Emotional attitude and cognitive processes. Emotions, consciousness and the connection of emotions

Cognitive theories emotions (cognitive theories of emotion)

Theories of emotion try to explain how an emotion is caused and what it is produced by a physiologist. changes and how one emotion differs from another. The answer to the first question distinguishes cognitive theories from other theories of emotions.

Theorists of all schools generally agree that anger, fear, or both are aroused when a situation is interpreted as irritating and/or dangerous. Many are firmly convinced that such arousal is programmed into the nervous system throughout evolutionary prehistory and serves the purpose of survival of the species. According to cognitive psychologists, any emotion is aroused by receiving information. about something and evaluating it. There is no doubt that certain evaluations turn out to be programmed: babies like everything sweet that they taste for the first time. However, older children and adults evaluate everything they encounter not only in terms of its impact on their bodily well-being, but also in terms of its impact on them as individuals. A child becomes furious when his peers tease him, and a young man gets angry when his friends make fun of him in the presence of a girl. If emotions depend on evaluations, then there should be as many different emotions as there are evaluations. Emotions can be classified, but they do not have to be derived from each other.

Not surprisingly, cognitive theories have a long history. In the 3rd century. BC e. Aristotle, in his treatise On the Soul, suggested that humans and animals are capable of making sensory assessments (thanks to what he called vis estimativa) things as good or bad for them and that these evaluations cause emotion, pleasure or displeasure. Thomas Aquinas, in his Commentaries on Aristotle, followed Aristotle in this explanation of the excitement of emotions.

Descartes argued that all emotions are caused directly by the impulse to action of “animal spirits,” or by the excitation of innate reflex acts accompanied by physiologist necessary for survival. changes - this opinion was shared by Darwin. Later, W. James and K. Lange changed the common sense idea that emotion gives rise to bodily changes to the exact opposite, arguing that bodily changes are a direct result of the perception of an exciting object, and our sensation of these changes is emotion.

The James-Lange theory of emotions was unconditionally accepted and soon led to a fatal decline in the interest of academic psychologists in the analysis of emotions.

However, to say that certain situations cause innate patterns of reactions does not at all mean to solve the problem. Fear or rage may cause flight or attack, but they still depend on the awareness that something is a threat or an irritation, and this is an assessment, however rudimentary.

M. B. Arnold introduced the concept of evaluation ( appraisal) into academic psychology. She defined emotion as “an experienced tendency to interact with everything that is intuitively assessed as good, or to avoid everything that is intuitively assessed as bad for me here and now,” which is “accompanied by a physiological pattern. changes organized for a specific act of approach or distance." Arnold distinguished several basic emotions as simple reactions to the assessment of basic situations: sympathy (love), antipathy, desire, disgust, joy, sadness, fearlessness, fear, anger, hope and despair.

In his book "Emotions and Personality" ( Emotion and personality Arnold showed that emotions depend not only on the intuitive assessment of something as “good or bad for me,” but also on the spontaneous assessment of possible reactions as appropriate or inappropriate. Something that threatens me may be seen as something that is difficult to avoid and therefore fearful, or it may be seen as something that can be prevented, respectively. decisive actions and win in a daring attack. Arnold emphasizes that such intuitive spontaneous evaluation is complemented by thoughtful value judgment, at least in older children and adults, just as sensory knowledge is complemented by conceptual knowledge. Because we use intuitive and reflective judgments simultaneously, even our intuitive judgments that generate emotions can be influenced by upbringing. Since man is one, every reflective value judgment will be accompanied by an intuitive assessment. Value judgments are rarely impartial and objective: what is valued is attractive in one way or another. Consequently, emotions can be subject to socialization and social influence. attitudes and customs.

Like other theorists who take the position of cognitivism, Arnold recognizes the importance of physiology. changes that accompany emotion. When these changes are felt, they, in turn, are also evaluated and can either intensify or change the original emotion. When a person experiencing fear evaluates the increase in heart rate as an indicator of a disturbance in the functioning of the heart, the feeling of fear of illness takes precedence over his initial feeling of fear. By definition, heart disease weakens the body. Hence, fear caused by increased heart rate dictates the assessment that, being sick, a person. will not be able to cope with this situation, which further enhances the initial feeling of fear.

Important research in the field of emotions were carried out by R. Lazarus and his colleagues. These scientists made appraisal the cornerstone of their theory of emotion. Lazarus believes that each emotion is based on a specific type of cognitive assessment, accompanied by motor-behavioral and physiological assessments. changes. He distinguishes between primary valuation, secondary valuation and revaluation. Secondary assessment is the subject's assessment of his relationship to a specific environment, and therefore it leads to an altered emotional reaction. Reappraisal can occur as a simple assessment of the meaning of this changed attitude towards the environment, or it can be a psychol. an attempt to cope with stress. Such revaluation is not necessarily based on factual information. - it may be an attempt to look at the situation from a more favorable point of view. In Lazarus's words, it may be a "defensive overestimation." Reappraisal may also represent an attempt at coping when direct action is not possible.

Lazarus et al. concluded that the subject's assessment of the situation and, therefore, the emotional reaction of the subject can be manipulated during the experiment. Let's experiment before the demonstration. group of a film with cruel naturalistic scenes of circumcision, they read out in one group a passage in which it was said about the pain of this procedure, in another group they said that the boys filmed in the film were eager to undergo this initiation rite and felt a sense of pride that stood it. Finally, they gave the third group “intellectualized” information, which emphasized the anthropological significance of this ritual. This film had the strongest emotional impact on the first group, while it did not have a significant impact on the emotions of the other two groups.

While the influence of cognition on evaluation is well documented, the need to distinguish between intuitive and reflective evaluation is much more difficult to justify. In his article “Feelings and Thinking: Preferences Do Not Require Inference” ( Feeling and thinking: Preferences need no inferences) R. B. Zayonc pointed out that the idea of ​​​​the primacy of feelings has lost its meaning since the time of Wundt. In cogn. psychol. it was replaced by an information processing scheme, according to which an affective reaction occurs only after the corresponding processing of incoming signals. Therefore the main work on cognitive processes has left aside affect or experience and focused exclusively on information processing. “However,” says Zajonc, “affect... is fundamental. currency circulating in people. communication." Consequently, “to evoke affect, you need to know very little about objects, in fact, have a minimum of information.” In memory, as in perception, the affective reaction is reproduced first. As Zajonc notes, just because affect can serve as a sign of the completion of cognitive activity (in listening to a joke, for example), it does not necessarily follow that cognitive activity is an obligatory component of affect.

According to Zajonc, there is a disconnect between affect and cognition. Similarity judgments and preference judgments have different dimensions ( dimensions). At the beginning of the 20th century. T. Nakashima reported in his work “Contribution to the Study of Affective Processes” ( Contribution to the study of affective processes), that judgments of pleasantness and unpleasantness do not depend on sensory characteristics and therefore cannot be mediated by them. Aesthetic judgments and preferences of all kinds do not rely on cognitive analysis. Let's experiment. research showed that judgments about sympathy and antipathy are made and recalled with greater confidence, while judgments that a given stimulus word is new or has already been presented are made with noticeable uncertainty. From this Zajonc concludes that the perceptual process, starting with sensory experience, first causes an unconscious affective reaction and then moves into the recognition of familiar features (also unconscious) before their reflective cognitive processing begins.

Thus, Zajonc pointed out a weak point in the armor of the Cogn. psychol. Thought and reflective judgment appear to depend on affect as much as on sensory experience. Since affect is a conscious experience of attraction/repulsion and is not generated by a value judgment, it must be caused by a spontaneous (unconscious) assessment of objects as good or bad and an assessment of reactions as appropriate or inappropriate. Emotions, which are usually accompanied by reflective judgments, can themselves be assessed as appropriate or inappropriate and changed through other corrective impressions, but rarely through reflection or persuasion.

see also Cognitive complexity, Learned helplessness, Thought disorders, Unconscious inferences


Emotion as a function of cognitive processes. Some modern theories view emotion primarily as a reaction or set of reactions driven by cognitive processes. This view of the nature of emotions, which is very characteristic of representatives of Western culture, is obviously generated by those ideas about human nature that go back to Aristotle, Thomas Aquinas, Diderot, Kant and other philosophers. These ideas are as follows: a) man, first of all and to the greatest extent, is a rational being; b) the rational principle is useful and beneficial for a person, the emotional principle harms and interferes with him; c) the mind (cognitive processes) should serve as a factor in controlling and replacing emotions.

The most developed of the theories of emotion and personality built within the above tradition is Arnold's theory (Arnold, 1960a, 19606). According to this theory, emotion arises as a result of exposure to a certain sequence of events described in categories of perception and evaluation.

Arnold interprets the term “perception” as “elementary understanding.” In this case, to “perceive” an object is to “understand” it in some sense, regardless of how it affects the perceiver. In order for the image presented in the mind to receive emotional overtones, the object must be assessed from the point of view of its influence on the perceiver. Emotion is thus not an assessment, although it can carry it within itself as an integral, necessary component. More precisely, an emotion is an unconscious attraction to or rejection of an object, resulting from an assessment of the object as good or bad for the individual.

The assessment itself is an unmediated, instantaneous, intuitive act, not associated with reflection. It occurs immediately after the perception of an object, acts as the final link in the perceptual process and can be considered as a separate process only reflexively.

These three acts, perception-evaluation-emotion, are so closely intertwined that our everyday experience cannot be called objective knowledge; it is always cognition-acceptance or cognition-rejection. The intuitive assessment of the situation gives rise to a tendency to action, which is experienced as emotion and is expressed by various somatic changes and which can cause expressive or behavioral reactions (Arnold, 1960a, p. 177).

An emotion can have a residual, or prolonged, effect. Tendencies to action caused by emotion have an organizing influence on the process of further perception and evaluation; emotions “fascinate and captivate us” (Arnold, 1960a, p. 184). In addition, intuitive evaluation and emotional response tend to be constant, so that an object or situation, assessed and emotionally responded to in a certain way, “every time” evokes the same evaluation and emotion (Arnold, 1960a, p. 184). Moreover, the assessment of an object and the emotional response to it tend to generalize - they are transferred to the entire class of objects.

Other cognitive theories of emotion. Schachter and his colleagues (Schachter, 1966, 1971; Schachter and Singer, 1962) proposed that emotions arise on the basis of physiological arousal and a cognitive assessment of the situation that caused this arousal. A certain event or situation causes physiological arousal, and the individual has a need to evaluate the content of the arousal, that is, the situation that caused it. The type or quality of emotion experienced by an individual does not depend on the sensation of physiological arousal, but on how the individual evaluates the situation. An assessment (“from memory or feeling”) of a situation allows a person to define arousal as joy or anger, fear or disgust, or any other emotion appropriate to the situation. According to Schechter, the same physiological arousal can be experienced as both joy and anger (and like any other emotion), depending on the interpretation of the situation. Mandler (1975) and Lazarus (1982) share the same view when explaining emotional activation processes.

In one well-known experiment, Schachter and Singer (1962) tested their theory in the following way: one group of subjects was injected with adrenaline, which causes arousal, and the other with a placebo. Each group was divided into three subgroups - some subjects were given true information about the effects of the drug, others were given false information, and the third were not told anything about the possible effects of the drug. After administration of the drug, all falsely informed subjects, some subjects who had accurate information, and some subjects who did not have any information, found themselves in the company of a person demonstrating euphoric behavior; the rest of the subjects found themselves in the company of a person who pretended to be angry. The researchers found that misinformed subjects and subjects who received no information tended to imitate the actor's moods and behavior, both euphoric and angry. Subjects who had accurate information about the effects of adrenaline were less susceptible to outside influences. In the euphoric model group, misinformed and uninformed subjects gave significantly higher ratings of their experience of joy than correctly informed subjects, but these ratings were not much different from the ratings of subjects in the placebo group. In the group that followed the “anger” model, uninformed subjects gave the highest ratings of the experienced state of anger, but members of the placebo group again did not confirm Schechter’s model. Their scores on the self-report anger scale did not differ from the scores of misinformed and uninformed subjects.

Schechter's work stimulated the theoretical and experimental study of emotions, although many researchers criticize his methodological approach (Izard, 1971; Manstead and Wagner, 1981; Plutchik and Ax, 1967). It is also depressing that two experiments that reproduced the Schechter-Singer experiment did not confirm its results (Marshall, 1976; Maslach, 1979). Maslach demonstrated that unexplained, hypnotically inspired excitation of the autonomic nervous system causes a person to want to interpret his internal state and his sensations negatively. There was no significant relationship between the actor's actions and what the subjects reported about their experiences. Marshall, following Schechter and Singer, used the drug stimulation technique in his experiment and obtained results similar to those of Mas-Lach.

Recent theoretical developments of the cognitivist and socio-cognitivist directions are similar to biosocial theories in their approach to the motivational and adaptive role of emotions, but differ from them in that the priority role in the process of emotion emergence is assigned to cognitive processes. However, for both of them, the fact that cognitive processes serve as a necessary link in the chain of events that activate emotion is indisputable.

The main contribution of cognitive theories to the study of emotions is the description of emotion-specific cognitive processes - a special kind of inference that causes a specific emotion. They have also deepened our understanding of the relationship between emotion and cognition.

Weiner (1985) explains the cognitive antecedents of emotion in terms of causal attribution. According to Weiner, the cause of an emotion is a function of a personal attribution of causation or cause of the activating event. He proposes three dimensions of causation: locus (internal-external), stability (stability-unstability), and control (controllability-uncontrollability). So, for example, if you are standing in line and someone tries to sit in front of you, you are likely to perceive his attempt as internally motivated and controlled and feel angry. But if the same person happens to be in the same place by accident - for example, someone running past and rudely pushes him - then you will interpret the reason as external and unregulated and, most likely, will feel pity for him or sadness.

More sophisticated causal measurement schemes have also been developed (Ellsworth and Smith, 1988; Roseman, 1984; Smith and Ellsworth, 1985). Thus, some theorists propose to supplement the control parameter with the responsibility parameter. They believe that attributions of responsibility and control are important for distinguishing between the emotions of surprise (external responsibility/control) and guilt (internal responsibility/control).

Some researchers, following the cognitivist tradition, have made attempts to divide the process of emotional activation into stages. In their research, they prove that the true precursors of emotion are evaluations/attributions. Because emotion occurs within milliseconds of an internal or external event, identifying the cognitive process that precedes the emotion is extremely difficult. However, no matter what place cognitive processes occupy in the causal chain, they are undoubtedly involved in the process of emotion and are part of the general phenomenology associated with emotions. Thus, cognitive scientists, both theorists and practitioners, continue to make significant contributions to the development of the psychology of emotions.

Emotions as a result of biological processes. Emotional Patterns as Personality Traits

Plutchik (1962, 1980) viewed emotions as a means of adaptation that played an important role in survival at all evolutionary levels. Below are the basic prototypes of adaptive behavior and their corresponding emotions (affective-cognitive structures).

Protypic adaptive complex

1. Incorporation - absorption of food and water

2. Rejection - rejection reaction, excretion, vomiting

3. Destruction - removing obstacles to satisfaction

4. Defense - initially in response to pain or threat of pain

5. Reproductive behavior - reactions accompanying sexual behavior

6. Deprivation - loss of an object that brings pleasure

7. Orientation - reaction to contact with a new, unfamiliar object

8. Exploration - more or less random, voluntary activity aimed at studying the environment

Primary emotion

Adoption


Disgust
Fear Joy

Grief Fright

Hope or curiosity

Plutchik defines emotion as a complex somatic reaction associated with a specific adaptive biological process common to all living organisms. Primary emotion, according to Plutchik, is limited in time and initiated by an external stimulus. Each primary emotion and each secondary emotion (which means a combination of two or more primary emotions) corresponds to a certain physiological and expressive-behavioral complex. According to Plutchik (1954), constant blocking of adequate motor reactions in conflict or frustrating situations causes chronic stress V muscles, which can serve as an indicator of poor adaptation, he provides a number of experimental data in support of this thesis.

According to Plutchik, his theory of emotions may be useful in the field of personality studies and psychotherapy. He proposed viewing personality traits as a combination of two or more primary emotions, even mutually exclusive ones. This approach - analyzing the way emotions are mixed - can contribute to a better understanding of many important emotional phenomena. For example, Plutchik offers the following formulas: pride = anger + joy; love = joy + .+ acceptance; curiosity = surprise + acceptance; humility = fear + acceptance; hatred = anger + surprise; guilt = fear + joy or pleasure; sentimentality = acceptance + grief. Social regulators (superego phenomena) can be understood in Plutchik’s system as a combination of fear and other emotions, and anxiety as a combination of fear and expectation. In his opinion, analyzing situations that give rise to fear in a person and identifying a person’s expectations in relation to such situations helps to understand the dynamics of anxiety.

Cognitive-affective approach

According to Singer, the close relationship between affect and cognitive processes is based on the child's attempts to adapt to a new and constantly changing environment. Singer, like Tomkins (1962) and Izard (1971), believes that environmental novelty activates the emotion of interest, which, in turn, reinforces the child's exploratory activity. Knowledge of the environment and successful adaptation reduce the level of arousal and activate the emotion of joy, while a large amount of complex material that is not available for assimilation can cause fear, sadness or fear.

The most important result of Singer's research was the introduction of his developments in the field of imagination and affect into the practice of psychotherapy (Singer, 1974). He emphasizes the importance of using imagination in combination with action (for example, in role-playing), through which the patient learns to understand a variety of affective manifestations and learns to control his emotions, thoughts and behavior. According to Singer, the work of imagination and fantasy helps to form a sense of competence and develops self-control. For example, he successfully treated voyeurism, relying only on the patient’s imagination. Singer encouraged the patient to imagine something unhealthy, causing disgust, for example, he asked to imagine a naked man with leprosy, and taught the patient to remember this image in moments of unhealthy attraction, when he had a desire to look into the window of a neighboring house to see a woman undressing there. Positively colored female images were used by Singer to neutralize heterosexual fear and homosexual inclinations. These techniques have become widespread in psychodynamic therapy, which has made it possible to understand the mechanisms of success of this technique.

THEORY OF DIFFERENTIAL EMOTIONS

The theory of differential emotions dates back to a rich intellectual heritage and claims kinship with the classical works of Duchenne, Darwin, Spencer, Kierkegaard, Wundt, James, Cannon, McDougal, Dumas, Dewey, Freud, Rado and Woodworth, as well as with the more modern works of Jacobson, Sinnot , Maurer, Gelgorn, Harlow, Bowlby, Simonov, Ekman, Holt, Singer and many others. All of these scholars, representing different disciplines and perspectives, generally tend to recognize the central role of emotions in motivation, social communication, cognition, and behavior. However, the credit for conceptually grounding the theory goes to our contemporary Sylvan Tomkins, whose brilliant two-volume work Affect, Imagination, Consciousness will be cited frequently throughout the course of this book.

The theory of differential emotions is so named because the object of its study is private emotions, each of which is considered separately from the others, as an independent emotional-motivational process that influences the cognitive sphere and human behavior. The theory is based on five key theses: 1) ten fundamental emotions (which will be briefly defined in Chapter 4 and discussed in detail in subsequent chapters) form the basic motivational system of human existence; 2) each fundamental emotion has unique motivational and implies a specific form of experience; 3) fundamental emotions, such as joy, sadness, anger or shame, are experienced in different ways and have different effects on the cognitive sphere and on human behavior; 4) emotional processes interact with drives, with homeostatic, perceptual, cognitive and motor processes and influence them; 5) in turn, drives, homeostatic, perceptual-cognitive and motor processes influence the course of the emotional process.

Emotions as the main motivational system

The theory of differential emotions recognizes the functions of emotions as determinants of behavior in the widest range of its manifestations: from violence and murder, on the one hand, to acts of self-sacrifice and heroism, on the other. Emotions are viewed not only as the body's primary motivational system, but also as fundamental personal processes that give meaning and meaning to human existence. They play an important role both in human behavior and in his inner world.

Six systems of personality organization

Personality is the result of a complex interaction of six systems: homeostatic, incentive (drive system), emotional, perceptual, cognitive and motor. Each system is to some extent autonomous and independent, and at the same time each of the systems is in some way related to the others.

The homeostatic system is essentially several intertwined and interdependent systems that operate automatically and unconsciously. The main ones are the endocrine and cardiovascular systems, which are associated with personality due to frequent interaction with the emotional system. Homeostatic mechanisms are generally viewed as supportive of the emotional system, but hormones, neurotransmitters, enzymes, and other metabolic regulators also play a role in regulating and reinforcing activated emotion.

The drive system is based on tissue changes and resulting deficits that signal a person about the needs of the body. The fundamental drives are hunger, thirst, sexual desire, the search for comfort and the avoidance of pain," It is difficult to dispute the important role of drives in situations of struggle for survival, but in everyday life (when basic needs and the need for comfort are satisfied) drives are psychologically significant only to the extent in which they influence emotions. An exception can be considered the sexual drive and the drive to avoid pain, these two drives themselves have some signs of emotions. They inevitably interact with emotions, and it is precisely because of this interaction that they play an important role in the organization of personality and behavior .

For the organization of personality, for its social interaction and for human existence in the highest sense of the word, four systems are fundamentally important: emotional, perceptual, cognitive and motor. Their interaction forms the basis of truly human behavior. The result of harmony in the relationships between systems is effective behavior. And vice versa, ineffective behavior and maladaptation are a direct consequence of a violation or incorrect implementation of systemic interaction.

Emotions and the emotional system

The theory of differential emotions starts from the fact that it recognizes the need to study individual emotions. However, the presence of a dozen fundamental emotions, which, in combination with drives and cognitive processes, form an innumerable variety of affective-cognitive structures, makes it extremely difficult to study human motivation.

Practicing psychologists in any field of activity - in engineering, educational or clinical psychology - sooner or later inevitably come to understand the specificity of individual emotions. When dealing with people, they see that people are happy, sad, angry, afraid, and not just “experience” some emotion. Currently, practicing psychologists are using less and less such general terms as “emotional problem”, “emotional disturbance” or “emotional disorder”; they are trying to analyze individual affects and affective complexes, considering them as motivational phenomena.

Definition of emotion. The theory of differential emotions defines emotion as a complex process that has neurophysiological, neuromuscular and sensory-experiential aspects. The neurophysiological aspect of emotion is defined primarily in terms of the electrochemical activity of the central nervous system. Facial nerves, muscle tissue and proprioceptors of the facial muscles are also involved in the emotional process. It is assumed that emotion is a function of the somatic nervous system (which controls voluntary movements) and that somatically activated emotion mobilizes the autonomic nervous system (which regulates the activity of internal organs and systems, the state of body tissues), which in turn can reinforce and strengthen the emotion.

At the neuromuscular, or expressive, level, emotion manifests itself primarily in the form of facial activity, as well as pantomimic, visceral-endocrine and sometimes vocal reactions.

At the sensory level, emotion is an experience that has direct significance for the individual. The experience of emotion can trigger a process in consciousness that is completely independent of cognitive processes.

Neurochemical processes, following innate programs, cause complex facial and somatic manifestations, which are then, through feedback, realized, as a result of which a person has a feeling/experience of emotion. This feeling/experience both motivates the person and alerts him to the situation. The innate response to the sensory experience of a positive emotion produces a sense of well-being and encourages and supports the approach response. Positive emotions contribute to a person's constructive interaction with other people, situations and objects. Negative emotions, on the contrary, are experienced as harmful and difficult to bear, awaken a withdrawal reaction and do not contribute to constructive interaction. We have already said that, despite the common division of emotions into positive and negative, the true sign of a specific emotional experience can only be determined taking into account the general context.

Concluding the discussion of individual elements of the definition of emotion, it should be noted that emotion is not just an organismic reaction. It cannot be considered only as an action performed in response to some stimulating event or situation; it itself is a stimulus, or reason, for our actions. Apparently, we can even say that emotions, to a greater or lesser extent, have the ability to self-generate. This statement seems especially true with regard to the emotion of interest, which plays an extremely important role in our everyday life, prompting us to engage in one activity or another. Be that as it may, any activated emotion - no matter whether it is generated by sensory information (for example, pain) or cognitive processes (evaluation, attribution) or was a response to a certain event - itself has a motivating, organizing influence on our thoughts and actions. In turn, thinking and behavior, as well as information stored in memory, have a counter-influence on it.

Systematicity of emotions. Emotions are dynamically, but at the same time more or less stable, interconnected, therefore the theory of differential emotions considers them as a system (Cicchetti, 1990). Some emotions, due to the nature of the innate mechanisms underlying them, are organized hierarchically. Darwin (1872) also noted that attention can develop into surprise, and surprise - “into astonished stupor,” reminiscent of fear. Developing this observation, Tomkins (1962) argues that stimuli that evoke emotions of interest fear and horror, represent a kind of hierarchy in which a stimulus of moderate intensity arouses interest, and a stimulus of greatest intensity - horror. The validity of this thesis can be seen if you observe the child's reaction to an unfamiliar sound. A sound of moderate intensity arouses interest in the child. But If, upon first presentation, an unfamiliar sound is loud enough, it can frighten the child, and a very loud, sharp sound can cause horror in the child.

Such a characteristic as polarity also testifies in favor of the systemic organization of emotions. Obviously, there are emotions that are directly opposite to each other. The phenomenon of polarity has been observed by many researchers, starting with Darwin (Darwin, 1872), and each of them provided their own evidence in favor of its existence (Plutchik, 1962). Joy and sadness, anger and fear are the most common examples of polarity. Emotions such as interest and disgust, shame and contempt can also be considered as opposite. However, like the concepts of “positive” and “negative”, polarity is not a characteristic that strictly defines the relationship between emotions; polarity does not necessarily imply mutual negation. Sometimes opposites do not oppose each other, one of them can cause the other, and an example of this is the “tears of joy” that are so understandable to us.

Other emotions, those that do not form polar pairs, under certain circumstances can also be interrelated with each other. When a person encounters an unknown (potentially exciting, potentially dangerous) object or finds himself in a new situation, his interest can transform into fear. Likewise, contempt mixed with joy and excitement produces “militant enthusiasm” (Lorenz, 1966). If a person regularly or quite often experiences two or more fundamental emotions at the same time, if at the same time they are, with some degree of certainty, associated with certain cognitive processes, this can lead to the formation of an affective-cognitive structure or even an affective-cognitive orientation. Descriptive term affective-cognitive orientation seems useful for understanding some personality traits. For example, a combination of emotions of interest and fear, associated with the idea that risk and overcoming danger contain an element of play and entertainment, leads to the formation of such an affective-cognitive orientation (or personality traits) as a thirst for adventure. However, the combination of interest and fear may be associated with the risk involved in research activities - in this case, the person's affective-cognitive orientation will be curiosity.

It is not only the desire for the structure of emotions described above that allows us to define emotions as a system. In addition, emotions have some common characteristics. Thus, unlike drives, emotions are not cyclical: digestive or any other metabolic processes occurring in the body cannot make a person experience emotions of interest, disgust or shame two or three times a day. Emotions, as a motivating factor, are universal and flexible. If satisfying a physiological drive, such as hunger or thirst, requires very specific actions and completely objective food or drink, then emotions of joy, contempt or fear can be caused by a variety of stimuli.

Emotions have a regulating influence on drives and other personality systems. This ability to regulate is one of the most important and most common functions of emotions: each emotion can strengthen or weaken the effect of another emotion, physiological drive or affective-cognitive structure. For example, unreduced drives that are within the body's tolerance awaken emotion, which in turn reinforces the drive. Sexual attraction, supported by the emotion of interest and excitement, can become unbearable, while the emotion of disgust, fear or grief can weaken, mask, reduce or suppress it.

Biological systems in the service of emotions. We can distinguish two biological systems that serve the functioning of the human emotional system. This is the reticular system of the brain stem, which regulates changes in the level of neural activity, and the autonomously innervated visceral endocrine system, which controls parameters such as hormonal secretion, heart rate, respiratory rate, etc. The visceral endocrine system helps the body prepare for the directional action caused by emotion, and helps support both the emotion and the action.

The emotional system rarely functions independently of other systems. Some emotions or complexes of emotions almost always occur in interaction with the perceptual, cognitive and motor systems, and effective personality functioning depends on how balanced and integrated the activities of the various systems are. In particular, since the influence of any emotion - both intense and moderate - is generalized, then all physiological systems and organs are involved to a greater or lesser extent in emotion. The influence of emotion on the body is evidenced by the specific response to emotion of the cardiovascular, respiratory and other functional systems.

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SUMMARY

Psychology relatively recently turned to a serious study of the problem of emotions. There are a variety of opinions regarding emotions - some scientists argue that emotions have nothing to do with behavior, but there is also the opposite approach, the one embodied in this book. We believe that emotions constitute the primary motivational system of humans.

Emotions appeared in humans during the process of evolution. It can be assumed that the origins of some human emotions should be sought in the simplest physiological drives, such as hunger, and in primary adaptive mechanisms, such as the approach-withdrawal reaction. Each emotion performed one or another adaptive function in the process of human evolution. Darwin's thesis that ways of expressing basic emotions are innate and universal has been repeatedly supported by cross-cultural and developmental psychology research.

A reflex is an automatic response to a stimulus, carried out without cognitive evaluation of the stimulus. Instinct is a more complex form of behavior; it, as a rule, awakens under the influence of hormonal changes in the body and implements the program embedded in the genes of the animal. For animals, reflexes and instincts are much more important than for humans, whose motivational system is based on emotions.

A comprehensive definition of the phenomenon of emotion should include physiological, expressive and empirical components. Emotion arises as a result of neurophysiological processes, which in turn can be caused by both internal and external factors. When an emotion arises in response to a mental image, symbol, or representation, we can talk about a formed connection between thought and feeling, or an affective-cognitive structure. Affective-cognitive structures can be a combination of drive and cognitive processes or a combination of drive, emotion and cognitive processes.

Vivid and expressive emotional states have long attracted the attention of scientists, artists and ordinary people, but the science of emotions should study not only these extremely short-lived experiences. There are consistent individual differences in the frequency and intensity of different people's experiences of certain emotions, and these differences can be studied and described in terms<эмоциональная черта>And<эмоциональный порог>.

For convenience, we divide emotions into positive and negative based on their sensory or experiential characteristics. However, we must remember that any emotion (for example, joy, fear) can be both positive and negative, depending on how much it helps or hinders the individual’s adaptation in a particular situation.



The influence of emotions on a person is generalized, but each emotion affects him in its own way. The experience of emotion changes the level of electrical activity in the brain, dictates which muscles of the face and body should be tense or relaxed, and controls the endocrine, circulatory and respiratory systems of the body. Emotions can cloud the perception of the world around us or color it with bright colors, turn the train of thought towards creativity or melancholy, make movements light and smooth or, conversely, clumsy.

Depending on the individual height of the emotional threshold, some children experience and show this or that emotion more often, while others less often, and this largely determines their relationships with the people around them. On the other hand, the reaction of others to the child’s emotional manifestations directly affects the development of his emotional style and the formation of certain personality traits.

Human behavior is based on emotions; they activate and organize a person’s perception, thinking and aspirations. Emotions have a direct impact on perceptual processes, filter information that a person receives through the senses, and actively interfere with the process of its subsequent processing.

FOR FURTHER READING

Forgas J. P., Bower O. N. Mood effects on personality - perception judgments. - Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 1987, 53 (1), 53-60.

The influence of emotions on perception (formation of impressions) and memory.

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Consideration of the constituent components of emotions and a brief overview of their functions.

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The role of emotions for personality and its development.

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The evolution of emotions and their role in adaptation.

Emotions are a special class of mental processes and states associated with instincts, needs and motives, reflecting in the form of direct experience (satisfaction, joy, fear, etc.) the significance of phenomena and situations affecting the individual for the implementation of his life activities. This definition is incomplete, since it does not reflect a number of essential characteristics of emotions and their difference from cognitive processes, namely: a) the connection of emotions with the unconscious sphere is not reflected, b) their relationship to the activity (and not life) of a person, c) the specificity of their occurrence), d) patterns of their functioning, etc.

Recognizing the significant difference between cognitive and emotional mental phenomena, it would be wrong to assert their complete autonomy, independence from each other. The position of L.S. is known. Vygotsky about the unity of “affect and intellect”, as well as the opinion that “without human emotions there can be no human cognition.” However, this unity does not mean identity. Emotional and cognitive processes interact closely, but they are not identical - and this is the crux of the problem.

Isolating experience as a form of manifestation of emotions as opposed to an image in the cognitive sphere emphasizes the difference between cognitive and emotional processes, defining them as forms of mental reflection emphasizes their connection and unity. Emotional processes influence human cognitive activity, regulating its direction and dispensing information. Experienced emotions and feelings leave their mark on our intellectual abilities.

The cognitive and emotional systems jointly provide orientation in the environment. Compared to cognitive information, emotional information is less structured. Emotions are a kind of stimulator of associations from different, sometimes unrelated areas of experience, which contributes to the rapid enrichment of initial information. This is a system of “quick response” to any changes in the external environment that are important from the point of view of the needs.

The founder of the attitude theory D.N. Uznadze emphasized that emotional states and cognitive processes have mental contents that are irreducible to each other. Cognitive processes are characterized by an objective and maximally dissected reflection of the surrounding reality. Emotional states, on the contrary, have a diffuse, holistic character, representing the state of the subject. They contribute to a clear reflection of the objective situation and concentration of consciousness on it.

S.L. Rubinstein notes on this issue that emotional states are characterized by several phenomenological features: firstly, in contrast to cognitive processes, they express modifications of the internal state of the subject and his attitude towards the object; secondly, they differ in polarity.

Within the framework of the neuropsychological approach E.D. Chomsky summarized the main differences between emotional states and cognitive processes as higher mental functions.

1. Higher cognitive mental functions are various types of mental activity aimed at solving certain psychological problems, i.e. to obtain a certain result. Emotional states initiate and accompany the solution of cognitive tasks, reflecting the success or failure of their implementation in relation to one or another need. Their “purpose” is to regulate and evaluate actions and situations.

2. Higher cognitive mental functions are largely conscious and subject to the most advanced form of control - voluntary control. Emotional phenomena are less conscious and less manageable.

3. Emotional states are characterized by sign and modality; other phenomena, for example, the sensation of color, are qualitatively specific to the cognitive sphere.

4. Emotional states are closely related to need-motivational processes, being their “internal mirrors”. Cognitive processes are less determined by needs, with the exception of gnostic needs, and are, first of all, “mechanisms of cognition.”

5. Emotional states are closely related to various physiological processes (vegetative, hormonal, etc.), cognitive processes - to a lesser extent, while they interact with the work of physiological systems in a different way.

6. Emotional phenomena are included as an obligatory component in the personality structure. Cognitive processes determine the structure of the personality to a lesser extent: their partial violations are compatible with the preservation of the personality as such.

Thus, the theoretical concepts of various authors show that mental states and cognitive processes have specific characteristics and thus are relatively independent classes of mental phenomena.

Along with the problem of the specificity of these mental phenomena, no less important is the problem of their unity. During the “cognitive revolution,” emotional states were viewed only as factors that were a source of error and subject to control when conducting experiments. At the end of the last century, emotions began to return to the study of cognitive processes, for example, the idea was expressed that cognitive representations (which include perceptions and ideas) are saturated with emotional experiences.

Currently, more and more scientists are focusing on the close relationship between the two categories. Models are being developed to show that the final assessment of a situation is the result of a complex interaction of cognitive processes and emotional states. The effect of “emotional framing of decision-making processes” was discovered, according to which states (regret, irritation, satisfaction, etc.) are caused by “frame effects”, since they depend on whether the result is perceived in the form of gain or loss.

According to V.D. Shadrikov, the separation of processes and states corresponds to the global analytical stage of the study of the psyche. Based on a systematic approach, it is necessary to move on to the synthesis of accumulated knowledge. In his concept of the inner world of a person, the author gives a leading place to emotional states. Touching on the issue of the relationship between cognitive processes and states, the author writes that emotional states determine the productive side of mental processes. They not only activate cognitive processes, but also create their emotional background, emotional coloring. Therefore, when characterizing cognitive processes, we can talk about emotional perception, emotional memory, and emotional thinking. However, according to the author, this aspect of mental processes has not been sufficiently developed.

The idea that the emotional and cognitive spheres of the psyche are inextricably linked and should be studied in unity was first formulated in Russian psychology by S. L. Rubinstein and L. S. Vygotsky.

The issue of “unity of intellect and affect” was considered by L. S. Vygotsky as central in the theory of the mental development of the child. This unity is revealed in the dynamic relationship and mutual influence of these aspects of the psyche at all stages of mental development. The way to solve this “vitally important” issue is to consider the affective and intellectual spheres as a single dynamic semantic system. These ideas were further developed in the experimental work of O.K. Tikhomirov and his students.

From the position of activity theory, the interaction of cognitive processes and emotional states was considered in the context of objective practical activity. Since cognitive processes respond to certain needs and motivations, they experience the regulating influence of emotional states. The close relationship between cognitive processes and emotional states expresses, according to A. N. Leontyev, the bias of the subject, his activity, and the belonging of the sensory reflection to the active subject.

The bias of the subject's consciousness is expressed in the selectivity of attention, in the emotional coloring of cognitive processes. In this case, emotions perform the function of internal signals and reflect the relationship between motives and success (or the possibility of successful implementation) of the subject’s corresponding activity. They are a direct sensory reflection of these relationships, an experience, arising before the subject’s rational assessment of his activities.

According to S. L. Rubinstein, mental processes and states should not be opposed; the dynamics of states and the laws to which they obey are inseparable from the dynamics of mental processes. The true unit of the psyche should be the holistic act of reflection by the subject of one or another object. The “product” of reflection always contains the unity of two opposing components - “knowledge and attitude, intellectual and emotional, of which one or the other may be predominant.”

Therefore, just as states can subordinate cognitive processes (for example, a person understands only what he “feels”), so cognitive processes can give rise to various emotional states. The author notes that the existence of intellectual states of surprise, curiosity, doubt, and confidence is an example of the interpenetration of the intellectual and emotional spheres.

The idea of ​​the unity of states and processes, as well as the dynamic nature of their relationship, along with L. S. Vygotsky and S. L. Rubinstein, is also expressed by many other researchers. For example, A.V. Petrovsky notes that in the context of the psyche, individual mental processes and states act in unity, forming integral systems of activity that realize the mutual transitions of “objective” and “subjective”, thereby acting as a dynamic system. A similar opinion is expressed by J. Piaget, according to which behavior presupposes the existence of two interrelated aspects: energetic (or affective) and cognitive (or structural). The affective aspect provides exchanges with the environment, which are structured by cognitive processes that determine the connections between subject and object. The affective and cognitive spheres are thus inseparable, while remaining different at the same time.

The dialectical unity of the two categories is noted by I. I. Chesnokova. According to the author, the state acts as a way of organizing mental processes in a certain period of time. On the other hand, the course of development of the mental processes themselves, directly related to the conditions of activity, produces new mental states that begin to interact with the background state.

K. Izard, considering the issue of the relationship between cognitive processes and emotional states, notes that emotional states are often associated with mental images, forming affective-cognitive structures, and the emotional component provides the motivational charge of the structure. As an example, the author cites a state of happiness in which a person perceives the world through “rose-colored glasses,” while the emotional state organizes and directs the individual’s mental activity. A theoretical analysis of the issue of the relationship between cognitive processes and emotional states leads the author to the following conclusion: just as a state can activate the cognitive process and influence its course, and vice versa. Consequently, the relationship between cognitive processes (perception, imagination, memory, thinking) and emotional states “...can be characterized as dynamic and reciprocal.”

The relationship between cognitive processes and mental states is most clearly manifested in altered states. Charles Tart, in his definition of an “altered state of consciousness,” indicates that one of its most important categorical features is a change in the quality of mental processes. It is the change in the quality of cognitive processes that is the criterion for altered states, although the individual also feels quantitative changes, for example, an increase or decrease in the number of visual images, greater or less clarity of images, etc. Numerous studies cited by Charles Tart show the influence of these states on qualitative and quantitative characteristics of cognitive processes: time perception, selectivity and attention span, logical thinking, etc.

Let us note one more aspect of the relationship between states and processes associated with ideas about dominant component of states. Based on this criterion N.D. Levitov classified mental states into three groups: cognitive, volitional and emotional. If any component dominates, the state itself can be considered as a dependent component.

The relationship between mental states and cognitive processes is complex, contradictory, and interdependent. Each component of the psyche has a particular, specific expression in the mental state. However, if any component dominates, the state can be considered as part of it. Therefore, it makes sense to identify a whole group of mental states, the common characteristic of which will be the dominance of one of the cognitive processes. For example, against the background of all other manifestations of the psyche, the process of thinking or imagination may take on predominant importance. In this case, mental states should be considered as states of reflection, daydreaming, reverie. In particular, on the basis of dominance, a group of gnostic mental states is distinguished: curiosity, surprise, bewilderment, doubt, puzzlement, daydreaming, etc.

Thus, an analysis of the theoretical positions of various authors shows that cognitive processes and mental states differ in terms of dynamism, mental content, structure, functions and neurophysiological foundations. On the other hand, they are considered by many researchers as interrelated mental phenomena.

When studying the relationship between mental states and cognitive processes, a number of difficulties arise, the solution of which determines the logic of empirical research. The most important question is conjunctiveness two mental phenomena. Indeed, mental states and cognitive processes are traditionally considered as separate categories of mental phenomena, while at the same time, most researchers consider cognitive processes as a component of mental states. This is due to the fact that cognitive processes, as a component of states, characterize the state as a whole, and methods for diagnosing cognitive processes are used to study states. For example, studies have shown that the most pronounced and significant signs of fatigue are disturbances in attention - the volume decreases, the functions of switching and distribution of attention suffer. Therefore, at the psychological level, this condition can be considered as a personal cognitive syndrome.

At the same time, the degree of integration of each individual process into the structure of mental states may be different. This situation is shown in the empirical studies of A.O. Prokhorov, in which the state is considered as a functional system that integrates those processes and properties that are necessary for the effective performance of activities.

When studying the relationship between the two categories, it is necessary to be guided by the principles of “interaction” and “non-disjunctiveness of the mental.” The last principle as formulated by S.L. Rubinstein sounds as follows: “In psychology they often talk about the unity of emotions, affect and intellect, believing that this overcomes the abstract point of view that divides psychology into separate elements or functions... In reality, we need to talk not just about the unity of emotions and intellect in life personality, but about the unity of the emotional, or affective, and intellectual within the emotions themselves, as well as within the intellect itself.”

In accordance with these principles, not only mental states integrate cognitive processes, but also vice versa. Thinking processes are an integrator of a certain set of emotional states that perform orienting and heuristic functions. The integration function can also be performed by the cognitive processes of working memory, imagination and attention.

The implementation of these principles in practice is facilitated by a systems approach that considers the system as many interacting components. Thus, cognitive processes and mental states, while remaining independent categories of mental phenomena, at the same time can be considered as a single interacting system.

The concept of “interaction” as a philosophical category denotes the processes of mutual influence of various objects on each other, their interdependence. Ontologically, this concept is an attribute of objective reality among its other integral properties: movement, space, time, reflection, structure, etc. “Interaction” determines the structural organization of any material system and reveals their properties.

The concept of “interaction” captures the direct and reverse impacts of things and phenomena on each other, direct and indirect relationships between objects, mutual exchanges of matter, energy and information. The concept of interaction is specified through the concepts of “change”, “becoming”, “process”, “development”.

In mathematical statistics, “interaction” refers to the effect of the interdependence of two variables, for example, task difficulty and level of arousal often interact in such a way that increased arousal leads to increased success in solving simple problems, but decreased success in solving complex ones.

In psychology, “interaction” is considered as a process of mutual influence, generating mutual conditionality and interconnection, as well as an integrating factor that contributes to the formation of structures.

The essence of the category “interaction” in relation to general psychology was most fully revealed in his works by S.L. Rubinstein and Ya.A. Ponomarev. To define “interaction” they used the concept of “reflection” - a universal property of matter, consisting in the ability of objects to reproduce the structural characteristics and relationships of other objects. Interaction is a reflection of some phenomena by others.

The category of interaction is broader than the category of activity, since the latter cannot be carried out without close interaction between the subject and the environment. Even internal, mental, for example, mental activity occurs about something and is an interaction in representation (in figurative or conceptual form). This is precisely why the concept of interaction is methodologically more correct than the concept of activity: it captures the inextricable connection between subject and object.

Interaction is always associated with overcoming uncertainty, therefore, in phylogeny, mechanisms of decision-making, interpretation, reflection, planning, and anticipation are formed that make it possible to transform uncertainty into certainty or reduce the likelihood of uncertainty in the future. Overcoming uncertainty as an information-energy barrier leads to the development of biological and social systems, and personality is considered as a product and a means of overcoming uncertainty by the psyche and consciousness, since overcoming uncertainty when interacting with a situation is possible only on the basis of the “internal” certainty of the subject.

From the point of view of practical application, the question of interaction comes down to the controllability of a particular phenomenon, as well as the possibility of its targeted change. Studying the interaction or revealing the natural conditionality of mental phenomena allows us to subsequently move on to searching for ways of their formation, education and self-government.

Let's consider some approaches to studying interaction.

Systems approach. The study of mental states as a multifunctional, holistic, multi-level phenomenon requires an adequate methodological apparatus. These requirements are met by a systems approach, understood as “a group of methods by which a real object is described as a set of interacting components.”

One of the varieties of the systems approach is the system-analytical approach of Ya.A. Ponomareva. According to the researcher, “only an interacting system can be a true subject of scientific analysis.”

From the position of Ya. A. Ponomarev, analysis of any interacting system in a functional sense, regardless of its specific features, allows us to distinguish the categories “product” and “process”. The first reflects the static, spatial side of the system. In the second – the dynamic, temporary side]. The functioning of interacting systems is carried out through mutual transitions of process into product and reorganization of the structures of components through differentiation and reintegration of their elements. The products of interaction, arising as a consequence of a process, turn into the conditions of a new process, exerting a reverse influence on the entire course of interaction. Depending on the properties inherent in the components, a method of interaction develops, on the basis of which the system can be classified into one form or another. To differentiate qualitatively unique forms of interaction, Ya.A. Ponomarev identifies two criteria: organization structure interacting system (qualitative criterion) and latent period (quantitative criterion), which expresses the natural unit of time characteristic of one or another form of interaction. Thus, time can be considered as a procedural aspect of interaction.

Distinguishes between “external” and “internal” interactions. External connections involve the reorganization of component structures through internal connections. The condition for any interaction process is a certain imbalance in the currently existing system of components. It can be caused by both external influences and processes within the component. Any change in the state of one of the components leads to a change in the relationship between the components, acting as a reason for their interaction.

Described by Ya.A. Ponomarev, the features of interaction contain a tendency towards the development of the system, since its equilibrium never remains static, but is preserved only in dynamics. The author defines the concept of “development” as follows: “Development is a way of existence of a system of interacting systems associated with the restructuring of a specific system, with the formation of qualitatively new temporal and spatial structures.”

Let us present the most general conditions necessary for interaction: firstly, what enters into interaction must relate to a certain structural level: biological, mental, physical, etc. (law of similarity); secondly, interacting structures should not be identical, they should differ in some way for interaction to arise (the law of difference).

As a result of the fulfillment of these conditions, mutual influence, interchange and the generation of an interaction product occur.

Synergetic approach. In synergetics, the concept of “interaction” plays a fundamental role, which is reflected in its definition as the science of interaction. The path to understanding complex systems lies in the discovery of the laws on the basis of which they are organized using their internal activity. The processes leading to the emergence of spatiotemporal structures are called “self-organization”.

Currently, the ideas of synergetics are actively used in various fields of psychology. From the perspective of synergetics, problems of a person’s inner world, mental states, perception, social groups, etc. are studied. Synergetics can be considered as a possible new paradigm for psychological science.

One of the most important tasks of synergetics is the study of the relationship between being and becoming. The initial conditions embodied in the state of the system are associated with being, and the laws governing the temporal development of the system are associated with becoming. Being and becoming must be considered as two related aspects of reality. The main idea of ​​synergetics is that at the stage of formation, disequilibrium acts as a source of order. Disequilibrium is what generates “order out of chaos.

A synergetic worldview allows us to take a new approach to the problem of effectively managing the development of complex systems. Ineffective management of a cognitive or social system consists of imposing an unusual form of organization on the system. According to the new approach, it is necessary to focus on the own laws of evolution and self-organization of complex systems.

G. Haken was the first to introduce the term “synergetics” into scientific use. This circumstance is due to the fact that, unlike other researchers, G. Haken paid serious attention to the applications of his ideas in psychology and other humanities. In particular, discussing the use of synergetics in the humanities, the author notes: “Such synergetic concepts as the parameter of order and subordination are applicable to sciences that have not yet been subjected to mathematization, and to sciences that will never be mathematized, for example, to the theory of the development of science.” .

Responding to criticism about the application of synergetics in psychology, the author notes that the principles of synergetics are used everywhere; it would be strange if they did not apply to the brain and its mental activity. The author expressed the starting position in the study of mental processes as follows: “The mental activity of the brain proceeds in accordance with the basic principles of self-organization.”

According to G. Haken's approach, biological and social systems are very complex and it is impossible to offer a general “recipe” for their analysis. Therefore, it is necessary to use the basic idea of ​​synergetics: “Look for qualitative changes on a macroscopic scale.”

G. Haken, within the framework of his approach, formulated the main questions of synergetics: What mechanisms give rise to new macroscopic structures? How to describe transitions from one state to another? To find answers to these questions, the author identifies the following features of synergetic systems and the “tools” for their research.

1. Complex systems are designed to perform certain functions that can only be performed with the coordinated interaction of its constituent parts.

2. In all cases of interest for synergetics, dynamics play a decisive role, therefore it is necessary to study the spatiotemporal evolution of the system.

3. Among the distinctive properties of synergetic systems is their stochasticity; the time evolution of systems depends on reasons that cannot be predicted with absolute accuracy.

4. An essential feature of synergetic systems is that they can be controlled by changing the external factors acting on them. These external factors are called “controlling parameters.” By changing the control parameters, one can study the self-organization of the system.

5. The main tool for studying dynamic systems are “order parameters”, which determine the behavior of the system components. The essence of the order parameter is that it is a form for the movement of matter, an indicator of cooperation and an abstract quantity.

The order parameter performs two functions: on the one hand, it subordinates the elements of the subsystem, on the other, the same elements support it unchanged.

The behavior of order parameters can be illustrated in two ways: firstly, by an appropriate space-time model, and secondly, using exact calculations.

The concept of disequilibrium mental states. Within the framework of this approach, based on the ideas of synergetics, states are considered as functional structures that are formed as a result of the introduction of energy and information into the system and have a certain reserve of energy.

According to the definition of A.O. Prokhorov, the category “non-equilibrium states” includes a subset of the set of all states, the manifestations of which depend on the level of mental activity of the subject. These states are updated due to the personal significance of situations, their specific content and high information saturation. Disequilibrium mental states arise as a reaction to various significant situations in life. The leading component of nonequilibrium states is the emotional component. The most general function of nonequilibrium states is to ensure the process of self-organization of the system.

There are relatively equilibrium states, states of increased and decreased mental activity. Nonequilibrium states of different intensity levels have specific qualities that are reflected in their structure, functions, and influence on other mental phenomena.

Non-equilibrium mental states have a number of specific characteristics: unstable parameters of the system are a small number of characteristics of the state that describe the macrostructure (modality, duration, intensity), they determine the behavior of the constituent parts of the system and the relationships between them; in the range from long-term states of low intensity to short-term states of high intensity, the coherence of their structure increases.

Reflexive, semantic and dynamic aspects of relations between states and cognitive processes

Isolating the reflexive side of the relationships between the phenomena being studied is necessary for the following reasons.

First, the inclusion of reflection in the relationship between states and cognitive processes corresponds to the provisions of the “cutting edge” of cognitive psychology – metacognitivism. According to this approach, there are special metacognitive processes that are not directly involved in the processing of information, but perform the function of its regulation. Reflection is part of metacognitive processes and forms an inextricable whole with the basic processes of information processing. For example, in the concept of intelligence M.A. Cold intellectual reflection is included in the metacognitive experience, which is the psychological basis of the ability to intellectual self-regulation. In the context of studying the thinking of V.V. Selivanov considers reflection to be one of the main content components of thinking - the metacognitive plan, “...manifested in the permanent reflection of methods of action with a cognizable object, methods of analysis and generalization of the conditions and requirements of the task, awareness of cognitions and meanings.”

Secondly, the object of cognitive processes is not only objects of the external world, but also one’s own processes, states and properties. In particular, mental states themselves become “information” that requires processing. The inner life of a person, his inner world, is extremely rich, occupying a person’s attention no less, and often more, than the events and circumstances of the surrounding world. All this is a strong determinant of mental state. The degree of awareness by the subject of his condition is one of the most important characteristics of the mental state; it emphasizes the regulating role of self-awareness.

Third, During the performance of an activity, a “division” of attention occurs, one part of which is directed to the content of the activity, and the other to oneself. Here the economy and “wisdom” of the organization of the psyche is manifested, since the same cognitive system performs the functions of orientation in the external and internal environment. The author proposes to distinguish the levels of reflexive processes in accordance with the levels of the structure of the cognitive hierarchy. Mental states in this case become the object of a metacognitive process, one of the functions of which is orientation in the internal content of the psyche. It should be noted that at one time N.D. Levitov separately identified the mental state of internal concentration, in which thoughts and experiences are in the focus of consciousness. The functional significance of this state lies in the control of attention and orientation in the internal content of one’s own psyche. As has been established, transferring attention from the main activity to oneself is a necessary condition for self-regulation of the psychophysiological state.

Fourthly, today among the methods for diagnosing mental states the primary position is occupied by psychological techniques that are addressed to the consciousness and self-awareness of the subject, his inner experience and reflection. The importance of self-awareness and reflection is confirmed by the attention of researchers to the concept of experience as the basic unit of mental states.

Thus, there are theoretical grounds for considering reflection as one of the leading factors in the relationship between states and cognitive processes.

At the same time, the reflexive aspect is the least studied area of ​​​​the relationship between states and processes. F.D. was one of the first to draw attention to this problem. Gorbov within the framework of aviation and space psychology, studying mental states in connection with gnostic phenomena created in the process of self-reflection. According to the author, different mental states in terms of the degree of experience are determined by different conditions for the occurrence of this process. The subject “finds himself” in activities accompanied by introspection (reflection) and changes in his sense of self, resulting in changes in mental state. Thus, in every mental state there is a latent “mirror effect” and an “echo effect”. The author notes the advisability of considering the “I – ​​second I” system as an important mechanism for perceiving and managing one’s own mental states. In the context of reflexive regulation of mental activity, one can also distinguish the system “I am a controller” - “I am a performer.”

Research shows that self-awareness provides information that leads to changes in state. This is due to the fact that in significant situations information about oneself is essential for the subject, thereby causing a change in state. This can be illustrated by the example of situational shyness, one of the factors of which is increased self-control.

Self-control is a rational reflection and assessment by the subject of his own actions on the basis of personally significant motives and attitudes. With increased self-control, which is a consequence of the subject’s constant focus on himself, a person constantly analyzes his behavior, evaluates himself negatively, cares about the impression caused and, in general, gives a negative assessment of his own state. As a consequence, a state of shyness arises, which is determined not only by the external situation, but also by the processes of self-reflection.

In the psychological dictionary of V.P. Zinchenko and B.G. Meshcheryakov's reflection is understood as a thought process aimed at analysis, understanding, self-awareness, including one's own actions, experience, states, attitudes towards oneself and others, etc. Conceptually, procedurally and functionally, reflection is associated with introspection, introspection, self-awareness.

In the psychological dictionary edited by A.V. Petrovsky, reflection is understood as a process of self-knowledge by the subject of internal mental acts and states. Reflection is not just the subject’s knowledge or understanding of himself, but also finding out how others know and understand the “reflector,” his personal characteristics, emotional reactions and cognitive representations.

YES. Leontyev connects reflection with the function of semantic regulation of life. The result of the reflexive elaboration of meanings is their transformation, described by the author as the effects of meaning awareness. The processes of restructuring semantic structures are the solution to the problem of meaning - determining the place of an object or situation in the context of the subject’s life. The result is the verbalization of the original meaning, its embodiment in meaning. Thus, awareness of meanings is achieved through the subject’s directed reflection of his relationships with the world.

A close definition of reflection is given by V.I. Slobodchikov and E.I. Isaev: “...This is such a specifically human ability that allows him to make his thoughts, emotional states, his actions and relationships, in general his whole self, the subject of special consideration (analysis and assessment) and practical transformation (up to self-sacrifice in the name of high goals and death “for one’s friend”).” The authors characterize reflection as the ability to implement value-semantic self-determination in relation to life as a whole.

The concept of reflection is of the same order as the concept of interpretation. Reflection is a person’s explanation to himself of his own behavior, states, experiences, etc. As a result, a consistent estimate of the eigenstates is achieved. Interpretation is an information process because it reduces the uncertainty that gives rise to many interpretation options. The essence of interpretation (achieving certainty) also lies in determining the meaning of information, its personal meaning (evaluation).

This understanding of reflection echoes the provisions of cognitive theories of emotions. In S. Schechter’s cognitive theory of emotions, the interpretation of information available to the individual about one’s own state and external influence is the main factor determining the intensity, duration and modality of the emotional state. Interpretation and assessment of the state is realized on the basis of cognitive processes. Similar ideas are presented by R. Lazarus in the context of the psychological theory of stress. Interpretation and assessment are considered as processes of determining the meaning of a situation and opportunities to overcome it. According to the author, such assessment is also carried out on the basis of cognitive processes. Within the framework of the concept of self-regulation of psychophysiological state, the cognitive component is considered, which is responsible for assessing one’s own state.

Thus, in the considered definitions of reflection, first of all, its intellectual side is noted as a process of analysis, evaluation, and interpretation of one’s internal states, processes, and properties. In the course of reflection on oneself, the subject turns into some content of cognitive processes. The close relationship between reflection and the semantic sphere of the subject is also emphasized.

In addition, in modern research there is a tendency to consider the relationship between emotional states and cognition as mediated and regulated by personality. Researchers believe that there is a system of certain personality traits or abilities that are responsible for organizing the influence of emotional states on the cognitive sphere of the individual. In particular, this trend is being implemented in the development of the problem of emotional intelligence. Emotional intelligence is understood as a certain model of abilities that involves the intersection of the emotional sphere and cognition. Four factors of emotional intelligence have been identified: perceiving emotions, understanding emotions, managing emotions, and using emotions. Emotional intelligence underlies self-regulation; in fact, it has to do with reflections own and “other people’s” emotional states and managing them for the purpose of adaptation. The end product of emotional intelligence is decision-making based on an understanding of emotional states, which are a differentiated assessment of events that have personal meaning.

Within the framework of social psychology, a “model of the impact” of emotional states on cognition is being developed. The connections between the two spheres are based on various mechanisms, the relevance of which is determined by the type of social thinking and the situation. Firstly, emotions serve to initiate the same or similar cognitive categories; secondly, emotional states are information about certain phenomena of the social world. These mechanisms are activated in various situations. If a person requires thorough thinking and interpretation of information, then the influence of emotional states on cognition occurs through the first mechanism; for tasks that require little cognitive effort, through the second. reflective mechanism. Emotional states have a stronger impact on cognition when a person is engaged in active cognitive activity.

Thus, in the above studies, mental states and cognitive processes are considered as a cognitive object; they are “perceived,” “reflected,” “evaluated,” and “interpreted.” All of these processes are implemented on a reflexive basis. From this we can assume that a promising direction of research may be the study of the relationship between states and cognitive processes, taking into account reflection, on the basis of which the state is interpreted, its “meaning”, which influences the meaningful characteristics of cognitive processes. On the other hand, reflection is considered as the highest, personal level of regulation of cognitive processes. Consequently, taking into account the positions of various researchers, we can make an assumption about the significant influence of reflection on the interaction of mental states and cognitive processes.

The semantic side of the relationship between mental states and cognitive processes.
The following provisions can serve as the most general basis for highlighting the semantic aspect of the relationship between states and cognitive processes.

1)General methodological principle of “non-disjunctiveness of the mental”(S.L. Rubinstein, A.V. Brushlinsky), according to which mental phenomena contain procedural and personal aspects, while the relationship between both aspects remains ontologically inseparable, “not disjunctive.” The mental as a process is characterized by its extreme dynamism, continuous mobility and variability. The methodological setting in the study of the psyche as a process involves revealing the relationships between the stages of the process during their formation. The personal aspect of mental phenomena appears in the case of studying a person’s relationship to certain tasks, to the situation as a whole, to other people, etc.

In the context of the relationship between states and cognitive processes, the need to take into account personal relationships was pointed out by S.L. Rubinstein, B.F. Lomov, V.N. Myasishchev and others. So, according to B.F. For Lomov, the concept of “subjective relations of the individual” is the most general, denoting the subjective position of the individual in a given situation. “Attitude” includes the moment of assessment, expresses the bias of the individual and is close in content to the concepts of “personal meaning”, “attitude”, at the same time, acting generic in relation to them. As integral personality properties, relationships influence all mental processes (phenomena) and are manifested in emotional reactions.

One of the modern implementations of the “personal approach” to the study of the relationship between cognition and emotional states is the development of the problem of emotional abilities (“emotional intelligence”).

2) L. S. Vygotsky’s position on the unity of the intellectual and affective sides of the psyche. According to this principle, the relationship between intellectual processes and emotions is carried out in the context of a “dynamic semantic system.”

This idea was most fruitfully implemented by O.K. Tikhomirov and his colleagues in experimental studies of emotional regulation of thinking. The inextricable connection between emotional states and thinking was shown, and the “central” factor of their interaction was identified - “the meaning of the final goal.” Under the influence of the meaning of the final goal, the meaning of the situation develops, mediated by the development of “operational meanings” of the elements of the situation. In later works, the motive began to be considered as a system-forming dynamic semantic system.

Let's look at these studies in more detail. OK. Tikhomirov studied the relationship between thinking and emotional states in the process of solving complex chess problems. The results of the experiments showed that the “emotional decision” is sometimes tens of minutes ahead of the issuance of a ready-made solution, and in the future it outlines the zone of subsequent searches, directing mental activity. Thus, according to the author, “...emotional states perform various kinds of regulatory, heuristic functions in thinking.” Interpreting the nature of the connection between emotional states and finding the main idea for solving a problem, the author concludes that states are included in the very process of finding a solution. They are associated with highlighting the approximate area where a solution can be found, as if determining the subjective significance of a particular direction of search.

In the studies of Yu.E. Vinogradov shows the impossibility of correctly solving difficult mental problems without the participation of emotional states. The author points to the phenomenon of “emotional development”, which consists in increasing emotional activation when performing logical operations, the culmination of which is the “emotional solution” of the problem. Emotional development, including the assessment of objectively significant elements, contributed to the formation of their meaning in the subjects; as a result, the processes of emotional and semantic development turned out to be interconnected, and the earlier the emotional coloring of actions with objectively significant elements arose, the faster their meaning was formed and the problem was solved. Thus, according to the author, emotional activation and regulation have a significant impact on the structure of mental activity, being the most important functions of emotions in the process of solving complex problems.

According to I.A. Vasiliev, when studying the problem of emotional regulation of mental activity, it is legitimate to use such concepts as “intellectual emotions and feelings.” These emotions arise in the course of mental activity and are directed towards the thought process itself, correlating with its individual phases. It is this orientation that determines the possibility of regulating mental activity. For example, during the analysis of a problem situation, a contradiction arises between the requirements of the goal and one’s experience, which is experienced in the form of a state of surprise. Attempts to resolve contradictions lead to some guesswork, which leads to the emergence of a state of conjecture. The stage of checking the guesses that have arisen is characterized by states of doubt and confidence. Accepting a hunch leads to the dominance of the emotion of confidence. At the last stage, specific emotions associated with the result of mental activity arise. Thus, intellectual emotions, when considered in unity with the thinking process, receive a meaningful description. The author believes that intellectual emotions represent an assessment; on this basis, he identifies the orienting and motivating function of emotions in the thought process. These functions are specific forms of emotional regulation.

3)The concept of semantic determination of states by A. O. Prokhorov, within the framework of which the assumption is developed that the semantic organization of consciousness determines the selectivity of the influence of life situations on the subject. The situation is “refracted”, mediated by semantic structures, significant components that have meaning for the subject are identified, and mental states are the consequence of this determination. Thus, the semantic characteristics of a person act as one of the factors in the relationship between cognitive reflection and the actualizing state, influencing the characteristics of the latter.

At one time B.A. Vyatkin and L.Ya. Dorfman, considered experience as the initial unit of analysis of mental states, connecting the situational and objectivity of experiences with energetic and semantic aspects, while the latter aspect was noted as the leading one. These two characteristics of experiences, according to the authors, determine the modality of the state.

The important role of semantic characteristics in the relationship between states and cognitive processes, taking into account their connection with experiences, can also be evidenced by JI studies. R. Fakhrutdinova, which, in particular, examined the relationship of visual perceptions and ideas with mental states. It has been shown that the mediating link in the relationship between states and cognitive processes is the subject’s experiences. According to the author, the accumulation of changes in the quantitative and qualitative characteristics of processes occurs in this intermediate link, a change in the mental state itself occurs after exceeding a certain “critical mass”. Thus, experiences act as a mechanism of self-regulation in a complex “process-state” system. The results of the study indicate that in the influence of mental processes on states through experiences, spatiotemporal characteristics are predominant.

In addition, in the context of the holistic psyche, the semantic aspect appears in conjunction with its other meaningful characteristics. The concept of “content”, as a rule, correlates with the category of consciousness and its components. Consciousness has a specific objective, semantic meaning, which is the semantic content of various mental formations. Semantic contents are formed in a person in the process of mastering speech and language. At the level of consciousness, mental states and cognitive processes acquire a sign nature, the study of which is associated with the phenomenology of the subject. For example, mental states at the level of consciousness are represented in meanings and experiences. The content aspect is specific only to the human psyche and reflects its cultural and historical conditioning. According to D.A. Leontyev: “The soul is content.”

V.M. once spoke about the need to consider the content and dynamic characteristics of the psyche. Rusalov. The content side, including worldview, ideals, values, aspirations, etc., is determined by social factors. Dynamic characteristics, manifested in temporary characteristics of behavior (tempo, rhythm, speed of operations, etc.), are significantly related to the biological properties of a person. The author showed that the dynamic properties of a person, manifested in temperament and abilities, are determined by the organization of a person’s natural qualities. At the same time, natural properties do not determine the content characteristics of mental activity.

In relation to the problem of determination of states, N.D. drew attention to the importance of substantive characteristics. Levitov: “...A person’s mental state largely depends on the significance for a person of the situation in which he finds himself.”

Recently, the content side of mental states has become the subject of increased interest among researchers. For example, A.O. Prokhorov conducted research on semantic state spaces. It has been established that cognitive processes are mediated by states that influence their course, manifestations and awareness, and also establish the categorical complexity of processes. The author identified four main factors - categories that determine cognitive processes in the semantic space of mental states: activity, assessment, attitude, dynamism. These same factors were included in the categorical structure of mental states, thereby showing that there is a certain similarity in the categorization of these phenomena in the human mind. The influence of level characteristics of cognitive processes on the size of semantic state spaces was also revealed - greater productivity of cognitive processes corresponds to a larger semantic space of mental states.

The semantic content of mental states and processes is associated with sensory content, some data accessible to awareness. According to the phenomenological tradition of E. Husserl, intentionality or “relationship” of mental phenomena to certain objects of the external world is an essential characteristic of mental life. In the “Amsterdam Reports” the author writes: “...As reflection reveals to us, it is inseparable from perception that it is the perception of such and such, just as the experience of a memory is in itself a recollection of such and such -then, in the same way, thinking is the thinking of such and such thoughts, people are afraid of something, love something, etc.” From the position of the psychological theory of meaning, a state is “the active intentional orientation of the subject towards certain phenomena of the external or internal world.”

In Russian psychology, an analogue of the concept of intentionality is the term “objectivity”. YES. Leontyev notes that the misunderstanding of this term “objectivity” is more the rule than the exception. The subject can be either an ideal object or a material one; the subject can also be integral life events and specific actions of the subject.

The objectivity of mental states is traditionally associated with the concepts of situation and experience. The subject’s experience of his attitude to the situation or various stages of activity is an essential characteristic of the state. This understanding of states allows us to answer the question “why does a state appear?”

Content characteristics play a decisive role in the study of states. A mental state is often characterized not so much by its functional nature (it is mental, emotional or volitional), but rather by its content and direction. Inappropriate anger, caused by an insignificant reason, cannot be identified with anger, a reaction to a serious offense. Under the direction of N.D. Levitov understood the uniquely experienced selective attitude towards reality, which is characteristic of a given person. Direction according to this definition means the content of significant goals and motives. The author calls attentiveness one of the forms of orientation, as its feature, which manifests itself in both involuntary and voluntary attention.

At the level of consciousness, experiences acquire their meaning and give rise to an important characteristic of mental life - meaningfulness. Any activity depends on the “meaningfulness” of sensory images, on the consciousness of the subject. The objective activity of the subject is always mediated by the processes of consciousness. Meanings, representing a special internal relationship, refract the situation in the human mind. The subject distinguishes between the objective meaning of certain phenomena and their meaning for himself, thus, the same phenomena are capable of acquiring different personal meanings in the consciousness of the subject, which creates the bias of human consciousness. According to the definition of A.N. Leontiev, personal meaning is the relationship between the motives and goals of activity, is an assessment of the vital significance for the subject of objective circumstances and his actions in these circumstances.

The content characteristics of cognitive processes, as shown in the studies of domestic scientists, are determined by their objectivity as the main property. Objects of the surrounding world or their combinations, constituting integral situations, form the sensory content of cognitive processes. At the level of consciousness, cognitive processes acquire the qualities of categoricality and meaningfulness. Thus, cognitive processes are determined, first of all, by the objective world. Similar positions are held in foreign cognitive psychology.

At the same time, one of the problematic issues within the information approach is the issue of representing information about the external world in the human mind. This is due to the fact that internal representations are not isomorphic to the surrounding reality, but have a person’s previous experience as a prerequisite. It is the structures of past experience that determine the content and procedural characteristics of cognitive processes.

Empirical studies predominantly show the influence of emotional states on cognitive processes. At the same time, many researchers note in terms of content the reverse influence of cognitive processes on states.

One of the mechanisms of such influence is cognitive priming. The content of a thought increases the likelihood of other thoughts that are semantically related to the original one appearing in the mind. As a result, the emotional state corresponding to the “priming thought” intensifies.

Another mechanism involves cognitive appraisals. For example, the concept of R. Lazarus assigns a large role to the significance of the event relative to the well-being of the individual. The intensity of the states depends on “how much is at stake” and the person’s confidence in his ability to cope with the situation. Based on the idea of ​​the subjective significance of events, the author introduces the concept of “assessment” and describes some of its varieties: “harm”, “threat”, “challenge”.

The two-way connection between cognitive processes and states of aggression in children was studied by N.A. Dubinko. A high level of aggression is associated with the perception of ambiguous situations as dangerous, harmful and threatening. Thus, this mental state determines the qualitative characteristics of cognition of the surrounding world. In turn, the aggressive states of younger schoolchildren may be a consequence of poor development of social-cognitive skills. Children's ideas about aggression influence their states and behavior.

Mental state has a significant impact on the perception and classification of current life situations. On the other hand, memories of life events change the state of the subject in accordance with their content. In addition, the authors note that, along with stressful events, a negative cognitive style can cause a subject’s depressive states.

Thus, not only cognitive processes acquire direction under the influence of emotional states, but also vice versa. This once again emphasizes the need to consider these mental phenomena as an interacting system. At the same time, it is important to note the connection between orientation and the semantic sphere of the individual. For example, D.A. Leontyev considers intentionality to be the most general characteristics of the semantic sphere, since the meaning of something indicates a purpose or target orientation.

Based on the considered theoretical and experimental studies, it can be assumed that the semantic context of activity has a significant impact on the relationship between states and cognitive processes, determining the quantitative and qualitative characteristics of mental states (modality, polarity, intensity, etc.) and cognitive processes (direction, selectivity, productivity). In addition, the productivity of cognitive processes may depend not only on the experienced states, but also on the “correspondence” of states and cognitive processes in terms of content.

Dynamic aspect of the relationship between mental states and cognitive processes is associated with the requirements of a systemic-functional approach to their study, within which opportunities open up for identifying patterns of relationships between two mental phenomena and their functions. According to E.P. Ilyin: “Understanding a condition as the status quo of the human psyche (i.e., a snapshot of its functional state at a given moment) contradicts the understanding of the condition as dynamically developing processes and does not allow us to identify either the cause or the mechanisms of its occurrence.” It is necessary to record the dynamics of indicators for a certain period of time under certain influences on a person (diachronic method).

The dynamic aspect is connected with the content aspect, since the intensity of the state can be considered as a condition for maintaining certain intentional structures of consciousness. This approach reflects the interdisciplinary connections between the psychological theory of meaning and conceptual ideas about the state as a functional structure with a certain supply of energy.

When studying the dynamics of mental states and processes, the general scientific categories of energy, space and time play an important role. According to B.F. Lomov, the level of mental processes and states brings psychology closer to the natural sciences, therefore the use of natural scientific methods is legitimate here. This feature of the research object contributed to the fact that many studies were carried out within the framework of a systems approach and synergetics methodology.

Historically, the first experimental studies of the relationship between emotional states and cognitive processes began in the laboratory of V.M. Bekhterev. For example, in the dissertation of V.V. Sreznevsky showed the influence of the state of fear on the processes of short-term memory. Later, S.L. Rubinstein, summarizing the results of many empirical studies, came to the conclusion that states can both increase and decrease the effectiveness of activity, can give effects of the opposite direction or generalized effects that spread for all manifestations of personality. S.L. Rubinstein noted that mental processes and states should not be opposed, since the dynamics of states and the patterns to which they obey are inextricably linked with the dynamics of mental processes. In addition, the author emphasized the dependence of the latter on the properties of the individual, as well as the relationship between the level of his achievements and aspirations developed during previous activities.

Regulatory influence of emotional states on mental processes S.L. Rubinstein described using the metaphor of “gateways”, which, when installed at one or another height, adapt the course of cognitive, volitional and other processes, thereby setting various dynamic aspects of activity. At the same time, the author notes the dependence of the dynamic characteristics of states on their content (the relationship to the object towards which the activity is directed).

Among modern studies, the dynamic side of the relationship between states and cognitive processes is most fully represented in the works of A.O. Prokhorova. According to the author, the study of the mechanisms of relationships between mental states and processes should consist of studying the structure of mental states. The mental state, being a reflection of the entire psyche as a whole and a certain component of it dominant in a given period of time, plays the role of a link between mental processes and personality traits. Each component of the psyche, if it is sufficiently effective relative to other components, can characterize a certain temporary state as a whole. In this case, the mental state can be considered as part of a given mental component. From this point of view, we can talk about the mutual influence of mental processes and states.

The mental state is the general functional level of mental activity, against the background of which mental processes develop. Due to differences in the order of temporal characteristics of processes and states, the variable characteristics of states are parameters for processes (for example, they set the level and range of changes in mental processes). The level and polar characteristics of mental states are of main importance.

Empirical studies of the relationships between mental states and processes were carried out in real conditions of educational and pedagogical activity in schools and universities: in lessons, lectures, seminars, practical exercises, etc. A.O. Prokhorov established that there are three types of influence of mental states on cognitive processes (hour-day time interval):

  1. “End-to-end” states that influence throughout the entire mental process (provide the background);
  2. states that influence the development of the mental process, which are “triggers”;
  3. states that provide the middle of the process;
  4. states that affect the termination of the process.

The results of studies of the relationships between processes and states made it possible to identify patterns of their interaction: integration, differentiation, disintegration (dynamic characteristics of interaction). Integration processes are associated with the convergence of individual processes to states, disintegration - with the collapse of previous structures, differentiation - with the formation of structural and functional blocks from different processes and states in the course of activity.

In terms of quantitative and qualitative characteristics of the relationship between processes and states, the following results were obtained:

  1. Mental processes are differently involved in interaction with states in the current time period (the ratio of the number of significant correlations to their total number, the average value of the involvement of cognitive processes is 19%).
  2. Each individual state integrates several mental processes.
  3. A ratio of stable - variable connections between mental processes and states was found (22% / 78%, respectively).
  4. There is a peculiarity of integration of mental processes and states in schoolchildren and students, due to the activity factor.
  5. Age-related features of the interaction of mental processes and states have been identified, for example, the involvement of imagination in interaction with states increases in ontogenesis (from grade 5 to grade 10).

Thus, these studies have established that mental states integrate processes, act as a way of organizing them (ensuring their alignment with the requirements of activity), which is manifested in the magnitude of the inclusion of the latter in relationships with states and the specificity of their interrelations. Mental states influence the procedural characteristics of processes and provide the background and stages of process development. The patterns of relationship dynamics include processes of integration, differentiation, and disintegration. Individual states integrate several different processes. The dominance of unstable, changeable connections in the structure of interaction between processes and states, as well as a tendency towards greater frequency and closeness of connections between states and processes of a higher level of hierarchy (imagination, thinking), was discovered.

Due to the high level of unstable connections between mental processes and states in the functional structure, changes in the latter (quality, nomenclature, sign, intensity) are ensured, which ensures the balance of the subject with the environment. Thanks to relatively stable connections, control of cognitive processes is ensured and their consolidation in the functional structure of states is ensured.

The issue of the relationship between mental states and cognitive processes is often raised in the context of studying certain psychological characteristics that influence the relationship between these mental phenomena. Apparently, the most significant of them are the own characteristics of states and cognitive processes.

Regarding mental states, such an important characteristic that determines the qualitative features of relationships is state level. Indicative in this regard are the studies of T.A. Nemchin, who studied states of neuropsychic stress. The researcher identifies three levels of neuropsychic stress, of which the most informative are “moderate” and “excessive” stress. With moderate tension, the effectiveness of the basic properties of attention increases: the volume, stability, and concentration of attention increase. Short-term memory and logical thinking also improve. In general, there is an increase in the efficiency of cognitive activity, despite the multidirectionality of the cross-functional characteristics of individual cognitive processes.

With excessive stress, a significant decrease in indicators of volume, stability, concentration, and switching of attention was observed. The productivity of short-term memory and logical thinking is significantly reduced. Thus, the results of the study show that with a high level of neuropsychic stress, disorganization of the subject’s cognitive activity occurs.

The mechanism of relations between cognitive processes and states of tension T.A. Nemchin describes on the basis of the theory of functional systems. The reason for the transition from a state of operational rest to a state of increased activity, subjectively experienced as moderate tension, is, according to the author, information about changes in external conditions that comes through analyzers to the perceptual-gnostic level of the individual’s neuropsychic organization. The gnostic functions of attention, memory, and logical thinking are activated and increase their productivity, ensuring an adequate reflection of the situation and optimal efficiency. As a result, an adequate assessment of the situation and a programmable desired result are formed, which is a system-forming factor. In a state of excessive stress, this mechanism is disrupted, which leads to an inadequate assessment of the situation and disruption of coordination of the activities of subsystems, ultimately leading to disorganization of activities.

Thus, the author attaches decisive importance in the process of adaptation to a difficult situation to the information block of the functional system of neuropsychic stress. The main factor determining the mechanisms of formation of mental states that reflect the process of adaptation to difficult conditions is not so much the objective essence of the situation as its subjective assessment by a person.

Similar studies in relation to the level characteristics of the state of stress were carried out by L.A. Kitaev-Smyk. The research results showed that against the background of a stressful state, it is possible not only to deteriorate the indicators of cognitive processes, but also to significantly improve them, in accordance with the indicators of the participation of these functions in activities (with the preservation of motivational factors that encourage the individual to purposeful activity). The principle of “strengthening the main direction” by weakening the secondary ones is implemented, which obeys the Yerkes-Dodson law (with an increase in the extremeness of the stress factor, after an improvement in the indicators of cognitive processes, their deterioration occurs).

Under moderate stress, cognitive processes are characterized by increased attention and thinking, and the ability to make insightful decisions. An increase in the extremeness of the stressor causes a “narrowing” of attention, leading to the loss of information important for activity. In addition, the perception of time is distorted, concentration of attention, and indicators of RAM and thinking are reduced. At the same time, the extremity factor is subjective; changes in the interpretation of the situation, certainty, and significance determine the ability to manage the cognitive manifestations of stress.

Another important characteristic that influences the interaction with cognitive processes is polarity states.

In studies carried out by A.O. Prokhorov showed that in general, negative states worsen, and positive states increase the productivity of cognitive processes. According to the author, the reason for these relationships lies in the differences in states experienced by the subject, as a result of which the integrating and differentiating functions of states differently connect the dynamic characteristics of processes with qualitatively different states.

The influence of negative mental states on the cognitive subsystem as a whole is shown in empirical studies by N.D. Zavalova et al. Under certain conditions of flight activity, mental states can lead to the disintegration of a holistic mental reflection through the mechanism of restructuring the dominant relationships between its main levels: perception, representation, thinking. In the case of a dominant value of one of the levels, a significant deformation of the system of cognitive processes may be observed.

Research also shows that color perception significantly depends on the polarity of a person’s states. For example, unpleasant experiences increase sensitivity to the color red, while positive emotions make a person more sensitive to the color blue. Under conditions of mental stress, there is a deterioration in the discrimination of color stimuli and a reduction in the yellow component of color perception.

The influence of positive emotional states on cognitive processes is intensively studied in foreign psychology. The results of memory research show that in positive emotional states, associative processes are more productive. Compared to negative conditions, subjects more easily detect connections between various phenomena, thoughts and ideas.

The experimental data obtained indicate that experiencing positive states helps to increase the productivity of thinking, improve the understanding of complex situations, and increase the productivity of verbal associations.

Positive states (which include calmness, satisfaction, joy, interest, serenity, etc.) have a beneficial effect on thinking - the repertoire of mental actions increases, the understanding of complex tasks improves, and test results for creativity and intelligence increase. Based on empirical research, “The Broaden-and-Build Theory of Positive Emotions” is proposed, according to which a complex of positive emotional states significantly increases the potential of thinking, and as a result, the physical, intellectual and social resources of the individual increase.

Thus, the considered empirical data indicate a functional asymmetry of positive and negative mental states. Negative states (distress, anxiety, fear, laziness, fatigue, etc.) are usually associated with disorganization of cognitive processes and a decrease in their productivity. Positive emotional states (calmness, interest, joy, love, satisfaction, etc.), on the contrary, can be an important source of increasing a person’s intellectual efficiency.

One such characteristic is individual cognitive style. According to M.A. Cold, cognitive styles are metacognitive abilities responsible for regulating intellectual activity. Their main functions are participation in the construction of objectified mental representations of what is happening and the control of affective states in conditions of cognitive reflection. There is evidence in the literature regarding the relationship between cognitive styles and emotional states. For example, the “analytical” cognitive style is predominantly associated with manifestations of states of fear and distress, while operating with the “synthetic” cognitive style is associated with the state of anger.

The susceptibility of cognitive processes to the influence of states also depends on the degree of structure of the cognitive process. By this term, J. Reikovsky understood the degree of separation of the reflected phenomenon from other phenomena (for example, a figure from the background), the degree of separation of the components of the phenomenon and the connections between them, as well as the degree of definiteness of the structure and organization of the phenomenon. The degree of structuredness of the cognitive process depends, first of all, on the properties of the cognizable reality: the less organized the object of knowledge itself, the less structured the cognitive process. This characteristic depends on the conditions in which cognition occurs, for example, poor lighting; a blurry image given by a projector, etc. According to J. Reikowski, the more structured the cognitive process is, the less susceptible it is to the influence of emotional states.

In addition, recently, within the framework of psychodiagnostics, there has been a tendency to consider methods for measuring cognitive processes as projective or quasi-projective. This draws attention to the qualitative analysis of the process of completing tasks and emphasizes the dependence of the characteristics of cognitive processes on personal factors. Thus, a holistic approach to the psyche is partially realized, since the opposition between personality tests and tests for measuring the characteristics of cognitive processes is removed.

In addition to “own” characteristics, the relationship between states and cognitive processes appears to be influenced by other psychological (and psychophysiological) factors, for example involuntary regulation. Modern ideas about the involuntary regulation of activation components of states are associated with the theory of self-regulation of mental tone by the American psychophysiologist D. Freeman.

In ordinary situations, self-regulation of the state is “woven” into the activity being performed as its subsystem through activation components. Changes in state occur automatically, are regulated at an unconscious, involuntary level, reflected in the activation of physiological indicators. In complicated conditions (lack of time, increased requirements for accuracy, selectivity, etc.), a person has a need to analyze the “price” and means of activity, which is manifested in an increased tendency to communicate with friends and the experimenter, increased motor and speech activity, and frequent changes postures, in terms of breathing, pulse, etc. These manifestations characterize involuntary self-regulation of states, which is aimed mainly at activation-energy components. Awareness of the discrepancy between current states and the requirements of activity leads to the transformation of self-regulation into independent activity with its own motive, goal, and image of the state. The main motive for self-regulation of states is the avoidance of negative and the desire for positive mental states.

The least opportunities for combining two types of activities are those activities that require sustained attention, excluding its switching to self-regulation of the state. Thus, the ineffectiveness of self-regulation of states in conditions of complex intellectual activity (solving visual and verbal problems) was shown.

A similar mechanism for regulating the state of monotony is described by E.P. Ilyin. In this case, the leading symptom is a decrease in mental activity, which is expressed in loss of interest in work, decreased attention, increased visual-motor reaction time, and increased parasympathetic influences. However, such a reduction conflicts with the goals and objectives of the activity, so regulatory mechanisms are activated that are designed to activate functional systems. Self-regulation is carried out through an increase in motor activity, leading to an increase in the flow of proprioceptive impulses into the cerebral cortex. Thus, the relationship between the state of monotony and cognitive processes is mediated by the involuntary regulatory mechanisms of the individual.

Another characteristic that influences the relationship between states and cognitive processes may be self-esteem personality. For example, data is provided according to which, with an equally high level of intelligence development, individuals with low self-esteem cope less successfully with intellectual tasks than individuals with high self-esteem. Empirical studies (carried out on a sample of adolescents) have shown that the psychological mechanism of the influence of self-esteem on the effectiveness of intellectual activity is the emotional state of the subject.

The role of self-esteem in determining states of tension is important. Self-esteem plays a regulatory role in activity, which is manifested in the characteristics of goal setting, the level of aspirations, and in relation to the subject and conditions of activity.

The relationship between states and cognitive processes (attention, memory, thinking) can be influenced by antipathy processes, the ratio of assessments of the extremity of the situation and the ability to overcome it, as well as achievement motivation, significant personal goals, etc.

So, the interaction of states and cognitive processes is determined by the characteristics of experienced states (sign, intensity, level, modality) and cognitive processes (level of development of cognitive processes, degree of organization of cognitive subsystems). In addition, researchers note the influence of personal characteristics: self-esteem, self-regulation, cognitive style, etc. Apparently, none of these factors allows us to accurately predict the relationship between states and cognitive processes. For example, although most authors point to the influence of level indicators of states on the characteristics of cognitive processes, at the same time it is noted that the result of interaction depends on the inclusion of factors of achievement motivation, self-regulation, assessment and interpretation of the situation, etc.

Thus, the relationship between mental states and cognitive processes is complex and multidimensional. Representing a single dynamic system, the interaction of processes and states is influenced by many personal characteristics.

There are reflexive, semantic and dynamic aspects of the relationship between mental states and cognitive processes. Reflexivity, personal meaning and time factor have a combined influence on the interaction of mental states and cognitive processes.

Level indicators of reflexivity mediate the interaction of mental states and cognitive processes. The regulatory function of reflexivity is associated with its level characteristics: a high level of reflexivity contributes to high productivity of cognitive processes with lower energy costs; the average level of reflexivity ensures the achievement of maximum productivity of cognitive processes, subject to the activation of high-intensity states; a low level of reflexivity is characterized by minimal productivity of cognitive processes over the entire range of changes in the intensity of states.

Personal meaning influences the organization of interaction between cognitive processes and mental states. The dominance of the procedural focus of personal meaning (compared to the focus on self-affirmation) in situations of educational activity strengthens the relationship between cognitive processes and states of medium and low intensity. At the same time, the level of integration of cognitive processes with states of high intensity levels decreases. In quantitative terms, this is expressed in an increase in the productivity of cognitive processes in less intense states.

In dynamic terms, the interaction of typical states and cognitive processes during educational activities leads to the emergence of qualitatively different spatio-temporal structures based on synchronous changes in their relationships: at the beginning of educational sessions, the structures of states and cognitive processes are characterized by an average level of integration; the middle of classes is accompanied by disintegration of connections in the structure of cognitive processes and a simultaneous increase in the level of integration of states; the end of training sessions is characterized by a high level of integration of the structure of cognitive processes and a low level of integration of the structure of states.

It has been established that the influence of states on cognitive processes is mediated by a temporal characteristic. At the initial stage of training sessions, the productivity of cognitive processes is facilitated by states of medium intensity, at subsequent stages (the middle and end of classes) by states of high intensity. The most “sensitive” to interaction with mental states in educational activity are attention processes; their indicators statistically significantly decrease in negative states of high and low intensity. The processes of memory and perception are the most resistant to the influence of states: during training sessions their characteristics remain constant or improve.

The influence of emotions on cognitive processes - Under the influence of emotions, the course of all cognitive processes can change. Emotions can selectively promote some cognitive processes and inhibit others.

A person who is in an emotionally neutral state reacts to objects depending on their significance, and the more important this or that factor (an object, its property) is for him, the better it is reproduced.

Emotions of moderate and high intensity already cause distinct changes in cognitive processes, in particular, a person has a strong tendency to perceive, remember, etc. only what corresponds to the dominant emotion. At the same time, the content of perceived, mnemonic and mental material strengthens and strengthens the emotion, which in turn further strengthens the tendency to focus on the content that caused this emotion. Therefore, most often, attempts to influence strong emotions through persuasion, explanations and other methods of rational influence are unsuccessful.

One of the ways to get out of a vicious emotional circle is the formation of a new emotional focus, strong enough to inhibit the previous emotion.

One of the main factors that determines whether a given person will be more or less influenced by emotions on his cognitive processes is the degree to which these processes are strengthened. Therefore, a child is more susceptible to the influence of emotions than, most often, an adult.

Emotional arousal improves the performance of easier tasks and makes it more difficult to perform more difficult ones. But at the same time, positive emotions associated with achieving success usually contribute to an increase, and negative emotions associated with failure - a decrease in the level of performance of activities and learning; when success evokes emotions of great strength, the flow of activity is disrupted, but even in the case when success is achieved at the cost of special efforts, fatigue may appear, which can worsen the quality of activity; when failure follows a series of successes, it can cause a short-term increase in the level of performance of the activity; a positive emotion contributes to better, and negative - worse performance of the activity as a result of which these emotions arose.

Emotions and thinking have the same origins and are closely intertwined in their functioning. However, the peculiarity of a conscious person is that emotions do not determine his behavior. The formation of a decision on a particular action is made by such a person in the process of carefully weighing all the circumstances and motives. This process usually begins and ends with an emotional assessment, but the process itself is dominated by thought. But if actions or deeds are carried out by a person on the basis of cold arguments alone, then they are much less successful than in the case when such actions are supported by emotions.