In the second half of the 1930s. Hitler behaved extremely aggressively towards Russia. He openly proclaimed a future war. However, the Anglo-French leaders generally pursued a policy of “appeasement” of Hitler and tried to direct his aggression to the east. In March 1939, Stalin sharply criticized this policy, saying that it was they, not Germany, who were the warmongers. However, on April 17, 1939, the Soviet government proposed that England and France conclude a mutual assistance agreement in case of aggression. But these negotiations turned out to be unsuccessful, since their participants sought not so much for real agreements as for putting pressure on Germany.

On August 23, 1939, a non-aggression pact for a period of 10 years and a secret protocol on the delimitation of spheres of influence were signed between the USSR and Germany. On September 1, 1939, German troops invaded Poland without declaring war. And already on September 3, Poland's allies - England and France - declared war on Germany.

The main reasons for the war:

· economic and political contradictions and the struggle for the redivision of the world;

· contradictions between capitalism and socialism;

· the establishment of fascist regimes in a number of countries.

In mid-September, when the Polish troops were defeated, Germany withdrew its army to the borders of the Soviet Union. Finland refused Stalin’s proposal to move the border away from Leningrad in exchange for territory in Karelia. On November 30, 1939, the Soviet-Finnish war began, which lasted until the spring of 1940. On March 12, the Soviet-Finnish peace treaty was signed, according to which the USSR ceded the territory of the Karelian Isthmus. The League of Nations expelled the USSR from its membership, condemning its actions. In May of the same year, Germany attacked Belgium and Holland. Holland and Belgium capitulated on May 14 and 28, respectively. On June 10, Italy entered the war against France and England. June 22, 1940 The Franco-German armistice was signed. According to it, Germany occupied most of its territory, and France paid huge sums. On June 25, Italy signed an armistice agreement with France.

On June 14 and 16, 1940, the USSR government demanded that Latvia, Lithuania and Estonia change the composition of their governments and allow the entry of additional troops. In August 1940, these states joined the USSR.

After the defeat of France, England remained the only country that continued the war with Germany. In May 1940, the British government was headed by Winston Churchill. America provided assistance to the country. In March 1941, the US Congress passed the Lend-Lease Act.

After Hitler's plan to seize England failed, Germany began preparations for war against the USSR. The Barbarossa attack plan was being developed.

On September 27, 1940, the Tripartite Pact was signed between Germany, Italy and Japan, according to which they promised to support each other. Soon it was joined by Hungary, Romania and Bulgaria. German troops were stationed in these territories.

On October 28, Italy attacked Greece in hopes of a short war, but encountered stubborn resistance. At the request of Mussolini on April 6, 1940. Germany attacked Greece and Yugoslavia. Surpassing them in power, it quickly broke the resistance of the Yugoslav and Greek armies.

By the summer of 1941, Germany and Italy had occupied 12 European countries. They established the so-called “new orders” that prohibited demonstrations that eliminated democratic freedoms. A huge number of people were imprisoned in concentration camps. The economies of these countries were used in the interests of the occupiers. An anti-fascist and patriotic resistance movement arose against the “new order”.

On the morning of June 22, 1941, Germany, violating the non-aggression pact, attacked the USSR without declaring war. Allied with Germany were Romania, Finland, Hungary, Slovakia, Croatia and Italy. A sudden attack on Soviet airfields put a significant part of the aircraft out of action. The Germans quickly advanced. By the winter of 1941, they captured the Baltic states, Ukraine, Belarus, Moldova, blocked Leningrad and approached Moscow.

From October 1941 to April 1942, fierce battles took place near Moscow. In December 1941, in the Battle of Moscow, Soviet troops launched a counteroffensive. The enemy was driven back. In the spring of the following 1942, the Red Army was defeated in the Crimea and near Kharkov. And in the middle of summer, German troops were stopped on the approaches to Stalingrad and the Caucasus.

In July 1941, an Anglo-Soviet agreement on joint actions in the war against Germany was signed, and in June 1942, a Soviet-American agreement on mutual assistance. A military-political alliance against the aggressors was formed, which included the USSR, the USA and Great Britain.

From November 1942 to February 1943, the Battle of Stalingrad lasted.

On November 19, 1942, Soviet troops under the leadership of Rokossovsky, Zhukov, Vatutin and other commanders launched a counteroffensive near Stalingrad. Here they defeated the fascist troops and their allies. This was a radical turning point in the course of the war.

In July - early August 1943, Soviet troops defeated Nazi troops on the Kursk Bulge.

In November 1942, in North Africa, the Anglo-American landing force, together with the French troops located there, having defeated the Italian-German group, seized control of the Mediterranean Sea, which opened the way for them to invade Italy.

In July 1943, Anglo-American troops landed in southern Italy. Marshal Badoglio, appointed after Mussolini's arrest, entered into secret negotiations with England and the United States. On September 8, 1943, Italy signed an armistice agreement and left the war. In response to this, the Germans occupied Central and Northern Italy, disarmed the army and blocked the path of Anglo-American troops. As a result, an Italian front was formed, which divided Italy into two parts.

In November - December 1943, the Tehran Conference of the Heads of Government of the three Allied Powers took place, at which it was decided to open a second front in France by the summer of 1944.

On June 6, 1944, Anglo-American troops landed in northern France. And on August 15 of the same year, the American and French armies were on the Mediterranean coast of France. A second front was opened. In August 1944, Allied forces, with the assistance of French Resistance units, entered Paris. And by September 1944, almost all of France was liberated.

In February 1945, the Yalta Conference took place, at which the decision to destroy the German armed forces was discussed. At the Crimean Conference, the heads of the three powers entered into a secret agreement according to which the USSR would enter the war with Japan two to three months after the end of the war in Europe.

In February 1945 Allied troops launched a new offensive on the Western Front. Soviet troops were moving towards. In the spring of 1945 Hungary was liberated. The troops of Zhukov, Konev, Rokossovsky and other commanders approached Prague, Vienna, Berlin and Bratislava. On April 25, 1945, a meeting took place between the advanced units of Soviet and American troops on the Elbe. USSR troops, having surrounded Berlin, proceeded to storm it.

On April 30, 1945, in recent events, German Chancellor Adolf Hitler committed suicide. The Berlin garrison laid down its arms.

The main result of the Great Patriotic War and the Second World War was the victory over fascism, in which the USSR played a decisive role. Throughout the Second World War, the Soviet-German front was the main one: it was here that 507 divisions of the Wehrmacht and 100 divisions of Germany’s allies were defeated, while US and British troops defeated 176 divisions.

One of the main results of the war was a new geopolitical situation, which was characterized by a confrontation between two systems - capitalist and socialist. In 7 countries of Central and Eastern Europe, leftist, democratic forces came to power. From that time on, the USSR was surrounded mainly by friendly states.

The Soviet people paid a huge price for these gains. 27 million Soviet citizens died. 1,710 cities and over 70 thousand villages lay in ruins.

Victory in the war was achieved thanks to the unparalleled courage and patriotism of the Soviet people, which was manifested in the creation of the people's militia and the partisan movement. One of the sources of victory was the friendship of the peoples of the USSR, which went through a harsh school and was tested in war conditions. The selfless labor of millions of home front workers provided the economic basis for military victories.

Introduction: The situation of the Soviet Union on the eve of the Great Patriotic War

1. The initial period of the war (June 1941 - November 1942). The main task of the army and the people is to survive!

2. 2nd period of the war (November 1942 - end of 1943). The initiative passes to the side of the Red Army. German troops suffer major defeats on the territory of the Soviet Union.

3. The final period of the war (January 1944 - May 1945). Liberation of the USSR and the countries of Eastern Europe from the Nazi yoke.

Conclusion: A great feat of the Red Army soldiers and home front workers.

On the eve of the war, a radical restructuring of our armed forces was carried out. Ground forces included rifle (infantry), armored and mechanized troops, artillery and cavalry. They also included special troops: communications, engineering, air defense, chemical defense and others. Organizationally, they united into ZoZ rifle, tank, motorized and cavalry divisions, 170 of which were located in the western military districts. In the ground forces, over 80% of the personnel of the Armed Forces underwent smriba. The Air Force and Navy were significantly strengthened.

The limited time that our country had did not allow us to resolve all the issues on which the ground-based security of the state depended. The Soviet government tried in every possible way to gain time, at least for another one or two years, when the next five-year plan would be completed, the main task of which was to rearm the army and fleet. Since 1939, the troops began to receive samples of new modern weapons and equipment: T-34 and KV tanks, BM-13 (Katyusha) multiple launch rocket weapons, F. Tokarev’s self-loading rifle (SVT-40), a heavy machine gun (12 .7 mm) on a tripod. Many activities were unfinished at the beginning of the war.

The peaceful efforts of the Soviet Union to curb fascist aggression were not supported by England, France and the USA. France was soon conquered by Germany and capitulated, and the British government, fearing the landing of German troops on the islands, did everything to push German fascism to the East, to war against the USSR. And they achieved it. On June 22, 1941, Germany treacherously attacked the Soviet Union. Germany’s European allies – Italy, Hungary, Romania and Finland – also entered the war against the USSR.

German generals warned Hitler about the danger of a war against Russia, emphasizing that the war should end with a German victory a maximum of 3 months after the start, since Germany did not have the economic resources to wage a long war in the vast expanses of Russia. To implement the plan of lightning war ("blitzkrieg") called "Barbarossa" - a plan for the destruction of Moscow, Leningrad, Kyiv, Minsk and the seizure of the North Caucasus, and most importantly Baku with its oil, the Nazis created exceptional military power, the main striking force of which were tank armies, capable of moving forward quickly.

To deliver a surprise strike, Hitler pulled 157 German and 37 divisions of Germany's European allies to the borders of the USSR. This armada was armed with about 4.3 thousand tanks and assault guns, up to 5 thousand aircraft, 47.2 thousand guns and mortars and 5.5 million soldiers and officers. The Red Army faced such a monstrous military machine in June 1941.

The Soviet Army in June 1941 in the border military districts had 2.9 million people, 1.8 thousand tanks, 1.5 thousand aircraft of a new design.

But the “blitzkrieg” did not work out for the Nazis, they had to fight for almost 4 years (or rather 1418 days and nights), and as a result they lost everything and shamefully capitulated in Berlin.

The war can be divided into three periods: the first period – June 1941 – November 1942; second period – November 1942 – end of 1943; third period – January 1944 – May 1945

1.First period.

So, how did military operations take place during the first period? The main directions of military operations: northwestern (Leningrad), western (Moscow), southwestern (Ukraine). Main events: border battles in the summer of 1941, defense of the Brest Fortress; the capture of the Baltic states and Belarus by Nazi troops, the beginning of the siege of Leningrad; Smolensk battles 1941; Kyiv defense, Odessa defense 1941 - 1942; Nazi occupation of Ukraine and Crimea; The Battle of Moscow in September-December 1941. In November 1941, the Germans realized that the “blitzkrieg” had not worked out, so they had to go on the defensive so as not to lose their main forces in the winter of 1941-1942.

On December 5, 1941, the Red Army went on the offensive near Moscow. This was the first major defeat of German troops in the Second World War, starting in the autumn of 1939. This was the collapse of the idea of ​​“blitzkrieg” - a lightning war and the beginning of a turning point in its course. The front in the east for Germany and its allies stopped near Moscow.

However, Hitler could not agree that further military operations against Russia would not lead Germany to victory. In June 1942, Hitler changed the plan - the main thing was to capture the Volga region and the Caucasus in order to provide the troops with fuel and food. The Nazi offensive began in the southeast of our country. A bright page in the history of the Great Patriotic War was the heroic defense of Stalingrad (July 17 – November 18, 1942). The battle for the Caucasus lasted from July 1942 to October 1943.

2.Second period of the war

The second period of the war begins with the counter-offensive of our troops at Stalingrad (November 19, 1942 - February 2, 1943). By this time, our country was experiencing an increase in military production and an increase in the USSR's combat reserves. The defeat of the 330,000-strong German fascist group over Stalingrad meant a radical turning point in the course of the war.

Offensive operations in the North Caucasus, the Middle Don, as well as breaking the blockade of Leningrad in January 1943 - all this dispelled the myth of the invincibility of the fascist army. In the summer of 1943, Hitler was forced to carry out total mobilization in Germany and in the satellite states. He urgently needed to take revenge for the defeats at Stalingrad and in the Caucasus. German generals no longer believed in a final victory over Russia, but made another attempt to take the initiative in the war on the Kursk Bulge. Here the Germans were preparing enormous tank equipment with the goal of going on the offensive again. The Battle of Kursk lasted for a month (from July 5 to August 5, 1943). The Soviet command launched a powerful artillery warning strike, but despite this, the Germans launched an offensive that lasted from July 5 to July 11, 1943.

And from July 12 to July 15, the Red Army launched a counteroffensive. On August 5, Orel and Belgrade were liberated, in honor of which the first salute during the war years thundered in Moscow to our generals and soldiers who won a major victory. The victory in the Battle of Kursk is regarded as an event of the war, during which the Soviet army “broke the back” of the German troops. From now on, no one in the world doubted the victory of the USSR.

From that moment on, the Soviet army took full strategic initiative, which was retained until the end of the war. In August-December 1943, all our fronts went on the offensive, German troops retreated everywhere beyond the Dnieper. On September 16, Novorossiysk was liberated, and on November 6, Kyiv.

In 1943, Russia achieved complete economic and military superiority over Germany. The restoration of the national economy began in the liberated regions and regions. Western countries (England and the USA) understood that next year the Soviet army would begin the liberation of European countries. Fearing being late and eager to share the victory over Nazi Germany, the rulers of the United States and Great Britain agreed to open a second front. To do this, they met with the Soviet delegation, headed by Stalin, at the Tehran Conference in 1943.

But even after the agreement on joint actions, the USA and Great Britain were in no hurry to open a second front, guided by their far-reaching plans to bleed the USSR, and after the war to impose their will on Russia.

Military operations are transferred to the territory of Germany's allies and the countries it occupied. The Soviet government officially stated that the entry of the Red Army into the territory of other countries was caused by the need to completely defeat the armed forces of Germany and did not pursue the goal of changing the political structure of these states or violating territorial integrity. The political course of the USSR was based on a program for organizing and recreating the state, economic and cultural life of European peoples, which was put forward back in November 1943, which provided for the provision of liberated peoples with full right and freedom to choose their state structure. The heads of the country did not agree with this statement some world powers. W. Churchill and many Western historians spoke about the establishment of “Soviet despotism” in the liberated territory.

Under the blows of the Red Army, the fascist bloc was falling apart. Finland left the war. In Romania, the Antonescu regime was overthrown and the new government declared war on Germany. During the summer-autumn of 1944, Romania (2nd Ukrainian Front), Bulgaria (2nd Ukrainian Front), Yugoslavia (3rd Ukrainian Front), Hungary and Slovakia were liberated. In October 1944, Soviet troops entered German territory. Together with the Soviet troops, the Czechoslovak corps, the Bulgarian army, the People's Liberation Army of Yugoslavia, the 1st and 2nd armies of the Polish Army, and several Romanian units and formations took part in the liberation of their countries.

Chronologically it happened like this. On August 20, troops of the 2nd and 3rd Ukrainian Fronts went on the offensive on the southern flank and after three days of fighting surrounded the main forces of the German-Romanian troops. On August 23, a military coup took place in Bucharest. The German protege, Marshal I. Antonescu, and a number of his ministers were arrested. Attempts by German troops to capture Bucharest encountered resistance from the city's rebellious population. On August 31, Soviet troops entered the capital of Romania.

Anti-Hitler coalition- a military-political alliance of states that acted in World War II against the aggressor countries (Germany, Japan, Italy and their satellites). Although by the end of the war the coalition consisted of more than 50 states, the USSR, Great Britain and the USA played key roles in it.

The beginning of the Great Patriotic War forced the leaders of Western states to reconsider their attitude towards the USSR. Already in the first days of the war, W. Churchill and F. Roosevelt declared their readiness to support the Soviet Union. On July 12, 1941, Great Britain and the USSR signed an agreement on joint actions against Germany, which recorded mutual obligations to provide assistance and support in the war, as well as to refuse to conclude a separate peace with the enemy. Soon after the agreement was concluded, the USSR and Great Britain took joint measures to prevent the use of Iranian territory by the Axis powers. On August 16, Moscow received a loan from the British government in the amount of 10 million pounds sterling, intended to pay for military purchases in Great Britain. The next step in creating the anti-Hitler coalition was the accession of the Soviet Union to the Atlantic Charter, previously signed by the United States and Great Britain.

At the same time, the Soviet government established contacts with the Free French national committee of Charles de Gaulle and the governments of Czechoslovakia and Poland, which were in exile, as well as a number of other states captured by the Nazis.

On September 29 - October 1, 1941, a meeting of the heads of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the three states took place in Moscow. Agreements were reached on the supply of weapons and military equipment to the USSR, which in turn guaranteed England and the USA their supply of strategic raw materials. In November 1941, the USSR officially joined Lend-Lease- a US government program that provided for the supply of ammunition, equipment, food and strategic raw materials to the allies of the anti-Hitler coalition. The bulk of them occurred in the period from mid-1943 to the end of 1944.

The direct entry of the United States into the war on December 7, 1941 completed the formation of the anti-Hitler coalition. The Declaration of the United Nations was signed on January 1, 1942 by representatives of 26 states, including the USSR, USA, Great Britain and China, which contributed to the further strengthening of the union of peoples opposing the aggressors. It contained an obligation to use all resources, military and economic, against those members of the Berlin Pact with which a given party to the Declaration was at war.

Important diplomatic documents that cemented the anti-Hitler coalition were the Soviet-British agreement on the “Union in the war against Hitler Germany and its accomplices in Europe and on cooperation after the war” of May 26, 1942 and the Soviet-American agreement “On the principles applied to mutual assistance in waging the war against aggression" dated June 11, 1942.

Following the conference of foreign ministers of the great powers, held in Moscow on October 19-30, 1943, its participants adopted a declaration stating that the war should end with the complete and unconditional surrender of Germany. In addition, it formulated the principles of the post-war world order. Another declaration, approved at the same conference, spoke of the inevitable responsibility of the Nazis for the crimes they committed.

The radical turning point during the Second World War, the entry of the Red Army onto the state borders of the USSR clearly demonstrated that the Soviet Union, even without outside help, could expel the Nazis from the European countries they occupied. Taking this into account, the United States and Great Britain, not wanting to see Soviet troops in Central and Western Europe before their armies were there, accelerated the landing of allied forces in France.

At the end of 1943, when Germany’s defeat had already become obvious, the “Big Three” - the leaders of the anti-Hitler coalition W. Churchill, F. Roosevelt, I. Stalin - gathered in Tehran (November 28 - December 1, 1943). The conference was also attended by foreign ministers, political and military advisers.

The main attention of the participants was focused on the problems of further waging the war, in particular the opening of a second front. As a result, the Declaration on joint actions in the war against Germany and post-war cooperation was approved. Stalin made a statement about the USSR's readiness to start a war with Japan after the defeat of Germany. It was decided that the Allies would open a second front before the summer of 1944 with their landing in France (this happened on June 6, 1944 - Operation Overlord).

Along with the problems of waging war, the first conference of heads of government discussed issues of post-war organization and ensuring lasting peace. In particular, the problem of the structure of Germany after the fall of the Nazi regime was touched upon. The USA and Great Britain insisted on the need to divide Germany into a number of small states, the Soviet delegation advocated the demilitarization and democratization of the German state, a public trial of the Nazi leadership, as well as the creation of a strong international body that would in the future become a guarantor that Germany would not initiate new wars.

The agenda of the Tehran conference included Polish and Iranian issues. Western countries tried to reconcile the USSR and the Polish émigré government in London, relations between which sharply deteriorated after the Germans publicized in 1943 the facts of the mass execution of Polish officers by the NKVD in the Katyn Forest near Smolensk. The issue of borders remained a stumbling block in Soviet-Polish relations. The USSR insisted on recognition of the 1939 borders, which generally corresponded to the Curzon line proposed back in 1920, and made it possible to preserve the unity of the Ukrainian and Belarusian peoples.

The liberation of a number of Eastern European countries from the Nazis by the Red Army highlighted the differences between the allies regarding their post-war structure. The USSR sought to create a “security belt” on its western borders from states friendly to it. Other participants in the anti-Hitler coalition, primarily Great Britain, wanted not only to achieve the restoration of their pre-war positions in these countries, but also to impose obligations on the Soviet Union to divide spheres of influence even before they were liberated.

For this purpose, in October 1944, W. Churchill paid a visit to Moscow. His proposal was as follows: in Romania the USSR received 90% of influence, and 10% remained for other countries; in Greece this ratio was the same, but in favor of Great Britain. Regarding Yugoslavia and Hungary, the British prime minister proposed establishing parity - 50% to 50%; in Bulgaria, 75% of influence was given to Moscow and 25% to other states. Discussion of these proposals took place at the level of foreign ministers.

The main thing was that the USSR agreed to give 90% of influence in Greece to the British and Americans, despite the fact that there was a high probability of communists coming to power in this country. This served as a demonstration of recognition of the allies’ sphere of influence outside the “security belt” and confirmed Moscow’s intention to continue cooperation in the post-war world.

A new meeting of the heads of the three allied states took place on February 4-11, 1945 in Yalta. After hearing the report of the Deputy Chief of the General Staff of the Soviet Army A. Antonov on the situation on the Soviet-German front, the allies agreed on military plans for the final defeat of Germany and outlined the principles on which the post-war world order would be based. It was decided to divide Germany into zones of occupation between the USSR, USA, Great Britain and France. The capital of Germany, Berlin, was also divided into occupation zones. The coordination and control of the actions of the occupation authorities was to be carried out by the Central Control Commission in Berlin. The USSR again opposed the idea of ​​the heads of the Western powers to dismember Germany. The leaders of the Big Three were unanimous in their opinion about the need for the complete destruction of German militarism and National Socialism.

During the negotiations, the Soviet side confirmed its commitment to enter the war against Japan 2-3 months after the end of hostilities with Germany. At the same time, the USSR demanded the preservation of the existing position of Mongolia, the restoration of rights to territories lost as a result of the Russo-Japanese War (South Sakhalin, the Kuril Islands), the internationalization of Port Arthur, and the joint operation of the Chinese Eastern and South Manchurian Railways with China.

Significant disagreements arose among the conference participants during the discussion of the Polish question. They concerned the establishment of the western border of Poland (the USSR proposed to transfer to the Poles a number of territories that had belonged to Germany before the war) and the composition of the Polish government. Stalin wanted to make it pro-communist, while Britain and the United States insisted on recognizing the legitimacy of the exile government in London.

The Declaration of a Liberated Europe adopted at the conference provided for the readiness of the allied states to assist the peoples of Europe in establishing democratic power. The conference participants decided to convene the founding conference of the United Nations on April 25, 1945 in San Francisco. All states that declared war on Germany and Japan before March 1, 1945 could participate in the conference. It was agreed that the Ukrainian SSR and the Belarusian SSR would be members of the UN along with the USSR.

End of World War II

On August 8, 1945, the USSR entered the war against Japan. Under the general leadership of Marshal A. Vasilevsky, Soviet troops of the Transbaikal, 1st and 2nd Far Eastern Fronts inflicted a number of significant defeats on the Kwantung Army, liberating Northeast China and North Korea. On September 2, 1945, the act of unconditional surrender of Japan was signed. The Second World War is over. The main result of the war was the defeat of the states of the aggressive bloc led by Nazi Germany and the elimination of the threat of extermination of the Russian and other peoples of the Soviet Union. The authority and influence of the USSR in the world increased. As a result of the war, over 60 million people died, including 27 million Soviet citizens.

The role of the USSR in World War II and resolving issues about the post-war world order

The historical significance of the USSR in World War II lies in the fact that it played the role of the main military-political force that predetermined the victorious course of the war and protected the peoples of the world from enslavement. The peoples of the Soviet Union were able to thwart the German plans for a lightning war in 1941, stopping the Nazis’ victorious march across Europe. The counteroffensive near Moscow destroyed the myth of the invincibility of the Wehrmacht, contributing to the rise of the Resistance movement and strengthening the anti-Hitler coalition. The defeats inflicted on Germany at Stalingrad and Kursk became a radical turning point in the war, forcing the countries of the aggressive bloc to abandon the offensive strategy. The crossing of the Dnieper by Red Army soldiers opened the way to the liberation of Europe. Having liberated Eastern Europe, the USSR returned statehood to the enslaved peoples, restoring historically just borders.

On the Soviet-German front, the main forces of the aggressor coalition were destroyed - 607 divisions, while the Anglo-American troops defeated 176 enemy divisions. About 77% of all Wehrmacht losses in World War II were on the Eastern Front. The Soviet-German front was the largest in length of all the fronts of World War II.

The Victory was based on the patriotic uplift of Soviet citizens, the unprecedented enthusiasm of the people, and the perception by the majority of Soviet people of Nazi aggression as a personal challenge, which gave rise to the desire to carry out a just war of liberation. This attitude is confirmed by examples of mass heroism at the fronts, fierce resistance in the occupied territories, and labor achievements in the rear. The economic base created during the first five-year plans made it possible not only to make up for a significant part of the losses incurred as a result of the enemy’s seizure of certain industrial areas, to restore the combat capability of the armed forces in the shortest possible time, but also to surpass the enemy in quantitative and qualitative terms, which made it possible to bring about a radical turning point in the war , which brought victory to the USSR. Another component of it was the successes of Soviet science and technology. The improvement of old and the creation of new models of military equipment, the introduction of scientific achievements into the industrial production of military products, the optimal development of the raw material base, the acceleration of the production process through the use of more advanced technologies - all this served to support the growth of the military power of the USSR. During the war years, the Soviet economic model with its inherent planning, directiveness, and strict centralization turned out to be more appropriate. This made it possible to quickly mobilize and redistribute material and human resources.

As a result of the war, a new balance of forces emerged in international relations. Although the USSR suffered great material and human losses, it significantly strengthened its political position in the world. By the end of the war, the Soviet Union had the world's largest land army and enormous industrial potential. In addition, the economic and political power of the United States has increased. The rivalry between the two superstates became the theme of international relations for the next 45 years.

This first became obvious during the Potsdam Conference (July 17 - August 2, 1945) of the “Big Three”, at which, instead of the deceased F. Roosevelt, the United States was represented by a new president, G. Truman, and already during the conference, W. Churchill was replaced by the victorious in the parliamentary elections, British Labor leader K. Attlee. At the conference, the principles of the “4 Ds” in relation to Germany were adopted: demilitarization, denazification, democratization and decentralization, the occupation authorities of Germany were created, the boundaries of occupation zones were clearly defined, and territorial changes in Europe were considered. In particular, the Soviet Union received Königsberg (modern Kaliningrad) and the surrounding territories. The USSR confirmed its readiness to start a war against Japan. At the same time, in Potsdam many contradictions emerged between the allies in the anti-Hitler coalition, which became the prologue to the beginning of the Cold War.

On October 24, 1945, the creation of the United Nations (UN) was completed. The USSR became one of the five permanent members of the UN Security Council.

During a meeting of the heads of the foreign ministries of Great Britain, the USSR and the USA, held in Moscow on December 16-26, 1945, draft peace agreements were drawn up with the former allies of Nazi Germany - Italy, Bulgaria, Hungary, Romania, Finland. Their signing took place already in 1947.

The victory over Nazism led to significant territorial changes in Europe and Asia, approved at the Potsdam Conference by the heads of government of the USSR, USA and Great Britain and the Paris Peace Conference (July 29 - October 15, 1946) by the foreign ministers of the victorious countries. At these meetings, the territorial acquisitions of the Soviet Union made in 1939-1940 were legitimized. In the Far East, the USSR returned South Sakhalin in 1946 and also received the Kuril Islands.

An important event in international law was the Nuremberg trials (November 1945 - October 1946) of the main Nazi war criminals. The International Military Tribunal, consisting of representatives of the USA, Great Britain and the USSR, sentenced 12 defendants to death (G. Goering, J. von Ribbentrop, W. Keitel, etc.), the rest of the convicts received long prison sentences. The entire leadership of the Nazi Party, as well as such organizations as the Gestapo, SD, and SS, were recognized as criminal.

23. USSR in the Second World War. The history of homeland

23. USSR in World War II

The historiography of the war until the mid-1980s was extremely ideological, dogmatic and opportunistic. Standard formulations and assessments of events migrated from book to book. Sometimes they changed to please the ruling officials. Under Stalin, much was written about the generalissimo’s military genius; under Brezhnev, the events near Novorossiysk occupied almost the central place in the war.

Documents and the names of government and military figures were falsified and suppressed. Although significant factual material on military history had been accumulated, there were serious works on the history of the war, the work of the rear, many problems remained outside the scope of scientific research. While in other countries participating in the Second World War, general works in dozens of volumes were created, losses of up to one soldier were calculated, and the history of almost every company was written.

Starting from the second half of the 80s, the situation with the study of the Great Patriotic War began to improve. New sources, works of foreign authors have been published, some memoirs of Soviet military commanders and economic leaders have been published without distortion, new and different approaches to the most important problems of this period have appeared: Soviet-German relations in the pre-war period, the reasons for the defeats of the Red Army at the first stage, the role of the allies and their supplies , sources of Victory, etc. There is a refusal of unambiguous assessments.

Historians have paid attention to new problems - collaborationism, mass consciousness during the war, etc.

23.1. On the eve of the war

Thus, assessing the actions of the parties in 1939, it should be said: responsibility for the fact that the opportunity to create a system of collective security in Europe and thereby prevent the outbreak of the Second World War was missed falls on both England and France, and on the leadership of the Soviet Union . The relationship between the parties developed in an atmosphere of mistrust and secret plans. Each side tried to solve its problems at the expense of the other. As a result, the fascist Reich was the winner, avoiding a war on two fronts and beginning to implement its plans for territorial conquests in Europe.

Of course, the Soviet leadership understood the inevitability of war with Germany and prepared the country for this war. The period of actual cooperation with the Nazi Reich was quite short. Already in November 1940, a gradual cooling of Soviet-German relations was observed. The USSR is making diplomatic moves (albeit very cautious) for the German invasion of Greece and Yugoslavia, the entry of German troops into Romania and Finland and other similar actions.

The preparations for war are also evidenced by the internal policies of the Soviet leadership: tightening legislation in the field of labor relations, introducing criminal liability for violations in this area. Efforts were made to equip the army with modern technology; strengthening the officer corps (in 1940, 42 new military schools were created, the number of students at military academies was almost doubled, and numerous courses for training junior lieutenants were established).

In the spring of 1941, a wide stream of information flowed to the Soviet leadership about Germany’s preparations for an attack on the USSR. This was reported by Soviet intelligence officers from different countries, figures of the international communist movement, information about this went through diplomatic channels. Closer to the summer, the exact date of Germany's attack on the USSR even became known - June 22, 1941. But at the same time, a number of steps by Stalin and his entourage in the last pre-war months may cause bewilderment. Already having an idea of ​​​​Hitler's intentions, Stalin concludes a trade agreement with Germany on January 10, 1941, according to which he supplies it with food and strategic raw materials. Diplomatic representatives of Belgium, Norway, and Yugoslavia are expelled from Moscow. Thus, the Soviet Union seems to agree with the inclusion of these countries in the German Reich. And the most odious step:

TASS message dated June 14, 1941, which spoke of the invariably friendly relations of the USSR with Germany. The message published in the press clearly disoriented the population and was seemingly illogical on the eve of the inevitable war with Germany. This also includes permission for the Germans to “search for the graves” of German soldiers who died in the First World War and were buried on our territory. As a result, just before the war, groups of German intelligence officers walked around the rear of our troops under the guise of “searching for graves.”

The air defense forces were forbidden to shoot down German planes that repeatedly violated our airspace and freely conducted reconnaissance.

The most common point of view explaining all these “oddities” is as follows. Stalin perfectly understood the country’s unpreparedness for war and wanted to delay it, to gain some more time to increase its defense capability.

And in the spring of 1941, the Soviet leadership (or rather, Stalin personally) presumably decided to begin preparations for the USSR’s attack on Europe, weakened by the war. The ideas of Stalin and his entourage about the nature of the war and the prospects for its development allegedly played a role in making such an important decision. It was assessed as imperialist, and it was predicted that it would inevitably develop into revolutionary, i.e. Stalin hoped that the working people of European countries, dissatisfied with the hardships of wartime, would oppose their governments and support the offensive of the Red Army. No wonder at the turn of 1940-1941. There is an intensification of the activities of the Comintern in the countries occupied by Germany.

A number of facts seem to indicate that the USSR is preparing for an offensive: the appointment in 1941 of the Chief of the General Staff G.K. Zhukov, the winner at Khalkhin Gol, who showed himself well during the January headquarters game, where options for offensive actions were practiced; increasing replenishment, but not yet in mobilization order, of units in the western districts; the movement of five armies from the interior of the country to the west; the creation in Ukraine of a strong operational force of 60 divisions, the formation of an airborne corps there, the reorganization of four rifle divisions of the Ukrainian district into mountain divisions (in mostly flat Ukraine); the construction of airfields near the western border, the movement of military warehouses to the border, which makes sense in preparation for an offensive; disarmament of fortified areas on the old border and neglect of their construction on the new one; Stalin’s speech on May 5, 1941 to graduates of military academies, in which the Soviet leader formulated the main task as follows: the time has come “to move from defense to a military policy of offensive actions.” After this speech in May-June 1941, steps were taken to change party and political propaganda among the population and in the Red Army. The essence of these changes is that the most serious enemy of the USSR is Germany, a military clash with it is not far off, and it is necessary to prepare for offensive actions. The only dissonance in this series is the mentioned TASS message of June 14, 1941; at the General Staff in May 1941, after Stalin’s speech on May 5, a plan for a “preemptive strike” of the Red Army was developed, according to which it was planned to deliver the main blow from the territory of Ukraine through Czechoslovakia, cutting off Germany from its southern allies and Romanian oil.

And it seems that this plan has begun to be implemented in practice. But to complete the preparation of the army, to complete the concentration of troops for the offensive in June 1941, some more time was required, perhaps several months. It was this time that Stalin wanted to win by demonstrating friendliness towards Germany. But all these facts have another explanation. Stalin did not intend to attack Germany first, but in the event of its aggression against the USSR, he planned to repel the first blow on the border and, with the help of powerful offensive actions, defeat the enemy on its territory.

In any case, in the summer of 1941, two large-scale plans collided, each of which carried enormous dangers for all of humanity. Hitler was only ahead of Stalin at the beginning of the implementation of his plan. Our troops turned out to be unprepared for either offensive or defensive actions.

23.2. Entry of the USSR into the Second World War. The first period of the Great Patriotic War

On June 22, 1941, Nazi Germany attacked the USSR. According to the “Barbarossa” plan (a plan for Germany’s attack on the USSR), the German command expected to capture the most important industrial and political centers of our country - Moscow, Leningrad, Donbass and others - in a few months, defeat the main forces of the Red Army in the first battles and prevent their retreat inland. It intended to achieve its goals through coordinated actions of four groupings - the Finnish group, army groups “North”, “Center”, “South”, delivering powerful attacks with their tank and mechanized formations on the flanks and rear of the Red Army.

Germany and its allies concentrated on the borders of the USSR 164 divisions numbering 4,733,990 people, 41,293 artillery pieces and mortars, 3,899 tanks, 4,841 aircraft.

The Soviet Union in the border districts had 174 divisions numbering 2,780,000 people, 43,872 guns and mortars, 10,394 tanks (of which 1,325 were T-34 and KV) and 8,154 aircraft (of which 1,540 were new designs).

In border battles, Soviet troops suffered a crushing defeat and were forced to retreat. By mid-July, 28 Soviet divisions were completely defeated, 70 divisions lost over 50% of their personnel and equipment. The total human losses amounted to over 1 million people. In total, 3,468 aircraft, about 6 thousand tanks, more than 20 thousand guns, 30% of all ammunition reserves, 50% of all fuel and fodder reserves were lost. The greatest losses were suffered by the troops of the Western Front. By July 10, German troops advanced deep into Soviet territory: in the main, western direction by 450-600 km, in the north-west - by 450-500 km, in the south-west - by 300-350 km.

For comparison: German losses during the same period amounted to about 100 thousand people, 900 aircraft, less than 1 thousand tanks. What are the reasons for such a catastrophic start to the war for our country?

First of all, it is worth saying about the degree of readiness of the USSR for war, and real, and not according to the assessment of Soviet leaders. This, first of all, should include the combat readiness of the armed forces: their deployment, technical equipment, and combat training.

From the data presented it is clear that in quantitative terms the Germans had an advantage only in personnel, but in the main types of weapons there was either equality or even our advantage. At the same time, we can definitely talk about the qualitative superiority of only fascist aviation over Soviet aircraft of old brands. There were few new aircraft (Yak-1, MiG-3, LaGG-3). In all other types of weapons, the Germans did not have a noticeable qualitative superiority. We were already armed with tanks such as the T-34 and KV, which in some respects were even superior to enemy tanks, and in sufficient quantity - 1325 against 1634 German medium tanks T-111, T-1U.

Thus, there was no great qualitative superiority of German technology. This means that the first place comes to the question of using the available forces of the Red Army, of the ability to properly dispose of them. This is the skill that our military-political leadership lacked. A number of major political mistakes and military-strategic miscalculations were made. Among such miscalculations and mistakes the following are traditionally named.

1. Miscalculation in determining the possible time of attack by Git-Yaer Germany. As a result, we fell behind in the concentration of troops and in the creation of powerful offensive groupings; the enemy achieved superiority in forces and means in the main directions.

2. Miscalculation in determining the direction of the enemy’s main attack. Stalin insisted that the Germans would concentrate their main forces in the south to capture Ukraine, Donbass - large agricultural and industrial areas. And that is why Soviet troops strengthened primarily the southern direction. However, the Germans delivered the main blow in the Smolensk-Moscow direction.

3. Another major mistake of a military-strategic nature was the Soviet command’s incorrect assessment of the initial period of the war. It was believed that during this period both sides would begin hostilities with only part of their forces, while the main forces would enter the war in two weeks, i.e. The Soviet command set limited goals at the first stage of the war. The Nazis immediately brought all available forces into battle in order to seize the strategic initiative and defeat the enemy.

4. The offensive mood also had an effect - they were going to beat the enemy on foreign territory, having stopped him in border battles, they immediately intended to go on the offensive. Therefore, the troops were not taught to defend themselves, they did not build sufficiently powerful defensive structures on the new border, and all this had an effect already in the first hours and days of the war.

Even if we accept the version that the USSR was preparing to attack Germany first, the listed mistakes and miscalculations did not make it possible to achieve success in 1941 in this case either. The Soviet military command made timid attempts to show Stalin the need to put troops on combat readiness, announce mobilization and other measures. However, Stalin categorically forbade this.

And here we come to the root of all troubles. Whether we accept the version that the Soviet Union is preparing offensive actions or adhere to the traditional point of view, in both cases the main sources of errors and miscalculations lie in the system of power that developed in the USSR in the 30s, in dictatorial autocracy, when the mistakes of the first person took on a fateful character for the country. Many decisions with far-reaching consequences were made by Stalin alone, and any fundamental disagreement with his views could quickly be regarded as “opposition”, “political immaturity” with all the ensuing consequences. The intimidation of the people, the affirmation of the stereotype about the genius of only one person, the need for mandatory approval of any decisions of Stalin practically did not allow the possibility of a multivariate analysis of the real situation, the search for possible alternatives. Thus, the channels for receiving objective information, original proposals, and searching for non-standard solutions were blocked. The Secretary General, as a rule, was told what he wanted to hear. Often they tried to guess his wishes. Such a system of power demanded not intelligence, talent and independence, but the ability to please the authorities and quickly carry out his “brilliant” instructions. And, as a result, incompetence triumphed in all echelons of power.

It was this incompetence that fatally affected the combat training of the Red Army before the war. During the pre-war years, the People's Commissariat of Defense was headed by the amateur K.E. Voroshilov, his deputy was S.M. Budyonny. The head of the Main Artillery Directorate of the People's Commissariat was G.I. Sandpiper. All of them were awarded the rank of marshal, although none of them had military knowledge to the extent of a battalion commander. Under their leadership, shagism was introduced into the army; many simplifications and conventions were allowed in the training of troops, and all this significantly reduced the combat readiness of the army. S.K. Tymoshenko, who replaced Voroshilov as People's Commissar after the inglorious war with Finland, took measures to improve combat training, but it was impossible to make up for many years of lost time in a year. As a result, all this had to be learned on the battlefield, which cost the lives of hundreds of thousands of people.

The real crime of Stalin and his entourage against the country was the repressions of the 30s, which were an important tool in the establishment and functioning of dictatorial autocracy. They most directly affected the quality of the Red Army officer corps before the war. In 1937-1938 About 40 thousand officers were purged from the army. Repression continued in subsequent years, although its scope decreased. The senior command staff suffered especially hard. From 1937 to 1941, 9 deputy people's commissars of defense, 2 people's commissars of the Navy, 4 heads of the Intelligence Directorate of the General Staff, 4 air force commanders, all fleet and district commanders and many others died. In total, about 600 senior officials were killed. On the fronts of the Great Patriotic War, 294 generals and admirals were killed or died from wounds over four years. The repression led to a huge turnover of personnel: tens of thousands of officers received new appointments every year. In the summer of 1941, in a number of military districts, up to half of the officers were in their positions from 6 months to one year. The level of their military education did not meet the requirements of the time. Only 7% of the commanders of the Red Army had a higher military education in 1941, and 37% did not even complete a full course of study at secondary military educational institutions. For high-quality training of mid-level officers, even in the presence of a well-organized training system, experience shows that it takes 5-10 years, not to mention the high command. The quality of training during that period decreased, since the works of the most prominent Soviet military theorists who were repressed during these years were removed from the training programs - M.N. Tukhachevsky, A.A. Svechina, A.I. Egorova and others.

The bloody purges also affected those officers who remained in the army. Many were afraid to take the initiative and make serious decisions, since if they failed, they could be accused of deliberate sabotage. In an atmosphere of mistrust and suspicion, careerists and demagogues quickly advanced through the ranks.

Public defamation of commanders undermined the confidence in them on the part of the Red Army soldiers. The most detrimental phenomenon for a military organization arose - distrust in command personnel, which again affected the level of combat training of units and formations.

All this manifested itself in the most terrible way during the difficult days of 1941 and became one of the main reasons for the defeats of our troops. The commanders were afraid to take the initiative, make independent decisions, waited for orders from above, the rank and file did not trust their commanders, did not know how to defend themselves, and were terrified of enemy aircraft. In conditions of a highly maneuverable war with the massive use of tanks and aircraft by the enemy, these factors led to the fact that Soviet troops were surrounded, and there were frequent cases of panic and flight.

The question arises: how could one prepare for some kind of offensive war given such a situation in the army? Apparently, this is again a consequence of complete incompetence and amateurism in the country's top political leadership. Did Stalin understand how difficult it was to prepare a regiment commander, especially an army commander, a front commander? Did you understand that of the 29 mechanized corps that he spoke about in his speech on May 5, 1941, most had not yet become a real military force and were not fully equipped with equipment and people? Apparently not completely. Stalin was essentially an amateur in military matters, but nevertheless considered himself entitled to command. And his intervention in the conduct of hostilities during the war, as a rule, led to huge casualties and major defeats. The most famous case is his categorical ban on the retreat of Soviet troops from Kyiv in August-September 1941, which led to the encirclement and capture of more than 600 thousand of our soldiers.

The failures of the first months at the front led to the destabilization of local and military government in many areas and caused socio-political tension in the rear. In the first weeks and months of the war, there were repeated cases of desertion from the Red Army, evasion of mobilization, and surrender. There were especially many such cases with conscripts from the western regions of Ukraine and Belarus. In the rear, facts of negative sentiment and statements criticizing the actions of the regime were noted. For example, from a secret report from the NKVD about the mood in the Arkhangelsk region, we learn that there is talk among workers, peasants and even leading party officials: “Everyone said that we would beat the enemy on his territory. It turns out the other way around... Our government fed the Germans for two years, it would be better to stockpile food for its army and for the people, otherwise now we will all face hunger.” Similar statements were recorded by internal affairs and state security agencies in Moscow and other places. They said that there was no united rear in the country, and even predicted anti-Soviet uprisings. There was a defeatist mood. Some even had certain hopes for the arrival of the Germans. It was often repeated in such statements that the German occupation did not threaten the common people, only Jews and communists would suffer. They hoped that the Germans would abolish the collective farm system.

Of course, there is no point in talking about the widespread, mass character of such sentiments, especially defeatism. The predominance was patriotic statements, the desire of the Soviet people to defend the Motherland, as evidenced by the large number of volunteers who wanted to join the army ahead of schedule. However, the very fact of the existence of such sentiments, anti-Soviet statements, which are still not isolated, indicates the presence of crisis phenomena in the relationship between the ruling regime and the people. And this, again, was a consequence of the regime’s policies in the pre-war years. Throughout the 30s, the Stalinist leadership practically waged a war against its own people (collectivization, dispossession, mass repressions), thereby not at all contributing to the unity of society.

To overcome the growing crisis of power, Stalin took the path of tightening repression. On August 26, 1941, the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command issued Order No. 270, calling for deserters to be shot on the spot, and their families to be arrested if they are officers, and to be deprived of state benefits and assistance if they are Red Army soldiers. No less cruel was the resolution of the State Defense Committee of November 17, 1941, authorizing the NKVD to carry out capital sentences of military tribunals without their approval by the highest judicial authorities, and also authorizing the Special Meeting of the NKVD to impose appropriate penalties, up to and including execution, according to facts about counter-revolutionary crimes, especially dangerous acts of state. Moreover, almost any action could fit into this category during the war. Criminal liability was established for failure to fulfill government tasks, unauthorized departure from an enterprise was equated to desertion, etc.

At the front, NKVD troops were sent to the front line to combat panic and desertion, and barrage detachments were created. It is difficult to give an unambiguous assessment of all these decrees and measures. In conditions of disorganization, military defeats, and the presence of negative sentiments among the population, the regime was forced to take these brutal measures. And they yielded results, helping to reduce the number of negative moods. But we must not forget that it was the actions and inactions of the Stalinist regime in the pre-war years that led to the catastrophic situation in the first months of the war.

Along with tough measures to restore order in the army and rear, other measures were taken to transfer the country to a war footing. A reorganization of the administration of the army and the country was carried out: on June 23, 1941, the Headquarters of the Main Command (later the Supreme High Command) was created under the chairmanship of Stalin. She was entrusted with leadership of the Armed Forces during the war. On June 30, the State Defense Committee was formed - an emergency body in whose hands all power in the country was concentrated. Stalin also became the chairman of the State Defense Committee. Thus, there was a further concentration of power in the hands of one person - Stalin.

One of the most important tasks for the country was the restructuring of the economy on a war footing: the evacuation of enterprises, equipment, and livestock from the western regions; the fastest possible expansion of military production (especially in view of the huge losses of weapons and equipment in the initial period of the war); solving the problem of providing the national economy with workers (most of the male population was drafted into the army).

Already on June 24, 1941, the Evacuation Council was created, and on June 30, the Labor Distribution Committee was created. During the war, the final touches were made to the system of barracks economy with the mechanism of total mobilization, the foundations of which arose in the pre-war period. June 26, 1941 The decree allowed the establishment of mandatory overtime work lasting from 1 to 3 hours per day. The decree also provided for tougher penalties for leaving the enterprise. By January 1942, the number of people convicted of leaving the enterprise was about 311 thousand people. In February 1942, it was announced that the entire working-age urban population would be mobilized to work in production and construction. Other sources of replenishment of the national economy with labor were: military conscription for alternative service of reservists, unfit for military service for health reasons, but fit for physical labor, as well as the human resources of the NKVD Gulag. The presence of a large contingent of prisoners and the ease of managing the camp labor system made it possible to quickly create and expand specialized or independent enterprises. By the beginning of 1945, among the enterprises that manufactured F-1, RG-42 grenade bodies and parts for other grenades, there were 6 enterprises of the People's Commissariat of Ammunition and 9 factories of forced labor colonies of the NKVD Gulag. Prison labor was widely used in the construction of factories, railways, etc.

In agriculture, working conditions were also tightened. Since February 1942, the mandatory minimum workdays for collective farmers increased by 1.5 times. The minimum extended to children 12-16 years old, criminal penalties were introduced for failure to meet it, and even a simple list of relevant violators, certified by an accountant, could serve as the basis for prosecution. Mobilization of the population for agricultural work was practiced. Refusal to do so was again subject to criminal penalties. Moreover, the authorities were guided by the principle “it is better to bend than to bend.”

However, the tightening of labor relations was combined during the war years with incentives to complete tasks. Its methodology was based on the use of the low standard of living of the population with rationed rationing and difficult wage conditions. As incentives, they used food (additional rations, cold breakfasts, etc.), closed rationed trade in manufactured goods, and resorted to financial levers (bonus, piecework wages). The sale of alcohol was also used to stimulate labor. In the active army, the process of promotion in rank was accelerated, and the awarding of orders and medals was widely used as incentives.

Moreover, during the war, serious changes occur in the functioning mechanism of the state apparatus itself, economic policy, and ideology. Along with the strengthening of centralization, opposite processes also took place - the expansion of the powers of lower bodies and structures, the encouragement of initiative from below. On July 1, 1941, the resolution of the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR “On expanding the rights of the People's Commissars of the USSR in wartime conditions” was adopted. They began to pay less attention to various bureaucratic procedures. In a critical situation for the country, and for the regime in particular, efficiency came first, rather than following instructions. During the war, at the front and in the rear, the demand for initiative, independence, and competence increased sharply. The criteria for the formation of command personnel in the army have changed especially noticeably.

During the war years, there was a more tolerant attitude of the authorities towards the personal farms of collective farmers and towards the sale of their products on the free market. The peasants did not die of hunger only thanks to their personal farming, since they received practically nothing on collective farms. At the same time, the free market was a very important source of food for the urban population: it provided up to 50% of the food consumption of city residents.

No less important changes have occurred in politics and ideology. There is a rejection of revolutionary, internationalist terminology in propaganda. The authorities are now appealing to traditional Russian patriotism, turning to the heroic past, which the revolution surrounded with contempt. In Stalin's speech on July 3, 1941, in his speech at the parade on November 7, 1941, there is a call to be inspired by the courageous images of our great ancestors - Alexander Nevsky, Dmitry Donskoy, Kuzma Minin and Dmitry Pozharsky, Suvorov and Kutuzov. In line with these changes, there was also an expansion of the scope of the church’s activities during the war years, especially since 1943, permission to open new churches, and the restoration of the patriarchate. The explanation for these changes lies in the desire of the authorities to maximally mobilize the forces of the people to repel the enemy. In conditions of constant deprivation, for many Soviet citizens, religion gave strength for life and work.

23.3. A turning point during the war

Despite the truly catastrophic start of the war for the Soviet Union, it should be said that the plans of the German command were not fully implemented. The enemy hoped, having defeated the main forces of our troops in border battles, thereby demoralizing the population and army and moving towards Moscow without encountering much resistance. His calculations were not destined to come true. Having overcome the shock of border defeats, our units resisted the enemy with ever-increasing strength.

The decisive event of the first year of the Great Patriotic War was the Battle of Moscow, which took place from October 1941 to March 1942 and included two stages: defensive - until December

1941 and the counter-offensive of Soviet troops from December 6, 1941, as a result of which the enemy was thrown back 100-200 km from Moscow. This battle finally buried the hopes of the fascist command for a quick outcome of the war. The war became protracted. As a result of a successful counteroffensive, Soviet troops seized the strategic initiative. The victory near Moscow, naturally, affected the mood and morale of the Soviet people.

After the victory near Moscow, the strategic initiative passed to the Soviet Union. However, once again the influence of Stalin’s dictatorial autocracy took its toll. At his insistence, despite the protests of the command, in the spring of 1942, offensive operations were undertaken simultaneously in several directions - attempts to unblock Leningrad (April-June), offensives in the Crimea and near Kharkov (May). This led to a scattering of forces and resources. The consequences of miscalculations in the planning of these operations were severe defeats. The strategic initiative again passed to the German command. From the end of June 1942, it launched an offensive on the southern sector of the Soviet-German front. Again there were cases of escape, panic, again encirclement and captivity. By the autumn of 1942, the Wehrmacht reached the foothills of the Caucasus, German units entered Stalingrad. And again, to restore order, the authorities resort to repressive measures (the famous decree No. 227 “Not a step back”). And again, the courage and tenacity of an ordinary soldier, the growing tenacity of the resistance stopped the enemy, allowed the Soviet command to gather reinforcements and prepare a counter-offensive. As a result of the successful counter-offensive at Stalingrad (November 1942 - February 1943), the Germans lost up to 1.5 million people. The counteroffensive grew into a general offensive in many sectors of the Soviet-German front: fascist troops rolled back from the Caucasus, most of the Donbass was liberated, and the blockade of Leningrad was broken. The Battle of Stalingrad marked the beginning of a radical turning point in the course of the war. The completion of this turning point was the Battle of Kursk (July-August 1943), when the German command tried to once again seize the strategic initiative. But his plans were not destined to come true; the Germans suffered a crushing defeat. As a result of the summer-autumn offensive of 1943, Soviet troops reached the Dnieper and liberated Kyiv and Novorossiysk. Until the end of the war, German troops no longer succeeded in major offensive operations.

In 1944, Soviet troops consistently carried out major strategic offensive operations along the entire front. In January, the blockade of Leningrad was finally lifted. At the same time, an offensive was launched in Ukraine. During the spring, Right Bank Ukraine, Crimea, and Moldova were liberated. In the summer, Soviet troops drove out the invaders from Belarus and the Baltic states, completely clearing Soviet land. In the fall, successful operations were carried out in Eastern and Southeastern Europe. The Nazis were expelled from Romania, Bulgaria, large parts of Poland and Hungary. In January 1945, a new offensive of our units began in Poland, which ended with the Berlin operation (April 16 - May 8, 1945). The last battles took place on May 9 in Prague.

On May 8, 1945, under the chairmanship of G.K. Zhukov, representatives of all allied countries in the Berlin suburb of Karlhorst signed an act of unconditional surrender of Germany. The terrible war, which claimed millions of lives, destroyed thousands of settlements and industrial enterprises, has ended.

23.4. Origins of Victory

What allowed the Soviet Union, despite the severe defeats of the first stage of the war, to survive and win? For a long time, the same formulations circulated in our literature as the reasons for our Victory - about the unshakable friendship of peoples, the leading role of the party, the indestructible power of the socialist economy, the patriotism of the Soviet people. But the real picture, of course, was much more complicated. There is still a fairly widespread point of view that one of the conditions for Victory was the economic system that developed in the USSR back in the 30s - the barracks economy with its strict centralization and system of total mobilization. But this same economic system led to mistakes and miscalculations, which resulted in delays in the development and mass production of the latest types of weapons, including the famous Katyushas, ​​T-34 tanks, etc. Nevertheless, the Soviet economy allowed, albeit at the cost of enormous efforts and sacrifices on the part of the people, quickly concentrate material and human resources in key areas (which was especially important in conditions when industrial potential as a result of the loss of a huge territory decreased, and human reserves were limited). And already in 1943, the Soviet Union was able to surpass Germany in the production of military equipment, which was of enormous importance for the Second World War, the war of technology.

It should be noted that during the war years there were tendencies towards abandoning some features of this economy - formalism, excessive bureaucratization. Initiative and independence of lower-level structures are encouraged, without which it was simply impossible to evacuate industrial enterprises in such a short time and establish production in a new location. In addition, none of the countries that participated in the Second World War knew such imbalances between production and consumption, between the military and civilian sectors of the economy. And this further reduced the standard of living of the people. Of course, the decline in well-being during the war occurred in all countries, but, perhaps, nowhere as severely as in ours.

Of course, the effective functioning of such an economy was possible only if the people agreed to endure all these hardships and understood the need for military mobilization measures to achieve Victory. That is, the decisive role was played by the position of the people, their attitude towards the war, towards the enemy, towards the authorities. The policies of the Stalinist elite in the 30s did not contribute to the unity of society. The existence of socio-political opposition and separatist tendencies among a number of nationalities was manifested in the so-called “negative” sentiments of the population in the first months of the war, in a fairly significant number of people who collaborated with the fascists in the occupied territory. Suffice it to say that about 1 million former Soviet citizens fought on the side of the Germans. Perhaps for the first time since the internecine wars of the XII-XIV centuries. Russians fought on the side of the enemy against their own state (of course, not only for political reasons).

However, patriotism still prevailed in the mood of the overwhelming majority of the population. Another question is what kind of patriotism? What was the subject of patriotic loyalty, for which Motherland did the Soviet people fight and work? For some people, especially for those whose adult life fell in the 30s, the Motherland merged with the political regime of Stalin; they saw great advantages in the socio-political system of the USSR in the 30s; significant social gains were associated with it: free education, medical care, the absence of obvious unemployment, which they went to defend in the war.

But, apparently, traditional Russian patriotism, traditional popular readiness for courage and selfless defense of the Fatherland from an external enemy played a much larger role in people’s behavior. The top Soviet leadership understood this very well. According to the former special representative of the American President in the USSR A. Harriman, in September 1941 Stalin told him: “We have no illusions that they (Russian people) are fighting for us. They are fighting for their mother Russia.” And the most striking confirmation of this is that at the most critical moments of the war, official propaganda resorted to heroic images and events of Russia’s past, appealed specifically to the national feelings of the population and practically did not use the term “socialist homeland.” Russian and Soviet patriotism could well be combined with a critical attitude towards the country's leadership. Among the negative statements there are quite a lot of critical characteristics of the country's leadership and its policies in the pre-war period, but the need to fight against the fascists is not questioned. For example, the words of a worker from the Kaluga region that he will go to defend Soviet land, but not those who sit in the Kremlin. The dominant people's attitude to the events were the following thoughts: a war is going on on our land, an enemy has attacked, cruel, merciless, who has set himself the goal of destroying our state, our culture, exterminating a significant part of the population, the enemy is pushing further and further, the country, our native land, your home needs to be protected, saved - what kind of disputes and conversations can there be? And the people stood up to defend the Motherland, as they stood up in the Patriotic War of 1812, as they stood up centuries earlier. Famous words of L.N. Tolstoy’s talk about the “club of the people’s war,” which nailed the French until the entire invasion was destroyed, can be fully attributed to the war of 1941-1945. It was truly a people's war, which was recognized by the political regime that existed in the USSR at that time. The authorities could only rely on the mass patriotism of the Soviet people, on their willingness to endure material hardships and deprivations, their willingness to sacrifice their lives to protect the Motherland and thereby save themselves.

The Stalinist regime took full advantage of these sentiments of the people, while not really trusting them, mediocrely squandering the fruits of mass patriotism. The government systematically withheld information from the people about the true situation in the war, and widely used the most brutal repressive methods of management, even when it was quite possible to do without them. The NKVD played no less a role during the war than before it. Just look at the fate of the people's militia, when in the summer and autumn of 1941 many qualified specialists, workers who were very necessary for the military economy, were sent to the front, poorly trained and equipped, in order to die there without much damage to the enemy. The Stalinist regime did not spare people in peacetime, and was even less ready to take care of human lives in wartime, saving its own existence. The principle of achieving goals at any cost triumphed. Time after time, units were sent into the bloody meat grinder of poorly organized battles to die there to the last man. Even at the last stage of the war, having a colossal advantage in technology and weapons, we often did not use this advantage. Infantry often attacked enemy defenses head-on without sufficient air and artillery support; the capture of cities was timed to coincide with the dates of revolutionary holidays, etc. The last major operation of the Soviet troops - Berlin - was carried out rather for political reasons - to prevent the Allies from getting ahead of the USSR and being the first to enter the German capital. As a result, more than 100 thousand were killed, victims that could have been avoided.

The formation of an anti-fascist coalition, in which the leading positions were occupied by the USSR, England, the USA and France, played a major role in the defeat of fascism. In the face of a terrible danger, ideological differences were temporarily forgotten. The Soviet people received significant support from supplies of equipment, weapons, and food from the allies, especially at a critical moment in the first period of the war; the diversion of German troops to conduct combat operations in other regions of the world also had an impact. The anti-fascist coalition was the basis of the post-war world order, which made it possible, despite all the difficulties, to avoid sliding into a new world war. But mutual distrust and ideological contradictions reappeared as soon as the final turning point in the war took place. The USSR's allies deliberately delayed the opening of a second front in Europe, which clearly prolonged the war. The motives of the Allies can be understood and explained, but they cannot be justified, since Soviet soldiers paid for this with millions of their lives.

The exact number of our losses during the Great Patriotic War is still unknown. The latest more or less reliable figure is 26.6 million total human losses directly from the fighting, who died of hunger and disease, who perished in captivity. Of these, the losses of the USSR armed forces were 11,944,100 people. The losses of the Wehrmacht and its allies on the Soviet-German front, according to various sources, ranged from 6 million to 8 million people. This unfavorable ratio of losses between the Wehrmacht and the Red Army is largely a consequence of the Soviet Union waging a war with “big blood.” And this is another crime of the Stalinist regime against the people.

Our people won the Great Patriotic War. It was his original patriotism, readiness for self-sacrifice, willingness to selflessly endure need and deprivation, ability to fight and work without thinking about himself that played a decisive role in the Victory. With their blood, the people paid for the mistakes and crimes of the Stalinist leadership in the pre-war and war years, but it was not this leadership that saved and saved, not Stalin and the Communist Party, but the Motherland and themselves.

As always, on June 22, we celebrate the day of remembrance and sorrow, when we remember the day the Great Patriotic War began, and those truly countless sacrifices on the part of our people. And as always on this day, people with inflamed liberalism experience incontinence of conscience, and they are eager to remind us of their “truth”

“I would like to remind you once again that the Soviet Union entered World War II not on June 22, 1941, but on September 17, 1939. It seems to me that we should not forget this,” writes Tamara Natanovna Eidelman, a history teacher at one of the Moscow schools.

The old song is that the USSR was the aggressor in World War II, Stalin was “Hitler’s ally,” and that means we got June 22 rightly so. In propaganda publications, one can, of course, write anything, even that Luna was founded by the first hetmans of Ukraine in the 10th millennium BC. But what is allowed to a careless schoolchild or teacher is still a little indecent.

The Second World War was a war of two coalitions, one of which is traditionally called the “Axis”, the core of which was Nazi Germany, which was gradually joined by Italy, Japan and other countries. The other in our and world historiography is traditionally called the “Allies” - the basis of this coalition was the Anglo-French alliance, which in September 1939 declared war on Germany after its attack on Poland. These allies were also gradually joined by other countries, of which by 1945 there were very, very many.

The Second World War was a war of these two coalitions - the Allies and the Axis. And to enter this war it was necessary to be in a state of war with one of the sides and join the other. In order to enter the war on September 17, 1939, the Soviet Union had to be at war with either Germany or England-France-Poland. But neither one nor the other happened.

Yes, the USSR sent its troops into Polish territory (most of it, however, was captured from Russia after the Soviet-Polish war of 1920, according to the Riga Peace Treaty). But the Soviet government justified these actions by the collapse of Polish statehood and the cessation of the functioning of the Polish government, which by that time had moved to Romania. Neither the Soviet Union declared war on Poland, nor Poland, although its officials called the USSR's actions an act of violence and a violation of international law, did not declare war on the USSR. Moreover, many Poles viewed the actions of the USSR as an attempt to limit the area occupied by Germany and, at least at first, welcomed the actions of the Soviet government.

Moreover, the British and French did not plan to declare war on the USSR. The pragmatic motivation for the actions of the Soviet government after the defeat of Poland by Germany was obvious and did not in any way dispose the allies to push the Soviet Union to the Axis side by declaring war or making any unfriendly steps. On September 18, 1939, the British cabinet stated that British guarantees for Poland apply only to the threat from Germany and there are no reasons to aggravate Soviet-British relations. Therefore, not even a protest was sent to the Soviet Union. Moreover, part of the allied press began to express the opinion that the establishment of a line of contact between the Soviet Union and Germany would inevitably bring the clash of these powers closer and objectively contribute to the entry of the USSR into the Allied camp.

Of course, the Allied camp at that moment did not know about the secret agreements between the USSR and Germany attached to the non-aggression pact, but it is extremely doubtful that these agreements, even if they were known, would have pushed the British and French to declare war on the USSR.

Thus, no entry of the USSR into World War II on September 17, 1939 occurred. The Soviet Union did not find itself in a state of war either with Germany, with which it maintained secret agreements on a number of issues (but there was no general alliance between the countries), nor with the Allies, who did not consider the actions of the USSR towards Poland a casus belli, or even with Poland itself , which, having been defeated, had neither the desire nor the ability to complicate its position by declaring war on the USSR.

Not being at war with any of the parties to the world conflict, the USSR was, of course, not a participant in World War II, regardless of what military actions it carried out separately. Just like Japan, although continuously fighting in China, did not become a participant in World War II until December 7, 1941, when it attacked the United States and Great Britain. And no matter how monstrous a crime the Nanjing Massacre was, it cannot be considered “one of the crimes of the Second World War.”

It would make sense for a history teacher to remember this, without accustoming either schoolchildren or readers to arbitrary interpretations of dates and facts. Moreover, if we leave chronological boundaries to the imagination of the creative imagination, then there is no reason to start the Second World War on September 1, 1939. Why not start it with the Anschluss of Austria? Or from the dismemberment of Czechoslovakia? And then, for example, Poland has been a participant in this war since September 30, 1938, when it annexed the Cieszyn region from Czechoslovakia? You can move the historical framework for a long time and with passion, although all this will have very little relation to science.

World War II began on September 1, 1939, and ended on September 2, 1945. And the USSR joined it on June 22, 1941, when Germany declared war on us and the Great Patriotic War began.

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