What happened near Moscow in a few weeks from the end of October to December 5, 1941 can hardly be called anything other than a miracle. After the terrible catastrophe near Vyazma and Bryansk, which absorbed more than 600 thousand troops from two fronts, the Red Army managed to restore the front, stop the German onslaught on the capital, and later go on a counteroffensive.
In the new book by A.V. Isaev, the “miracle” is given the contours of rationality. Based on Soviet and German documents, the sequence of events that allowed the Soviet state to stand on the edge of the abyss is restored. It took G.K.'s composure, quick reaction and almost incredible instincts. Zhukov for timely countering of emerging crises. Moreover, from the pages of the documents comes an understanding of the far from flawless conduct of the defensive operation of the Western Front, with blunders at different levels of the military hierarchy that almost cost Moscow itself, missed opportunities for defense and counterattacks.
What is the role of the great Generals Mud and Frost in the miracle near Moscow? What role did the numerous horses of the infantry divisions play in the Wehrmacht disaster? The splendor and poverty of the Panzerwaffe near the walls of Moscow. The tenacity of the cadets and the fury of tank attacks just steps away from the capital. All this is in the new book of the leading Russian historian of the Great Patriotic War.
The publication is illustrated with unique maps and exclusive photographs.
Series:
Publisher's abstract: A new book by a leading military historian is dedicated to the turning point battle of the Great Patriotic War. This very word - Stalingrad - has entered all languages, long ago becoming a common noun, a symbol of perseverance and valor. The recent order of the Russian Minister of Defense, which declassified a huge array of documents, allowed the author for the first time to write the history of the Battle of Stalingrad without omissions or omissions. In the book by Alexei Isaev, this battle appears for the first time in all its grandiose scale - not only the battles in the city itself, but also the autumn counterattacks of the Stalingrad Front are described here in detail. It was then that a grueling positional battle unfolded north of Stalingrad, in which several times more troops were involved than on the streets of the city, hundreds of aircraft and tanks. The author convincingly proves that in conditions of unstable defense, Soviet tank corps were the most advanced means of fighting, more than once saving the Stalingrad Front from defeat and ultimately snatching victory from the enemy in this greatest battle of the Great Patriotic War.
Series:
The great Soviet Union emerged as a tank power. It was in the USSR that the best tank of the Second World War was created. It was here that the theory of deep operations was born - a mechanized offensive based on tanks deep into the enemy’s defense. It was in Soviet Russia in the early 30s of the last century that the first armored formations appeared, intended not to reinforce infantry, but for independent action, which transformed the tank from a tactical weapon into a strategic, determining factor in modern warfare. It is not for nothing that our ISs and T-34s, victoriously trampling the Berlin pavements with their tracks, became the main symbol of Soviet military power... This book contains the best works of leading modern authors devoted to the history of the development and combat use of Soviet tanks - from the first tank battles in Spain to the grandiose battles near Moscow and on the Kursk Bulge, from the disaster of 1941 to Victory Day.
Series:
× We need to wait a little!
Genre: History, Language: ru Abstract: “The dizziness of success” after the defeat of the Germans near Moscow turned out to be short-lived, but they had to pay for it in great blood - in the spring and summer of 1942, the Red Army suffered a series of crushing defeats, which in their scale were comparable to a catastrophe the beginning of the war, but which could no longer be justified by the “suddenness of the enemy...
Genre: History, Language: ru Abstract: Is it true that the unprecedented ferocity of the Battle of Stalingrad is explained not so much by military as by ideological reasons and that if the city had not been named after the Leader, the Red Army would not have defended it at any cost? Did the Soviet command throw entire divisions into battle unarmed, as shown in the scandalous film “The Enemy of...
Genre: History, Language: ru Abstract: In the first days of the war, Stalin was in complete prostration. In 1941, the Germans “drove the Red Army all the way to Moscow,” since almost no one in the USSR “wanted to fight for a totalitarian regime.” The Leningrad blockade played into the hands of Stalin, who wanted to “starve out opposition Leningrad.” Hitler's military leaders in all respects...
Genre: History, Language: ru Abstract: Books by Alexey Isaev “Anti-Suvorov. The Little Man's Big Lie" and "Anti-Suvorov. Ten Myths of World War II" became the top bestsellers of 2004, selling a record 100,000 copies and returning reader interest in the military-historical genre. In this edition, both volumes are not only united under one cover for the first time, but are supplemented with new materials. IN …
Genre: History, Language: ru Abstract: The Great Soviet Union emerged as a tank power. It was in the USSR that the best tank of the Second World War was created. It was here that the theory of deep operations was born - a mechanized offensive based on tanks deep into the enemy’s defense. It was in Soviet Russia in the early 30s of the last century that the first armored formations appeared, designed ...
Genre: History, Language: ru Abstract: After the June disaster of 1941, the defeat of Soviet troops in the Border Battle and unprecedented encirclement operations carried out by the Wehrmacht on the Eastern Front, it seemed to many that the Red Army could no longer withstand the crushing blows of German tank wedges . Millions of soldiers and commanders of the Red Army perished in the “cauldrons” near Kiev, ...
Genre: History, Language: ru Abstract: In March 1945, the Nazis made their last attempt to turn the tide of the war by launching a counterattack in the area of Lake Balaton. The best tank forces of the III Reich were concentrated here - the SS divisions “Leibstandarte Adolf Hitler”, “Reich”, “Totenkopf”, “Viking”, etc., staffed by convinced Nazis and armed with the latest armored vehicles (in total...
Genre: Other non-fiction, Language: ru Abstract: Is it true that the unprecedented ferocity of the Battle of Stalingrad is explained not so much by military as by ideological reasons and that if the city had not been named after the Leader, the Red Army would not have defended it at any cost? Did the Soviet command throw entire divisions into battle unarmed, as shown in the scandalous film...
Genre: History, Language: ru Abstract: June 22, 1941. This day is forever marked in national calendars with black mourning color. This is one of the most terrible dates in our history. This is the day of the greatest military catastrophe. How could this happen? Why did the enemy manage to take the USSR by surprise? Why was German aviation allowed at the very first...
+To the 70th anniversary of the legendary Operation Bagration.
A new book by a leading military historian dedicated to the greatest triumph of the Red Army. The best modern study of the enormous Soviet offensive, which crushed the largest army group on the Eastern Front in just two weeks, Army Group Center. A new look at the turning point of the Great Patriotic War.
Did you know that this phenomenal victory in Belarus was preceded by a series of unsuccessful offensive operations, and from the autumn of 1943 to the spring of 1944, the western direction was a positional “Verdun” for the Red Army, so that the Supreme Commander-in-Chief even had to authorize an investigation by the GKO commission and accept the most stringent measures and make impartial “organizational conclusions”? How did our troops manage to overcome this positional impasse, turning the trench “meat grinder” into a major maneuver operation, which is rightly called the “Stalinist blitzkrieg”? What made it possible not only to break through, but to completely collapse the enemy’s defenses? Why did the Germans fail to maintain the integrity of the front and retreat to new positions in an organized manner? How did the heavy defeat of the Wehrmacht develop into the worst military disaster in German history? And who is to blame for this “epic defeat”?.. Based on operational documents not only from Soviet, but also German archives, this investigation restores the course of the brilliant Operation Bagration, which largely predetermined the Great...
History is based on facts: archaeological excavations, documents, written memories and testimonies. Despite this, it is presented in different ways, omitting certain facts and focusing on what confirms the theory of historians who defend dissertations and publish books with sensational discoveries. Alexey Isaev is one of those who doubted the veracity of the statements of the sensational writer Viktor Suvorov, who described the actions of the USSR in the Second World War.
Citizen and man
Alexey Valerievich is 42 years old. He was born before the collapse of the Soviet Union in the capital of Uzbekistan and managed to receive an education that was considered the best in the world. After graduating from school in his native Tashkent, he entered the Moscow Engineering Physics Institute. Graduated from the Faculty of Cybernetics. From then until now he has lived in the capital.
For a long time, Alexey Isaev was seriously interested in history and worked in large Russian military archives, including the Central one, owned by the Ministry of Defense. In 2007 he became an employee of the Institute of Military History. In 2012 he received the academic degree of Candidate of Historical Sciences. His dissertation was devoted to the Second World War.
These facts refute the claims of Isaev’s ill-wishers that he is just an amateur who has no idea about history as a science.
Main opponent
in his books he criticizes the theory of V.B. Rezun, who publishes his books under the sonorous name - Suvorov. Rezun’s version of the role of the Soviet Union in the Second World War is very different from the official one. Two books by Isaev are devoted to its refutation.Despite his disagreement with Vladimir Bogdanovich, Alexey Valerievich does not refuse to admit the mistakes of the USSR during the war. He highlights facts that were hidden before perestroika and are reluctantly highlighted now.
As Zadornov said, you can criticize your country, or you can spoil it. The difference is obvious: Rezun violated his military oath and fled to England. For treason to the Motherland in the Soviet Union, he was sentenced to death in absentia. Isaev, although he does not always write pleasant things, lives, works and publishes books in Moscow.
Historical views
writes about objective facts and gives them his assessment. Its readers are history buffs who are ready to listen not only to the official version of events. The basis of Isaev’s creativity is the myths about the Second World War, which he debunks in his books. The most famous of them:- Soviet aviation was destroyed on the ground in the first hours after the attack.
- The Allies provided food and equipment, but the destruction of enemy troops was entirely the merit of the USSR.
- At the beginning of the war there was no communication, and for this reason the troops could not organize and fight back.
- Accusing Stalin of cowardice and inaction in the first few days after the start of the war.
In his research, Alexey Isaev pays great attention to the actions of both Soviet and German aviation.
Books
Isaev’s books, although published in small editions, are popular. At the moment, 11 works dedicated to the Second World War have been published. Two of them refute V. Rezun’s distorted interpretation of the facts. One book is dedicated to Marshal Zhukov, a commander who contributed to the victory and was denigrated by many writers.
Several works describe in detail significant battles: for Stalingrad, Berlin and Kharkov. One book sets out a brief history of the war, and two more contain facts that have been silent for a long time.
Accordingly, he discusses anything, but not this most important issue.
Therefore, we will go over it with the largest strokes, but we will still chew it into another sheet for the most dull. Luckily there is time.
1. Isaev says nothing about geography, about the territory on which the war was to be fought. He does not invite the reader to take a kilometer-five kilometer map of the place of events, i.e. the entire western territory of the USSR, without really giving the necessary maps of the necessary areas in his books, and suggests being guided by the fingers and fictionalized opinion of Isaev himself. But this is obviously a wrong approach, because the maps themselves reveal a lot of interesting things. For example, remembering ZOVO, the configuration of the German offensive with two tank groups in converging directions was the only one possible. Well, the fact that the Bialystok ledge itself, even with the available forces, at least somewhat larger, was impossible to defend. Although move literally 50 kilometers back, let’s say to the line Kobrin-Gainovka-Rudek (a village in the middle between Bialystok and Volkovysk)-Grodno, organize a frontier and I don’t want to fight. Based on the Belovezhskaya and Augustovskaya Pushchas, and tens of kilometers of swamps.
No, of course, I do not in any way pretend to have discovered anything there, but when I get acquainted with the real data, i.e. map, I have some questions that Isaev, as an “expert in the topic,” as he positions himself, should ask and clarify. Because the army seemed to be forced to fight in the worst possible conditions. And some citizens even express the opinion that the armies were deliberately “framed” and that Pavlov was shot for a reason. Who would explain all this?
Again, I don't know and I could be wrong. But who would explain why troops are deployed here or there, and what impact all this has on how these battles ultimately end? =)
In warfare, geography and the use of terrain is one of the main factors. The terrain dictates everything - from the possibilities of digging in to the capacity of transport arteries, and therefore the density of troops. And it turns out that the deployment lines of troops, the directions of strikes, etc. This is a serious dilemma that requires careful discussion.
But Isaev often excludes this question for some reason. He can write 30-50 pages about the course of events, but nothing about the terrain. Although the same Western authors often provide good maps, even color ones, some collections of photographs that give an idea of the relief and local architecture, and so on.
2. The same applies to operational densities, the same number of divisions per kilometer of front. So, all interwar literature, be it ours or Western, is replete with these assessments of the realities of WWII and sometimes interwar conflicts. What about Isaev? But nothing, he completely ignores these questions. That is, when talking about the course of certain operations, he speaks only about the course of events, but does not describe not only the topography, but also the density of troops and their weapons, although according to the ideas of military science of that time, these are perhaps the most important indicators. How should one treat Isaev’s work after this, other than as fiction?
Take the same Triandafillov, whom they like to mention, but they really don’t like to read and quote. And read what exactly he writes there. What masses of troops does he like to operate, what operational density (the total number of divisions of the front divided by its width) he recognizes as characteristic of the Eastern European region. Look what he writes about the composition of the shock army, the width of the front of its offensive and the density of troops during the breakthrough. And this is what he says - even for Eastern Europe and the weakness of local industry, the average estimated density of front troops will be no more than 10-12 km per division, and this is in the realities of 1927-29! In this case, we are talking about average density, because in key areas of defense this density will be even higher! 6-8km or so.
Breaking through all this will be shock armies consisting of about 15-20 divisions, generously reinforced with artillery, tanks and aviation. And the breakthroughs themselves will occur at the front up to 30 km!
That is, Triandafillov describes a kind of prototype of “tank” armies, of course, at the level of technology of the second half of the 20s. This is exactly how the Germans acted, combining the efforts of a shock (tank) army and a smaller auxiliary army used to consolidate the results. It’s clear that this is partly a stretch on my part, and of course tanks in those years did not have such mobility and resource, and there was no such general motorization, but as for me, Triandafillov correctly grasped the essence - large strike formations capable of create very high specific densities of forces and means, and confidently break through the enemy’s defenses. And, remembering Pervokonnikov and Vtorokonnikov, it was probably assumed that it would be possible to use the results of these breakthroughs...
Therefore, we must keep such assessments in mind, not to mention later authors like Isserson and lesser-known ones, in order to at least navigate something there, and not allow various kinds of fiction writers to manipulate us.
However, Isaev insists that the Red Army did not have time to mobilize and, they say, this is the main reason for the defeats of the summer of 1941. But is it? Let's just calculate what actually happened, using the example of our beloved ZOVO.
The length of the ZOVO border was around 400 km. He had 24 rifle divisions. This is approximately equal to 16.5 km per division, this does not even take into account that 4 divisions were maintained by 6 thousand personnel, as well as the fact that the Soviet 10 thousand “core” states 04/100 were noticeably weaker than the German ones. Plus, you can add 6 motorized divisions with an average of 10 thousand people each, without raising the issue of their OSS. The result will be 30 divisions, or ~13 km per division. That is, this is clearly not enough for defense against concentrated shock armies, be it tanks or infantry reinforced with tanks.
In addition, one must take into account that the troops were spread thinly along the border and located in several echelons, so the actual tactical densities were 20-25+ km per division of 10-12 thousand personnel. In Triandafillov’s terminology, these are precisely very stretched fronts of divisions, permissible only in secondary theaters, where no active enemy actions are expected. But this is exactly how Soviet divisions were built in the main attack zone of reinforced enemy groups!
In reality, it was even more fun, because up to half of the ZOVO forces were located in the second echelon at a great distance and in reality these 400 km of border were covered by 11 rifle and 4 motorized rifle divisions (we do not count cavalry and tank divisions according to Triandafillov’s precepts). Normal, right? 15 divisions on 400 km of front or the _operational_ estimated density is as much as ~27 km per division! What, excuse me, “cover-up” are we talking about?
But the “funny thing” is that the main part of these forces of the 1st echelon was located exactly in the Bialystok ledge... And the front was hanging on snot, “for some reason” exposed to attacks by German tank groups.
Now let's get back to the topography, Ozi, and look at the alternatives. For example, the same option Kobrin-Gainovka-Rudek-Grodno. The final front of the district extends under 200 km, despite the fact that more than half are forests covered with swamps. Defend yourself to your heart's content. And the operational density when built in one echelon is up to ~6.5 km... Without taking into account swamps. =)
What happens? But it turns out that Isaev’s regularly repeated thesis that “the Germans forestalled us in deployment and we simply did not have time to mobilize” is false. It was not a matter of mobilization. It wasn't about deployment. The point was where to deploy, along what lines and what densities to create. Agree that “When to mobilize?” and "Where to deploy?" These are two very different questions that take the debate in very different directions.
I repeat. I could be wrong. I may not take into account or understand something, incl. from the field of political things. But why should I get to this point myself, independently studying these factors that are not mentioned anywhere? Moreover, since we have such a “great specialist” and “authority” on 1941 as Isaev... Why? Why does he not have a word about this, not a single chapter, not a single detailed section in his numerous books?
Isaev had nothing on this topic. But Veremeev, a sapper by profession, somehow had it. Moreover, it is simple, without details about the topography and numbers. So which of them is a professional military historian? =)
3. Organizational and staffing structures.
One of the key questions that all Russian near-historical publicists fear like fire and stubbornly avoid. Meanwhile, Western authors like Glantz, Zalogi and the authors of Osperey often publish our entire states, in the manner of Western military regulations on OPFOR.
Although I personally will undertake to assert that the very organization of our units and formations was one of the sources of problems, focusing on the wartime staff of 04/400 and remembering that this was an unattainable ideal.
For example:
One of the main problems of the Soviet divisions, among other things, was anti-tank defense. Let's skip the issue of mines, regulations and everything else, let's talk about artillery. In the Soviet division 04/400 there were only 16 divisions and 54 45s scattered among units of different levels (2 per battalion, 6 per regiment and 18 per division). Not 34 76-mm films, as some authors like to say, mixing divisions and 18 regiments together, but only 16.
That is, even the calculated density of anti-tank guns with a division front of 10 km was 70/10 = 7 guns per km of front. If we take the actual width of the division’s front at 20+ km, it turns out that the real density of Soviet anti-tank guns was no more than 3.5 anti-tank guns per kilometer of front! And what kind of anti-tank defense can we talk about here for any division formation?
No less sad is the fact that the 45s were scattered across different levels of the division, and were not united in the hands of rifle regiment commanders, say, into anti-tank divisions of 18 guns, giving them a kind of anti-tank reserve option.
It turns out that due to the lack of divisions and the incorrect organization of the 45th, both regimental commanders and division commanders were deprived of full-fledged anti-tank artillery reserves. And adding here the factors of overextended divisional defense fronts and the lack of massive anti-tank mines, we come to the conclusion that anti-tank defense in the ZOVO zone was in principle impossible!
This is precisely one of the main reasons for the defeat of ZOVO. In this, as in many other things. Accordingly, for us, like any truly professional military historian, the course of events and the history of the actions of enemy tank corps are completely unimportant until we have seen these elementary figures describing the combat, logistics and other capabilities of units, formations and formations.
Where are Isaev’s?
4. Conclusions.
Isaev’s two books about 1941, “Stopped Blitzkrieg,” 2010, and about the alternative year 41, “The Great Patriotic Alternative,” are written in exactly this style. No analysis of geography and capacity, no analysis of organizational structures, no analysis of operational and tactical densities and deployment options. Nothing!
Instead of all this, after the minimum amount of data given to the reader drop by drop, there immediately follows a transition to a description of the chronology of events, within the framework of which Isaev diligently tries to pass off his value judgments and reflections as facts, sliding into fiction. =)
Ask yourself honestly: what topic is Isaev an expert on? By infantry? No. By artillery? No. Aviation? No. By tanks? No. In military engineering and missile defense? No. On operational, strategic or tactical issues? No. In supply, logistics, logistics or military-industrial complex? No.
So which one? Not for any reason. He is an expert only in the course of events, chronology, and this is the only topic he delved into.
But I, like real military men and historians, are interested in the question not of what happened (i.e. chronology), but why and how technically it happened? And if we take an analogy with any team sport, then geography is the field, OHS and combat personnel are the characteristics and set of players, the density of formations and equipment is the density of those same players in different parts of the field. But this is exactly what Isaev, like many Russian authors, does not have. They are trying to sell us some kind of ideological journalism, and not tell us what, how and why it really happened and what options there were...
And if this is explained on the fingers of the historical method, then in the scheme: collection of facts - reconstruction - interpretation - conclusions, these _publicists_ and _ideologists_ (from Rezun and Solonin to Isaev and Co.) come from the end. That is, they have certain ready-made conclusions to which they adapt the data and documents that they decide to show us in _strictly dosed_ manner, they replace their reconstructions and interpretations with rhetoric, reasoning and value judgments, up to certain dogmas. But if you come from the end, it’s pseudoscience!
Moreover, they abandon calculations as a method, i.e. they don’t want to check what they are saying with mathematics, but military calculations are one of the foundations of military affairs. Be it here, or in Europe, or in the USA. That is, they, again, want the right to say whatever they want about commanders, chiefs of staff and operators, but at the same time they in no way want to get into their shoes and substantively show readers exactly what problems and choices they faced... And they in no case do they want to show the reader what exactly the sphere of competence of those same commanders consists of! What exactly are those professionals at? What exactly can they do well or poorly? What exactly is this military matter at this level? You don’t need to tell me whether the same Zhukov is good or bad, I’ll decide for myself, you’d better tell me what exactly he is competent in and what exactly his craft is. =)
But as a result, forum users of all stripes have been fighting on forums for decades, clinging to this or that quote from the next publicist and sometimes swearing at each other in all sorts of ways. I've been wondering for a long time why this is even possible? After all, in many ways, military affairs, like military history, is an exact, testable science. Much in it can be measured, proven or disproved literally on the knee, regardless of the positions and opinions of both interlocutors. But then I started to take a closer look at the structure of popular Russian war-historical creatives and it dawned on me. And this is not science or history. This is precisely ideological journalism, with a lot of exaggerations, exaggerations, omissions and outright lies. And I don’t want to focus on this. I'm interested in data and documents, I'm interested in statistics and calculations, I'm interested in geography and maps, but I don't need this eternal squabble and protracted nonsense.
Therefore, in answer to the question posed, Isaev, like many others, is not particularly historical. Precisely because he comes from the end and often tailors his reasoning to a certain ready-made answer. A dosed amount of data with defaults, a bag of reasoning, rhetoric and editorial insertions and voila - we came to predetermined conclusions. The fact that it took 400+ pages of fiction smeared on the table, which could have been spent much better, does not interest anyone. The author is popular. The book is on sale. Everyone is happy with everything.
In addition, for variety, I can demonstrate all this using the example of Isaev’s reasoning about submachine guns, which amazed me at one time. It’s just that everyone was shouting Isaev-Isaev back then. And this was the first time I encountered him. Well, I took it, read it and was stunned. But that will be another time.