09:35 04.02.2016
In June 1941, the Red Army surpassed the Wehrmacht in terms of the number of weapons in its troops, despite the fact that Germany captured the weapons of all the European countries it conquered, including the weapons of France, which had a huge number of tanks, guns and aircraft. In terms of the number of troops, the armed forces of Germany alone exceeded the Armed Forces of the USSR by 1.6 times, namely: 8.5 million people in the Wehrmacht and a little more than 5 million people in the Workers' and Peasants' Red Army.
The website of the Zvezda TV channel publishes a series of articles about the Great Patriotic War of 1941–1945 by the writer Leonid Maslovsky, based on his book “Russian Truth”, published in 2011.
In his original materials, Maslovsky, in his words, exposes “the myths invented by Russia’s ill-wishers about the events of the Great Patriotic War and shows the greatness of our Victory.” The author notes that in his articles he intends to “show the unseemly role of the West in preparing Germany for war with the USSR.” In June 1941, the Red Army surpassed the Wehrmacht in terms of the number of weapons in its troops, despite the fact that Germany captured the weapons of all the European countries it conquered, including the weapons of France, which had a huge number of tanks, guns and aircraft. In terms of the number of troops, the armed forces of Germany alone exceeded the Armed Forces of the USSR by 1.6 times, namely: 8.5 million people in the Wehrmacht and a little more than 5 million people in the Workers' and Peasants' Red Army. 
This balance of forces took place despite the fact that, in preparation for repelling aggression, the USSR only increased the number of the Red Army from 1.433 million people to 5.1 million people in the period from 1937 to June 22, 1941. But when they talk about our defeats in 1941, they somehow casually mention the force that came against us at that terrible time. After all, this is not the strength of Germany, but of a huge “country” - Europe. It far exceeded our strength and capabilities in peacetime. It took boundless tension for 4 years of all the forces of the entire Soviet people to defeat the enemy who attacked our country. At this time, workers often slept in the shops, saving working time, and tens of thousands of soldiers and officers of the Red Army died in fierce continuous battles with the enemy. 
So let's look at the issue of enemy power. Germany's 8.5 million armed forces included 1.2 million civilian personnel, recruited throughout Europe and possibly in non-European countries as well. Of the 8.5 million people, ground forces accounted for about 5.2 million people. The number of 8.5 million did not include the number of armies of Germany’s European allies that have their own armed forces: Italy, Hungary, Romania, Finland. And this is a considerable force - only, for example, the armed forces of royal Romania numbered from 700 thousand to 1 million 100 thousand people, and the armed forces of Finland - 560-605 thousand people. If we accept that on average the armies of these allies numbered 625 thousand people , and this is the minimum possible number, then we will see that, in fact, on June 22, 1941, Germany and its allies had at least 11 million trained, armed soldiers and officers, and Germany could very quickly make up for the losses of its army and strengthen its troops. Our Red Army in number 5 million people in 1941 opposed armies subordinate to Germany with a total number of at least 11 million people. And if the number of German troops alone exceeded the number of Soviet troops by 1.6 times, then together with the troops of the European allies it exceeded the number of Soviet troops by at least 2.2 times. This is such a monstrously huge force that opposed the Red Army. That’s why Krebs told Halder: “Russia will do everything to avoid war. He will make all concessions, including territorial ones.” The fact is that the number of “new Germany”, that is, united Europe, amounted to more than 300 million people and by 1941 was more than 1.5 times greater than the number of the USSR, which at that time At the time, there were 194.1 million people. 
The question may arise: why did the USSR not increase the size of its army to 11 million people in pre-war times? We must understand that these 11 million men had to be removed from the national economy at a time when industry and agriculture valued every pair of working hands; they had to be armed and trained in military affairs, clothed, shod, and provided with normal nutrition. The woman who had just risen On its feet after two devastating wars, Russia did not have the means to maintain armed forces equal in size to the armed forces of a rich and huge state - Europe united by Germany. With the outbreak of the war, enterprises switched to working with extended working hours according to wartime laws, some workers and specialists were drafted into the army, and women and children replaced them at the factories' machines, usually performing work that did not require high qualifications. Skilled workers were booked and continued to work. The majority of peasants did not have armor. The 8.5 million people of the German army were armed with 5,639 tanks and assault guns, over 10 thousand combat aircraft, over 61 thousand guns and mortars. By June 1941, the Navy consisted of 217 warships of the main classes, including 161 submarines. On June 22, 1941, 5.5 million soldiers and officers of Nazi Germany and its satellites crossed the border of the USSR and invaded our land. Of the 5.5 million people, there were at least 800 thousand people in the armies of Germany's allies. 
During the war, the number of troops of states allied with Germany increased. During the war, we captured 752,471 Romanian, Hungarian, Italian and Finnish soldiers alone. The 5.5 million-strong army of Europe that attacked the USSR was armed with about 4,300 tanks and assault guns, 47.2 thousand guns and mortars, 4,980 combat aircraft and over 190 warships. The number of Soviet Armed Forces by June 1941 was over 5 million people (5,080,977 people): in the Ground Forces and Air Defense Forces - over 4.5 million people, in the Air Force - 476 thousand people, in the Navy - 344 thousand people. The Red Army was armed with over 67 thousand guns and mortars, 1860 new tanks and over 2700 (3719 pieces, according to G.K. Zhukov) new types of combat aircraft. In addition, the troops had a large number of outdated armored and aircraft equipment. The Navy had 276 warships of the main classes, including 212 submarines. The number of troops that attacked us was approximately 500 thousand greater than the number of all armed forces of the USSR. But we must keep in mind that in June 1941, the troops that were in the Far East in case of an attack by Japan, in the Caucasus in case of an attack by Turkey, and in other dangerous areas did not participate in the war with Germany. I believe that at least one million military personnel were in service in the indicated places. Thus, the number of Red Army troops intended to repel an attack by Germany and its allies was no more than 4 million people as of June 22, 1941, against 5.5 million German troops and its satellites. In addition, from the first weeks of the war, Germany transferred fresh divisions from Europe to the Eastern Front. As can be seen from the above data, at the beginning of the war, the Red Army, in comparison with the troops of Germany and its allies that attacked the USSR, had 19,800 more guns and mortars, 86 units more than warships of the main classes, and also surpassed the attacking enemy in the number of machine guns. Small arms, guns of all calibers and mortars in combat characteristics were not only not inferior, but in many cases superior to German weapons. As for the armored forces and aviation, our army had them in quantities that far exceeded the number of units of this equipment available to the enemy at the beginning of the war. But the bulk of our tanks and aircraft, in comparison with the German ones, were “old generation” weapons, morally obsolete. Most of the tanks had only bulletproof armor. A significant percentage were faulty aircraft and tanks subject to write-off. However, it should be noted that before the start of the war, the Red Army received 595 units of heavy KB tanks and 1,225 units of medium T-34 tanks, as well as 3,719 aircraft of new types: Yak-1 fighters , LaGG-3, MiG-3, Il-4 (DB-ZF), Pe-8 (TB-7), Pe-2 bombers, Il-2 attack aircraft. Basically, we designed and produced the specified new, expensive and high-tech equipment in the period from the beginning of 1939 to the middle of 1941, that is, for the most part during the validity of the non-aggression treaty concluded in 1939 - the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact. During the 19 peaceful pre-war years, the USSR built 11.5 thousand large industrial enterprises. With the outbreak of the war, most of these enterprises began to work for the front, for victory. And before the war, the bulk of weapons were manufactured thanks to the construction of new plants and factories: blast furnaces and open-hearth furnaces for steel smelting, enterprises for the production of guns, aircraft, tanks, ships, submarines and other enterprises of the military-industrial complex. It was the presence of a large number of weapons that allowed us survive and win. For despite the huge losses of weapons in the initial period of the war, we still had a sufficient amount of weapons to resist during the retreat and for the offensive near Moscow. A short-term shortage of artillery, small arms, and automatic weapons was felt in certain sectors of the front, as well as a shortage of ammunition, due to the untimely appearance of artillery units in the right direction and violations in matters of supply, delivery of weapons and ammunition to the troops. As a result of bloody battles and the retreat of the army, the loss of a large number of aircraft and especially tanks. Many tanks were lost due to lack of fuel. Especially often, for this reason, tanks were abandoned when our troops left the encirclement. We lost planes both in battles and at airfields. It must also be said that in 1941 the German army did not have equipment similar to our heavy KB tanks, Il-2 armored attack aircraft and BM-13 (Katyusha) rocket artillery. To be continued…
The opinions expressed in the publications of Leonid Maslovsky are the opinions of the author and may not coincide with the opinions of the editors of the Zvezda TV channel website.
Artillery is the god of war!
Infantry is the queen of the fields!!
Tanks are an iron fist!!!.
Dear colleagues, I bring to your attention information about the state and balance of forces of tank armies at the beginning of the Great Patriotic War.
How was it possible to lose in 41? having 26,000 tanks?!
Notes (hereinafter simply - Note). Once again, a person, exploring the reasons for the defeat of the Red Army in 1941, tries on the Wehrmacht the same methods (and the same shirts) that were in the USSR. No more than the number of tanks. And the quality indicators of tanks (both the USSR and Germany) are generally replaced. We will highlight and analyze these places separately.
I immediately picture long and slender columns of armored vehicles - like the Parade on Red Square...
Well, let's compare the tanks on 06/22/41. QUANTITATIVELY and QUALITATIVELY….
SO – QUANTITATIVELY
As of 06/22/41 The USSR had 12,780 tanks and wedges in the Western districts...
The Wehrmacht had 3,987 armored vehicles on the border of the USSR + German satellites advanced 347 tanks to the borders of the USSR.
Total – 3987+347= 4334
Note The number 4334 also includes tanks and wedges. Let's really figure it out and count. Nothing secret, official network data.
1. Tank Pz I (no more than a wedge), all modifications (Ausf A and B), including command ones, as of June 22, 1941, serviceable - 877 units (78%), not serviceable (under repair) - 245 (22% ).
In total, there are 1122 wedges. This wedge had no cannon armament at all. The main armament is two MG-34 machine guns with a caliber of 7.92 mm. The maximum armor thickness is 13 mm.
2. Tank Pz II. Directly on June 22, 1941, production series from Ausf A to G4 took part (last version April 1941). There are 1074 tanks in total. Immediately serviceable - 909 (85%), in repair - 165 pieces (15%). The maximum armor thickness is 30 mm.
3. Tank Pz III. Directly on June 22, 1941, production series from Ausf A to J took part. A total of 1000 tanks. Immediately serviceable - 825 (82%), in repair - 174 pieces (17%). The maximum armor thickness is 30 mm.
4. Tank Pz IV. Directly on June 22, 1941, production series from Ausf A to E took part. A total of 480 tanks. Immediately serviceable - 439 (91%), in repair - 41 pieces (9%). The maximum armor thickness, only on the E series, and for 223 tanks, is 50 mm frontal.
At the same time, there are 223 (7%) (maximum number, excluding faulty tanks) tanks with an armor thickness of 50 mm.
Tanks with armor thickness from 13 to 30 mm - 2827 (93%) units. And the most popular Wehrmacht tank is the Pz I wedge - 1,122 units.
Now we begin to deal with satellite tanks.
347 tank is generally all the tanks in the bunch of all the allied countries of Germany in World War II. This includes Romanian tanks, Renault FT-17 and French B-1bis and Italian Vickers 6 tons. On June 22, 1941, these may have been modern and serviceable tanks, but nothing more than that, if you just want to laugh. We will not take them into account in our article. Because we will not follow Gareev’s methods.
The superiority is exactly 3 times...
Note So far the superiority is exactly 4 times.
However, there is an English proverb: (the devil is in the details).
Let's see the DETAILS
FIRST
Sometimes those who say that, well, we had 3 times more tanks than the Germans, forget that the Germans, in principle, have 4334 - this is serviceable tank equipment, combat-ready.
Note Why on earth did ALL 4334 BECOME SERVICEABLE AND COMBAT READY? This is where the details start to emerge. Everything is fine. But we won’t believe it.
In our country, only tanks of the first two categories (out of 4 available) could be combat-ready... The first category is a completely new technology.
The second category is serviceable military equipment, used and faulty military equipment requiring routine repairs.
The third and fourth categories - there are already various types of repairs - medium repairs, major repairs, non-repairable, and so on. That is, this third or fourth category can actually be discarded. As for the border districts, there were about 8,000 tanks of the first two categories (minus those requiring routine repairs).
2. Categorizing equipment is nothing more than bureaucratic correspondence only for repair departments. Categorization is intended to indicate the service level of a tank (or other equipment) in the army. Categorization has nothing to do with the practice of using tanks.
3. Medium repairs were carried out in departments by departments with the involvement of specialists from repair departments. In average repair there may be tanks not only of III or IV categories, but also II and even I. A tank is transferred to the fourth category only before it is written off. Before this, the tank was in category III. And it will be repaired.
Pay attention to the logic of the author, who is trying to prove that the USSR had as many tanks as Germany. First, ALL THE TANKS that GERMANY COULD HAVE are counted. Including tanks with bulletproof armor, as well as tanks manufactured in 1917. And in relation to the USSR, a note is used that only tanks of the first two categories, that is, new tanks, will be counted. That's just not how things are done. If you want to count, count, just apply the same methods to everyone. Because if we start counting only new German tanks, produced in 1940 and 1941, then our number of German tanks will be reduced to 1124 and no more.
Where did the number of 8000 tanks come from?
Very simple. This is arithmetic (Pupkina, without pictures). It’s just that 4,780 tanks are stupidly equated with old, outdated and faulty tanks. Why was this done? In order to try to prove that there were about 8000 serviceable types.
Once again, pay attention. When counting German tanks, the words " near" not used. Everything is accurate. There are so many of these. Plus these have so much more. And everything is fine.
And the USSR (poor thing) has about 8000. There is no accuracy. And it cannot be.
Let's really look at the details. And let's compare.
As of June 22, the Western Special Military District alone had 1,136 T-26 tanks. It was customary to laugh at this tank in the USSR. But, by the way. Captured T-26s were used by the Wehrmacht in both 1941 and 1942. And in Finland, the T-26 was in service until 1961.
October 1941. The German infantry is advancing under the cover of... the Soviet T-26 tank (already in other hands).
October 1941. BT-7M, on the other side.
Armored car Ba-20 from the Germans.
Another Ba-20 in different hands.
And this is the T-34, on the other side.
This is a modernized (by the Germans) KV-1 tank
August 1941, apparently - these are not serviceable tanks?
November 1941. Modernized and improved (by the Germans) thirty-four.
September 1941. The Germans did not pass by the KV-2, they also brought it to mind. The finishing is visible to the naked eye.
March 1945. Soviet tank crews did not disdain German tanks.
Armor - 15 mm (20 mm since 1939), in 1940 the T-26 received shielded armor. But, let’s not let the T-26, armor is the only thing that the T-26 was inferior to German tanks on June 22, 1941.
But in terms of armament he was superior to them. Because the T-26 had a 45-mm 20-K tank gun. The initial speed of an armor-piercing projectile is 760 m/s. Until December 1941, this was quite enough to knock out any German tank at a distance of 300 meters.
Little of. The latest modifications of the T-26, produced in 1938 and 1939, had a stabilizer in the vertical plane of the gun and sight. Therefore, it was easier for this type of tank (the latest modification consisted of 2567 vehicles) to fire on the move, without short stops.
The ratio is 1 to 2... It seems to be good... However, there is such a sad thing: 95% of Soviet tanks had bulletproof armor and could be hit by any anti-tank gun...
Note And 93% of German tanks (we have already proven this above) were tanks with bulletproof armor.
The PAK 35/36 penetrated 40 - 50 mm of armor with a sub-caliber armor-piercing projectile from 300 meters. With a conventional shell, it penetrated the armor of 95% of Soviet tanks from half a kilometer away.
Note And the Soviet 45-mm anti-tank gun 53-K penetrated 40-50 mm of armor from 300 meters with a sub-caliber armor-piercing projectile. With a conventional shell, it penetrated the armor of 100% of German tanks from half a kilometer away.
Speed - firing 10-15 rounds per minute...
Note The Soviet gun has the same rate of fire, 10–15 rounds per minute.
Both the Wehrmacht in 41-42, and the Red Army in 43-45, sought to avoid an oncoming tank battle in the offensive: what’s the point of spending a lot of ammunition, people and equipment forming a breakthrough, and introducing a tank corps/division into it, in order to 20-30 km, exchange your tanks in battle for enemy tanks? - It would be much wiser to place your anti-tank missile system under counterattack by enemy tanks...
Note But stop here. Dear! You are a blacksmith who jumps from topic to topic. We are not interested in what happened in 1942 and 1943. We're looking specifically at 1941.
The attacker uses his infantry formations, which are the majority in the army, to attack a pre-selected area of defense. The defender can only cover this blow to a limited extent with the same infantry formations - he could assemble for “ sealing» breakthrough only those of them that were in close proximity to the affected area. The defender is forced to use valuable motorized mechanized formations to parry the attack, pulling them towards the section of the front that is being breached... where he runs into anti-tank defenses on the flanks of the enemy’s attack...
THAT. the entire number of Soviet tanks was devalued by their bulletproof armor...
Note The same thing applied to German tanks, whether on defense or on the offensive. However, this is not the answer to the question “ Why" This is nothing more than speculation on the topic. Combat is organized and coordinated actions. And not rides, in order to “ pulling together, bumping" Any anti-tank unit is not without its limits. And even more vulnerable than the tank itself. That’s why in the USSR the 45-mm anti-tank gun (PTP) was called “ goodbye Motherland"(there was also an option " death to the enemy..... calculation"), and in the Wehrmacht the 37-mm Pak 35/36 anti-tank gun was called " mallet».
Now let's look at the QUALITY side...
We had the best tank in the world, T-34-76 and KV... They would have prayed to roll it out " in an open field» - « crowd on crowd"all German tanks...
Hmm...I immediately remember a joke...
There is a tour of the zoo. He reaches a cage with a huge elephant. And then one person asks:
- What does he eat with you?
“Well,” the guide answers him, “cabbage, hay, carrots, vegetables, a total of 100 kilograms.”
- So what - will he eat all this? - the curious tourist is surprised.
“He’ll eat something,” the guide answers, “but who will give it to him?!”
Note And who, one might ask, is to blame for the fact that Soviet tanks (elephants) were not given 100 kilograms of something a day? And the anecdote given is somewhat inappropriate. Need an example? Please. In August 1941, a tank platoon of senior lieutenant Zinovy Konstantinovich Klobanov disabled 22 enemy tanks in just one battle. If we take the example of Kolobanov in August 1941, then the question arises, who limited Kolobanov’s elephants? Nobody. That is, when no one interfered with the tank crews of the Red Army in battle (from the elephant breeders, in the form of senior management), the tank crews not only achieved results, but also accomplished real feats.
If there were idiots in the Wehrmacht who only dreamed of clashing in an oncoming tank battle with enemy tanks, then it’s clear that we would have given them a task... But the trouble is, the vile little thing, both at Prokhorovka, and at Lepel, and wherever it could - exposed her anti-tank missile system to the counterattack of Soviet tanks... against which the tank attacks were safely broken up... and if the T-34 or KV had a chance, then other tanks were burned at distant approaches...
Note The point is not that there were idiots in the Wehrmacht or not. But the point is that, I repeat, the battle is organized and coordinated actions. It is not a single tank that achieves success in battle, but only as a result of joint active actions. And if the Germans’ reconnaissance worked at the proper level and identified Soviet tanks: without infantry, without artillery and air support, then why blame the Germans? It turns out that it was not the Germans who were idiots, but the Soviet command. Which is not clear what he was thinking when he sent his tanks into battle.
BUT! It seems like we were talking about 1941. It’s not clear how to return the author to 1941? Prokhorovka is just flowers. But the berries appear further. There really is a joke there.
Here’s a small detail - the share of tanks with normal armor (i.e. medium and heavy) capable of resisting anti-tank artillery was:
- in the Red Army - about 5%;
- in the tank forces of the Wehrmacht on the eastern front - about 50%.
Note Here they are, the berries appeared. It turns out that in 1941 the Germans had medium and heavy tanks, in percentage terms as much as 50%. Whereas in the USSR there are only 5% of them. This is an anecdote, if only they could compare it with the tank fleet of Italy, there would be no problems. But with USSR tanks it’s funny. Did the Germans have something equal to the T-35? Or maybe there was something equal to the T-28? Why these tanks were lost will be answered below.
We can name the Soviet heavy tanks of 1941 without any problems. But, just let the respected author name “ heavy"German tanks on June 22, 1941?
Once again, pay attention to what words are used to describe German tanks - “ medium and heavy" And for the Soviet " faulty and outdated" This is a method of NLP (neuro-linguistic programming). The key to this method is the union " And" This was always done in the USSR when it was necessary to denigrate something. This method can be used to denigrate anything at all, for example: “ astronauts and sadomites" We didn’t say anything bad about the astronauts, but the negativity is already obvious. The result will come if you repeat this constantly. This was proven back in the 19th century by Gustave Lebonne.
But our medium tanks were better than the German ones! Isn't it true!?
Note In some ways yes, but in others no.
I’m disappointed, but the best tank of the Red Army was the T-34-76 in 1941. still inferior to his German " opponent».
Note The key word in the sentence above is the word " after all" Therefore, we will answer the author in the same word (and method): the T-34-76 in 1941 was not inferior to any German tank. And therefore we will disappoint the respected author.
ARMOR - as an opportunity to resist enemy anti-tank weapons:
T-34-76 - 40 – 45 mm.
PZ-3-J - 50 mm.
Note Pz III Ausf. J is a tank manufactured in March 1941. This is the only thing the author grabbed onto. But there is one small thing. From March to December 1941, the Pz III Ausf J was produced with a 50 mm KwK 38 L/42 gun (50 mm tank gun, model 1938, with a barrel length of 42 calibers, or 2100 mm).
Since December 1941, Pz III Ausf J began to be produced with a 50-mm KwK 39 L/60 cannon (50-mm tank gun, model 1939, with a barrel length of 60 calibers, or 3000 mm).
Since March 1941, all T-34s have been equipped with a 76.2 mm F-34 cannon with a barrel length of 41.5 calibers, which is 3162 mm.
Two clarifications need to be made here:
- the strength of German armor was approximately 1.5 times higher than that of Soviet armor (in 1941, where did this come from?)
- the T-34 armor plates have a rational angle of inclination.
But the slope of the armor plates makes sense when the caliber of the projectile is equal to the thickness of the armor. Therefore, for example, the artilleryman of a 50-mm cannon was “ purple“At what angle are the armor plates of the tank bent... the main thing is to hit it.
Note It turns out that rational angles of inclination are bullshit? Why then did all the countries in the world subsequently switch to rational angles? But! On a German tank from June 1941, a 50 mm cannon with a short barrel. A very wonderful weapon. But this weapon could only cause harm to the T-34 manufactured in March 1941 from a distance of 300 meters, and to the side or rear. All. In all other cases, it could not. But that’s not even the main thing. Not every hit on a tank and penetration of the armor means the defeat of the tank.
And the T-34 could, with its 76-mm cannon, harm the Pz III Ausf J from at least 500 meters, even from 1000. Not just because the gun was more powerful, but in addition to the cannon, the Pz III Ausf J lacked rational armor angles. Which they hit at everything not with a 50 mm cannon, but with a 76 mm one.
In the same example with Klobanov, the KV-1 tank received more than 40 hits from German shells during the battle. And not only was it not damaged, but it was also capable of further battles. Very surprisingly, Kolobanov’s tank did not fall into category IV after the battle on August 22. This was for the Soviet tank crews " purple whether a German shell will hit them or not. Because they knew very well that the Germans had short-barreled tank guns, which were not intended to fight armored targets.
By December 1941, the Wehrmacht command had just reconsidered its attitude towards its tanks. Because the Wehrmacht tankers were far from “ purple“A Soviet 76-mm armor-piercing shell will hit them or it won’t.
ENGINE:
T-34-76 -engine " V-2» « was dying» after 40-60 hours of operation. This is an indicator of production quality.
Pz-III Ausf. J - engine " Maybach"had a service life of 400 hours. This is also an indicator of production quality.
SPEED (Highway/Road):
T-34-76 – 54/25 km/h
Pz-III Ausf. J - 67/15 km/hour
But! On the gravel highway Kubinka Pz-III Ausf. H and J accelerated at a measured kilometer to a speed of 69.7 km/h, while the best figure for the T-34 was 48.2 km/h. The BT-7 on wheels, singled out as a standard, reached only 68.1 km/h!
AT THIS POINT: The German vehicle surpassed the T-34 in terms of smoothness, it also turned out to be less noisy - at maximum speed the Pz.III could be heard from 150–200 m away, and the T-34 from 450 m away. Even in this case, you can add the author that Soviet tankers, sadly enough, were very fond of the Pz-III Ausf. J and not only, but even version N. Why? Because the tank was of high quality. Nothing whistled, fell off, or turned on its own.
CREW CONVENIENCE:
Pz-III Ausf. J - had a three-man turret, in which there were quite comfortable conditions for the combat work of crew members. The commander had a comfortable turret, which provided him with excellent visibility, and all crew members had their own intercom devices.
The T-34 turret could hardly accommodate two tankers, one of whom served not only as a gunner, but also as a tank commander, and in some cases, as a unit commander. Only two of the four crew members – the tank commander and the driver – were provided with internal communications. All of the above is absolutely true. But this does not apply directly to the tank itself. This is the problem of Soviet tank generals. Who ordered the T-34, while the tank commander was not a gunner, but a loader. This generally applied to all Soviet tanks produced before 1943. And we emphasize that this is not a problem with the T-34, it’s a problem with the Soviet tank school.
"ARMOR PIERCING" tank in '41:
- T-37-76 – limited by the lack of armor-piercing shells. At the end of 1941 solved.
- Pz-III Ausf. J – limited by a relatively weak gun.” At the end of 1941 solved by introducing a new gun...
Note The absence of an armor-piercing shell is not an indication that a tank cannot fight against a tank. German Pz-III Ausf. J behind the eyes and ears, a hit from a 76-mm high-explosive fragmentation projectile would be enough. And just one. After the battle, the crew would have to be removed from a completely intact tank and replaced with another.
After reading, the answer to the question does not come. So what is the reason? Why did the USSR, having even 8,000 serviceable tanks, manage to dry out 3,050 tanks in the initial phase of the war, of which the vast majority were wedges?
After all, everything is calculated very simply. For every German tank there are 2 Soviet ones and another 1900 can be left in reserve. Just in case. You never know.
But they didn’t do that. And they didn’t.
As of October 28, 1941, there were 441 tanks on the Western Front, of which: 33 KV-1, 175 T-34, 43 BT, 50 T-26, 113 T-40 and 32 T-60. This is from 3852 of the original composition, on June 22, 1941.
On October 28, 1941, on the Western Front, there were 8.7 (almost 9) times fewer tanks than there were on June 22 of the same year!
But if you already need to answer the question, then there is no problem.
REASONS for the loss of tanks in the USSR from 6/22/1941 to 10/28/1941:
1. any Wehrmacht tank is not just an armored cart. Each tank had appropriate communications equipment. He didn't just have something. These means of communication have been tested, there was some experience in using them. And if a person did not understand or did not want to understand: how a means of communication works, what it is needed for, and what is achieved with the help of means of communication in battle, then this person would NEVER BE PUT TO THE POST OF A TANK COMMANDER;
2. The Wehrmacht command tank is not just the same tank as the others, just a little different. This is a control vehicle that could take part in battle on an equal basis with all the tanks in the platoon. But with all this, she not only controlled, but had a connection with each participating tank. And among other things, the commander of a Wehrmacht tank platoon had in his command tank: communications for interaction with infantry, communications for interaction with artillery, communications for interaction with aviation and a means of communication with senior authorities. And if the commander of a tank platoon could not CORRECT ARTILLERY FIRE, DIRECT OWN AVIATION, AND COULD NOT INTERACT WITH INFANTRY, then such a person would never be appointed to the position of commander of a tank platoon.
As of 2013, in the Russian army, the commander of a tank platoon not only does not have (but does not even dream of having) means of communication to interact with aviation, and does not have contact with his own artillery. He has very infrequent and very unstable communication with his tanks, as well as (not always) with the infantry;
3 . A Wehrmacht tank platoon is not three tanks, as was customary in the USSR and now in Russia. A Wehrmacht tank platoon consists of 7 tanks. Two in each compartment, plus the commander’s tank itself, the 7th tank. Therefore, a Wehrmacht tank company could be used to carry out operational tasks. And I was attracted. But why? It is still not clear in the USSR and in Russia. Because the organization is not just different. But completely different. Not even close to Soviet.
There were two tanks in each squad for a reason. The essence of the application is simple: the first one performs a maneuver (any), and the second one covers it at this time. There are generally a lot of options for action;
4 . The term for coordinating a Wehrmacht tank crew is two years (the figure is still wild for the USSR army and especially for Russia). People not only learned from the practical experience of their predecessors, but the crews literally got used to each of their people. In order to achieve understanding in battle without words at all, from one half glance. At the same time, special attention was paid to which crew was supporting and which was operating. And therefore they did not create a mixture of people.
The Wehrmacht tank commander was not a loader. He was only a gunner in the Pz I tank. On all other Wehrmacht tanks, the tank commander controlled the crew in battle.
And one last thing. The specific customers of tanks in Germany were not generals, but those who fought in tanks. That is, when the German Minister of Armaments sent his representatives to the troops so that they would give a clear and clear picture of what and how to modernize, then representatives of the Ministry of Armaments talked with driver mechanics, gunners and tank commanders. And not with the commanders of tank divisions. The tank division commander could only facilitate the delivery of a representative of the Ministry of Armaments to each unit and its protection.
That's why the Germans didn't have " flying tanks“, but this is precisely why the Wehrmacht managed to get to Moscow on Pz I Ausf A wedges.
And everything that was slapped in the USSR before 1941, into which a simply colossal resource was poured (factories sank space for almost 20 years, it turns out just like that), it was either stupidly abandoned (and accordingly went to the Germans) or lost - because was not intended for war at all. For travel during parades on Red Square, and nothing more.
Gareev’s methods still live today. Not only do they rewrite history. To this day, only a quantitative indicator is assessed in the Russian army. And everything is not of high quality. The training of those who will fight in general is not taken into account. So not so long ago, the Chief of the General Staff of Russia, Gerasimov, stated that: “ The troops are poorly prepared, but the headquarters are very well prepared».
But, " highly professional staff"they cannot prepare in any way (even before their " almost"level) of those who will bring victories or defeats to these headquarters in the war.
In 1941, the headquarters were also prepared to such an extent “ Fine"that this did not prevent the Red Army from retreating all the way to Moscow.
Among the many poorly studied questions of the pre-war history of the Red Army, the question of its strength in 1939 - 1941 stands out due to its almost complete lack of development. The documents currently available on this issue are rather fragmentary and often use rounded figures. Nevertheless, these data give a general idea. Two types of statistics on the number of personnel are usually used: staffing and payroll. The first is a purely calculated indicator, and the second reflects the real state of the armed forces. Units outside the norms were considered to be formations that could be used in peaceful production and were supported by the budget of civilian departments. These included a special railway corps, operational railway regiments, a construction corps, construction battalions and other similar formations."
By the beginning of 1939, the strength of the Red Army was 1,910,477 people (of which 1,704,804 were in the ground forces and air force, 205,673 in units outside the norm). As statistics show, at the beginning of 1939, there were 7 Red Army soldiers per 1 commanding officer, 27 Red Army men per 1 political officer, 10 Red Army soldiers per other general command staff, and 3 Red Army soldiers per 1 junior commanding officer. The total number of people liable for military service as of July 1, 1939 was 11,902,873 people born in 1899-1918, of which 7,892,552 people were trained and 4,010,321 were not trained. It was planned in 1940 to train 3 million people in mostly scarce military specialties in 1 - 1.5 month training sessions.
In the summer of 1939, the size of the army was 1,698.6 thousand personnel (apparently, units outside the norms were not taken into account). The military conflict at Khalkhin Gol required the call-up of 173 thousand reserve personnel to strengthen the troops of the Western Military District and the 1st AG. Formally, this contingent was called up for training camps, but on July 16, by the Decree of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR and the order of the People's Commissar of Defense No. 0035 of July 17, it was mobilized for the period until February 1, 1940. During the partial mobilization that began on September 7 in 7 military districts (BUS ) 2,610,136 people were called up (see table 5), who on September 22, by the Decree of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR and by the order of the People's Commissar of Defense No. 177 of September 23, were declared mobilized “until further notice.”
At the same time, according to the resolution of the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR No. 1348-268ss of September 2, 1939, from September 5, the next conscription for active military service should begin for the troops of the Far East and 1 thousand people for each newly formed division, and from September 15 for all others districts. In total, 1,076 thousand people were drafted into the Red Army before December 31, 1939. In addition, according to the new Law on General Military Duty of September 1, 1939, the service life of 190 thousand conscripts of 1937 was extended by 1 year. By the 20th of September 1939, the strength of the Red Army exceeded 5 million people (including 659 thousand recruits). The normalization of the situation on the western borders of the USSR made it possible to begin reducing the number of the Red Army on September 29, and by January 7, 1940, 1,613,803 people were fired. On October 2, 1939, the government approved the proposal of the People's Commissar of Defense to dismiss those called up for training camps for the Far East. By December 1, the troops of the LVO and KalVO remained mobilized, the BOVO and KOVO continued to discharge those called up from the reserve, and the MVO, ORVO and HVO completed their discharge and switched to peacetime organization. As of December 27, the total strength of the Red Army was up to 3,568 thousand people (units outside the norms are not taken into account).
However, the outbreak of war with Finland required the replacement of losses and an increase in the size of the Red Army. On December 28, 1939, it was decided to call up 546,400 people to the Red Army to strengthen the troops of the western military districts and 50 thousand reserve command personnel. At the same time, 5 younger conscription ages - 376 thousand people - were called up to PriVO, Urals and Siberian Military Districts. Thus, it took 972,400 to strengthen the army. During the Soviet-Finnish War, 550 thousand people were drafted into the Red Army. In total, from September 1939 to March 12, 1940, 3,160 thousand people were called up from the reserves into the Red Army, of which 1,613 thousand were discharged, and 1,547 thousand people remained in the army.
After the end of the war with Finland, the Soviet command again faced the question of reducing the size of the army. In memo No. 16314/ss dated March 29, the People's Commissar of Defense reported to the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks and the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR that as of March 1, there were 4,416 thousand people in the Red Army, of which 1,591 thousand were reservists who came from the reserves and 163 thousand - Red Army soldiers conscripted in 1937. The People's Commissar asked for permission to dismiss 88,149 people from the rear units and institutions formed for the active army, and 160 thousand registered personnel called up in September 1939 to BOVO, KOVO, KalVO and OdVO. In addition, the People's Commissar announced the dismissal of 80 thousand volunteers. All these measures were approved on April 1 by the Politburo of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks and formalized by resolution of the Defense Committee No. 159ss.
The beginning of the reduction of the Red Army led to the fact that by November 10, 1940, 1,205,120 people of junior command and rank and file of the reserve were dismissed, and the remaining 9,101 people detained should have been dismissed before January 1, 1941. At the same time, according to the document issued on June 3, 1940. People's Commissar of Defense Order No. 0110 should have “detained until further notice the middle and senior commanding staff of the reserve” and until November 1, 1940, the Red Army soldiers conscripted in 1937. However, the Decree of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR issued on the same day, the Red Army soldiers conscripted in 1937 were detained in the army until January 1, 1941 On January 20, 1941, the People's Commissar of Defense issued order No. 023, according to which reserve command personnel who “meet the requirements of the service,” detained until further notice by order of June 3, 1940, were to be enlisted in the Red Army. All others were subject to transfer “to the reserves by February 15, 1941.”
The dismissal of the assigned personnel led to the fact that since the fall of 1940, the payroll strength of the Red Army was lower than the regular one. It was not possible to find documents reflecting the number of personnel of the Red Army in the winter and spring of 1940-1941. What is known is that both the staff and payroll numbers of the army grew. From March 25 to April 5, 1941, in all military districts, except PribOVO and Far Eastern Fleet, a partial conscription into the Red Army was carried out for citizens born after September 1, 1921 and not drafted in 1940. A total of 394 thousand people were conscripted . The conscription took place in an organized manner, within a strictly established period, without publicity in the press or at meetings. Conscripts were notified only by personal summons, and recruiting stations were equipped only on the inside; no posters or slogans were posted on the outside. On May 15, 1941, the conscription of assigned reserve personnel to the BUS began, which was supposed to last until July 1. In total, by June 22, 1941, 805,264 people were drafted, which accounted for 24% of the contingent called up for mobilization, and the size of the Red Army again exceeded 5 million people.
During the two pre-war years, the Red Army was significantly increased; its strength, excluding units outside the norm, increased almost 2.7 times. Naturally, such a rapid organizational development of the Red Army was accompanied by an increase in the number of weapons and military equipment (see Table 1), the production of which also increased.
Table 1
In total, in 1939 - the first half of 1941, the troops received from industry 81,857 guns and mortars, 7,448 tanks and 19,458 combat aircraft. By the summer of 1941, the Soviet Armed Forces were the largest army in the world.
One of the most controversial issues related to Operation Barbarossa and the assessment of the actions of Soviet troops is the balance of forces of the warring parties. Many researchers have used this balance of forces, along with other factors, to determine the combat effectiveness of Soviet troops and the final outcome of the operation. Archival materials now available provide the historian with the opportunity to fairly accurately determine the real balance of forces and better analyze how this balance contributed to the defeat of the Soviets.
Soviet historical works, based on open sources, unanimously exaggerated the number of German troops and underestimated the number of their own. By the mid-1960s, these sources claimed that the total number of German armed forces in June 1941 reached 8,500,000 soldiers, including about 6,000,000 in the ground forces, 1,700,000 in the air force, and the rest in the navy and specialized forces. connections like SS. According to these sources, the German ground army consisted of 214 divisions (including 169 infantry, 21 tank, 14 motorized divisions and 2 independent brigades, supported by 11,000 tanks and assault guns, approximately 78,000 guns and mortars and 11,000 aircraft.
Of this total, the Germans involved 152 divisions in battles in the East, including 19 tank and 14 motorized, as well as 2 separate brigades with a total ground force of 3,300,000 soldiers. To these troops were added 1,200,000 soldiers in the air force and 100,000 in the navy—a total of 77 percent of active German troops. The same Soviet source estimated the strength of the German satellite troops at 29 divisions (16 Finnish and 13 Romanian) and 16 brigades (3 Finnish, 9 Romanian and 4 Hungarian) with a total number of 900,000 soldiers. This gave a huge final figure of 5,500,000 fighters (of which 4,600,000 were Germans), 181 divisions and 18 brigades, supported by 2,800 tanks and assault guns, 48,000 guns and mortars, 4,950 aircraft (of which up to 1,000 were Finnish and Romanian) .
The same source estimated the number of Soviet troops on June 22 at 4,207,000 fighters, plus those mobilized in the first half of 1941, the number of which was estimated at 793,000 fighters, giving a total armed forces strength of 5,000,000. This number included 2,900,000 soldiers in the western military districts, consolidated into 170 divisions and 2 brigades, supported by 1,800 heavy and medium tanks (including 1,475 new tanks), 34,695 guns and mortars and 1,540 aircraft of new designs (plus many obsolete aircraft).
According to this source, the balance of power in the East was as follows:
| Red Army | Axis powers | Ratio | |
| Divisions and their equivalents (2 brigades = 1 division) | 171 | 190 | 1:1,1 |
| Personnel | 2 900 000 | 5 500 000 | 1:1,9 |
| Tanks and assault guns | 1800 | 2800 | 1:1,6 |
| Guns and mortars | 34 695 | 48 000 | 1:1,4 |
| Aircraft | 1540 | 4950 | 1:3,2 |
By the end of the 1980s, Soviet open sources estimated the total number of German troops and their satellites deployed against the Soviet Union at 5,500,000 soldiers, organized into 190 divisions (including 19 tank and 14 motorized) and supported by 4,300 tanks and assault guns, 47 200 guns and mortars and 4,980 combat aircraft (of which 83 percent were Wehrmacht aircraft). The same source puts the total strength of the Soviet armed forces at 5,373,000 soldiers, including 4,553,000 in the ground forces and air defense, 476,000 in the air force and 344,000 in the navy, supported by 1,861 new brand tanks, 67,000 guns and mortars and 2,700 aircraft of new designs. Soviet troops in the western military districts are estimated at 2,680,000 soldiers, 1,475 new tanks, 37,500 guns and mortars and 1,540 aircraft of new designs, organized into 170 divisions (103 rifle, 40 tank, 20 motorized and 7 cavalry) and 2 brigades. The balance of forces thus becomes as follows:
| Red Army | Axis powers | Ratio | |
| Divisions | 171 | 190 | 1:1,1 |
| Personnel | 2 680 000 | 5 500 000 | 1:2,1 |
| Tanks and assault guns | 1475 | 4300 | 1:2,9 |
| Guns and mortars | 37 500 | 47 200 | 1:1,3 |
| Aircraft | 1540 | 4980 | 1:3,2 |
In 1991, the Soviet balance of power changed again. An authoritative and detailed article by M.I. Meltyukhova, based mainly on archival sources, determined the total strength of the Soviet armed forces at 5,373,000 soldiers, 23,140 tanks, 104,114 guns and mortars and 18,570 aircraft, with 303 divisions of ground forces and 16 airborne and 3 rifle brigades. Of this number, 2,780,000 fighters (including the Air Force, Air Defense Troops and NKVD Border Troops), consolidated into 177 divisional equivalents, were deployed in the western border districts, supported by 10,394 tanks (including 1,325 vehicles of new brands), 43,862 guns and mortars and 8154 aircraft (including 1540 new designs).
Based on German archival sources, Meltyukhov determines the total number of German armed forces on June 15, 1941 at 8,229,000 soldiers, including 3,960,000 field army troops, 1,240,000 Reserve Army troops, 1,545,000 Luftwaffe troops, 160,000 SS troops , 404,000 Navy personnel and 920,000 personnel in all types of specialized support organizations. These troops were consolidated into 208 divisions, 1 combat group, 3 motorized and tank brigades and 2 infantry regiments with 5,694 tanks and assault guns, 88,251 guns and mortars, and 6,413 aircraft.
Of this total, Germany was going to involve 4,600,000 fighters in the battles in the East (3,300,000 ground and SS troops, 1,200,000 air force personnel and 100,000 naval personnel), consolidated in 155 divisions with 3,998 tanks and assault guns, 43,407 guns and mortars, 3,904 aircraft. In fact, it initially deployed 127 divisions with 4,029,250 troops, 3,648 tanks and assault guns, 35,791 guns and mortars, and 3,904 aircraft.
Based on foreign archival materials, Meltyukhov gives the following number of German satellite armed forces involved in the East: Finland - 302,600 soldiers (17.5 divisions), 86 tanks, 2047 guns and mortars, 307 aircraft; Romania - 358,140 soldiers (17.5 divisions), 60 tanks, 3,255 guns and mortars, 423 aircraft; Hungary - 44,000 soldiers (2 divisions), 116 tanks, 200 guns and mortars, 100 aircraft; in total - 704,740 soldiers (37 divisions), 262 tanks, 5,502 guns and mortars, 937 aircraft.
Thus, according to Meltyukhov, the total number of German and satellite troops deployed in the East reached 4,733,990 soldiers (161 divisions), 3,899 tanks and assault guns, 41,293 guns and mortars, 4,841 aircraft. As a result, the balance of forces was as follows:
| Red Army | Axis powers | Ratio | |
| Divisions | 174 | 164 | 1,1:1 |
| Personnel | 2 780 000 | 4 733 990 | 1:1,7 |
| Tanks and assault guns | 10 394 | 3899 | 2,6:1 |
| Guns and mortars | 43 872 | 41 293 | 1,1:1 |
| Aircraft | 9576 | 4841 | 2,0:1 |
Previously classified Soviet sources estimated the total strength of the German armed forces and their satellite forces at 7,254,000 soldiers, 6,677 tanks and assault guns, 77,800 guns and mortars, and 10,100 combat aircraft. Of this total of 5,500,000, 3,582 tanks and assault guns, 41,763 guns and mortars, 4,275 aircraft (in 191.5 divisions) were involved in the war against the Soviet Union. The same source states that the strength of the Soviet armed forces was 5,373,000 soldiers, 18,680 tanks, 91,400 guns and mortars, 15,599 aircraft. Of this number, 2,901,000 soldiers, 11,000 tanks, 21,556 guns and mortars, and 9,917 aircraft were deployed in the western border military districts.
This source adds to those mentioned above the number of tanks and aircraft of older models that previous sources did not take into account, increases the total number of artillery in the Red Army (from 67,000 to 91,400 guns) and raises the number of manpower deployed in the western military districts (from 2 680,000 fighters to 2,901,000 fighters). While these Soviet troop numbers are likely correct, the German figures require confirmation. The result is the following balance of forces:
| Red Army | Axis powers | Ratio | |
| Divisions | 171 | 191,5 | 1:1,1 |
| Personnel | 2 901 000 | 5 500 000 | 1:1,9 |
| Tanks and assault guns | 11 000 | 3582 | 3:1 |
| Guns and mortars | 21 556 | 41 763 | 1:1,9 |
| Aircraft | 9917 | 4275 | 2,3:1 |
German sources estimate the strength of the German armed forces (Wehrmacht) as of June 22 at 7,234,000 fighters. Of this number, 3,800,000 served in the Field Army (Feldheer), 1,200,000 in the Reserve Army (Ersatzheer), 1,680,000 in the Luftwaffe, 404,000 in the Navy (Kriegsmarine) and 150,000 in the Waffen-SS. The army and SS ground forces initially deployed in the East numbered 3,050,000 soldiers (including 67,000 in Finland). The initial strength of Luftwaffe forces in the East was around 700,000 troops. The total number of 3,750,000 fighters was supported by 3,350 tanks, 7,000 guns and almost 3,000 aircraft. Of the 210 German divisions, 145 were deployed in the East.
Meltyukhov's figures seem to be most accurate for Soviet and German allied forces. The number of German troops (including 700,000 Luftwaffe troops) should be estimated at 3,750,000 soldiers, organized into 135 divisions (including strategic reserves and 9 security divisions), supported by 3,350 tanks and assault guns, 7,184 guns and mortars, 2,000 aircraft. Together with the Allied forces involved (most Finnish troops and half Romanian), the total strength of the Axis forces rises to approximately 4,200,000 troops, 3,612 tanks and assault guns, 7,686 guns and mortars, and 2,937 aircraft. Taking into account Meltyukhov's data, classified Soviet data, additional German data and direct strategic reserves, the following balance of forces is obtained:
| Red Army | Axis powers | Ratio | |
| Divisions | 174 | 164 | 1,1:1 |
| Personnel | 2 780 000 | 4 733 990 | 1:1,7 |
| Including strategic reserve | 3 700 000 | 4 733 990 | 1:1,3 |
| Tanks and assault guns | 11 000 | 3612 | 3:1 |
| Guns and mortars | 43 872 | 12 686 | 3,5:1 |
| Aircraft | 9917 | 2937 | 3,4:1 |
The Soviet strategic reserves include about 1 million of the nearly two million soldiers mobilized shortly after June 22, most of whom ended up in one way or another in the new reserve armies thrown into battle in July and August (21st to 43rd Armies series) . The Axis had no equivalent for these reserves.
So, by the summer of 1941, everything was ready for the “liberation” campaign in Europe. According to V. Suvorov, the “liberation” campaign was thwarted by Hitler’s preventive strike at the last moment. And we ask ourselves: could it have been otherwise? After all, it wasn’t Hitler who could have been ahead of Stalin by a couple of weeks, but vice versa! In search of an answer, let's look at some numbers and facts. Let's start with a table characterizing the balance of forces of the parties on June 22, 1941 (compiled by me from “The Thunderstorm” by I. Bunich, the works of V. Suvorov, as well as from the following works: Conquest R. The Great Terror. Florence, 1978 Hoffman I. Preparation of the Soviet Union to an offensive war. 1941 // Domestic History. 1993. No. 4).
In addition to overwhelming quantitative, the Red Army also had enormous qualitative superiority. Some facts are simply amazing - for example, on June 23, 1941, near the Lithuanian city of Raseiniai, one KB tank held back the 4th German tank group of Colonel General Hoepner for 24 hours (i.e., a quarter of all German armored forces). And there are plenty of other facts - for example, our troops discovered one damaged KB, and around there were ten destroyed German tanks; KB met with a group of German tanks, received more than 70 shells, but none penetrated its armor; KB destroyed eight German tanks, itself received more than 30 shells, but remained unharmed (quoted from: Suvorov V. The Last Republic. pp. 356–358). Or here’s another: one KB tank resisted 50 German tanks for several days, supported by infantry, artillery, etc. (Yakovlev N.N. Marshal Zhukov. P. 15).
In the early days of the war, Soviet tank armadas counterattacked the troops of Kleist's 1st Panzer Group in Ukraine. It was there (and not near Prokhorovka two years later) that the largest tank battle of the Second World War took place. 5,000 Soviet tanks (that is, more than Hitler had in total) inflicted such blows on the enemy that already on June 26, F. Halder wrote in his diary about this battle: “Let us trust in God.” The German prisoners taken in this battle looked depressed and were close to panic; Again, our commanders will have a chance to observe such a psychological state of the Germans very, very not soon - only after Stalingrad and Kursk (Yakovlev N.N. Marshal Zhukov. P. 25).
And this happened not only in tank forces. Here are entries from F. Halder's diary. August 1: “There are 0 divisions in the reserve of the High Command of Divisions” (this is on the 41st day of the war!). August 7: “Given the current situation with fuel, it is impossible to carry out major operations” (this is a month and a half later. How did they prepare for war - I want to exclaim after V. Suvorov). August 16: “Ammunition consumption. During the period from August 1, the amount of ammunition was delivered that was provided for by the entire Barbarossa plan (quoted from: Suvorov V. Purification. P. 324). And so on - V. Suvorov alone cites similar quotes from Halder’s diary (and not only from him) in batches.
Further more. An entry from the diary of the same Halder dated August 10: “The exhausted German infantry will not be able to counter these enemy attempts with decisive offensive actions.” August 11: “What we are now doing is the last and at the same time dubious attempt to prevent the transition to trench warfare. The command has extremely limited means... Our last forces have been thrown into battle.” August 22: “...In the afternoon, our disputes and discussions were interrupted by a telephone conversation with Field Marshal von Bock (Commander-in-Chief of Army Group Center), who again emphasized that his troops were at the point that they had reached in anticipation of attacking Moscow will not be able to defend itself for a long time.” It's not about the offensive. Not about blitzkrieg. Not to the point of trying to keep what was captured (Suicide. pp. 342–343).
The question arises: how, with all this, did the Germans manage to advance so far into Russia? How were they able, having already been stopped by the end of the summer, and having suffered defeat at Yelnya in early September, to begin the attack on Moscow again on September 30? A sudden blow alone cannot explain this. Perhaps I. Bunich is right, who believes that given the existing balance of forces, by July 1 at the latest, the Germans, despite all the tactical surprise of their attack, should have been stopped and then quickly defeated. Let me remind you once again that the Barbarossa plan as such was based on the premise that all the troops available to Stalin were concentrated at the very border and after the defeat of these troops the campaign could be considered won. The troops of the Second and subsequent strategic echelons, not provided for by German plans, inevitably had to stop and defeat the Germans, who were not ready to fight them. By the way, this is exactly how Zhukov reassured Stalin when he nevertheless expressed fears that the Germans would attack (if you believe I. Bunich): even if the Germans themselves attack us, we, with our superiority in strength, will immediately stop them, surround them and destroy them (Thunderstorm. P. 549). This would have happened, continues I. Bunich, if the Red Army had resisted (Ibid. pp. 556–557).