Military generals of the Chechen war. List of Russian heroes of the Chechen war

Since the times of Ancient Rome, it has been known that a peaceful life is ensured, first of all, by the readiness to repel anyone who decides to start a war. But war is a matter that requires the participation of experienced professionals. In the army, such professionals are military leaders who have proven their ability to lead troops in battle. And win.

“Moskovsky Komsomolets” recently published material, which spoke of the impending return to leadership of the army of generals who had gone through armed conflicts, been in the thick of war and in practice proven their ability to fight in defense of the Motherland.

That MK article mentioned several names of generals who, in his opinion, could soon take upon themselves the restoration of the army’s combat capability after the destructive actions of their predecessors, as many experts believe.

Some of the forecasts made in the MK material have already been confirmed.

Intermonitor decided to select three quotes from the Internet that characterize these military men as individuals and as professional defenders of Russia.

Valery Gerasimov is close to the Urals, because just yesterday he commanded the troops of the Central Military District, whose headquarters are located in Yekaterinburg.

1. General Gerasimov in the Chechen campaign.

The Battle for Komsomolskoye is an episode of the Second Chechen War (CTO 1999-2009 Chechen conflict) that took place in the foothill village of Komsomolskoye, Urus-Martan district of the Chechen Republic from March 5 to March 20, 2000.

The assault on the village of Komsomolskoye was carried out by Russian federal forces (Major General V.V. Gerasimov, Colonel General M.I. Labunets) who blocked and destroyed large armed formations of the Chechen Republic of Ichkeria here (divisional general R.G. Gelayev, brigade general X M. Khachukaev), who broke into the village from the Argun Gorge.

During the fighting in the village, at least 1,200 militants were killed, of which about 350 were killed while trying to escape from the encirclement. In addition, more than 70 were captured (mostly wounded and shell-shocked).

On the part of the federal forces, according to unconfirmed reports, about 50 servicemen of the Ministry of Internal Affairs and the Ministry of Defense were killed and more than 300 were wounded. Commander Seifulla's detachment (about 300 people) responded to Gelayev's calls for help, but on the way to the village they were destroyed by air fire and artillery. Gelayev and several groups of militants still managed to break through the encirclement and retreat to Georgian territory (to the Pankisi Gorge). During the assault on the village, Buratino launchers were used.

According to the commander of the federal troops during the hostilities, Gennady Troshev, “the operation in Komsomolskoye practically ended the active phase of hostilities in Chechnya.”

2. General Gerasimov hosted the Victory Parade in Moscow

A military parade in honor of the 67th anniversary of Victory in the Great Patriotic War was held on Red Square. 14 thousand military personnel took part in it. The main difference between the current Victory Parade and last year’s is that all its participants are dressed in full dress uniform, with the exception of military personnel from the mechanized column, Interfax reports. A field uniform is provided for them.

Last year, all military personnel participating in the parade were dressed in field uniforms. For the first time, new Lynx armored vehicles will drive across Red Square, which will accompany launchers of the Topol-M strategic missile systems.

3. General Valery Gerasimov in war conditions

Bandits armed to the teeth turned Bamut into an impregnable fortress: they actively used the mines of the former Strategic Missile Forces division, dug underground passages to residential buildings, and created additional shelters from artillery strikes in concrete basements. The mountainous terrain, covered with greenery, also played into the hands of the militants.

Major General Valery Gerasimov was entrusted with leading the actions of our troops in the Bamut direction. While working on the ground, an armored group led by Valery Vasilyevich was ambushed. They began to shoot at the column point-blank from small arms and grenade launchers. The group immediately dismounted and took up the fight. Without losing control, we fought off the advancing militants until the helicopters arrived...

Of course, they did not remain in debt to the bandits. A week later, the mercenaries were lured into a well-constructed trap. As a result, more than a dozen bearded men were killed and a large consignment of small arms was captured.

1. Sharp turns of fate of General Vladimir Shamanov

His name became known to Russia during the Chechen war. Popular rumor spread legends about him. For example, that army commander Shamanov managed to liberate villages in which armed bandits had dug in without firing a single shot.

And when his fighting career was at its stellar takeoff, Shamanov suddenly submitted his resignation and hung up his jacket with the Star of the Hero of Russia on a nail. And he went into politics. Having become the governor of the Ulyanovsk region, after 4 years he refused to go to new elections.

Then there were the inconspicuous positions of assistant to the prime minister and adviser to the minister of defense. And suddenly - the Decree of the President of Russia on the return of Shamanov to combat formation and the “hottest” position in the Armed Forces - the head of the Main Directorate of Combat Training.

This is the first time in the history of the modern Russian army that a reserve general has been called up to such a high command post.

2. General Vladimir Shamanov in the war “080808”

...an order to Lieutenant General Vladimir Shamanov to lead a group of Russian troops in Abkhazia. On the same day, Shamanov arrived in Adler, and from there to Sukhumi.

When the Russian naval convoy approached the shores of Abkhazia, a naval battle took place with five Georgian missile boats attacking it, one of which was sunk by an anti-ship missile.

At night, large landing ships in the Sukhumi area landed a battalion tactical group of the Airborne Forces and again went to sea, taking up positions to provide cover from attacks by the Georgian Navy. At night, the first transport aircraft from Ulyanovsk arrived at the Babushary airfield with paratroopers of the 31st brigade on board.

3. General Vladimir Shamanov in the Chechen campaign

The snow-capped mountains, on the slope of one of which is the village of Laha-Varanda, still pose a danger. Every day, shots are heard from nearby heights: Chechen snipers are working. From there, groups of militants are trying to break through the military barrier from the mountains. Army sappers place mines on their paths, leaving small passages for their own.

Before my eyes, a detachment of flamethrowers in white camouflage suits went on a special mission to the not yet liberated village of Pionerskoye. It is located 500 meters from Laha Varanda. “Immediately open salvo fire,” the commander gives the final instructions. “Then take positions.”

The situation, I must admit, is difficult,” says the commander of the Shamanov group. “The troops cannot move forward yet.” This is due to the general situation in Chechnya. The pockets of resistance of the bandits narrowed sharply, and this was clearly visible in Grozny and in the mountainous territory of the republic. Mountains interfere with the maneuvers of armed forces: there are impassable places, and crevices and caves serve as good shelter for bandits. The actions of aviation and artillery here are not so effective. Plus, difficult weather conditions. There are fogs and frosts for weeks. The other day, one of the units was conducting reconnaissance in the area of the Wolf Gate. The guys began to climb to a height of 800 meters above sea level. There are icy slopes, visibility is about a hundred meters, no more.

Therefore, today the main task of the Western group is to prevent the militants from breaking out from Grozny and retreating to the mountains, as well as from breaking out from the Argun Gorge.
- How great is the danger that you will not hold back the militants?
- It cannot be completely denied. Over the past two days, the active actions of reconnaissance units managed to partially destroy and partially disperse seven gangs that were trying to break out of the gorge. They refused open battle, we finished them off on their escape routes. There were several attempts to blow up the situation in populated areas. Clean-ups are going on there now.
In general, there is something to work on. We recently conducted an inspection trip and looked at the outposts of the internal troops. The location of the outposts and the organization of combat service did not comply with any rules.

By the decision of General Kazantsev, all units of the Internal Troops and the Ministry of Internal Affairs operating in this area are directly subordinate to me. This allows for better organization and coordination of work. While during the inspection we found 27 trails with fresh traces of militants, today there are only three. But, I repeat, no one is immune from accidents. These are mountains, and you can’t put soldiers every ten meters.

General Sergei Surovikin, like General Valery Gerasimov, is close to the Urals. Surovikin served in the Urals both as a division commander and as a chief of staff - first deputy commander of the Central Military District. In addition, General Surovikin, almost from a young age, became what is called a “media figure”: in August 1991, at the time of the State Emergency Committee, a Soviet Army patrol, as part of an armored group, advanced in Moscow to protect government institutions, and was attacked using “ Molotov cocktail,” three attackers were killed. 24-year-old captain Surovikin commanded this patrol. Subsequently, Surovikin was placed in Matrosskaya Tishina prison, from where he was released on the personal order of Boris Yeltsin and with an early promotion to the rank of major - for exemplary execution of the Order.

1. General Sergei Surovikin saves soldiers in extreme situations

At that time, S.V. Surovikin was not yet a general and was not even a battalion commander. Sergei Vladimirovich Surovikin commanded a company in the Taman division. This episode from the life of a military man explains in the best possible way why Sergei Vladimirovich Surovikin was promoted to all ranks except lieutenant colonel ahead of schedule, and why he became the chief of staff of the division and a colonel at the age of thirty-two.

The mechanic violated the temperature conditions of the engine and the ejector caught fire. A column of flame shot up, the car turned into a torch. And then the conscript soldier, sitting at the controls of the BMP, made a second mistake: he turned off the engine. The landing party had not yet managed to understand anything. The mechanic, who understood what was happening, was gripped by horror and simply became numb - unable to move or say a word.

Captain Sergei Surovikin instantly found his bearings and rushed towards the burning infantry fighting vehicle. While running, he gave the order to the landing party to evacuate, pulled the mechanic out from behind the levers, and sat down in his place - the “fire on wheels” had to be taken as far away as possible - if the ammunition had exploded, the losses could have been very serious - there were people around.

Surovikin tried to start the burning engine and... God loves the Guard - the blazing engine started. In a burning car that could explode at any moment, Sergei Vladimirovich Surovikin rushed to the shore of the reservoir. Two kilometers of furious driving on a burning infantry fighting vehicle, when every meter could have been the last in his life... Flying up to the shore, Surovikin immediately jumped in his car from the dam and crashed into the water from a height of two and a half meters. The water extinguished the completely sunken infantry fighting vehicle, and captain Sergei Surovikin climbed ashore.

2. General Sergei Surovikin in the Chechen campaign

While moving into position, the reconnaissance squad of the reconnaissance platoon (9 people who acted as patrol) encountered contact battles with bandits leaving the city from the Internal Troops of the Ministry of Internal Affairs.

The squad's fighters took up a position on the street, near the walls of one of the buildings of the destroyed poultry farm. From a tactical point of view, the place was not the most favorable, but there was no choice: the battle had to be fought immediately and where the clash took place. The militants first fired small arms, but almost immediately used grenade launchers (under-barrel and RPG-22).

Finding himself under fire from grenade launchers, the reconnaissance commander led the squad inside a dilapidated building and continued to fight from there. The building was not completely destroyed - its roof was preserved. This circumstance later became fatal for our guys.

One of the shots fired by the militants at the scouts who were interfering with their retreat hit the supporting structure of the building and destroyed it. The roof collapsed, and the concrete floor slab buried nine scouts...

It should be noted that the militants had no way to get around our soldiers: on both sides of the poultry farm there was a flat, large field on which the bandits would undoubtedly have been discovered and destroyed. The only opportunity to escape secretly was the complex of ruins of a poultry farm, and the only obstacle in the way of the militants at the beginning of the battle were patrol scouts from 70 SMEs. Before their death, the scouts destroyed several militants.

But the death of our guys was not in vain: while the battle was going on, the second squad of the reconnaissance platoon of the 70th motorized rifle regiment approached, and the bandits were unable to break through. Some of the militants were killed on the spot, and some went back to the city.

In the morning, at the site of the death of nine reconnaissance heroes, the Commander of the 42nd Motorized Rifle Division, Major General Sergei Surovikin, publicly promised to destroy three militants for each soldier.

The special operation lasted a total of two weeks. Under the leadership of the intelligence chief of the 42nd Motorized Rifle Division, 36 militants were destroyed. Those. - four militants for each dead scout.

The intelligence chief of the 42nd MSD was subsequently awarded the Order of Courage for this special operation.

3. General Sergei Surovikin and the war in Tajikistan

In 1998, in the Vose region of the republic, a record amount of precipitation fell in a short period of time, which triggered mudflows. Now the TV picture gives us a pretty good idea of what natural disasters are, so I think everyone imagines how huge streams of water mixed with mud and stones with wild speed and force, sweeping away everything in their path, rush down from the peaks. It was in this emergency situation that several villages with their population and a kindergarten found themselves. The elderly, women and children urgently needed help; they were in mortal danger.

At that moment, the commander of the 149th regiment, Lieutenant Colonel Sergei Vladimirovich Surovikin, makes an immediate decision to conduct a rescue operation. Since the depth and size of the mudflow did not allow conventional vehicles to reach the disaster site, they began to fight their way to the disaster site in tanks. The scale of the disaster was such that even tanks could hardly cope with the onslaught of the elements. Heading the column, Lieutenant Colonel Sergei Surovikin, together with the crew of the first vehicle, using equipment for underwater driving of tanks, crossed the mud barrier along the bottom.

“Leading the column” is not just a nice turn of phrase. The driver mechanics were justifiably afraid that the tanks could be washed away by a mudflow. Then Sergei Surovikin personally sat down at the control levers of the lead tank and literally led the column behind him. The commander's personal example and decisive actions helped the personnel fulfill their duty without loss.

During the operation, servicemen of Sergei Surovikin’s regiment took 34 children and 55 village residents to safety. Later, at the end of the operation, doctors stated that the soldiers and officers (including Sergei Surovikin himself) suffered from severe hypothermia and some even required hospitalization.

As Oleg Voevoda, a participant in those events, notes, “The regiment commander, Sergei Vladimirovich Surovikin, was very strict, he tore three skins from us, but in the beginning he always demanded from himself. Lieutenant Colonel Surovikin is a true commander in the highest sense of the word. Not a staff one. For him to sit in warm offices while his subordinates put themselves at risk has never been the norm.”

In May 1999, now Colonel Sergei Surovikin was informed that an armed group of 30 to 50 bandits had broken through from the territory of Afghanistan with the aim of carrying out actions to intimidate the population, destroy authorities and carry out terrorist attacks on the territory of Tajikistan. Task Force 117 of the Moscow Border Detachment pursued this bandit group. Colonel Surovikin took over the overall leadership of the reconnaissance company and, using five infantry fighting vehicles, carried out an operation to block the militants in a matter of hours. During the ensuing battle, the bandits suffered significant losses and were forced to surrender.

There were no casualties among Russian military personnel. Which once again emphasizes the high level of training of military personnel and the management skills of their commanders.

We were unable to find any mention of the military past of General Andrei Tretyak, and it is also not visible from his official biography. However, it undoubtedly emerges that General Tretyak is a strategist and that, even at the cost of his career, he tried to maintain the effective functioning of the headquarters.

1. General Andrei Tretyak and relations with Russia’s geostrategic allies

The following fact shows how interested Yerevan is in the presence of a Russian garrison in Gyumri. The 102nd Russian military base is probably the only one in the world for which it is not its actual owner, that is, Moscow, who pays for it, but the host country. That is, Armenia. Which is contrary to world practice. Even the United States regularly settles accounts with the Cubans for its base at Guantanamo Bay.

However, it should be taken into account that Azerbaijan and Turkey have the same alliance as we have with Armenia. Then it is logical to assume that in the event of an apocalyptic development of events around Nagorno-Karabakh, the Turks may take the side of Baku.

Despite the improbability of such a situation, it appears to be being discussed at a fairly high level. In any case, in May, Armenian Defense Minister Seyran Ohanyan said that in the event of aggression by Azerbaijan, his country expects the fulfillment of obligations by its partners in the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO). It is clear that we are talking, first of all, about Russia.

Ohanyan said these words immediately after negotiations with the head of the Main Operations Directorate of the General Staff of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation, General Andrei Tretyak. According to the Eurasianet portal, Tretyak confirmed that in the event of hostilities, Russia will fulfill its obligations under the treaty. That is, he will rush to defend his ally in the CSTO. The general emphasized that this time Russia will not refuse to intervene, as happened during the pogroms in Kyrgyzstan.

2. General Andrei Tretyak and protecting operators at the cost of his career

...the former head of the Main Operations Directorate of the General Staff, Lieutenant General Andrei Tretyak, challenged General Makarov’s decision to transfer the laboriously assembled operator officers (responsible for drawing up operation plans) to another place, Valery Gerasimov supported him. However, Nikolai Makarov transferred them anyway, simultaneously dismissing General Tretyak.

3. General Andrei Tretyak, official biography

Lieutenant General Andrei Vitalievich Tretyak was born on March 11, 1959 in the city of Magdeburg (GDR, since 1990 - Germany) in the family of a military man.

He graduated from the Kiev Higher Combined Arms Command School in 1980, the Military Academy named after. M.V. Frunze in 1991, Military Academy of the General Staff of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation in 2001.

He served as a platoon and company commander in the Group of Soviet Forces in Germany (GSVG), chief of staff and battalion commander in the Belarusian Military District.

After graduating from the Military Academy. M.V. Since 1991, Frunze has successively held the positions of deputy chief of the operational department of the division headquarters, chief of staff - deputy regiment commander, regiment and brigade commander, and chief of staff of the division in the Far Eastern Military District.

After graduating from the Military Academy of the General Staff in 2001, he was appointed division commander in the Siberian Military District.

Since 2003, Andrei Tretyak served as chief of staff of the 29th Combined Arms Army (Ulan-Ude) of the Siberian Military District.

Since May 2005 - Commander of the 20th Guards Combined Arms Army (Voronezh) of the Moscow Military District.

Since April 2008, he held the position of chief of staff - first deputy commander of the Leningrad Military District.

In January 2010, Andrei Tretyak was appointed to the position of Chief of the Main Operations Directorate - Deputy Chief of the General Staff of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation.

In July 2011, he wrote a letter of resignation.

In October 2011, Russian President Dmitry Medvedev relieved Andrei Tretyak from the post of chief of the main operational directorate of the General Staff of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation - deputy chief of the General Staff, and dismissed him from military service.

Based on materials from Russian media.

Text: Philip Yudin

The first Russian general to be awarded the title of Hero of Russia even before the end of the First Chechen War was Colonel General Anatoly Romanov. In July 1995, as commander of the Internal Troops of the Ministry of Internal Affairs of the Russian Federation, he headed the United Group of Federal Forces in the Chechen Republic.
Anatoly Aleksandrovich served in this position for less than three months - in October 1995, the convoy that included the general’s car was blown up in Grozny by a radio-controlled land mine. Romanov survived, having received severe wounds. He is still undergoing treatment in a military hospital. Anatoly Alexandrovich, in addition to the medical staff himself, is supported by his relatives; his wife Larisa has always been by his side all these years.
Anatoly Alexandrovich was a brilliant negotiator who worked hard and fruitfully to peacefully resolve the military conflict in Chechnya.
A. A. Romanov received the highest rank of Russia a month after the assassination attempt. Earlier, in 1994, he was awarded the Order of Military Merit. Anatoly Aleksandrovich has the “Maroon Beret” (April 1995, for the development of special forces of the Internal Troops). These are only the awards that General Romanov received during the First Chechen War. Previously, there were the Orders of the Red Star (1988) and For Personal Courage (1993), the medal “For Impeccable Service,” and anniversary medals.
For heroism shown in the First Chechen Campaign, another general of the Internal Troops of the Ministry of Internal Affairs of the Russian Federation, Deputy Commander of the North Caucasus District of the Internal Troops, Major General Nikolai Skrypnik, received the Hero Star. Nikolai Vasilyevich replaced his seriously wounded predecessor in his post; Skrypnik headed the tactical group of the Internal Troops in Chechnya.
In the summer of 1996, in the area of one of the Chechen villages, under the direct leadership of N.V. Skrypnik, units of Russian troops carried out an operation to destroy a large gang of militants led by field commander Doku Makhaev. Skrypnik's armored personnel carrier, like General Romanov's UAZ, was blown up by a radio-controlled landmine. The mortally wounded general did not live even an hour, dying without regaining consciousness.
He was posthumously awarded the title of Hero of Russia after the formal end of the First Chechen Campaign, in November 1996.

There are many wars written into the history of Russia. Most of them were liberation, some began on our territory and ended far beyond its borders. But there is nothing worse than such wars, which were started as a result of the illiterate actions of the country’s leadership and led to terrifying results because the authorities solved their own problems without paying attention to the people.

One of such sad pages of Russian history is the Chechen war. This was not a confrontation between two different peoples. There were no absolute rights in this war. And the most surprising thing is that this war still cannot be considered over.

Prerequisites for the start of the war in Chechnya

It is hardly possible to talk about these military campaigns briefly. The era of perestroika, so pompously announced by Mikhail Gorbachev, marked the collapse of a huge country consisting of 15 republics. However, the main difficulty for Russia was that, left without satellites, it was faced with internal unrest that had a nationalistic character. The Caucasus turned out to be especially problematic in this regard.

Back in 1990, the National Congress was created. This organization was headed by Dzhokhar Dudayev, a former major general of aviation in the Soviet Army. The Congress set its main goal to secede from the USSR; in the future, it was planned to create a Chechen Republic, independent of any state.

In the summer of 1991, a situation of dual power arose in Chechnya, since both the leadership of the Chechen-Ingush Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic itself and the leadership of the so-called Chechen Republic of Ichkeria, proclaimed by Dudayev, acted.

This state of affairs could not exist for long, and in September the same Dzhokhar and his supporters seized the republican television center, the Supreme Council and the Radio House. This was the beginning of the revolution. The situation was extremely precarious, and its development was facilitated by the official collapse of the country carried out by Yeltsin. Following the news that the Soviet Union no longer existed, Dudayev's supporters announced that Chechnya was seceding from Russia.

The separatists seized power - under their influence, parliamentary and presidential elections were held in the republic on October 27, as a result of which power was completely in the hands of ex-General Dudayev. And a few days later, on November 7, Boris Yeltsin signed a decree stating that a state of emergency was being introduced in the Chechen-Ingush Republic. In fact, this document became one of the reasons for the start of the bloody Chechen wars.

At that time, there was quite a lot of ammunition and weapons in the republic. Some of these reserves had already been captured by the separatists. Instead of blocking the situation, the Russian leadership allowed it to get even more out of control - in 1992, the head of the Ministry of Defense Grachev transferred half of all these reserves to the militants. The authorities explained this decision by saying that it was no longer possible to remove weapons from the republic at that time.

However, during this period there was still an opportunity to stop the conflict. An opposition was created that opposed Dudayev's power. However, after it became clear that these small detachments could not resist the militant formations, the war was practically already underway.

Yeltsin and his political supporters could no longer do anything, and from 1991 to 1994 it was actually a republic independent of Russia. It had its own government bodies and had its own state symbols. In 1994, when Russian troops were brought into the territory of the republic, a full-scale war began. Even after the resistance of Dudayev’s militants was suppressed, the problem was never completely resolved.

Speaking about the war in Chechnya, it is worth considering that the fault for its outbreak, first of all, was the illiterate leadership of first the USSR and then Russia. It was the weakening of the internal political situation in the country that led to the weakening of the outskirts and the strengthening of nationalist elements.

As for the essence of the Chechen war, there is a conflict of interests and an inability to govern a vast territory on the part of first Gorbachev and then Yeltsin. Subsequently, it was up to the people who came to power at the very end of the twentieth century to untie this tangled knot.

First Chechen war 1994-1996

Historians, writers and filmmakers are still trying to assess the scale of the horrors of the Chechen war. No one denies that it caused enormous damage not only to the republic itself, but to all of Russia. However, it is worth considering that the nature of the two campaigns was quite different.

During the Yeltsin era, when the first Chechen campaign of 1994-1996 was launched, Russian troops could not act coherently and freely enough. The country's leadership solved its problems, moreover, according to some information, many people profited from this war - weapons were supplied to the territory of the republic from the Russian Federation, and militants often made money by demanding large ransoms for hostages.

At the same time, the main task of the Second Chechen War of 1999-2009 was the suppression of gangs and the establishment of constitutional order. It is clear that if the goals of both campaigns were different, then the course of action was significantly different.

On December 1, 1994, airstrikes were carried out on airfields located in Khankala and Kalinovskaya. And already on December 11, Russian units were introduced into the territory of the republic. This fact marked the beginning of the First Campaign. Entry was carried out from three directions at once - through Mozdok, through Ingushetia and through Dagestan.

By the way, at that time the Ground Forces were led by Eduard Vorobiev, but he immediately resigned, considering it unwise to lead the operation, since the troops were completely unprepared for conducting full-scale combat operations.

At first, Russian troops advanced quite successfully. The entire northern territory was occupied by them quickly and without much loss. From December 1994 to March 1995, the Russian Armed Forces stormed Grozny. The city was built up quite densely, and Russian units were simply stuck in skirmishes and attempts to take the capital.

Russian Defense Minister Grachev expected to take the city very quickly and therefore did not spare human and technical resources. According to researchers, more than 1,500 Russian soldiers and many civilians of the republic died or went missing near Grozny. The armored vehicles also suffered serious damage - almost 150 units were damaged.

However, after two months of fierce fighting, federal troops finally took Grozny. Participants in the hostilities subsequently recalled that the city was destroyed almost to the ground, and this is confirmed by numerous photographs and video documents.

During the assault, not only armored vehicles were used, but also aviation and artillery. There were bloody battles on almost every street. The militants lost more than 7,000 people during the operation in Grozny and, under the leadership of Shamil Basayev, on March 6 they were forced to finally leave the city, which came under the control of the Russian Armed Forces.

However, the war, which brought death to thousands of not only armed but also civilians, did not end there. The fighting continued first on the plains (from March to April), and then in the mountainous regions of the republic (from May to June 1995). Argun, Shali, and Gudermes were taken successively.

The militants responded with terrorist attacks carried out in Budennovsk and Kizlyar. After varying successes on both sides, a decision was made to negotiate. And as a result, on August 31, 1996, agreements were concluded. According to them, federal troops were leaving Chechnya, the republic's infrastructure was to be restored, and the question of independent status was postponed.

Second Chechen campaign 1999–2009

If the country's authorities hoped that by reaching an agreement with the militants, they would solve the problem and the battles of the Chechen war would become a thing of the past, then everything turned out to be wrong. Over several years of a dubious truce, the gangs have only accumulated strength. In addition, more and more Islamists from Arab countries entered the territory of the republic.

As a result, on August 7, 1999, the militants of Khattab and Basayev invaded Dagestan. Their calculation was based on the fact that the Russian government at that time looked very weak. Yeltsin practically did not lead the country, the Russian economy was in deep decline. The militants hoped that they would take their side, but they put up serious resistance to the bandit groups.

The reluctance to allow Islamists into their territory and the help of federal troops forced the Islamists to retreat. True, this took a month - the militants were driven out only in September 1999. At that time, Chechnya was led by Aslan Maskhadov, and, unfortunately, he was not able to exercise full control over the republic.

It was at this time, angry that they failed to break Dagestan, that Islamist groups began carrying out terrorist attacks on Russian territory. Horrible terrorist attacks were committed in Volgodonsk, Moscow and Buynaksk, which claimed dozens of lives. Therefore, the number of those killed in the Chechen war must include those civilians who never thought that it would come to their families.

In September 1999, a decree “On measures to increase the effectiveness of counter-terrorism operations in the North Caucasus region of the Russian Federation” was issued, signed by Yeltsin. And on December 31, he announced his resignation from the presidency.

As a result of the presidential elections, power in the country passed to a new leader, Vladimir Putin, whose tactical abilities the militants did not take into account. But at that time, Russian troops were already on the territory of Chechnya, again bombed Grozny and acted much more competently. The experience of the previous campaign was taken into account.

December 1999 is another painful and terrible chapter of the war. The Argun Gorge was otherwise called “Wolf Gate” - one of the largest Caucasian gorges. Here, the landing and border troops carried out the special operation "Argun", the purpose of which was to recapture a section of the Russian-Georgian border from Khattab's troops, and also to deprive the militants of the weapons supply route from the Pankisi Gorge. The operation was completed in February 2000.

Many people also remember the feat of the 6th company of the 104th parachute regiment of the Pskov Airborne Division. These fighters became real heroes of the Chechen war. They withstood a terrible battle on the 776th height, when they, numbering only 90 people, managed to hold back over 2,000 militants for 24 hours. Most of the paratroopers died, and the militants themselves lost almost a quarter of their strength.

Despite such cases, the second war, unlike the first, can be called sluggish. Perhaps that is why it lasted longer - a lot happened over the years of these battles. The new Russian authorities decided to act differently. They refused to conduct active combat operations carried out by federal troops. It was decided to exploit the internal split in Chechnya itself. Thus, Mufti Akhmat Kadyrov went over to the side of the federals, and situations were increasingly observed when ordinary militants laid down their arms.

Putin, realizing that such a war could last indefinitely, decided to take advantage of internal political fluctuations and persuade the authorities to cooperate. Now we can say that he succeeded. It also played a role that on May 9, 2004, Islamists carried out a terrorist attack in Grozny, aimed at intimidating the population. An explosion occurred at the Dynamo stadium during a concert dedicated to Victory Day. More than 50 people were injured, and Akhmat Kadyrov died from his injuries.

This odious terrorist attack brought completely different results. The population of the republic was finally disappointed in the militants and rallied around the legitimate government. A young man was appointed to replace his father, who understood the futility of the Islamist resistance. Thus, the situation began to change for the better. If the militants relied on attracting foreign mercenaries from abroad, the Kremlin decided to use national interests. The residents of Chechnya were very tired of the war, so they already voluntarily went over to the side of the pro-Russian forces.

The counterterrorism operation regime, introduced by Yeltsin on September 23, 1999, was abolished by President Dmitry Medvedev in 2009. Thus, the campaign was officially over, since it was not called a war, but a CTO. However, can we assume that veterans of the Chechen war can sleep peacefully if local battles are still taking place and terrorist acts are carried out from time to time?

Results and consequences for the history of Russia

It is unlikely that anyone today can specifically answer the question of how many died in the Chechen war. The problem is that any calculations will only be approximate. During the period of intensification of the conflict before the First Campaign, many people of Slavic origin were repressed or forced to leave the republic. During the years of the First Campaign, many fighters from both sides died, and these losses also cannot be accurately calculated.

While military losses can still be more or less calculated, no one has been involved in ascertaining losses among the civilian population, except perhaps human rights activists. Thus, according to the current official data, the 1st war claimed the following number of lives:

Russian soldiers - 14,000 people;
militants - 3,800 people;
civilian population - from 30,000 to 40,000 people.

If we talk about the Second Campaign, the results of the death toll are as follows:

federal troops - about 3,000 people;
militants - from 13,000 to 15,000 people;
civilian population - 1000 people.

It should be borne in mind that these figures vary greatly depending on which organizations provide them. For example, when discussing the results of the second Chechen war, official Russian sources talk about a thousand civilian deaths. At the same time, Amnesty International (an international non-governmental organization) gives completely different figures - about 25,000 people. The difference in these data, as you can see, is huge.

The result of the war is not only the impressive numbers of casualties among killed, wounded, and missing people. This is also a destroyed republic - after all, many cities, primarily Grozny, were subjected to artillery shelling and bombing. Their entire infrastructure was practically destroyed, so Russia had to rebuild the capital of the republic from scratch.

As a result, today Grozny is one of the most beautiful and modern cities. Other settlements of the republic were also rebuilt.

Anyone interested in this information can find out what happened in the territory from 1994 to 2009. There are many films about the Chechen war, books and various materials on the Internet.

However, those who were forced to leave the republic, lost their relatives, their health - these people hardly want to immerse themselves again in what they have already experienced. The country was able to withstand this most difficult period of its history, and once again proved that dubious calls for independence or unity with Russia are more important for them.

The history of the Chechen war has not yet been fully studied. Researchers will spend a long time looking for documents about losses among military and civilians and rechecking statistical data. But today we can say: the weakening of the top and the desire for disunity always lead to dire consequences. Only the strengthening of state power and the unity of people can end any confrontation so that the country can live in peace again.

The first Chechen war lasted exactly one year and nine months. The war began on December 1, 1994, with the bombing of all three Chechen air bases - Kalinovskaya, Khankala and Grozny-Severny, which destroyed all Chechen aviation, including several "corn bombers" and a couple of antediluvian Czechoslovak fighters. The war ended on August 31, 1996 with the signing of the Khasavyurt Agreements, after which the federals left Chechnya.

Military losses are depressing: 4,100 Russian troops were killed and 1,200 missing. 15 thousand militants were killed, although Aslan Maskhadov, who led the military operations, claimed that the militants lost 2,700 people. According to Memorial human rights activists, 30 thousand civilians in Chechnya were killed.

There were no winners in this war. The federals were unable to take control of the territory of the republic, and the separatists did not receive a truly independent state. Both sides lost.

An unrecognized state and preconditions for war

The only Chechen whom the whole country knew before the start of the war was Dzhokhar Dudayev. The commander of a bomber division, a combat pilot, at the age of 45 he became a major general of aviation, at 47 he left the army and entered politics. He moved to Grozny, quickly rose to leadership positions and became president in 1991. True, the president is just the unrecognized Chechen Republic of Ichkeria. But the President! He was known to have a tough temperament and determination. During the riots in Grozny, Dudayev and his supporters threw the chairman of the Grozny City Council, Vitaly Kutsenko, out of the window. He crashed and was taken to the hospital, where Dudayev’s men finished him off. Kutsenko died, and Dudayev became a national leader.

Now it has somehow been forgotten, but Dudayev’s criminal reputation was known back in that period in 1993. Let me remind you how much noise the “Chechen advice notes” caused at the federal level. After all, it was a real disaster of the national payment system. Fraudsters, through shell companies and Grozny banks, stole 4 trillion rubles from the Central Bank of Russia. Exactly a trillion! Let me say for comparison that the Russian budget in that very year 1993 was 10 trillion rubles. That is, almost half of the national budget was stolen using Chechen advice notes. Half the annual salary of doctors, teachers, military personnel, officials, miners, half of all government income. Huge damage! Subsequently, Dudayev recalled how money was brought to Grozny by trucks.

These are the marketers, democrats and supporters of national self-determination that Russia had to fight in 1994.

Beginning of the conflict

When did the first Chechen war begin? December 11, 1994. This is what many historians and publicists believe out of habit. They think that the first Chechen war of 1994-1996 began on the day when the President of the Russian Federation Boris Yeltsin signed a decree on the need to restore constitutional order in Chechnya. They forget that ten days earlier there was an air strike on airfields in Chechnya. They forget about the burnt corn fields, after which no one either in Chechnya or in the Russian armed forces doubted that there was a war going on.

But the ground operation really began on December 11. On this day, the so-called “Joint Group of Forces” (OGV), which then consisted of three parts, began to move:

western;
northwestern;
eastern.

The Western group entered Chechnya from North Ossetia and Ingushetia. Northwestern - from the Mozdok region of North Ossetia. Eastern - from Dagestan.

All three groups moved straight to Grozny.

The OGV was supposed to clear the city of separatists, and then destroy the militant bases: first in the northern, flat part of the republic; then in the southern, mountainous part.

In a short time, the OGV had to clear the entire territory of the republic from Dudayev’s formations.

The North-Western group was the first to reach the outskirts of Grozny, on December 12, and got involved in battle near the village of Dolinsky. In this battle, the militants used the Grad multiple launch rocket system, and that day they did not allow Russian troops to reach Grozny.

Gradually two other groups joined in. By the end of December, the army approached the capital from three sides:

from the west;
from North;
from the east.

The assault was scheduled for December 31st. On New Year's Eve. And the eve of the birthday of Pavel Grachev, the then Minister of Defense. I won’t say that they wanted to predict victory for the holiday, but this opinion is widespread.

Storm of Grozny

The assault has begun. The assault groups immediately encountered difficulties. The fact is that the commanders made two serious mistakes:

Firstly. The encirclement of Grozny was not completed. The problem was that Dudayev’s formations actively took advantage of the gap in the open encirclement ring. In the south, in the mountains, militant bases were located. The militants brought in ammunition and weapons from the south. The wounded were evacuated to the south. Reinforcements were approaching from the south;
Secondly. We decided to use tanks on a massive scale. 250 combat vehicles entered Grozny. Moreover, without proper intelligence support and without infantry support. The tanks turned out to be helpless in the narrow streets of urban areas. The tanks were burning. The 131st separate Maykop motorized rifle brigade was surrounded and 85 people were killed.

Parts of the Western and Eastern groups were unable to penetrate deep into the city and retreated. Only part of the North-Eastern group under the command of General Lev Rokhlin gained a foothold in the city and took up defensive positions. Some units were surrounded and suffered losses. Street fighting broke out in various areas of Grozny.

The command quickly learned lessons from what happened. The commanders changed tactics. They abandoned the massive use of armored vehicles. The battles were fought by small, mobile units of assault groups. Soldiers and officers quickly gained experience and improved their combat skills. On January 9, the federals took the building of the Petroleum Institute, and the airport came under the control of the OGV. By January 19, the militants left the presidential palace and organized a defense on Minutka Square. At the end of January, the federals controlled 30% of the territory of Grozny. At this moment, the federal group was increased to 70 thousand people, it was headed by Anatoly Kulikov.

The next important change occurred on February 3rd. To blockade the city from the south, the command formed the “South” group. Already on February 9, it blocked the Rostov-Baku highway. The blockade is closed.

Half the city turned into ruins, but victory was won. On March 6, the last militant left Grozny under pressure from the United Forces. It was Shamil Basayev.

Major fighting in 1995

By April 1995, federal forces had established control over almost the entire flat part of the republic. Argun, Shali and Gudermes were taken under control relatively easily. The settlement of Bamut remained outside the control zone. The fighting there continued intermittently until the end of the year, and even into the next year 1996.

The operation of the Ministry of Internal Affairs in Samashki received quite a public response. The propaganda campaign against Russia, professionally carried out by Dudayev's Chechen Press agency, seriously influenced world public opinion about Russia and its actions in Chechnya. Many still believe that civilian casualties in Samashki were prohibitively high. There are unverified rumors about thousands of deaths, while the human rights society Memorial, for example, believes that the number of civilians killed during the cleansing of Samashki is in the dozens.

What is true here and what is an exaggeration is now impossible to discern. One thing is certain: war is cruel and unfair. Especially when civilians are dying.

Advancement in mountainous regions was more difficult for federal forces than marching across the plains. The reason was that troops often got bogged down in the defense of militants, and even such unpleasant incidents occurred as, for example, the capture of 40 paratroopers of the Aksai special forces. In June, the federals took control of the regional centers of Vedeno, Shatoy and Nozhai-Yurt.

The most socially significant and resonant episode of the first Chechen war of 1995 was the episode associated with events going beyond the borders of Chechnya. The main negative character of the episode was Shamil Basayev. At the head of a gang of 195 people, he carried out a raid on trucks in the Stavropol Territory. The militants entered the Russian city of Budennovsk, opened fire in the city center, broke into the building of the city department of internal affairs, and shot several police officers and civilians.

The terrorists took about two thousand hostages and herded them into a complex of city hospital buildings. Basayev demanded the withdrawal of troops from Chechnya and the start of negotiations with Dudayev with the participation of the UN. Russian authorities decided to storm the hospital. Unfortunately, there was a leak of information, and the bandits managed to prepare. The assault was not unexpected and was unsuccessful. The special forces captured a number of auxiliary buildings, but did not break into the main building. On the same day they made a second assault attempt, and it also failed.

In short, the situation began to become critical and the Russian authorities were forced to enter into negotiations. The then Prime Minister Viktor Chernomyrdin was on the phone line. The whole country tensely watched the television report when Chernomyrdin spoke into the phone: “Shamil Basayev, Shamil Basayev, I am listening to your demands.” As a result of negotiations, Basayev received a vehicle and left for Chechnya. There he released the 120 remaining hostages. In total, 143 people died during the events, 46 of them were security forces.

Military clashes of varying intensity took place in the republic until the end of the year. On October 6, militants made an attempt on the life of the commander of the United Armed Forces, General Anatoly Romanov. In Grozny, on Minutka Square, in a tunnel under the railway, the Dudayevites detonated a bomb. The helmet and body armor saved the life of General Romanov, who was passing through the tunnel at that moment. As a result of his injury, the general fell into a coma and subsequently became deeply disabled. After this incident, “retaliation strikes” were carried out on militant bases, which, however, did not lead to a serious change in the balance of power in the confrontation.

Fighting in 1996

The New Year began with another hostage-taking episode. And again outside of Chechnya. This is the story. On January 9, 250 militants carried out a bandit raid in the Dagestan city of Kizlyar. First, they attacked a Russian helicopter base, where they destroyed 2 non-combat-ready MI-8 helicopters. Then they captured the Kizlyar hospital and maternity hospital. The militants drove up to three thousand townspeople from neighboring buildings.

The bandits locked people on the second floor, mined it, and barricaded themselves on the first floor, and put forward demands: the withdrawal of troops from the Caucasus, the provision of buses and a corridor to Grozny. Negotiations with the militants were conducted by the authorities of Dagestan. Representatives of the federal forces command did not participate in these negotiations. On January 10, the Chechens were provided with buses, and the militants with a group of hostages began moving towards Chechnya. They were going to cross the border near the village of Pervomaiskoye, but did not get there. Federal security forces, who were not going to put up with the fact that the hostages were taken to Chechnya, opened warning fire, and the convoy had to stop. Unfortunately, as a result of insufficiently organized actions, confusion occurred. This allowed the militants to disarm a checkpoint of 40 Novosibirsk policemen and capture the village of Pervomaiskoye.

The militants fortified themselves in Pervomaisky. The confrontation continued for several days. On the 15th, after the Chechens shot six captured policemen and two negotiators - Dagestan elders, the security forces launched an assault.

The assault failed. The confrontation continued. On the night of January 19, the Chechens broke through the encirclement and fled to Chechnya. They took with them captured police officers, who were later released.

During the raid, 78 people died.

Fighting in Chechnya continued throughout the winter. In March, the militants tried to retake Grozny, but the attempt ended in failure. In April, a bloody clash occurred near the village of Yaryshmardy.

A new turn in the development of events was brought about by the liquidation of Chechen President Dzhokhar Dudayev by federal forces. Dudayev often used the Inmarsat satellite phone. On April 21, from an aircraft equipped with a radar station, the Russian military located Dudayev. 2 SU-25 attack aircraft were lifted into the sky. They fired two air-to-ground missiles along the bearing. One of them hit the target exactly. Dudayev died.

Contrary to the expectations of the federals, the removal of Dudayev did not lead to decisive changes in the course of hostilities. But the situation in Russia has changed. The presidential election campaign was approaching. Boris Yeltsin was keenly interested in freezing the conflict. Negotiations continued until July, and the activity of both the Chechens and the federals noticeably decreased.

After Yeltsin was elected president, hostilities intensified again.

The final battle chord of the first Chechen war sounded in August 1996. The separatists again attacked Grozny. The units of General Pulikovsky had a numerical superiority, but they could not hold Grozny. At the same time, militants captured Gudermes and Argun.

Russia was forced to enter into negotiations.