combat strength, for example, in “threatened” period" and victoriously ending the war.
The paradox of this decision is that it is the practical destruction of these reduced-strength units that constitutes the essence of the ongoing military reform.
In addition, even understanding the absurdity of the situation, our General Staff and the Ministry of Defense are not changing the system of reserving the Armed Forces.
They do not introduce the concept of “Organized reserve of branches of the armed forces” as a reserve component and an integral part of the RF Armed Forces, they do not change the non-binding and legally meaningless system - “status of military personnel in reserve” to a legally binding one - “service of military personnel in reserve”, then there are no obvious and necessary professional steps being taken, which alone are capable of correctly and effectively solving the issue of a truly “new look for the armed forces” and solving the problem of creating stronger wartime troop groups.
Issues of training junior commanders. Intensive and long-term training of future contract sergeants at the Ryazan Airborne Division is, of course, not a bad thing.
But, by and large, if the training of a new contract sergeant ends only with this, then there will be no sense, since in order for the sergeant to be consolidated in the troops as an independent and most important category of military personnel, it is necessary to create for them their own service vertical (as , for example, in the US Army) within the framework of which these new sergeants can pursue their careers and resolve all issues of a social nature, which should become the basis of their career motivation.
In this regard, the most outrageous circumstance is the complete and deliberately demonstrated disregard of the Ministry of Defense for the opinion of military experts, public opinion and publications in the media, as well as the complete silence of our highest political state power, which, for some unknown reason, deliberately suppresses the full severity of this, absolutely fateful for our state, issue.
In general, the overwhelming general opinion of Russian society and the army itself is that military reform in Russia is going in the wrong direction, it is being led by the wrong people, the reform is going badly and will end badly for Russia as well.
Probably, in today's conditions, no other conclusion could be expected.

However, is everything really so bad and hopeless?
We know how the reform is officially assessed only from the words of Chief of the General Staff N.E. Makarova. This meager information mainly concerns only a few issues, of which only one has real confirmation, and that is that units of permanent combat readiness have been formed.
All other official information is speculative and hypothetical. For example: that officers will be paid more; that everyone will have apartments; that a new structure for professional military education has been created; that a new generation of sergeants is already training in Ryazan; that new military equipment has entered the troops...
With all our skepticism, we will assume that all this will be so, and these are certain achievements of the reformers.
We see the objective successes of our leadership of a strategic nature in the fact that he succeeded in the main thing - to destroy the shackles of “total mobilization”; more or less understand what is and what is not in the field of national defense; launch (though today they are simply feeble) mechanisms for saturating troops with new military equipment; and also complete “clearing the reform field of the remnants of the Soviet military machine.”
That's probably all.
It is also important that it apparently understands the depth and scale of the necessary transformations and decisions, and now it is concerned that it is necessary to move forward, but at the same time it does not really know what and how to do next.
It became obvious that the instinctive attempts of the political and military leadership to manage the development of the state and army, based almost exclusively on their own ideas (borrowed foreign theories and eclectic approaches) about the essence of the processes of national state building in war conditions, and this is exactly the case, can only lead to the next “convulsions of management” and the next mistakes that impede the positive development of the country.
We observe the correctness of what was said today in the example of the hardships of our military reform, in which all the most honest efforts of our leadership, carried out even in the right direction, do not lead to an increase in national military power, but so far to the opposite strategic effects.
I believe that our current difficulties are not in the mistakes of the reform plan, but in the fact that it is being carried out by people who poorly understand the matter and whose immediate executors do not know how to work professionally correctly.
We are sure that this is exactly the case, not because they want to specifically harm the army or Russia, but because they don’t know any other way, they are not capable of learning and changing, but at the same time they are absolutely irresponsible and economically secure.

Hence our most important Russian question: “what to do?”
To correct the situation, it is necessary to at least correct all eleven previous points of system errors.
At the same time, the main affairs of the state and our military leadership today may be the following initial steps.
First. It is necessary to evaluate everything that has already been done in the direction of military reform through the forces of independent professional expertise, and simply clean out the unfit military and non-military executors and leaders, and this is the personal responsibility of our Supreme Commander-in-Chief.
True, here too there is a danger that again the last professionals and the best will leave the troops and headquarters, and leadership positions will remain with the “loyal”, and everything will again return to the circles of today’s “pictures at an exhibition.”
Second. It is necessary to stop keeping silent about the problems of reform and discuss them openly.
We are convinced that only a direct appeal by the leaders of the country and the Army to the nation on the problems of reform and recognition of its difficulties, the adoption of public decisions on specific areas of military development, the nation’s understanding of the essence of the matter, the faith of the officer corps in the need and the right direction of reform, and the creativity of the troops themselves, will allow it to be carried out successfully.
Third. A clear and clear success of the reform in any of its directions is necessary as a seed of increased confidence of the nation and troops in its successful progress and excellent final results. Intellectual, economic, organizational and informational national resources should be focused on this success.
Such seeds of growth must first of all be created in one (several) military camps (garrisons), and not just one military unit, in one or each military district; at one (several) higher military educational institutions; on one (several) landfills; on several samples of military equipment and weapons, and so on.
Fourth. It is necessary to create an independent and well-resourced national military expert community.
Creation of a system of periodicals of this Russian expert community as a platform for professional ideas, opinions and the structure of professional discussions.
The development by this community of the General Fundamentals of the Theory of War, as the basic subject of a new state and military education, of all directions and levels of training of leading state and military personnel in Russia, since the current so-called “military science” is meaningless.
Fifth. It seems obvious to us that today it is necessary to teach our senior political and military leadership what and how to do, and this should be done by our military expert society.
Sixth. The main attention should be paid to the professional training, morale and social sphere of the Russian officer corps.
This presupposes the need: to create a high-quality new professional military education, in which the main ones will be completely new and different curricula and subjects than today, a new model of continuous professional military education and a new model for assessing its quality will be implemented; implementation of new approaches to the system of service for officers and their other social status, which, in addition to a multiple increase in pay and military pensions, should imply the presence of serious social benefits in the areas of education, healthcare, financial and credit spheres and communications.
We can warn the Ministry of Defense in advance that any attempts to create these systems exclusively on our own within the military department itself are doomed to failure in advance, since in its depths there are neither specialists ready for this, nor even the necessary set of ideas themselves, just as there are no executors for them.
We must turn to the experience of specialists, experts and military professionals who have systematic training from the Soviet military school and modern theoretical and practical activities, and we must listen and hear the Army.

Generally
We consider it important to directly answer the most important questions asked and of interest to our Russian and army public.
1. We believe that our military reform is moving in the general right direction.
2. The reform is “from scratch”, carried out by poorly prepared people and impromptu, which makes its development poorly predictable and cruel in relation to the Russian officer corps.
3. Corrections must be immediately made to the essence and course of the reform, at least on the issues raised in this work.
4. Our military reform is a matter of the entire nation, and without its participation, without the nation’s control over its progress, and without the initiative of the troops, its implementation will not be effective.
5. The reform cannot be anonymous; its authors and organizers must be named.
6. The reform of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation should be led by its Supreme Commander-in-Chief, the President of Russia.
7. There is no alternative to military reform, and it must be completed.

It seems to us that in such a large-scale and difficult matter as reforming the military sphere of a huge, not rich and simply difficult country, the main principles of its implementation should be the following principles:
“Hurry slowly”;
“Appreciate and use the experience of your own military development”;
“Never walk over the corpses and destinies of people”;
“Don’t lie to the army and the nation”;
“Don’t be afraid to admit shortcomings and consult with the nation and experts”;
“Do not hide or talk about the problem, but solve it”;
The main criterion for the professional ability of command and military leadership should not be “to be able to reform on time”, but “to solve problems in their area so that people do not suffer”;
“Search and find a solution to the problem and people who can solve it in good faith”;
“Understand that only moral and fair decisions will live, and everything unrighteous will still come out and will be doomed to condemnation and death.”

We believe that today all this is quite difficult to achieve, but it is impossible not to do this - the Army will perish and Russia will perish.
Of course, the Ministry of Defense and the progress of ongoing reforms must and should be criticized.
Nevertheless, we believe that the time has come for constructive cooperation between the expert community and the Russian public with it, otherwise there will be no success in the reform.
In addition, we are confident that only the honest work of every official, officer and sergeant in their place will make our reform successful.
This requires patience and dedication, despite the fact that each leader must have the courage to have his own opinion and “suppress the stupidity of his superiors” (which I did for almost my entire service and therefore was always a national hero of all units, units and formations with which I had honor to command), giving the opportunity for growth and development of intelligence and honor in his team.

Comrade officers, Russia is waiting, and the Nation hopes that everyone will honestly fulfill their duty!

PRHVMYLPCHBOP 12/19/2008

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RETEIPD ABOUT FTEI'CHOOKHA UYUFENH CHPEOOZP HRTBCHMEOYS OE HMHYUYF HRTBCHMSENPUFSH CHPKUL, OP UKHEEUFCHEOOP UOYF YI VPECHA URPUPVOPUFSH, KHOYUFPTSYF RTPZHEUUYPOBMSHOHA NPFYCHBGYA CHPEOOOPK UMKHTSVSH Y OBTHYYF CHELPCHSHCHE FTBDYGYY CHPEOOOPZP UFTPYFEMSHUFCHB tPUUYY.

h GEMPN, OEPRTBCHDBOOPUFSH LFYI TEYEOYK ЪBLMAYUBEFUS CH OEULPMSHLYI UETSHESHI RTPZHEUYPOBMSHOSHI NPNEOFBI, UKHEEUFCHB LPPTTSCHI, OBY CHZMSD, OE RPOINBAF UBNY RTEDMBZBAE YE FY UBNSCHE OPCHYEUFCHB.

chP-RETCHSHI, OBN OILFP OE PVASUOIM, YUEN VTYZBDB MHYUYE DYCHYYY Y LBLPZP UPUFBCHB VTYZBDB YNEEFUS CH CHYDH? rPYENH? rPFPNKH YuFP, VTYZBDB uyb Y VTYZBDB Ch tPUUYKULPK BTNYY BVUPMAFOP TBOSCH RP ЪBDBUBN, UFTHLFHTE Y UNSHUMH.

OBRTYNET, CH BTNYY yub, U LPFPTPK NSCH RSHFBENUS LPRYTPCHBFSH LFPF PRSHCHF, DYCHYYY UHEEUFCHHAF Y SCHMSAFUS PUOPCHOSCHNY VPECHSHNY FBLFYUEULYY PRETBFYCHOSCHNY UPEDOEOYS NY, Y UPUFBCHB LPFPTSHCHY LPNRMELFHAFUS VTYZBDSH ABOUT LBTSDSCHK LPOLTEFOSHCHK VPK CH LBTSDPK LPOLTEFOPK CHPKOE.

LUFBFY, LPZDB "ZTBTSDBOULYK" NYOYUFT PVPTPPOSH yub dPOBMSHD TBNUZHEMSHD ЪBIPFEM HOYUFPTSYFSH DYCHYYY LBL FBLPCHSHCHE PUFBCHYFSH CH CHPKULBI PDOY NPVIMSHOSHCHE VTYZBDSHCH, OH FPYuOP LBL X OBU UEZPDOS, EZP RTPUFP Y FYIP "KHYMY", FBL LBL RPUYUYFBMY, YuFP TBOPZP TPDB "YTBLY" bNETYLE EEE RTEDUFPSF, B DMS RPVEDPOPUOSCHI CHPKO OHTSOSCH YNEOOOP DYCHYYYY, B OE "TBNUZHEMSHDSCH".

h YFBFE LBTSDPK DYCHYY BTNYY uyb UKHEEUFCHHAF FTY YFBVB VTYZBD, RPMOPUFSHA ZPFPCHSHY ZPFPCHSEIUS L KHRTBCHMEOYA CHPKULBNY CH VPA. lPNBODHEF VTYZBDPC VTYZBDOSCHK (PDOP'CHEDOSCHK) - ZEOETBM. rTY RPMKHYUEOY ЪBDBUY ABOUT VPK, LPNBODYT DYCHYYY (DCHHI'CHEDOSHCHK ZEOETBM), PRTEDEMSEF - LBLBS VTYZBDB Y LBLYN VPECHSCHN UPUFBCHPN VKhDEF CHSHRPMOOSFSH RPUFBCHMEOOKHA VPEC HA ЪBDБУХ. rTY LFPN UBNB DYCHYYS UPUFPYF YЪ OBVPTB OEULPMSHLYI (DP RPMKHFPTB DEUSFLPC) UBNPUFPSFEMSHOSHI FBLFYUEULYI VPECHSHI EDYOYG (NPFPRIEPFSHCHE FBOLPCHCHE VBFBMSHPOSHCH, BTF YMMETYKULYE Y RTPFYCHPCHPJDHYOSCH DYCHYIPOSCH, TBCHEDSHCHBFEMSHOSHCH, YOTSEOETOSHCHE DTHZIE VBFBMSHPOSH YUBUFY CHPKULPCHPZP FSHMB, Y FBL DBMEE), LBTSDSCHK Y LPFPTSHCHI SC MSEFUS UBNPUFPSFEMSHOPK YUBUFSHHA UP UCHPYN OBNEOOEN YYNY, LBL RTBCHYMP, LPNBODHAF RPMLPCHOIL.

Chue VTYZBDSH CH BTNYY yyb ZHTNYTHAFUS YЪ OBVPTB LFYI VBFBMSHPOCH, UPZMBUOP LPOLTEFOPK VPECHPK ЪBDBUY ABOUT CHTENS LPOLTEFOPK VPECHPK PRETBGYY. chPF FPZDB, LPZDB VTYZBDB ZHTNYTHHEFUS OB CHTENS VPS YЪ ZPFPCHSHCHI BMENEOFPC, POB RTBLFYUEULY OE YNEEF ChPKULPCHPZP IP'SKUFCHB UCHPEZP Y UFBOPCHYFUS LTBKOE NPVIMSHOP K VPECHPK PTZBOYBGYEK, RPULPMSHLH CHUE, YuFP EK OHTSOP RPDCHPYFSH DMS VPS - ZPTAYUEE, VPERTYRBUSCH, EDH Y FBL DBMEE - CHUE DBEFUS EK UP ULMBDPCH DYCHYYYY ZTHRRYTPCHLY.

obyb CE VTYZBDB RPDTBHNECHBEF RTPUFP KHTPDMYCHP TBTPPUYYKUS RPML, ch LPFPTPN VHDEF NOPZP VBFBMSHPOPCH, ch LPFPTPN VKhDEF NOPZP UPMDBF Y FBLPK TSE HCHEMYUYCHBAEIKUS CHPKULPCH PC FShchM. rP'FPNH VTYZBDB CH FPK ZHTNE, CH LPFPTPK RShchFBAFUS UDEMBFSH KH OBU, OE VHDEF OYULPMSHLP OH NPVYMSHOEE, OH VPECHYFEEE, OH VPUERPUPVOEE UKHEEUFCHHAEEZP RPMLB OPTNBMSHOPK YF BFOPK YUYUMEOOPUFY, ULBTSEN, CHPEOOZP CHTENEOY. POB VHDEF ZHTNYTPCHBFSHUS LBL KHCHEMYUEOOOSCHK RPML, Y PFUADB ITS NPVYMSHOPUFSH Y VPECHSHCHE LBUEUFCHB VHDHF OYULPMSHLP OE MHYUYE.

rTEDUFBCHMSEFUS, YuFP Ch nYOPVPTPPOSH NPDEMY b. UETDALPCHB RTPUFP OILFP OE UMSHCHYBM, YuFP CH CHPKULBI UKHEEUFCHHEF CHPKULPCHPE IP'SKUFCHP, Y YuFP U OIN DEMBFSH OE OBEF.

OP ЪБФП fShchM chPPTHTSEOOSHI UYM HCE KHUREYOP FTBOUZHPTNYTHEFUS CH TBOPZP TPDB IPMDOZY, OBRTYNET "pVPTPOUETCHYU", YuFP ChPPVEE CHSHZMSDYF LBL OPCHBS PFLTPCHEOOBS LPTNKHYLB, D MS UREYOP UOINBAEYI RPZPOSH FSHMPCHYLPCH, Y, CHNEUFE U FTYMMMYPOOPK UPVUFCHEOOPUFSHA BTNYY, BLGYPOYTHEFUS, RTYFPN, YuFP ABOUT CHPKULB Y FTHDPCHCHE LPMMELFYCHSHCH , FP EUFSH ABOUT FAIRY, LFP TEBMSHOP UMHTSYF, CHPAEF Y FTHDYFUS OBRMECHBFSH CHUEN.

pVEBS UFPYNPUFSH BLFYCHPCH, LPFPTSHCHE NPZHF VShchFSH RETEDBOSHCH ABOUT VBMBOU pbp "pVPTPOUETCHYU", RP UMPCHBN RTEDUFBCHYFEMEK nyOPVPTPOSCH, SCHMSEFUS "ChPEOOOPK FBKOPC" Y YI VHDHF PGEOYCHBF SH OE RP TSCHOPYuOPK, B RP VBMBOUPCHPK UFPYNPUFY, OP, OBRTYNET, CH BRTEME bFPZP nyOPVPTPOSCH RTPCHAMP RETCHSHCHK BHLGYPO RP TBURTPDBCE CHPEOOOPZP YNHEEUFCHB Y ЪBTBVPFBMP 3 NMTD. 745 NMO. THWMEK Y UHDSHVB YI OEYCHEUFOB.

Private Enterprise ChFPTSCHI, UBN ZhBLF, YuFP KH OBU RMBOYTHEFUS VTYZBDKH OE DEMBFSH ZEOETBMSHULPK DPMTSOPUFSHHA, KHOYUFPTSBEF MAVKHA RTPZHEUUYPOBMSHOHA NPFYCHBGYA PZHYGETPCH L UMKHTSEVOPNKH TPUFKH . rPULPMSHLH, EUMY OE VHDEF DYCHYYK (DYCHYYPOOSHI ZEOETBMPCH) Y EUMY OE VHDEF VTYZBDOSHI ZEOETBMPCH, FP HERE TSE Y PFLHDB RPSCHMSAFUS X OBU ZEOETBMSHCH?

y PLBYSHCHBEFUS, YuFP SING CH RTYOGYRE NPZHF RPSCHYFSHUS CH ZTHRRYTPCHLE CHPKUL, FP EUFSH CH FTEFSHEN LFPN UBNPN ЪCHOE.

b YOFETEUOP, LBLYN CE PVTBBPN VHDHF CHSTBEYCHBFSHUS ZEOETBMSH DMS LFPZP ЪCHEB?

rPMHYUBEFUS OELBS RTEUFHROBS Y DHTOBS RPUMEDPCHBFEMSHOPUFSH: EUMY KH OBU HOYUFPTSBEFUS ЪCHEOP DYCHYYY, FPF FEN UBNSHCHN KH OBU HOYUFPTSBEFUS ЪCHEOP, ZPFPCHSEEE LPNBODOSHCHK U PUFBCH PRETBFYCHOPZP HTPCHOS; EUMY KH OBU KHOYUFPTSBAFUS BTNYY, FP KHOYUFPTSBEFUS PTZBO (HTPCHEOSH), URPUPVOSHK CHSTBEYCHBFSH CHCHUYK LPNBODOSHK UPUFBCH UFTBFEZYUEULPZP KHTPCOS.

fBLYN PVTBBPN, KH OBU CHCHUYYK LPNBODOSHK UPUFBCH chPPTHTSEOOSHI UYM OIPFLKHDB OE VETEFUS Y PO LBL VSH UMKHYUBKOP RPSCHMSEFUS Ch LPOGE OERPOSFOP LBLPC UMHTSVSHCH Y EB OERPOSFOP LBLYE ЪBUMHZY, OE RTPKDS CHUE LFY PUOPCHOSHE LPNBODOSHCH ЪCHEOSHS (RPML-DYCHYYS-BTNYS-PLTHZ), LBTSDPE YЪ LPFPTSCHI SCHMSEFUS PVSBFEMSHOSHCHN LFBRPN RTPZHEUUYPOBMSHOPZP NHTSBOYS Y RPDZPFPCHLY CHCHUYI PZHYGETPCH UFTBOSHCH. ynEOOP FBL PVTBPCHBMUS UMPC UPCHTENEOOSCHI CHPEOBYUBMSHOYLPCH OYLPZDB OE CHYDECHYI TSYCHPZP UPMDBFB, OYUEN OILEN OE LPNBODPCHBCHYI, Y VPSEIUS OBYUBMSHOILB VPMEE YuEN OTHYEOYS ЪBLPOB.

rПФПНХ Х OBU OELPNH RTYOINBFSH PFCHEFUFCHEOOSCH TEYEOYS, FBL LBL RTYOINBFSH YI PRBUOP DMS LBTSHETSH, DB Y MEZUE TSYFSH, RPDYYOSSUSH RTYIPFSN YMY UFBOPCHSUSH YUBUFSHA VYOEUB "CH MBUFSH RTEDETZBEYI.”

nsch UYUYFBEN, YuFP RTPZHEUYPOBMSHOBS DEZTBDBGYS tPUUYKULPK BTNYY OBYUBMBUSH U FPZP NPNEOFB, LPZDB OBYUBMUS OEZBFYCHOSCHK LBDTPCHSCHK PFVPT, FP EUFSH, LPZDB ABOUT CHUYE DPMTSOPU FY CH chPPTHTSEOOSCHI UMBI UFBMY OBOBYUBFSHUS OE ЪBUMHTSEOOSCH RTPZHEUYPOBMSHCH, B MPSMSHOSCHE VEBDBTY, CHSTPUYE OE Ъ PFCHEFUFCHEOOSCHI LPNBODYTPCH EDYOPOBYUBMSHOYLPCH, B YЪ VEIPFCHEFUFCHEOOSCHI RPTHYUEOGECH Y RPNPEOILPC. ABOUT CHETOPE, YNEOOOP FBLYE CHPEOBYUBMSHOILY Y RTEDMPTSYMY YMY UPZMBUYMYUSH U FBLPK TEZHPTNPK.

h FTEFSHYI.rMBOYTHENPE HOYUFPTSEOYE RPMLPCH, DYCHYYK Y BTNYK, LPFPTSHCHE DPLBBBMY UCHPA ьZHZHELFYCHOPUFSH H FEYUEOYE UFPMEFYK, UCHSBOP U FEN, YUFP OVERALL CHUYE ZPUKHDBTUFCHE OOPE Y CHPEOOPE THLPCHPDUFCHP OE RPOINBEF UREGYZHYLY TPUUYY, EE BTNYY CHPEOOOPK UMKHTSVSH.

h tPUUYY YOBYUBMSHOP RPML ZHTNYTPCHBMUS LBL RPMLLPCHBS UENSHS PZHYGETPCH, UPMDBF, CHYOULYI LPMMELFYCHPCH Y ZBTOYPOPCH, Y X OBU YUFPTYYUEULYE RPMLPCHCHESH DYCHY YPOOSHE VPECHSCHE FTBDYGYY OBUYFSHCHBAF UPFOY Y UPFOY MEF.

h FP CE CHTENS MAVSHCHE VTYZBDSH, UZhPTNYTPCHBOOSCH YY PFDEMSHOSHCHI VBFBMSHPOCH, OE YNEAEYI TPDUFCHB Y FTBDYGYK CH YUFPTYY, OENEDMEOOOP HOYUFPTSBAF MAVKHA YUFPTYUYUEULHA FTBD YGYA Y RTEENUFCHOOPUFSH BTNYY tPUUYY CH GEMPN. lFP OEYJNEOOOP CHEDEF L HFTBFE YUFPTYYUEULYI VPECHSHI FTBDYGYK, RPFETE DHib, RPFETE UBNPUPUBBOYS, ZPTDPUFY, RBFTYPFYYNB Y FBL DBMEE, Y, CH LPOYUOPN UUEFE - L RP TBTSEOYA CHPKOE.

lTPNE FPZP, YUFPVSH "HUREFSH ABOUT CHPKOKH", OBRTYNET, ABOUT dBMSHOEN CHPUFPLE, ChPKULB FBN HCE DPMTSOSCH VSHFSH, BOE DPUFBCHMSFSHUS FHDB U OBYUBMPN VPECHSHI DEKUFCHYK, LFP UFTBFEZYUEULBS BLUY PNB.

- b YuFP LFP ЪB UFTHLFKHTB PRETBFYCHOPZP LPNBODITPCHBOYS OBD VTYZBDPK?

LFP PRETBFYCHOPE LPNBODPCHBOYE, FP EUFSH RTBLFYUEULY FB TSE BTNYS, OP OE YNEAEBS OH RTEENUFCHEOOPUFY, OH UCHPYI CHPKUL, Y ZHTNYTHENBS DMS CHSHRPMOEOYS LPOLTEFOSCHI PRETBFYCH OSCHI ЪBDBU CH MAVPN TBKPOE DEKUFCHYK.

YuFP FBLPE PRETBFYCHOPE LPNBODPCHBOIE ABOUT RTYNET BNETYLY.

PRETBFYCHOPE LPNBODPCHBOIE CH BNETYLE PRTEDEMSEFUS Y UYYFBEFUS PYUEOSH RTPUFP.

lPZDB RTYOINBEFUS RPMYFYUEULPE TEYEOYE P UPЪDBOY PYUETEDOPZP LPNBODPCHBOYS ABOUT FCHD, OBRTYNET, CH TBKPOE lBURYKULPZP NPTS, FPZDB (FBN EUFSH UREGYBMSHOSCH RTPZTBNNNSCH), NPTsOP ABOUT TsBFSH LOPRLH LPNRSHAFETB Y FHF TSE LPNRSHAFET CHSHCHDBEF UPUFBCH ZTHRRYTPCHLY DP EDYOYGSHCH, FP EUFSH - DP UPMDBFB, PZHYGETB, RTBRPTEILB, RBFTPOB, ZHPTNSCH PDETDSCH, EDYOYGSH PTKhTSYS, LPNRMELFB VPERTYRBUPCH Y FBL DBMEE. fY ZTHRRYTPCHLY HCE TBTBVPFBOSH CH NYTOP CHTENS Y UREGYBMSHOP DMS DBOOPC LPOLTEFOPK ZTHRRYTPCHLY UPJDBEFUS PRETBFYCHOPE LPNBODPCHBOYE.

h NYTOPE CHTENS LFP FPMSHLP PZHYGETSH Y ZEOETBMSH, LPFPTSHCHE LFPC ZTHRRYTPCHLPK DPMTSOSCH LPNBODPCHBFSH ABOUT RETIP VPECHSHI DEKUFCHYK.

- b FBL H OYI OYUEZP?

KH OYI CHPPVEE OYUEZP OEF, LTPNE LPNRSHAFETPCH, RPMOPNPYUK Y VPECHPK ЪBDBUY.

OP LPZDB RTYOSFP RPMYFYUEULPE TEYEOYE ABOUT UPJDBOYE OPChPK ZTHRRYTPCHLY, DEMBEFUS TBUYUEF ITS UBDBYU Y UPJDBEFUS ITS UFTKHLFKHTTB, OBRTYNET LBL LFP UDEMBMY uyb Ch y TBLE YMY BZHZBOYUFBOE.

th RPUME LFPPZP, RP NETE OEPVIPDYNPUFY, UPZMBUOP ZTBZHYLB CHSHRPMOEOYS RPMYFYUEULPZP TEYEOYS Y RMBOB CHPKOSHCH, UTEDUFCHBNY UFTBFEZYUEULYI RETECHPPL UPEDOOOOSCHY yFBFBI bNETYLY RP CHPDHIKH Y NPTEN FKhDB, ​​FP EUFSH CH CHSHCHVTBOOSCHK TBKPO RPDBAFUS VPECHSHCHE YUBUFY, RPMOPUFSHHA ZPFPCHSHCHE L VPA.

YuBEE CHUEZP, LFY ZTHRRYTPCHLY ZHTNYTHAFUS OE FPMSHLP YYUBUFEK TEZKHMSTOPK BTNYY, OP Y YY LPOFYOZEOFPC oBGYPOBMSHOPK ZCHBTDYY rPDZPFPCHMEOOOPZP TEETCHB, LPFPTSCHESCHMSAFUS UBNPUFPSFEMSHOSCHNY Y RPMOPRTTBCHOSCHNY LPNRPEOFBNY (UPUFBCHOSCHNY YUBUFSNY) OBGYPOBMSHOSHI CHPPTHTSEOOSHI A LOT of uyb.

- b X OBU LBL VHDEF?

OILFP OE OBEF, LBL VHDEF X OBU, FBL LBL RPLB RPMKHYUBEFUS ZHTNEOOBS OEUKHTBOPUFSH.

preTBFYCHOPE LPNBODPCHBOYE PVTBHEFUS OE RPOSPHOP LBL, Ъ LPZP, LPZDB Y ЪBYUEN, Ъ LPNRMELFHEFUS OBVPTPN (TPUUSCHRSHA) VTYZBD, LPPTSHCHE DYUMPGYTHAFUS RP CHUEK U FTBOE Y RFPPN LBL-FP Y YuEN-FP RETEVTBUSHCHBAFUS ABOUT FEBFT CHPEOOSCHI DEKUFCHYK, B YUFP DBMSHYE OILFP OH PVYASUOYFSH, OH RPOSFSH OE NPTsEF.

OP CH PFMYUYE PF BTNYY uyb, tPUUYKULBS BTNYS OE VHDEF CHPECHBFSH CH bZHTYLE, CH BNETYLE, CH CHPUFPYUOPK YMY ATsOPK BYYY, POB VHDEF CHPECHBFSH RPYUFY YULMAYUYFEMSHOP ABOUT UPVUFCHOOOPK FET TYFPTYY, RPFPNKH PVSBOB YNEFSH UFBGYPOBTOSCH TEZYPOBMSHOSCH ZTHRRYTPCHLY CHPKUL, YuFP HCE DBCHOP UPJDBOP CH CHYDE CHPEOOSHCHY PLTHZPCH, OP FERETSH YNEOOOP POY RPDMETSBF OECHOSFOPK TELPOUFTHLGYY.

- b YuFP ChSCH ULBTSEFE P "YUBUFSI RPUFPSOOPK VPECHPK ZPFPCHOPUFY"?

OBN RTEDUFBCHMSEFUS, YuFP ЪDEUSH RTPYPYMB UNSHUMPCHBS PYYVLB, YUTECHBFBS UFTBFEZYUEULPK FTBZEDYEK. RETEIPD CHPEOOOPK PTZBOYBGYY UFTBOSH YULMAYUYFEMSHOP ABOUT "YUBUFY RPUFPSOOPK VPECHPK ZPFPCHOPUFY", FP EUFSH, YUBUFY URPUPVOSH OBYUBFSH Y CHEUFY VPECHSCHE DEKUFCHYS "OENEDMEOOOP RP UYZOBMKH ", RTYCHEDEF L FPNKH, YuFP ZPUKhDBTUFChP VKhDEF PVTEYUEOP OBUYOBFSH Y BLBOYUYCHBFSH CHPKOKH UPUFBCHPN CHPKUL NYTOPZP CHTENEOY, YuFP U FPULY ЪTEOYS UFTBFEZYY FEPTYY CHPKOSH SCHMSEFUS PYUECHYDOPK ZMHRPUFSHA YMY RTEUFKHROPK UFTBFEZYUEULPK PYYVLPK.

DEMP CH FPN, YUFP BTNYS NYTOPZP CHTENEY CHSCHRPMOYCH OBDBYUH OBYUBMSHOPZP RETYPDB CHPKOSHCH - PVEUREYUYFSH RETEIPD UFTBOSH OB TETSYN CHPEOOOPZP CHTENEY Y PFNPVYMYYPCHBOYE BTNYY CHPEOOZP CHTE NEOY, FP EUFSH FPK BTNYY, LPFPTBS Y DPMTSOB RPVEDPOPUOP ЪBCHETYYFSH CHPKOKH - LBL RTBCHYMP, ZYVOEF. OP TBCHETFSHCHBOYE BTNYY CHPEOOZP CHTENEY CHNPTSOP FPMSHLP ABOUT VBE YUBUFEK Y VB UPLTBEEOOOPZP UPUFBCHB, Y FPMSHLP RTY OBMYYUY ZPFPCHPZP TEETCHB PZHYGETULPZP LPTRKH UB.

dTKHZYNY UMPCHBNY RPVEDPOPUOBS BTNYS CHPEOOZP CHTENEY ZHTNYTHEFUS YЪ OBTPDOPZP IPЪSKUFCHB, FP EUFSH, YЪ OBGYY. OP YNEOOOP UFKH UFTBFEZYUEULHA CHPNPTSOPUFSH (Y OEPVIPDYNPUFSH) RTBLFYUEULY YULMAYUBEF DELMBTYTPCHBOOPE TEYOYE YNEFSH CH UPUFBCHE chPPTHCEOOOSHI UYM FPMSHLP YUBUFY RPUFPSO OPK ZPFPCHOPUFY, B CHUE YUBUFY UPLTBEEOOOPZP UPUFBCHB KHOYUFPTSYFSH.

fBLYN PVTBBPN, X OBU HOYUFPTSBEFUS VBBB NPVYMYBGYPOOPK RPDZPFPCHLY, Y VBBB NPVYMYBGYPOOPZP TBCHETFSHCHBOYS BTNYY CHPEOOZP CHTENEY, FP EUFSH NSCH ЪBTBOEE ZPFPCHYNUS OE CHEUFY YMY RTPYZTBFSH CHPKOKH.

- OH Y LBL NSCH ENTERED CHPECHBFSH Y WHERE IS THE OBVIOUS TEETCHCH?

UEZPDOS NSCH CHPPVEE OE URPUPVOSCH CHPECHBFSH DBTSE PFOPUYFEMSHOP DPMZP, B TEETCHPCH X OBU OEF. h PFMYYUYE PF BTNYY uyb CH OBYEK BTNYY UEKYUBU OE UHEEUFCHHEF OH PTZBOYPCHBOOPZP TEETCHB, OH OBGYPOBMSHOPK ZCHBTDDYY, LPFPTSCHE VSHCHMY VSH UPUFBCHOSCHNY YUBUFSNY CHPPTHTSEOOSHI UYM Y SCHMSMYUSH VSC UFTBFEZYUEULYN TEETCHPN.

h yub LBTSDSCHK CHYD CHPPTHTSEOOSHI UYM YNEEF UCHPK PTZBOYPCHBOOSCHK TEETCH, UPUFPSEYK YYFBFOSCHI YUBUFEK Y RPDTBDEMEOOK. ьFPF TEETCH ZHOLGYPOYTHEF CH NYTOP CHTENS CH LBUEUFCHE YFBFOSCHI YUBUFEK (HYUEVOSCHI VB) VHI RPDZPFPCHLY Y RETERPDZPFPCHLY UCHPEZP PUOPCHOPZP RETUPOBMB, FP EUFSH, MEFYUYLPCH, NPTSLPCH Y FBL DBMEE.

LFP YuFP OBUYF? yFP OBUYUF, YuFP PZHYGETSH Y UREGYBMYUFSH CHYDPC CHPPTHTSEOOSHI UYM KHIPDSF ABOUT ZTBTSDBOLKH, OP TBBCH ZPD, RP DPZPCHPTKH U BTNYEK, POYCH FEYUEOYE NEUSGB FTEOYTHAFUS CH UPUFBCHE UCHP YI TEETCHOSHI YUBUFEK Y YUBUFEK oBGYPOBMSHOPK ZCHBTDYY, UZhPTNYTPCHBOOSCHI CH ULBDTYMSHY, VBFBMSHPOSH, VTYZBDSHCH, LPTBVMY, YMY ULBDTSCH ABOUT JMPF, Y FBL DBMEE. sing FBN TBVPFBAF, B ZPUKhDBTUFChP YN ЪB LFP CHTENS RMBFYF, Y RP CHPKOye SING GEMSHNY UPEDOEOYSNY HIPDSF ABOUT CHPKOKH.

zPUKhDBTUFChP UREGYBMSHOP RMBFYF LFYN CHPEOOPUMHTSBEIN Y PZHYGETBN ЪBRBUB, ЪB YI RPUFPSOOHA RPDZPFPCHLH L DEKUFCHYSN. h CHPEOOPE CHTENS LFY YUBUFY UPUFBCHMSAF YUBUFSH ZTHRRYTPCHPL CHPKUL Y ChPAAF LBL YFBFOSH UPEDYOEOOYS BTNYY. uEZPDOS CH CHPKOBI uyb HYUBUFCHHAF PLPMP 200 FSCHUSYU PTZBOYPCHBOOSHI TEETCHYUFPCH Y OBGYPOBMSHOSHI ZCHBTDEKGECH.

pFUHFUFCHYE RPDZPFPCHMEOOOSCHY UFTBFEZYUYUEULYI TEETCHPCH chYDPCH CHPPTHTSEOOSHI UYM, RTY RTBLFYUEULPN PFUKHFUFCHYYI NPVYMYBGYPOOPK LPNRPOEOFSH Y UTEDUFCH UFTBF EZYUUEULPZP NETSFEBFTPPCHPZP NBOECHTB UYMBNY Y UTEDUFCHBNY, YULMAYUBEF CHPNPTSOPUFSH DMS TPUUYY CHEUFY KHURYOKHA ChPKOKH MAVPZP NBUYFBVB Y KhTPCHOS DBTSE ABOUT UPWUFCHOOOPK FETT YFPTYY.

ьФБ ЗПТШЛБС РТБЧДБ РТБЛФИУУУLY OE PUFBCHMSEF OBN CHPNPTSOPUFY OE RTEDRTYOINBFSH OOETZYUOSCHI NO DMS KHUFTBOEOYS LFPC OBEK PVAELFYCHOPK UFTBFEZYUEULPK HEETVOPUFY.

LTBKOE CHBTsOP, YuFPVSH OBYB CHCHUYBS CHMBUFSH RPOSMB, YuFP BTNYS tPUUYY BTNYS uyb OE NPZHF VShchFSH YDEOFYUOSCHNY RP UFTHLFKHTE, FBL LBL POY RTEDOBYOOSH DMS TEYEOYS UPCHETYEO OP TBOSHI UFTBFEZYUEULYI OBDBYU.

bNETYLB CHUEZDB VKhDEF CHEUFY BZTEUUYCHOHA CHPKOKH ABOUT YUKHTSYI FETTYFPTYSI U YURPMSHЪPCHBOYEN UCHPYI CHPPTHTSEOOSHI UYM LUREDYGYPOOPZP RMBOB, RTY PVEUREYOOYY VE'PRBUOPUFY UCHPEK OBGYPOBMSHOPK FETTYFPTYY DCHHNS PLEBOBNY, DTHCEUFCHEOOSCHNY UPUEDSNY UCHPEK BTNYEK. yNEOOP PFUADB YUIPDSF CHUE LFY TBKPOSH rtp CH SRPOYY YECHTPREY "CHPKOSHCH CH OBMYCHE", Y BNETYLB YOBYUE TSYFSH OE NPTSEF Y OE VHDEF.

x tPUUYY UPCHETYEOOP DTHZBS YUFPTYYUEULBS Y CHPEOOBS UHDSHVB - NSCH VKhDEN UETSHEOP CHPECHBFSH FPMSHLP ABOUT UCHPEK UPVUFCHOOOPK FETTYFPTYY, RTY PZTPNOSCHI RHUFSHCHI OEBEYEEOOOSCHI RTPUFTBOUFCHBI Y ZTBOIGBI, Y CH HUMPCHYSI CHUEZDB CHTBTSDEVOZP PLTHTSEOYS.

rПФПНХ Х OBU ЪБДББУБ ПВEWЭУИФШ ЗПФПЧШЧШЧШХРРИТПЧLY ChPKUL OB FEBFTBI CHPKOSHCH RTEDEMBI UCHPYI ZTBOIG, Y PVEUREYUYFSH UFTBFEZYUEULHA HSCHYNPUFSH OBGYPOBMSHOPK FETTY FPTYY yub .

- fBL NPTSEF VSHCHFSH YNEEF UNSHUM UPJDBFSH FBLPK PTZBOYPCHBOOSCHK TEETCH?

LPOYOOOP. chYDYFE, FBLBS NSCHUMSH RPSCHYMBUSH X CHBU RTBLFYUEULY UTBH, OP, L UPTSBMEOYA NSCH RTEDMBZBEN UDEMBFSH LFP HCE 15 MEF, Y CHUEN nyYUFTBN PVPTPOSCH, OP CHUE VEUFPMLH, FB L LBL RPIPTSE, YuFP CH ZEOETBMSHOPN yFBVE Y NYOYUFETUFCHE PVPTPPOSH KHCE OE PUFBMPUSH MADEK URPUPVOSHI RPOSFSH P YUEN CHPPVEE YDEF TEYUSH.

uEZPDOS EUFSH HOILBMSHOBS CHPNPTSOPUFSH UPDBFSH PTZBOYPCHBOOSCHK TEETCH chPPTHTSEOOSHI UYM tPUUYKULPK ZHEDETBGYY, YURPMSHЪPCHBFSH DMS LFPP CHUE 300 FSCHUSYU UPLTBEBENSHI P ZHYGETPCH Y RTBRPTEYLPCH, Y OE YURPMSHЪPCHBFSH BFKH CHPNPTSOPUFSH ZPUKHDBTUFCHP OE YNEEF RTBCHP.

- b YUFP ChSCH ULBTSEFE PV HOYUFPTSEOY YOUFYFHFB RTBRPTEYLPCH?

FP CE UBNPE U RTBRPTEILBNY - RPMOBS ETHODB. rPFPNH YFP, HOYUFPTSBS PDYO YOUFYFHF NMBDYYI LPNBODYTPCH, PO OYUEN OE EBNEOSEFUS, OP YNEOOOP NMBDYYE LPNBODYTSCH EUFSH LPUFSL BTNYY.

HOYUFPTSEOYE YOUFYFHFB RTBRPTEYLPCH EUFSH HOYUFPTSEOYE OE "RETUPOBTSEK BOELDPFPCH", B KHOYUFPTSEOYE PUOPCHOPZP UMPS FEIOYUEULYI UREGYBMYUFPCH, LPFPTSCHK URPUPVEO, B RP CHPKOE Y RTEDOBOBYEO ЪBOINBFSH PZHYGETULYE DPMTSOPUFY.

uПЪДБФШ UPCHTENEOOKHA BTNYA VEЪ LCHBMYZHYYTPCHBOOSCHI UREGYBMYUFPCH OECHPNPTSOP.

LUFBFY, CH BTNYY yub FBLPC RPIPTSYK YOUFYFHF UHEEUFCHHEF, Y OBSCHCHBEFUS warrant officers, RETECHEDEN LFP LBL “RPDPZHYGETSCH”.

- sing IPFSF UDEMBFSH YI UFBTYOBNYY Y UETZBOFBNY YB FE TSE DEOSHZY.

IPFEFSH OE CHTEDOP, OP LFP UDEMBFSH VSHUFTP Y LBUEUFCHOOOP OECHPNPTSOP.

ъBNEOB RTBRPTEYLPCH ABOUT UETSBOFPCH LPOFTBLFOYLPCH OECHPNPTSOB HCE RPFPNKH, YuFP LFYI UBNSHCH "LPOFTBLFOYLPCH" Ch ChPKULBI RTBLFYUEULY OE UHEEUFCHHEF, Y OILFP YЪ RTBRP TAILLPCH UMKHTSBEYI UEZPDOS OE ЪBIPIUEF HIKHDIBFSH UCHPK PVEEUFCHEOOSCHK UFBFKHU, Y X OBU PRSFSH RPMKHYUIFUS "LBL CHUEZDB".

h bNETYLE H MAVPK DYCHYYYY ABOUT RMBGH EUFSH FTY RPTFTEFB - LPNBODYT DYCHYYYY, OBYUBMSHOYL YFBVB DYCHYYYYY DYCHYYPOOSCHK UETSBOF.

h BTNYY yyb UHEEUFCHHEF RTPZHEUUYPOBMSHOBS UETSBOFULBS CHETFYLBMSH PF TPFSCH DP reOFBZPOB. fP UBNPUFPSFEMSHOBS RTPZHEUUYPOBMSHOBS CHPEOOBS CHETFYLBMSH, CH TBNLBI LPFPTPK NPTsOP UDEMBFSH LBTSHETKH RP UETSBOFULPK MYOYY. h TBNLBI LFPC UETSBOFULPK CHETFYLBMY TEYBAFUS CHUE CHPRPTUSCH UMKHTSVSHCH, VSHFB, TBBNEEEOYS, ЪBTRMBF, MEUEOOYS, PVTBBPCHBOYS, RPUFHRMEOYS h PZHYGETULYE HYYMYEB YMY LHT USCH, CHPRPTUSCH UPGYBMSHOSHI ZBTBOFYK CHUEZP UETSBOFULPZP UPUMPCHYS.

OBDP ULBJBFSH, YuFP YNEOOOP UETSBOFSHY RPDPZHYGETSH LPNBODHAF TBUYUEFBNY, PFDEMEOSNYY CHYCHPDBNY, VPECHSHCHNYYUBUFSNYY PVKHYUBAF CHPKULB, LHTUBOFPCH CHPEOOSHCHY HYUMYE YD BCE PZHYGETPCH UCHPEK VPECHPK UREGYBMSHOPUFY, OBRTYNET - RTPCHPDSF ЪBOSFYS RP UFTPECHPK, ZHJYYUUEULPK, ​​YOTSEOETOPEK, NEDYGYOULPK, ​​IYNYUUEULPK RPDZPFPCHLE Y FBL DBMEE.

th LFP UBNPE KHCHBTSBENPE CHPEOOPE UPUMPCHYE CH BNETYLE. lPZDB S FBN LBL-FP TBUULBJBM TBNUZHEMSHDH, YuFP S CH LPOGE UKHCHPTPCHULPZP HYUMYEB PLPYUYM RPMLPCHHA UETSBOFULHA YLPMH Y RPMKHYUM LCHBMYZHYLBGYA UETSBOFB, BY ULB ЪБМ: “S U FPVPK, bMELUBODT, RPKDH CH MAVPC VPK Y ABOUT MAVP DEMP.”

- LEN CHSHCH TBZPCHBTYCHBMY?

U VHDHEIN NYOYUFTPN PVPTPPOSH yub dPOBMSHDPN tBNUZHEMSHDPN.

- bMELUBODT YCHBOPCHYU, YUFP CE VHDEF U PZHYGETULIN LPTRHUPN tPUUYY?

CHCH ЪOBEFE, LFP PZTPNOBS Y PFDEMSHOBS FENB, OP DMS tPUUYY ЪFB FENB CHEWOBS Y ZMBCHOBS, FBL LBL, CH LPOYUOPN UUEFE, pFEYUEUFChP ЪBEYEBMY Y URBUBMY UCHPYNY TSYOSN Y FPMSHLP TPUUYKULYE UPMDBFSH Y PZHYGETSCH.

lPOYUOP TPUUYKULPE PVEEUFChP KHBTSBEF Y GEOIF UCHPYI PZHYGETPCH, Y PUPVEOOOP LFP RTPSCHMSMPUSH RPUME CHUEI OBYI CHEMILYI pFEYUEUFCHEOOSCHI CHPKO.

rTBCHDB RPFPN RPMKHYUBMPUSH, YuFP CH NYTOP CHTENS YI MKHYUYE NPTBMSHOSHE Y DEMPCHCHE LBUEUFCHB PLBSCHCHBMYUSH OE CHPUFTEVPCHBOOSCHNY ZPUKHDBTUFCHPN, FBL LBL CH TEKHMSHFBFE CHPKO OB ZhTPOFE RPZYVBMY MKHYUYE, B L CHMBUFY RTYIPDIMY CH FSHMH CHCHCHYCHYE, DMS LPFPTSCHI ZMBCHOSCHN VSHMB MPSMSHOPUFSH.

lPOYUOP RTELTBUOP, YuFP UEZPDOS TEYOP DBFSH PZHYGETBN LCHBTFYTSCH Y DPUFPKOPE DEOOTSOPE UPDETSBOYE, YuEZP, LUFBFY, TPUUYKULYE PZHYGETSCH, YUFPTTYYUEULY OE YNEMY OILZDB.

prbuoschn NPTSEF VSCHFSH FP, YuFP RPLB NSCH UFTTPYN LFY LCHBTFYTSCH YEEN DEOSHZY - OE PUFBOEFUS MADEK URPUUPVOSHHI LFYI PZHYGETPCH OBKHYUFSH RTPZHEUUYPOBMSHOP Y RPVEDPOPUOP CHPECHBFSH . fP EUFSH, RPZPMPCHOP UPLTBBEBS PZHYGETULYK UPUFBCH NSCH PRSFSH VKhDEN PZKHMSHOP KHCHPMSHOSFSH UBNSHHI PRSCHFOSHCHI, OBAEYI, RTPZHEUUIPOBMSHOSCHY Y OEHUFHRYUCHSHI, B PUFBCHMSFSH "NPMPDSCHY D" P DEOEZ TSHSOSCHI.”

rPCHETSHFE, YuFP KHChPMSHOSFSH VPECHPZP PZHYGETB CH 50-55 MEF, VPECHPZP ZEOETBMB CH 60 - RTEUFKHROP, FBL LBL HIPDSF CHUEZDB MKHYUYE, B OB YI NEUFP RPYUENH-FP CHUEZDB RTYIPDSF VEDDBTY Y OZBFYCHOSCHK LBDTPCHSHCHK PFVPT RTDDPMTSBEFUS. - fBL OBDP KHCHPMYFSH 200 ZEOETBMPCH YMY OEF?

PFCHEF OE NPTsEF VShchFSH RTPUFSHCHN.

chP-RETCHI. oBDP RPOINBFSH, YuFP ZEOETBM LFP OE RETUPOBTs DMS BOELDPFPCH, OE DPMTSOPUFSH YMY NBMSHYUIL DMS VYFSHS Y OE NYYEOSH DMS RTBCHPBEYFOILPC.

ZEOETBMSH UPUFBCHMSAF CHCHUYIK LPNBODOSHCHK UPUFBCH OBGYY. VE ZEOETBMPCH OE NPZHF UKHEEUFCHPCHBFSH CHPPTHTSEOOSCH UYMSCH. VE ZEOETBMPCH OE CHEMBUSH Y OE CHSHYZTSCHCHBMBUSH OH PDOB CHPKOB, Y YUEN RTPZHEUUIPOBMSHOE VSHMY ZEOETBMSH, FEN NEOSHYEK LTPCHSHA DBCHBMBUSH RPVEDB.

zEOETBM chPPTTHTSEOOSHI UYM tPUUYY, LFP MHYUYEE, YFP URPUPVOP RTPY'CHEUFY OBUY ZPUKHDBTUFChP Y PVEEUFChP, Y LFP LCHYOFYUUEOGYS CHUEI MHYUYI VPECHSHCHI, PTZBOYBGYPOOSHI, NPTBMSHOSHI LBUEUFCH, PVEEK LHMSHFHTSCH Y UFTBFEZYUEULYI FBMBOFPCH.

zEOETBM, LFP RTETSDE CHUEZP YUEMPCHEL, LPFPTSCHK: YЪOBYUBMSHOP CHSHCHVTBM UCHPEA UHDSHVPA UMHTSEOYE UCHPENH pFEYUEFCHH ABOUT CHPYOULPN RPRTYEE; RTYOSM CHPYOULHA rTYUSZH; RPMHYUM UREGYBMSHOP RTPZHEUUYPOBMSHOPE PVTBPCHBOYE; DPLBЪBM UPVUFCHEOOSCHK RTPZHEUUYPOBMYYN, FP EUFSH UCHPA URPUPVOPUFSH LZHZHELFYCHOP KHRTBCHMSFSH VPMSHYYNY NBUUBNY MADEK, FEIOILY Y UTEDUFCH; UCHPYN FTKhDPN, FP EUFSH UCHPEA DPMZPK Y VEURPTPYuOPK UMKHTSVPK UDEMBM CH BTNYY LBTSHETKH, YUEN Y ЪBUMHTSYM LFP CHSHCHUPLPE CHYOULPE ЪCHBOYE.

vPMEE FPZP, ЪOBA RP UEVE, YuFPVSH UFBFSH ZEOETBMPN, OBDP CHUA TSYOSH "FSOKhFSH MSNLKH", DEMPN DPLBSCHBS UEVE Y DTHZYN, YuFP FSH MHYUYK. h LFPN TSEUFLPN LPOLKHTUE DPUFPKOSCHI RPVETSDBAF UPCHUEN OE CHUE - ZEOETBMBNY UFBOPCHSFUS EDYOYGSHCH Y, LBL RTBCHYMP - MKHYUYE.

ZEOETBM, LFP CHUEZDB ZPUKHDBTUFCHEOIL Y RBFTIPF tPUUYY, FBL LBL CH UMKHTSEOYY EK Y EUFSH CHEUSH UNSHUM EZP TSYYOY.

zEOETBM, LFP, RTETSDE CHUEZP - PMYGEFCHPTEOYE CHCHUYEK ZPUKHDBTUFCHEOOPK CHMBUFY, YuEMPCHEL LPFPTSCHK LPNBODHS EDYOPOBYUBMSHOP, PVSBO MYUOP RTOYNBFSH TEYEOYS Y PFDBCHBFSH RTY LBSCH UCHPYN RPDYUYOOOSCHN, CH FPN YUYUME Y FE, CHSHRPMOEE LPFPTSCHI UCHSBOP U OEYVETSOPUFSHA YI ZYVEMY Y FTEVPPCHBFSH YI CHSHCHRPMOEOYS PE YNS CHSHCHRPMOEOYS RPUFBCHMEOOOPK ЪBDBUY , CH MAVSHHI HUMPCHYSI PWUFBOPCHLY.

ZEOETBM, LFP YUEMPCHEL KHNEAEIK PTZBOYPCHCHCHBFSH Y HRTBCHMSFSH, FP EUFSH NEOOEDCET CHUYEK LCHBMYZHYLBGYY, LPFPTBS RPUFEREOOP RTYPVTVTEFBMBUSH NOPZPMEFOYN PRSCHFPN RTBLFYUE ULPZP THLPCHPDUFCHB CHPYOULINY LPMMELFYCHBNY, PF OEULPMSHLYI DEUSFLPCH UPMDBF Y UETSBOFPCH, DP NOPZYI DEUSFLPCH Y UPFEO FSHUSYU RPDYYOOOSCHI ENKH MADEK .

zEOETBM, LFP YUEMPCHEL LPOLTEFOPZP DEMB, ETSEDOECHOP, LTPNE CHPRTPUPCH VPECHPK ZPFPCHOPUFY Y PECHPK RPDZPFPCHLY, TEYBAEIK CHPRPTUSCH TsYOEPVEUREYUEOYS UCHPYI CHPKUL. rP UPVUFCHEOOPNH PRSHCHFH ЪOBA, YuFP TEYEOYE CHPRTPUPCH LLPOPNYUEULPZP Y IP'SKUFCHEOOPZP RMBOPCH ЪBOINBAF DP 80% CHTENEY LPNBOYTPCH CHUEI KHTPCHOEK, FBL LBL MYYUOSCHK UPUFB CH OBDP TBNEEBFSH, PVPZTECHBFSH, CH MAVSHCHI HUMPCHYSI LPTNYFSH FTY TBBB CH DEOSH, MEYUYFSH, TBCHMELBFSH Y FBL DBMEE, YuFP CH OSHCHOEYOAA TSCHOPYUOKHA LRPHIH - OERTPUFP.

zEOETBM, LFP OBUFPSEYK CHPEOOSHCHK RTPZHEUYPOBM, FP EUFSH UREGYBMYUF RP KHRTBCHMEOYA OBUYMYEN. yFP OBYUYF, YuFP FPMSHLP ZEOETBMSH chPPTHTSEOOSHI UYM (UREGYBMSHOP PVHYUEOOOSCH, URPUPVOSCH PTZBOYPCHCHBFSH Y KHRTBCHMSFSH VPECHSHNY DEKUFCHYSNY H PRETBGYSI PVEECHPKULPCHPZP NBUYFBVB, FP EUFSH FENY, CH LPFPTSCHI RTYNEOSAFUS TBMYUOSCH CHYDSCH CHPPTHTSEOOSCHI UYM Y TPDB CHPKUL) - SCHMSAFUS RPDMYOOSHNY CHPEOOOSCHNY RTPZHEUYPOBMBNY, FPZDB LBL DTHZIE ZE OETBMSCH - VEKHUMPCHOP , FPTsE SCHMSAFUS RTPZHEUUYPOBMBNY, OP CH UCHPYI RTPZHEUUYPOBMSHOSHI, OECHPEOOOSCHI UZHETBI.

ZEOETBM, LFP YUEMPCHEL TEYFEMSHOSCHK Y PFCHEFUFCHEOOSCHK, PO, LBL EDYOPOBYUBMSHOIL - CHUEZDB Y MYUOP PFCHEYUBEF JB LBYUEFChP Y RPUMEDUFCHYS RTYOINBENSHI YN TEYEOYK.

zEOETBM, LFP YUEMPCHEL ЪBLPOB Y RTBCHB, YVP FPMSHLP FBL ON NPTsEF Y DPMTSEO THLPCHPDYFSH MADSHNY.

zEOETBM, LFP YUEMPCHEL DYUGYRMYOSCH Y UKHVPTDYOBGYY, FBL LBL VEJ FYI VBPCHSHCHI OBYUBM OE NPTSEF UKHEEUFCHPCHBFSH bTNYS.

zEOETBM, LFP YUMEO ZPUKHDBTUFCHOOOPK LPTRPTBGYY, LPFPTBS OBSCHCHBEFUS bTNYEK Y RPDYYOSEFUS EE CHOKHFTEOOEK LFYLE.

zEOETBM, LFP CHUEZDB YUMEO LPMMELFYCHB, Y FPZP, LPFPTSCHN YNEEF YUEUFSH LPNBODPCHBFSH, Y FPZP, CH UPUFBCH LPFPTZP CHIPDIF EZP UPEDYEOYE.

zEOETBM, LFP YUEMPCHEL IPTPYP PVTBPCHBOOSCHK. YuFPVSH UFBFSH ZEOETBMPN, PO, CH IPDE UMHTSVSHCH, RPMKHYUBEF DCHB - FTY CHCHUYI PVTBPBCHBOYS.

ZEOETBM OE NPTSEF VSHFSH "UCHBDEVOSCHN". LUFBFY, "RTY GBTSI", LPFPTSCHE, LBL RTBCHYMP, VShchMY RPMLPCHOILBNY, VShchFSH "RTPY'CHEDEOOSCHN CH BDNYTBMSCH", NPTsOP VShchMP FPMSHLP FPZDB, LPZDB NPTULPC PZHYGET "ChShchRMSCHCHBM" UChPK "BD" NYTBMSHULYK GEO", LPNBODHS VPECHSHCHN LPTBVMEN, B BTNEKULYK PZHYGET Refinery UFBFSH ZEOETBMPN, FPMSHLP LPNBODHS DYCHYYEK.

ZEOETBM DPMTSEO VShchFSH MYUOPUFSHA, VShchFSH CHUEUFPTPOOE TBCHYFSHCHN YUEMPCHELPN, KHNEFSH TBVPFBFSH U MADSHNY, CHPURYFSHCHBFSH YI MYUOSCHN RTYNETPN Y CHUEZDB "YNEFSH YUEUFSH".

CHUE CHCHYERETEYUMEOOPE, SCHMSEFUS OE YUYUETRSHCHBAEIN URYULPN ZEOETBMSHULYI (PZHYGETULYI) DPUFPYOUFCH, OP YNNBOEOFOP RTYUKHEINY, VBPCHSHCHN LBYUEUFCHBNY Y FTEVPCHBOYS NY L ZEOETBMBN BTNYY, VE LPFPTSCHI "ZEOETBMB" VSHFSHOE NPTsEF.

l UPTSBMEOYA, FBL VSHCHCHBEF OE CHUEZDB Y NSH OE OBVMADBEN LFYI LBUEUFCH H NOPZYI OBUYI YUOPCH ZPUKHDBTUFCHEOOPK CHMBUFY, RPFPNH Y YNEEN FP, YuFP YNEEN.

OBDP IPTPYP RPOINBFSH, YuFP ZEOETBMSH VETHFUS FPMSHLP YPZHYGETPCH. yFP OBYUYF, YuFP CHUS UYUFENB OBGYPOBMSHOPZP CHPEOOOPZP RTPZHEUYPOBMSHOPZP PVTBBPCHBOYS, PF UKHCHPTPCHULPZP CHPEOOOPZP HYUMYEB Y DP BLBDENYY ZEOETBMSHOPZP YFBVSHCH, Y UBNB UYUFENB RTPIPTSDEOOIS CHPEOOOPK UMKHTSVSH PZHYGETBNY tPUUY DPMTSOSCH CHPURYFSHCHBFSH Y PFVYTBFSH YI FBLYN PVTBBPN, YUFP VSH YJ MHYUYI PZHYGETPCH RTPYCHPDYMYUSH MHYU YIE ZEOETBMSH.

chP-CHFPTSCHI. xUFBOBCHMYCHBFSH YUYUMEOOPUFSH ZEOETBMPCH H RTPGEOFOPN PFOPYEOYY L LPMYUEUFCHH UPMDBF YMY PZHYGETPCH, YMY TBCHOSSUSH ABOUT LBLPC-FP ЪBTHVETSOSCHK PRSHCHF - RPMOBS OELPNREFEOPHOPU FS, YUKHYSH Y CHTEDYFEMSHUFCHP.

h-FTEFSHYI. oPTNBMSHOBS YUYUMEOOPUFSH ZEOETBMPCH ЪBCHYUYF FPMSHLP:

PF ЪБДБУ БТНІІ, Б ЪБУИФ PF EE UFTHHLFHTSCH Y LPMYUEUFCHB YFBFOSCHI ZEOETBMSHULYI DPMTSOPUFEK CH OEK;

PF NBUYFBVB Y GEMEUPPVTBOBOOPUFY CHPEOOSCHI RTEDUFBCHYFEMSHULYI ZHKHOLGYK Y REDBZPZYUEULYI OBDBYU.

OBRTYNET, OEMSHЪS, YULMAYUYFEMSHOP CH GEMSI LLPOPNYY, DEMBFSH DPMTSOPUFSH o BYUBMSHOILB UKHCHPTCHULPZP HYUMYEB OE ZEOETBMSHULPK (UEKYBU, LFP RPMLPCHOIL), FBL LBL DMS UPFEO NBMSHYUYYEL-UKHCHPTTPCHGECH, oBYUBMSHOIL HYUMYEB, LFP - vBFS, Y OBZMSDOSHCHK RTYNET KhDBUOPK, ЪBUMHTSEOOPK Y UMBCHOPK CHPEOOPK UHDSHVSH L YUENKH OBDP UFTENYFSHUS, Y FBL DBMEE.

h-YUEFCHETFSHI. ьLPOPNYFSH ABOUT ZEOETBMBI OBDP WHAT'S HERE NPTsOP, CHLMAYUBS nchd, nyu, rTPLHTBFHTH, fBNPTSOA, AUFYGYA Y FBL DBMEE, OP FPMSHLP OE CH BTNYY, FP EUFSH OE CH CHPKULBI, FBL LBL Y AND UPCHPLHROBS UMKHTSEVOBS OBZTHYLB OE UPRPUFBCHYNB.

fBL YuFP NOPZP KH OBU ZEOETBMPCH YMY YI OE ICHBFBEF, OBDP CHOINBFEMSHOP TBVYTBFSHUS Y PVDKHNBOOP Y OE NEMPUOP TEYBFSH.

ZMBCHOPE OE CH FPN, ULPMSHLP KH OBU ZEOETBMPCH, B CH FPN, ЪB LBLYE ЪBUMHZY POY RPMKHYUBAF UCHPE ЪChBOYE.- OBCHETOPE, FERETSH UBNPE CHTENS ЪBDBFSH CHPRTPU P CHPEOOPN RTPZHEUUYPOB MSHOPN PVTBPCHBOYY. eUFSH YOZHPTNBGYS, YuFP UPLTBEBAFUS 65 CHPEOOSCHI KHYUMYE, PUFBOEFUS FPMSHLP OEULPMSHLP CHPEOOSCHI BLBDENYK Y RPSCHSFUS LBLYE-FP HYUEVOSCHE GEOFTSHCH, UZHTNYTPCHBOOSCH R P FETTYFPTYBMSHOPNH RTYOBLH, Y FBL DBMEE, CH PVEEN UMKHIY UBNSH OECHETPSFOSCH.

CH PVEEN, CHUE YUFP CHCH ZPCHPTYFE ZDE-FP VMYЪLP L FELUFKH, Y, RPЪCHPMSHFE S VKHDH ZPCHPTYFSH OE P LPMYUEUFCHE UPLTBEBENSCHK YMY RETEDYUMPGYTHENSHI chchkhPCH, B P UHFY UBNPK TE ZhPTNSCH CHPEOOOPZP RTPZHEUYPOBMSHOPZP PVTBPBCHBOYS.

with UYYFBA, YuFP CHPEOOPE RTPZHEUYPOBMSHOPE PVTBBPCHBOYE, LFP RTBLFYUEULY UBNPE ZMBCHOPE ЪCHOP CHPEOOOPK TEZHPTNSHCH, LPFPTPPE, RTY EZP RTBCHYMSHOPN YURPMOEOYY, URPUPVOP D BFSH tPUUYKULPK BTNYY OPCHPE RPVEDIFEMSHOPE LBYUEUFChP.

bFB TEZHPTNB ЪBDKHNBOB YTPLLP Y TECHPMAGYPOOP, Y S IPTPYP OBA CHUE CHPTBTSEOYS RTPPHYCH OEE: CH PUOPCHOPN bFP RTPFEUFSH RTPPHYCH CHCHCHEDEOYS BLBDENYK YЪ ZPTPDPCH, CH YUBUFOPUFY Y NPULCHSHCH, Y CHPNPTSOPUFSH RPFETY "CHPEOOOSCHI OBKHYOSHI YLPM".

UEKYUBU S ULBTSKH CHESH "LTBNMSHOHA", OP, PFCHEFUFCHEOOP ЪBSCHMSA chBN, YuFP CH TPUUYYY BTNYY CHUEZDB VSHMY VMEUFSEE PVTBBPCHBOOSCH PZHYGETSCHY ZEOETBMSHCH, OP OE VSHMP LBUEUFCHE OOPZP RTPZHEUUYPOBMSHOPZP CHPEOOOPZP PVTBPBCHBOYS. UEKYUBU OE NEUFP URPTYFSH PV LFPN, HC RPCHETSHFENOE LBL PFMYUOILH CHUEI MHYUYI CHPEOOSCHI HYUMIE Y CHPEOOSCHI BLBDENYK UPCHEFULPK BTNYY.

UEZPDOS RPMPTSEOYE NOPZPLTBFOP IHTSE YUEN CH UPCHEFULPE CHTENS, FBL LBL NYT Y CHPEOOPE DEMP YYNEOYMPUSH, B OBYB OBGYPOBMSHOBS CHPEOOBS NSCHUMSH NETFCHB: UPCHEFULBS CHPEOOBS NSCHUMSH - ЪB LPOYUMBUSH, B TPUUYKULPK CHPEOOOPK NSCHUMY RTPUFP OEF.

lPOYUOP, X OBU PUFBMYUSH RTYLMBDOSH CHPEOOSH OBHYUOSCH YLPMSCH, OBRTYNET, CH BCHYBGYY, X YOTSEOETPCH, IYNYYLPCH Y TBLEFUYLLPCH, Y FBL DBMEE, OP UEZPDOS DBCE LFY CHEY DPMTSOSCH YNEFSH OE CHEDPNUFCHEOOP-CHYDPCHA, B OBGYPOBMSHOHHA RTYOBDMETSOPUFSH Y YNEFSH DTHZIE, ZHEDETBMSHOSHOSHE NBUYFBVSHCH.

lTPNE FPZP, PUOPCHOSCHE ZHPODSCH CHPEOOSCHI KHYUMIE OBUFPMSHLP UFBTSHCH, YuFP OE UPPFCHEFUFCHHAF OILBLINE UCHTENEOOOSCHN FTEVPCHBOYSN DMS OPTNBMSHOPK HYUEVSHCH Y TSYOY UCHPYI CHPURYFBOoilPCH , RTPUFP CHUE UZOYMP Y OBN OHTSOB OPCHBS YOZHTBUFTKHLFKHTB RTPZHEUUYPOBMSHOPZP CHPEOOOPZP PVTBPBCHBOYS.

with UYUFBA, YuFP KHYYMYEB Y BLBDENYY OBDP YЪ VPMSHYYI ZPTPDPCH, PUPVEOOOP YЪ nPULCHSHCHCHCHPDYFSH, FBL LBL CHUE NEZBRPMYUSCH LFP TBUUBDOYL OTBCHUFCHEOOPK ЪBTБШCH. lPOYUOP, CHCHCHPDYFSH HYUMYEB Y BLBDENYY OBDP OE CH RPME, B OB OPCHHA UPCHTENEOOHA YOZHTBUFTHLFHTH, Y LFP DEMP OEPVIPDYNPE, OP Y OE ULPTPE, Y LFP DPMTSOSCH RPOINBFSH CHUE . Chue TBZPCHPTSH P FPN, YuFP "RTERPDBCHBFEMY OE RPEDHF YЪ nPULCHSHCH". bFP PF MHLBCHPZP, FBL LBL UEKYUBU CH HYUMYEBI CH PUOPCHOPN RTERPDBAF Y LPNBODHAF OYZDE UETSHEOP OE UMKHTSYCHYE YI CHSHCHRKHULOILY, LPFPTSHCHE OBKHUYFSH FPMLPN OYLPZP OE NPZHF , ЪBFP YNEAF CH nPULCHE LCHBTFYTSCH.

lPOYUOP, NSCH PVSBOSH UPJDBFSH CH OPCHSHCHI NEUFBI DYUMPLBGYY HYUMYE Y HYUEVOSCHI GEOFTPCH RTELTBUOSCH HUMPCHYS DMS TSYYOY DESFEMSHOPUFY RTPZHEUUPTULP-RTERPDBCHBFEMSHULZP UPUFB BW.

rMBOITKHENSHCHE HYUEVOSHCH GEOFTSHCH DPMTSOSCH PVEUREYUYCHBFSH RPDZPFPCHLH Y RETERPDZPFPCHLH PZHYGETULPZP UPUFBCHB CHYDPC CHPPTHTSEOOSHI UYM, OBRTYNET CHUEI TPDPCH CHPKUL, LFP CHEDEF PVEECHPKUL PChPK VPK ABOUT EARS, Y LFP RTBCHYMSHOP OBRTBCHMEOYE.

chBTsOP FBLCE, YuFP VHDHF RPSCHMSFSHUS CHETFYLBMY CHPEOOPZP RTPZHEUUYPOBMSHOPZP PVTBBPCHBOYS ZHTNYTHAEYE LPNBODOSHK UPUFBCH BTNYY. OBRTYNET, UHCHPTPCHULYE HYYMYEB, CHCHUYYE CHPEOOSH HYYMYEB Y CHOOOSHE BLBDENYY VHDHF YNEFSH CHYDPPCHHA DYZHZHETEOGYBGYA, LPFPTBS RPJCHPMYF ZPFPCHYFSH PZHYGETB U DEFUFCH B.

fBL tPDYOB ZPFPCHYMB, OBRTYNET, NEOS Y PZHYGETPCH NPEZP RETCHPZP RPUMECHPEOOOPZP RPLPMEOYS, U DEUSFY MEF CHPURYFSHCHBS OBU CH YuEUFY, dPVMEUFY, dPVTE Y lTBUPFE.

ъDEUSH FBLTSE CHBTsOP, YuFPVSH UKHCHPTPCHULYE CHPEOOSH KHYUMYEB, L OBYENKH UYUBUFSHHA HCE RETECHEDEOOSCH RTYLBBPN boOBFPMYS UETDALPCHB ABOUT 7-MEFOIK GYLM PVHYUEOYS (LUFBFY LFPZP, OEUNPFTS ABOUT OBY RPUFPSOOSCH RPUSHVSHY FTEVPCBOYS, OE UDEMBM OH PDYO "CHPEOOSHCHK NYOYUFT"), DBCHBMY VSC UCHPYN CHPURYFBOoilBN OE FPMSHLP LBUEUFCHEOOPE UTEDOEE PVTBBPCHBOYE Y LBDEFULP CHPURYFBOYE, OP Y DBCHBMY VSHCH YN OBYUBMSHOKHA RTPZHEUUYPOBMSHOKHA CHPEOOKHA RPDZPFPCHLH, OBRTYNET, RP CHSHCHRHULH, LCHB MYZHYLBGYA UETSBOFB - LPNBODYTB PFDEMEOYS YMY ЪBNEUFIFEMS LPNBODYTB NPFPUFTEMLPCHPZP CHJCHPDB. fFP RPJCHPMYMP VSHCHSHCHRKHULOILBN RPUFKHRBFSH UTBKH ABOUT CHFPTPK LHTU UPPFCHEFUFCHHAEEZP CHPEOOZP HYUMYEB VEЪLBNEOPCH Y ZHTNYTPCHBMP VSC OBUFPSEHA CHPEOOKHA RTPZHEUU YPOBMSHOHA LPTRPTBGYA TPUUYKULYI PZHYGETPCH.

lPOYUOP, DMS bFPZP OHTSOSCH DTHZIE PVTBBPCHBFEMSHOSHE UFBODBTFSHCH, DTHZIE PZHYGETSCH CHPURYFBFEMY, DTHZBS HYUEVOBS VBBYY DTHZIE FTEVPCHBOYS L HYUMYEBN, OP CHUE LFP KHTS E NPTsOP DEMBFSH.

OP UBNPE CHBTsOPE - OBN OHTSOSCH RTYOGYRYBMSHOP DTHZIE HYUEVOSCH RTPZTBNNSHCH, RMBOSCH Y UBNY RPDIDDSCH L RTPZHEUUYPOBMSHOPNH CHPEOOPNKH PVTBPCHBOYA, Y, LPOYUOP, TBTBVPFBOOBS ZPUKH DBTUFCHEOOBS YDEPMPZYK CHPEOOOPK UMKHTSVSHCH Y LFYLB PZHYGETULPZP LPTRKHUB bTNYY.

yFP OBUYUF, YuFP DPMTSOSCH VShchFSH TBTBVPFBOSH OPCHSHCHE RTPZHEUYPOBMSHOSCH PVTBPCHBFEMSHOSH UFBODBTFSHCH Y UPDBOSH UPCHTENEOOOSCH HUMPCHYS DMS PVHYUEOYS, BKH OBU RTBLFYUEULY OH CH PDOPN chchh'E OEF YOFETOEFB!

OBDP ULBUBFSH, YuFP THLPCHPDUFCHP chPPTHTSEOOSHI UYM LFY OBDBYUY RPOINBEF, NSCH YN RPNPZBEN Y, OBDEAUSH, CHUE VKhDEF UDEMBOP RTBCHYMSHOP.

with DKHNBA, YuFP CH GEMPN Y, CH LPOYUOPN UUEFE, CHUE KHUFTPYFUS, Y TEZHPTNB VHDEF RTPchedeob NBLUINBMSHOP LZZHZHELFYCHOP Y VEVPMEJOOOP.

OP UBNPE ZMBCHOPE CH FPN, YuFP OBYB CHCHUYBS CHMBUFSH DPMTSOB RPOSFSH, YuFP PZHYGETSH LFP GEMBS ZPUKHDBTUFCHEOOBS RBFTYPFYUEULBS Y RTPZHEUUYPOBMSHOBS LPTRPTBGYS, Y KHOYTSBFSH PZH YGETPCH OEDPCHETYEN, OECHOINBOYEN Y UPVUFCHEOOSCHN CHPYOUFCHHAEIN OERTPZHEUYPOBMYNPN OEMSHYS, B CHMBUFSH LFP DEMBEF ETSEDOECHOP.

IPUKH RTPUFP OBRPNOIFSH OBEK ZPUKHDBTUFCHOOOPK CHMBUFY Y OBYENKH TPUUYKULPNH PVEEUFCHH, YuFP YUFPTYYUEULY "HOYTSEOOSCHY PULPTVMEOOOSCH" VSHMY URPUPVOSCH FPMSHLP ABOUT VHOF, OP CHPKOKH OE CHSHYZTSHCHBMY OILZDB.

ъБУЭН И ЛПНХ ОХЦОШХ HOYTSEOOSCH BTNYS Y PZHYGETSCH, LPFPTSCHE NPZHF FPMSHLP EEMLBFSH LBVMHLBNY ZPCHPTYFSH "FBL FPYuOP", OP CHPECHBFSH OE URPUPVOSH(?), PFCHEF RTPUF - FPMSHLP OB YYN CHTBZBN.

OBDP CH NYTOP CHTENS FETREMYCHP, RTPZHEUYPOBMSHOP Y MAVPCHOP CHSTBEYCHBFSH OBGYPOBMSHOSCHK PZHYGETULYK LPTRKHU, FBL LBL EUMY OBUOEFUUS CHPKOB, B POB PYUECHYDOP tPUUYY EEE RTEDUFPYF, PZH YGETPCH Y ZEOETBMPCH URPUPVOSHI RPVEDYFSH OE VHDEF, Y CHSFSH YI VHDEF OEPFLKHDB.

UEZPDOS LFYN CHBTSOEKYN DEMPN CH tPUUYY OE ЪBOYNBEFUS OILFP.

- lFP TSE YDEPMPZ LFPC TEZHPTNSHCH?

UBNPE ZMBCHOPE, YuFP OILFP OE OBEF, PFLKhDB LFB "NSCHUMSH" RTYYMB, Y LFP BCHFPT CHUEZP LFPP. x OBU DBCE OEF OPChPK, PUNSCHUMOOOPK Y RTYOSFPK chPEOOOPK DPLFTYOSCH, LPFPTBS PDOB FPMSHLP Y DBEF UHNNH PZHYGYBMSHOSHI ЪBDBU chPPTHTSEOOSCHI uym tPUUYY, LPFPTSCHE Y SCHMSAFU S PUOPCHPK MAVSHHI UFTKHLFHTOSHCHY YFBFOSHHI YYNEOOYK.

UEZPDOS CH NYOPVPTPPOSHY ZEOYFBVE CHPEOOKHA DPLFTYOH TPUUYY DBTSE ZHYYYUEULY OELPNH OBRYUBFSH, RTPUFP OEF UFTBFEZYUEULYI KHNPCH Y ZEOYFBV DBCHOP HCE OE "NPZ BTNY" Y", B OYuFP DTHZPE, RPFPNH Y DEMBEFUS CHUE RP RTYOGYRH "RBMEG-RPM-RPFPMPL".

UBNPE PRBUOPE CH FPN, YuFP UEZPDOS OILFP OYUEZP FPMLPN PV LFYI TEYEOYSI OE OBEF, Y FPMSHLP UUSCHMBAFUS ABOUT LBLPK-FP OPCHSHCHK "RETURELFYCHOSCHK PVMYL chPPTHTSEOOSHI UYM", RTY UP FOUROOOP OERPOSFOPK EZP "RETURELFYCHOPUFY". OP CHUE NPTsEF LPOYUYFSHUS LTBIPN, ЪB LPFPTSCHK PRSFSH OILFP PFCHEFUFCHEOOPUFY OE RPOUEEF, Y BCHFPTPCH "RTPELFB" PRSFSH RETEDCHYOKHF, OBRTYNET "URBUBFSH PMYNRYBDH CH UPYUY" YM Y CH DTHZPE NEUFP.

vPMEE FPZP, LFY TEYEOYS Y RMBOSHCH, LPFPTSCHE RTOYINBMYUSH VEYETSHEOPZP PVUKHTSDEOOYS, UEZPDOS RTBLFYUEULY FBL TSE OE PVUKHTSDBAFUS OYZDE. OBRTYNET, LFP OE PVUKhTSDBEFUS OH H BLBDENYY CHPEOOSCHI OBHL, B UPCHEF VE'PRBUOPUFY TPUUYY CHPPVEE NPMYUYF.

Chue NHYUBAFUS UMKHIBNY Y KHFEYULBNY, B ZEOYFBV Y NYOPVPTPPOSH NPMYUBF "LBL TSCHVB PV MED", OCHETOPE RPFPNKH, YuFP ULBBFSH OYUEZP, B PVYASUOYFSH RTPYUIPDSEEE RTPZHEUUYPOB MBN OEChPNPTSOP, DB Y DEMBFSH LFP OELPNH, Y UPЪDBEFUS CHREYUBFMEOYE, YuFP BChFPTSCH TEZHPTN RTPUFP Oye RPOINBAF UKHEEUFCHB UMPC, LPFPTSHNY PRETYTHAF, B bTNYA HCE MYIPTBDYF.

X ChBU EUFSH UCHPS YOZHPTNBGYS, YMY CHUE LBLYE-FP UMKHIY? zPChPTSF, ZBTCHBTDULYE NBMSHYUYLY RTYEIBMY YЪ YOUFYFHFB RETEEIDDOPK LLPOPNYYLY, FBL OBSCCHBEFUS LFB ZBKDBTPCHULBS UFTHLPHHTTB?

CHPF FP, P YUEN S UEKYUB ZPCHPTA PV LFPN... with OE OBA RTP LFYI NBMSHYUYLPCH. with ЪOBA, YuFP Ch 90-I ZPDBI "TBVPYUYE LPOFBLFSCH" oBYUBMSHOILB ZEOYFBVB bOBFPMYS lChBYOYOB U "NBMSHYUILBNY ZBKDBTB" RTYCHEMY L RTEDBFEMSHULPK UDBYUE OBUYI CHPEOOSCHI VB ABOUT LH VE (mKHTDEU) Y PE CHSHEFOBNE (lBNTBOSH), Y UFP OH PDYO YY UETSHESHI CHPEOOSHCHY LURETFPC Y BOBMYFYLPCH L LFPC TBVPFE OE RTYCHMELBMUS.

OP UEZPDOS CH ZEOYFBVE Y NYOPVPTOSH VHLCHBMSHOP OE U LEN TBZPCHBTYCHBFSH.

h PUOPCHOPN OYLFP OYUEZP OE OBEF, B FE, LFP OBAF YMY OE RPOINBAF OYUEZP, YMY RTPUFP NPMYUBF CH UFTBIE UPWUFCHOOOPZP KHCHPMSHOOYS, B CH LFP CHTENS "NBMSHYULYY DECHPU" LY UETDALPCHB", OBSCHCHBAF PZHYGETPCH "YEMEOSHNY YUEMPCHYULBNY" Y TEYBAF UPVUFCHEOOSCH LLPOPNYYUEULYE RTPPVMENSCH. fBLPCHB TEBMSHOPUFSH.

with KHCHETEO, YuFP RTEYDEOF tPUUYY dNYFTYK NEDCHEDECH EDCHB MY RTEDUFBCHMSEF UEVE L YUENH NPTsEF RTYCHEUFY RPZPMPCHOPE PFPPTZPCHMEOYE tPUUYKULPK BTNYY, FBL LBL ABOUT OBUYI ZMBBI OZBFYCHOP NEOSEFUS NPFYCHBGYS CHPYOULPK UMKHTSVSHCH, KHOYUFPTSBEFUS EE OTBCHUFCHEOOSCHK ZPUKHDBTUFCHEOOSCHK RBFTYPFYUEULYK UMKHTSEVOSCHK UFETTSEOSH. VEЪ YuEZP BTNYS OE OHTSOB Y DBTSE PRBUOB, FBL LBL BTNYS, UPUFPSEBS Ъ FPTZPCHGECH OYLPZDB OYUEZP OE CHSHYZTSCHBMB.

lTPNE FPZP, NOE RTEDUFBCHMSEFUS CHBTSOSHCHN, YuFPVSH rTEYDEOF Y rTEDUEDBFEMSH RTBCHYFEMSHUFCHB RPOINBMY, YuFP LLPOPNYLB Y VYOEU CH TPUUYY NPZHF RTPGCHEFBFSH FPMSHLP Y YUL MAYUYFEMSHOP CH BFNPUZHETE VE'PRBUOPUFY, PUOPCHH LPFPTPK DBEF NPEOBS BTNYS UFTBOSHCH. - b YuFP chShch, bMELUBODT yCHBOPCHYU NPTSEFE ULBJBFSH OBUUEF NBUUPCHPK TBURTDBDTSY CHPEOOOPK UPVUFCHEOOPUFY?

NPZH ULBUBFSH FPMSHLP FP, YuFP TBURTPDBTsB CHPEOOOPK UPVUFCHEOOPUFY UEZPDOS YDEF, YDEF NBUYFBVOP Y DMS PVEEUFCHEOOPUFY FBKOP. rPULPMSHLH RTBCHDH RTPUFP OILFP OE ZPCHPTYF, FP CHUE LFP VKhDYF CHUSLYE, NPTsEF VSHFSH Y MPTSOSHCHE, OP UFTBIOSCHE UMKHIY, CHTPDE FPZP, YuFP ZMBCHOPE ЪDBOYE ZEOYFBVB RTPDBE FUS VBOLKH chfv-24(???), Y DMS bFPZP ZMBCHOSCHE HRTBCHMEOYS ZEOYFBVB - PRETBFYCHOPE Y NPVYMYBGYPOOPE . BN.

OP, UBNPE UFTBYOPE, YuFP UBNB NBOETB RTPchedeoys LFYI TBURTPPDBC OPUIF SCHOSCHK RTYCHLKHU UBNPDKHTUFCHB Y LPTTHRGYPOOPK RTEUFHROPUFY, YuFP, EUFEUFCHEOOP OETCHYTHEF BTNEKULHA PVE EUFCHEOOPUFSH.

lPOYUOP, LFB NBUUPCHBS TBURTPDBTSB OE DPMTSOB VShchFSH ZMBCHOSCHN DEMPN nYOYUFETUFCHB PVPTPPOSH, FBL LBL DEOSHZY X ZPUKHDBTUFCHB EUFSH, OP ZhBLFYUUEULY LFP EDYOUFCHOOPE YUEN LZH ZHELFYCHOP ЪBOYNBEFUS LPNBODB b. UETDALPCHB.

UBNPE FTECHPTsOPE CH LFPN DEME FP, YuFP UPCHETYEOOP OERPOSPHOP RPYUENH, LPNH, LBL, RP LBLYN GEOBN Y UB YuFP RTDDBEFUS YNHEEUFChP ABOUT FTYMMYPOSH THVMEK, YuFP PF LFPP CHSHCHYZTSCH CHBEF bTNYS Y ZPUKHDBTUFCHP Y ZDE LFY DEOSHZY CHPPVEE.

rTEDUFBCHMSEFUS, YuFP EUMY ЪBFTEVPCBFSH IPFS VSC RETEYUEOSH RTPDBOOPK YNY UPVUFCHEOOPUFY BTNYY, FP URYUPL VHDEF PZTPNOSCHN, UHNNSH LPMPUUBMSHOSHCHNY, RPLHRBFEMY OEYCHEU FOSCHNY, B RPUMEDUFCHYS HTSBUOSCHNY.

PLBTSEFUS, YuFP NSCH RTYUKHFUFCHKHEN RTY CHFPTPK ZHBIE RTEUFKHROPK RTYCHBFYBGYY ZPUUPVUFCHEOOPUFY, OP HCE DBCE Y VEY CHBKHYUETPCH, LPFPTSCHE, LUFBFY, VPMSHYOUFCHP PZHYGET PCH CHPPVEEE OE RPMKHYUBMY, S, OBRTYNET, OE RPMKHYUM.

uFTBYOP RPDKHNBFSH, YuFP LFP NPTsEF PLBBBFSHUS RTBCHDPK.

CHUE LFP OE YNEEF OILBLLPZP PFOPYEOYS L CHPEOOOPK TEZHPTNE, Y LFP HCE DEMP ZMBCHOPK RTPLHTBFHTSCH Y UUEFOPK RBMBFSHCH, B POY, RPIPTSE, TsDHF LBLPK-FP LPNBODSCH, OP TsDBFSH LP ZDB RTPSCHYFUS OPCHBS RMESDB PMYZBTIPCH PF NYOPVPTPOSCH OEMSHЪS.

dBCE UFTBOOP, YuFP EEE OEF OH PDOPZP DERKHFBFULPZP ЪBRTPUB RP bFPNKH RPCHPDH, B NOPZPYUYUMEOOSCHCHUFKHRMEOYS CH RTEUUE U YOZHPTNBGYEK P ZhBLFBI SCHOP LTYNYOBMSHOSHCHI, PUFBAFU S VEЪ PFCHEFB.

OBDP ULBJBFSH, YuFP PFLTPCHOOPE ЪBNBMYUYCHBOYE bFPK RTPVMENSCH KHNEOSHIBEF KHCHETOOPUFSH TPUUYKULPK PVEEUFCHEOOPUFY Y PUPVEOOOP PZHYGETULPZP LPTRKHUB TPUUYY CH YUYUFPFE RPNSH UMPC CHCHUYEK ZPUKHDBTUFCHOOOPK CHMBUFY Y EE ​​ZPUKHDBTUFCHOOOPK DEEURPUPVOPUFY.

NSH OBDEENUS, YUFP UEKYUBU, U OBDEMEOYEN rBTMBNEOFB tPUUY LPOFTPMSHOSCHNY ZHOLGYSNY BOFYLPTTTHRGYPOOBS TBVPFB CH NYOPVPTPOSCH BLFYCHOP OBUOEFUS.

- b YuFP chShch DKHNBEFE PFOPUYFEMSHOP ЪBRTEEEOOYS LTYFYLY TEZHPTNSHCH, LPFPTPPE YDEF RTSNP PF b. UETDALPCHB Y ZEOYFBVB?

S LFPZP OE OBBA. OP EUMY LFP FBL, FP LFP CHUE RMPIP. lFP UBNBS TBURTPUFTBOEOOBS PYYVLB MADEK, LPFPTSHCHE OE KHCHETEOSHCH UCHPEK LPNREFEOPHOPUFY Y RTBCHPFE.

rTBLFYUEULY LFP YI LPNRMELU OERPMOPGEOOPUFY, LPFPTSCHK VSHM FEN ZBLFPTPN, ABOUT LFPTPPN, LUFBFY, YUFPTYYUEULY OBBLBOYUYCHBMYUSH OEKHDBYUEK CHUE TSEMBOS Y RPRSHFLY TEZHPTNYTPCHBOYS BTNYY tPUUYY.

OP LFPF LPNRMELU UFTBYEO FEN, YFP EZP OPUYFEMY, B LFP, LBL RTBCHYMP, UBNY NYOYUFTSH Y OBUMSHOIL, RTPUFP UYYFBAF UCHPYNY "CHTBZBNY" CHUEI FAIRIES, LFP LTYFYLHEF YI DE KUFCHYS, RTSNP KHLBSCCHBEF ABOUT CHPNPTSOSCHE PYYVLY YMY ZPCHPTYF, LBL OBDP UDEMBFSH - FBL LPNRMELU OERPMOPGEOOPUFY PDOPZP YUEMPCHELB YMY PDOPK ZTHRRSH YUYOPCHOYLPCH NPTSEF PVETOKHFSHUS FTBZEDYEK DETSBCHSHCH, FBL LBL OE YEHFUS Y OE YURTBCHMSAFUS PYYVLY, B YEHFUS Y OBLBSCHBAFUS YUEUFOSHCH, ЪOBAEYE Y UNEMSCH MADI, Y RPVETSDBEF CHPYOUFCHHAEBS Y OYLBBS UETPUFSH.

ъDEUSH EUFSH EEE PDOB PRBUOPUFSH. SWORD ZHNYMECH, OBY CHEMILYK HYUEOSCHK, ULBUBBM, YUFP OBTPDSCH OBUYOBAF YUYUEBFSH YY YUFPTYY FPZDB, LPZDB RBUUYPOBTYY, FP EUFSH, MADI FCHPTYUEULYE, UNEMSHCHE, PTZBOY BFPTSCH Y MYDETSCH, Y LPFPTSCHE ZYVOKHF RETCHSHCHNY CH TECHPMAGYSI Y CHPKOBI - OBUYOBAF CHSHCHDBCHMYCHBFSHUS YЪ ZPUKHDBTUFCHEOOSHI UFTHLFKHT, BTNYY CHMBUFY , DTHZPK LBFEZPTYEK, CHETOEEE FYRPN MYUOPUFEK - UHVRBUUIPOBTYSNY YMY YLKHTOILBNY.

NSH LFP CHYDYN UEKYUBU RPYUFY PE CHUEN NYTE, RPFPNKH Y CH NYTE DEMB YDHF IHTSE, B KH OBU KHCE OELPNKH UMKHTSYFSH CH BTNYY Y ЪBEEBFSH tPDYOH OE ЪB DEOSHZY, B CHMBUFSH OE CHYDY F RTYYUYOSCH OBGYPOBMSHOSCHI OEKHDBYU CH UCHPEK RMPIPK TBVPFE, B YEEF "LTBKOYI". rTBLFYUEULY FBL ЪBLBFYMYUSH CHUE CHEMYLYE YNRETYY, CH FPN YUYUME Y uuut.

- FBL YFP DEMBFS?

UOBYUBMB ZMBCHOSHE CHCHCHPDSH. nsch UYUYFBEN, YuFP UDEMBOB ZMBCHOBS PYYVLB, LPFPTHA OBYB CHCHUYBS ZPUKHDBTUFCHEOOBS CHMBUFSH DEMBEF RPUFPSOOP - TEZHPTNB BTNYY DPCHETEOB UBNPNKH CHPEOOPNKH CHEDPNUFCHH, B CH OEN YULMAYUY FEMSHOP DYMEFBOFBN, Y CHEDEFUS BVUPMAFOP CHPMAOFBTYUFYUEULY Y VEULPOFTPMSHOP.

yNEOOOP LFB UFTBFEZYUEULBS PYYVLB OE DBMB tPUUY ChPNPTSOPUFY UPJDBFSH UPCHTENEOOHA BTNYA, B EE UEZPDOSYOE RTDPDPMTSEOYE NPTSEF CHPPVEE U BTNYEK RPLPOYUYFSH .

UBNPE VEUFPMLPCHPE DEMP ЪBOINBFSHUS UFTHLFKHTOSHNY YЪNEOOOSNYY ZPMSHN UPLTBEEOYEN CHPKUL, FBL LBL LBYUEUFChP BTNYY ЪBCHYUYF FPMSHLP Y YULMAYUYFEMSHOP PF PVEE ZP VMBZPTSEMBFEMSHOPZP Y FTEVPCHBFEMSHOPZP CHOYNBOYS OBGYYY CHMBUFY L BTNYY, PF LBYUEUFCHB PZHYGETULLPZP LPTRKHUB Y LPTRKHUB NMBDYYI LPNBODYTPCH, B FBL TSE LBYUEUFCHB OBGYPOBM SHOPK CHPEOOOPK NSHUMY Y FEIOPMPZYUEULPZP HTPCHOS CHPPTHTSEOYS.

rTEYDEOF TPUUY LBL CHETIPCHOSCHK ZMBCHOPLPNBODHAEIK DPMTSEO ЪBOINBFSHUS CHPEOOOPK TEZHPTNPK MYUOP. BY PVSBO CHSHCHUMKHYBFSH CHPEOOSCHI RTPZHEUYPOBMPCH, OBFSH NOOEYE CHPKUL Y OEBCHYUYNSHI CHPEOOOSCHI LURETFPC Y RTYOINBFSH TEYEOYE RP CHPEOOOPK TEZHPTNE CHECHEYOOOP.

PFCHEYUBFSH RETED OBGYEK JB OEKHDBYUKH CHPEOOOPK TEZHPTNSH VHDEF OEUFYOE boBFPMYK UETDALPCH, B CHCHUYBS ZPUKHDBTUFCHEOOBS CHMBUFSH UFTBOSHCH, FP EUFSH MYUOP dNYFTYK NEDCHEDECH MYUOP CHM BDYNYT rHFYO, Y SING DPMTSOSCH LFP OBFSH.

1. rTPCHEDEOYE CHPEOOPK TEZHPTNSH OEPVIPDYNP, BTNYS L TEZHPTNBN ZPFPCHB Y YI TsDEF, FBL LBL EE UKHEEUFCHHAEE RPMPTSEOYE KhTsBUOP.

OP PZHYGETULYK LPTRKHU OYUEZP FPMLPN P TEZHPTNE OE OBEF, B SCHMSFSH UPVPA “VPMCHBOB CH UFBTPN RPMSHULPN RTEZHETBOUE” UYUYFBEF OYCE UCHPEK YEUFY.

FEN OE NEOEE, PZHYGETSCH YULTEOOE IPFSF RPNPYUSH NYUFTH PVPPTPOSH RTPCHEUFY TEZHPTNH RPMOP Y ZHZHZHELFYCHOP, OP FTEVHAF CH EE RTPchedeoYY TBHNB Y RTPZHEUUYPOBMYNB, KHBTSEOYS L UEVE, L FTBDYGYSN tPUUYKULPK BTNYY Y EE ​​LFYLE.

2. rTPchedeoye TBDYLBMSHOPK CHPEOOOPK TEZHPTNSH RPUREYOP, FP EUFSH VEЪ chPEOOPK DPLFTYOSCH, SUOPZP Y YICHEUFOPZP PZHYGETULPNH LPTRKHUH RMBOB, LURETYNEOFB, RHFEN PVCBMSHOP ZP UPLTBEEOYS RTPZHEUYPOBMSHOPK PUOPCHSH BTNYY PZHYGETPCH Y RTBRPTEYLPCH, B FBLCE RHFEN TBURTPPDBTSY CHPEOOOPK UPVUFCHEOOPUFY RTEUFKHROP, OEYIVETSOP RTYCHEDEF L TBCHBMKH BTNYY Y HFTBFE tPUUYEK CHPNPTSOPUFY OPTNBMSHOP Y VEJPRBUOP TBCHYCHBFSHUS.

3. CHUE NETPRTYSFYS TEZHPTNSCHY CHUE UPLTBEEOOYS DPMTSOSCH KHMKHYUYBFSH VPECHA URPUPVOPUFSH CHPPTHTSEOOSHI UYM TPUUYY, BOE HIKHDYBFSH HUMPCHYS TSYYOY, UMKHTSVSHCH Y RTPZHEUYPOBMSHOP TO DESFEMSHOPUFY CHPKUL Y PZHYGETULPZP LPTRKHUB.

4. rTPGEUUPN CHPEOOOPK TEZHPTNSH OEPVIPDYNP KHRTBCHMSFSH. lFP OBYUIF, YuFP, CH FPN YUYUME, OEPVIPDYNP YNEFSH PVTBFOKHA UCHSSSH ZPUKHDBTUFCHB Y CHPKUL. dTHZYNY UMPCHBNY, OEPVIPDYNP UPJDBFSH BOBMPZ lPNYFEFB OBTPDOPZP LPOFTPMS, LPFPTSHCHK VSHM VSHCH KHRPMOPNPYUEO TEBZYTPCHBFSH ABOUT YOZHPTNBGYA P IPDE TEZHPTN Y VPTSHVE U LPTTHRGY EK OERPUTEDUFCHOOOP YI CHPYOULYI YUBUFEK Y RTPIYCHPDUFCHEOOSCHI LPMMELFYCHPCH. VEЪ ЪBDEKUFCHPCHBOYS FChPTYUEULPZP RPFEOGYBMB TPUUYKULPK PVEEUFCHEOOPUFY Y EE ​​LPOFTPMS ЪB IPDPN TEZHPTN, NSCH TYULKHEN PUFBFSHUS, CH VHLCHBMSHOPN UNSHUME, KH "TBVYFP" ZP LPTSHFB".

5. eUMY CHUE PUFBCHYFSH LBL EUFSH, FP VHDHF CHRKHUFHA RPFTBUEOSH PZTPNOSHCHE DEOSHZY, OP BTNYY OPCHPZP CHCHUYEZP LBYUEUFCHB tPUUYS OE RPMKHUYF Y OBUYE RPTBTSEOYE VHDEF OEY VETSOP.

yFP OBYUYF, UFP KhCE YUETE 3-5 MEF BTNYS tPUUY LBL TEBMSHOBS ZMPVBMSHOBS Y DBCE TEZYPOBMSHOBS VPECHBS UYMB YUYUEJOEF, Y POB VHDEF URPUPVOB RTPCHPDYFSH FPMSHLP PFDE MSHOSHE BOFYFETPTTYUFYUUEULYE PRETBGYY, NYTPFChPTUFCHPCHBFSH Y "RKHZBFSH OBUEMEOYE PUFBCHYEKUS SDETOK NPESHA", YFP CHTSD MY SCHMSEFUS GEMSHHA PVIASCHMEOOOPK PYUETEDOPK CHPEOOPK TEZHPTNSCH.

b EEE YUETEЪ 5-7 MEF, tPUUYS PUFBOEFUS WEЪBEIFOPK RETED MYGPN BZTEUUYY MAVPZP TPDB.

yFP OBYUYF, YuFP TPUUYS UBNB UEVE RTPYZTBEF YuEFCHETFHA NYTPCHHA CHPKOKH, YuEZP TsDHF Y ABOUT YuFP OBDEAFUS OBUY ZEPRPMYFYUEULYE RTPFPYCHOIL.

6. hPEOOBS TEZHPTNB DPMTSOB UFBFSH PUOPCHOSCHN oBGYPOBMSHOSCHN RPTPELFPN tPUUYYY YB OEE DPMTSEO PFCHEYUBFSH MYUOP CHETIPCHOSCHK ZMBCHOPLPNBODHAEIK chPPTHTSEOOSCHNY UYMBNY RTE YIDEOF TPUUYY DNYFTYK BOBFPMSHECHYU NEDCHEDECH.

oEPVIPDYNP:

chP-RETCHI. iCHBFYF LPYNBTYFSH BTNYA. OEMSHЪS HOYTSBFSH PZHYGETPCH, FKHRP NPMYUBFSH Y DEMBFSH CHYD, YuFP OYUEZP OE RTPYUIPDYF, Y YuFP CHUE IDEF RTBCHYMSHOP.

oEPVIPDYNP OBYUBFSH PFLTSCHFPE Y ZMBUOPE PVUKHTSDEOOYE RTEDMBZBENSHI TEZHPTN, KHURPLPYFSH PVEEUFCHEOOPUFSH Y PZHYGETULYK LPTRKHU, OE VPSFSHUS LTYFYILY Y UPVUFCHOOOPK OELPNREFEOF OPUFY, OBDP YUEUFOP TBVYTBFSHUS U RTPVMENPK Y CHOPUIFSH OEPVIPDYNSCHE RPRTBCHLY CH TEYEOYS RP TEZHPTNE Y UPPFCHEFUFCHHAEYE RMBOSCH.

chP-CHFPTSCHI. CHCHCHEUFY CHPKULB YY TSCHOLB Y BUFBCHYFSH YI OE UPLTBEBFSHUS Y MAVPK GEOPK CHSHCHTSYCHBFSH, B BOYNBFSHUS RTPZHEUUYPOBMSHOPK VPECHPK RPDZPFPCHLPK.

h-FTEFSHYI. URBUFY PZHYGETULYK LPTRKHU Y YYNEOIFSH UYUFENKH RTPIPTSDEOOYS UMKHTSVSHCHY UYUFENKH RTPZHEUUYPOBMSHOPZP CHPEOOOPZP PVTBPCHBOYS.

h-YUEFCHETFSHI. OYLPZP OE KHCHPMSHOSFSH, OE UPJDBCHBS HUMPCHYK Y CHPNPTSOPUFEK UPGYBMSHOPK BDBRFBGYY, Y NBLUINBMSHOP YURPMSHЪPCHBFSH ChPNPTSOPUFY UBNPZP RTPGEUUB UPLTBEEOYS YUYUME OOPUFFY BTNYY.

h-RSFSCHI. oBYUBFSH VPTSHVH U LPTTHRGYEK U NYOYUFETUFCHB PVPTPPOSH Y chPEOOOPK RTPLHTBFHTSCH, FBL LBL YI TPMSH Y OBUEOYE CH RETYPD ZHKHODBNEOFBMSHOSHI TEZHPTN, ULTSHFOPUFY NETPRTYSFYK Y NBUYFBVPCH ЪBDEKUFCHCHBOOPUFY PZTPNOSHI NBUU OBUEMEOYS TPUUYY Y VADTSEFOSCHI UTEDUFCH - UFBOPCHYFUS PRTEDEMSAEIN, B TSEMBAYI, RPD YHN TEZHPTNSCH "PFRYMYFSH UEVE NBMEOSHLYK UCHYUOP TO ЪБЧПДYЛ » OBKDEFUS NOPZP.

h-YEUFSCHI. UPЪDBFSH ZPUKHDBTUFCHEOOSCHK GEOFT UFTBFEZYUUEULPZP BOBMYYB, LPFPTSCHK VSH YNEM CHNPTSOPUFYY LPNREFEOGYA BOBMYYTPCHBFSH UFTBFEZYUEULHA PVUFBOPCHLH, UP DBChBFSH RTPPELFSH OEBCHYUYNSHI UFTBFEZYUUEULYI DPLHNEOPCH OBGYPOBMSHOPZP NBUYFBVB, DEMBFSH UFTBFEZYUEULYE PVPVEEOYS, DBCHBFSH RTPZHEUUYPOBMSHOSCH PFCHEFSHCH ABOUT UMPTSOSCH PE RTPUSH OBGYPOBMSHOPZP Y CHPEOOPZP UFTTPYFEMSHUFCHB, Refinery VSC ЪBUFBCHYFSH ЪBTBVPFBFSH OBYKH OBGYPOBMSHOKHA CHPEOOKHA NSCHUMSH.

ьФПФ GEOFT NPTSEF VShchFSh RPDYUYOOOSCHN OERPUTEDUFCHEOOP nYOYUFTH PVPTPOSCH, YUFPVSH ZPCHPTYFSH ENKH RTBCHDH, YMY VSHFSH RPDYUYOOOSCHN rTEYIDEOFH TPUUYYY ChPKFY CH LBUEUFCHE UBNPUF PSFEMSHOPK UFTHHLFHTSCH CH UPUFBCH UPCHEFB VEPRBUOPUFY TPUUYKULPK ZHEDETBGYY.

h-WEDGES. h rTBCHYFEMSHUFCHE TPUUYY DPMTSEO VSHFSH UP'DBO UREGYBMSHOSCHK PTZBO DMS RTPCHEDEOYS CHPEOOPK TEZHPTNSHCH, LPFPTSCHK DPMTSEO ChPZMBCHMSFSH MYUOP rTEDUEDBFEMSH rTBCHYFEMSHUFCHB.

h-CHPUSHNSCHI. rBTMBNEOF TPUUYY DPMTSEO UPЪDBFSH UREGYBMSHOKHA LPNYUUYA RP CHPEOOOPK TEZHPTNE, LPOFTPMYTPCHBFSH EE IPD Y ЪBOINBFSHUS LFPC RTPVMENPK CH ETSEDOECHOPN TETSYNE.

h-DECHSFSCHI. UPCHEF VE'PRBUOPUFY TPUUYKULPK ZHEDETBGYY DPMTSEO UREGYBMSHOP ЪBOINBFSHUS CHPRTPUBNY CHPEOOOPK TEZHPTNSH LBL UCHPYN ZMBCHOSCHN DEMPN PVEUREYUEOYS OBGYPOBMSHOPK VE'PRBUOPUFY TPUU YY.

h-DEUSFSCHI. uYUEFOBS RBMBBFB tPUUYY DPMTSOB HCE ЪBOYNBFSHUS ZHJOBUPCHSHNY RPFPLBNY Y UFTKHLFHTOSHNY RTEPVTBBPCHBOYSNY CH NYOPVPTPOSCH Y OE TsDBFSH LPZDB DEOEZ ABOUT TEZHPTNKH HTSE OE PU FBOEFUS.

bFPF RETEYUEOSH VEKHUMPCHOP OE YUYUETRSHCHBAEIK, OP BVUPMAFOP OEPVIPDYNSCHK, FBL LBL VEJ PTZBOYBGYYY RTPchedeoys ChPEOOOPK TEZHPTNSH YNEOOP CH FBLPN LMAYUE, P E HUREY NPTsOP RTPUFP ЪБВШЧФШ.

eUFSH EEE PDOB UETSHEOBS PRBUOPUFSH. nPTsEF UMHYYFSHUS FBL, LBL VSHMP RPUMEDOYE DCHBDGBFSH MEF CHUEZDB.

dPRKHUFYN, FTECHPZY YUBSOYS BTNYY DPKDHF DP rTEYIDEOFB Y BY RPFTEVHEF PFCHEFB ABOUT LFY Y DTHZYE CHPRTPUSCH PF NYOYUFTB PVPPTPOSH.

NYOYUFT PVPTPPOSH U OBYUBMSHOILPN zEOETBMSHOPZP YFBVB RTYDHF Y ULBTsHF, YuFP CHUE OPTNBMSHOP, CHUE RPUYUYFBOP RTBCHYMSHOP, CHUE TEYEOYS RTDDHNBOSCH, B CHUE CHPRPTUSCH ЪBDBAF "OEL" PNREFEOFOSH OEKHDBYUOILY, LPFPTSCHE ROPOINBAF CHEMYYUYS Y ZMHVYOSCH chBYEZP ZEOYBMSHOPZP UBNSCHUMB CHPEOOOPK TEZHPTNSHCH, FPCHBTYE chetipchoshchk zMBCHOPLPNBODHAEIK, POY OBN NEYBA F ", WITH UBN UMSCHYBM FBLYE TEYU OE TB.

rPUME LFPPZP RTEYDEOF HURPLBYCHBEFUS, RTDPDPMTSBEF CHETYFSH NYOPVPTPPOSH Y ZEOYFBVH, OILFP OYUEZP OE NEOSEF Y DHTSH CHPTBUFBEF: CHUEI LFP RTPPHYCH - KHChPMSHOSAF, RP MENYLB CH BTNYY PVEEUFCHE ЪBDBCHMYCHBEFUS, CHUE TECEPHUS RP TSICHPNH, OILFP OH UB YUFP OE PFCHEYUBEF, B FEN CHTENEOEN CHPTPCHUFChP RTDPDPMTSBEFUS Y UPUFPSOIE tPUUYKULPK BTNYY KHIKHDIBEFUS. fBL CHUE Y YMP RPUMEDOYE DCHBDGBFSH MEF.pVYASCHMEOOBS CHPEOOBS TEZHPTNB, VEKHUMPCHOP, TECHPMAGYPOOB Y TSYJOOOOP OEPVIPDYNB tPUUYY, B OBYUYF, RPFETY Y TSETFCHSHCH OEK RTBLFY YUEULY OEYVETSOSCH.

obyb PVEBS ЪBDББУБ UDEMBFSH FBL, YUFPVSH POB VSHMB RTPchedeob NBLUINBMSHOP LZZHZHELFYCHOP, B DMS UKHDEV UPFEO FSCHUSYU CHPEOOPUMHTSBEYI NBLUINBMSHOP VEЪVPMEЪOOOP.

ъBDБУБ ЗТБЦДБУЛПЗП ПВЭУФЧБ ІУПУФПYФ Х FPN, YuFPVSH ЪBUFBCHYFSH CHMBUFSH UMKHYBFSH Y UMSHCHYBFSH EZP ZPMPU Y OE DPRKHUFYFSH CH TEZHPTNE LBFBUFTPZHYUEULPZP “UBNP” FELB", LPZDB EE PYYVLY OE YURTBCHMSAFUS, B FYTBTSYTHAFUS.

- bMELUBODT yCHBOPCHYU, chby VPECHPK RHFSH YDEF PF LPNBODITB CHJCHPDB?

NPK VPECHPK RKhFSH YDEF PF UKhChPTPChGB, S ZPTTSHUSH UCHPEK UMKHTSVPK tPDYOE Y UCHPYN VPECHSCHN RHFEN, BY RTSN, YUYUF Y UMBCHEO, LBLYN Y DPMTSEO VShchFSH RHFSH RPFPNUFCHEOOPZP TKHULPZ P PZHYGETB. with ЪBLPOYUYM nPULPCHULPE UKHCHPTPCHULPE CHPEOOPE HYUMYEE, nPULPCHULPE CHCHUYEE PVEECHPKULPCHPE LPNBODOPE HYUMYEE, chPEOOHA BLBDENYA YNEOY n. part zhTHOYE, chPEOOKHA BLBDENYA zEOETBMSHOPZP YFBVB, Y CHUE LFP U PFMYUYEN YMY U NEDBMSH.

with YNEM YuEUFSH LPNBODPCHBFSH: NPFPUFTEMLPCHSHCHN CHJCHPDPN YuEFSHTE ZPDB - 30 UPMDBF; NPFPUFTEMLPCHPK TPFPC DCHB ZPDB - 100 YuEMPCHEL; NPFPUFTEMLPCHSHCHN VBFBMSHPOPN 3 ZPDB - 500 YuEMPCHEL; PFDEMSHOPK YUBUFSHHA HLTERMEOOOSCHN TBKPOPN 2 ZPDB - 800 YuEMPCHEL, NPFPUFTEMLPCHSHCHN RPMLPN 2 ZPDB - 2200 YuEMPCHEL; YFBVPN NPFPUFTEMLPCHPK DYCHYYYY 3 ZPDB - 6000 YUEMPCHEL (CHUE LFP ABOUT dBMSHOEN chPUFPLE); 35 NPFPUFTEMLPCHPK DYCHYYEK CH zuchz 4 ZPDB - 15000 YuEMPCHEL; YFBVPN 28 pVEECHPKULPCHPK BTNYY CH VEMPTHUUYY 4 ZPDB - RPYUFY 50000 YUEMPCHEL; PDYO ZPD LPNBODPCHBM ZTHRRYTPCHLPK OE OBUYI CHPKUL CH EEE VPMEE OEOBYEK UFTBOE; TBVPFBM RPNPEOILPN nYOYUFTB PVPPTPOsch uuut NBTYBMB BCHYBGYY EChZEOYS YCHBOPCHYUB yBRPYOYLPCHB RP CHPEOOOPK TEZHPTNE.

l OEYUBUFSH CHUEI UMBCHOSCHI Y NPZKHYYI RPMLPCH, DYCHYYK Y BTNYK HCE OEF, LBL OEF chPPTHTSEOOSHI UYM CHEMYLPZP UPCHEFULLPZP UPAB Y CHEMYLPZP RPVEDPOPUOPZP UPCHEFU LPZP CHPEOOOPZP UFYMS.

eUMY NSCH IPFYN UPЪDBFSH CHEMILHA tPUUYA, NSCH PVSBOSHCH CHUE LFP CHPUUPЪDBCHBFSH, OP HCE CH OPChPN LBUEUFCHE. OP FAIRY, LFP ЪOBEF, LBL LFP CHUE DEMBFSH, U LBTSDSCHN DOEN UFBOPCHYFUS CHUE NEOSHIE, Y ZTSDHEEE UPLTBEEOYE, CHPNPTsOP, DPVSHEF Y RPUMEDOYI.

- OE IPFYFE MY chsch, bMELUBODT yCHBOPCHYU, ULBJBFSH YUFP-OYVHDSH PZHYGETBN tPUUYKULPK BTNYY?

RPYUFH ЪB YUEUFSH. with the pzhagetulpnh lptrchukh tonui Prfinynb, Kommersant, Vetreyis ydbyui, Yufpvsch Chicadetzdetsbfsh FP Uyubufsha, lpftpe Oyvetsop owl osophyzoof chneuf at the Tezhpnpk.

lPZDB S YYUEUFSH LPNBODPCHBFSH 35 NPFPUFTEMLPCHPK DYCHYYEK CH ZETNBOYY, NPK LPNBODHAYK 20 pb ZEOETBM-MEKFEOBOF bMSHVETF nBLBYPCH ABOUT chPEOOPN UPCHEF BTNYY ULBUBM OEFMEOOHA ZHTBKH: “fPCHBTYEY PZHYGETSCH, RTELTBFYFE ЪBOINBFSHUS REUUYNYYNPN!”.