After a crushing defeat on the Volga, the German troops of Army Groups “A” and “Don” retreated to Rostov, and partially consolidated on the Taman Peninsula. By holding Taman, the Germans covered the approaches to Crimea and ensured the use of sea communications, limiting the actions of the Soviet fleet. In the spring of 1943, heavy fighting broke out in the Novorossiysk region, but units of the North Caucasus Front encountered strong enemy defenses here. Almost all settlements and heights of the mountainous areas were turned into strongholds and centers of resistance. The German Blue Line in depth on the Taman Peninsula stretched from the Azov to the Black Seas. Only through a naval landing operation did Soviet troops manage to capture Malaya Zemlya on Taman - a small bridgehead in the Myskhako area, which was the reason for the first major air battles in the skies of Kuban.
I-16
The Kuban air battles were characterized by the fact that both opposing sides met here on equal terms for the first time. No one had a decisive superiority in the tactics of action and organization of aviation, as well as in the quality of aviation equipment. The new Yak-7b and La-5 fighters began to enter service with the Soviet Air Force in large numbers, and the flight characteristics of the Yak-1 and LaGG-3 were significantly improved due to the further lightweighting of the design and the installation of a more powerful uprated M-105PF engine.
The Germans became more active in Taman in April 1943, trying to liquidate the Myskhako bridgehead with the help of the 17th Army alone and pin down the formations of the North Caucasus Front in order to prevent their transfer to the Kursk area on the eve of Operation Citadel. The main role in the battles was assigned to the Luftwaffe, which was supposed to disrupt the enemy’s offensive and raze his forward positions to the ground. For this purpose, up to 1,000 aircraft of the 4th Air Fleet (about 38% of all German aviation on the Eastern Front) were concentrated at the airfields of the Crimea and the Taman Peninsula. Among the 580 bombers were six air groups of Ju-87 dive bombers under the command of Colonel E. Kupfer. The fighter units of the best German squadrons (JG3, JG51, JG52, JG54) consisted of 250 fighters, including a number of Focke-Wulf FW.190 aircraft.
BB-1 (Su-2), 1937
The Air Force of the North Caucasus Front, under the command of General Vershinin, included the 4th and 5th Air Armies. In total - about 600 combat vehicles. However, the actions of Soviet aircraft greatly complicated the field airfields, which became muddy during the rains. The concrete runways of German fixed air bases avoided this problem. Large enemy aviation forces, concentrated in a limited area, predetermined the intensity of the air battles that unfolded into the largest air battles of the Great Patriotic War. They took place in three stages. The first stage of air battles took place from April 17 to April 24, 1943, when the German command attempted to eliminate the Myskhako bridgehead. About 450 bombers and about 200 fighters were thrown at the defenders of Malaya Zemlya. Kupffer's Stukas, in waves of 25 aircraft, bombarded artillery positions, fortifications and strongholds of the Soviet troops. On April 17, they flew 494 sorties, losing only 7 vehicles. The total number of Luftwaffe sorties that day exceeded one and a half thousand. There were three times fewer Soviet aircraft in the air. Although almost 500 vehicles were brought in to support the paratroopers, the distance of the airfields from the front line allowed the fighters to remain over the combat area for no more than 10-15 minutes. On the aircraft route, in addition, there were the northwestern spurs of the Main Caucasus Range with a height of 400-500 meters, so if the cloudiness dropped to the level of the mountains, flights became impossible. Based only 40-50 km from Novorossiysk, German aviation, due to this, dominated the bridgehead for the first time. However, on land, the Nazis only slightly managed to break into the battle formations of the defenders of Malaya Zemlya. Due to the difficult military situation, on April 18, representatives of Headquarters Marshal Zhukov and Air Force Commander Marshal Novikov arrived at the North Caucasus Front. To restore the lost balance of forces, the 267th IAD and three air corps from the reserve of the high command were urgently redeployed to Kuban: the 2nd bomber, 2nd mixed and 3rd fighter, led by General E. Savitsky. Taking into account the new formations, the strength of the Soviet Air Force increased to 900 aircraft, among which there were 370 fighters, 170 attack aircraft and 260 day and night bombers. Fighter aviation was almost entirely armed with new types of combat vehicles, and only about 6% were made up of obsolete I-16 and I-153 aircraft. 11% of the fighters were the American Bell P-39 Airacobra and the English Supermarine Spitfire Mk. Vb.
On April 19, fierce air battles broke out over Myskhako. Colonel Kupfer's slow and poorly protected Ju.87 bombers immediately suffered heavy losses. They completed only 294 sorties and switched to night operations the very next day. On April 20, replenished with fresh reserves, the Soviet Air Force was the first to strike with a hundred bombers at 11.30, disrupting the enemy offensive. Another 100 aircraft attacked the German positions five hours later - the commander of the 17th German Army was forced to regroup his forces. On April 21, ADD bombers in groups of 5-10 bombed the airfields of the 55th Luftwaffe squadron - Saki and Sarabuz. On this day, the activity of German aviation decreased by almost half and gradually began to decline - Soviet pilots won victory in the air. The German Air Force lost 152 aircraft in a week.
The second stage of air battles took place in the area of the Krymskaya village from April 29 to May 10, 1943, when the 56th Army launched an offensive in the direction of the main attack of the Soviet troops with the aim of defeating the Taman enemy group. German aviation tried to contain enemy attacks with bombing strikes, and Luftwaffe fighters in the sky opposed the actions of Soviet bombers and attack aircraft supporting ground units on the battlefield. On a relatively narrow section of the front (25-30 km), up to 40 air duels took place during the day, in which 50-80 aircraft from both sides simultaneously took part.
On April 28, in the early morning, groups of German bombers began to attack the forward positions of the Red Army. The fighters of the 4th VA countered 850 Luftwaffe sorties with only 310. Soviet pilots shot down 25 enemy aircraft at the cost of 18 of their own aircraft. This was clearly an unfavorable ratio, given that the battles were fought mainly with Luftwaffe escort fighters, which reliably covered the bombers. The tactics of the Soviet Air Force required further improvement. At first, fighters flew out on patrol, having a strictly defined area within three or four points to cover the troops. A certain patrol time and flight altitude were required. But since these points were not far from each other, the planes, flying in a straight line, were forced to reduce speed and found themselves in a disadvantageous position. This weakness was immediately taken advantage of by German fighters, clearing the airspace before the bombers attacked. In addition, some Soviet pilots were too keen on air battles, flying over the front line and coming under attack from a more numerous enemy.
On April 29, the scales in the battles tipped to the side of Soviet aviation. At night, on the eve of the offensive of the 56th Army, two nines of Pe-2s attacked the village of Krymskaya - the fires were used as landmarks by the remaining bombers, among which were light-engine U-2s. At 7 o’clock in the morning, three nines of Pe-2s raided the headquarters of the German troops, and after them six and seven Il-2 attack aircraft rushed into battle, operating at intervals of 10 minutes. At first, each group of Ilyushins was covered by a pair of fighters, but then reinforced units of red star aircraft began to patrol over the entire combat area. The infantry attack at 7.40 was supported by nine more dive bombers, accompanied by 4-8 fighters. A total of 493 Soviet aircraft (144 bombers, 84 attack aircraft and 265 fighters) took part in the three-hour first strike. During the day, USSR aviation carried out 1,308 combat sorties (including 379 at night). The Germans, in turn, carried out only 539, losing 74 aircraft. The superiority of Soviet fighters in the air turned out to be so great that panicked reports from Luftwaffe pilots were often heard on the radio: “In the Krymskaya area, Russian fighters are hitting our bombers. Send help. There are Russian fighters all around... We can’t complete the mission, Russian fighters are chasing us everywhere...”
In the following days, during the offensive of the 56th Army, the activity of the Red Army aviation remained quite high - for every German plane in the sky there were two Soviet ones. To detect enemy vehicles and target USSR Air Force fighters at them, they used 5 radar stations, three of which were located directly in the offensive zone of the 56th Army. One station was essentially the command post of the 4th VA. All aviation management was carried out centrally, first from the Air Force command post of the North Caucasus Front, and then from the headquarters of the 4th VA, whose commander personally or through an operational group located 4 km from the front line gave orders. One of the air division commanders, who headed the operational group, directly supervised aviation operations in the air. When planning air operations, Air Force units were assigned strictly defined tasks. For example, at the first stage of the battle, out of 900 aircraft, 370 were intended to fight German aircraft in the air, and 278 at airfields. To suppress enemy anti-aircraft artillery, units equipped with obsolete I-16 and I-153 fighters were used. In addition, one fighter regiment was constantly in reserve, and several dozen aircraft remained to cover their own airfields.
To repel enemy air raids, the entire front-line area, according to the Stalingrad system, was divided into sectors, for each of which one fighter air division was responsible. Regimental command posts had direct telephone communication with VNOS posts.
Due to the fact that Luftwaffe airfields were located close to the front line, the main task of Soviet fighters was air patrol. On average, about 50% of all fighter aircraft sorties were spent on this. During the patrol, the battle formation known as the “Kuban whatnot” proved itself to be the best. In the air, the fighters were separated in height by two or three tiers. The lower, strongest group acted against enemy bombers on their likely flight routes, the upper covering group went above the lower one with an elevation of 800-1000 meters. The order of both groups consisted of pairs of fighters, with an interval of 200-250 meters in pairs, and 800-1000 meters between pairs. The pairs were also separated in height.
Junkers Ju-87
Effective tactics and numerical superiority allowed Soviet pilots to seize operational air supremacy. In 12 days of fighting, they shot down 368 enemy aircraft at the cost of only 70 fighters. The personal account of Soviet aces, whose names were published in the newspaper of the 4th VA on May 1, 1943, quickly increased. Among them was the leader D. Glinka, who won 21 personal victories in 48 air battles. V. Fadeev personally shot down 18 enemy aircraft in 48 air battles, N. Lavitsky in 68 battles - 15, A. Pokryshkin in 55 battles - shot down 14 aircraft personally and 6 in a group.
Having broken through the first line of German defense, the troops of the 56th Army advanced 10 km and liberated the village of Krymskaya, an important communications hub on the Taman Peninsula. While the soldiers were strengthening themselves in new positions, there was a temporary lull at the front. It was put to good use by the command of the Soviet Air Force. By convening various conferences, in which such experienced pilots as Alexander Pokryshkin, Vladimir Lavrinenkov, Sultan Amet-Khan and others took part, an exchange of experience took place between fighter units. This experience was summarized in a special directive from Marshal A. Novikov, sent to all air armies. Based on the directive, it was proposed to allocate special groups of fighters to conduct air combat, especially in the vertical. Duty zones were now supposed to be located above enemy territory to a depth of 10-15 km. Fighter formations were ordered to be divided into two groups: one to distract enemy fighters, the other to destroy bombers. A large role was also given to attacking enemy airfields. Not least important was the protection of our own air bases. To cover them, 275 anti-aircraft guns and 120 anti-aircraft machine guns were allocated. For camouflage purposes, 17 false airfields were built, on which there were 110 mock-ups of combat vehicles.
On the morning of May 26, 234 Soviet bombers and attack aircraft, accompanied by 150 fighters, attacked Wehrmacht positions in the area of the villages of Kyiv and Moldavanskaya. After a forty-minute bombardment, the troops of the North Caucasus Front launched another offensive, trying to break through the second line of German defense. The battles in the air flared up again with unrelenting force.
However, the Luftwaffe command, having gathered the aviation of Crimea, the Taman Peninsula and southern Ukraine into a single fist, was able to prepare for such a turn of events, creating a numerical superiority in forces. 1,400 German aircraft were sent to the battle formations of the advancing troops. Acting at an increasing pace, the Germans at the end of the day made a star raid, numbering up to 600 vehicles. 12 groups of aircraft, 40-60 aircraft each, attacked from different directions. In total, during May 26, German aviation carried out 1,669 sorties, and in the following days - even up to 2,000 or more. Dominance in the sky again passed to the Luftwaffe - air strikes became so powerful that Soviet ground troops were forced to retreat in certain areas.
K. Vershinin, who took command of the 4th VA, quickly took retaliatory measures. The number of patrolling fighters was clearly insufficient. Many enemy bomber groups simply did not have time to intercept, and often the battle began after the bombs had already been dropped on the target. Often it was not even possible to break through to the bombers - the Luftwaffe fighters imposed a distracting duel. Therefore, the simplest way out of this situation was to increase the number of patrolling Soviet aircraft, as well as intercept enemy bombers before approaching the front line. To solve this problem, the number of escort fighters was reduced to a minimum - bombers and attack aircraft began to fly in large formations under the protection of their machine guns. The freed forces were sent to fight enemy aircraft. As a result of these measures, enemy losses immediately increased and in two weeks amounted to 315 aircraft. About 150 fighters were shot down on the Soviet side.
At the beginning of June 1943, the German leadership, realizing the hopelessness of the air war over Taman, began transferring bomber units to the central sector of the Eastern Front. Now the battles were fought primarily by fighters. The number of Luftwaffe sorties immediately decreased - on June 7, their number was only 300. This was also facilitated by constant raids on German airfields, which were carried out mainly at night.
As a result, the Germans lost the battle over Kuban. According to Soviet data, the Luftwaffe lost 1,100 aircraft between April 17 and June 7, of which over 800 were destroyed in the air. The fighter units of the German Air Force suffered significant losses. In JG52 alone, starting from April 17, a third of all pilots were out of action.
Although Soviet aviation also lost at least 750 aircraft in the battles over Kuban, Soviet pilots were optimistic about the future. The first major victory over the Luftwaffe gave hope, but final victory was still a long way off.
Sources -
1943 is the year of the liberation of Kuban from the fascist invaders.
The air battle that unfolded in the skies of Kuban in April-June 1943 became one of the largest air battles of the Second World War and was an integral part of the Soviet offensive in the Caucasus. This battle was divided into several episodes and did not stop for more than two months. Both sides were increasing their air presence in the region, so the battle in the air was large-scale and brutal. On some days, there were up to 50 air battles in the skies, involving up to 70 aircraft on each side. New generation Soviet fighters played one of the main roles in the battle. For the first time during the Great Patriotic War, Soviet pilots imposed their will on the Luftwaffe, actively interfered with and opposed the Germans in carrying out their combat missions. By mid-April 1943, the Germans concentrated the main forces of their 4th Air Fleet - about 820 aircraft - at the airfields of Kuban and Crimea. Additionally, they could attract about 200 more bombers from airfields in southern Ukraine. In total, the 4th air fleet consisted of more than 1000 aircraft: 580 bombers, 250 fighters and 220 reconnaissance aircraft. The best fighter squadrons of Germany were transferred here for support: the 3rd “Udet”, the 51st “Mölders”, the 54th “Green Hearts”, armed with the latest models of Me-109 and Fw-190 fighters. Additionally, one fighter squadron each from Slovakia, Croatia and Romania was used in this theater of operations. The Soviet side also did not sit idly by, and already on April 18 began transferring the 2nd Bomber, 3rd Fighter and 2nd Mixed Air Corps, as well as the 282nd Fighter Division to the North Caucasus Front, bringing the number of aircraft to 900 aircraft , of which 370 fighters, 170 attack aircraft, 360 bombers, of which 195 are night aircraft. Of these, about 65% of the aircraft were new types: La-5, Yak-1, Yak-7B, British and American B-3 and B-20 bombers, as well as Spitfire and Airacobra fighters. The concentration of such a number of aircraft in a rather limited theater of operations predetermined a stubborn and intense struggle for air supremacy.
In total, three air battles took place in the skies of Kuban. The first of them began on April 17, 1943 with an attempt to eliminate the bridgehead in the Myskhako area. In order to throw the paratroopers of the 18th Army into the sea, the enemy attracted about 450 of its bombers and 200 covering fighters. On the Soviet side, about 500 aircraft, including 100 bombers, were used to counter the Germans. On that one day, German pilots flew about 1,000 sorties in the area. On April 20, the enemy again tried to carry out a powerful offensive, but this time Soviet aviation managed to launch a preemptive strike with 60 bombers and 30 covering fighters half an hour before the start of the offensive, and a few minutes later a new strike by a group of 100 aircraft, which thwarted the plans of the German command. If we estimate the losses of the parties, then according to the Soviet archives of the Red Army Air Force, it destroyed the entire German 4th Fleet, while the Germans, for their part, reported the destruction of 1000 aircraft in air battles and 300 shot down by anti-aircraft fire, i.e. even more than there were on this section of the front. So it is possible to determine the losses of the parties only approximately, although the fact that the losses of both sides were enormous is beyond doubt. Most likely, the losses on the Soviet side were higher, since the Germans paid more attention to the training of their pilots. There is no doubt that the best fighter pilots, flying in pairs since 1939, operated on the German side in the Kuban. Even young German pilots from the replenishment had about 200 hours of flight time, and upon arrival at combat units they had to fly about 100 more hours in the front line, performing tasks to protect airfields and study the terrain. The Germans proceeded from the fact that the Russians had more pilots and aircraft, so they tried to conserve personnel. On the Soviet side, along with aces such as: A. I. Pokryshkin, A. F. Klubov, G. G. Golubev, V. I. Fadeev, graduates of flight schools with minimal flight time, as well as pilots who arrived from the Far East, also participated or other remote districts with no combat experience. But, even despite this, the approximate losses of fighter pilots on the German side amounted to 75 people, and taking into account the allies, about 135, which is half of the total number of fighters of the 4th Air Fleet available at the beginning of the battle.
The victories of the Red Army in the North Caucasus were facilitated by the successful course of the Battle of Stalingrad. After the encirclement of Paulus's army on the Volga and the collapse of German plans to relieve it, the Nazis began to retreat in the Caucasus. On January 1, units of the Northern Group of Forces of the Transcaucasian Front went on the offensive. By the beginning of February, Soviet soldiers reached the Sea of Azov and liberated Rostov, which significantly complicated the withdrawal of German units from the Caucasus.
Therefore, the enemy retreated hastily and disorderly, suffering heavy losses. He wanted to have time to gain a foothold on the “Blue Line” - a powerful defensive line stretching from Novorossiysk to Temryuk. Fierce fighting broke out in the area of the villages of Abinskaya and Krymskaya in early February. To speed up the liberation of Novorossiysk and the entire Kuban, the Soviet command decided to land troops on the left bank of Tsemes Bay, in the area of South Ozereyka and Stanichka. The operation was risky. The Germans had a defense in depth in the Novorossiysk area and had significant forces; the entire Myskhako region and the coastal strip were shot through.
Only an unexpected and swift blow could lead to success. And this blow was dealt by a detachment of volunteers of Major Ts.L. Kunikova. On February 4, on a cold and stormy night, the Kunikovites landed on a piece of land south of Novorossiysk. From that moment on, the heroic epic of Malaya Zemlya began. In the first days, the Nazis made furious attempts to defeat the landing. However, the Little Earthers not only repelled enemy attacks, but also expanded their bridgehead. The struggle on a piece of land with an area of 30 square kilometers lasted more than 7 months - 225 days. The history of wars does not know an example of such a long stay of troops in the landing force on such a piece of land. The landing on Malaya Zemlya created a threat of encirclement for the enemy group and could contribute to the liberation of Novorossiysk, so the Nazis made every effort to throw the paratroopers into the sea.
Ts.L. Kunikov, the organizer of the landing and the soul of the heroic detachment of paratroopers, died in battle. Mikhail Kornitsky accomplished a feat on Malaya Zemlya. He rushed into the crowd of German soldiers with a bunch of grenades and saved his comrades at the cost of his life. Posthumously, like Kunikov, he was awarded the title of Hero of the Soviet Union.
The Germans did not give up their attempts to defeat the landless people even for a day. They undertook the most serious of them on the twentieth of April, trying to present a gift to the Fuhrer for his birthday. The earth burned under the defenders’ feet, enemy aircraft and artillery plowed up literally everything. Not only was there not a single tree left, but not even a single blade of grass. And the landless people continued to fight. At the end of April, the enemy threw four more infantry divisions, 500 guns, and dozens of tanks against them; Hundreds of planes bombed the defenders' positions.
In just five days of the fascist assault, about 17 thousand bombs were dropped on sailors and infantrymen. The Red Army soldiers not only survived, but also inflicted enormous damage on the enemy, destroying 30 thousand enemy soldiers, about 100 guns, and 58 aircraft during the battles. 6,268 soldiers and commanders who fought on Malaya Zemlya were awarded orders and medals. 21 soldiers from small lands were awarded the title of Hero of the Soviet Union. On a small land bridgehead, a memorial complex was erected in memory of the heroic defenders. In 1973, Novorossiysk was awarded the title of Hero City.
Simultaneously with the battles on Malaya Zemlya, fierce battles took place on the Blue Line. The Soviet command was unable to create a superiority of forces here, and the enemy fiercely resisted. After all, for the Nazis, the loss of the Taman Peninsula would have created great difficulties (especially for aviation concentrated in the south), put the troops stationed in the Crimea in a difficult position, and undermined the morale of German soldiers. And Hitler never tired of repeating that the time would soon come when the German army would again move to the Caucasus from the Taman Peninsula.
In other sectors of the North Caucasus Front, into which the Northern Group of Forces was transformed, the successes were impressive. On January 11, the Krasnodar offensive operation began. On January 24, Soviet troops reached the line
Belaya Glina - Armavir - Labinskaya, and two days later the Kavkazskaya station (a large railway junction) and the city of Kropotkin were liberated. The offensive developed rapidly. On January 29, Tikhoretsk and Maykop were liberated.
On February 4, the German group was cut into two parts: the Seventeenth Field Army was thrown back to the lower reaches of the Kuban, and parts of the tank army hastily retreated to Rostov. Pursuing the enemy, Soviet troops reached the Sea of Azov in the Yeisk area and cut off the Nazis’ escape route from the territory of Kuban to the north. At the same time, Soviet bombers launched powerful attacks on enemy airfields in the area of the villages of Timashevskaya and Slavyanskaya.
The city of Krasnodar was liberated by troops of the North Caucasus Front, with the active support of partisans, on February 12.
The offensive operation of the Soviet troops in the area of the Krymskaya and Neberdzhaevskaya villages did not lead to serious changes at the front. The result of the Krasnodar operation was the advance of the troops of the North Caucasus Front by 60-70 kilometers, but it was not possible to completely solve the assigned tasks.
In April–June 1943 there were Air battles over Kuban, as a result of which our aviation seized air supremacy in most sectors of the Soviet-German front. After a crushing defeat in Battle of Stalingrad German troops of Army Groups “A” and “Don” retreated to Rostov, and partially consolidated on the Taman Peninsula. By holding Taman, the Germans covered the approaches to Crimea and ensured the use of sea communications, limiting the actions of the Soviet fleet. In the spring of 1943, heavy fighting broke out in the Novorossiysk region, but units of the North Caucasus Front encountered strong enemy defenses here. Almost all settlements and heights of the mountainous areas were turned into strongholds and centers of resistance. The German Blue Line in depth on the Taman Peninsula stretched from the Azov to the Black Seas. Only through a naval landing operation did Soviet troops manage to capture Malaya Zemlya on Taman - a small bridgehead in the Myskhako area, which was the reason for the first major air battles in the skies of Kuban.
The Kuban air battles were characterized by the fact that both opposing sides met here on equal terms for the first time. No one had a decisive superiority in the tactics of action and organization of aviation, as well as in the quality of aviation equipment. New fighters began to enter service with the Soviet Air Force in large numbers. Yak-7B And La-5, and flight data Yak-1 And LaGG-3
were significantly improved by further simplifying the design and installing a more powerful uprated M-105PF engine.
The Germans became more active in Taman in April 1943, trying to liquidate the Myskhako bridgehead with the help of the 17th Army alone and pin down the formations of the North Caucasus Front in order to prevent their transfer to the Kursk area on the eve of Operation Citadel. The main role in the battles was assigned to the Luftwaffe, which was supposed to disrupt the enemy’s offensive and raze his forward positions to the ground. For this purpose, up to 1,000 aircraft of the 4th Air Fleet (about 38% of all German aviation on the Eastern Front) were concentrated at the airfields of the Crimea and the Taman Peninsula. Among the 580 bombers were six air groups of dive bombers Ju-87 under the command of Colonel E. Kupfer. The fighter units of the best German squadrons (JG3, JG51, JG52, JG54) consisted of 250 fighters, including a number of aircraft Focke-Wulf FW.190.
The Air Force of the North Caucasus Front, under the command of General Vershinin, included the 4th and 5th Air Armies. In total - about 600 combat vehicles. However, the actions of Soviet aircraft greatly complicated the field airfields, which became muddy during the rains. The concrete runways of German fixed air bases avoided this problem.
Large enemy aviation forces, concentrated in a limited area, predetermined the intensity of the air battles that unfolded into the largest air battles of the Great Patriotic War. They took place in three stages. The first stage of air battles took place from April 17 to April 24, 1943, when the German command attempted to eliminate the Myskhako bridgehead. About 450 bombers and about 200 fighters were thrown at the defenders of Malaya Zemlya. Kupffer's Stukas, in waves of 25 aircraft, bombarded artillery positions, fortifications and strongholds of the Soviet troops. On April 17, they flew 494 sorties, losing only 7 vehicles. The total number of Luftwaffe sorties that day exceeded one and a half thousand. There were three times fewer Soviet aircraft in the air. Although almost 500 vehicles were brought in to support the paratroopers, the distance of the airfields from the front line allowed the fighters to remain over the combat area for no more than 10-15 minutes. On the aircraft route, in addition, there were the northwestern spurs of the Main Caucasus Range with a height of 400-500 meters, so if the cloudiness dropped to the level of the mountains, flights became impossible. Based only 40-50 km from Novorossiysk, German aviation, due to this, dominated the bridgehead for the first time. However, on land, the Nazis only slightly managed to break into the battle formations of the defenders of Malaya Zemlya. Due to the difficult military situation, on April 18, representatives of Headquarters Marshal Zhukov and Air Force Commander Marshal Novikov arrived at the North Caucasus Front. To restore the lost balance of forces, the 267th IAD and three air corps from the reserve of the high command were urgently redeployed to Kuban: the 2nd bomber, 2nd mixed and 3rd fighter, led by General E. Savitsky. Taking into account the new formations, the strength of the Soviet Air Force increased to 900 aircraft, among which there were 370 fighters, 170 attack aircraft and 260 day and night bombers. Fighter aircraft were almost entirely armed with new types of combat vehicles and only about 6% were made up of obsolete aircraft I-16 And I-153. 11% of fighters were American Bell P-39 Airacobra and English Supermarine Spitfire Mk.Vb.
On April 19, fierce air battles broke out over Myskhako. Colonel Kupfer's slow and poorly protected Ju.87 bombers immediately suffered heavy losses. They completed only 294 sorties and switched to night operations the very next day. On April 20, replenished with fresh reserves, the Soviet Air Force was the first to strike with a hundred bombers at 11.30, disrupting the enemy offensive. Another 100 aircraft attacked the German positions five hours later - the commander of the 17th German Army was forced to regroup his forces. On April 21, ADD bombers in groups of 5-10 bombed the airfields of the 55th Luftwaffe squadron - Saki and Sarabuz. On this day, the activity of German aviation decreased by almost half and gradually began to decline - Soviet pilots won victory in the air. The German Air Force lost 152 aircraft in a week.
The second stage of air battles took place in the area of the Krymskaya village from April 29 to May 10, 1943, when the 56th Army launched an offensive in the direction of the main attack of the Soviet troops with the aim of defeating the Taman enemy group. German aviation tried to contain enemy attacks with bombing strikes, and Luftwaffe fighters in the sky opposed the actions of Soviet bombers and attack aircraft supporting ground units on the battlefield. On a relatively narrow section of the front (25-30 km), up to 40 air duels took place during the day, in which 50-80 aircraft from both sides simultaneously took part.
On April 28, in the early morning, groups of German bombers began to attack the forward positions of the Red Army. The fighters of the 4th VA countered 850 Luftwaffe sorties with only 310. Soviet pilots shot down 25 enemy aircraft at the cost of 18 of their own aircraft. This was clearly an unfavorable ratio, given that the battles were fought mainly with Luftwaffe escort fighters, which reliably covered the bombers. The tactics of the Soviet Air Force required further improvement. At first, fighters flew out on patrol, having a strictly defined area within three or four points to cover the troops. A certain patrol time and flight altitude were required. But since these points were not far from each other, the planes, flying in a straight line, were forced to reduce speed and found themselves in a disadvantageous position. This weakness was immediately taken advantage of by German fighters, clearing the airspace before the bombers attacked. In addition, some Soviet pilots were too keen on air battles, flying over the front line and coming under attack from a more numerous enemy.
On April 29, the scales in the battles tipped to the side of Soviet aviation. At night, on the eve of the offensive of the 56th Army, two nines Pe-2 attacked the village of Krymskaya - the fires were used as landmarks by the remaining bombers, among which were light-engine U-2. At 7 o'clock in the morning three nines Pe-2 raided the headquarters of the German troops, and after them six and seven attack aircraft rushed into battle IL-2, operating at intervals of 10 minutes. At first, each group of Ilyushins was covered by a pair of fighters, but then reinforced units of red star aircraft began to patrol over the entire combat area. The infantry attack at 7.40 was supported by nine more dive bombers, accompanied by 4-8 fighters. A total of 493 Soviet aircraft (144 bombers, 84 attack aircraft and 265 fighters) took part in the three-hour first strike. During the day, USSR aviation carried out 1,308 combat sorties (including 379 at night). The Germans, in turn, carried out only 539, losing 74 aircraft. The superiority of Soviet fighters in the air turned out to be so great that panicked reports from Luftwaffe pilots were often heard on the radio: “In the Krymskaya area, Russian fighters are hitting our bombers. Send help. There are Russian fighters all around... We cannot fulfill an important role, Russian fighters are pursuing us everywhere..."
played in the victory in the air battles over Kuban massive raids on German airfields carried out on May 6-8, 1943, carried out on May 6-8, 1943, with the aim of forcing the Germans to postpone the offensive on Kursk Bulge. In addition to achieving the immediate goals of the operation - the destruction of military transport aircraft prepared for the airborne operation to capture the Kursk railway junction - the incidental destruction of a certain number of combat aircraft was also achieved. In addition, those transport aircraft and gliders that supplied the Kuban group of German troops from Crimea by air were partially destroyed.
In the following days, during the offensive of the 56th Army, the activity of the Red Army aviation remained quite high - for every German plane in the sky there were two Soviet ones. To detect enemy vehicles and target USSR Air Force fighters at them, they used 5 radar stations, three of which were located directly in the offensive zone of the 56th Army. One station was essentially the command post of the 4th VA. All aviation management was carried out centrally, first from the Air Force command post of the North Caucasus Front, and then from the headquarters of the 4th VA, whose commander personally or through an operational group located 4 km from the front line gave orders. One of the air division commanders, who headed the operational group, directly supervised aviation operations in the air. When planning air operations, Air Force units were assigned strictly defined tasks. For example, at the first stage of the battle, out of 900 aircraft, 370 were intended to fight German aircraft in the air, and 278 at airfields. Units equipped with outdated fighters were used to suppress enemy anti-aircraft artillery I-16 And I-153. In addition, one fighter regiment was constantly in reserve, and several dozen aircraft remained to cover their own airfields.
To repel enemy air raids, the entire front-line area, according to the Stalingrad system, was divided into sectors, for each of which one fighter air division was responsible. Regimental command posts had direct telephone communication with VNOS posts.
Due to the fact that Luftwaffe airfields were located close to the front line, the main task of Soviet fighters was air patrol. On average, about 50% of all fighter aircraft sorties were spent on this. During the patrol, the battle formation known as the “Kuban whatnot” proved itself to be the best. In the air, the fighters were separated in height by two or three tiers. The lower, strongest group acted against enemy bombers on their likely flight routes, the upper covering group went above the lower one with an elevation of 800-1000 meters. The order of both groups consisted of pairs of fighters, with an interval of 200-250 meters in pairs, and 800-1000 meters between pairs. The pairs were also separated in height.
Effective tactics and numerical superiority allowed Soviet pilots to seize operational air supremacy. In 12 days of fighting, they shot down 368 enemy aircraft at the cost of only 70 fighters. The personal account of Soviet aces, whose names were published in the newspaper of the 4th VA on May 1, 1943, quickly increased. The leader among them was Dmitry Borisovich Glinka, who scored 21 personal victories in 48 air battles. V. Fadeev personally shot down 18 enemy aircraft in 48 air battles, N. Lavitsky in 68 battles - 15, A. Pokryshkin in 55 battles - shot down 14 aircraft personally and 6 in a group.
Having broken through the first line of German defense, the troops of the 56th Army advanced 10 km and liberated the village of Krymskaya, an important communications hub on the Taman Peninsula. While the soldiers were strengthening themselves in new positions, there was a temporary lull at the front. It was put to good use by the command of the Soviet Air Force. By convening various conferences, in which such experienced pilots as Alexander Pokryshkin, Vladimir Lavrinenkov, Sultan Amet-Khan and others took part, an exchange of experience took place between fighter units. This experience was summarized in a special directive from Marshal A. Novikov, sent to all air armies. Based on the directive, it was proposed to allocate special groups of fighters to conduct air combat, especially in the vertical. Duty zones were now supposed to be located above enemy territory to a depth of 10-15 km. Fighter formations were ordered to be divided into two groups: one to distract enemy fighters, the other to destroy bombers. A large role was also given to attacking enemy airfields. Not least important was the protection of our own air bases. To cover them, 275 anti-aircraft guns and 120 anti-aircraft machine guns were allocated. For camouflage purposes, 17 false airfields were built, on which there were 110 mock-ups of combat vehicles.
On the morning of May 26, 234 Soviet bombers and attack aircraft, accompanied by 150 fighters, attacked Wehrmacht positions in the area of the villages of Kyiv and Moldavanskaya. After a forty-minute bombardment, the troops of the North Caucasus Front launched another offensive, trying to break through the second line of German defense. The battles in the air flared up again with unrelenting force.
However, the Luftwaffe command, having gathered the aviation of Crimea, the Taman Peninsula and southern Ukraine into a single fist, was able to prepare for such a turn of events, creating a numerical superiority in forces. 1,400 German aircraft were sent to the battle formations of the advancing troops. Acting at an increasing pace, the Germans at the end of the day made a star raid, numbering up to 600 vehicles. 12 groups of aircraft, 40-60 aircraft each, attacked from different directions. In total, during May 26, German aviation carried out 1,669 sorties, and in the following days - even up to 2,000 or more. Dominance in the sky again passed to the Luftwaffe - air strikes became so powerful that Soviet ground troops were forced to retreat in certain areas.
K. Vershinin, who took command of the 4th VA, quickly took retaliatory measures. The number of patrolling fighters was clearly insufficient. Many enemy bomber groups simply did not have time to intercept, and often the battle began after the bombs had already been dropped on the target. Often it was not even possible to break through to the bombers - the Luftwaffe fighters imposed a distracting duel. Therefore, the simplest way out of this situation was to increase the number of patrolling Soviet aircraft, as well as intercept enemy bombers before approaching the front line. To solve this problem, the number of escort fighters was reduced to a minimum - bombers and attack aircraft began to fly in large formations under the protection of their machine guns. The freed forces were sent to fight enemy aircraft. As a result of these measures, enemy losses immediately increased and in two weeks amounted to 315 aircraft. About 150 fighters were shot down on the Soviet side.
At the beginning of June 1943, the German leadership, realizing the hopelessness of the air war over Taman, began transferring bomber units to the central sector of the Eastern Front. Now the battles were fought primarily by fighters. The number of Luftwaffe sorties immediately decreased - on June 7, their number was only 300. This was also facilitated by constant raids on German airfields, which were carried out mainly at night.
As a result, the Germans lost the battle over Kuban. According to Soviet data, the Luftwaffe lost 1,100 aircraft between April 17 and June 7, of which over 800 were destroyed in the air. The fighter units of the German Air Force suffered significant losses. In JG52 alone, starting from April 17, a third of all pilots were out of action.
On August 12, Russia celebrates Air Force Day. Russia is deservedly famous for its “air shield”. Today we will remember 7 famous air battles of Russian aviation.
First World War. Alexander Kozakov
The most successful Russian pilot - ace during the First World War was Alexander Aleksandrovich Kozakov. Kozakov’s combat record includes 32 victories, although many official sources indicate a different figure - 17. This discrepancy is explained by the fact that, according to the rule existing in Russian aviation, only the enemy airplane that fell on territory not occupied by the enemy was considered shot down. On March 19, 1915, in one of his first combat missions, the pilot of the 19th air detachment of the 5th Army, headquarters captain Alexander Kozakov, repeated the feat of Pyotr Nesterov, ramming a German Albatross. Under the fuselage of his Moran, a metal “cat” with long “paws” and a pyroxylin bomb was attached to a cable (and this was in 1915, when the French and Germans were already installing machine guns on their planes). Having deftly maneuvered in the air, Kozakov overtook the Albatross and, hovering above it, tried to throw off the cat. But, as luck would have it, she got caught in the skin of her own airplane. Kozakov decided to hit the Albatross from above with the wheels of his Moran. The blow turned out to be so strong that the Moran tore through the skin of the wings of the enemy airplane, as if riding it. In this position, Kozakov flew for several seconds and then “jumped off his horse.” The out-of-control German plane overturned and fell to the ground like a stone. Both enemy pilots died, but the Russian pilot still managed to land the wounded Moran on his territory. True, the airplane turned over during its run, but the pilot survived.
Air raid on Berlin
Exactly a month after the start of the Great Patriotic War, German aviation carried out its first massive raid on Moscow. Enemy raids prompted the Soviet military-political leadership to launch retaliatory strikes on Berlin. On June 26, 1941, the People's Commissar of the Navy, Admiral Kuznetsov, had already visited Stalin with a proposal to bomb the German capital. The Supreme Commander-in-Chief liked the idea. It was necessary to prove that Soviet aviation had not been destroyed, as Germany’s chief propagandist Goebbels trumpeted. The operation was extremely dangerous; it was expected that the bombers would spend at least eight hours in the air. At significant altitudes, the temperature outside the aircraft could reach 50 degrees below zero. Considering that the cabins were not heated, warm fur suits and oxygen masks were prepared for the pilots. The cars had to be made as light as possible. And due to what? The armor protection was removed. There were anti-aircraft guns around Berlin within a radius of one hundred kilometers, and hundreds of fighters were on duty at the airfields. But three of our planes reached the capital of the Reich without firing a single shot. Even in Saaremaa there was an agreement: there would be no radio communications over the target, signals would be given by the commander of the operation, Colonel Preobrazhensky, with aeronautical lights. Berlin was not waiting for “guests”, it was all in lights, perfectly visible. Navigator G.P. Molchanov recalled the flight to Berlin this way: “It’s a matter of minutes to the goal. Beneath us is the lair of fascism! I’m carrying out bombing! The pulses of the separated FABs are counted like a heartbeat. 500. Only 35 minutes after the first bombs fell, an air raid warning was announced in Berlin. The city was plunged into darkness. Our bombers had to break through a continuous wall of fire. Preobrazhensky ordered the radio operator: “Krotenko, tell the airfield: mine.” place - Berlin. I’ve completed the job. I’m coming back.” The bombers took the opposite course. The reference books still say that all our crews returned to the airfield without losses. In fact, there were losses. Lieutenant Dashkovsky's plane did not reach its airfield by a little. It fell on the forest near Cahul and caught fire. The crew died. Years later, the German writer Olaf Greller would write: “What had never been possible before and no one else would be able to do until 1945 was accomplished by Preobrazhensky’s pilots: they took the fascist air defense by surprise, the strongest and most equipped it had ever been in 1941.” .
Although the Battle of Kursk is rightly considered a tank battle, the battle in the sky was no less important. The Luftwaffe provided its tank divisions with very valuable air support, but the Red Army Air Force ultimately proved its superiority in the air. The military operations of Soviet aviation in defense near Kursk received a much greater scope than in the defensive operations of the Battles of Stalingrad and Moscow. The battles became especially fierce in the area of the city of Izium, where our troops crossed the Seversky Donets River and were now fighting heavy battles on its right bank. German bombers in groups of 20–30 aircraft, under the cover of fighters, tried to bomb the crossings and delay the advance of our troops. The air battles during the Battle of Kursk were distinguished by the incredible intensity and heroism of the Soviet pilots.
According to the memoirs of Georgy Baevsky: “On August 15, covering my troops and the crossing in the Izyum area, “in a heavy air battle with 80-100 Xe-111 and Yu-88, 16–20 Me-109f,” as recorded in the flight book, I shot down a Xe-111, “the ammunition consumption was 380 ShVAK.” And again there were “hunters” among the enemy fighters. On the same day, six La-5s were under the command of one of our best pilots, a veteran of the regiment, commander of the 3rd Guard Squadron, Captain N.P. Dmitrieva, covering the crossings, was engaged in a heavy battle with enemy fighters. Suddenly - and in battle everything happens suddenly - a bright flash in front of the plane and a cutting sharp pain in the eyes turned off Nikolai Dmitriev’s consciousness for a few seconds. The flames engulfed the entire plane, he entered. in a steep spin and did not react to the release of the steering wheels. With great difficulty, Dmitriev left his La-5, the “Messers” tried to shoot the parachutist in the air, but our fighters reliably covered the commander, who, while descending, began to tear off his burning clothes. He fell on. advanced, in the disposition of his troops, burned, unconscious. There was a bloody wound where the left eye used to be. The infantry took Dmitriev to the nearest field hospital, and from there he was sent to Moscow."
Battle of Kuban
The air battle that took place in the skies of Kuban in April-June 1943 became one of the largest air battles of the Second World War and was an integral part of the Soviet offensive in the Caucasus. New generation Soviet fighters played one of the main roles in the battle. For the first time during the Great Patriotic War, Soviet pilots imposed their will on the Luftwaffe, actively interfered with and opposed the Germans in carrying out their combat missions. In total, three air battles took place in the skies of Kuban. The first of them began on April 17, 1943 with an attempt to eliminate the bridgehead in the Myskhako area. In order to throw the paratroopers of the 18th Army into the sea, the enemy attracted about 450 of its bombers and 200 covering fighters. On the Soviet side, about 500 aircraft, including 100 bombers, were used to counter the Germans. From April 28 to May 10, an air battle unfolded in the skies over the village of Krymskaya. The intensity of these battles can be evidenced by the fact that during the 3 hours of the offensive, German aviation carried out more than 1,500 sorties. The last major air battles took place between May 26 and June 7 in the area of the Kievskaya and Moldavanskaya villages during the breakthrough of the German Blue Line. For some time, the Germans managed to seize air superiority, which made life very difficult for the advancing troops. The retaliatory countermeasure was attacks by Soviet aviation on German airfields. From May 26 to June 7, the Red Army Air Force conducted 845 sorties against Nazi airfields in Anapa, Kerch, Saki, Sarabuz and Taman. In total, during the battles in the skies of Kuban, Soviet aviation carried out about 35 thousand sorties.
Khalkhin Gol. Ram
The ramming method, mastered by Nesterov, was further developed and became one of the favorite methods of combat of Soviet pilots even before the Great Patriotic War. In 1938, in the battles of Khalkhin Gol, senior lieutenant Skobarikhin used a ram, but now it was made on a collision course and on planes that approached at a speed of about 900 kilometers per hour - this is three times faster than in 1914.
The second ramming attack on Khalkhin Gol was carried out on August 3 by the squadron commander
56th Fighter Regiment Captain V.P. Kustov. On this day the enemy wanted
launch a powerful air strike on the positions of Soviet troops. Japanese Armada
The bombers and fighters were intercepted by Soviet planes. Already
several enemy vehicles fell to the ground in flames. However, some
The bombers stubbornly rushed forward. One car was attacked by the captain
Kustov. At the decisive moment, the Soviet pilot ran out of ammunition.
In a few seconds, bombs could rain down on Soviet soldiers... With a screw
the captain of his fighter hit the fuselage of a Japanese bomber,
it flared up and, falling apart, fell down... Upon collision
Viktor Kustov, the first in the history of aviation to destroy with a ram, also died.
strike by an enemy bomber.
The next day, August 4, a ram was carried out on Khalkhin Gol.
fighter pilot A.F. Moshin. In the air that began over Mount Khamar-Daba
During the battle, Soviet pilots shot down eight enemy aircraft. One of them destroyed
Lieutenant Moshin. While chasing the second car, he got behind it. However,
Moshin ran out of ammunition. Skillfully maneuvering, he came close to
enemy aircraft and hit the stabilizer with the propeller. Japanese fighter
crashed into the ground.
Moshin landed safely at his airfield. Except a little
bent propeller, his I-16 had no damage
Ram. The Great Patriotic War
During the Great Patriotic War, aerial ramming was not provided for by the military regulations, any manuals or instructions, and Soviet pilots resorted to this technique not by order of the command. During the Great War, Soviet pilots carried out more than 600 aerial rams. It should be noted that Soviet Air Force pilots used rams on all types of aircraft: fighters, bombers, attack aircraft and reconnaissance aircraft. Aerial rams were carried out in single and group battles, day and night, at high and low altitudes, over one’s own territory and over the enemy’s territory, in all weather conditions. There were cases when pilots rammed a ground or water target. Thus, the number of ground rams is almost equal to air attacks - more than 500. Perhaps the most famous ground ram is the feat that was performed by the crew of Captain Nikolai Gastello on June 26, 1941 in a DB-3f (Il-4, twin-engine long-range bomber). The bomber was hit by enemy anti-aircraft artillery fire and made a so-called “fire ram”, hitting an enemy mechanized column.
Akhtung-akhtung! Pokryshkin in the sky!
It would be wrong to talk about the history of military aviation without mentioning Pokryshkin. It is not necessary to retell all the exploits of the pilot; let us remember the main thing. The legendary battle of April 29, 1943 is widely known. Then the eight aircobras led by Pokryshkin scattered and turned back three echelons of Yu-87 (81 aircraft). In addition, they were covered by ten Me-109s. One pair pinned down enemy fighters, the other six with a “falcon strike” through a powerful fire barrier (the shooters of 27 bombers sent more than 400 bullets per second towards them), twice repeating a mathematically calculated maneuver with a variable dive profile and a sharp upward movement, shot 12 “Junkers” (four of which - Pokryshkin). Returning to the airfield, he shoots down the fifth bomber.
In the essay “Master of the Sky - Alexander Pokryshkin,” front-line correspondents A. Malyshko and A. Verkholetov wrote: “Does he shoot? - friends say about him. “It comes with all the fire, burns like a blast furnace.” All firing points on Pokryshkin’s vehicle were transferred to one trigger. Four against 50, three against 23, alone against 8 Pokryshkin entered the battle. And I never knew defeat. Moreover, in each battle he took upon himself the most dangerous thing - the attack of the leader of the German groups.
A second - and the impeccable geometry of the battle formations breaks, instantly plunging into the chaos of close air combat. Seventy-five years ago, on December 16, 1942, the Middle Don offensive operation began near Stalingrad, during which the forces of the Southwestern and left flank of the Voronezh front attacked the eighth Italian and third Romanian armies of the Don group under the command of Field Marshal Erich von Manstein.
Each side brought in between 400 and 500 aircraft of various types for the battle. In two weeks, the Red Army broke through an enemy front 340 kilometers wide, defeated 11 enemy divisions and reached the rear of Army Group Don. This success was achieved largely thanks to the effective actions of Soviet aviation. RIA Novosti publishes a selection of other notable air operations of the twentieth century.
Three fights
One of the largest air battles of the Second World War took place over the Kuban in April-June 1943, at the height of the battle for the Caucasus. The German side, taking advantage of its numerical superiority in aviation, used up to 1.2 thousand aircraft to disrupt the offensive of the Red Army. The USSR took up to 1050 aircraft into the air. Soviet aces fought both on new fighters and on those well-tested in past battles. The Luftwaffe was fought by the LaGG-3, La-5, Yak-1B, Yak-7, as well as the American P-39 Airacobra, P-40E Kittyhawk and British Spitfire MK.V received under Lend-Lease. Attacks on ground targets were carried out mainly by Pe-2 dive bombers, Il-2 attack aircraft and Il-4 long-range aircraft. The Germans relied mainly on their famous Messers - the BF-109 of the new modifications G-2 and G-4 - as well as on the FW-190 fighters. The backbone of the Luftwaffe bomber force was the He-111 and Ju-88 aircraft.
Soviet historiography divides the battle over Kuban into three major air battles. The first occurred from April 17 to April 24 in the Myskhako area. Wehrmacht forces, with close air support, tried to destroy a group of troops of the 18th Army. The Germans sent 450 bombers and 200 covering fighters to the small landing. They were opposed by 500 Soviet aircraft, including 100 bombers. The German side managed to maintain the initiative in the air, but the fighter aircraft of the Soviet Union were able to achieve the main task: to prevent enemy bombers from launching attacks on the battle formations of the Soviet troops in an organized manner.
The second major battle took place from April 28 to May 10 over the village of Krymskaya. Its high intensity is evidenced by the fact that during the three hours of the offensive, German aviation carried out more than one and a half thousand sorties. The last major air battles took place from May 26 to June 7 in the area of the Kyiv and Moldavanskaya villages. In total, during the three battles, the USSR lost about 750 aircraft, Germany - about 1.1 thousand. Air battles in the Kuban are assessed positively by Soviet history due to the significant erosion of the Luftwaffe's air power along the entire front. In addition, Soviet pilots went through excellent training during the battle for the Caucasus, developed a number of effective tactical schemes, and learned to fight in new combat formations.
Direct path to kamikaze
One of the largest air battles in the Pacific theater of World War II was the Battle of the Mariana Islands on June 19-20, 1944. The US Navy's Fifth Fleet engaged a powerful carrier force of the Imperial Japanese Navy, which consisted of nine "floating airfields". The Americans advanced with 12 aircraft carriers. A thousand US carrier-based aircraft were opposed by about 750 Japanese aircraft. The Imperial Navy lost this battle with a “devastating score.”
In two days, the Americans lost 123 aircraft. However, they destroyed more than 600 enemy vehicles and sank three aircraft carriers. The technical imperfection of their fighters, as well as the low level of crew training, led to such a sad result for the Japanese. The huge losses in aviation of the Japanese Empire could no longer be made up. In October 1944, during the Battle of Leyte Gulf, considered the largest naval battle in history, four Japanese aircraft carriers were unable to engage because there were no aircraft available for them. In part, it was the defeat in the Mariana Islands and the acute shortage of carrier-based aircraft that led to the creation of kamikaze units in the Japanese fleet.
"Black Tuesday"
The Korean War is also remembered for its fierce air battles. American strategic aviation suffered one of its biggest defeats on October 30, 1951 from Soviet aircraft. On this day, later called "Black Tuesday" in the United States, 21 B-29 Stratofortress heavy bombers, accompanied by 200 fighters, took off to attack Namsi airfield. 44 Soviet MiG-15s moved to intercept this armada.
The fighter escort was far behind the bombers, as it took off late. The B-29s flew for a certain part of the route with minimal cover. The Soviet aces took advantage of this. Twenty-two pairs of MiG-15s dived through a thin formation of American F-86s and attacked strategic bombers. As a result of the fleeting battle, 12 “flying fortresses” and four covering fighters were shot down. The remaining bombers had to retreat. According to the testimony of the navigator of one of the B-29s, who participated in this raid and was later captured, there were killed and wounded on all the planes that survived the MiG-15 attack. The Soviet side lost only one fighter in this battle.
Two against twenty eight
In one of the first battles of the Yom Kippur War, an air skirmish took place, once again proving that numerical superiority in the sky is not always a guarantee of victory. On October 6, 1973, 28 Egyptian MiG-17s and MiG-21s attacked the Israeli Ophira airbase on the Sinai Peninsula near Sharm el-Sheikh. At the airfield at that moment there was only one pair of F-4 Phantom II fighter-interceptors on duty with crews - a pilot and a navigator in each car. The Israeli pilots were greatly helped by the fact that enemy fighters simply did not perceive them as a significant threat and began to bomb the runways and other infrastructure of the base.
The pair took off and immediately engaged the Egyptian aircraft in maneuverable close combat. The MIM-23 anti-aircraft missile system deployed at the air base provided considerable assistance to the Israeli pilots. During a short six-minute skirmish, two Phantoms managed to shoot down from four to seven fighters and hold out until reinforcements arrived - four Israeli Mirages. After this, the MiGs stopped attacking and left in the direction of the mountains. According to many analysts, the Achilles heel of the Egyptian aircraft in this battle was the excessive bomb load - their pilots did not expect to encounter serious resistance from enemy aircraft. However, the Egyptians inflicted considerable damage: they destroyed the airfield's radar, and also scored at least three hits on the runways.