The Battle of Kursk, which became one of the key battles of the Great Patriotic War, occurred from to .
And on July 12, 1943, the day when the Church honors the memory, the largest tank battle in military history took place near the Prokhorovka station in the Belgorod region.
On July 12, 1943, on the southern front of the Kursk Bulge in the area of Prokhorovka station, one of the largest battles in military history using armored forces took place. On both sides, up to 1.2 thousand tanks and self-propelled artillery units were involved in the battle.
From July 5 to August 23, 1943, battles for the Kursk Bulge took place, during which German troops tried to encircle Soviet units and go on the offensive. To accomplish this task, they decided to use a bridgehead at the Prokhorovka railway station. This was the only convenient place for the passage of tanks, which were given great importance in the battles near Kursk. Therefore, the enemy threw heavy Tiger tanks and Ferdinand self-propelled guns here. Several tank armies and corps were sent to defend the bridgehead.
July 12 at 8:30 a.m. formations of the 5th Guards Tank Army under the command of Lieutenant General P. A. Rotmistrov and the 5th Guards Army under the command of Lieutenant General A. S. Zhadov, after a fifteen-minute artillery preparation and with aviation support, launched a counterattack. The most difficult oncoming tank battle fell on the 18th and 29th tank corps, which entered into confrontation with the 2nd SS Panzer Corps on a 6-kilometer section of the front between the villages of Storozhevoye and Psyol, two kilometers southwest of Prokhorovka.
“... With gaping holes, with tracks and turrets torn off, hundreds of tanks were burning among the rye. The ammunition exploded, thousands of sparks flying in all directions. The towers fell to the ground with a roar. The battle took place on the ground and in the air, burning planes fell from a height and exploded. The crews of the damaged tanks, leaving the burning vehicles, continued the hand-to-hand fight, wielding machine guns, grenades and knives. It was an unimaginable mixture of fire, metal and human bodies. Everything was burning around, and this is probably how artists should depict hell,” recalled an eyewitness to the battle.
Neither side managed to achieve the goals set for July 12: the Germans failed to capture Prokhorovka, break through the defenses of Soviet troops and enter the operational space, and Soviet troops failed to encircle the enemy group.
Estimates of combat losses in the battle of Prokhorovka in various sources differ greatly. But basically these numbers vary between 300-400 tanks. The losses of Soviet troops during these two days amounted to more than 300 tanks (according to some foreign data, up to 400). German troops in this two-day battle lost, according to various sources, 320-400 tanks.
In this situation, the German command made a forced decision to withdraw on the southern front of the Kursk Bulge and from July 16 to 24 withdrew troops to their original positions.
In memory of those who died near Prokhorovka, on May 3, 1995, on the 50th anniversary of the Victory in the Great Patriotic War, the Church of the Holy Apostles Peter and Paul was opened in Prokhorovka. The names of 7 thousand soldiers who died here are carved on the marble slabs of its walls.
After five days of defensive battles south of Kursk, the command of the Voronezh Front reported to Headquarters that the German offensive was running out of steam and the moment had come to take active action.
In the evening, the command of the Voronezh Front received an order from Headquarters to conduct a counterattack against a large group of German search forces. Clustered in the Mal area. Beacons, Ozerovsky. To carry out a counterattack, the front was reinforced by two armies, the 5th Guards, under the command of A. Zhadov, and the 5th Guards Tank, under the command of P. Rotmistrov. transferred from the Steppe Front. The plan for carrying out a counterattack, developed at the headquarters of the Voronezh Front with the participation of the representative of the Headquarters A. Vasilevsky VI army commanders, was as follows. The main core of the 5th Guards Tank Army, reinforced by two breakthrough tank regiments, was supposed to, with the support of two self-propelled artillery regiments and a regiment of guards rocket mortars and all available attack aircraft, cut in two the SS tank corps, whose forces seemed to have dried up in the previous laziness. At the same time, it was planned to reach the Pokrovka-Yakovlevo line. then turn to the East and West, cutting off the retreat routes for the German troops and encircling the resolved groups with the assistance of units of the 5th Guards Army, as well as the 2nd Tank Corps and the 2nd Guards Tank Corps.
However, preparations for a counterattack, which began on July 10-11, were thwarted by the Germans, who themselves inflicted powerful blows on our defense in this section of the bottom. One is in the direction of Oboyan, and the second is towards Prokhorovka. The first strike, according to the Germans, was more of a distracting nature, and nevertheless, its strength and surprise led to the fact that some units of the 1st Tank and 6th Guards Armies retreated 1-2 km in the direction of Oboyan.
The offensive began in different sectors in the direction of Prokhorovka, when the 2nd battalion of the SS tank regiment “Leibstandarte Adolf Hitler” (LSSAH), together with the 3rd battalion under the command of I. Peiper, with a sudden attack captured the height of 252.2, dominating the Teterevino-Prokhorovka road. After 10 minutes, the Tiger company of the Totenkopf division began to cross the Psel River, trying to expand the bridgehead between the villages of Krasny Oktyabr and Mikhailovka.
South-West of Prokhorovka in the direction of the village. Yasnaya Polyana led the attack from the SS division Das Reich. Due to the sudden disorganized withdrawal of some infantry units of the 5th Guards Army and the 2nd Tank Corps, the artillery preparation of the Soviet counteroffensive, which began on July 10, was disrupted. Many batteries were left without infantry cover and suffered losses both in deployment positions and on the move. The front found itself in a very difficult situation.
Only the quick introduction of the 42nd Infantry Division into the battle, as well as the transfer of all available artillery to direct fire, made it possible to stop the advance of German tanks.
Group "Kempf" consisted of the 6th and 19th Panzer Divisions, which had about 180 tanks, which were opposed by 100 domestic tanks. On the night of July 11, the Germans launched a surprise attack from the Melekhovo area to the north and northwest with the goal of breaking through to Prokhorovka. The infantry units of the 9th Guards and 305th Rifle Divisions defending in this direction, who did not expect such a powerful blow, retreated. To cover the exposed section of the front, on the night of July 11-12, 10 IPTABr from the Stanki reserve were transferred. In addition, the 1510th IPTAP and a separate anti-tank rifle battalion were involved in this area. These forces, together with infantry units of the 35th Guards Rifle Corps, did not allow the development of an offensive in the direction of Art. Prokhorovka. In this area, the Germans managed to break through only to the Sev River. Donets in the Novo-Oskonnoye region.
July 12, 1943. Decisive day.
Opponents' plans for the decisive day.
The commander of the SS Panzer Corps, Paul Hausser, assigned the following tasks to his three divisions:
LSSAH - bypass the village. Storozhevoye from the north and reach the line Petrovka - st. Prokhorovka. at the same time strengthening its position at an altitude of 252.2.
Das Reich - push back the opposing Soviet troops to the line east of Ivanovka.
Totenkopf - conduct an offensive along the Prokhorovka-Kartashevka road.
This was an offensive in the direction of the station. Prokhorovka from three directions in order to overcome the last line of Soviet defense and prepare the “gate” for entering the reserves of Army Group “South” into the breakthrough.
At the same time, the Command of the Voronezh Front, considering the German offensive thwarted and the crisis overcome, was about to launch a planned counter-offensive on Luchki and Yakovleve. At this point, the 5th hectare tank army began to concentrate two tank corps, which included about 580 tanks, P. Rotmistrov chose the line of deployment of the first echelon of the army to the west and southwest of the station. Prokhorovka at the front 15 km. Units of the 2nd Guards Tank Corps and the 5th Guards Tank Corps also prepared for snowflakes.
By 5 o'clock in the morning. A diversionary strike by the Germans from the south.At this time, the German troops of the Kempf group, trying to develop their offensive in a northern direction, struck in the defense zone of the 69th Army. By 5 o'clock in the morning, units of the 81st and 92nd Guards Rifle Divisions of the 69th Army were thrown back from the defensive line near the river. Northern Donets - Cossack and the Germans managed to capture the villages of Rzhavets, Ryndinka, Vypolzovka. A threat arose to the left flank of the deploying 5th Guards Tank Army and, by order of Headquarters representative A. Vasilevsky, front commander N. Vatutin gave the order to send the mobile reserve of the 5th Guards Tank Army to the defense zone of the 69th Army.
At 8 a.m.A reserve group under the command of General Trufanov launched a counterattack on the units of the German troops of the Kempf group that had broken through.
Thanks to the persistent defense of the Red Army units, the Germans' 3rd Tank Corps (300 tanks and 25 assault guns) never managed to break through to Rotmistrov's positions from the south.
At 7:45.Immediately after dawn on July 12, light rain began, which slightly delayed the start of the German offensive on Prokhorovka, but did not prevent the Soviet 18th Tank Corps under General Bakharov from launching an attack on the 2nd LSSAH battalion on the outskirts of the Oktyabrsky state farm with the forces of one tank brigade. Up to 40 Soviet tanks launched an attack on the village of Mikhailovka, but were repulsed by a division of assault guns and retreated.
From 8 o'clock in the morningLuftwaffe aircraft began intensive bombing of Soviet positions near Prokhorovka.
AT 8.30 AMthe main forces of the German troops as part of the tank divisions Leibstandarte Adolf Hitler, Das Reich and Totenkonf. numbering up to 500 tanks and self-propelled guns (including 42 Tiger tanks), went on the offensive in the direction of Art. Prokhorovka in the highway and railway zone. This grouping was supported by all available air forces. However, in the first phase of this offensive, only up to half of the armored forces available to the German troops were involved - one battalion each of the LSSAH and Das Reich divisions, two Tiger companies and one T-34 company, with a total of about 230 tanks. 70 assault guns and 39 Marder anti-tank self-propelled guns.
At 9:00After a 15-minute artillery barrage, the German group was, in turn, attacked by the main forces of the 5th Guards Tank Army. The 18th Tank Corps of General Bakharov broke into the Oktyabrsky state farm at high speed, and despite heavy losses, captured it. However, near the villages of Andreevka and Vasilyevka, he met an enemy tank group, which included 15 Tiger tanks and a battalion of assault guns. Two platoons of "Tigers" (H. Wendarf and M. Wittmann) opened fire on Soviet tanks from a standing position from a distance of 1000-1200 m. The assault guns, maneuvering, fired from short stops. Having lost about 40 tanks, units of the 18th. were able to capture Vasilyevka, but were unable to develop the offensive further and at 18 o’clock they went on the defensive. From their fire, the Germans lost one Tiger and seven assault guns burnt out, as well as three Tigers, six medium tanks and up to 10 self-propelled guns knocked out and damaged.
At approximately 11:30The 29th Panzer Corps began the battle for height 252.5 where it was met by tanks of the SS Division “Leibstandarte Adolf Hitler”. Throughout the day, the corps fought a maneuver battle, but after 16 hours it was pushed back by the approaching tanks of the SS Totenkopf division and, with the onset of darkness, went on the defensive.
At 14.30The 2nd Guards Tank Corps, advancing in the direction of Kalinin, suddenly encountered the advancing SS tank division Das Reich. Because. that the 29th Tank Corps was stuck in battles for height 252.5. The Germans struck the 2nd Guards Tank Corps on its exposed flank and forced it to retreat to its original position. During these battles, the 2nd Guards Tank Corps lost 24 of the 41 tanks brought into battle knocked out and damaged. Of these, 12 cars burned down.
The 2nd Tank Corps, which provided the junction between the 2nd Guards Tank Corps and the 29th Tank Corps, was able to somewhat push back the German units in front of it, but came under fire from assault and anti-tank guns pulled up from the second line, suffered losses and stopped.
12 a.m. German attack from the north.
By noon on July 12, it became clear to the German command that the frontal attack on Prokhorovka had failed. Then they decided, having crossed Psel, to go with part of their forces north of Prokhorovka to the rear of the 5th Guards Tank Army, for which the 11th Tank Division and the remaining units of the extra SS Totemkopf * tank (96 tanks and self-propelled guns. motorized infantry regiment, up to 200) were allocated MOTORCYCLISTS). The group broke through the battle formations of the 52nd Guards Rifle Division and by 1 p.m. captured height 226.6.
But on the northern slopes of the heights, the Germans ran into stubborn resistance from Colonel Lyakhov’s 95th Guards Rifle Division. The division was hastily reinforced with an anti-tank artillery reserve, consisting of one IPTAP and two separate DIVISIONS of captured guns (one division was equipped with 88 mm anti-aircraft guns). Until 6 p.m., the division successfully defended itself against advancing tanks. But at 20:00. After a massive air raid, due to the lack of ammunition and large losses of personnel, the division, under the attacks of approaching German motorized rifle units, retreated beyond the village of Polezhaev. Artillery reserves had already been deployed here and the German offensive was stopped.
The 5th Guards Army also failed to complete its assigned tasks. Faced with massive fire from German artillery and tanks, the infantry units advanced forward to a distance of 1-3 km, after which they went on the defensive. In the offensive zones of the 1st Tank Army, 6th Guards Army. The 69th Army and the 7th Guards Army also did not achieve decisive success.
From 13 to 15 JulyGerman units continued to conduct offensive operations, but by that time they had already lost the battle. On July 13, the Fuhrer informed the commanders of Army Group South (Field Marshal von Manstein) and Army Group Center (Field Marshal von Kluge) that he had decided to abandon the continuation of Operation Citadel. This decision was also influenced by the successful landing of the Allies in Sicily, which took place during the Battle of Kursk.
CONCLUSIONS:
The battles near Prokhorovka in the post-war years were declared “the largest tank battle of the Second World War.” At the same time, most authors, when describing it, agreed that “more than 1000 tanks came to hand-to-hand combat in a small field not far from Prokhorovka.” Today this field is even shown to passing tourists, but analysis of even domestic wartime documents proves that this legend correlates with them, to put it mildly, very roughly.
The so-called “tank battle near Prokhorovka did not take place on any separate field, as was commonly believed. The operation was carried out on a front with a length of more than 35 km (and taking into account the southern direction - even more) and consisted of a number of separate battles with the use of tanks by both sides. In total, according to estimates from the command of the Voronezh Front, 1,500 tanks and self-propelled guns from both sides took part here. Moreover, the 5th Guards Tank Army, operating in a zone with a length of 17-19 km, together with attached units, at the beginning of the battles, numbered from 680 to 720 tanks and self-propelled guns. and the German group - up to 540 tanks and self-propelled guns.
The main events here took place on July 12, which accounted for the maximum losses of equipment and personnel on both sides. In the battles of July 11-13, the Germans lost to the west and southwest of Prokhorovka, according to reports from the front command, about 320 tanks and assault guns (according to other sources - from 180 to 218) knocked out, abandoned and destroyed, the Kempf group - 80 tanks, and the 5th Guards Tank Army (excluding the losses of General Trufanov’s group) - 328 tanks and self-propelled guns (see table). For unknown reasons, the front's report does not contain accurate information about the losses of the 2nd Guards Tank Corps and the 2nd Tank Corps operating here, which are estimated at 55-70 vehicles damaged and destroyed. Despite the large concentration of tanks on both sides, the main losses were inflicted not by enemy tanks, but by enemy anti-tank and assault artillery.
The counterattack of the troops of the Voronezh Front did not end in the destruction of the wedged German group and therefore was considered a failure immediately after completion, but since it allowed the German offensive to bypass the city of Oboyan to Kursk to be thwarted, its results were later considered a success. In addition, it is necessary to take into account the fact that the number of German tanks participating in the battle and their losses, given in the report of the command of the Voronezh Front (commander N. Vatutin, member of the military council - N. Khrushchev), are very different from the reports of the commanders of the units subordinate to them . And from this we can conclude that the scale of the so-called “Prokhorov Battle” could have been greatly inflated by the front command. to justify the large losses of personnel and equipment of front units during the failed offensive.
July, 12 -a memorable date in the military history of the Fatherland. On this day in 1943, the largest tank battle in World War II between the Soviet and German armies took place near Prokhorovka.
Direct command of the tank formations during the battle was exercised by Lieutenant General Pavel Rotmistrov on the Soviet side and SS Gruppenführer Paul Hausser on the German side. Neither side managed to achieve the goals set for July 12: the Germans failed to capture Prokhorovka, break through the defenses of Soviet troops and gain operational space, and Soviet troops failed to encircle the enemy group.
“Of course, we won at Prokhorovka, not allowing the enemy to break into operational space, forced him to abandon his far-reaching plans and forced him to retreat to his original position. Our troops survived a four-day fierce battle, and the enemy lost its offensive capabilities. But the Voronezh Front had exhausted its strength, which did not allow it to immediately launch a counteroffensive. A stalemate situation has developed, figuratively speaking, when the command of both sides still wants to, but the troops can’t!”
PROGRESS OF THE BATTLE
If in the zone of the Soviet Central Front, after the start of their offensive on July 5, 1943, the Germans were unable to penetrate deeply into the defense of our troops, then a critical situation developed on the southern front of the Kursk Bulge. Here, on the first day, the enemy brought into the battle up to 700 tanks and assault guns, supported by aviation. Having met resistance in the Oboyan direction, the enemy shifted his main efforts to the Prokhorovsk direction, trying to capture Kursk with a blow from the southeast. The Soviet command decided to launch a counterattack against the wedged enemy group. The Voronezh front was reinforced by the reserves of the Headquarters (5th Guards Tank and 45th Guards armies and two tank corps). On July 12, in the Prokhorovka area, the largest tank battle of World War 2 took place, in which up to 1,200 tanks and self-propelled guns took part on both sides. Soviet tank units sought to conduct close combat (“armor to armor”), since the range of destruction of the 76 mm T-34 gun was no more than 800 m, and the rest of the tanks were even less, while the 88 mm guns of the Tigers and Ferdinands hit our armored vehicles from a distance of 2000 m. When approaching, our tankers suffered heavy losses.
Both sides suffered huge losses at Prokhorovka. In this battle, Soviet troops lost 500 tanks out of 800 (60%). The Germans lost 300 tanks out of 400 (75%). For them it was a disaster. Now the most powerful German strike group was drained of blood. General G. Guderian, at that time the inspector general of the Wehrmacht tank forces, wrote: “The armored forces, replenished with such great difficulty, due to large losses in people and equipment, were out of action for a long time ... and already more so in the Eastern there were no quiet days at the front.” On this day, a turning point occurred in the development of the defensive battle on the southern front of the Kursk ledge. The main enemy forces went on the defensive. On July 13-15, German troops continued attacks only against units of the 5th Guards Tank and 69th armies south of Prokhorovka. The maximum advance of German troops on the southern front reached 35 km. On July 16, they began to retreat to their original positions.
ROTMISTROV: AMAZING COURAGE
I would like to emphasize that in all sectors of the grandiose battle that unfolded on July 12, the soldiers of the 5th Guards Tank Army showed amazing courage, unshakable fortitude, high combat skill and mass heroism, even to the point of self-sacrifice.
A large group of fascist “tigers” attacked the 2nd battalion of the 181st brigade of the 18th tank corps. The battalion commander, Captain P. A. Skripkin, bravely accepted the enemy’s blow. He personally knocked out two enemy vehicles one after another. Having caught the third tank in the crosshairs, the officer pulled the trigger... But at the same instant his combat vehicle shook violently, the turret filled with smoke, and the tank caught fire. Driver-mechanic foreman A. Nikolaev and radio operator A. Zyryanov, saving a seriously wounded battalion commander, pulled him out of the tank and then saw that a “tiger” was moving right at them. Zyryanov hid the captain in a shell crater, and Nikolaev and loader Chernov jumped into their flaming tank and went to ram, immediately crashing into the steel fascist hulk. They died having fulfilled their duty to the end.
The tankmen of the 29th Tank Corps fought bravely. The battalion of the 25th brigade, led by the communist Major G.A. Myasnikov, destroyed 3 "tigers", 8 medium tanks, 6 self-propelled guns, 15 anti-tank guns and more than 300 fascist machine gunners.
The decisive actions of the battalion commander and company commanders, senior lieutenants A. E. Palchikov and N. A. Mishchenko, served as an example for the soldiers. In a heavy battle for the village of Storozhevoye, the car in which A.E. Palchikov was located was hit - a caterpillar was torn off by a shell explosion. The crew members jumped out of the car, trying to repair the damage, but were immediately fired upon by enemy machine gunners from the bushes. The soldiers took up defensive positions and repelled several attacks by the Nazis. In this unequal battle, Alexei Yegorovich Palchikov died the death of a hero, and his comrades were seriously injured. Only the mechanic-driver, candidate member of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks, foreman I.E. Safronov, although he was also wounded, could still fire. Hiding under a tank, overcoming the pain, he fought off the advancing fascists until help arrived.
REPORT OF THE REPRESENTATIVE OF THE Supreme High Command Headquarters MARSHAL A. VASILEVSKY TO THE SUPREME COMMANDER IN CHIEF ON COMBAT OPERATIONS IN THE PROKHOROVKA AREA, July 14, 1943.
According to your personal instructions, since the evening of July 9, 1943, I have been continuously in the troops of Rotmistrov and Zhadov in the Prokhorovsky and southern directions. Until today, inclusively, the enemy continues on the Zhadov and Rotmistrov front massive tank attacks and counterattacks against our advancing tank units... From observations of the progress of the ongoing battles and from the testimony of prisoners, I conclude that the enemy, despite the huge losses, both in manpower , and especially in tanks and aircraft, still does not give up the idea of breaking through to Oboyan and further to Kursk, achieving this at any cost. Yesterday I personally observed a tank battle of our 18th and 29th corps with more than two hundred enemy tanks in a counterattack southwest of Prokhorovka. At the same time, hundreds of guns and all the PCs we had took part in the battle. As a result, the entire battlefield was littered with burning German and our tanks within an hour.
Over the course of two days of fighting, Rotmistrov's 29th Tank Corps lost 60% of its tanks irretrievably and temporarily out of action, and the 18th Corps lost up to 30% of its tanks. Losses in the 5th Guards. mechanized corps are insignificant. The next day, the threat of enemy tanks breaking through from the south into the Shakhovo, Avdeevka, Aleksandrovka areas continues to remain real. During the night I am taking all measures to bring the entire 5th Guards here. mechanized corps, the 32nd motorized brigade and four iptap regiments... The possibility of an oncoming tank battle here and tomorrow cannot be ruled out. In total, at least eleven tank divisions continue to operate against the Voronezh Front, systematically replenished with tanks. The prisoners interviewed today showed that the 19th Panzer Division currently has about 70 tanks in service, the Reich Division has up to 100 tanks, although the latter has already been replenished twice since July 5, 1943. The report was delayed due to late arrival from the front.
The Great Patriotic War. Military historical essays. Book 2. Fracture. M., 1998.
THE COLLAPSE OF THE CITADEL
On July 12, 1943, a new stage of the Battle of Kursk began. On this day, part of the forces of the Soviet Western Front and Bryansk Front went on the offensive, and on July 15, the troops of the right wing of the Central Front attacked the enemy. On August 5, troops of the Bryansk Front liberated Oryol. On the same day, troops of the Steppe Front liberated Belgorod. On the evening of August 5, an artillery salute was fired for the first time in Moscow in honor of the troops who liberated these cities. During fierce battles, troops of the Steppe Front, with the assistance of the Voronezh and Southwestern Fronts, liberated Kharkov on August 23.
The Battle of Kursk was cruel and merciless. Victory in it came at great cost to the Soviet troops. In this battle they lost 863,303 people, including 254,470 permanently. Losses in equipment amounted to: 6064 tanks and self-propelled guns, 5244 guns and mortars, 1626 combat aircraft. As for Wehrmacht losses, information about them is fragmentary and incomplete. Soviet works presented calculated data according to which during the Battle of Kursk, German troops lost 500 thousand people, 1.5 thousand tanks, 3 thousand guns and mortars. Regarding losses in aircraft, there is information that during the defensive stage of the Battle of Kursk alone, the German side irretrievably lost about 400 combat vehicles, while the Soviet side lost about 1000. However, in fierce battles in the air, many experienced German aces, who had been fighting for many years in the East, were killed. front, among them 9 holders of the Knight's Cross.
It is undeniable that the collapse of the German Operation Citadel had far-reaching consequences and had a decisive influence on the entire further course of the war. After Kursk, the German armed forces were forced to switch to strategic defense not only on the Soviet-German front, but also in all theaters of military operations of the Second World War. Their attempt to regain the strategic initiative lost during the Battle of Stalingrad suffered a crushing failure.
EAGLE AFTER LIBERATION FROM THE GERMAN OCCUPATION
(from the book “Russia at War” by A. Werth), August 1943
(...) The liberation of the ancient Russian city of Oryol and the complete liquidation of the Oryol wedge, which threatened Moscow for two years, was a direct result of the defeat of the Nazi troops near Kursk.
In the second week of August I was able to travel by car from Moscow to Tula, and then to Orel...
In these thickets, through which the dusty road from Tula now ran, death awaits a person at every step. “Minen” (in German), “mines” (in Russian) - I read on old and new tablets stuck in the ground. In the distance, on a hill, under the blue summer sky, the ruins of churches, the remains of houses and lonely chimneys could be seen. These miles of weeds were no man's land for almost two years. The ruins on the hill were the ruins of Mtsensk. Two old women and four cats were all the living creatures that Soviet soldiers found there when the Germans withdrew on July 20. Before leaving, the Nazis blew up or burned everything—churches and buildings, peasant huts and everything else. In the middle of the last century, Leskov and Shostakovich’s “Lady Macbeth” lived in this city... The “desert zone” created by the Germans now stretches from Rzhev and Vyazma to Orel.
How did Orel live during the almost two-year German occupation?
Of the 114 thousand population in the city, only 30 thousand now remain. The occupiers killed many residents. Many were hanged in the city square - the same one where the crew of the Soviet tank that was the first to break into Oryol is now buried, as well as General Gurtiev, the famous participant in the Battle of Stalingrad, killed on the morning when Soviet troops took the city in battle. They said that the Germans killed 12 thousand people and sent twice as many to Germany. Many thousands of Oryol residents went to the partisans in the Oryol and Bryansk forests, because here (especially in the Bryansk region) there was an area of active partisan operations (...)
Wert A. Russia in the war of 1941-1945. M., 1967.
*Rotmistrov P.A. (1901-1982), Ch. Marshal of Armored Forces (1962). During the war, from February 1943 - commander of the 5th Guards. tank army. Since Aug. 1944 - Commander of the armored and mechanized forces of the Red Army.
**Zhadov A.S. (1901-1977). Army General (1955). From October 1942 to May 1945, commander of the 66th Army (from April 1943 - 5th Guards) Army.
: “In his report, Hitler first explained in detail the postponement of the operation. According to him, this was necessary in view of the then-replenishment of units with personnel and equipment and the strengthening of the formations participating in this operation. Now these units are fully staffed. As for weapons, for the first time we surpass the Russians in the number of tanks...
He correctly justified his decision to launch Operation Citadel by the fact that we can no longer wait until the enemy begins his offensive, perhaps only in the winter or after the opening of a second front. The rapid and complete success of the offensive is also desirable because of the effect it will have on our allies and on our homeland...
In general, he is quite confident in the success of the operation... Hitler said that now it is impossible to make promises to individual peoples of the Soviet Union due to the bad impact this will have on our soldiers. Our soldiers must know what they are fighting for, namely, for living space for their children and grandchildren...” (p. 506)
July 2, 1943. 741st day of war
July 3, 1943. 742nd day of the war
July 4, 1943. 743rd day of the war
July 5, 1943. 744th day of the war
July 6, 1943. 745th day of the war
July 7, 1943. 746th day of the war
Fierce fighting on July 7 continued to be fought by units of the 17th Guards Rifle Corps, which covered the direction to Olkhovatka. Sometimes the enemy managed to break into the battle formations of the Soviet troops, but with energetic counterattacks they were thrown back to their original position.
On July 7, the Kempf group, with up to 300 tanks, struck from the Belovskaya area, still on Korocha, against the right flank of the 7th Guards Army (M.S. Shumilov). The Kempf group advanced 5 kilometers that day, but the enemy failed to break through the second line of defense along the entire offensive front.
July 8, 1943. 747th day of the war
July 9, 1943. 748th day of the war
July 10, 1943. 749th day of the war
July 11, 1943. 750th day of the war
On July 11, the enemy, as a result of fierce bloody battles, managed to advance somewhat towards Prokhorovka both from the west and the south. By the end of the day, a dangerous battle crisis had set in on the Voronezh Front sector. The Headquarters moved the 5th Guards Combined Arms Army and the 5th Guards Tank Army from its reserve to the Prokhorovka area.
From the Melekhovo area, an auxiliary attack to the north was carried out by three tank and three infantry divisions of the Kempf operational group, which had about 300 tanks. The German 24th Tank Corps was transferred to the zone of action of the 4th Tank Army from Donbass.
July 12, 1943. 751st day of war
July 13, 1943. 752nd day of war
The 2nd SS Panzer Corps and the 3rd Panzer Corps of Task Force Kempf were ordered to encircle and destroy the formations of the 69th Army defending between the Northern Donets and Lipovy Donets rivers in the Leski, Gostishchevo, Shakhovo areas.
July 14, 1943. 753rd day of the war
July 15, 1943. 754th day of the war
July 16, 1943. 755th day of the war
July 17, 1943. 756th day of the war
July 18, 1943. 757th day of the war
July 19, 1943. 758th day of the war
July 20, 1943. 759th day of the war
July 21, 1943. 760th day of the war
July 22, 1943. 761st day of war
The Mginsk offensive operation of the troops of the Leningrad (L. A. Govorov, 67th Army, 13th Air Army) and Volkhov (K. A. Meretskov, 8th Army and 14th Air Army) fronts began (see map - Mginsk offensive operation (86 KB)). The plan of the Soviet command was to strike the enemy from the north and east in converging directions towards Mgu. The German 18th Army of Army Group North, relying on powerful defenses, put up strong resistance. Shock groups of the 67th and 8th armies, during fierce battles that lasted for a month, only slightly penetrated the enemy’s defenses.
July 23, 1943. 762nd day of the war
July 24, 1943. 763rd day of the war
July 25, 1943. 764th day of the war
July 26, 1943. 765th day of the war
July 27, 1943. 766th day of the war
July 28, 1943. 767th day of the war
July 29, 1943. 768th day of the war
Mginsk offensive operation. Since July 29, along with the aviation of the Leningrad and Volkhov fronts, long-range aviation launched massive strikes on enemy troops. Heavy losses forced the Germans to pull all the reserves of the 18th Army to the Mginsky ledge.
July 30, 1943. 769th day of the war
July 31, 1943. 770th day of the war
List of cards
2. The situation before the Battle of Kursk by the end of July 4, 1943 (306 KB). Wikipedia Wikipedia Wikipedia
July 12th, 2016
July 12, 1943 near the station Prokhorovka A situation arose that had never been seen in military history. On a piece of land only ten kilometers wide, two armadas, more than a thousand vehicles, collided. Moreover, the Germans had the latest Tigers, Panthers and Ferdinands on their side. It was not just a battle, but a real tank duel...
The Battle of Prokhorovka was the culmination of a grandiose strategic operation that went down in history as Battle of Kursk, which was decisive in ensuring a radical change during the Great Patriotic War. The events of those days unfolded as follows.
Hitler's command planned to carry out a major offensive in the summer of 1943, seize the strategic initiative and turn the tide of the war in its favor. For this purpose, a military operation codenamed “Citadel” was developed and approved in April 1943.
Having information about the preparation of fascist German troops for an offensive, the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command decided to temporarily go on the defensive on the Kursk ledge and, during the defensive battle, bleed the enemy’s strike forces. Thus, it was planned to create favorable conditions for the transition of Soviet troops to a counteroffensive, and then to a general strategic offensive.
On July 12, 1943, in the area of the Prokhorovka railway station (56 km north of Belgorod), the advancing German tank group (4th Tank Army, Task Force Kempf) was stopped by a counterattack by Soviet troops (5th Guards Army, 5th Guards Tank Army).
Initially, the main German attack on the southern front of the Kursk Bulge was directed to the west - along the Yakovlevo - Oboyan operational line. On July 5, in accordance with the offensive plan, German troops as part of the 4th Panzer Army (48th Panzer Corps and 2nd SS Panzer Corps) and Army Group Kempf went on the offensive against the troops of the Voronezh Front, in position 6- On the first day of the operation, the Germans sent five infantry, eight tank and one motorized divisions to the 1st and 7th Guards Armies.
On July 6, two counterattacks were launched against the advancing Germans from the Kursk-Belgorod railway by the 2nd Guards Tank Corps and from the Luchka (north) - Kalinin area by the 5th Guards Tank Corps. Both counterattacks were repelled by the German 2nd SS Panzer Corps.
To provide assistance to Katukov’s 1st Tank Army, which was waging heavy fighting in the Oboyan direction, the Soviet command prepared a second counterattack. At 23:00 on July 7, front commander Nikolai Vatutin signed directive No. 0014/op on readiness to begin active operations from 10:30 on the 8th. However, the counterattack, delivered by the 2nd and 5th Guards Tank Corps, as well as the 2nd and 10th Tank Corps, although it eased the pressure on the 1st TA brigades, did not bring tangible results.
Having not achieved decisive success - by this time the depth of advance of the advancing troops in the well-prepared Soviet defense in the Oboyan direction was only about 35 kilometers - the German command, in accordance with its plans, shifted the spearhead of the main attack in the direction of Prokhorovka with the intention of reaching Kursk through the bend of the Psel River .
The change in direction of the attack was due to the fact that, according to the plans of the German command, it was in the bend of the Psel River that it seemed most appropriate to meet the inevitable counterattack of the superior Soviet tank reserves.
If the village of Prokhorovka was not occupied by German troops before the arrival of Soviet tank reserves, it was planned to suspend the offensive altogether and temporarily go on the defensive, in order to take advantage of the advantageous terrain, preventing the Soviet tank reserves from escaping from the narrow defile formed by the swampy floodplain. the Psel River and the railway embankment, and prevent them from realizing their numerical advantage by covering the flanks of the 2nd SS Panzer Corps.
By July 11, the Germans took their starting positions to capture Prokhorovka. Probably having intelligence data about the presence of Soviet tank reserves, the German command took action to repel the inevitable counterattack of the Soviet troops. The 1st Division of the Leibstandarte-SS "Adolf Hitler", better equipped than other divisions of the 2nd SS Panzer Corps, took a defile and on July 11 did not undertake attacks in the direction of Prokhorovka, pulling up anti-tank weapons and preparing defensive positions.
On the contrary, the 2nd SS Panzer Division "Das Reich" and the 3rd SS Panzer Division "Totenkopf" supporting its flanks conducted active offensive battles outside the defile on July 11, trying to improve their position (in particular, the 3rd Panzer Division covering the left flank The SS Totenkopf expanded the bridgehead on the northern bank of the Psel River, managing to transport a tank regiment to it on the night of July 12, providing flanking fire on the expected Soviet tank reserves in the event of an attack through the defile).
By this time, the Soviet 5th Guards Tank Army was concentrated in positions northeast of the station, which, being in reserve, on July 6 received an order to make a 300-kilometer march and take up defense at the Prokhorovka-Vesely line. The concentration area of the 5th Guards Tank and 5th Guards Combined Arms Armies was chosen by the command of the Voronezh Front, taking into account the threat of a breakthrough by the 2nd SS Tank Corps of the Soviet defense in the Prokhorovsk direction.
On the other hand, the choice of the indicated area for the concentration of two guards armies in the Prokhorovka area, in the event of their participation in a counterattack, inevitably led to a head-on collision with the strongest enemy group (2nd SS Panzer Corps), and given the nature of the defile, it excluded the possibility of covering the flanks of the defender in this direction of the 1st Leibstandarte-SS Division "Adolf Hitler".
The frontal counterattack on July 12 was planned to be carried out by the 5th Guards Tank Army, the 5th Guards Army, as well as the 1st Tank, 6th and 7th Guards armies. However, in reality, only the 5th Guards Tank and 5th Guards Combined Arms, as well as two separate tank corps (2nd and 2nd Guards), were able to go on the attack; the rest fought defensive battles against the advancing German units. Opposing the front of the Soviet offensive were the 1st Leibstandarte-SS Division "Adolf Hitler", the 2nd SS Panzer Division "Das Reich" and the 3rd SS Panzer Division "Totenkopf".
The first clash in the Prokhorovka area occurred on the evening of July 11. According to the recollections of Pavel Rotmistrov, at 17 o’clock he, together with Marshal Vasilevsky, during reconnaissance, discovered a column of enemy tanks that were moving towards the station. The attack was stopped by two tank brigades.
At 8 am, the Soviet side carried out artillery preparation and at 8:15 went on the offensive. The first attacking echelon consisted of four tank corps: 18, 29, 2 and 2 Guards. The second echelon was the 5th Guards Mechanized Corps.
At the beginning of the battle, Soviet tankers gained some advantage: the rising sun blinded the Germans advancing from the west. The high density of the battle, during which tanks fought at short distances, deprived the Germans of the advantage of more powerful and long-range guns. Soviet tank crews were able to target the most vulnerable spots of heavily armored German vehicles.
To the south of the main battle, the German tank group “Kempf” was advancing, which tried to enter the advancing Soviet group on the left flank. The threat of envelopment forced the Soviet command to divert part of its reserves to this direction.
At about 1 p.m., the Germans withdrew the 11th Tank Division from reserve, which, together with the Death's Head division, struck the Soviet right flank, on which the forces of the 5th Guards Army were located. Two brigades of the 5th Guards Mechanized Corps were sent to their aid and the attack was repulsed.
By 2 p.m., Soviet tank armies began to push the enemy westward. By evening, Soviet tankers were able to advance 10-12 kilometers, thus leaving the battlefield in their rear. The battle was won.
Destroyed German tank Pz.II
Destroyed German tank Pz.Kpfw.V Panther