Tell me, uncle, is it not for nothing that Moscow, burned by fire, was given to the French?
Lermontov
The Battle of Borodino was the main battle in the War of 1812. For the first time, the legend of the invincibility of Napoleon's army was dispelled, and a decisive contribution was made to changing the size of the French army due to the fact that the latter, due to large-scale casualties, ceased to have a clear numerical advantage over the Russian army. In today's article we will talk about the Battle of Borodino on August 26, 1812, consider its course, the balance of forces and means, study the opinion of historians on this issue and analyze what consequences this battle had for the Patriotic War and for the fate of two powers: Russia and France.
➤ ➤ ➤ ➤ ➤ ➤ ➤ ➤ ➤Background of the battle
The Patriotic War of 1812 at the initial stage developed extremely negatively for the Russian army, which constantly retreated, refusing to accept a general battle. This course of events was perceived extremely negatively by the army, since the soldiers wanted to take the battle as quickly as possible and defeat the enemy army. Commander-in-Chief Barclay de Tolly understood perfectly well that in an open general battle the Napoleonic army, which was considered invincible in Europe, would have a colossal advantage. Therefore, he chose a retreat tactic in order to exhaust the enemy troops, and only then accept the battle. This course of events did not inspire confidence among the soldiers, as a result of which Mikhail Illarionovich Kutuzov was appointed commander-in-chief. As a result, several significant events occurred that predetermined the preconditions for the Battle of Borodino:
- Napoleon's army advanced deep into the country with great complications. Russian generals refused a general battle, but actively got involved in small battles, and partisans were also very active in fighting. Therefore, by the time Borodino began (late August - early September), Bonaparte’s army was no longer so formidable and significantly exhausted.
- Reserves were brought up from the depths of the country. Therefore, Kutuzov’s army was already comparable in size to the French army, which allowed the commander-in-chief to consider the possibility of actually entering the battle.
Alexander 1, who by that time, at the request of the army, had left the post of commander-in-chief, allowed Kutuzov to make his own decisions, insistently demanded that the general take the battle as soon as possible and stop the advance of Napoleon’s army deep into the country. As a result, on August 22, 1812, the Russian army began to retreat from Smolensk in the direction of the village of Borodino, which is located 125 kilometers from Moscow. The place was ideal to take the battle, since excellent defense could be organized in the Borodino area. Kutuzov understood that Napoleon was only a few days away, so she threw all her strength into strengthening the area and taking the most advantageous positions.
Balance of forces and means
Surprisingly, most historians who study the Battle of Borodino still argue about the exact number of troops on the warring sides. The general trends in this matter are such that the newer the research, the more data showing that the Russian army had a slight advantage. However, if we look at Soviet encyclopedias, they present the following data, which presents the participants in the Battle of Borodino:
- Russian army. Commander - Mikhail Illarionovich Kutuzov. He had at his disposal up to 120 thousand people, of which 72 thousand were infantrymen. The army had a large artillery corps, numbering 640 guns.
- French army. Commander - Napoleon Bonaparte. The French emperor brought a corps of 138 thousand soldiers with 587 guns to Borodino. Some historians note that Napoleon had reserves of up to 18 thousand people, which the French emperor retained until the last and did not use them in the battle.
Very important is the opinion of one of the participants in the Battle of Borodino, the Marquis of Chambray, who provided data that France fielded the best European army for this battle, which included soldiers with extensive experience in warfare. On the Russian side, according to his observations, they were basically recruits and volunteers, who, by their entire appearance, indicated that military affairs was not the main thing for them. Chambray also pointed to the fact that Bonaparte had a large superiority in heavy cavalry, which gave him some advantages during the battle.
Tasks of the parties before the battle
Since June 1812, Napoleon had been looking for opportunities for a general battle with the Russian army. The catchphrase that Napoleon expressed when he was a simple general in revolutionary France is widely known: “The main thing is to force battles on the enemy, and then we’ll see.” This simple phrase reflects the entire genius of Napoleon, who, in terms of making lightning-fast decisions, was perhaps the best strategist of his generation (especially after the death of Suvorov). It was this principle that the French commander-in-chief wanted to apply in Russia. The Battle of Borodino provided such an opportunity.
Kutuzov's tasks were simple - he needed active defense. With its help, the commander-in-chief wanted to inflict the maximum possible losses on the enemy and at the same time preserve his army for further battle. Kutuzov planned the Battle of Borodino as one of the stages of the Patriotic War, which was supposed to radically change the course of the confrontation.
On the eve of the battle
Kutuzov took a position that represents an arc passing through Shevardino on the left flank, Borodino in the center, and the village of Maslovo on the right flank.
On August 24, 1812, 2 days before the decisive battle, the battle for the Shevardinsky redoubt took place. This redoubt was commanded by General Gorchakov, who had 11 thousand people under his command. To the south, with a corps of 6 thousand people, General Karpov was located, who covered the old Smolensk road. Napoleon identified the Shevardin redoubt as the initial target of his attack, since it was as far as possible from the main group of Russian troops. According to the plan of the French emperor, Shevardino should have been surrounded, thereby withdrawing the army of General Gorchakov from the battle. To do this, the French army formed three columns in the attack:
- Marshal Murat. Bonaparte's favorite led a cavalry corps to strike Shevardino's right flank.
- Generals Davout and Ney led the infantry in the center.
- Junot, also one of the best generals in France, moved with his guard along the old Smolensk road.
The battle began on the afternoon of September 5th. Twice the French tried unsuccessfully to break through the defenses. Towards evening, when night began to fall on the Borodino field, the French attack was successful, but the approaching reserves of the Russian army made it possible to repel the enemy and defend the Shevardinsky redoubt. The resumption of the battle was not beneficial for the Russian army, and Kutuzov ordered a retreat to the Semenovsky ravine.
Initial positions of Russian and French troops
On August 25, 1812, both sides carried out general preparations for the battle. The troops were putting the finishing touches on defensive positions, and the generals were trying to learn something new about the enemy's plans. Kutuzov's army took up defense in the form of a blunt triangle. The right flank of the Russian troops passed along the Kolocha River. Barclay de Tolly was responsible for the defense of this area, whose army numbered 76 thousand people with 480 guns. The most dangerous position was on the left flank, where there was no natural barrier. This section of the front was commanded by General Bagration, who had 34 thousand people and 156 guns at his disposal. The problem of the left flank became significant after the loss of the village of Shevardino on September 5. The position of the Russian army met the following tasks:
- The right flank, where the main forces of the army were grouped, reliably covered the path to Moscow.
- The right flank allowed for active and powerful attacks on the enemy’s rear and flank.
- The location of the Russian army was quite deep, which left ample room for maneuver.
- The first line of defense was occupied by infantry, the second line of defense was occupied by cavalry, and the third line housed reserves. A widely known phrase
reserves must be maintained for as long as possible. Whoever retains the most reserves at the end of the battle will emerge victorious.
Kutuzov
In fact, Kutuzov provoked Napoleon to attack the left flank of his defense. Exactly as many troops were concentrated here as could successfully defend against the French army. Kutuzov repeated that the French would not be able to resist the temptation to attack a weak redoubt, but as soon as they had problems and resorted to the help of their reserves, it would be possible to send their army to their rear and flank.
Napoleon, who carried out reconnaissance on August 25, also noted the weakness of the left flank of the Russian army's defense. Therefore, it was decided to deliver the main blow here. In order to divert the attention of Russian generals from the left flank, simultaneously with the attack on Bagration’s position, an attack on Borodino was to begin in order to subsequently capture the left bank of the Kolocha River. After capturing these lines, it was planned to transfer the main forces of the French army to the right flank of the Russian defense and deliver a massive blow to the army of Barclay De Tolly. Having solved this problem, by the evening of August 25, about 115 thousand people of the French army were concentrated in the area of the left flank of the defense of the Russian army. 20 thousand people lined up in front of the right flank.
The specificity of the defense that Kutuzov used was that the Battle of Borodino was supposed to force the French to launch a frontal attack, since the general front of the defense occupied by Kutuzov’s army was very extensive. Therefore, it was almost impossible to get around him from the flank.
It is noted that on the night before the battle, Kutuzov strengthened the left flank of his defense with the infantry corps of General Tuchkov, as well as transferring 168 artillery pieces to Bagration’s army. This was due to the fact that Napoleon had already concentrated very large forces in this direction.
Day of the Battle of Borodino
The Battle of Borodino began on August 26, 1812 in the early morning at 5:30 am. As planned, the main blow was delivered by the French to the left defense flag of the Russian army.
An artillery shelling of Bagration's positions began, in which more than 100 guns took part. At the same time, General Delzon’s corps began a maneuver with an attack on the center of the Russian army, on the village of Borodino. The village was under the protection of the Jaeger regiment, which could not resist the French army for long, the number of which on this section of the front was 4 times greater than the Russian army. The Jaeger Regiment was forced to retreat and take up defense on the right bank of the Kolocha River. The attacks of the French general, who wanted to move even further into the defense, were unsuccessful.
Bagration's flushes
Bagration's flushes were located along the entire left flank of the defense, forming the first redoubt. After half an hour of artillery preparation, at 6 o'clock in the morning Napoleon gave the order to launch an attack on Bagration's flushes. The French army was commanded by generals Desaix and Compana. They planned to strike at the southernmost flush, going to the Utitsky forest for this. However, as soon as the French army began to line up in battle formation, Bagration's chasseur regiment opened fire and went on the attack, disrupting the first stage of the offensive operation.
The next attack began at 8 o'clock in the morning. At this time, a repeated attack on the southern flush began. Both French generals increased the number of their troops and went on the offensive. To protect his position, Bagration transported the army of General Neversky, as well as the Novorossiysk dragoons, to his southern flank. The French were forced to retreat, suffering serious losses. During this battle, both generals who led the army in the assault were seriously wounded.
The third attack was carried out by the infantry units of Marshal Ney, as well as the cavalry of Marshal Murat. Bagration noticed this French maneuver in time, giving the order to Raevsky, who was in the central part of the flushes, to move from the front line to the second echelon of defense. This position was strengthened by the division of General Konovnitsyn. The attack of the French army began after a massive artillery preparation. The French infantry struck in the interval between the flushes. This time the attack was successful, and by 10 o'clock in the morning the French managed to capture the southern line of defense. This was followed by a counterattack launched by Konovnitsyn’s division, as a result of which they managed to recapture the lost positions. At the same time, General Junot's corps managed to bypass the left flank of the defense through the Utitsky forest. As a result of this maneuver, the French general actually found himself in the rear of the Russian army. Captain Zakharov, who commanded the 1st horse battery, noticed the enemy and struck. At the same time, infantry regiments arrived at the battlefield and pushed General Junot back to his original position. The French lost more than a thousand people in this battle. Subsequently, historical information about Junot's corps is contradictory: Russian textbooks say that this corps was completely destroyed in the next attack of the Russian army, while French historians claim that the general participated in the Battle of Borodino until its very end.
The 4th assault on Bagration's flushes began at 11 o'clock. In the battle, Napoleon used 45 thousand troops, cavalry and more than 300 guns. By that time Bagration had less than 20 thousand people at his disposal. At the very beginning of this assault, Bagration was wounded in the thigh and was forced to leave the army, which negatively affected morale. The Russian army began to retreat. General Konovnitsyn took over command of the defense. He could not resist Napoleon, and decided to retreat. As a result, the flushes remained with the French. The retreat was carried out to the Semenovsky stream, where more than 300 guns were installed. The large number of the second echelon of defense, as well as a large number of artillery, forced Napoleon to change the original plan and cancel the attack on the move. The direction of the main attack was transferred from the left flank of the Russian army's defense to its central part, commanded by General Raevsky. The purpose of this attack was to capture artillery. The infantry attack on the left flank did not stop. The fourth attack on the Bagrationov flushes was also unsuccessful for the French army, which was forced to retreat across the Semenovsky Creek. It should be noted that the position of the artillery was extremely important. Throughout the Battle of Borodino, Napoleon made attempts to capture enemy artillery. By the end of the battle he managed to occupy these positions.
Battle for Utitsky Forest
The Utitsky forest was of great strategic importance for the Russian army. On August 25, on the eve of the battle, Kutuzov noted the importance of this direction, which blocked the old Smolensk road. An infantry corps under the command of General Tuchkov was stationed here. The total number of troops in this area was about 12 thousand people. The army was positioned secretly in order to suddenly strike the enemy’s flank at the right moment. On September 7, the infantry corps of the French army, commanded by one of Napoleon’s favorites, General Poniatowski, advanced in the direction of the Utitsky Kurgan to outflank the Russian army. Tuchkov took up defensive positions on Kurgan and blocked the French from further progress. Only at 11 o'clock in the morning, when General Junot arrived to help Poniatowski, the French launched a decisive blow on the mound and captured it. Russian general Tuchkov launched a counterattack, and at the cost of his own life managed to return the mound. Command of the corps was taken by General Baggovut, who held this position. As soon as the main forces of the Russian army retreated to the Semenovsky ravine, the Utitsky Kurgan, a decision was made to retreat.
Raid of Platov and Uvarov
At the moment of the critical moment on the left flank of the defense of the Russian army at the Battle of Borodino, Kutuzov decided to let the army of generals Uvarov and Platov into battle. As part of the Cossack cavalry, they were supposed to bypass the French positions on the right, striking in the rear. The cavalry consisted of 2.5 thousand people. At 12 noon the army moved out. Having crossed the Kolocha River, the cavalry attacked the infantry regiments of the Italian army. This strike, led by General Uvarov, was intended to force battle on the French and divert their attention. At this moment, General Platov managed to pass along the flank without being noticed and go behind enemy lines. This was followed by a simultaneous attack by two Russian armies, which brought panic to the actions of the French. As a result, Napoleon was forced to transfer part of the troops that stormed Raevsky’s battery in order to repel the attack of the cavalry of the Russian generals who went to the rear. The battle of the cavalry with the French troops lasted several hours, and by four o'clock in the afternoon Uvarov and Platov returned their troops to their original positions.
The practical significance of the Cossack raid led by Platov and Uvarov is almost impossible to overestimate. This raid gave the Russian army 2 hours to strengthen a reserve position for an artillery battery. Of course, this raid did not bring a military victory, but the French, who saw the enemy in their own rear, no longer acted so decisively.
Battery Raevsky
The specificity of the terrain of the Borodino field was determined by the fact that in its very center there was a hill, which made it possible to control and shell the entire adjacent territory. This was an ideal place to place artillery, which Kutuzov took advantage of. The famous Raevsky battery was deployed in this place, which consisted of 18 guns, and General Raevsky himself was supposed to protect this height with the help of an infantry regiment. The attack on the battery began at 9 am. By striking at the center of Russian positions, Bonaparte pursued the goal of complicating the movement of the enemy army. During the first French offensive, General Raevsky’s unit was deployed to defend Bagrationov’s flushes, but the first enemy attack on the battery was successfully repulsed without the participation of infantry. Eugene Beauharnais, who commanded the French troops in this sector of the offensive, saw the weakness of the artillery position and immediately launched another blow on this corps. Kutuzov transferred all the reserves of artillery and cavalry troops here. Despite this, the French army managed to suppress the Russian defenses and penetrate his stronghold. At this moment, a counterattack by Russian troops was carried out, during which they managed to recapture the redoubt. General Beauharnais was captured. Of the 3,100 French who attacked the battery, only 300 survived.
The position of the battery was extremely dangerous, so Kutuzov gave the order to redeploy the guns to the second line of defense. General Barclay de Tolly sent an additional corps of General Likhachev to protect Raevsky's battery. Napoleon's original plan of attack lost its relevance. The French emperor abandoned massive attacks on the enemy's left flank, and directed his main attack on the central part of the defense, on the Raevsky battery. At this moment, the Russian cavalry went to the rear of the Napoleonic army, which slowed down the French advance by 2 hours. During this time, the battery's defensive position was further strengthened.
At three o'clock in the afternoon, 150 guns of the French army opened fire on Raevsky's battery, and almost immediately the infantry went on the offensive. The battle lasted about an hour and, as a result, Raevsky’s battery fell. Napoleon's original plan hoped that the capture of the battery would lead to dramatic changes in the balance of forces near the central part of the Russian defense. This did not turn out to be the case; he had to abandon the idea of attacking in the center. By the evening of August 26, Napoleon's army had failed to achieve a decisive advantage in at least one sector of the front. Napoleon did not see significant prerequisites for victory in the battle, so he did not dare to use his reserves in the battle. Until the last moment, he hoped to exhaust the Russian army with his main forces, achieve a clear advantage in one of the sectors of the front, and then bring fresh forces into battle.
End of the battle
After the fall of Raevsky's battery, Bonaparte abandoned further ideas of storming the central part of the enemy's defense. There were no more significant events in this direction of the Borodino field. On the left flank, the French continued their attacks, which led to nothing. General Dokhturov, who replaced Bagration, repelled all enemy attacks. The right flank of the defense, commanded by Barclay de Tolly, had no significant events, only sluggish attempts at artillery bombardment were made. These attempts continued until 7 pm, after which Bonaparte retreated to Gorki to give the army a rest. It was expected that this was a short pause before the decisive battle. The French were preparing to continue the battle in the morning. However, at 12 o'clock at night, Kutuzov refused to further continue the battle and sent his army beyond Mozhaisk. This was necessary in order to give the army a rest and replenish it with manpower.
This is how the Battle of Borodino ended. Until now, historians from different countries argue about which army won this battle. Domestic historians talk about the victory of Kutuzov, Western historians talk about the victory of Napoleon. It would be more correct to say that the Battle of Borodino was a draw. Each army got what it wanted: Napoleon opened his way to Moscow, and Kutuzov inflicted significant losses on the French.
Results of the confrontation
The casualties in Kutuzov's army during the Battle of Borodino are described differently by different historians. Basically, researchers of this battle come to the conclusion that the Russian army lost about 45 thousand people on the battlefield. This figure takes into account not only those killed, but also the wounded, as well as those captured. During the battle of August 26, Napoleon's army lost a little less than 51 thousand people killed, wounded and captured. The comparable losses of both countries are explained by many scholars by the fact that both armies regularly changed their roles. The course of the battle changed very often. First, the French attacked, and Kutuzov gave the order to the troops to take up defensive positions, after which the Russian army launched a counteroffensive. At certain stages of the battle, Napoleonic generals managed to achieve local victories and occupy the necessary positions. Now the French were on the defensive, and the Russian generals were on the offensive. And so the roles changed dozens of times during one day.
The Battle of Borodino did not produce a winner. However, the myth of the invincibility of Napoleonic army was dispelled. Further continuation of the general battle was undesirable for the Russian army, since at the end of the day on August 26, Napoleon still had untouched reserves at his disposal, totaling up to 12 thousand people. These reserves, against the backdrop of a tired Russian army, could have a significant impact on the result. Therefore, having retreated beyond Moscow, on September 1, 1812, a council was held in Fili, at which it was decided to allow Napoleon to occupy Moscow.
Military significance of the battle
The Battle of Borodino became the bloodiest battle in the history of the 19th century. Each side lost about 25 percent of its army. In one day, the opponents fired more than 130 thousand shots. The combination of all these facts later led to the fact that Bonaparte in his memoirs called the Battle of Borodino the largest of his battles. However, Bonaparte failed to achieve the desired results. The illustrious commander, accustomed exclusively to victories, formally did not lose this battle, but did not win either.
While on the island of St. Helena and writing out his personal autobiography, Napoleon wrote the following lines about the Battle of Borodino:
The Battle of Moscow is the most important battle in my life. The Russians had an advantage in everything: they had 170 thousand people, an advantage in cavalry, artillery and terrain, which they knew very well. Despite this we won. The heroes of France are generals Ney, Murat and Poniatowski. They own the laurels of the winners of the Moscow Battle.
Bonaparte
These lines clearly show that Napoleon himself viewed the Battle of Borodino as his own victory. But such lines should be studied exclusively in the light of the personality of Napoleon, who, while on the island of St. Helena, greatly exaggerated the events of past days. For example, in 1817, the former Emperor of France said that in the Battle of Borodino he had 80 thousand soldiers, and the enemy had a huge army of 250 thousand. Of course, these figures were dictated only by Napoleon’s personal conceit, and have nothing to do with real history.
Kutuzov also assessed the Battle of Borodino as his own victory. In his note to Emperor Alexander 1 he wrote:
On the 26th, the world saw the bloodiest battle in its history. Never before has recent history seen so much blood. A perfectly chosen battlefield, and an enemy who came to attack but was forced to defend.
Kutuzov
Alexander 1, under the influence of this note, and also trying to reassure his people, declared the Battle of Borodino as a victory for the Russian army. Largely because of this, in the future, domestic historians also always presented Borodino as a victory of Russian weapons.
The main result of the Battle of Borodino was that Napoleon, who was famous for winning all the general battles, managed to force the Russian army to take the fight, but failed to defeat it. The absence of a significant victory in the general battle, taking into account the specifics of the Patriotic War of 1812, led to the fact that France did not receive any significant advantages from this battle.
Literature
- History of Russia in the 19th century. P.N. Zyryanov. Moscow, 1999.
- Napoleon Bonaparte. A.Z. Manfred. Sukhumi, 1989.
- Trip to Russia. F. Segur. 2003.
- Borodino: documents, letters, memories. Moscow, 1962.
- Alexander 1 and Napoleon. ON THE. Trotsky. Moscow, 1994.
Panorama of the Battle of Borodino
The Russian people are rightly proud of the military valor of their sons shown in the Battle of Borodino. This battle took place during the Patriotic War - September 7 (August 26, old style) 1812 on the Borodino field, 12 kilometers west of the city of Mozhaisk, 110 kilometers from Moscow.
On the Borodino field, the Russian army, defending the national independence of its people, fought to the death with the army of the French Emperor Napoleon I Bonaparte. By 1812, Napoleon had conquered almost all of Europe. Using the conquered peoples, he organized a huge army, moved it to the East in order to defeat Russia and then conquer world domination.
The Russian army was three times smaller than Napoleon's army, and it had to retreat deep into its country, exhausting and bleeding Napoleon's troops with brutal battles.
WHAT IS WONDERFUL ABOUT THE BATTLE OF BORODINO
The enemy passed over 800 kilometers across Russian soil. There were only 110 kilometers left to Moscow. Napoleon hoped to occupy Moscow and dictate enslaving peace terms to the Russians.
But the Russians did not even think of laying down their arms. Mikhail Illarionovich Golenishchev-Kutuzov, appointed commander-in-chief, talented military general, favorite of soldiers and officers, decided to block Napoleon’s path to Moscow and give a general battle to the French on the Borodino field.
Russian troops were waiting for this battle during their long retreat. They were determined to measure their strength with the enemy and were ready to die rather than let the enemy pass. An ardent patriot and skilled commander, Kutuzov skillfully organized the battle on the Borodino field. On September 7, 1812, from 6 a.m. to 6 p.m., numerically superior French forces continuously attacked the Russians. For twelve hours, almost non-stop, there were fierce hand-to-hand battles, with up to 1,000 guns fired from both sides. The Russian and French regiments completely died in battle, without yielding a single step to each other. Napoleon did not take losses into account and threw more and more units of his formidable infantry and cavalry into the attack, but he failed to achieve success in the Battle of Borodino. The French army crashed here against the indestructible force of the Russian troops.
On the Borodino field, the Russians dealt Napoleon's army a blow of such force that this army could no longer recover. The Battle of Borodino marked the beginning of the defeat of Napoleon's “grand army”. By the end of 1812, the war ended with the almost complete extermination of the enemy. The remnants of Napoleon's defeated army were expelled from Russia. In 1813-1815 Napoleon was completely defeated. His empire collapsed, and Napoleon himself died a prisoner on the deserted island of Saint Helena. The peoples of Europe enslaved by him restored their national independence with the help of Russia.
THE SITUATION ON THE EVE OF THE PATRIOTIC WAR OF 1812
As a result of the revolution of 1789 in France, the bourgeoisie came to power. Napoleon Bonaparte, a talented, energetic general and outstanding politician, seized supreme power in 1799, and in 1804 declared himself “emperor of all the French.” In fact, he consolidated the dominant position of the bourgeoisie in France and therefore initially enjoyed the support of not only the big, but also the middle and petty bourgeoisie and the French peasantry. Napoleon waged continuous wars with England and the feudal states of Europe - Prussia, Austria, Spain, Russia and a number of small German states. Initially, these states tried to suppress the French Revolution by force of arms and restore the power of the king and nobility in France. The main role in this struggle belonged to England, which, however, took very little part in it with its troops, but skillfully set the Russian Prussians, Austrians, and Spaniards against France.
Back in 1793, the French revolutionary army not only defended the independence of France, but also went on the offensive against the feudal countries of Europe. Napoleon appeared in the eyes of the French as the continuer of these revolutionary wars. This gave Napoleon the aura of a national hero, although in fact he strangled the revolution and subsequently waged purely wars of aggression. These wars invariably ended in French victories. Napoleon's victories expanded the territory of the French empire and opened up new markets and new sources of raw materials for the French bourgeoisie. During 1796-1809 Napoleon utterly defeated the Austrians, Prussians, Italians, and British many times and clashed with the Russians twice - in 1805 and 1807. By 1807, Napoleon had conquered Austria, Prussia, Holland, Belgium, Italy and the small German states. After the Peace of Tilsit in 1807, Russia became an ally of France.
England remained invulnerable to Napoleon's ground forces. She continued to fight him. The powerful commercial and industrial bourgeoisie of England successfully competed with the French bourgeoisie.
England's economic power was based on developed industry and extensive maritime trade. Napoleon decided to strike at English trade by introducing the so-called continental blockade1. He prohibited all European states from conducting maritime trade with England, buying its goods and loading their goods onto English ships. Special controllers-consuls of the French Empire were sent to the seaports of Germany, Austria, Belgium, Holland, France, and Italy, who monitored the exact implementation of the Napoleonic order on the continental blockade and confiscated English goods.
If the continental blockade had actually been fully implemented over a number of years, England would have suffered economic collapse. But the fact is that it was impossible to implement a complete blockade. Napoleon had to immediately give separate permissions for the import of English goods (mainly raw materials) even to France. The blockade so significantly affected the interests of all states and had such a detrimental effect on their economies that all sorts of attempts immediately began to circumvent the harsh demands of Napoleon and his controllers. Bribes, bribes, smuggling, etc. were used.
The continental blockade also hit Russia hard. Russian bread and all types of raw materials were largely bought by the British and exported on English ships. From England, Russia received good quality industrial goods. The blockade broke through these established connections. The dominant class of noble landowners in Russia at that time had nowhere to sell their grain. Merchants trading with England were threatened with ruin. This caused acute discontent among the ruling classes of Russia not only with the policies of France, but also with the policies of their Tsar Alexander I, an ally of Napoleon. Smuggling trade with the British began to be established on a large scale through Russian ports.
Napoleon, who knew from his agents that the Russians were not complying with the demands of the blockade, came more and more to the conclusion that in order to deal a serious blow to England, it was necessary to first conquer Russia, seize its rich resources, and then wage a fight with England. Napoleon dreamed of world domination. He wanted to go through the territory of conquered Russia to India and expel the British from there.
Since 1810, Napoleon gradually began to prepare for a campaign against Russia. In 1811, this preparation was already in full swing. Napoleon either assured Alexander I of friendship, or threatened him, but continued to assure that the movements of troops to the Russian border did not at all mean that war was imminent.
However, it was already clear to the Russian government, including Tsar Alexander I, that war with Napoleon was inevitable. Therefore, the Russians were preparing for war. The armament of the army was improved, its organization and tactics were improved, supplies were prepared, and money was found to wage the war.
Having completed preparations for war, Napoleon, at the head of his troops, crossed the Neman River on June 24, 1812, along which the western border of Russia then passed. The Patriotic War of 1812 began.
NAPOLEON'S ARMY
The French army was led by Napoleon Bonaparte, who seized supreme power in France during the bourgeois revolution.
Napoleon was boundlessly ambitious, richly gifted with natural abilities, brave, calculating and calm at the most critical moments. He was distinguished by his rare ability to work and read a lot. He was never a revolutionary, but he used the revolutionary situation for his personal interests.
In the revolutionary army, Napoleon began to quickly advance in the ranks and for outstanding services in the defeat of the British in the city of Toulon, he received the rank of brigadier general at the age of twenty-three. In 1795, he distinguished himself in suppressing an uprising of noble aristocrats in Paris against the government of the big bourgeoisie - the so-called “Directory”. He shot down huge crowds of nobles trying to seize government offices in the narrow streets of the city with grapeshot guns. This made the name of Napoleon known to all French people, made him popular among the broad masses and, especially among soldiers and young officers of the French armies.
As a reward for defeating the noble uprising, Napoleon asked the government to give him the position of commander of one of the armies. The government, which was already beginning to be afraid of the formidable general, sent him to command the army in Northern Italy. This French army was in the most difficult situation. Small in number, poorly equipped, robbed by quartermasters and suppliers, it could hardly hold out on the southern slopes of the Alps against the superior forces of the Austrians, who then owned Northern Italy. The government sent Napoleon here with the secret hope that the Austrians would certainly defeat his weak army and the defeated Napoleon would lose his glory and popularity among the French people, which was dangerous for the government.
But it turned out just the opposite. Having received an army, Napoleon deployed his military skill to its full extent, his ability to control troops and subjugate them to his will. Having brutally dealt with the thieving quartermasters and improved the supply of the army, he finally won the trust of soldiers and officers. In 1796, Napoleon completely defeated the Austrians within a few months, expelled them from Italy and forced them to conclude a peace beneficial to France.
From 1796 until 1812, Napoleon fought almost continuous wars and did not know a single defeat. His troops crossed almost all the states of Western Europe. The army of the largest feudal powers in Europe obediently bowed before the bayonets of his grenadiers and the blades of his cavalry.
These wars of Napoleon were aggressive. Napoleon placed the conquered countries in heavy economic dependence on France, removed princes, dukes and kings, and in their place put his relatives or marshals of his army. At the same time, Napoleon no longer cared about changing the feudal order in the conquered country, but carried out the ruthless exploitation of the conquered people in favor of France.
It was with these goals that Napoleon went to Russia in 1812. He wanted to use Russia in his own interests, without changing its political system, maintaining serfdom. When the Russian people understood Napoleon's aggressive goals, they rose up to fight for national independence.
What was Napoleon's strength? What explained his many years of victories in wars? What constituted the formidable danger hanging over Russia in 1812?
As a master of military affairs, who had supreme power and enormous material capabilities, Napoleon highly raised the combat effectiveness of the army. With his victories, he managed to captivate the French soldiers with him, managed to convince them that he, Napoleon, was only “the first soldier of France.” Always being among the soldiers on campaigns, riding around their ranks under fire and personally leading them into the attack, he achieved great popularity.
Napoleon waged the war differently from the way the armies of the feudal powers of Europe waged it. Using the experience of the revolutionary wars of France, he made his large army light and mobile, freeing it from large convoys. He said that the war should feed itself, and supported the army at the expense of the local population. He created in his army permanent formations of infantry, cavalry and artillery - divisions and corps - while his opponents, just before the battle, formed detachments from various parts of the troops. This gave Napoleon enormous advantages in maneuverability.
Finally, Napoleon was by far the most educated and intelligent monarch of his time, and he most fully and purposefully used all the resources of the state for the war. He delved into all the details of state life, knew them well, and in war he personally commanded his troops.
Napoleon's main strength was his army. With soldiers' bayonets, he created a French empire that included almost all of Western Europe. His army was a formidable, hitherto unprecedented force, the largest in Europe. In France, the revolutionary government introduced universal conscription in 1793. In the rest of the countries of Western Europe, there were still mercenary recruited armies, recruited from declassed elements of the population. In Russia there was a national army, recruited from the tax-paying classes, that is, from peasants and townspeople.
France under Napoleon was a rich country. Napoleon took large indemnities from the conquered countries. This allowed him to provide the army well.
In numerous wars, the French army accumulated rich combat experience. Constant victories gave rise to special confidence in her strength and invincibility. Gradually, Napoleon's army created a cadre of experienced war professionals - officers and soldiers. However, these cadres constituted only the basis, the skeleton of the army. For his campaign in Russia, Napoleon assembled the so-called “grand army” of about 600,000 people. In this army, the French, including recruits, made up only about 30%. The rest were “allied contingents,” that is, troops deployed by the countries of Europe conquered by Napoleon. There were Germans, Italians, Austrians, Poles, Belgians, Dutch, etc. The Russian people called the invasion of the “great army” the invasion of “twelve languages.”
The “allied contingents” were far inferior to the French in their combat effectiveness. When Napoleon's army entered Russia and had to fight the Russians, who offered fierce resistance, desertion began to develop among the “allies”, and many sick and lagging behind appeared. The same was true among French recruits.
Only Napoleonic guards maintained exemplary order. These were selected units. The “Old Guard” consisted entirely of veterans of the Napoleonic wars. Napoleon knew almost every soldier here by sight. He kept them in a particularly privileged position. The "Young Guard" was staffed by the bravest soldiers and capable officers from the combat units of the army. She was also noted for her high combat efficiency. Napoleon threw his guards into the attack at the turning point of the battle, when it was necessary to stun the enemy with a formidable blow and complete his defeat.
The French army under the command of Napoleon, which entered Russia in June 1812, was formidable in numbers, a highly combat-ready armed force, its officers and soldiers had rich combat experience.
M.I. KUTUZOV AND THE RUSSIAN ARMY IN 1812
At the head of the Russian army in the decisive period of the war of 1812. there was an old fighting Russian general Mikhail Illarionovich Golenishchev-Kutuzov. Kutuzov served in the Russian army for over fifty years. He was born in 1745 to the family of an educated general of the engineering troops in his time. Mikhail Illarionovich studied in the engineering and artillery corps in St. Petersburg, which he graduated in 1761. From that moment, Kutuzov’s service in command positions began. He went up the entire career ladder - from a junior officer in an infantry company to the commander-in-chief of the army. This long service gave Kutuzov a wealth of combat experience, brought him closer to the Russian soldier and officer, and taught him to appreciate the Russian soldier.
Kutuzov was a participant in many wars, in which he proved himself not only an outstanding military leader, but also an exceptional brave man. In 1764, Kutuzov, as a company commander, took part in a campaign in Poland. During the Russian-Turkish War of 1768-1774. Kutuzov was first in the Danube Army under Field Marshal Rumyantsev, and then in the Crimean Army. Then he served in Crimea in the army of the great commander Suvorov. Under the command of Suvorov, he fought in the Russian-Turkish War of 1787-1791. and took part in the assault on the Izmail fortress. In 1805, Kutuzov, already in the position of commander-in-chief, made a campaign in Austria against Napoleon. After Napoleon defeated the Austrians at Ulm, he turned his army of two hundred thousand against Kutuzov, who had only 50,000 people. Skillfully maneuvering and steadfastly repelling Napoleon's advancing army with rearguard battles, Kutuzov safely withdrew his troops to the area of the city of Olmutz. But here Tsar Alexander I intervened in the matter, who decided to command the troops himself, give Napoleon a battle, defeat him and achieve the glory of the winner. Kutuzov proposed to refrain from a decisive battle until the situation and the arrival of reinforcements from Russia, as well as Austrian units, were clarified. Contrary to Kutuzov's warnings, Alexander I gave Napoleon the battle of Austerlitz and suffered a severe defeat.
An attempt to blame Kutuzov for the defeat at Austerlitz on Alexander I failed. For this, he especially hated Kutuzov and fired him from the army.
In 1811, Alexander I appointed Kutuzov as commander-in-chief of the Moldavian army, which since 1806 had waged a continuous war with the Turks. The Turks had to be defeated as soon as possible and forced to make peace, since a war with Napoleon was imminent.
Despite his hostility towards Kutuzov, Alexander I knew that only Kutuzov would be able to quickly defeat the Turks.
Kutuzov brutally defeated the Turks twice and forced them to sign peace in May 1812, just a month before Napoleon's invasion, thereby saving Russia from the need to fight on two fronts.
Kutuzov not only had extensive combat experience, but was a richly gifted, talented commander, an ardent Russian patriot and a deeply educated person, well versed not only in military affairs, but also in politics. He went through combat school under the guidance of the great Russian commanders - Field Marshal Pyotr Aleksandrovich Rumyantsev and Generalissimo Alexander Vasilyevich Suvorov. He perfectly mastered their brilliant martial art, brought into it a lot of his own, new things that corresponded to the new conditions of the war, and studied the combat experience of his enemy Napoleon. Kutuzov knew the Russian soldier deeply, appreciated and loved him. Russian soldiers also knew, loved and trusted Kutuzov unlimitedly. They knew that Kutuzov was the favorite student and comrade-in-arms of the great Suvorov, whom the entire Russian army revered as an invincible hero and father of soldiers. In 1812, due to long periods of service in the ranks of the Russian army, especially in non-commissioned officer positions2, veterans who fought under the command of Suvorov still served.
Among them were those who served under the command of Kutuzov, who saw him in battle - always ahead, calm, brave. There were those who saw how Kutuzov, seriously wounded in the head, was carried out from the battlefield - near Alushta in the Crimea and near the Turkish fortress Ochakov. Doctors considered the second wound to the head fatal for Kutuzov. But Kutuzov said that he “cheated death and survived.” Subsequently, from wounds to the head, Kutuzov became blind in his right eye. Old soldiers, eyewitnesses of Kutuzov's exploits, passed them on to new recruits, and thus the entire mass of soldiers was imbued with complete confidence in their remarkable commander.
Military officers also loved Kutuzov. They knew how brilliantly Kutuzov acted in 1805 against Napoleon in 1811 against the Turks on the Danube, they knew and believed in Kutuzov’s high skill as a commander.
Kutuzov was always well aware of the enemy's condition. His teacher, Suvorov, spoke about Kutuzov: “Smart, smart, cunning, cunning.” Indeed, none of the opponents could ever deceive Kutuzov. Kutuzov himself deceived his opponents many times. In 1805, saving his army from defeat by Napoleon's superior forces, he brilliantly deceived the French Emperor and especially his Marshal Murat several times and escaped the attack. In 1811, Kutuzov outwitted the Turkish commander-in-chief, lured him to the northern bank of the Danube, and defeated him piecemeal with a skillful maneuver.
Napoleon knew Kutuzov's high leadership qualities, and for his cunning he called him “the old fox of the North.” And Kutuzov himself attached military significance to his cunning. They say that when in August 1812 he was leaving for the active army and saying goodbye to his family in St. Petersburg, a young nephew asked him: “Do you, uncle, really hope to defeat Napoleon?” - “Break? No, I don't hope to break it! And I hope to deceive!” These words cannot, of course, be understood in the sense that Kutuzov defeated his opponents only by deception and cunning. Kutuzov's cunning was one of the elements of his military leadership.
The most important thing that helped Kutuzov save Russia in 1812 and expel Napoleon was a correct understanding of the nature of the struggle against the formidable conqueror. Kutuzov highly and objectively appreciated Napoleon's military leadership and knew the power of his army. He also knew the formidable strength and iron stamina of the Russian soldier. Kutuzov was one of the few in Russia who understood that only a people's war could break Napoleon. He contributed in every possible way to the outbreak of this nationwide war. He issued weapons to peasants, led the partisan movement, trying to achieve interaction between the partisans and army units. Kutuzov did this against the will of the tsar, amid the frightened cries of the noble landowners, who feared the armed peasants more than the French. Denunciations rained down on Kutuzov to the tsar that, by arming the serfs, he was preparing a “second Pugachevshchina.” But the old commander calmly did his job. He himself was a noble landowner, but at the same time he was an ardent Russian patriot. He put the interests of the Motherland above the interests of his class, which Tsar Alexander, “the first landowner of Russia,” failed to do.
Alexander I constantly harmed Kutuzov and removed him from service more than once. But Kutuzov, as a commander, was so great and skilled that Alexander, against his will, had to resort to Kutuzov’s help in difficult moments. This happened in 1805, in 1811 and, finally, in August 1812. Entrusting Kutuzov with the main command of the army, Tsar Alexander always assigned his spies and informers to him, who slandered Kutuzov. And in 1812, Alexander assigned such a spy to Kutuzov in the role of chief of staff, the arrogant German General Bennigsen.
In 1812, Kutuzov opposed Napoleon, being sixty-seven years old. A brilliant commander, an ardent patriot and a favorite of soldiers and officers, who had rich combat experience - such was Napoleon’s opponent
The Russian army in 1812 was numerically significantly inferior to Napoleonic army. On the western border, Russia was able to field only about 200,000 soldiers against Napoleon's army of six hundred thousand.
In terms of fighting qualities, the Russian army was not inferior to Napoleon's army. The Russians had already fought the French three times. The first time was in 1799 in Northern Italy and Switzerland. The Russians, in alliance with the Austrians under the command of Suvorov, then inflicted a number of defeats on the French.
The second meeting took place in 1805 near Austerlitz, which ended in the victory of Napoleon and the shameful defeat of Tsar Alexander, namely Tsar Alexander, but not the defeat of the Russian army. The fighting spirit of the Russian soldiers was by no means broken. They remembered well that shortly before Austerlitz: a six-thousand-strong Russian detachment under the command of General Bagration fought stubbornly all day long with the thirty-thousand-strong French vanguard, and with the onset of darkness, with bayonets, they paved the way for themselves and left the encirclement, capturing prisoners and the French banner. The French themselves called Bagration’s detachment “a squad of heroes.”
In 1807, the Russians had two major battles with the French - near Preussisch-Eylau and near Friedland in East Prussia. At Preussisch-Eylau, Napoleon failed to break the Russians. His army, numerically equal to the Russians, suffered huge losses in fruitless attacks, which were all repulsed by the Russians.
At Friedland, Napoleon defeated the Russians, thanks to the incompetent leadership of the commander-in-chief, General Bennigsen.
Thus, the French won two victories over the Russians and suffered several defeats from the Russians. But this was when the French had a great advantage over the Russians in organizing the army.
Between 1806 and 1811 the Russian army was reorganized and partially rearmed with better weapons. At the same time, the experience of Suvorov’s wars, the French revolutionary wars and the Napoleonic wars was taken into account. Following the example of the French, the Russian army had infantry and cavalry divisions and corps that had a permanent composition, formed in peacetime. People knew each other, knew their bosses.
Thus, by 1812 the Russian army was not inferior to the French in organization and armament. The Russians did not believe in the invincibility of the French, since they themselves had beaten them more than once under the leadership of Suvorov, Kutuzov, and Bagration.
In the wars preceding the Patriotic War of 1812, the Russian army acquired extensive combat experience. There were many capable military generals and officers and fired soldiers.
When Napoleon sent his troops across the Neman River near the city of Kovno on June 24, 1812, two Russian armies were deployed in the path of the advance of his main forces, numbering almost 400,000 people. The first - about 110,000 people - was located in the Vilna region. The second consisted of 50,000 people and was located in the Volkovysk region. Thus, Napoleon had a two and a half times numerical superiority in the main direction of his offensive. The position of the Russians was further complicated by the fact that a unified command had not been established. The first army was commanded by General Mikhail Bogdanovich Barclay de Tolly, and the second by General Pyotr Ivanovich Bagration. Both of these commanders were experienced generals.
At first, Alexander I was at the headquarters of the 1st Army. But given his failure at Austerlitz, he did not dare to command the troops himself, but he intervened in everything and interfered with everyone. The smartest people from his courtiers managed to persuade the tsar to leave the army for Moscow, and then to St. Petersburg in order (as he was told) “with his high presence to support the spirit of the people in a difficult struggle.”
Soon after the start of the war, he left the army without uniting the command of the 1st and 2nd armies in the same hands.
Given the current situation, the Russian army was forced to retreat. But it was very difficult for two separate armies to retreat in full view of the superior French forces. Napoleon threw his corps at the Russians in such a way as to separate both Russian armies and destroy them separately. With heavy rearguard battles, the Russian armies began to retreat in the general direction to Smolensk in order to unite there and repel the enemy with joint forces.
The French pursued the Russians, tried to cut off their escape routes, and draw the main Russian forces into a decisive battle, but they did not succeed. The Russians, maintaining their strength, continued to retreat without engaging in a decisive battle.
Battles with Russian rearguards, impassability, lagging convoys, difficulties with food and fodder and, most importantly, the actions of Russian partisans in the rear and on the flanks exhausted and bled the French army. The Russian population began to burn everything in the path of the French movement and went into the forests and deep into Russia.
But their forced retreat was also difficult for the Russians. Heavy marches under the constant threat of being cut off, the sight of burning villages and cities, the devastation of their native land both physically and morally oppressed the Russian troops. In separate rearguard battles, the Russians inflicted defeats on the French. These particular successes could not yet change the general state of affairs, but the soldiers understood the matter in their own way. They reasoned like this: “After all, we are beating the French. Why retreat, why give up our native land for destruction? We all need to stand up strong, fight and not let the French go further, because we are strong.”
The great Russian poet Mikhail Yuryevich Lermontov in his poem “Borodino” very well conveys these sentiments of Russian soldiers. In this poem the old soldier says:
“We retreated silently for a long time.
It was a shame - they were expecting a fight.
The old people grumbled:
Why should we go to winter quarters?
Don't the commanders dare?
Aliens tear up their uniforms
About Russian bayonets?
Both Russian armies managed to avoid defeat and unite in Smolensk on August 3. Now not only the soldiers, but also the majority of the officers and generals were waiting for a decisive battle.
But General Barclay de Tolly knew that Napoleon’s forces were still too superior to those of the Russian army, that there was little hope of winning a decisive battle. Therefore, he ordered to continue the retreat to Vyazma and Gzhatsk.
This caused open murmur in the army and in the rear. General Barclay was accused of treason, they said that he was leading Napoleon straight to Moscow, that there was nothing else to expect from the “German”. By the way, Barclay was not a German, but a descendant of a Scotsman who switched to Russian service. Accusing him of treason or bad actions was completely unfair. As Minister of War, he did a lot to strengthen the Russian army. He also acted correctly against Napoleon. And, nevertheless, he was completely unsuited to the role of commander-in-chief in the Patriotic War of 1812. He, an honest and knowledgeable general, did not know how to approach the heart of a soldier and an officer. He could honestly fulfill his duty, but he could not and did not know how to lead the masses.
The war was acquiring a nationwide character, and therefore a leader was required who was close in spirit to the Russian soldier and the Russian people, a leader whom everyone would certainly trust. And the Russian people found such a leader in the person of General Kutuzov.
After the conclusion of a peace treaty with Turkey in May 1812 in Bucharest, Alexander I dismissed Kutuzov from service. When the French invasion began, Kutuzov came to St. Petersburg. At this time, by order of Tsar Alexander I, the nobles formed a militia, and Kutuzov was elected head of the St. Petersburg and Moscow militias. Meanwhile, the mood of the retreating army was falling, and rumors of Barclay's treason were spreading.
All segments of the population asked the tsar to immediately appoint Kutuzov as commander-in-chief of the Russian army.
Very reluctantly, under pressure from public opinion, Alexander I appointed Kutuzov as commander-in-chief of all Russian troops on August 203.
Kutuzov immediately left for the active army, arrived in Gzhatsk on August 29, and on August 30 issued an order to take command.
The army greeted Kutuzov with delight. “Kutuzov has come to beat the French,” the soldiers said, hinting that Kutuzov would not retreat, but would give battle to Napoleon. The army expected a decisive battle and hoped that Kutuzov would give this battle immediately. Kutuzov himself also perfectly understood what was expected of him. He considered it necessary to give a decisive battle on the roads to Moscow, using that mighty spirit, that anger and resentment with which the Russian people were full, to inflict a cruel blow on Napoleon.
However, Kutuzov also well understood that General Barclay de Tolly was right in continuing the retreat, that Napoleon’s forces were still too great, that it was necessary to further increase the Russian army through suitable reinforcements. In addition, Kutuzov had just arrived and was not up to date; he needed to look around. Therefore, he rejected the position planned for battle in the area of the city of Gzhatsk and ordered a retreat further to the east. At the same time, he sent to reconnoiter the position for the battle in the area of the village of Borodino.
The troops were somewhat disappointed that Kutuzov was continuing his retreat, but they believed him and believed that this was the last retreat. Kutuzov skillfully supported this belief. So, upon his arrival, greeting the troops, he said: “With such and such fellows, let’s retreat!” - and the soldiers were convinced that the retreat would soon really come to an end.
Meanwhile, Kutuzov’s position was very difficult. According to intelligence data from the headquarters, Napoleon's forces directly pursuing the Russians in the Moscow direction were estimated at 186,000 people. Kutuzov had about 110,000 people. In addition, he knew that the enemy forces were highly combative. To decide to fight in these conditions required great courage. The commander had a huge responsibility, because the fate of the Motherland largely depended on the outcome of the battle.
Kutuzov decided to give Napoleon's army a general battle on the Borodino field.
What did Kutuzov hope for when making his decision?
It has already been said above that the Russian army was not inferior in quality to the French. The question of quantitative superiority remained. Kutuzov knew that reinforcements were coming to him and at Borodin he would have 120,000 people. He mistakenly counted Napoleon's forces at 186,000 people (in fact, Napoleon brought only 130,000 people to Borodin). Kutuzov decided to balance the inequality of forces by choosing a position so that Napoleon could not, due to the nature of the terrain, immediately deploy his superior forces, so that he would have to attack on a narrow front and bring his troops into battle in parts under the brutal fire of Russian guns. Kutuzov correctly believed that if he had 40,000 men under the command of the fearless General Bagration on the left flank of the Borodino position, they would be able to hold off an enemy twice their size.
When making a responsible decision on the Battle of Borodino, Kutuzov counted on the courage of the Russian troops, the high combat skill of their commanders and the skillful use of the terrain.
RUSSIAN AND FRENCH FORCES IN THE BATTLE OF BORODINO
Napoleon launched an offensive on the main direction Vitebsk-Smolensk-Moscow, with 400,000 soldiers. He brought only 130,000 to Borodin. Thus, having traveled about 800 kilometers through Russian territory, Napoleon lost almost 70% of his army. Some died in battle, many fell ill, fell behind, and deserted. Napoleon had to allocate many troops to guard the supply routes and flanks of the advancing army.
At Borodino, 120,000 Russians fought against a French army of 130,000.
The balance of forces by combat branch before the Battle of Borodino was as follows:
The French - The Russians
Infantry 86,000 - 72,000
Regular cavalry 28,000 - 17,000
Cossacks - 7000
Artillerymen 16000 - 14000
Militia - 10,000
Guns 587 - 640
Total: 130,000 and 587 guns. - 120,000 and 640 guns.
The French had an advantage in infantry and regular cavalry, while the Russians had an advantage in artillery. The Russian militias were poorly trained and insufficiently armed, their combat value was low.
The armament of the Russian and French armies was equivalent in combat qualities.
The infantry was armed with a smooth-bore, muzzle-loading rifle with an attached bayonet. The gun had a flintlock and a shelf on which gunpowder was poured. When the trigger was pulled, the flintlock would create a spark that would hit the gunpowder on the shelf. The latter flared up and through the seed slit transferred the fire to the powder charge - this is how the shot was fired. In wet weather the gun misfired a lot, and in the rain it was impossible to shoot at all. Black smoky powder was used for both rifles and cannons, and therefore, with the opening of fire, the battlefield was clouded with thick smoke, interfering with observation.
The gun fired only at 200-220 meters, but a well-aimed shot could be fired at 60-70 meters. The infantry fired in volleys - in platoons, companies and battalions. Single fire was fired only by the rangers, scattered in a chain in front of their units.
The main strength of the infantry lay not in fire, but in the bayonet strike of infantry units and units formed in columns.
The artillery was armed with smooth-bore guns loaded from the muzzle on wheeled carriages. These cannons fired round cast-iron cannonballs and explosive grenades at a distance of up to 2 kilometers, and with grapeshot up to 500 meters. The rate of fire of the guns was insignificant, since loading from the muzzle required a lot of time. To ensure continuity of artillery fire from this point, a battery of a very large number of guns was installed. Batteries of several dozen guns were not uncommon; Napoleon used batteries of 100 guns. In such a battery, the firing order was established, and the fire was carried out continuously.
In the Battle of Borodino, the French had more mobile 3-pound (i.e. 70 mm) and 4-pound (i.e. 80 mm) guns. The Russians have heavier 6-pounder (95 mm) and 12-pounder (120 mm) guns. The artillery maintained the closest cooperation with the infantry and cavalry. It was located with the infantry not only in defense, but accompanied it in the attack, moving on the flanks of infantry columns. Horse artillery worked in the same way with cavalry.
Grapeshot artillery fire significantly supported the infantry. This fire caused great losses to the enemy, since one was not supposed to apply oneself to the terrain or take cover from fire - it was considered shameful. Even reserves that came under enemy artillery cannon fire remained in place in close formation and suffered losses.
Regular cavalry was then divided into light cavalry - hussars, lancers, dragoons and heavy cavalry - cuirassiers. Light cavalry were armed with sabers or broadswords and pistols. The light horsemen did not have protective weapons to protect them from attacks with cold steel.
The heavy cavalry was made up of tall, strong men and selected large horses. The horsemen had protective weapons (metal cuirasses), which covered the chest and partly the shoulders from chopping and piercing blows. For weapons they had heavy broadswords and pistols. The cavalry attacked in battle in a closed two-rank formation, falling on the enemy in the quarry. In such battles, heavy cavalry, of course, had an advantage.
Cossacks were called irregular or irregular cavalry. They were armed, in addition to pistols and sabers, with pikes. If it was possible to get a gun in battle, the Cossack took it with him. They attacked not only with a deployed front, like regular cavalry, but also with a lava, that is, in a loose formation, trying to cover the enemy’s flanks. In battle, they sometimes used very cunning techniques, luring the enemy into an ambush, bringing him under grapeshot fire, etc.
BORODIN POSITION OF THE RUSSIANS AND ENGINEERING EQUIPMENT
The position near the village of Borodino, where Kutuzov gave a decisive battle to Napoleon, was chosen by the Quartermaster General of the Russian Army4 Colonel Tol on the instructions of Kutuzov himself. The right flank of the position abutted the Moscow River near the village of Maslovo, and the left flank abutted the wooded area south of the village of Utitsa. The Moscow River, which has steep banks here, and the dense forest south of the village of Utitsa were difficult to pass obstacles for the troops, who had to fight in dense, dense battle formations (columns and deployed formations). Thus, both flanks of the position were covered by natural obstacles. The front of the position stretched from the village of Maslovo, through Gorki, Borodino, Semenovskaya, to the village of Utitsa (see diagram) - for about 8 kilometers. The terrain of the entire battlefield from the village of Maslovo to the village of Utitsa is open, slightly hilly, cut here and there by shallow ravines and covered with bushes. From the front of the position (“the front line,” as we say now) and in its depth right up to the city of Mozhaisk, for 12 kilometers, the terrain was passable everywhere for troops and convoys. This was of great importance for the Russians in the event of a forced retreat.
As for the front of the position, it was not everywhere accessible for attacks by large forces. The position chosen by Kutuzov put the enemy at a disadvantage, since he could not immediately send large forces against the Russians. West of the village of Maslovo, the small river Kolocha flows into the Moscow River, which stretches in front of the front of the position to the village of Borodino, and then deviates to the west. This river flows along steep and partly swampy banks and at that time represented a serious tactical obstacle to the crossing of large masses of troops under fire. And since Kutuzov occupied the eastern bank of the Kolocha River and moved the rangers (combat guard) to its very bed, this section of the position became inaccessible for the actions of large forces.
The area south of the village of Borodino and up to the village of Utitsa was everywhere accessible for operations of all types of troops in compact formations. The front of this section was about 3.5 kilometers.
Thus, by skillful choice of terrain, Kutuzov greatly limited the ability of enemy troops to maneuver.
The Borodino field is cut from west to east by two roads. The first was called the New Smolensk Road. She walked through the villages of Valuevo, Borodino, Gorki and further to the city of Mozhaisk. It was a “highway” (not a highway, but a good, wide dirt road), along which Napoleon’s main forces advanced towards Moscow. The second road was called Old Smolenskaya. It passed south of Novaya through the villages of Elnya, Utitsa and further to the city of Mozhaisk. Napoleon's large forces also advanced along this road.
Kutuzov, having occupied the Borodino position with Russian troops, cut both roads and blocked Napoleon’s path to Moscow. Napoleon could not bypass the Borodino position, since he was hampered in the north by the Moscow River, and in the south by forests and impassable roads. He was forced to attack the Russians where Kutuzov wanted it, and not where Napoleon himself was more profitable. In this case, Kutuzov sought the same thing that Russian commanders achieved in the past: Alexander Nevsky - in the battle with the Germans on Lake Peipus, Dmitry Donskoy - in the battle with the Tatars on the Kulikovo Field, Peter the Great - in the battle with the Swedes near Poltava. These Russian commanders also prepared their defenses so skillfully that they forced their opponents to attack in a strictly defined direction and thus achieved victory.
Of the two roads on the Borodino field, Novaya Smolenskaya, which was better and shorter to Mozhaisk than the Old one, was of greater importance. Kutuzov paid special attention to firmly maintaining the New Smolensk Road.
During September 4-6, 1812, by order of Kutuzov, the position chosen for the battle was hastily equipped with engineering structures. Trenches for infantry and artificial obstacles were not built in front of them then, since the infantry repelled attacks by standing tall in deployed formation. Only the rangers, scattered in a chain in front, prepared for themselves a sheltered, convenient place for shooting - either by tearing off single trenches, or by adapting local objects.
The fortifications were built mainly for the installation of artillery. If possible, abatis were built in front of these fortifications. Part of the infantry was also placed in the fortifications for the guns, which covered the guns from being captured by the enemy.
This is how the Borodino position was strengthened. The Russians built the following structures on it (see diagram).
1. South of the village of Maslovo there are three so-called “flashes”5, that is, three arrow-shaped trenches for cannons. These flushes contained 26 guns. From the front, the Maslovsky flushes were covered with an abatis. Artillery from these flashes covered with fire the approaches to the Moscow River and the Kolocha River in its lower reaches.
2. Between the Maslovsky flashes and the village of Borodino, five separate fortifications were built, in which 37 guns were installed, covering the approaches to the Kolocha River with their fire.
3. Near the village of Borodino, a continuous trench was dug for rangers and a fortification for four guns.
4. South of Borodino, on the so-called “Kurgan Heights,” a fortification with 18 guns was built. This fortification was called the “Raevsky battery.”
5. South-west of the village of Semenovskaya, three flashes were built, each of which was equipped with 12 guns. These flashes were first called “Semyonov flashes”, and then were renamed “Bagration flashes”, since they were heroically defended and General Bagration was mortally wounded here.
6. South of the village of Shevardino, on a hill that dominated the entire surrounding area, a closed earthen fortification was built - the “Shevardino Redoubt”. 12 guns were installed in the redoubt and infantry were stationed for its stubborn defense. The Shevardinsky redoubt played the role of a “forward position”6.
The Russian fortifications on the Borodino field were of great importance. A particularly important role was played by the Shevardinsky redoubt, the Semenovsky (Bagrationov) flushes and the Raevsky battery, around which the most fierce battles took place. the main position of the Russians. But since it was strongly advanced and could easily be bypassed from the south, Kutuzov, after personal reconnaissance, pushed the left flank of the main position to the village of Utitsa, and ordered the Shevardinsky redoubt to be defended as a forward fortification.
PLANS OF THE PARTIES
Napoleon was aware of the danger for his army of going deeper into the boundless expanses of Russia, especially when he was convinced that the people were beginning to take part in the war. The difficulties of fighting a “warring people” were known to Napoleon from the experience of the war in Spain, where for several years his troops could not break the partisans and suffered huge losses under their blows.
Therefore, from the very beginning of the campaign, Napoleon sought to force the Russians to a decisive battle, defeat the Russian army in this battle and force Tsar Alexander I to make peace. Napoleon hoped to defeat the Russians in Lithuania and Belarus, but the Russians left, exhausting the French with rearguard battles. He hoped for a decisive battle near Smolensk, but the Russians continued to retreat. In burnt Smolensk, Napoleon felt the mortal danger of a further offensive and was inclined to stop and settle into winter quarters west of the Dnieper River. But shame for the fruitless campaign and passion for the pursuit prompted Napoleon to move on. He decided to dictate peace to Alexander I in Moscow, as he had already dictated his terms many times in the defeated capitals of Europe.
Napoleon still considered his army stronger than the Russian one and was confident that in a decisive battle he would completely crush the Russians. Therefore, when he was convinced that the Russians had finally settled on the Borodino position, he said: “Now they are caught.”
However, despite his confidence in his abilities, Napoleon was very wary of Kutuzov’s actions. The appointment of the latter as commander-in-chief of the Russian armies made Napoleon think twice. He remembered the brilliant maneuvering of Kutuzov in 1805, when Napoleon was unable to defeat the Russian army, having a fourfold superiority in forces. Now Napoleon did not have such superiority. Napoleon understood perfectly well that in Kutuzov he had a strong and dangerous enemy. When Napoleon learned of Kutuzov’s appointment as commander-in-chief, he said: “Let’s see what this old fox of the North will do.” When these words became known to Kutuzov, he modestly remarked: “I will try to justify the opinion of the great commander.”
The tenacity and activity of the Russian army, led by Kutuzov, forced Napoleon to exercise great caution and avoid complex maneuvers in the Battle of Borodino. This was reflected in the battle plan drawn up by Napoleon.
Having familiarized himself with the Borodino position occupied by the Russians and the grouping of their forces, Napoleon drew up the following plan for September 7:
1. Deliver the main blow with a mass of infantry and cavalry, with powerful artillery support, on the Russian left flank in the Semyonovsky flushes, Raevsky’s battery.
2. Break through the Russian position here and introduce strong reserves into the breakthrough.
3. The attack of these reserves should be turned north to the flank and rear of Kutuzov’s main forces, which were covering the New Smolensk road. Pin the Russians to the Moscow River and then destroy them.
This plan involved the French in a brutal frontal battle with the Russians along a narrow front. But the Russians have always been distinguished by their iron staunchness, and breaking through their position was extremely difficult. Napoleon's marshals knew this and, for their part, offered Napoleon another plan - to allocate a detachment of 40,000 people and send it around the forests south of the village of Utitsa, take this detachment deep into the flank and rear of the Russians and crush their position with an unexpected blow. In previous wars with the Austrians, Italians, and Prussians, Napoleon was very fond of such detours, which always led to the complete defeat of the enemy. Here, to the surprise of the marshals, Napoleon categorically rejected this plan. The marshals did not understand what was going on. Many of them began to say that “the emperor began to forget his craft,” that is, he forgot how to fight.
But Napoleon was right. He knew that the outflanking detachment would need many hours before it would pass through the roadless thicket of the forest and be able to take part in the battle. And during this time, Kutuzov, having discovered the weakening of the French front, himself will go on the offensive and defeat the weakened French troops. Napoleon knew the Russian “Instructions for Officers”, which stated that “wherever the enemy appears, you must turn your chest towards him, go towards him and defeat him.” Napoleon knew that the Russians acted according to these “Instructions”.
That is why Napoleon did not accept the plan of his marshals, abandoned complex maneuvers and settled on the simplest of them - a frontal attack followed by the introduction of fresh units into the breakthrough.
What was Kutuzov’s plan in the Battle of Borodino?
Kutuzov always had to fight with numerically superior enemy forces. Given such an unfavorable balance of forces, he also had a good, reliable method for achieving success. This technique consisted of stubborn defense in the first part of the battle, and then, when the enemy weakened, an unexpected transition to the offensive with the reserves saved until that moment of the battle.
Kutuzov prepared the Battle of Borodino primarily as a defensive one, but with the possibility of a subsequent transition to the offensive. The goal of the battle was to inflict a serious defeat on Napoleon's army and prevent it from entering Moscow.
Thus, Kutuzov’s plan included solving two problems:
the first task is to inflict the greatest possible losses on the enemy with a stubborn defense of limited forces, bleed him dry and confuse him;
the second task is to go on the offensive with fresh forces that did not take part in the first stage of the battle and defeat the enemy.
Both commanders - Napoleon and Kutuzov - managed to half fulfill their plans in the Battle of Borodino. Napoleon managed to break through the left flank of the Russian position, but there were not enough reserves to enter the breakthrough, since they were defeated during the breakthrough itself. With stubborn defense, Kutuzov managed to severely weaken the French army, but he did not have enough strength to go on the offensive.
What were the moods of the soldiers and officers in the Battle of Borodino and how were they supposed to influence the course of the battle?
Of the soldiers of Napoleon's army, the physically and morally most resilient, well-trained, and drawn into the field and combat life came to Borodin. Among them were many veterans who had fought in countless battles.
Why did they fight to the death with the Russians on the Borodino field?
They sought to achieve peace as quickly as possible, since Napoleon assured them that if they only defeated the Russians here, peace would be concluded. They sought to quickly reach Moscow, take possession of rich booty, plunder, receive generous rewards from the emperor and return home with glory.
The courage of Russian soldiers in the Battle of Borodino was based on something completely different. The enemy has invaded our native land; ruined it, threatened to enslave the Russian people. It is necessary, without sparing your life, to defeat the enemy and expel him from his native land. Before the Battle of Borodino, Russian soldiers and officers were filled with the deepest patriotic impulse. Everyone was ready to accept death in battle, but not to disgrace the title of a Russian warrior. On the eve of the battle, fellow countrymen from different regiments visited each other, wrote letters, and bequeathed what to convey to their relatives in the event of death in battle. The soldiers understood the significance of the upcoming battle. Everyone was in a solemnly elated mood. Before the battle, they cleaned and repaired uniforms, shoes, equipment, sharpened weapons, and put on clean linen.
The officers asked Kutuzov for permission to fight on the Borodino field in ceremonial uniforms, with all orders. Kutuzov allowed. This is how the army of heroes prepared for the decisive battle for the independence of Russia.
Tens of thousands of glorious exploits of nameless heroes, soldiers and officers, were seen on the Borodino field on September 7, 1812. Very few of the names of these heroes were preserved for posterity.
Old sergeant major7 Ivan Ivanovich Brezgun is a veteran of the Suvorov and Kutuzov campaigns. In 1805, he took part in a campaign in Austria and was part of Bagration’s “team of heroes”, which lost half of its strength in battle, but saved the main forces of the Russian army. In the battle near Shengraben, Brezgun received his seventh wound and was promoted to non-commissioned officer for the courage shown in battle. After recovering from his wound, he took part in the 1807 campaign against the French. He was also in the unsuccessful battle for the Russians near Friedland, and understood that the culprit of the Russian defeat was the then commander-in-chief, General Bennigsen.
In the Battle of Borodino, Brezgun spent the whole day in the most terrible sector - near the Bagration flushes. Many times that day he and his company stubbornly fought with bayonets against the French infantry and repelled cavalry attacks. He encouraged young soldiers by word and example of personal courage; he emerged from the Battle of Borodino unharmed and continued his military service.
Young soldiers, recruits of 1812, were not inferior in courage to veterans. Conscription soldier in 1812 Maxim Starynchuk was an ardent patriot. Along with all the other soldiers, he was dissatisfied with the retreat and was firmly convinced that the retreat was explained by the “treason” of General Barclay de Tolly. While others were only silently grumbling, Starynchuk loudly, in front of everyone, threw the word “traitor” into the suspect general’s face. This was a serious violation of discipline, and a military court sentenced Starynchuk to death. Thanks to the efforts of General Bagration, Starynchuk was saved from execution. In the Battle of Borodino, Starynchuk, distinguished by his enormous strength, brutally fought the French with a bayonet and butt. Many enemies fell under his powerful blows. But then a flying bullet hit Starynchuk in the forehead and lodged deep in the bones. Starynchuk fell and lost consciousness. A few moments later he woke up again and stood on his feet. The hand-to-hand fight continued, and two Frenchmen rushed at Starynchuk with guns at the ready. Starynchuk did not have a weapon, but he still went to meet the attackers, grabbed the bayonets with his hands and pulled them off the guns. Armed in this way, Starynchuk again rushed into the thick of the battle, striking with bayonets right and left. However, the head wound eventually weakened the hero, and he again lost consciousness, falling onto a pile of enemies struck to death.
When Starynchuk was brought to the dressing station, he came to his senses again. The doctor began to remove the bullet from the bone, but could not remove it. At that time, sedatives were not yet known, and surgical instruments were primitive. The doctor picked at Starynchuk’s forehead with an awl for a long time, exhausted himself and tormented the wounded man. Finally, Starynchuk said to the doctor: “I’m tired, rest, and I’ll live with the pig!”
Cuirassier Adrianov was a liaison officer under General Bagration in the Battle of Borodino. He carried a telescope for the general (there were no binoculars then), provided him with minor services and could not take personal part in hand-to-hand combat with the French. When Bagration was wounded and was being taken to the dressing station, Adrianov ran up to the stretcher and said: “Your Excellency, they are taking you to treatment, you no longer need me!” Following this, Adrianov jumped into the saddle and, drawing his broadsword, rushed into the thick of the battle. As if trying to reward himself for lost time, Adrianov alone plunged into the crowd of French horsemen upset by the battle; Having defeated many enemies, he died the death of a hero.
On the Borodino field, all Russians behaved like heroes. It should be noted that in addition to patriotism, in addition to ardent hatred of the enemy invader and the desire to expel him from the borders of one’s country, military traditions were also of great importance. Since the time of Peter the Great, the Russian army has hardly known defeat. Many regiments had distinctions on their banners and in their uniforms for feats accomplished in the past. Thus, the Absheron infantry regiment wore red gaiters in memory of the fact that in the battle with the Prussians at Zorndorf in East Prussia in 1758 during the Seven Years' War, this regiment repelled attacks while standing in blood. The regiment lost almost all its officers, but retained its position. It was already mentioned above that veterans of Suvorov’s campaigns, accustomed only to winning, took part in the Battle of Borodino. They fought stubbornly and brilliantly with the French in Italy, Switzerland, and Austria, when the goal of the war was not particularly close and clear to them. Fighting on the Borodino field, for Russia, for Moscow, for their families and property, they showed iron courage.
Napoleon underestimated the high morale of the Russian army, but Kutuzov took it well into account.
BATTLE FOR THE SHEVARDINSKY REDOUBTE
On September 5, 1812, around noon, Napoleon's army began to approach the Borodino position in three columns. The main forces, which included Napoleon himself, marched in the center along the New Smolensk road to the villages of Valuevo and Borodino. The right column approached along the Old Smolensk Road, through the village of Yelnya. The left column walked along the country roads to the village of Bezzubovo (see diagram).
At this time, Kutuzov had already decided to push the left flank of the position to the line of heights west of the village of Semenovskaya, the village of Utitsa. Work was underway on the construction of Semenov flashes.
The Shevardinsky redoubt remained ahead of the main position at a distance of 1,300 meters. It was impossible to support this redoubt even with artillery fire from the main position.
The redoubt was basically ready, and the troops for its defense were in place. In total, 3,000 people were concentrated here. infantry, 4,000 people. cavalry and 36 guns. In the redoubt itself, 12 guns were installed - one artillery company. All other troops stood behind and on the flanks of the redoubt, since there was no more room in it. To the right of the redoubt, 18 guns took up a position. Behind the redoubt stood infantry in two lines in battalion columns. To the left of the infantry, with a ledge back, stood the cuirassiers (heavy cavalry) in regimental columns.
In addition, two regiments of dragoons (light cavalry) stood on the flanks of the entire battle formation - to the right of the artillery and to the left of the cuirassiers. From the front, the battle formation was guarded by rangers scattered in a chain in front of the redoubt.
The position of the detachment at the Shevardinsky redoubt was very dangerous. However, Kutuzov ordered General Bagration, who commanded the 2nd Army, which occupied the left flank of the Borodino position, to defend the redoubt. When making this decision, Kutuzov was guided by two considerations. Firstly, it was necessary to find out Napoleon’s plan through battle and establish the main direction of his attacks. Secondly, it was impossible to withdraw troops from the redoubt during the day, in full view of Napoleon’s superior forces, without heavy losses. With successful pursuit, the enemy could have broken into the main position on the shoulders of those retreating, thereby disrupting the preparations for a decisive battle by Kutuzov.
Napoleon strove to quickly take the Shevardinsky redoubt from a raid in order to deploy his forces in front of the main Russian position and quickly attack it before the Russians had time to strongly strengthen themselves.
Therefore, Napoleon immediately sent huge forces to attack the Shevardinsky redoubt: 30,000 people. infantry, 10,000 people. cavalry and 186 guns. Napoleon assigned troops to attack the redoubt from the right and central columns. This allowed the French to attack the redoubt from three sides: from the north and west by the troops of the central column, and from the south by the troops of the right column.
On September 5, at about 4 p.m., after a series of minor skirmishes, the French deployed all forces assigned to attack the redoubt. Two infantry divisions moved in from the north; from the west - two infantry divisions and two cavalry corps; from the south - two infantry divisions and one cavalry division.
The French came almost close to the redoubt. After brutal canister artillery fire and point-blank rifle fire, a brutal hand-to-hand fight began. The redoubt changed hands several times. But under the pressure of superior enemy forces, the Russians retreated, and the redoubt remained in the hands of the French. The Russians, moving back a little, reorganized and prepared to repel further enemy attacks. It was clear that the French would now try to completely encircle the Russian detachment and destroy it.
General Bagration knew about the difficult situation of the Shevardinsky detachment, but did not give the order for its withdrawal to the main position, since this was still premature and dangerous. Bagration moved about 6,000 people from the main position from the village of Semenovskaya to help the Shevardinsky detachment. infantry of the 2nd Grenadier Division. This made the situation easier, but the French still retained an overwhelming numerical superiority.
Around 17:00 a fierce battle began again. The French launched an attack on the Russian detachment from three sides in order to encircle and crush it. They failed. The Russians not only did not yield a single step, but they themselves launched a counterattack and sought to reoccupy the redoubt. Infantry and cavalry were mixed up, hand-to-hand combat was in full swing everywhere. Entire units on both sides fell under the blows of bayonets and broadswords, but the French and Russians continued to fight steadfastly.
But then help came to the Russians. To the north of the redoubt a thunderous “hurray!” rang out. It was Bagration who personally led the regiments of the 2nd Grenadier Division into the attack. The French wavered and rolled back behind the redoubt. The redoubt was reoccupied by the Russians.
But not for long. The French put the disordered regiments in order, and the battle began to boil again. The redoubt again began to change hands. Attacks from both sides followed one after another.
Only with the onset of darkness did the battle begin to subside. The Shevardinsky redoubt remained in Russian hands. They defended it against the French forces three times superior. Late in the evening of September 5, Bagration received an order from Kutuzov to leave the redoubt and withdraw troops to the main position. The redoubt played its role. Napoleon's plan was clarified, Russian troops were concentrated at the main position.
In the battle for the Shevardinsky redoubt, the Russians lost about 6,000 people, the French - 5,000. The French were discouraged by the iron resistance of the Russians at the Shevardinsky redoubt.
Napoleon had something to think about before the decisive battle. When he asked how many Russian prisoners were taken at the Shevardinsky redoubt, he was told that there were no prisoners at all. To the menacing question “why?” - the emperor was told that “the Russians are dying, but they are not surrendering.”
The tenacity of the battle for the Shevardinsky redoubt is evidenced, by the way, by the following fact. On September 6, the day after the battle for the redoubt, Napoleon met the 61st French infantry regiment and noticed that there was no third battalion. To the question “where is the third battalion?” The regiment commander answered the emperor: “Everyone remained at the redoubt!”
Around midnight on September 6, when the Russians were retreating from the Shevardinsky redoubt, the French Marshal Murat, the commander of the entire French cavalry, who had unsuccessfully attacked the redoubt during the day, decided to disrupt the systematic retreat of the Russians. He moved a detachment of 4,000 people. cavalry to attack the retreating Russians and cause confusion in their ranks. Most of the Russian infantry had already retreated by this time. The cuirassier division was retreating, and behind it, at a considerable distance from it, the last battalion of the Odessa infantry regiment, consisting of about 250 people, was retreating. This battalion could easily have been destroyed by Murat's cavalry before the cuirassiers could arrive.
However, the battalion escaped by using military stratagem. Having learned from intelligence about the movement of the French cavalry, the battalion stopped. The drummers began to beat the march, and the soldiers began to shout “Hurray!” At the same time, the cuirassiers, notified of the danger, turned back and galloped to the aid of the battalion.
The beating of drums, shouts and the trampling of horses brought confusion to the ranks of the French. They were late with the attack, the Russian cuirassiers arrived in time to help their infantry, and Murat’s plan failed.
Thus, the Russians defending the Shevardinsky redoubt, having completed their task, retreated in an organized manner to the main forces of their army.
BATTLE ORDERS OF THE RUSSIANS AND FRENCH AT THE BATTLE OF BORODINO AND COMBAT METHODS
During September 6, there were no major military clashes on the Borodino field. Reconnaissance was carried out, commanders studied the battlefield, final orders were drawn up, and the troops took their places in the army's battle order. As a result of reconnaissance and personal observations, Napoleon came to the conclusion that the area north of the village of Borodino (obstacle - the Kolocha River) and south of the village of Utitsa (forest) was difficult to pass, and therefore decided to deliver the main blow in the Semyonovsky flushes section, Raevsky’s battery (see diagram) .
Kutuzov, for his part, having assessed the progress of the battle for the Shevardinsky redoubt and the deployment of the French army, built his army into a deep battle formation for stubborn defense. There were three lines in this battle order:
The first line consisted of infantry corps.
In the second line are cavalry corps.
The third line contains reserves (infantry, cavalry and artillery).
The entire combat position of the army was covered from the front by a combat guard of rangers. The flanks were guarded by Cossack cavalry.
The artillery was partly installed in fortifications dug for it, and partly it was attached to its own divisions (each division had an artillery company, some had two companies). In addition, Kutuzov ordered part of the artillery to be left in reserve near the village of Psarevo.
If we look at the diagram, we will notice that the Russian battle formation is denser on the right flank and in the center and less dense on the left flank. Many military writers blamed Kutuzov for this arrangement of the army; they said that Napoleon was going to deliver the main blow on the left flank, and it was necessary to build the battle formation on the left flank more densely than on the right. The first to attack Kutuzov was his former chief of staff, General Benningsen, an enemy and envious of Kutuzov.
These attacks on Kutuzov are completely unfair. It is known that it is more profitable to counterattack an enemy who has broken through not in the front, but in the flank. Kutuzov's battle formation provided precisely such a maneuver. In addition, Kutuzov hoped, having exhausted the enemy, to go on the offensive, bringing his reserves into battle. He kept these troops away from the direction of the enemy’s main attacks, so as not to draw them into battle prematurely.
Napoleon deployed the main forces of his troops south of the Kolocha River and sent up to 86,000 soldiers and over 450 guns to attack Bagration's flushes and Raevsky's battery. Napoleon aimed auxiliary attacks at the village of Utitsa and the village of Borodino.
Thus, the Russians had more forces in the direction of the New Smolensk road, and the French - to the south of it. At the same time, Napoleon was very worried about this arrangement of the Russians. He feared their advance along the New Smolensk road, on which his convoys were located. Napoleon was generally afraid of any unexpected, cunning maneuver by Kutuzov.
It was already said above that the front of the Borodino position had a length of about 8 kilometers. 250,000 soldiers (130,000 French and 120,000 Russians) had to fight on such a narrow front on both sides. This is a very high density. In our time, in such a position, the defender would deploy one division - up to 10,000 soldiers, and the attacker - a corps, up to 30,000 soldiers. In total, this means that there would be about 40,000 manpower, i.e., six times less than in 1812. But that’s not all. In our time, both sides would echelon their forces 10-12 kilometers deep. Then the total (for both sides) depth of the battlefield would be about 25 kilometers, and its area would be 200 square kilometers (8X25). And in 1812, the French and Russians were separated by only 3-3.5 kilometers in depth. The total depth of the battlefield was 7 kilometers, and the area was 56 square kilometers.
The artillery density was also high. In the direction of the main French attack, it reached 200 guns per kilometer of front.
How were such a large number of troops deployed in the Battle of Borodino, in what formations and formations did they operate?
Before the start of the battle on the Borodino field, massive walls of people and horses stood at a distance of about one kilometer from each other. The infantry and horse units were arranged in regular quadrangular columns. The infantrymen stood with their guns at their feet. The cavalrymen stood dismounted, holding their horses by the bridle, ready to jump into their saddles on command and gallop towards the enemy.
The defending infantry lined up in a two-ranked close formation (as they do in modern times) and met the attacker with rifle fire. The infantry attacked in battalion columns, with up to 50 people along the front and 16 people in depth. The regiments formed their battalions in one or two lines. They attacked with an entire division at once. At the same time, the front of the attack was extremely narrow - for a battalion 30-40 meters, for a regiment 100-120. Such infantry columns with guns “on hand” went on the attack with a quick gymnastic step, maintaining alignment and closing ranks when the dead and wounded fell, to the sound of drums beating the “attack”, with banners flying. When approaching several tens of meters, they rushed with bayonets.
Since a decisive attack in columns often broke through the deployed formation of the defending infantry, the defender’s reserves usually also stood in columns and immediately launched a counterattack.
To repel cavalry attacks, the infantry was built in a square, i.e. into a square column, each side of which was a front. No matter from which side the cavalry attacked the infantry square, it met rifle fire and bayonet bristles everywhere. An entire infantry regiment was usually formed in a square, and if it did not have time, then battalion squares were formed. Disordered infantry was usually easily destroyed by cavalry. Therefore, the ability to quickly build a square was very important for the infantry. In the Battle of Borodino, the Russian infantry used a very interesting technique to combat the cavalry attack. When the French cavalry rushed at our infantry and the latter did not have time to form a square, the infantrymen lay down on the ground. The cavalry rushed past. And while it was being built for a new attack, our infantry managed to form into a square.
The cavalry fought, as a general rule, only in mounted formation with edged weapons - they attacked or counterattacked in a deployed two-rank formation.
Before the Battle of Borodino, Kutuzov specifically instructed the infantry not to be particularly distracted by shooting, but to quickly move on to a bayonet strike. He assigned the cavalry the task of supporting the infantry everywhere and immediately. These instructions of the commander-in-chief in the Battle of Borodino were well carried out not only by the infantry and cavalry, but also by the artillery.
The Russian artillery, installed in the fortifications on the Borodino field, remained in place during the battle, and the damaged guns were replaced by others from the reserve. The guns operating with the divisions maneuvered on the battlefield along with the infantry and cavalry. At the same time, the guns were moved both by horse-drawn teams and rolled by people on their hands under enemy fire. Thus, the artillery did not leave its infantry and cavalry without fire support in the Battle of Borodino.
The high density of saturation of the Borodino field with manpower created great crowding in the battle. Forced to attack on a narrow front, the French were deprived of the possibility of wide maneuver; they had to attack several times in the same place.
Short action, mixing of units in constant hand-to-hand combat, and gunpowder smoke covering the battlefield made it very difficult to control the battle. The only means of communication that senior commanders could then use were mounted messengers. Officers - orderlies and adjutants - were sent to verbally transmit important orders. The commanders-in-chief could influence the course of the battle by sending reserves to where it was especially necessary. The reasonable initiative of private bosses was of great importance for success. This is important even now, with rich and diverse means of communication. This was especially important in 1812. Kutuzov, in his combat order before the Battle of Borodino, specifically drew the attention of unit commanders to this.
Kutuzov chose a command post at a height near the villages of Gorki, and Napoleon chose the Shevardinsky redoubt. Both of these points are located about 1.5 kilometers from the battle line. Both are located at heights from which the battlefield is clearly visible when gunpowder smoke does not interfere. Both commanders sat at their command posts on camp stools, listened to the noise of the battle, observed, listened to reports and reports, and gave orders. A battle is not only a competition of troops, but also a competition of the minds and will of commanders.
BATTLE OF BORODINO
The Battle of Borodino lasted from 5 hours 30 minutes to 18 hours on September 7, 1812. During the day, fighting took place in different parts of the Russian Borodino position, on the front from the village of Maloe in the north to the village of Utitsa in the south. The longest and most intense battles took place for Bagration's flushes and for Raevsky's battery (see diagram). It was said above that Napoleon’s plan was to break through the Russian position in the Bagrationov flushes sector, Raevsky’s battery, and then introduce reserves into the breakthrough and push them to the north to press the Russian army to the Moscow River and destroy it. Napoleon had to attack Bagration's flushes eight times before finally, at the cost of horrific losses, he managed to take them around noon. However, the approaching Russian reserves stopped the enemy, forming east of the village of Semenovskaya.
The French attacked Raevsky’s battery three times, also suffered very heavy losses here and were able to take it only after 15 hours.
In the attacks of Bagration's flushes and Raevsky's battery, the French suffered such heavy losses that they had nothing to build on the success they had achieved. The troops were frayed and battle-weary. True, Napoleon’s old and young guard remained intact, but he did not risk throwing this last reserve of his into the fire, being deep in the enemy’s country.
Napoleon and his troops lost faith in the possibility of defeating the Russians. The Russians, after the loss of Bagration's flushes and Raevsky's battery, retreated back 1-1.5 kilometers, reorganized and were again ready to repel the enemy. However, the French no longer decided on a general attack on the new Russian location. After taking Raevsky's battery, they carried out only a few private attacks, and continued artillery fire until dusk.
The Battle of Borodino breaks up into a series of battles.
Battle for the village of Borodino
The diagram shows that the northern section of the Russian position was located along the eastern bank of the Kolocha River. On the western bank of the Kolocha River, the Russians occupied only the village of Borodino.
On the morning of September 7, the village of Borodino was occupied by one battalion of Russian guards rangers with four guns. To the west of the village there was a military guard consisting of rangers from army regiments. The bridge over the Kolocha River east of Borodino was guarded by a special team of 30 sailors from the guards crew, who were supposed to destroy the bridge after the Russians retreated to the eastern bank.
The occupation of the village of Borodino was important for the French. They expected to install artillery here and support attacks on Raevsky’s battery with flanking fire.
Against Borodin and to observe the area north of it to the Moscow River, Napoleon allocated one corps, commanded by his stepson Eugene Beauharnais. Borodino's attack by units of this corps began the Battle of Borodino. Beauharnais moved parts of two divisions to attack Borodino at once - one from the north, the other from the west. The French began moving at 5 o'clock and quietly, under the cover of the morning fog, approached Borodino. At 5 o'clock 30 minutes they were noticed by Russian artillerymen, who opened fire. The French cannons, deployed west of Borodino to support the attack of their infantry, also began firing. Following this, Russian rangers opened rifle fire, and artillery thundered on Bagration's flashes. The field began to become clouded with thick gunpowder smoke.
The French rushed to attack Borodino from two sides. The guards rangers met them with bayonets. However, the forces were disproportionate. Many Russian rangers were stabbed to death on the spot, the rest began to retreat to the bridge over the Kolocha River, forming a square and stubbornly fighting off the advancing avalanche of French with bayonets. A handful of brave men managed to retreat across the river, but a significant part of the French also broke through the bridge.
The French who had broken through were already approaching the village of Gorki, where Kutuzov was driving up to his command post. At the battery near the village of Gorki at that time there was the commander of the 1st Army, General Barclay de Tolly, who commanded the troops of the Russian right flank in the Battle of Borodino.
Barclay de Tolly sent three regiments of chasseurs against the French. The rangers quickly struck, enveloped the enemy from the south and drove him back. Most of the French who broke through were cut down, the rest retreated to Borodino. The Russians did not pursue the French beyond the Kolocha River. A team of sailors dismantled the wooden bridge.
Borodino remained in the hands of the French, who immediately installed a strong artillery battery southeast of the village. Fire from this battery was fired not only at Raevsky’s battery, but also at the Russian battery near the village of Gorki. Individual cannonballs flew into Kutuzov’s command post more than once.
After the capture of Borodino, the French no longer advanced against the northern section of the Russian position. All further French attacks took place south of Borodino, against the Bagration flushes, the Raevsky battery and the village of Utitsa.
Battles for Bagration's flushes
Before the start of the battle, Bagration allocated about 8,000 soldiers with 50 guns to defend the flushes. To strike the flushes and develop the success of which he had no doubt, Napoleon allocated 43,000 people and over 200 guns - seven infantry and eight cavalry divisions under the command of Marshals Davout, Murat, Ney and General Junot.
However, Napoleon did not at all imagine that all these huge forces would have to be brought into battle for the very flushes. He believed that the main core of these forces would go into battle when the flushes had already been taken, when the Russian position was broken through and the French would drive the Russians north, to the Moscow River, where the Russians would lay down their arms. For the first attack of the flushes, from this entire mass of troops, Napoleon appointed only two infantry divisions under the overall command of Marshal Davout. Napoleon knew that the Russian forces defending the flushes were very small. The 8,000 soldiers who defended the flushes belonged to two heroic divisions - the 27th Infantry Division of General Neverovsky and the Combined Grenadier Division of General Vorontsov. Both of these divisions fought for the Shevardinsky redoubt on September 5 and suffered heavy losses there.
But Napoleon cruelly miscalculated. In fact, 43,000 soldiers and 200 guns were not enough to capture the Bagration flushes. He had to take troops from the reserve. Up to 50,000 Napoleon's foot and horse soldiers and 400 guns took part in the battles for the flushes and the village of Semenovskaya located behind them.
The Russians, too, during the stubborn six-hour battle, gradually brought reinforcements to the flushes. In total, up to 30,000 foot and mounted Russian soldiers with 300 guns took part in the battles in this direction.
The French launched only eight attacks on Bagration's flushes. Only as a result of the eighth attack, when the wounded General Bagration was out of action, did the French manage to occupy the flushes.
Let's look at fights for flushes in more detail.
The first and second attacks of Bagration's flushes. The battles for Bagration's flashes began almost simultaneously with the French attack on the village of Borodino - at about 6 o'clock.
About 500 meters southwest of the flashes there was a forest (Utitsa forest), which stretched far to the south, beyond the village of Utitsa. The edge of the forest skirted the flushes from the southwest and south. The Russians defending the flushes positioned themselves partly on the flushes, and partly to the north and south of them. The gap between the left flank of the troops on the flushes and the Russian troops near the village of Utitsa was occupied by rangers scattered in the forest.
At about 6 o'clock, Marshal Davout led two infantry DIVISIONS with 30 guns to the edge of the Utitsky forest and began to form them into columns for attack. Russian artillery opened fire on the French with cannonballs from a distance of 500 meters. The French, despite the losses, completed the formation, and their columns moved to the flushes to the sound of drums. At the same time, to the west of the flushes, the French installed three strong batteries - a total of 102 guns - and opened fire on the flushes from a distance of about 1,000 meters.
When the French columns approached the flushes at 200 meters, the Russian artillery switched to frequent fire with grapeshot. A shower of lead mowed down the dense columns of the French, many officers were killed and wounded. The French hesitated. At this time, Russian rangers moving forward from the forest opened rifle fire on their right flank. Hit by buckshot and rifle fire, the French could not stand it and fled back into the forest. Having reformed, they again moved to attack, but again unsuccessfully. The Russians again drove them back with friendly fire. The French retreated, leaving many dead and wounded.
The battered French divisions, shocked by losses, reorganized, rested, and the artillery that had moved forward hit the flushes. The Russian artillery successfully responded to the French, and the Russian infantry was full of courage after successfully repelling the first enemy attack.
But Davout was in a hurry to take flushes and soon launched a second attack. The French rushed forward furiously again. The commander of the right flank division that attacked the southern flush, General Compan, was mortally wounded by grapeshot, and his division fell into confusion. Marshal Davout, who was watching the battle, quickly galloped up to the division, stopped it and, at the head of the 57th French regiment, burst into the southern flush.
But General Bagration also vigilantly followed the battle. Seeing that the French had occupied the southern flush, Bagration immediately launched several infantry battalions into a counterattack. The Russian drums beat the “attack” menacingly, and from the gunpowder smoke that enveloped the flashes, battalion columns of Russian infantry rushed towards the French with bayonets at the ready. Bagration knew that the French could not withstand this counterattack. Therefore, following the infantry, he immediately sent cavalry to pursue the French as they retreated from the flushes.
The Russian bayonet attack was indeed successful. The French fled from the flushes, pursued by the Russian cavalry. The cavalry galloped to the edge of the forest, cut down many French and captured 12 French guns. However, the Russians failed to take away the guns. The French, in turn, threw their cavalry forward to help the frustrated infantry. After a brutal slaughter, the Russian cavalry retreated behind the flushes.
The first two attacks on the flushes were repulsed. The French suffered heavy losses. Among those killed was one general; four generals were wounded. Marshal Davout himself was shell-shocked, but remained in service.
Third attack of Bagration's flushes. The unsuccessful outcome of the first two attacks showed Napoleon that flushes could not be taken with two divisions. He sent Ney's corps to help Marshal Davout's corps. The forces of the advancing French against the flushes were brought to 30,500 bayonets and sabers with powerful artillery.
Bagration noticed the movement of French units to the west of the flushes and assessed the formidable danger hanging over them. He decided to bring to the flushes everything that was possible from the 2nd Army, which he led. He pulled up not only his reserve consisting of one infantry and one cavalry divisions, he removed another infantry division from the left flank from the village of Utitsa and placed it behind the village of Semenovsaya.
As a result of these movements, Bagration managed to concentrate about 15,000 bayonets and sabers and up to 120 guns for the defense of the flashes.
Kutuzov also assessed the great danger threatening the left flank of the Borodino position and, above all, the Bagration flushes. He gave the order to move large forces to help Bagration, namely:
1. 100 guns from the artillery reserve stationed near the village of Psarevo.
2. Three cuirassier regiments from their cavalry reserve.
3. The entire 2nd Infantry Corps, which stood on the right flank, where the French did not attack. In place of the 2nd Corps, a chain of rangers was moved to monitor the French.
4. Three guards infantry regiments from their reserve - Izmailovsky, Lithuanian and Finnish.
In total, Kutuzov decided to send over 14,000 people with 180 guns to support Bagration. With the arrival of these reserves, Bagration could already deploy 29,000 soldiers and 300 guns to defend the flushes. However, the bulk of Kutuzov’s reinforcements could take their places only after 1.5-2 hours, at about 10 o’clock. In the meantime, 15,000 Russians were holding back 30,000 French. For the third attack, the French deployed four infantry divisions - two that had already attacked the flushes twice, and two fresh ones from Marshal Ney's corps. The French decided to crush the Russians with their numbers and lined up their troops for the attack in unprecedentedly dense battle formations even for that time. One of the fresh divisions formed in four lines. Three regiments marched one after the other in a deployed front of battalion columns (battalions side by side), and the fourth came from behind, having battalions also in columns, but built behind each other. This whole mass of people went on an attack on the flushes around 8 o'clock. From a distance of 200 meters, the Russians met the attack with grapeshot. The French suffered huge losses, but a powerful stream of people rolled forward uncontrollably. The left and right flushes were occupied by the French after a fierce bayonet battle. On the middle flush the fight was still going on. But Bagration did not allow the enemy to gain a foothold in the flushes they occupied. He quickly launched infantry and cavalry into a counterattack. A brutal bayonet fight and cutting with sabers began again. The French were thrown out of flushes. At about 9 o'clock the Russians again occupied the flushes and began to put them in order and replace the damaged guns with new ones.
The fourth attack of Bagratnon's flushes. Marshals Davout, Murat and Ney, accustomed to victories, driven by Napoleon, became furious with failures and losses. By 9:30 a.m. they launched a new, fourth attack on the flushes. They have now deployed five infantry divisions. In addition, Murat moved up part of his cavalry in order to penetrate deep into the Russian rear after defeating them on flushes.
This time the blow of the superior French forces was so friendly and swift that they managed to capture all three flushes. About two regiments of French infantry broke through deeper and even captured the village of Semyonovskaya for a while, but at that time reinforcements were already approaching Bagration. He sent about two divisions into a counterattack under the command of the commander of the 8th Russian Infantry Corps, General Borozdin. Borozdin's swift counterattack quickly crushed the French and put them to flight. The Russians pursued the fleeing people and killed many of them. Murat, who rushed with the cavalry to cover the retreat of his infantry, was almost captured. He was forced to abandon his horse and take refuge in the ranks of the infantry, with whom he retreated from the flashes. By 10 o'clock the Russians had completely cleared the flushes from the French. The tenacity and ferocity of the battle grew. Subsequently, the French said that the tenacity and resilience of the Russians began to acquire a “sinister” (of course, for the French) character. French General Pele, a participant in the Battle of Borodino, describes the Russian counterattacks at Bagration’s flushes as follows: “As reinforcements approached Bagration’s troops, they walked forward with the greatest courage over the corpses of the fallen to take possession of the lost points. Before our eyes, Russian columns moved at the command of their commanders, like moving entrenchments (fortifications), sparkling with steel and flame. In open areas, hit by our grapeshot, attacked either by cavalry or infantry, they suffered enormous losses. But these brave warriors, having gathered their last strength, attacked us as before.”9
Fifth attack of Bagration's flushes. Despite the heavy losses, the available French forces in front of Bagratnon's flushes were still very large. Murat gradually strengthened the battered five infantry divisions from the three cavalry corps under his command. True, according to Napoleon’s plan, these corps were supposed to build on their success and not attack flushes. Murat spent them prematurely - but what could be done? After all, Napoleon himself, through the adjutants he sent, hurried the marshals to quickly take the flashes.
All three marshals - Davout, Murat and Ney - were constantly under fire, stopping the fleeing French, rebuilding broken units and throwing them into battle again. Immediately after repelling the fourth attack, the marshals reorganized the mixed troops, Murat threw up several fresh cavalry regiments, and the French again launched a fifth attack on the flushes. The Russians, frustrated by the counterattack and pursuit, were overwhelmed, and all three flushes were occupied by the French. But it was already eleven o'clock. The reinforcements sent by Kutuzov were already taking their places. The French, who burst into the flushes, were immediately counterattacked not only from the front, but also on both flanks. This counterattack was attended by troops of the 2nd Russian Infantry Corps, sent by Kutuzov from the right flank. The French were thrown off the flushes and retreated with heavy losses. Thousands of corpses lay in heaps in front of the flushes, on the flushes themselves, around them - but the French had not yet achieved anything. Thus the fifth enemy attack was repulsed.
Sixth attack of Bagration's flushes. Napoleon, watching the progress of the battle from the Shevardinsky redoubt and receiving reports from the marshals, was shocked by the inhuman tenacity of the Russians and the huge losses of his troops. He had already received reports of the death of many of his favorite generals. Gloomy, menacing, upset, he sat with a telescope in his hands. Behind him a silent retinue crowded, and even further away stood the columns of the old and young guards - the emperor's reserve. . Observing the reflection of the fifth attack on the flushes and the approach of Russian reserves to the left flank of the Russian position, Napoleon came to the conclusion that it would not be possible to take the flushes head-on with attacks only from the west. He decided to throw two more infantry divisions of Junot's corps onto the flushes, sending them to bypass the flushes from the south. Junot's corps was originally intended for action against the village of Utitsa. Now Napoleon ordered him to turn and take part in the sixth attack of the flushes, bypassing them from the south. The sixth attack began. Five infantry divisions of Davout and Ney moved from the west, two infantry divisions under the command of Junot - from the south.
But reinforcements approached the Russians in the flush area, which allowed Bagration to maneuver against the flanks of the advancing French. Holding back the attack of the columns of Davout and Ney from the front, Bagration simultaneously counterattacked them from the north and threw them back from the flushes. Junot's divisions, turning to the north, tried to attack the flushes in the flank and rear. But unexpectedly they themselves were attacked from the east on their right flank by a fresh Russian infantry division and three cuirassier regiments. After a stubborn battle, Junot's divisions were driven back, and the danger of bypassing the flushes from the south was over.
Seventh attack of Bagration's flushes. All seven infantry divisions, appointed by Napoleon not only to master the flushes, but also to develop success, took part in the sixth attack of the flushes. The marshals understood that it was useless to ask Napoleon for new reinforcements, since their forces were already significantly superior to the Russians. Therefore, with frantic energy, they organized the seventh attack of the flushes with the same seven divisions. The troops of Davout and Ney again attacked the Russians head-on, walking over the piles of their dead comrades, and Junot deployed from the south and led his columns in such a way as to go deeper around not only the flushes, but also the Russian troops stationed southeast of the flushes. But this attack was repulsed. The remnants of the defenders of the flushes again drove back the columns of Davout and Ney with grapeshot fire and bayonets. Junot's columns, before reaching the flushes, were quickly attacked by Russian infantry regiments transferred by Kutuzov from the village of Maslovo. Junot's divisions suffered heavy losses under Russian bayonets and rolled back.
It was already about half past eleven. The battle, unprecedented in its intensity, raged for six hours. The day was sunny and hot. But the battlefield was dark with smoke and dust. The roar of artillery echoed for tens of kilometers. The Russians have already repulsed five frontal attacks on flushes and two strong attacks covering the flank. Despite the great numerical superiority of their forces, the French were not successful. The marshals were discouraged, Napoleon was greatly depressed and worried, and his troops were losing courage and self-confidence. And the Russians continued to hold their positions.
Eighth attack of Bagration's flushes. Then Napoleon decided to break the Russian resistance with artillery fire of unprecedented force. He concentrated 400 guns against the flashes - on a front of about 1.5-2 kilometers. While these guns were destroying the Russian position, the eighth attack of the flushes was being prepared. This time up to 45,000 infantry and cavalry soldiers were concentrated against them. Bagration could oppose the eighth attack of the flushes with about 15,000-18,000 soldiers with 300 guns. Kutuzov knew that the critical moment of the battle was approaching. He decided to transfer some more troops from his right flank to the left flank. But this transfer took time - again 1.5 - 2 hours. And the French attack was about to begin. Kutuzov was worried not only about the attack itself, but also about the impact of Napoleon’s reserves on the depth of the Russian position if the attack was successful. The Russian commander decided to tie up the French reserves at all costs, divert Napoleon's attention and gain time for regrouping. To this end, he ordered the Russian cavalry, standing on the right flank, to cross the Kolocha River, go around the left flank of the French and hit them in the rear. Kutuzov gave this order at about 11:30 am. Below we will see what a big role this raid of the Russian cavalry on the rear of the French played. Around noon the French launched their eighth flush attack. Supported by the fire of their artillery, units of Davout, Ney and Junot in dense columns rushed towards the flushes. Russian grapeshot mercilessly mowed them down, but triple superiority in forces allowed the French to quickly capture the flushes. Then Bagration launched a counterattack with all his available forces. A brutal hand-to-hand fight began. The Russians fought fiercely and were not inferior to the French. But at this time the Russians suffered a great misfortune. General Bagration was seriously wounded. This legendary comrade-in-arms of Suvorov and Kutuzov had an exceptional influence on the soldiers, who believed in his outstanding combat skills and admired his courage and heroism. Bagration's wound made a depressing impression on the soldiers. They still fought stubbornly, but fatigue from the long battle was already beginning to take its toll. And the superior French forces continued to advance furiously. The Russians began to feel confused in some places. However, thanks to Suvorov’s school of education, there were many enterprising, capable generals in the Russian army. One of them, the commander of the 3rd Infantry Division, Lieutenant General Konovnitsyn, took command of the troops instead of Bagration. He restored order and withdrew the troops from the flushes to the eastern bank of the Semenovsky ravine (600 meters away).
Here he quickly installed artillery, built up infantry and cavalry, and delayed further French advances. Despite their great numerical superiority, the French were so exhausted by the battle that they did not immediately launch an attack on the Russians beyond the Semenovsky ravine. They urgently asked Napoleon for reinforcements, but received nothing. This short pause allowed the Russians to more firmly organize resistance at the Semyonov position.
Fights for Semenovskaya position
Behind the Semenovsky ravine, the Russians gathered up to 10,000 soldiers with strong artillery. With these forces it was necessary to delay the further advance of the French and close the breakthrough that formed after the occupation of the Bagration flushes. The position of the Russians here was difficult. At the Semenovskaya position, the remnants of the troops were gathered, stubbornly fighting for flushes for several hours. Only on the left flank were three fresh guards infantry regiments that arrived from the reserve - Lithuanian, Izmailovsky and Finland. These regiments stood in a square, with regimental banners in the center. Having received no reinforcements from Napoleon, the marshals organized an attack with available forces. They recruited up to 25,000 bayonets and sabers and powerful artillery. Having installed strong batteries on flashes, the French began shelling the Russians beyond the Semenovsky ravine. Russian artillery responded energetically. To attack, the French built their superior forces in such a way as to envelop the Russians on both flanks and hit them with cross-fire from artillery. Infantry columns of the corps of Ney and Davout were formed in the center, and strong cavalry units were formed on the flanks. On the right flank, south of the cavalry, was Junot's infantry, which was supposed to bypass the Russians from the south and prevent counterattacks from the village of Utitsa.
The infantry columns of Marshal Ney were the first to attack. But they did not reach the Russian positions and were repulsed by grapeshot. Now, following this attack, the French again moved with all their might - infantry in the center, cavalry on the flanks. On the right flank, the heavy French cavalry of General Nansouty's corps moved against the Russian infantry guard regiments.
Huge horsemen, covered with shiny cuirasses (bibs), wearing high metal shakos, on huge horses rushed towards the Russian guard. In Europe, the French heavy cavalry were called "iron men". The crushing blows of their broadswords more than once brilliantly completed the defeat of Napoleon's opponents. But the Russians were by no means inclined to overestimate the fighting qualities of the French heavy cavalry. The Russians called them not iron men, but “iron pots,” mocking their tall metal shakos. It was difficult to surprise the Russians with their large stature, and especially the guard, which itself was staffed by giants. The grapeshot of Russian artillery brutally hit the French rushing into the attack. But they rushed to crash into the ranks of Russian infantry. They were accustomed to the fact that infantry squares would first shoot when they approached, then become upset and become victims of their broadswords. The Russian guards behaved differently. During the first attack, they did not shoot at all, but stood motionless with their bayonets pointed forward. Their squares froze like steel, not a single bayonet wavered. This made such an impression on the French that they turned their horses before reaching the Russian squares.
However, after this, forced by their superiors, the French again furiously rushed at the Russians. This time the Russian squares met them with point-blank fire. Hand-to-hand combat began. The French boldly cut into the Russian ranks, but died from bayonets. Several times the French rolled back into the field, fell under Russian grapeshot, again rushed to the square and rolled back again. The Russian guards suffered severe losses here. The Lithuanian regiment lost 956 people out of a total of 1740, i.e. more than a half. But the French heavy cavalry suffered even greater losses. Nansouty's corps was virtually defeated here and its remnants were driven away by a counterattack of Russian cuirassiers. The Russian guard regiments held their positions. In 1912, on the centennial anniversary of the Battle of Borodino, Russian guardsmen erected a monument in honor of their heroic ancestors. A massive granite monument stands in the place where the squares of Russian guardsmen stood on the afternoon of September 7, 1812. The indestructible monument, firmly rooted in the ground, recalls the steadfastness that the guardsmen showed. They fought to the death and found life and glory in the hearts of their descendants.
North of the village of Semenovskaya, Russian positions were attacked by another French cavalry corps. He had several fierce battles with Russian infantry and cavalry. Despite the courage shown, the Russians were pushed back here and began to retreat. In the center, the French infantry captured the village of Semenovskaya and also forced the Russians to retreat.
The Russians retreated in battle to a cannon shot east of the village of Semenovskaya (about 1 kilometer) and began to prepare for battle at a new line. The breakthrough of the Russian position was partially accomplished by the French. All that remained was to take Raevsky’s battery to expand the breakthrough and build on the success with reserves. But Napoleon did not have enough reserves. We have already seen that in the struggle for Bagration’s flushes, the French also expended those forces that were intended to develop success. In the battles for the Semenovskaya position, these forces finally dried up. Physical fatigue and moral shock from the losses and steely tenacity of the Russians finally broke the French. The marshals failed to move the remnants of their troops to pursue the retreating Russians. These troops did not go further than the Semenovskaya position. But success had to be developed immediately, before the Russians had time to organize resistance in a new place, otherwise everything would have to start all over again. And so the marshals began to urgently demand that Napoleon bring into action the remaining untouched reserve - the imperial guard. In total, Napoleon had up to 27,000 selected troops - the old and young guard. Napoleon valued them very much. He loved those critical moments of the battle when, according to his abrupt order, “Guard to the fire!” Shiny shelves passed him with shouts of welcome. Responding to greetings, Napoleon usually said to the guards: “Go and bring me victory!” And the guards threw themselves into the fire with crushing force. No one and nothing could resist her. But here, on the fields of Russia, the situation was different. Napoleon saw his best army regiments melt away in battle. What will happen if the same fate befalls the guard? And Napoleon answered the marshals: “I will not allow my guard to be defeated 3,000 kilometers from France.” But the marshals insisted. The whole retinue insisted, murmurs were heard, time passed, it was necessary to decide on something. And Napoleon made up his mind. He ordered the young guard to move into battle, which began moving from the Shevardinsky redoubt, but Napoleon immediately canceled his order. This forced him to make a deft maneuver by Kutuzov.
Russian cavalry raid on the French left flank and its results
At 11:30 a.m., Kutuzov gave the order for a cavalry raid on the left flank and rear of the French. The 1st Cavalry Corps of General Uvarov and the Cossacks of Ataman Platov took part in the raid - only a few thousand sabers. Around noon, this cavalry forded the Kolocha River and moved towards the French. At the same time, Uvarov’s cavalry corps went to the village of Bezzubovo, and Platov’s Cossacks bypassed Bezzubovo from the north and struck deeper into the rear of the French. Bezzubov had a French infantry regiment and an Italian cavalry division. The Italians did not accept the battle and rode away, and the French lined up in a square and blocked the Russian cavalry's road to Bezzubovo, occupying the mill dam. Uvarov's cavalry unsuccessfully attacked the French infantry several times. Finally, at the cost of significant losses, she managed to push the French back to the western outskirts of the village of Bezzubovo, but she was unable to advance further. But Platov’s Cossacks, having broken through significantly southwest of Bezzubov, began to destroy the French convoys and caused panic in Napoleon’s rear. Carts and individual transporters on horseback with their tracks cut off rushed to the south, pursued by the Cossacks. And at this time, a battle between Uvarov’s cavalry and the French infantry raged near Bezzubov. Napoleon had just given the order for the young guard to move to the Semenovskaya position of the Russians to develop the success achieved, when a wave of panic reached his command post at the Shevardinsky redoubt. Separate groups of maddened transporters with loud cries of “Cossacks! Cossacks! They galloped almost to the emperor’s command post. At the same time, reports arrived that the Russians were attacking Bezzubovo.
This made a huge impression on Napoleon. He ordered the young guard to be detained, the attack on Raevsky’s battery to be suspended, several units to be moved to his left flank, and, finally, he himself went there to personally assess the situation. Napoleon lost almost two hours of precious time until he became convinced that the forces of the Russian cavalry attacking his left flank were very small. Kutuzov ordered Uvarov and Platov not to get involved in battle with large French forces, but to retreat back beyond the Kolocha River, since Kutuzov had already achieved his goal - he had won the two hours of time he needed. The Russian troops rebuilt, regrouped and were ready to continue the stubborn battle. I wonder why the attack of small forces of Russian cavalry made such a big impression on Napoleon, which forced him to suspend the offensive on the main direction and lose a lot of time? After all, the French left flank was occupied by forces significantly superior to the Russian cavalry of Uvarov and Platov. In addition to the already mentioned Italian cavalry division and the French infantry regiment that were with Bezzubov, an entire French infantry division was stationed in Borodino. But all this seemed not enough to Napoleon. He sent new units to the left flank and went there himself. Why is this? But because Napoleon was all the time tensely waiting for some trick on the part of Kutuzov, he waited and was afraid of this trick. Even on the eve of the battle on September 6, Napoleon observed with apprehension and bewilderment a strong group of Russian troops on the New Smolensk road. Napoleon knew that Kutuzov understood his plan - to deliver the main blow to the Russian left flank. So why does Kutuzov leave such large forces on his right flank? It is clear that Kutuzov is planning some unexpected trick in the direction of the New Smolensk road. And there in the rear there were transports of the French army with ammunition, the loss of which threatened disaster. And so, when Napoleon was carried away by the fight in the main direction, when the French suffered heavy losses here and the order had already been given to move the young guard, the battle suddenly began at Bezzubov, and Russian cavalry appeared in the rear. So here it is, Kutuzov’s trick! He went on the offensive in the northern sector, his cavalry had already broken through to the rear, and the combat transports were in danger! Such thoughts flashed through Napoleon's head. They forced him to direct all his attention to his left flank.
The material damage to the French from the Russian cavalry raid was small. But Napoleon's loss of time was decisive, since he lost the initiative of the battle from his hands. Kutuzov's trick was a brilliant success.
Battles for the Raevsky battery
Raevsky's battery was built on a hill from which the Russian position was clearly visible: to the north - to the New Smolensk road, and to the south - to the Bagration flashes. Therefore, the capture of this battery was of great importance for the French. The advance of the French east of Bagration's flushes exposed the troops that had broken through to a flank attack from the battery if it was held by the Russians. For this feature, Raevsky’s battery was called the “key of the Borodino position,” the capture of which significantly complicated the defense of this entire position. There were 18 guns installed on the battery itself, and there were also guns on the sides of the fortification. A small part of the Russian troops assigned to defend the battery were located inside the fortification, the rest stood behind and on the flanks. In total there were eight Russian infantry battalions in the first line and three Jaeger regiments in reserve. The defense of this sector was led by the commander of the 7th Infantry Corps, Lieutenant General Raevsky, a courageous and skillful general, after whom the battery was named10. To the west of the Raevsky battery, a dense young forest grew a little over two hundred meters away. From the edge of this forest, the French infantry attacked the battery. Russian artillery could only fire up to the edge of the forest, since there was no further observation. After the French occupied the village of Borodino (about 6 hours), they installed strong artillery southeast of it and began flanking Raevsky’s battery. The French attacked Raevsky's battery three times and only after 15 hours did they manage to finally occupy it. The battles for Raevsky’s battery were of the same stubborn and fierce nature as for Bagration’s flushes.
The first attack of Raevsky's battery. Napoleon intended three infantry divisions to capture Raevsky's battery. But just as in the battles for Bagration’s flushes, these initially assigned forces turned out to be few. It was necessary to attract even larger cavalry units. The Russians also had to reinforce the troops defending Raevsky’s batteries during the battles. The first attack on Raevsky's battery was launched by the French at about 9 o'clock. Two enemy infantry divisions took part in it. They concentrated on the edge of the forest to the west of the battery and from here they quickly attacked the battery. The timing of this first attack by Raevsky’s battery coincided with the formidable third attack of Bagration’s flushes. At the same time, a difficult battle was going on for the Russians on their left flank near the village of Utitsa, which was attacked by Poniatowski’s Polish corps, which had a triple superiority over the Russians in infantry! Thus, on the entire section of the front south of the village of Borodino at ten o’clock the position of the Russians was very serious. Only a little over 200 meters separated the French, who were emerging from the forest to the west of the Raevsky battery, from the parapet of the Russian fortification and from the Russian infantry and artillery standing on its sides. Without firing, in slender battalion columns, with quick gymnastic steps, with guns at the ready, the French moved to the attack. Russian cannons, throwing out a shower of grapeshot, hit the enemy. The French, despite heavy losses, continued to march. When the opponents were at a distance of 100-90 steps, abrupt commands of Russian officers were heard and rifle volleys began to shoot at the French columns. Entire ranks began to fall, mowed down by bullets. The French could not stand it and rushed back. A few minutes later they disappeared into the forest, leaving many corpses and wounded on the field in front of the battery. The first attack of Raevsky's battery was repulsed.
Second attack of Raevsky's battery. At about 10 o'clock the French launched a second attack on Raevsky's battery. By this time, the Russian left flank had been strengthened by arriving reserves, and the Russian position against Bagration's flushes had improved. But a critical situation had arisen at Raevsky’s battery. Three French infantry divisions took part in the second attack, but one infantry division (of General Morand) was significantly ahead of the other two divisions. Despite the frequent grapeshot fire from the Russians, the columns of this division rushed forward so quickly that they managed to hide in the thick powder smoke in front of the Russian cannons before they were shot down by grapeshot.
In the smoke, French infantry suddenly climbed over the parapet and occupied the battery. The Russians, after a short bayonet fight, having lost many officers, became confused and began to retreat. The French began to pull up their artillery to the battery in order to firmly gain a foothold in this important point for them. At this time, Kutuzov sent the chief of staff of the 1st Army, General Ermolov, to the left flank to General Bagration to clarify the situation. Ermolov was passing near Raevsky’s battery at the time when the latter was occupied by the French. Ermolov was a dashing military general of the Suvorov school. Seeing the disorderly retreat of the Russians, he drew his saber and galloped towards those retreating. With the help of the infantry battalion of the Ufa regiment, which was in reserve, Ermolov stopped the retreating Russians and, without rebuilding them, led the crowd directly into a bayonet counterattack on the battery. Three chasseur regiments, which were in reserve, also joined this counterattack. The French were swept away from the battery and rushed to the forest. The heated Russians pursued the French on their heels and stabbed them. Russian soldiers burst into the forest west of the battery. A dangerous situation has arisen. There were two French infantry divisions in the forest, which were late to launch an attack at the same time as Moran's division. They could easily destroy the pursuing Russians. Then Ermolov sent Russian dragoons after the infantry with orders to stop the infantry and return them back. This was finally done, and the Russians returned to their position and took their places. The second attack by Raevsky's battery was very costly for the French. Moran's division was virtually destroyed. The enemy lost up to 3,000 people killed and wounded, including five generals. The Russians also suffered heavy losses. Here the young twenty-eight-year-old General Kutaisov, chief of Russian artillery, was killed. Ermolov's counterattack made a strong impression on the French. Only around noon the enemy launched a third attack on Raevsky’s battery.
Third attack of Raevsky's battery. Having occupied Bagration's flushes, the French installed strong artillery on them and opened flanking fire on Raevsky's battery from the south. Now this battery was under crossfire from three directions - from the village of Borodino, from the side of the forest to the west of the battery, and from the Bagration flashes. After a brutal bombardment of the battery, the French launched a third attack at the beginning of the thirteenth hour.
But at this time, the Russian cavalry attacked the French left flank, and Napoleon ordered the third attack of Raevsky’s battery to be stopped. This attack was resumed only after 14 hours, and the resulting struggle broke up into a number of separate battles and lasted until 15 hours 30 minutes. This time, three enemy infantry and three cavalry divisions took part in the attack. Infantry columns attacked from the front, one cavalry division attacked the flank from the north and two cavalry divisions from the south. Bagration's flushes and Semenov's position at this time were already in the hands of the French, and this allowed them to deeply cover Raevsky's battery from the south. But Kutuzov also completed the regrouping by 2 p.m., using the time lost by Napoleon. The 4th Infantry Corps was placed back and south of the battery, and even deeper - two guards infantry regiments and very strong cavalry (two corps). History has not preserved for us a clear and consistent presentation of all the events that took place between 14 and 15 hours on September 7, 1812 around the Raevsky battery. The surviving documents and memories of the participants testify to the brutal tenacity of the battles, the courage and initiative of the troops and the enterprise of the private commanders who controlled individual centers of the battle. At the beginning of the fifteenth hour, after powerful artillery preparation, the French infantry and cavalry went on the attack. South of the battery, the French cavalry attacked a square of Russian infantry units. The Russians allowed the cavalry rushing in the quarry 60 steps, and then drove it back with several volleys at point-blank range. The French cavalry repeated its attacks several times, and finally, it managed to break through between the thinned squares of Russian infantry to the rear of Raevsky’s battery. Some parts of the French cavalry began attacking the battery from the rear. But at this time they were attacked by the Russian cavalry, which was standing behind the infantry. After a series of battles and brutal slaughter, the French were driven back. It is interesting that the commander of the 1st Russian Army, General Barclay de Tolly, personally took part in these cavalry battles as an ordinary soldier. He was very sensitive to the fact that the army suspected him of treason, and sought death in battle in order to prove with blood his loyalty to military duty. However, although several horses were killed under General Barclay during the day of battle, he himself emerged from the battle unharmed.
The French cavalry failed to capture Raevsky's battery. French infantry, covered on the flanks by cavalry, attacked Raevsky's battery from all sides. It suffered heavy losses, but in the end, units of one of the attacking divisions managed to break into the battery from the south. A brutal hand-to-hand fight began in the cramped space inside the fortification. The Russians were led by the seriously ill General Likhachev, commander of the 24th Infantry Division. He had difficulty walking and sat on a camp stool inside the fortification throughout the battle for the battery. Now, when he saw that the French had gained the upper hand, the general got up from his stool and, having already been wounded several times, went to the French bayonets, not wanting to survive the defeat of his division. The French took the bleeding hero prisoner. At the beginning of the sixteenth hour, Raevsky's battery was finally taken by the French. The Russians retreated in battle and, joining the units that had already withdrawn from the Bagration flushes and the Semenov position, organized defense at a new line 1-1.5 kilometers east of Raevsky’s battery. The French, upset by the battle, weakly pursued the retreating Russians. By 15:30 the Russians had completed their retreat and stopped at the line designated by Kutuzov.
Fighting on the Old Smolensk Road
The battles on the Old Smolensk Road took place near the village of Utitsa and for the mound located to the east of it. Both of these points were prepared for defense by the troops of the 3rd Russian Infantry Corps of General Tuchkov after Kutuzov’s chief of staff, General Bennigsen, ordered the corps to move out of the ambush and thereby violated Kutuzov’s plan. Ahead of the 3rd Corps and behind its left flank were the Cossacks of Ataman Karpov - about 2,500 sabers, and in the rear, 1.5 kilometers east of the village of Utitsa, stood the Moscow militia - up to 7,000 people. For communication between the 3rd Corps and the Russian troops on the Bagration flushes, four Jaeger regiments were stretched out in the forest northeast of the village of Utitsa. Napoleon sent the Polish corps of General Poniatowski, consisting of over 10,000 people with 50 guns, along the Old Smolensk Road.
On September 6, Napoleon did not know about the presence of the 3rd Russian corps near the village of Utitsa, which was located “secretly” by order of Kutuzov. Therefore, Poniatowski’s corps was intended by Napoleon to attack the Bagratnonov flash from the south. Kutuzov foresaw this, which is why he placed the 3rd Corps in ambush for an unexpected attack on the enemy’s flank and rear if the latter turned north towards Bagration’s flushes. General Bennigsen, as is known, thwarted this brilliant plan of Kutuzov. On the morning of September 7, Poniatowski’s corps discovered the 3rd Russian Infantry Corps near the Utitsa villages and at 8 o’clock attacked it head-on. By this time, General Tuchkov, on the orders of General Bagration, sent one division to the Bagration flushes, where the Russians had already repulsed the first and second attacks of Marshal Davout’s troops. In the area of the village of Utitsa, Tuchkov had only 10 infantry battalions with 36 guns left and the Cossacks of Ataman Karpov guarding the left flank of the entire Russian army. Poniatowski launched 28 infantry battalions into the attack, supported by 50 guns. After an unequal battle, the Russians left the village of Utitsa and retreated to the Utitsa Kurgan, which was more advantageous for stubborn defense. Having occupied the village of Utitsa, Poniatovsky for a long time did not dare to attack the Russians on the Utitsa mound. He did not know about the departure of an entire division from Tuchkov’s corps to Bagration’s flushes and was afraid of being defeated. Only at about 11 o’clock, when Junot’s French troops appeared north of the village of Utitsa, advancing on Bagratnon’s flushes from the south, Poniatovsky began an attack on the Utitsa mound. The Poles suffered heavy losses under Russian artillery fire, but thanks to their almost triple numerical superiority they managed to capture the mound from both flanks and force the Russians to abandon it at about 11:30 am. General Tuchkov withdrew the troops from the mound in perfect order and stopped them east of the mound out of range of grapeshot fire. At this time, reinforcements sent by Kutuzov approached Bagration. In turn, Bagration sent an infantry brigade to help Tuchkov under the command of Tuchkov’s brother. The brigade arrived just at the moment when the Russian troops who had retreated from the Utitsky Kurgan stopped at a new line. The Tuchkov brothers immediately organized a counterattack. All available troops quickly formed battalion columns, the drums loudly beat the “attack”, the banners unfurled, and the Russians, without firing a shot, rushed with bayonets at a quick pace. The Poles were thrown off the mound and hastily rolled back to the village of Utitsa under heavy fire from Russian guns quickly installed on the mound. During the counterattack, Tuchkov Sr. (corps commander) was mortally wounded.
Poniatowski withdrew his troops to the village of Utitsa, stopped them and did not launch new attacks until 15:00. At about 15 o'clock, when the Russians defending Bagration's flushes were setting up on a new line, and the defenders of Raevsky's battery were fighting back to the same line, Poniatovsky again attacked the Utitsky Kurgan. The first attack (in general it was already the second, since the first one took place at 11:30 a.m.) was decisively repulsed by the Russians, who met it with a short bayonet strike. Poniatowski organized a new attack. At this time, the French troops of Junot's corps advanced east and threatened to completely cut off the Russians on the Old Smolensk Road from the main forces of the Russian army. This could only be avoided by retreating to a line to which the main forces had already retreated. General Baggovut, who took command of the Russian troops on the Old Smolensk Road after Tuchkov was wounded, did just that. He left part of Ataman Karpov’s Cossacks on the mound, and withdrew the rest of the troops and attached them to the left flank of the previously withdrawn Russian units. The Poles, who suffered heavy losses, did not pursue the retreating Russians.
The end of the Battle of Borodino
At about 15:30 the Russians retreated along the entire front. They ceded to the French a strip of terrain 1-1.5 kilometers deep, covered with piles of corpses and fragments of material, and stood firmly on a new frontier. The right flank of the Russian troops at this line was located east of the village of Gorki, the left - east of the Utitsky Kurgan. At about 4 p.m., one French cavalry division tried to attack the Russians on the line they occupied, but was decisively repulsed. The Russians hastily improved the defense of the occupied line, built fortifications, expecting attacks from large French reserves, but the French did not attack again. Only the French artillery fired frequently at the new Russian position until dusk. Russian artillery responded energetically.
What happened to the French?
After the capture of Raevsky's battery, the marshals again began to insistently demand the introduction of the guard into battle to develop the success achieved. Napoleon galloped forward with his retinue to personally assess the situation. He saw mountains of corpses of the French and Russians, and in the distance - Russian troops standing orderly in a new position, despite losses from French artillery cannonballs. And Napoleon understood what the marshals, carried away by the battle, did not understand. He realized that the French army had not won any victory, since the capture of a small section of the battlefield could not be considered a success. After all, the Russian army was not defeated, but it stood in perfect order, ready to continue the battle. Napoleon understood that the attacks of the guard would increase the number of losses, perhaps they would achieve partial success, but he still would not achieve the defeat of the Russians, especially since night was approaching. And if so, then you can’t spend your last reserves, since the Russians will still fight - maybe they’ll attack the French that same night, maybe tomorrow on the same field, or maybe they’ll retreat again and meet the French in a new position.
Having assessed the situation, Napoleon refused to send the guard into battle. He ordered the attacks to stop and artillery fire to be increased on the Russians. Following this, Napoleon went back to the Shevardinsky redoubt.
Later, Napoleon gave the order to withdraw the army for the night to its original position, since the mountains of corpses and the groans of tens of thousands of wounded made a depressing impression on the soldiers. On the Borodino field, Napoleon lost more than 58 thousand killed and wounded soldiers and 47 generals, without achieving victory in the general battle with which he sought to decide the fate of the war. The French settled down for the night, setting up a strong military guard, as Napoleon feared a night attack by the Russians.
What about the Russians? What was their mood and the mood of their leader, General Kutuzov?
The Russian troops were tired and drained of blood from the battle. Their situation was also difficult, since there were almost no fresh units that had not participated in the battle. All available troops fought and suffered heavy losses. But nevertheless, the Russians were full of vigor and readiness to continue the fight.
The soldiers and officers understood that they had completed the main combat mission: they had held the battlefield and inflicted severe losses on the French. Experienced fighters understood that an organized retreat of 1-1.5 kilometers meant absolutely nothing. Tomorrow everything can be returned with a transition to the offensive. Kutuzov skillfully maintained this high, fighting mood of his army.
When a report came from General Barclay de Tolly about heavy losses and a request to allow a retreat from the occupied line, Kutuzov replied: “They were repulsed everywhere, for which I thank God and our brave army. The enemy has been defeated, and tomorrow we will drive him out of the sacred Russian land!” Following this, Kutuzov loudly said to the adjutant: “Kaisarov!” Sit down, write an order for tomorrow. “And you,” he said to another adjutant, “go along the line and announce that tomorrow we will attack.” These orders from Kutuzov quickly became known to the troops and increased their cheerful, confident mood. The adjutants who conveyed orders were greeted and escorted by the troops with enthusiastic cries of “Hurray!” On the evening of September 7, Kutuzov began receiving reports of losses. These losses were so great that Kutuzov decided not to continue the battle on the Borodino field, so as not to expose his army to the danger of defeat. He decided to retreat to Moscow. This was a more expedient decision, which gave Kutuzov the opportunity to further strengthen his army, and, continuing the war in conditions more favorable to himself than to the enemy, to defeat him. “When it’s not just about the glory of won battles,” Kutuzov reported to Alexander I, “but the whole goal, being aimed at the destruction of the French army, I decided to retreat.” At dawn on September 8, Kutuzov gave the order to withdraw. This order did not discourage the Russian troops. They trusted their old leader. They understood and saw that this was not an escape from a victorious enemy, but a necessary maneuver to organize victory in the future. The Russians began their retreat to Mozhaisk and further to Moscow in perfect order.
The retreat was covered by a strong rearguard, which held back at a great distance the remnants of Murat's cavalry, sent by Napoleon to pursue the Russians. The French army moved towards Moscow, towards its inevitable death.
CONCLUSION
The Russian army won a major victory on the Borodino field. Napoleon, who sought to defeat the Russians in a general battle and thereby decide the fate of the war in his favor, did not achieve this goal.
The iron tenacity of the Russian soldier, who selflessly defended the independence of Russia, the will and martial art of the great Russian commander Kutuzov defeated the formidable Napoleonic army and broke the will of Napoleon. Kutuzov’s great service to the Russian people. But, assessing this merit, we must not forget what our great leaders Lenin and Stalin teach us. They teach that history is created not by individual heroes and leaders, but by the broad masses of the people; that victories are won by troops led by generals. At the same time, the organizing and mobilizing role of leaders and commanders significantly multiplies the efforts of the masses when the commander correctly understands the historical tasks facing the people and leads the masses along the shortest paths to solving these problems. It is in this case that the commander achieves great success. Kutuzov's historical merit lies in the fact that he deeply understood the desire of the Russian people to defend their state independence at all costs, he was passionately imbued with this desire and led the Russian army in a decisive struggle against the formidable foreign conqueror. We saw how Kutuzov, relying on the fortitude of the Russian soldier, skillfully organized the Battle of Borodino. The Russian troops led by Kutuzov managed to defeat the main group of French troops while repelling persistent frontal attacks by Bagration's flashes and Raevsky's battery. While the Russians withdrew in order and were ready to continue the battle, the French units that took the Semyonovskaya position and the Raevsky battery could not even pursue the retreating Russians. What mattered here was not only losses, but also the complete loss of offensive impulse, and this is a moral defeat. Kutuzov failed in the Battle of Borodino to fulfill the second part of his plan, that is, to go on the offensive and finally defeat the French. For this, the Russian forces remaining by the evening of September 7 were not enough. But Kutuzov did not abandon his plan for the complete destruction of Napoleonic army. Later, Kutuzov accomplished this task perfectly.
He prepared and organized a counter-offensive and inflicted a decisive defeat on the enemy. Assessing Kutuzov’s counter-offensive, Comrade Stalin wrote: “Our brilliant commander Kutuzov, who ruined Napoleon and his army with the help of a well-prepared counter-offensive, also knew very well about this.” Napoleon's army was drained of blood in the Battle of Borodino. Particularly sensitive for Napoleon was the defeat of his cavalry. Kutuzov forced Napoleon to use superior French cavalry in frontal attacks in the terribly crowded battlefield. In this cramped environment, most of the French cavalry died under Russian grapeshot, under bullets and bayonets of Russian infantry, under the blades of Russian cavalry. The losses of the French cavalry were so great that the Battle of Borodino is called in history “the grave of the French cavalry.” In the last years of his life, being a prisoner of the British on the island of St. Helena, Napoleon often recalled the Battle of Borodino. He was aware that it was this battle that served as the beginning of the events that led him to the island. He wrote: “Of all my battles, the most terrible is the one I fought near Moscow. The French showed themselves worthy of victory, and the Russians acquired the right to be invincible.” Elsewhere he wrote: “Of the fifty battles I gave, in the battle of Moscow the French showed the most valor and achieved the least success.” The result of the Battle of Borodino was briefly and energetically determined by the Russian general Ermolov, the same one who recaptured Raevsky’s battery from the French after their second, successful attack. Ermolov said: “In the Battle of Borodino, the French army crashed against the Russian army.” The Battle of Borodino was a turning point in the Patriotic War of 1812. It was of enormous international significance. It affected the future destinies of all of Europe. Weakened at Borodin, Napoleon subsequently suffered a general defeat, first in Russia and then in Europe. His empire collapsed, and the peoples he enslaved regained their national independence.
The Russian people were repeatedly invaded by foreigners who tried to enslave them. But every time he stood up to defend his homeland. During the centuries-old struggle, the Russian people have accumulated rich military traditions; its memory preserves the greatest feats of courage, valor and self-sacrifice of its faithful sons. During the Great Patriotic War of the Soviet Union, our leader Comrade Stalin pointed out that in the fight against the German fascists, let us be inspired by the images of the great Russian commanders of the past - Alexander Nevsky, Dimitry Donskoy, Kozma Minin, Dimitry Pozharsky, Alexander Suvorov, Mikhail Kutuzov. This instruction from the leader emphasized the historical connection of our struggle for the honor and independence of the Soviet Motherland with the struggle of the patriots of the past. The soldiers of the Soviet Army and Navy, who fought to the death on the outskirts of Moscow, Leningrad, Stalingrad, Sevastopol, and Odessa, remembered well the heroes of 1812 who fought to the death on the Borodino field.
Colonel V.V.PRUNTSOV
Popular essay
Military Publishing House of the Ministry of the Armed Forces of the USSR
Anniversary of the Battle of BorodinoThe date of the Battle of Borodino, August 26, 1812 according to the old style or September 7 (8) according to the new style, will forever remain in history as the day of one of the greatest victories of Russian weapons. It's Russia's Military Glory Day!
The reasons for the battle near Borodino are quite varied. General Mikhail Illarionovich Golenishchev-Kutuzov, appointed commander of the Russian troops, avoided, as far as possible, the battle planned by Napoleon Bonaparte in conditions unfavorable for the Russian army. The reason for this reluctance to give a general battle was the serious superiority of Bonaparte's army in numbers and experience in military operations. Systematically retreating deeper into the country, Kutuzov forced the French to disperse their forces, which contributed to the reduction of Napoleon's Grand Army. However, a retreat to Moscow could seriously undermine the already low morale of Russian soldiers and provoke disapproval in society. 
For Bonaparte, it was important to quickly capture key Russian positions as quickly as possible, but at the same time maintain the combat effectiveness of his own army. 
Understanding the seriousness of the task and the danger of Napoleon as a commander, Kutuzov carefully chose the location of the battle. And, as a result, he stationed the army on lands near the village of Borodino. This area, covered with a large number of ravines, streams and rivulets, minimized the numerical superiority of the French army and the significant superiority of artillery. In addition, it greatly complicated the possibility of detours and made it possible to block all roads leading to Moscow (Gzhatsky tract, Old and New Smolensk roads). 
Kutuzov, when planning the Battle of Borodino, placed the main emphasis on the tactics of wearing out the enemy, and he attached great importance to the reliability of the hastily built fortifications. 
Even a brief summary of the Battle of Borodino will take a lot of time. It became the most cruel and bloody in the 19th century. Defeat meant complete capitulation for Russia, and for Napoleon it meant a grueling and long military campaign.
The Battle of Borodino began with French artillery, which opened fire along the entire front at about 6 o'clock in the morning. At the same time, French columns began to take up positions for attack.
The Life Guards Jaeger Regiment was the first to be attacked. And the French immediately encountered stubborn resistance, but, nevertheless, the regiment was forced to surrender its positions and retreat beyond the Koloch River. 
Bagration's flushes located on the left flank were occupied by artillery and the 2nd consolidated division of Major General Vorontsov. Chains of rangers were posted in front; the rangers of Prince Shakhovsky covered the fleshes from the bypass. Neverovsky's division, also a major general, was stationed behind. The Semenovsky Heights were occupied by the division of Major General Duka. From the French side, the attack on this sector was carried out by troops of the corps of General Junot, Marshals Murat (cavalry), Davout, and Ney. Their total number reached 115 thousand soldiers. 
The flush attacks launched by the French at 6 and 7 a.m. were repulsed. Moreover, the battle in this area was incredibly intense. During the Battle of Borodino, a third attack was launched. Bagration's flushes were reinforced by the Lithuanian and Izmailovsky regiments, the division of Major General Konovnitsyn and cavalry units (1st Cuirassier Division and 3rd Cavalry Corps). But the French, preparing a massive offensive, concentrated considerable forces, including 160 guns. The 3rd attack, launched at about 8 a.m. and the subsequent 4th attack, launched at 9 a.m., also failed. During the 4th attack, Napoleon managed to briefly occupy the flushes, but the French were knocked out of their positions. The dead and wounded soldiers left on the battlefield presented a terrible picture. Further attacks, as well as attempts to bypass the already dilapidated flushes, were unsuccessful. 
Only when holding these fortifications ceased to be advisable did the Russian troops, under the command of Konovnitsyn, retreat to Semenovskoye, where a new line of defense was occupied - the Semenovsky ravine. The troops of Murat and Davout were already exhausted, but Napoleon did not take the risk and refused their request to bring the Old Guard, the French reserve, into battle. Even a later attack by heavy cavalry under the command of Nansouty was unsuccessful.
The situation in other directions was also difficult. The Battle of Borodino was still far from over. While the battle for the capture of flushes was going on, the French attacked the Kurgan Heights with the Raevsky battery located on it, one of the many heroes who showed unprecedented courage to defend their homeland. Despite attacks from superior forces under the command of Eugene Beauharnais, Napoleon's stepson, the battery was able to hold the heights until reinforcements arrived, and then forced the French troops to retreat.
A description of the Battle of Borodino would not be complete without mentioning the detachment of Lieutenant General Tuchkov, who prevented the Polish units of the Poniatovsky detachment from bypassing the left flank of the Russians. He, having taken positions on the Utitsky Kurgan, covered the Old Smolensk road. During the battles for this height, Tuchkov was mortally wounded. Polish troops were unable to take the mound during the day. In the evening they were forced to retreat beyond the village of Utitskoye and take a defensive position. 
On the right flank events developed just as intensely. Ataman Platonov and Lieutenant General Uvarov at approximately 10 a.m. carried out a diversionary cavalry raid deep into the Great Army, which helped relieve pressure on the Russian defense along the entire front. Ataman Platonov, having reached the rear of the French to the village of Valuevo, forced the French emperor to temporarily suspend the offensive in the center, which gave a respite to the Russian troops. Uvarov's corps operated no less successfully in the area of the village of Bezzubovo.
The actions of the Russian and French troops can be more clearly imagined using the diagram of the Battle of Borodino. From 6 pm the battle gradually began to calm down. The last attempt to bypass the Russian positions was made at 9 pm. But, in the Utitsky forest, the French were met by riflemen from the Life Guards of the Finnish Regiment. Realizing that it would not be possible to break the resistance of Kutuzov’s troops, Napoleon ordered to abandon all captured fortifications and retreat to their original positions. The bloody Battle of Borodino lasted more than 12 hours. 
The losses in the Battle of Borodino are enormous. Napoleon's Grand Army lost about 59 thousand wounded, missing and killed, among them 47 generals. The Russian army under the command of Kutuzov lost 39 thousand soldiers, including 29 generals.
The results of the Battle of Borodino, surprisingly, still cause serious controversy. The fact is that both Napoleon Bonaparte and Kutuzov officially declared their victory. But answering the question of who won the Battle of Borodino is not difficult. Kutuzov, despite the huge losses and subsequent retreat, considered the Battle of Borodino an undoubted success of Russian weapons, largely achieved thanks to the resilience and unparalleled personal courage of soldiers and officers. History has preserved the names of many heroes of the Battle of Borodino in 1812. These are Raevsky, Barclay de Tolly, Bagration, Davydov, Tuchkov, Tolstoy and many others.
Napoleon's army suffered huge irreparable losses without achieving any of the goals set by the Emperor of France. The future of the Russian company became very doubtful, the morale of the Grand Army fell. This was the outcome of the battle for Bonaparte. 
The Russian historian Mikhnevich reported the following review of Emperor Napoleon about the battle:
“Of all my battles, the most terrible is the one I fought near Moscow. The French showed themselves worthy of victory, and the Russians acquired the right to be invincible... Of the fifty battles I gave, in the battle of Moscow the French showed the most valor and achieved the least success.”
The date of the Battle of Borodino, September 7, 1812 (August 26, old style), will forever remain in history as the day of one of the greatest victories of Russian weapons.
There were several reasons why the Battle of Borodino took place. General Mikhail Illarionovich Golenishchev-Kutuzov, appointed commander of the Russian troops, avoided, as far as possible, the battle planned by Napoleon Bonaparte in conditions unfavorable for the Russian army. The reason for this reluctance to give a general battle was the serious superiority of Bonaparte's army in numbers and experience in military operations. Systematically retreating deeper into the country, Kutuzov forced the French to disperse their forces, which contributed to the reduction of Napoleon's Grand Army. However, a retreat to Moscow could seriously undermine the already low morale of Russian soldiers and provoke disapproval in society. For Bonaparte, it was important to quickly capture key Russian positions as quickly as possible, but at the same time maintain the combat effectiveness of his own army.
Understanding the seriousness of the task and the danger of Napoleon as a commander, Kutuzov carefully chose the location of the battle and eventually stationed the army on lands near the village of Borodino. This terrain, covered with a large number of ravines, streams and rivulets, minimized the numerical superiority of the French army and the significant superiority of its artillery. In addition, it greatly complicated the possibility of detours and made it possible to block all roads leading to Moscow (Gzhatsky tract, Old and New Smolensk roads). Kutuzov, when planning the Battle of Borodino, placed the main emphasis on the tactics of wearing out the enemy, and he attached great importance to the reliability of the hastily built fortifications.
Even a brief summary of the Battle of Borodino will take a lot of time. It became the most cruel and bloody in the 19th century. Defeat meant complete capitulation for Russia, and for Napoleon it meant a grueling and long military campaign.
The Battle of Borodino began with French artillery, which opened fire along the entire front at approximately 6 o'clock in the morning. At the same time, French columns began to take up positions for attack.
The Life Guards Jaeger Regiment was the first to be attacked. The French immediately encountered stubborn resistance, but still the regiment was forced to surrender its positions and retreat across the Koloch River.
Bagration's flushes located on the left flank were occupied by artillery and the second consolidated division of Major General Vorontsov. Chains of rangers were posted in front; the rangers of Prince Shakhovsky covered the fleshes from the bypass. The division of Neverovsky, a major general, was stationed behind. The Semenovsky Heights were occupied by the division of Major General Duka. From the French side, the attack on this sector was carried out by troops of the corps of General Junot, Marshals Murat (cavalry), Davout, and Ney. Their total number reached 115 thousand soldiers.
The flush attacks launched by the French at 6 and 7 a.m. were repulsed. Moreover, the battle in this area was incredibly intense. During the Battle of Borodino, a third attack was launched. Bagration's flushes were reinforced by the Lithuanian and Izmailovsky regiments, the division of Major General Konovnitsyn and cavalry units (the first cuirassier division and the third cavalry corps). But the French, preparing a massive offensive, concentrated considerable forces, including 160 guns. The third attack, launched at about 8 a.m., and the subsequent, fourth, launched at 9 a.m., also failed. During the fourth attack, Napoleon managed to briefly occupy the flushes, but the French were knocked out of their positions. The dead and wounded soldiers left on the battlefield presented a terrible picture. Further attacks, as well as attempts to bypass the already dilapidated flushes, were unsuccessful.
Only when holding these fortifications ceased to be advisable did the Russian troops under the command of Konovnitsyn retreat to Semenovskoye, where a new line of defense was occupied - the Semenovsky ravine. The troops of Murat and Davout were already exhausted, but Napoleon did not take the risk and refused their request to bring the Old Guard, the French reserve, into battle. Even a later attack by heavy cavalry under the command of Nansouty was unsuccessful.
The situation in other directions was also difficult. The Battle of Borodino was still far from over. While the battle for taking flushes was going on, the French attacked Kurgan Heights with the Raevsky battery located on it, one of the many heroes who showed unprecedented courage to defend their homeland. Despite attacks from superior forces under the command of Eugene Beauharnais, Napoleon's stepson, the battery was able to hold the heights until reinforcements arrived, and then forced the French troops to retreat.
A description of the Battle of Borodino would not be complete without mentioning Lieutenant General Tuchkov’s detachment, which prevented Poniatowski’s Polish units from bypassing the Russian left flank. Tuchkov, having taken up positions on the Utitsky Kurgan, covered the Old Smolensk Road. During the battles for this height, Tuchkov was mortally wounded. Polish troops were unable to take the mound during the day. In the evening they were forced to retreat beyond the village of Utitskoye and take a defensive position.
On the right flank events developed just as intensely. Ataman Platonov and Lieutenant General Uvarov at about 10 am made a diversionary cavalry raid deep into the Great Army, which helped relieve pressure on the Russian defense along the entire front. Ataman Platonov, having reached the rear of the French to the village of Valuevo, forced the French emperor to temporarily suspend the offensive in the center, which gave a respite to the Russian troops. Uvarov's corps operated no less successfully in the area of the village of Bezzubovo.
The actions of the Russian and French troops can be more clearly imagined using the diagram of the Battle of Borodino. From 6 pm the battle gradually began to calm down. The last attempt to bypass the Russian positions was made at 9 pm. But in the Utitsky forest the French were met by riflemen from the Life Guards of the Finnish Regiment. Realizing that it would not be possible to break the resistance of Kutuzov’s troops, Napoleon ordered to abandon all captured fortifications and retreat to their original positions. The bloody Battle of Borodino lasted more than 12 hours.
The losses in the Battle of Borodino are enormous. Napoleon's Grand Army lost about 59 thousand wounded, missing and killed, among them 47 generals. The Russian army under the command of Kutuzov lost 39 thousand soldiers, including 29 generals.
The results of the Battle of Borodino, surprisingly, still cause serious controversy. The fact is that both Napoleon Bonaparte and Kutuzov officially declared their victory. But answering the question of who won the Battle of Borodino is not difficult. Kutuzov, despite the huge losses and subsequent retreat, considered the Battle of Borodino an undoubted success of Russian weapons, largely achieved thanks to the resilience and unparalleled personal courage of soldiers and officers. History has preserved the names of many heroes of the Battle of Borodino in 1812. These are Raevsky, Barclay de Tolly, Bagration, Davydov, Tuchkov, Tolstoy and many others.
Napoleon's army suffered huge irreparable losses without achieving any of the goals set by the Emperor of France. The future of the Russian campaign became very doubtful, the morale of the Grand Army fell. This was the outcome of the battle for Bonaparte.
The significance of the Borodino battle, despite all the controversy, is so great that today, 200 years later, Borodino Day is celebrated both in Russia, on the Borodino field, and in France.
Raevsky's battery is a key point in the Battle of Borodino. The artillerymen of the infantry corps of Lieutenant General Raevsky showed miracles of bravery, courage and military art here. The fortifications on Kurgan Heights, where the battery was located, were called by the French “the grave of the French cavalry.”
French cavalry grave
Raevsky's battery was installed on Kurgan Heights the night before the Battle of Borodino. The battery was intended to defend the center of the battle formation of the Russian army.
The firing position of the Raevsky Battery was equipped in the form of a lunette (a lunette is a field or long-term defensive structure open from the rear, consisting of 1-2 frontal ramparts (faces) and side ramparts to cover the flanks). The front and side parapets of the battery had a height of up to 2.4 m and were protected in front and on the sides by a ditch 3.2 m deep. In front of the ditch, at a distance of 100 m, in 5-6 rows there were “wolf pits” (camouflaged recesses-traps for enemy infantry and cavalry).
The battery was the object of repeated attacks by Napoleonic infantry and cavalry with Bagration's flashes. Several French divisions and almost 200 guns were involved in its assault. All the slopes of the Kurgan Heights were strewn with the corpses of the invaders. The French army lost more than 3,000 soldiers and 5 generals here.
The actions of the Raevsky Battery in the Battle of Borodino are one of the most striking examples of the heroism and valor of Russian soldiers and officers in the Patriotic War of 1812.
General Raevsky
The legendary Russian commander Nikolai Nikolaevich Raevsky was born in Moscow on September 14, 1771. Nikolai began his military service at the age of 14 in the Preobrazhensky Regiment. He takes part in many military companies: Turkish, Polish, Caucasian. Raevsky established himself as a skilled military leader and at the age of 19 he was promoted to lieutenant colonel, and at the age of 21 he became a colonel. After a forced break, he returned to the army in 1807 and actively participated in all major European battles of that period. After the conclusion of the Peace of Tilsit, he took part in the war with Sweden, and later with Turkey, at the end of which he was promoted to lieutenant general.
Nikolai Nikolaevich Raevsky. Portrait by George Dow.
The commander’s talent was especially evident during the Patriotic War. Raevsky distinguished himself in the battle of Saltanovka, where he managed to stop the divisions of Marshal Davout, who intended to prevent the unification of Russian troops. At a critical moment, the general personally led the Semenovsky regiment into the attack. Then there was the heroic defense of Smolensk, when his corps held the city for a day. In the Battle of Borodino, Raevsky’s corps successfully defended Kurgan Heights, which the French attacked especially fiercely. The general took part in the Foreign Campaign and the Battle of the Nations, after which he was forced to leave the army for health reasons. N. N. Raevsky died in 1829.
Raevsky's battery in 1941
In October 1941, the Raevsky Battery again became one of the key defense points on the Borodino field. On its slopes there were positions of anti-tank guns, and at the top there was an observation post. After Borodino was liberated and the fortifications of the Mozhaisk defense line were put in order, Kurgan Height was left as a key stronghold. Several new bunkers were erected on it.
Fortifications at the Raevsky Battery in 1941 (below, center). Fragment of the map of the 36th fortified area of the Mozhaisk defense line.
A bunker on the slope of Kurgan Heights.
This article uses a fragment of the plan of the Raevsky Battery from the wonderful book by N. I. Ivanov “Engineering work on the Borodino Field in 1812”. Highly recommended for anyone interested in the history of the Battle of Borodino.