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1) Characteristics of the economic situation in Russia after the end of the civil war.
In the autumn of 1918, the First World War ended. Period from 1918 to 1923 characterized in world history by the post-war revolutionary upsurge. Behind him in 1923 - 1929. A temporary partial stabilization of capitalism followed, giving way to a crisis and deepening inter-imperialist contradictions (1929 - 1939), which led to the Second World War.
The First World War did not only lead to the growth of the revolutionary movement. The German, Austro-Hungarian, and Ottoman empires collapsed, and new states emerged. The situation in the world has changed significantly.
A significant factor in the revolutionary upsurge of 1918 - 1923. there was a socialist revolution in Russia. Bourgeois-democratic revolutions took place in Germany and Austria-Hungary. In Germany, the revolution had socialist tendencies: Soviet power was proclaimed in a number of cities. In April 1919, the Soviet Republic arose in Bavaria. For more than 4 months of 1919, the Soviet Republic existed in Hungary. In the summer of 1919, a Soviet republic was proclaimed in Slovakia. In other capitalist countries there were also clashes between workers and governments, as a reaction of workers to the deterioration of the economic situation as a result of an unpopular heavy war. By 1923, the working class had been defeated in social battles. Capitalism has retained its power and might.
The socialist revolution in Russia influenced not only the growth of revolutionary sentiments in Western countries. Under the influence of the October Revolution and under the direct leadership of the Bolshevik Party, communist and workers' parties were created from left groups in the parties of the Second International. The formation of communist parties was also facilitated by the revolutionary upsurge of 1918 - 1923.
In 1919, the young communist parties united into the Third International (dissolved in 1943 due to the World War).
Standing on the position of the world socialist revolution, the Bolshevik government considered it necessary to create a single organization to lead the world labor movement. Moscow's position as a world revolutionary center during this period was extremely strong.
How did the situation in the world after the First World War affect the prospects for the development of Soviet Russia? First of all, it should be said that at the end of 1920, the civil war ended in the main territory of the country (military operations continued only in remote areas in the Far East and Central Asia) and the country was faced with the task of transitioning to peaceful economic construction.
The difficult internal economic and political situation of Western countries, the growth of national liberation struggles in India, China, Turkey, Afghanistan and other countries, interest in obtaining raw materials from Russia and in using the Russian market to sell goods dictated to Western countries the need for peaceful coexistence with the Soviet state.
In turn, the Soviet government was interested in receiving Western loans, machinery and equipment, and in using European and American specialists to boost the economy.
Pursuing an active foreign policy, by the end of 1920 the Soviet Republic had concluded peace treaties with a number of countries, primarily with the Baltic republics. In March 1921, a trade agreement was concluded with England, in May with Germany, then with Italy, Norway, etc. At the same time, Western states, and, above all, the United States, continued the policy of economic blockade of Soviet Russia, supported counter-revolutionary emigrant forces and anti-Soviet armed formations located near the borders of Russia carried out political and military provocations.
Foreign policy relations with the countries of the East developed most successfully. Our country has eliminated the unequal enslaving treaties concluded by tsarism; for the first time in history, showing goodwill and friendly feelings, it concluded new equal treaties with Iran, Turkey, Afghanistan, etc. This policy of the Soviet state had a positive impact on all of Asia.
Thus, Russia's foreign policy position in international affairs was strengthened, but remained complex. The refusal of Western countries to provide loans, the hatred towards each other that had accumulated during the years of civil war and intervention, forced the Soviet state to rely on internal resources. The main task now was to restore the destroyed economy, to lay an economic foundation under Soviet power.
At the end of 1920, the Soviet people victoriously completed the war against foreign interventionists and internal counter-revolution. Our country has the opportunity to return to peaceful creative work. The historical transition from solving military problems to peaceful economic construction at the end of 1920 - beginning of 1921 took place under extremely complex and difficult conditions.
The First World Imperialist and Civil Wars brought the country's national economy to ruin. Industry, agriculture, and transport were in extremely difficult condition at the beginning of the recovery period.
The economy of our country continued to remain multi-structured. It intertwined elements of five socio-economic structures: patriarchal, small-scale, private capitalism, state capitalism, socialism.
All these socio-economic structures did not exist in isolation, but in close interconnection; there was an acute, fierce struggle between them.
The internal situation of the young republic was extremely difficult. Severe devastation, the result of 7 years of continuous wars, set the country's economy back several decades. Here are a few figures that give an idea of the internal situation of the country: the total volume of industrial production fell 7 times. Pig iron smelting was 2 times less than in 1862. Due to the lack of fuel, most enterprises were inactive. Cotton fabrics were produced 20 times less than in 1913. Devastation also reigned in agriculture. Grain production was halved. The number of livestock has decreased significantly. The country lacked bread, potatoes, meat, butter, sugar, and other necessary food products. The irreparable human losses were enormous: since 1914, 19 million people have died.
The long war and devastation affected the social composition of the country: the size of the working class decreased by 2 times (in Petrograd - by 4.3 times).
The active part of the workers performed management work and held positions in Soviet government bodies; up to 30% of the workers went to the villages to escape hunger. The process of declassification threatened the social base of Soviet power.
Since the end of 1920, the position of the ruling Bolshevik Party in Russia began to rapidly deteriorate. The multimillion-dollar Russian peasantry, having defended their land in battles with the White Guards and interventionists, more and more persistently expressed their reluctance to put up with the economic policy of the Bolsheviks, which stifled any economic initiative.
The latter persisted because they did not see anything wrong in their actions. This is understandable: after all, they regarded “war communism” not simply as a sum of emergency measures forced by the war, but also as a breakthrough in the right direction - towards the creation of a non-commodity, truly socialist economy. True, the Bolsheviks advanced towards a new economy along the path of radically breaking the previous market structures much further and faster than originally planned, and explained this by the fact that the bourgeoisie resisted militarily, and it was necessary to immediately deprive it of economic power in order to protect the revolution. In the new, peaceful conditions, the peasants had to be patient, regularly supply grain to the city according to surplus appropriation, and the authorities would “distribute it to plants and factories”, promptly restore on this basis the industry almost completely destroyed during the years of hard times, return the debt to the peasantry, and then - then, according to Lenin, “we will have communist production and distribution.”
In response, one after another, anti-government peasant uprisings break out in different parts of the country. By the spring of 1921 There were already about 200 thousand people in the ranks of their participants. Discontent also spread to the armed forces. In March, sailors and Red Army soldiers of Kronstadt, the largest naval base of the Baltic Fleet, took up arms against the communists. A wave of mass strikes and demonstrations by workers was growing in the cities. People in the city were also dissatisfied with the policy of war communism: the urban population did not like the equal distribution of food, labor conscription, etc. As a result, a crack appeared in the alliance of the working class and the peasantry - the basis of Soviet power. Rebellions broke out with the participation of middle peasants, the most powerful was the Kronstadt rebellion of sailors who came from peasant backgrounds. They were close to the needs and ideology of the village.
In the critical situation of the first post-war spring, the leadership of the Bolshevik Party did not flinch. It coldly threw hundreds of thousands of bayonets and sabers of the regular Red Army to suppress popular uprisings. At the same time, V.I. Lenin forms two principles of the “lesson of Kronstadt”. The first of them read: “Only an agreement with the peasantry can save the socialist revolution in Russia before revolution occurs in other countries.” The second “lesson” demanded that the “struggle against the Mensheviks, socialist-revolutionaries, anarchists” and other opposition forces be toughened in order to completely and completely isolate them from the masses.
As a result, Soviet Russia entered a period of peaceful construction with two diverging lines of internal policy. On the one hand, a rethinking of the fundamentals of economic policy began, accompanied by the emancipation of the country's economic life from total state regulation. On the other hand, in the purely political sphere, the “nuts” remained tightly tightened, the ossification of the Soviet system, crushed by the iron heel of the Bolshevik dictatorship, remained, and any attempts to democratize society and expand the civil rights of the population were resolutely suppressed. This was the first, general in nature, contradiction of the NEP period.
At the same time, dissatisfaction with the policies of war communism became increasingly evident in the village. If during the civil war the peasants (and they were 80% of the entire population at that time) put up with surplus appropriation as a forced phenomenon - in return they received land, defense from invaders, freedom from landowners, now in peace the system of military communism has come in conflict with the interests of the peasantry.
The peasantry, who no longer wanted to put up with surplus appropriation, protested more and more loudly, the most acute political form of which was the rebellion against Soviet power in the Tambov province, Siberia, and Ukraine. Lenin considered this spontaneous dissatisfaction with Soviet policy to be the greatest danger to the new system. It testified to the emergence of such antagonism in society, which could not be eliminated by the use of military force.
With the end of the civil war, the policy of “war communism” reached a dead end. The need to change the political course was recognized by the majority of both the leadership and ordinary members of the party. However, some believed that to get out of the crisis it was necessary to improve the old policy and build socialism with its help, while others proposed new ways.
For the most orthodox and fanatical part of the Bolshevik leadership, it would be quite natural and acceptable to continue the policy of “war communism”, introduced at one time as a forced and last resort measure during the most difficult period of the civil war. But if later during the civil war, during the period of martial law, the actions of the revolutionary tribunals and the “emergency”, this policy caused acute discontent, which opened up resistance and, at least, a dull murmur, then the population has to put up with “belt tightening” after the “victory” in the civil war no longer wanted. The most die-hard supporters of the communist idea were able to see firsthand the need for change. This time too, Lenin had to make considerable efforts to convince some of his most zealous comrades, who did not want to hear about “betrayal of the ideals of the proletarian revolution,” about “retreat” and “surrender of positions won in a bloody battle.” Having turned the mood in their favor, the Bolshevik leadership moved to introduce the New Economic Policy. Its successful implementation was associated with the fulfillment of the above-mentioned tasks of restoring the destroyed national economy.
The New Economic Policy - NEP - became, in a way, a lifeline for the RCP(b), which was rapidly losing popularity in the face of growing mass discontent among the wider population. The question of whether the Bolsheviks retained power in their hands or whether the Bolshevik experiment would fail was seriously on the agenda. It was the NEP that became a panacea for communist leaders under these conditions.
2) The essence of the NEP. Its main measures in different areas of the economy, results and results.
The New Economic Policy is an economic policy pursued in Soviet Russia beginning in 1921. It was adopted in March 1921 by the X Congress of the RCP(b), replacing the policy of “war communism” pursued during the Civil War. The New Economic Policy aimed at restoring the national economy and the subsequent transition to socialism. The main content of the NEP is the replacement of surplus appropriation with a tax in kind in the countryside (up to 70% of grain was confiscated during surplus appropriation, and about 30% with a tax in kind), the use of the market and various forms of ownership, attracting foreign capital in the form of concessions, carrying out a monetary reform (1922-1924), in as a result of which the ruble became a convertible currency.
1. SOVIET RUSSIA AFTER THE END OF THE CIVIL WAR
Having won a series of victories over the White Guard armies in 1920, the Red Army and the RCP(b) could celebrate their common success in the Civil War. At the same time, the socio-economic and political situation in the country in 1921-1922. remained extremely tense. The enormous psychological fatigue of the people from the turbulent events of previous years also had its effect. V.I. Lenin publicly admitted in March 1921:<Никогда страна не достигала такой усталости, изношенности, как теперь>1.
The New Economic Policy was born in pain. On March 15, 1921, the X Congress of the RCP (b) adopted a resolution on the report of V.I. Lenin<О замене разверстки натуральным налогом>. This decision took place in an extremely difficult situation. Suffice it to recall what L.B. Krasin said in 1923: if the NEP program had been proposed not by V.I. Lenin, but by someone else, he would have been described as<дряблого соглашателя, если не коварного изменника и предателя>2.
According to V.V. Kabanov’s calculations, at the beginning of 1921, 99.3% of seizures from peasant farms were carried out in kind3. The turn to NEP occurred rapidly: the Politburo commission itself, consisting of L.B. Kamenev, N. Osinsky and A.D. Tsyurupa, to which Lenin transferred<Предварительный, черновой набросок тезисов насчет крестьян>, was formed only on February 8, 1921. But it was in this document that Lenin’s fateful words were unambiguously voiced for the first time:<Удовлетворить желание беспартийного крестьянства о замене разверстки (в смысле изъятия излишков) хлебным налогом>4.
Therefore, it is not surprising that many Bolsheviks simply did not have time to quickly and correctly navigate the new historical situation. For example, two months after the transition to the new economic policy, the same N. Osinsky reported to the Central Committee:<В течение двухнедельной поездки по Тульской, Орловской, Курской и Воронежской губерниям мне пришлось убедиться в том, что новая политика в деревне, связанная с заменой продразверстки натурналогом, недостаточно усвоена местами. Не усвоено достаточно самое существо нового курса. Одни полагают, что мы становимся на путь возвращения к буржуазным отношениям, другие, наоборот, думают, что предпринимается показной политический ход (так, например, ответственный работник Елецкой уездной организации спрашивал меня, улыбаясь по секрету: <будет ли осенью восстановлена продразверстка>)> .
In August 1922, G. E. Zinoviev will remember that a year earlier<замечалось почти полное непонимание НЭПа>6.
All this took place despite the fact that on April 29, 1921, the Organizing Bureau of the Central Committee, implementing the decisions of the congress, decided:
<1) Кампанию по всестороннему разъяснению крестьянским и рабочим массам продналога считать важнейшей для настоящего момента.
2) Immediately give accurate, concise reports to all Provincial Committees about what they have done in this direction, sending comprehensive materials to the Central Committee, noting all new unresolved issues that have arisen locally in connection with the implementation of the tax in kind. Provide weekly reports>7.
But at first the directive was poorly implemented. Local party organizations were clearly in no hurry. There is nothing to be surprised here either, since the policy of the Bolshevik leadership on the peasant issue was not particularly consistent in 1918 - 1920.8
However, outside the village there was even less clarity and order. Thus, during the first half of 1921, Narkomfin stood aloof from the study of the economic processes of the NEP, delving into the search for a new measure of value to replace the monetary one9. It is clear that in such a situation there was simply no talk of any normally functioning market.
At the same time, the destruction of the central administrations and the formation of trusts, the gradual withering away of the functions of the Supreme Economic Council for the direct supply of industrial enterprises with raw materials and fuel, the absence of a hard currency created, as L. Sabsovich correctly noted, such conditions under which<ни какое планирование промышленности не могло иметь места>10. Lenin in 1921 directly admitted that<мы на 5 недель обыкновенно не умеем рассчитать>11.
The Bolshevik leader, in correspondence with I.S. Unshlikht and V.V. Fomin, described the situation on the railway in January 1922 as follows:<Первый раз я ехал по железным дорогам не в качестве <сановника>, raising everyone and everything to their feet with dozens of special telegrams, and as an unknown person traveling with the Cheka, my impression is hopelessly depressing. If these are the orders of a special small wheel in a mechanism, standing under the special supervision of the Cheka itself, then I can imagine what is being done in the NKPS in general! The camber must be incredible there>12.
Famine and epidemics were raging in the country. Let us illustrate what happened in the Volga region in 1921 with two examples from the life of the Samara province. The specially authorized STO for fuel, in a report dated July 8, 1921, reported on the cholera epidemic in Samara. He pointed out that in the city itself, manure and cesspools had not been removed for 4 years. On the Volga embankment, where brisk trade was going on, dead cattle are lying around. In the square, the author of the document observed a man writhing in a fit of cholera, over whom passing people calmly stepped. The city recorded up to 500 cases of illness per day. And at the same time, the entire population drank only raw water. The authorities' reaction is described as follows:<Местные власти, за исключением времени, которое они проводят на даче, идут в работе в сторону наименьшего сопротивления. Губисполком заседает и разговаривает, Губчека ищет виноватых, Парткомы силются организовать субботники, но нет людей и хлеба, кооперативы бумаги пишут, Профсоюзы мечутся и кричат до хрипоты>13.
In the province, flight from the party was clearly evident, the main reason for which was hunger14. P.A. Sorokin, who visited the famine-stricken areas of the Samara province in the winter of 1921, cites his conversation with a local policeman. The latter, having removed another person who had died of hunger into the barn, where ten corpses were already lying on the floor, said:
< - Запирать надо... Воруют.
- They steal... what?
- Yes, to eat. This is what we've come to. In the village, the cemetery is guarded so that the corpses are not stolen from the graves.
- Were there any murders for this purpose? - I forced myself to ask.
- Not in our village, but in others there were. A few days ago in the village of G., a mother killed a child, cut off his legs, boiled him and ate him>15.
Similar things happened in other regions. Thus, in April 1922, the leadership of Bashkiria was forced to adopt a special resolution<О людоедстве>, aimed at combating corpse eating and cannibalism, as well as suppressing the trade in human meat>. The situation in the Kustanai province in the report of the provincial committee is described as follows:<На почве голода идут самоубийства ответственных работников. Ужасающая картина голода в апреле достигает своего апогея. Количество трупов, валяющихся по улицам, в детских домах не поддается учету. За один лишь январь месяц по городу зарыто более 1500 трупов. Это по городу, а в деревнях в общей сложности еще больше>17.
After the end of the Civil War, the country lay in ruins. Many industrial enterprises stood still or were not operating at full capacity. In 1920, 8.7 million tons of coal were mined - slightly more than in 1898, and iron smelting fell to 116 thousand tons, which is 2 times less than in 1862. Cotton fabrics were produced approximately the same amount how much in the distant pre-reform 185718 Transport was worn out and also functioned with serious interruptions. According to the calculations of Soviet historians, by the end of the Civil War, 3,672 railway bridges and 1,700 miles of railway tracks were in a destroyed state19.
The personnel composition of the workers underwent noticeable changes: some were killed, some died, some were still in the Red Army. The situation of those remaining in the city was unenviable. It is significant that during the celebration of the fifth anniversary of the October Revolution, workers of the Moscow plant<Красный пролетарий>turned to Trotsky with the question of how long they would still be<ходить разутые и раздетые>?20 Many workers fled to escape hunger in the village, whose material and technical base also suffered serious damage. The surplus appropriation system, which could not be abandoned in a number of regions of the country even after the decisions of the Tenth Congress of the RCP(b), continued to undermine the incentive for producers to work.
Let us note that the most important factor that had a significant impact on the development of the entire socio-political situation in the country was the demobilization of the army, which led to an increase in banditry. It is very significant that in his report on the political activities of the Central Committee at the X Congress of the RCP(b), V.I. Lenin repeatedly addressed this problem, which he assessed as<новую форму войны>21.
The life of the country continued to be greatly affected by the insurgency. Thus, the peasant uprising in Western Siberia, which broke out on January 31, 1921, continued until the end of spring. It spread over the entire Tyumen province, partly capturing the Omsk, Chelyabinsk and Yekaterinburg provinces. At least one hundred thousand people took part in the uprising and, according to V.V. Moskovkin’s definition, it outgrew<в крупномасштабную войну с фронтами, укрепленными районами, <котлами>encirclement and thousand-kilometer marches of military formations>22. Many facts speak about the degree of bitterness. For example, in the Ishim district of the Tyumen province, it was not uncommon for captured food workers to have their bellies cut alive, grain to be poured into them, and a sheet of paper with the inscription hung over them<Разверстка выполнена полностью>. In other places, representatives of the Soviet government had their noses and ears cut off, their eyes gouged out, pierced with pitchforks, burned and frozen alive. The Bolsheviks responded with adequate cruelty. The total losses on the part of the authorities alone exceeded ten thousand people. Among peasants, the figure was much higher: tens of thousands of people died, were maimed, and lost their homes and property. In addition, as a result of these events, the number of livestock decreased sharply, crops fell by a quarter, and famine began23.
The situation in the Urals also remained tense. According to some data, in the Osinsky district of the Perm province alone, during 1921, up to 15 thousand deserters and bandits were identified, from whom up to 10 thousand rifles and several dozen machine guns were taken24.
The situation with banditry in the North Caucasus in the summer of 1921 is reflected in the document compiled by the head of Intelligence. Department of North Caucasian Military District Stroilo<Обзоре повстанческого движения на территории Северо-Кавказского военного Округа за июль и август 1921 г.>. The picture painted turned out to be very colorful and contradictory. So, the peasantry on the Don<резко и отрицательно>did not apply to alien gangs (Maslakovites sometimes even helped against the Sovrabotnikov), but to local ones, made up of Cossacks. The Cossacks, in turn, on the contrary,<широко сочувствует подобным движениям и охотно идет за своими офицерами на всякую авантюру>. At the same time, the Review noted:<Казачьи банды имеют все признаки правильной организации регулярных казачьих конных частей с зачатками старорежимной дисциплины>. The Don Cossacks had a negative attitude towards the alien gangs.
The situation in the Kuban is characterized as the most confusing, which was determined primarily by the motley composition of the rebels. Among them were<вечно зеленые>, i.e. those who<имеют связь с родными, зачастую работают дома и не прочь покинуть отряды и вернуться домой. Если бы доверяли амнистиям>. In addition, large numbers of officers, gendarmes, intelligentsia, and petty bourgeoisie who had fled from all over the country gathered in Kuban. Many of them regretted that they did not leave Russia on time. But the greatest danger to Soviet power was posed, as stated in the Review, by consistent Kuban independentists and adherents of the idea<единой и неделимой>Russia. Finally, in the Kuban there were plenty of refugees hiding from mobilization, criminals and all sorts of seekers of easy money.
The Review noted the following as serious risks:<Главари крупных отрядов, вышедшие зачастую из видных офицеров, имея широкие полномочия от авторитетных антисоветских организаций... борясь с мелкими бандитскими отрядами и приобретая популярность среди населения, постепенно объединяют вокруг себя мелкие отряды, реорганизуя их в правильные войсковые соединения>. The conclusion from this was alarming:<...можно смело сказать, что настоящее движение Кубани аналогично с прошлогодним и также обещает закончиться авантюрой, подобной генерала Фостикова>. In order to protect relatives, the Review admitted, the rebels sometimes take hostages from among Soviet and party workers.
Regarding the Terek province it is said that there, too, the movement<носит серьезный характер>. The total number of rebel detachments registered on the territory of the North Caucasus Military District by August 25, 1921 in the Review was determined to be 105. In them: bayonets - 2401; sabers - 4751; machine guns - 111; guns - 125.
Those who survived this confrontation remembered it for the rest of their lives. For example, A. Mikoyan once said in the late twenties:<Я помню, как в 1922 году мы с т.Ворошиловым сидели в штабе, имея перед собой карту Северокавказского края, по которой были десятки флажков, указывавших на наличие кавалерийских белых банд, расставленных по всем станицам, несколько тысяч кавалерийских сабель бандитских и белопартизанских отрядов. Это было в 1922 - 23 году, а только в 1924/25 г. кончились остатки открытой гражданской войны>26.
In Ukraine, the tense situation remained throughout 1921. A.V. Shubin only estimates the number of fighters who were in April 7, 1921 under the command of N. Makhno at 13 thousand. According to other data, in the summer of the same year, 43 gangs numbering 3,356 bayonets and 4,006 sabers with 88 machine guns operated in Ukraine28. In total, in 1921, the rebels carried out 1,376 raids on populated areas, 259 on Soviet authorities, 342 on food supplies. and prom. institutions and enterprises. During this period, they killed 3,785 and wounded 745 people29.
In this regard, Lenin’s phrase, written in January 1922 and addressed to I.S. Unshlikht, should not be surprising:<Малейшее усиление бандитизма и т.п. должно влечь военное положение и расстрелы на месте>30.
However, it was not only the situation in the country that affected the RCP(b). Of no small importance was the fact that the decision to transition to a new economic policy was forced. Questions immediately arose about the role of the party in the new historical conditions, about the permissible limits of the retreat undertaken. But complete clarity on these issues was far from complete. It is no coincidence that at the XI party conference held in December 1921, the speaker on the issue of the party’s immediate tasks, L.B. Kamenev, was literally bombarded with questions about the prospects for the new economic policy. As a result, L.S. Sosnovsky stood up for Kamenev:<Я думаю, что тов.Каменев и даже весь ЦК не может объяснить, до каких пор будет продолжаться отступление. Да и я не знаю, отступление ли это и не прав ли был тов.Евдокимов, когда сказал, что это вовсе не отступление>31. Thus, in his report to the XI Party Congress, Lenin essentially answered the long-formulated and pressing question about the permissible limits of retreat.
What did the Bolshevik leaders fear? This question was partly answered by G.E. Zinoviev in a report at the XII Party Conference (August 1922):
<Вообще мои тезисы никто не должен рассматривать как идеологию репрессий. Теперь не 18-й год. Дело сложнее; переплет интереснее; одними репрессиями невозможно ничего добиться...
At the same time, it is necessary to see clearly. Here they are, these potential targets of the Socialist Revolutionaries and Mensheviks, a possible source of their strength and energy. Here they are<общественные>congresses of bourgeois-democratic intelligentsia. Here is bourgeois literature, which has just barely surfaced, here is high school, here is cooperation>.
And more about legal congresses of the intelligentsia:
<Я не говорю, что на этих съездах были непременно организованные меньшевики и эсеры. Нисколько. Но резон для меньшевизма и эсерства в его последней формации, последней интерпретации, - вползти в <советскую легальность>, relying on the supposed gradual degeneration of the Russian Communist Party,<взорвать изнутри>, disintegrate, dissolve Soviet power - this is>32.
Zinoviev was right in many respects. Since the autumn of 1921, the non-party intelligentsia experienced euphoric anticipation of genuine liberalization and even a radical change in the political regime. Many private publications appeared, of which there were 33,733 in Moscow alone in 1921. True, these expectations were largely not met. It is not surprising that the negative attitude of a significant part of the intelligentsia towards Soviet power persisted throughout the twenties. It is also important that mistakes and individual relaxations of the regime within the country were often perceived as steps towards the inevitable death of Soviet power. Information about the mood of the people was quickly put on the table of the party leaders34. There were also enough informants. Thus, in March 1926, Teslenko’s memo to the Vasileostrovsky district committee of Leningrad about the mood of part of the Leningrad State University professors reported that<эти люди... среди своих людей усиленно проводят ту линию, что <высшие люди>The Bolsheviks fully admit that nothing is working out for them: grain exports have failed, overhead costs are very high, the peasantry is barefoot and undressed, and much more - in a word: nothing is working out for the Bolsheviks, the Bolsheviks are bankrupt, they are giving up one position after another and we quickly need seize and strengthen their positions in universities>35.
Already at the dawn of the new economic policy, any manifestations of public initiative on the part of the authorities aroused, at best, a wary attitude. Moreover, in 1922, the Main Directorate for Literature and Publishing (Glavlit) was created, designed to act as a barrier to the spread of non-communist ideology. Its main functions are previewing and issuing publication permissions. A repertoire control committee was also created under Glavlit, without whose permission not a single work could be allowed to be staged. The first lists of banned books soon followed. Decrees were issued that provided for measures of administrative supervision over societies, unions, their congresses and conferences, and a permitting procedure for their organization was established36.
But in order to bring the entire society under strict control, it was necessary to achieve a situation in which the gaze of government agents would be able to penetrate everywhere. To solve such a global problem, a completely reliable tool was absolutely necessary, which was not yet available.
2. STAFF OF THE RCP(b) IN 1921 - 1922<БОЛЕЗНИ>PARTS
What was the state of the ruling party in the first years of NEP? It is generally accepted that the RCP(b) in the spring of 1921 had 732,000 members (no records were kept of candidates). However, as we will see below, the state of accounting in the RKP(b) was such that this figure is hardly worth trusting.
The transition to NEP revealed different reactions among communists. Sentiments ranged from approving and wary-skeptical to categorically unacceptable. It is worth taking into account that for many members of the RCP(b), the restructuring of consciousness and behavior turned out to be difficult, because during the years of war they were psychologically accustomed to living in an emergency situation and acting using military methods37.
In 1921 - 1922 thesis<За что боролись?>was perhaps the most common. The attitude of communists towards party membership is also interesting. In the materials of the Central Committee's Educational Distribution Department we read:<Отношение к партийным билетам со стороны очень многих членов партии - возмутительное. Разгильдяйство в этой области доходит до того, что каждый вечер теряется до 1000 билетов>. The figure requires no comment.
The Central Committee of the RCP(b) received very unique documents. For example, in one of the statements to the Central Committee it was proposed to include in the Charter of the RCP (b) a clause that would allow temporary withdrawal from the party while maintaining seniority, but subject to mandatory return to the party after the expiration of the leave. In this way, the author of the statement proposed to preserve for the party the following category of its members,<которые устали от несения партийных обязанностей, от партийной дисциплины и хотят отдохнуть, освободиться. Обыкновенно эти т.т. подают заявления о выходе из партии>39.
In addition, among ordinary Bolsheviks in a number of places the views of<рабочей оппозиции>and related groups. The following quote gives an idea of the direction of their ideas that were in circulation among the workers:<РКП стала партией организаторской интеллигенции. Пропасть между РКП и рабочим классом все более углубляется и этот факт нельзя затушевать никакими резолюциями и постановлениями коммунистических съездов, конференций и т.д.>40. So wrote educated in the fall of 1921 in the magazine<Рабочая Правда>group of communists. The leaders of the RCP(b) were especially concerned that<рабочая оппозиция>was closely connected with the working masses.
As a result, an outflow from the party began due to disagreement with the NEP, and individual and group exits became common41. In a number of districts in 1921 and at the beginning of 1922, the monthly percentage of quitting the party reached 10.
And all this happened at a time when the desire to join the party on the part of unprincipled careerists clearly intensified. There was a continuous flow of information from the field on this topic. Let's give two examples.
On March 20, 1921, member of the RCP(b) M.A. Sokolov reported to the Central Committee that<много есть членов партии, которые мечтали и мечтают давно как бы залезть повыше и получить побольше деньжонок. Этим самым из наших членов р.к.п. создаются не идейные коммунисты, а идейные карьеристы>42.
Another example. In September 1920, A. Vlasov, a former metal worker, sent a letter signed<Красный Командир>, to several addresses at once: to the Central Committee, MK,<Правду>, Lenin, etc. He wrote angrily:
<Я, раненый красный командир, немного подлечился и на днях уезжаю на южный фронт. Прожив в Москве 3 месяца, я видел то, о чем никогда и не догадывался.
I saw depravity among our responsible communist workers and saw the encouragement of the arbitrariness they were committing by the Central Committee...
Our Communist Workers' Party is on the eve of bankruptcy: the party has no authority, and if it does, it is only fear of the CHEKA. And why? Yes, because, comrades, our party committees have become bureaucratic bodies. They are completely out of touch with the masses...>43.
The author also gave very specific examples. But the conclusions he made are more important. Both the above and the following below:<Вы думаете, что мы не знаем, что как какой-нибудь товарищ поднял голос, так его ссылают на окраину>44.
The influx into the party of people whose motives were far from ideological could not but have consequences. And especially in difficult moments. So, on March 12, 1921, G. Feigin reported the following to the Ivanovo-Voznesensky Provincial Committee of the RKSM:<Итак, ребятки, направились под Кронштадт, в город Ораниенбаум. Сегодня ночью или завтра буду в бою. Из ивановских со мной Эдельман из Вичуги, а также весь Владимирский губком РКП... Уехал я добровольно. Стыдно стало за некоторых типов, у которых сразу появились все возможные болезни, вплоть до венерических>45.
Of course, the real reasons for sabotaging the trip could be very different, even hidden sympathy for the rebel sailors. But from the point of view of the ruling party, the presence of such an unreliable element in its ranks was nonsense. Let us note that if in January 1921 there were 2,680 members and candidates for membership of the RCP(b) in the military and civilian organizations of Kronstadt, then during the uprising about 900 people left the party, and 41 cells of the RCP(b) generally disintegrated46. But mass exits from the party took place even before the uprising47. It is not surprising that the Tenth Congress pointed out the need to hold<перерегистрацию всех коммунистов в армии и флоте, взять их на строгий учет и не допускать никаких самовольных отлучек, приравняв таковые к дезертирству>48.
But the NEP also brought additional problems. For example, a closed letter from the secretary of the Vitebsk Civil Code for June 1922 said:<Как еще один яркий отрицательный момент, укажу на крайнюю трудность в настоящее время всяких перебросок. Сдвинуть с места члена партии теперь в высшей степени не легко. Протесты и жалобы бесконечны. Почти нет случаев, чтобы тот или иной работник подчинился перемещению, не сделав всего возможного, чтобы от него уклониться. Огромные затруднения представляет также необходимость считаться с разбухшим чиновничьим самолюбием и привычкой многих членов партии рассматривать всякое назначение с точки зрения повышения или понижения по службе. Нужны крутые революционные меры для перевоспитания очиновничившихся членов партии>49.
We emphasize that the listed phenomena were widespread in the party apparatus. And what happened then in<низах>parties?
In the conditions of post-war devastation, the position of the majority of ordinary communists in material terms could not differ significantly from the position of the bulk of the peasantry and townspeople. Thus, a statement dated March 18, 1921, sent to the Central Committee by employees of the Kushkinsky branch of the Special Department of the Turkfront, contained a protest against the executions of communists that had taken place. In addition, its authors say that they<голы, голодны>, <иногда за фунт чуреку (пшеничная лепешка) готовы отдать свою жизнь>. It is interesting that the authors of the statement considered it necessary to make the following clarification:<Из коммуниста-чекиста или особиста, бывшего еще вчера таким же <верноподданным>like others, they want to create an ideal worker who would be crystal clear, who would not make mistakes in anything. But if we take every communist-chekist or special officer and consider all his physical and psychological structures, then we will see that he has a stomach that regularly makes itself felt, he has other inclinations that are a legacy of the past and which are almost impossible to get rid of >50.
Struggling for survival, party members, crushed by poverty, were capable of a variety of actions, including filing applications for assistance to the ARA51.
But along with the listed phenomena, there were others, no less important, from our point of view, for understanding the state of the party in 1921-1922. First of all, information from the field that came to the Central Committee's Educational Distribution Department in these years clearly indicated a shortage of party leaders. Thus, the Kharkov provincial committee of the Communist Party of Ukraine (Bolsheviks) reported at the end of 1920:<Недостаток в работниках громадный, стоит одного члена ячейки перевести в другую, чтобы ячейка распалась>52.
But what can we say about the cells in the Kharkov region, when sometimes there were not enough people even in large cities. Thus, the old Bolshevik Tatyana Fedorovna Lyudvinskaya later recalled that at the same time, at the end of 1920, she was forced to simultaneously manage the organizational department and the agitation and propaganda department in the Sokolniki district party committee of Moscow. Moreover, the entire apparatus of the district committee consisted of its secretary VAKotov, the department manager and Lyudvinskaya herself53. And the Plenum of the Caucasian Bureau of the Central Committee on September 5, 1921 decided:<В виду недостатка партийных, советских, профессиональных работников предложить всем ЦК и облпарткомам сократить количество комиссаров, допуская совместительство>54.
By 1921, a somewhat paradoxical situation had developed: local party functionaries spoke of a catastrophic shortage of people, and Bolshevik leaders emphasized that the party had grown beyond all measure. It should not be forgotten that during the entire period of the Civil War, 70% of all party members served in the Red Army55.
So what happened on the ground? To some extent, some later statements by local party workers help to answer this question. Thus, in September 1924, one of the communists of the Poltava province told the story of a cell in his village:
<Вместо 90 человек в 1920 - 21 гг. в комячейке состоит сейчас 14 человек, из них 10 кандидатов, т.е. из старых осталось всего 4 человека. Куда же делись остальные 86 человек? 12 человек вычищено по чистке в конце 1921 г., 10 исключено после чистки по разным причинам. 14 убито в 1920 - 21 г., 30 командировано на партийно-советскую работу в уезд и губернию, на учебу, а 2 человека после исключения из партии ушли в уголовные банды и были нами расстреляны>56.
And although the calculations here are not very good, the plot itself is very indicative. And, I think, not uncommon for that time. Zinoviev, at the 11th Party Congress, admitted the fact that they were meeting<крупные поселки шахты и т.д., где на 10 - 12 тысяч рабочих ячейка в 6 человек>57. A typical example is a request from Novgorod:<Новгубком вынужден просить по возможности прислать в распоряжение Новгородского Губкома: двух работников для партработы в губернском и 5 товарищей в уездном масштабе, трех работников уездного масштаба для советской работы (Предисполком, завотделами)>58. There were also conflicts between provincial committees over party workers. For example, a lawsuit lasted for several months between the Aktobe and Pskov provincial committees over I.M. Parshin, born in 1896, a member of the RCP (b) from 5.H. 191859. And the leaders of the Ryazan Provincial Committee in September 1921 sought from the Central Committee the return of Nikolai Mikhailovich Gribanov from the Tambov Provincial Committee60.
In a number of places, frequent changes of cell secretaries were common. The outflow of party workers from volost party organizations also increased. About the reasons for this phenomenon, in particular, in a letter dated June 6, 1921 from Ligovo, Petrograd province. Communist D. Pavlov reported to V.I. Lenin. He noted that party workers in the volosts<приходится с утра до вечера с темной непонимающей массой иметь дела>while having nothing<из предметов первой необходимости>. D. Pavlov’s general conclusion was bleak:<Ясное дело, волостные работники все бегут из волостей..., потому что жить нельзя, если жить, то нужно воровать или просить кулака>62.
Let us add that in the future, a significant number of party members will view work in the countryside as exile63, and a common phenomenon was the desire of communists from the outskirts to move to the central regions64.
At that time, in the correspondence of the Bolsheviks, there were regular references to the behavior of many members of the RCP (b) as a common sore point. Thus, member of the Presidium of the Stavropol Provincial Committee and Chairman of the Provincial Executive Committee F.S. Lizarev, in a memorandum to the Central Committee dated May 2, 1921, named drunkenness, protectionism, concealment of crimes, laxity, banditry, robbery, torture, and idleness as widespread phenomena. Lizarev indignantly cites the following fact:<При отъезде тов.Белобородова из Ставрополя я ему указал на сильно разлагающее влияние существующего здесь пьянства, на что тов.Белобородое с раздражением мне ответил; <Скажите какой исполком не пьянствует>>65.
What Lizarev reported aroused Lenin’s interest. On May 26 he wrote to Molotov:<Записка Лизарева архиважна. Надо обратить сугубое внимание и проверить через вполне объективных людей>66.
In general, Lenin demanded that manifestations of mismanagement, theft and abuse of power be stopped quickly and cruelly. For example, in July 1921 he demanded<послать Контрольную комиссию на Дон... и расстрелять на месте тех, кого изобличат в грабежах>67.
There were many options for discreditable behavior. Thus, in the report of the Vladimir Provincial Committee, among the reasons for expulsion from the RCP(b) were theft, bribe, desertion, religious beliefs, disobedience to party discipline, selfishness, abuse of office, failure to attend meetings, beating one’s father, etc.68 And in the Voronezh province for the period from April 13 to June 1, 1922, control commissions scheduled 38 village cells for inspection. The reasons that forced us to take this step were the following:< а) в 11-ти указанных ячейках установлены пьянки, склоки, должностные преступления, растраты и уголовные преступления; б) в 9-ти ячейках слабое руководство работой, неавторитетность ячеек, командование, грубое обращение с крестьянством и нарушение коммунистической этики> 69.
However, the main<из нездоровых явлений>in 1921-1922 according to the Secretariat of the Central Committee were considered<хозяйственное обрастание, пьянство и преступления по должности... При этом все затемняющим по своим размерам, характеру и результатам является пьянство... Вследствие значительных размеров пьянства известны случаи роспуска целых уездных организаций>70.
Very interesting things happened in a number of places. For example, in the Nizhny Novgorod province, village communists pawned party tickets to kulaks-moonshiners for moonshine71. In one of the districts of the Voronezh province, a party cell<спилась до того, что ограбила кооператив, сборщика, убила секретаря ячейки и скрылась, перейдя на положение бандитов>72. In the Yeletsk district of the Arkhangelsk province, the entire PEC attended the wedding of a member of the PEC who married the daughter of a priest. The interesting thing here is that before the CC<кампания оправдывалась тем, что они праздновали победу, когда пролетарий сумел победить сердце поповны>. And in one of the provinces, a drunken provincial prosecutor (!) spent the night in an empty herring barrel in the middle of the city market73. In the Voronezh province, cases of drunken revelry by members of the RCP (b) in restaurants in the company of prostitutes were recorded74.
Another dangerous phenomenon that threatened the party was the received<громадное распространение>bribery75. For example, according to information from the Secretariat of the Central Committee for July 1922, the protocols of all districts of the North Dvina province<говорят о преступлениях ответственных работников по должности>76. By the end of the civil war, Lenin even had to admit that the Soviet government simply lacked honest people77. Regarding bribes, the party leader directly stated on October 17, 1921 that<у нас они на каждом шагу>. Although almost immediately I considered it necessary to make a reservation that they were holding<на почве безграмотности>78. And when in August 1921 a draft decree on combating bribery was discussed in the Small Council of People's Commissars, Lenin strongly spoke out for tougher punishments79.
The abuses of the party and state apparatus in general regularly infuriated him. So, on September 3, 1921, Lenin wrote a letter to D.I. Kursky. In it, the leader of the Bolshevik Party demanded:
<4) устроить совещание московских народных судей, членов трибуналов и т.п. для выработки успешных мер борьбы с волокитой;
5) definitely this fall and winter of 1921 - 22. put on trial in Moscow 4-6 cases of Moscow red tape, selecting cases<поярче>and making every court a political matter;
6) find at least 2 - 3 smart ones<экспертов>in cases of red tape, the communists are meaner and smarter (bring in Sosnovsky) in order to learn how to persecute them for red tape>80.
Further more. On December 23, 1921, Lenin addressed P.A. Bogdanov with the following words:<Мы не умеем гласно судить за поганую волокиту: за это нас всех и Наркомюст сугубо надо вешать на вонючих веревках>81. And in February 1922, he addressed L.B. Kamenev with despair:<Христа ради, посадите Вы за волокиту в тюрьму кого-либо! Ей-ей, без этого ни черта толку не будет>82. Finally, a few days later, in a letter to G.Ya. Sokolnikov, Lenin essentially summarizes:<Коммунисты стали бюрократами. Если что нас погубит, то это>83.
Economic fouling and the growing indifference to party responsibilities on its basis worried the Secretariat of the Central Committee no less than drunkenness and bribery. It is clear that to interpret the concept<хозяйственное обрастание>it can be done in different ways. But when, for example, the Ural Bureau reported that some communists, most of whom occupied economic positions, had lackeys, trips, diamonds, then with any interpretation of the concept the fact had to be recognized84.
The Bolshevik leaders quickly assessed another danger that was approaching them, namely that the party would constantly lose the most knowledgeable and energetic people capable of independently solving their material problems. In addition, the Bolshevik Party, which experienced a catastrophic shortage of personnel in the countryside, was also faced with the fact that under the NEP, many party members were primarily engaged in running their own households, and not in party work. It is no coincidence that the resolution of the Eleventh Congress<Об укреплении и новых задачах партии>admitted:<Часть <коммунистов>-peasants with a petty-bourgeois psychology begin to move away from the party, because the party only constrains them as small owners>85. For example, from Altai they reported:<На работоспособность секретарей волпарткомов влияет имеющееся у некоторых на руках крестьянское хозяйство. Случается, что часть из них уделяет больше внимания своему хозяйству, нежели партработе. Таких секретарей в Барнаульском уезде имеется например 6 человек>. It was also noted there that strong economic peasants were also leaving the party86. Similar phenomena were also reported from Ivanovo-Voznesensk, Rybinsk, and Kaluga87.
Thus, some peasants, including those who returned from the Red Army, began to quickly restore their farms, and their interest in belonging to the RCP (b) began to decrease.
It is worth providing such data. As a result of the party purge of 1921, on average, out of every hundred communist workers, 17 people dropped out, then out of a hundred communist peasants - 42 people. The party census of 1922 established that if the average number of urban cells in all regions of the country did not fall below 15 people, then the average number of rural cells ranged from 6 to 13 people89. At the same time, we should not forget about the isolation of rural communists from their cells. For example, in Bashkiria it reached 50 km90. The total number of members of peasant party cells in 1922 was determined by the party census to be 102 thousand people91.
Squabbles among communist leaders were another very common occurrence92. How far things sometimes got can be illustrated by an example from the life of the Astrakhan province:<...обособленность отв.работников и отсутствие парт.давления и контроля снизу, создала благоприятные условия для процветания в организации (ее верхушечной части) ненормальных явлений: бюрократизм, пьянство, кумовство... В такую обстановку попала группа новых приезжих т.т.: Рябов, Лурье, Попов, а в последствии Емельянов. Развернувшаяся между 2-я группами работников борьба заполнила всю историю организации на протяжении года с лишним... Прения между ГК и ГКК (в ГК были избраны прибывшие, а в ГКК прежние руководители - О.Н.) дошли до крайних своих пределов: Емельянов КК был исключен из партии, а КК распущена ГК>93.
Not only in party committees, but also at all levels of their hierarchy, there was a struggle for influence and power. But, as a rule, the matter did not reach the point of encroaching on the prerogatives of the central government. Participants in the struggle on a regional scale were the regional, provincial and district (district) committees of the RCP (b). As a rule, all committees justified their encroachments on power, based on the specific situation, either by the need to centralize the party or by the need for its democratization. In reality, any committee defended its own powers94.
And, finally, the party leadership was alarmed by the extremely low level of training of communists, as well as the increasing number of cases of party members leaving Soviet party schools due to difficult financial situations. The Central Committee of the RCP(b) tried to restrain this process, demanding that the abandonment of Soviet party schools, education in which was a party responsibility, be considered as<тяжелое нарушение партийной дисциплины, со всеми вытекающими отсюда последствиями>. Leaving the Soviet party school was considered permissible only with the permission of the party committee and if there was<весьма уважительных причин>95.
Let us note that already the X Congress in the resolution<О Главполитпросвете и агитационно-пропагандистских задачах партии>demanded:<Необходимо обязать всех ответственных работников партии быть лекторами партийных школ и смотреть на эту работу, как на одну из важнейших своих обязанностей>96. However, the average level of cadets in provincial and district Soviet party schools was such that schools, as a rule, had to start with classes in the Russian language and arithmetic 97 before moving on to the main part of the program.
It is not difficult to understand the concerns of the party leadership in this regard: the emerging party-state apparatus urgently needed cadres of performers whose social background and political orientation would not cause concern. In addition, the Tenth Party Congress recognized that the main contradiction of the war period<было то обстоятельство, что при быстром количественном росте партии характер работы мешал коммунистическому воспитанию всей массы партийных членов, в особенности же вновь поступивших>98. Inspections constantly revealed facts indicating the severity of the problem. For example, some communists considered Zubatov a revolutionary, Sverdlov a teacher of the Sverdlovsk courses, and Khalturin the head of the Comintern. Not everyone knew when the February and October revolutions took place. And in the Vladimir organization, one of the party members counted five Internationals99. Somewhat later, in January 1922, in a circular letter about the plan for internal party propaganda, the Central Committee of the RCP (b) was forced to admit the following important circumstance:<Возложение пропагандистских функций на партячейки, которое практикуется до сих пор, не дает нужных результатов...>. The system of party and Soviet-party schools, from the school of political literacy to the higher party school, was determined by the Central Committee as the main means of Marxist education of the Bolsheviks.
But learning was hampered by economic devastation. And here it is necessary to remember that the life of ordinary party members was often not much different from the life of ordinary people. For example, about the life of Moscow State University students in 1921, you can read in the memorandum of university professor M. Smith to the Central Committee of the RCP (b). He wrote:<О голоде говорить не приходится. Пайки получает лишь небольшое меньшинство, получает их с огромным запозданием и, конечно, пайки эти отнюдь не похожи на пищевой прожиточный минимум... Электричество отсутствует... В комнатах живут, как правило, столько человек, сколько в ней помещается кроватей. Стол же для занятий полагается один на семь, на восемь человек. Тут же готовят пищу на чадящих железных печурках. Одежда у пролетарской части студенчества в большинстве случаев чрезвычайно мало защищает их от сурового климата Москвы. Вопрос о сапогах и подметках составляет вечную трагедию>100.
The material problem simply could not be resolved quickly. It is no coincidence that in February 1925, at a meeting of university cells, a representative of the workers' faculty named after M.N. Lomonosov complained:<Зачастую студенты торгуют на улицах папиросами до 12 часов ночи>101.
Thus, in 1921, the party leadership found itself at the head of a numerically expanded and very motley organization (as confirmed by the Tenth Congress), individual parts of which were subject to a wide variety of social ailments. Fatigue from participating in wars was taking its toll. With the transition to NEP in party<верхах>The postulates about the unity of the party and the need to maintain the strictest discipline in the retreating army were recognized as relevant. The NEP was considered a retreat. And from the point of view of putting these postulates into practice, both the situation on the ground and the degree of control of the party left much to be desired.
X Congress of the RCP(b) in resolution<По вопросам партийного строительства>oriented:<Нужно вновь собрать партию, которая за период войны была разбита на отдельные отряды... Без решения этой основной задачи не может быть выполнена гигантская строительно-хозяйственная роль пролетарского авангарда>102.
3. ORGANIZATIONAL AND PERSONNEL DEVELOPMENT OF THE RCP(b) FROM X TO XI CONGRESS
In 1921, the activities that formed the basis of the activities of the Secretariat of the Central Committee during the Civil War partially continued to take place. And in that regime, the most important area of work was the mobilization of communists to be transferred to a failed or shock area. In December 1919, I.V. Mgeladze complained:<В деле назначений и перемещений была какая-то чехарда, превращавшая партийных работников в кочевников>103.
The implementation of various<недель>, <кампаний> (<Недели помощи фронту>, <Недели укрепления партийных организаций>, <Недели утепления зданий>)104. The report of the Central Committee's Educational Distribution Department for the period between the X and XI Party Congresses indicates the 13 most important mobilizations and planned transfers of communists that took place during the year. Three of them were mobilizations<для работы с бандитизмом>in the Tambov, Tyumen and Saratov provinces, and one<для усиления Петербургской организации (в связи с обнаружившейся ее слабостью во время Кронштадтского мятежа)>105. You can also read about the mobilizations in the report of the Central Committee’s Department for Work Among Women for 1921106.
Many of the mobilizations listed above were carried out due to the fact that in a number of regions of the country in 1921 the Civil War, in fact, had not yet ended. In a number of places, due to a lack of personnel, until mid-1922 the method of shock campaigns was predominant107. For example, the Kustanai provincial committee reported:<Проводятся кампании по организации сельских и волостных комитетов взаимопомощи, неделя проверки помощи голодающим, по изъятию церковных ценностей, недели инвалида и достояния красноармейца и т.д.>108.
However, the situation, albeit gradually, was changing. Before the game I stood up more and more definitely<задача, отказавшись от лихорадочных массовых перебросок, в которых отдельные индивидуальные качества каждого коммуниста не учитываются, а эффект достигается количеством, появлением ударных групп коммунистов на опасных и слабых местах фронта военного, продовольственного и т.д., производить систематический подбор и изучение коммунистов для максимального и наиболее целесообразного их использования. Эта задача требовала налаженного учета>109.
But he wasn’t there. P.A. Zalutsky admitted in 1921 that before, upon admission to the party<никто не наблюдал за тем, кто идет в партию, какие социальные группы в некоторые моменты больше всего вступают в партию. Даже не было количественного подсчета, а также качественного учета тех людей, которые идут в партию>110. In the conditions of the Civil War there was simply no time for this. At that time, active participants in party building were, for example, the political departments of military units. In their work they were guided by instructions<Памятки коммунисту на фронте>, published by the All-Russian Bureau of Military Commissars:<Каждый коммунист на срронте, куда бы и на какую работу и должность он ни попал, обязан, прежде всего, создать партийную ячейку>111.
There were multiple attempts to keep records during the Civil War. But different bodies dealt with this in different ways, and it was not uncommon to have additions, replies and a formal attitude to the matter. The organizational and functional design of the departments of the Central Committee had not yet been completed. Thus, only in the summer of 1920, within the Secretariat of the Central Committee, an Agitation and Propaganda Department was created, designed to centralize the activities of numerous ideological institutions of various departments. Throughout the Civil War they managed without such a body112. The scope of activity of the two departments of the Central Committee was different, but the problem of its centralization turned out to be common.
The basis for determining the state of the party at the end of the Civil War turned out to be the most ordinary accounting of its members. It is no coincidence that in the report of the Central Committee's Educational Distribution Department for the period between the IX and X Party Congresses, the<переход от бессистемного и случайного распределения к распределению систематическому и плановому, основывающемуся на точных данных учета и статистики>113. It is also important that this task was not set by Stalin or anyone else, but by the situation itself. And it would have to be resolved in any case.
At the X All-Russian Party Conference held in May 1921, a survey of delegates was conducted. It showed that the secretariats of many party committees were in their infancy114. The conference adopted the Work Plan of the Central Committee. It recognized that the challenges facing the country<требуют сосредоточения главного внимания на целесообразном распределении партийных сил, что неразрывно и, в первую голову, связано с выдвиганием новых работников и перемещением таковых с менее ответственной на более ответственную работу>. The movements had to pursue, first of all, goals<повышения общей партийной и советской работы>. The task was set of drawing up a plan for the systematic promotion of new employees with monthly monitoring of its implementation. The task was separately noted<установления живой связи партийных центров с местами>and the question of establishing a system of periodic calls to the secretaries of the provincial committees. Finally, the following was admitted:<Задача правильного распределения партийных сил требует усиления учетного аппарата парткомов снизу до верху>115.
Such priorities were outlined by the top leadership of the RCP(b). As for local party organizations, some of them did not see the need to conduct any form of systematic accounting work at all. And such an attitude towards accounting, naturally, could not pass without leaving a trace. According to Zalutsky, a speaker at the XI party conference on the preliminary results of the party purge that took place in the second half of 1921,<ни один партийный комитет... не знал точно, сколько у него имеется членов партии>116. Perhaps Zalutsky was too categorical, but statements of this kind are not made without basis.
Thus, one of the main tasks that the Secretariat of the Central Committee had to solve after the Tenth Congress of the RCP(b) was the establishment of registration of party members. And in order to make progress in solving this problem, it was first of all necessary to establish a timely supply from the localities of all the information necessary for the Secretariat of the Central Committee, as well as to instill in local party functionaries the desire and ability to study the personnel composition of their own organization.
This was partly facilitated by the decision taken by the Central Committee of the RCP(b) on July 12, 1921 to conduct an all-Russian census of party members 117. In addition, based on the decisions of the Tenth Congress,<генеральная чистка>parties. The congress demanded<очищения партии от некоммунистических элементов путем точного учета каждого отдельного члена РКП по выполняемой им работе по должности, а также и как члена Российской Коммунистической партии>118. On July 27, an appeal from the Central Committee of the RCP(b) to all party organizations was published<Об очистке партии>, which spoke of the need to achieve<чтобы наша партия более, чем когда бы то ни было, была вылита из одного куска>.
Subject of special<забот>those members of the RCP(b) who had previously been members of other parties became members. As a result of the purge, 159,355 people were expelled from the party and voluntarily left, i.e. 24.1% of the total composition of the organization>119 (in the Urals, for example, 13,284 people, or 22.9% of the total composition of the organization120). It is also worth noting that those expelled from the party during the purge soon began to be taken into special registration by the provincial bodies of the GPU121.
During the census and purge, the Secretariat of the Central Committee was once again faced with the problem of obtaining the necessary information from local party workers. Moreover, this problem was common to all its departments122. In particular, the Secretariat of the Central Committee was clearly not satisfied with the local attitude towards the census of party members. This is evidenced by circular letter No. 250 dated February 23, 1922, signed by V. Mikhailov, sent to the provincial and district committees:<Отправляя Вам новые партбилеты, ЦК обращает Ваше внимание на дефекты, часто встречающиеся при проверке присланных Вами анкет <Всероссийская перепись>... for example: lack of a party card number, lack of information about the place of service, party and service experience, etc. which does not give firm confidence in the belonging of this or that rewritten comrade to the RCP>123.
The conclusion, to put it mildly, is not comforting, since we were talking about membership in the only legal party. Moreover, the Educational Distribution Department of the Central Committee considered the All-Russian census as the basis, the foundation of all subsequent accounting work124.
Faced with the lack of organization of the local accounting apparatus, the lack of personnel and the inability of many senior officials to carry out accounting work correctly, the Central Committee's Administration and Distribution Department was forced to gradually strengthen its control. For example, in 1921, the most important tasks in the activities of the accounting subdepartment were recognized as streamlining accounting and accounting for responsible party employees125.
But the solution to these problems has rarely gone smoothly. Thus, the district committees of the Vologda province<до июля 22 г. не могли усвоить, что учет ответработников является основной работой>126. And this was the rule rather than the exception. The prejudice of the provincial committees against accounting work was so persistent that it took a long time to overcome it. Much later, in one of the circular letters to the provincial committees, regional committees of the Central Committee bureau, V.M. Molotov and L.M. Kaganovich once again reproached them for<до сих пор еще продолжают смотреть на учетно-распределительную работу, как на анкетно-техническую, а не как на одну из важнейших организационно-политических задач партии>127. Let us add that from the standpoint of today there is no doubt about the validity of these words.
A.P. Balashov, who worked in the Secretariat of the Central Committee from 1922 to 1926, emphasized another aspect of the problem:<В... 1922 - 1923 годах ЦК вынужден был давать обширные и детальные инструкции на места, поскольку обращался к людям в большинстве своем малограмотным, зачастую толком и не понимавшим, о чем речь идет в этих постановлениях - и, следовательно, нуждавшихся в конкретных разъяснениях и указаниях>128. Perhaps Balashov was exaggerating somewhat. However, the focus on the monopoly of power in the country and the lack of trained functionaries, objectively within the framework of the chosen political course, led to the growth of circular creativity. From this point of view, Stalin would subsequently ride on the already visible trend, introducing his personal political interest into it.
In the meantime, from the report of the Central Committee's Educational Distribution Department for September 1921, we learn that the problem is with the processing of accounting material for the census of responsible employees<идет медленнее, чем хотелось бы. Объясняется это тем, что многие Губкомы по сей день не прислали частично или даже полностью материалы по переписи или прислали его в таком виде, который затрудняет его обработку>129. The Organizational Instruction Department, having conducted a survey of party organizations in 39 provinces in September-October, noted similar problems:<громадное большинство>committees have not yet completed their organizational registration130.
The reasons for this state of affairs were partly revealed at a meeting of the heads of accounting and statistical departments of the provincial committees, held by the Uchraspred of the Central Committee on December 16 - 18, 1921. It was attended by the heads of statistics of Voronezh, Ivanovo-Voznesensk, Gomel, Nizhny Novgorod, Moscow, Novgorod, Kursk, Petrograd, Orel , Tver, Bryansk, as well as representatives of the Tambov Provincial Committee and the Dalburo of the Central Committee. The representative of Tula did not appear at the meeting at all131.
The first item on the meeting agenda was reports from the field. Orel representative S.T. Lukashin said:<Аппарат слаб. Работа ведется неудовлетворительно. Учет ответственных работников стоит неподвижно>. K.N. Pavlov from Novgorod spoke in the same spirit:<Аппарат развален. Нет и не было работы. Распределение работников производит Бюро Губкома или Орготдел без связи с учетстатом. Учет ответственных работников не производился до последнего времени>132.
Let us note that this situation with registration was not somewhere in Siberia or Central Asia, but in Orel and Novgorod. Moreover, 1921 was already ending, and the next party congress was just around the corner. The situation urgently needed to be broken. Looking ahead, we will say that it was still not possible to do this fully. Although this did not prevent Molotov from boasting in his report at the XI Congress that if between the IX and X Congresses 35 thousand local written materials were received, then during the period between the X and XI Congresses up to 120 thousand documents were received133. But such statements were unlikely to greatly inspire anyone at the congress. It was absolutely clear to many party functionaries present at the congress that the connection between the Central Committee and local party organizations had not yet been established, and as recently as January 25, 1922, signed by Molotov and the head of distribution S.I. Syrtsov, circular No. 2780 was sent to the provincial and regional committees, demanding immediate sending of lists of responsible provincial-level officials indicating their positions. Lists of county-level responders had to be sent no later than February 7134.
Thus, the Secretariat of the Central Committee still had enough problems with obtaining information. And in this regard, we can agree with I.N. Stukov, who assessed Molotov’s report as<пропитанный насквозь, от начала до конца, бесшабашным канцелярским благодушием и оптимизмом>135.
G.L.Olekh in his detailed work emphasized that the amount of unclaimed data tended to increase. According to his calculations, in November 1921, provincial protocols were used by only 46%, district protocols by 21%; in January 1922 this figure dropped to 28 and 17 percent, respectively. In this regard, it was decided to take from the materials sent by the committees only facts on two categories of issues: 1) new forms, methods and content of work; 2) abnormalities and deviations in the life of county organizations. Trying to extinguish the wave of reports caused by its own directives, the Central Committee subsequently twice (by circulars dated December 12, 1923 and September 23, 1924) reduced the reporting frequency of party committees - in the first case to 2, in the second - to 3. x months136. The following figures give an idea of the scale of paper creation at the level of provincial committees:
from December 1921 to February 1922, the correspondence of the Altai Provincial Committee amounted to 1125 copies. (536 issues per month), and Novonikolaevsky - 1159 (580 issues per month). From August 15 to November 20, 1921, the Siberian Party Center issued 160 circulars (of which 28 were secret), i.e. on average 44 circulars per month137.
In fairness, it must be admitted that since the end of 1921, Molotov and the Secretariat of the Central Committee took vigorous measures to improve the situation with regard to accounting. First of all, the Directorate of Distribution of the Central Committee began to consistently strive to remove the functions of personnel distribution from the registration departments of the provincial committees and regional committees138. Secondly, the circular sent to the provincial and regional committees on March 21, 1922, signed by Syrtsov, read:<Губучетстат не должен заниматься, как это практикуется сплошь да рядом почти во всех Губкомах учетом всех членов Партии поголовно и в результате не достигается никакого учета. Необходимо на первое время ограничиться учетом139.
That is, exclusively responsible employees>
The Department of Distribution of the Central Committee oriented the gubernia statistics department to concentrate efforts on the main area of their work at that time. Thirdly, a course was taken towards a unified accounting system for the entire batch140. And finally, a study of the responding workers began, about which Syrtsov gave the following instructions at a meeting of the head of statistics:<первое - определение степени пригодности ответственного работника к должностям, которые он занимал; второе - определение специальности работника... и третье, необходимо так прикрепить ответственного работника, чтобы он дал на этой работе максимум производительности>141.
Note that the last setting was especially significant for understanding the general approach. Another important area of activity of the Central Committee's Educational Distribution Department during the period between the X and XI Party Congresses remained work on the distribution of personnel. In May 1921 alone, 2,278 people entered the department and were assigned142. In total, from March 1921 to February 1922, through the Uchraspred department of the Central Committee, 22,550,143 appointments and business trips were received.
But this work also had many problems. Circular letter No. 239 dated January 17, 1922 stated the following phenomenon:
<В настоящее время число рядовых работников, прибывающих в распоряжение Учраспреда ЦК и количество запросов о перемещении рядовых работников настолько увеличилось, что стало явно затруднять какую бы то ни было планомерную работу Учраспреда и заставило ЦК пересмотреть установленный порядок перемещений и переводов>1 .
Let us note that this problem arose largely objectively and would have had to be solved in any case. The scale of this phenomenon is evidenced, for example, by data on the activities of the Central Committee's Uchraspred for February 1922: in just one month, 1,096 people arrived at the department's disposal, of which 8 were regional workers, 129 provincial, 184 district, and there were 727 ordinary communists. At the same time, there was no data on 48 people at all, but there is little doubt that the overwhelming majority of them consisted of ordinary party members. Let us add that 171 people arrived at the Central Committee at their personal request, and 466 - without indicating the reasons for their arrival at all145.
All this forced the Secretariat of the Central Committee to resume what had begun in December 1920 and ultimately turned out to be a protracted struggle against the arbitrary displacement of ordinary communists. Without solving this problem, it was difficult to achieve a high degree of controllability of the party. Circular Letter No. 239 introduced the following procedure. First of all, the movement of ordinary workers from province to province was now to be carried out by the provincial committees without the sanction of the Central Committee through an agreement between them. This measure was aimed at relieving the Central Committee's Department of Distribution from the routine work of distributing ordinary party members. Direct secondment to the Central Committee without a call or prior consent of the Central Committee was allowed in exceptional cases under the responsibility of the secretary of the provincial committee and with an indication of the motives. And, finally, those who came to the Central Committee in violation of the procedure established by the circular should be returned without consideration of their applications and at the expense of the organizations that sent them incorrectly146.
<Инструкцией по регистрации приезжих и уезжающих>a procedure was established according to which no candidate or party member had the right to either be on the territory of the province or leave it without registering with the party committee. To register, it was necessary to present a party card (or candidate card), a document justifying the arrival and permission from the relevant party committee to arrive147. The same organizational and political line continued<Инструкция по технике, учету и отчету по распределению партработников>, the subject of regulation of which is indicated in its very name. And the very first paragraph of this document read:<Ни один член или кандидат Партии не может получить назначения без представления его личного дела Президиуму Губкома (Заворгинотделу) (в Укоме в Бюро Укома)>148.
All these provisions, however, in many respects still had to be put into practice. We also note that the last two instructions were included in the Collection of circulars, regulations and instructions on the registration and distribution of members of the RCP, issued at the beginning of 1922. This Collection was a major event in the internal party life and became a kind of report on the work done in the period between the X and XI party congresses work on the development of internal party legislation in this area. The Collection, in addition to the instructions indicated above, includes<Положение о специальном учете ответственных работников>, <Инструкция по постановке на учет в Губкомах, Укомах, Райкомах и в ячейках РКП>, <Инструкция по учету ответственных работников>, <Инструкция по учету штрафных, выбывших и исключенных>, <Положение о едином партийном билете>, <Инструкция о едином партийном билете>and some other documents, the analysis of which allows us to get some idea of how far the process of regulation of internal party life had gone by 1922. Let us dwell on the consideration of some of the listed documents.
<Инструкция по постановке учета в Губкомах, Укомах, Райкомах и в ячейках РКП>established the procedure by which all registration of members and candidates of the RCP, their movement, movement and work took place in the cell. The records in the cells themselves had to be kept according to lists, the responsibility for the correct maintenance of which and the timely provision of information to higher party bodies rested with the cell secretary149.
In the ukomas and district committees, records had to be kept on personal files, which consisted of a questionnaire, a registration card and all materials relating to a given communist. Removal of materials and personal files from the archive was allowed only in emergency cases and subject to mandatory replacement with a receipt establishing when, by whom and for what purpose the material was taken from the cell’s archive. The provincial committees did not keep records of all party members. But the provincial committees had to keep records of provincial and district-level responders, records of those who left and were expelled from the party, records of those who left and arrived in the organization, records of mobilizations and records of issued party cards150.
The regulation of the last issue was aimed<Положение о едином партийном билете>. It declared the party card to be the only indisputable proof of the status of a member of the RCP (b), and the ticket number was retained by the party member for the entire duration of his status in the RCP (b). If the ticket was lost, a duplicate was issued with the same number. District and county party committees had the right to issue party cards. But at the same time, party card forms for all party organizations were prepared exclusively by the Central Committee of the RCP, and all tickets were<на строгом учете Секретариата ЦК, осуществляемом через местные парткомы>151. These measures were aimed at strengthening control over the issuance of party cards.
An important document was<Инструкция по учету ответственных работников>, which established the procedure according to which, when party workers were nominated for a responsible position, under their dictation, they had to fill out personal sheets, which were then entered into the archive of the responsible workers in the corresponding group. At the same time, a corresponding note was made on the questionnaire and the alphabet card. Further, each movement of a provincial-scale employee was to be immediately reported to the Central Committee by the provincial committee. On changes in the composition of county-level workers, the provincial committee was obliged to send a statement of changes to the Central Committee once a month. The regional committees were supposed to report to the provincial committee about the movements of responders<не позже следующего после перемещения дня>152. Thus, a hierarchical pyramid was built on paper with the strict subordination of inferiors to superiors. This scheme, however
1.1. Crisis of the end of 1920-1921. and his lessons
The beginning of the 20s of the 20th century in Russia was marked by a deep crisis. Devastation swept the entire national economy of the country: factories and factories did not work, transport was destroyed, there was not enough fuel. At the beginning of 1921, the volume of industrial production was only 12% of the pre-war level, and the output of iron and cast iron was 2.5%. The sale of agricultural products decreased by 92%, the state treasury was replenished by 80% through surplus appropriation. About 2 million Russians emigrated, most of them city dwellers.
Labor productivity in some industries has dropped by 80%. Most of the mines and mines were destroyed and flooded. Plants and factories mostly stood still. The crisis also gripped the village. In 1920, grain production was less than 64% of pre-war levels. In 1921, 34 provinces of the country were gripped by drought. The situation was especially difficult in the Volga region. In the spring and summer, a terrible famine broke out in the Volga region; after the confiscation, there was no grain left. Since 1919, entire regions came under the control of rebel peasants. "Internal political crisis." This is how Lenin publicly and sharply defined the situation in the country that arose in February 1921. Although its reasons lay on the surface, it was unexpected for the Soviet government, because appeared against the backdrop of victories in the civil war.
The peasantry demanded full right to dispose of the land and the products of their labor. The expression of this feeling of the owner was the struggle against the “military-communist” policy of all kinds of “requisitions” from above. Lenin subsequently noted that a complete ban on trade during the civil war was harmful. Therefore, the slogan “free trade” became widespread among the peasantry.
The alliance between the working class and the peasantry has weakened. Due to hunger and fatigue, dissatisfaction also manifested itself among workers, whose standard of living decreased by approximately 3 times. The working class has decreased in number. Many workers went to the countryside to feed themselves, becoming artisans. An extremely dangerous process of dispersal and declassification of the working class was underway, and the social base of Soviet power was narrowing.
It came to strikes in the cities and riots in the countryside. Peasant uprisings engulfed part of Siberia, Ukraine, the Tambov province and a number of other areas. A wave of mass strikes and demonstrations by workers was growing in the cities. The demands of the peasantry were fair and indicated the only way to save the Soviet state from economic collapse. The contradictory nature of the situation was that the retreating counter-revolution, which took into account the lessons of its defeat, tried to take advantage of it. At their core, these were spontaneous outbursts of popular indignation against the policies of the Soviet government. But in each of them there was also an element of organization to a greater or lesser extent. It was contributed by a wide range of political forces: from monarchists to socialists. A new civil war was brewing.
An urgent revision of the methods of governing society that developed during the war years became necessary. Lenin thinks about this intensely. A year later, in his work notebook, he succinctly expressed the gigantic work of thought he had done in two phrases: “1921: an economic approach to the peasantry. Searches for economic policy".
By the spring of 1921 the party and the country were on the eve of fundamental decisions of long-term significance. Profound changes were required in all spheres of public life, domestic and foreign policy. The political crisis has shown the unacceptability of half-measures and cosmetic repairs to the command-administrative system of managing society. A rethinking of the fundamentals of economic policy began, accompanied by the emancipation of the country's economic life from total state regulation.
1.2. The need to change economic policy
The policy of “war communism,” the most important elements of which were surplus appropriation and direct exchange of products between city and countryside, played the greatest role in winning victory during the Civil War. But it became a brake on the development of productive forces. The appropriation system, which deprived the peasant of the right to have surpluses, did not create an economic incentive for the peasant to expand production. On the contrary, the peasant reduced the production of bread and other agricultural products.
“Requisitioning in the countryside,” said V.I. Lenin, “this direct communist approach to the tasks of construction in the city, interfered with the rise of the productive forces and turned out to be the main cause of the deep economic and political crisis that we stumbled upon in the spring of 1921.”
In these conditions, industry could not develop, since workers, not receiving enough bread, were forced to leave factories and factories. The development of industry and agriculture was hampered by the lack of economic links between city and countryside. Under “war communism,” trade in essential products was prohibited, and an attempt was made to block any turnover that was inevitable with the existence of millions of small commodity producers. This had an extremely negative impact on the development of middle peasant farms, which became predominant in the countryside during the Civil War.
With the transition to peaceful economic construction, it was necessary to create an economic link between city and countryside, between industry and agriculture through trade. To ensure the fastest restoration of agriculture, it was necessary to create among the peasants a personal material interest in increasing the productivity of their farms, give the peasants the right to have surpluses and allow them to freely sell them in order to buy industrial goods. Consequently, it was necessary to replace surplus appropriation with a tax in kind.
In order to restore factories, factories, and transport in the conditions of the economic devastation that the country was experiencing, it was necessary, first of all, to supply the working class with bread, provide enterprises, transport with fuel and raw materials, and also create a sales market for industrial products. Without the concentration of large food reserves in the hands of the state, there can be no talk of any reconstruction of large-scale industry, wrote V. I. Lenin.
Demands to abolish the surplus appropriation system were increasingly heard from peasants and workers.
On February 4, Lenin spoke in favor of revising relations with the peasantry. “We must direct all efforts,” Lenin said, “to improve relations between workers and peasants.” Thus, with the end of the civil war and the transition to peaceful socialist construction, it was necessary to abolish the policy of “war communism” and create a strong alliance between the working class and the peasantry on a new economic basis.
A new economic policy was needed.
Lenin developed the New Economic Policy (NEP), a policy of complete economic and political reorganization of the development of society in the conditions of a mixed economic life.
The transition from the administrative system to self-financing is the main thing, Lenin believed. He wrote that we are introducing the NEP seriously and for a long time. At the same time, Lenin, Trotsky, Kamenev and Zinoviev, Stalin and Bukharin saw in the NEP the danger of a petty-bourgeois counter-revolutionary coup, the restoration of capitalism.
The confrontation and struggle of ideologies in 1918-1922 affected all segments of the population in post-revolutionary Russia. The main hostilities were between the Bolsheviks and the white movement. This struggle was joined by a third force, the so-called “greens”, of an anarchist persuasion, represented mainly by the peasantry, dissatisfied with the arbitrariness of the authorities, extortions, forced mobilization and opposed both the Bolsheviks and the whites. This civil war, unprecedented in its cruelty and scale, brought to power the Bolshevik government, which turned out to be the most consistent and coordinated in achieving its goals by force. The main military operations ended in 1920, after the defeat and flight of Baron Wrangel’s army from Crimea, but individual uprisings and uprisings against the Bolsheviks continued until 1922.
The consequences of the civil war had contradictory and ambiguous consequences for the further development of Soviet Russia. All industrial and production capacities of the European part of the Russian Empire were in a critical situation; mechanical engineering, metallurgy and the military-industrial complex were especially affected. Most of the production potential of factories and light industry plants, previously owned by private individuals, were destroyed and rendered unusable. During the hostilities, the integrity of the infrastructure was damaged; 15,000 versts of railways were not destroyed, out of 75,000 versts in 1914. Ties with the Ukrainian Donbass, Siberia and the Caucasus were temporarily disrupted. The industry experienced a huge shortage of energy resources such as oil and coal. All over again, almost from scratch, we had to re-establish ties with foreign companies. The implementation of the policy of war communism led to confrontation between the trade union movement and the Bolshevik government. This often led to sabotage and sabotage by workers. Most of the engineering staff and skilled workers were destroyed or emigrated. Production indicators fell by 5-8 times, and in some areas up to 30 times, at the beginning of 1922, compared to the pre-war indicators of 1913.
The banking system was destroyed, which contributed to the outflow of wealth from the country, despite the nationalization of the banking sector. This caused the fall of the national currency and the transition to a system of commodity exchange. Foreign interventionists, in exchange for supplying weapons and equipment to the rebel armies, actively exported gold reserves, raw materials and agricultural products to territories not controlled by the Bolsheviks.
The agrarian question, which was not resolved under tsarism, reached the climax of its crisis under the Bolsheviks. Surplus appropriation - the confiscation of surplus peasant products, the confrontation in the countryside between the committees of the poor and the main producers - the middle peasants and kulaks, led to peasant riots, which were brutally suppressed. The confrontation between the peasantry and the authorities in the Tambov province in 1921 became especially brutal, to suppress which military units were sent, led by the future Marshal of the USSR, M. N. Tukhachevsky. This policy led to a decrease in crops and a reduction in livestock farming. The general discontent of the peasants forced the authorities to make a temporary concession and replace the surplus appropriation system with a tax in kind. Tax in kind is the necessary minimum of bread for the army and workers. The peasants were allowed to sell the rest in exchange for industrial goods. The tax in kind stimulated the expansion of peasant farming and became the first step towards the NEP.
The cultural and scientific spheres of life suffered particular damage. The best representatives of the intelligentsia emigrated from the country: doctors, engineers, academics, and the creative elite. The destruction and flight of the working intelligentsia led to an acute shortage of educated specialists in the economy and industry. There was a catastrophic shortage of experienced managers, who were replaced by people without education, but with the necessary class background. The extermination of the clergy as a class, the destruction of cultural monuments and the creative heritage of the past led to a decline in morals and the cultural level of the population.
Demographic losses for the period from 1918-1922, according to rough estimates, ranged from 15 to 20 million. These are losses on the fronts of the civil war, those who died from epidemics and famine, and those who emigrated abroad. No state has suffered losses comparable to these. A shortage of workers in industry and agriculture, along with destroyed infrastructure, threw Russia back into the 19th century.
The conclusion of the Brest-Litovsk Peace Treaty with Germany led to the loss of vast territories. Later, the Bolsheviks would be able to return Ukraine and the Caucasus to their rule, but the loss of Poland, the Baltic states, Finland, and part of Belarus turned out to be irrevocable. The loss of these territories with a multi-million population and important industrial facilities aggravated the economic and political situation of Soviet Russia.
Probably the only positive consequence of the civil war is the consolidation of a single and firm power in the territories inherited from the Russian Empire. Despite the enormous losses that Russia suffered, it was possible to create the foundations of a new, Soviet society, with Soviet people united by a common goal - building socialism. Thanks to a systemic, albeit cruel, policy, Russia managed to avoid disintegration into separate parts, as the Western powers expected, in order to make Russia a raw material appendage of their economy. This provided the prerequisites for the restoration and growth of industrial potential and the unification of society, which allowed the Soviet Union to survive the Second World War.
Description: A significant factor in the revolutionary upsurge of 1918 - 1923. there was a socialist revolution in Russia. Bourgeois-democratic revolutions took place in Germany and Austria-Hungary. In Germany, the revolution had socialist tendencies: Soviet power was proclaimed in a number of cities. In April 1919, the Soviet Republic arose in Bavaria. For more than 4 months of 1919, the Soviet Republic existed in Hungary. In the summer of 1919, a Soviet republic was proclaimed in Slovakia. In other capitalist countries there were also clashes between workers and governments, as a reaction of workers to the deterioration of the economic situation as a result of an unpopular heavy war. The abstract contains 1 file:
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1) Characteristics of the economic situation in Russia after the end of the civil war.
In the autumn of 1918, the First World War ended. Period from 1918 to 1923 characterized in world history by the post-war revolutionary upsurge. Behind him in 1923 - 1929. A temporary partial stabilization of capitalism followed, giving way to a crisis and deepening inter-imperialist contradictions (1929 - 1939), which led to the Second World War.
The First World War did not only lead to the growth of the revolutionary movement. The German, Austro-Hungarian, and Ottoman empires collapsed, and new states emerged. The situation in the world has changed significantly.
A significant factor in the revolutionary upsurge of 1918 - 1923. there was a socialist revolution in Russia. Bourgeois-democratic revolutions took place in Germany and Austria-Hungary. In Germany, the revolution had socialist tendencies: Soviet power was proclaimed in a number of cities. In April 1919, the Soviet Republic arose in Bavaria. For more than 4 months of 1919, the Soviet Republic existed in Hungary. In the summer of 1919, a Soviet republic was proclaimed in Slovakia. In other capitalist countries there were also clashes between workers and governments, as a reaction of workers to the deterioration of the economic situation as a result of an unpopular heavy war. By 1923, the working class had been defeated in social battles. Capitalism has retained its power and might.
The socialist revolution in Russia influenced not only the growth of revolutionary sentiments in Western countries. Under the influence of the October Revolution and under the direct leadership of the Bolshevik Party, communist and workers' parties were created from left groups in the parties of the Second International. The formation of communist parties was also facilitated by the revolutionary upsurge of 1918 - 1923.
In 1919, the young communist parties united into the Third International (dissolved in 1943 due to the World War).
Standing on the position of the world socialist revolution, the Bolshevik government considered it necessary to create a single organization to lead the world labor movement. Moscow's position as a world revolutionary center during this period was extremely strong.
How did the situation in the world after the First World War affect the prospects for the development of Soviet Russia? First of all, it should be said that at the end of 1920, the civil war ended in the main territory of the country (military operations continued only in remote areas in the Far East and Central Asia) and the country was faced with the task of transitioning to peaceful economic construction.
The difficult internal economic and political situation of Western countries, the growth of national liberation struggles in India, China, Turkey, Afghanistan and other countries, interest in obtaining raw materials from Russia and in using the Russian market to sell goods dictated to Western countries the need for peaceful coexistence with the Soviet state.
In turn, the Soviet government was interested in receiving Western loans, machinery and equipment, and in using European and American specialists to boost the economy.
Pursuing an active foreign policy, by the end of 1920 the Soviet Republic had concluded peace treaties with a number of countries, primarily with the Baltic republics. In March 1921, a trade agreement was concluded with England, in May with Germany, then with Italy, Norway, etc. At the same time, Western states, and, above all, the United States, continued the policy of economic blockade of Soviet Russia, supported counter-revolutionary emigrant forces and anti-Soviet armed formations located near the borders of Russia carried out political and military provocations.
Foreign policy relations with the countries of the East developed most successfully. Our country has eliminated the unequal enslaving treaties concluded by tsarism; for the first time in history, showing goodwill and friendly feelings, it concluded new equal treaties with Iran, Turkey, Afghanistan, etc. This policy of the Soviet state had a positive impact on all of Asia.
Thus, Russia's foreign policy position in international affairs was strengthened, but remained complex. The refusal of Western countries to provide loans, the hatred towards each other that had accumulated during the years of civil war and intervention, forced the Soviet state to rely on internal resources. The main task now was to restore the destroyed economy, to lay an economic foundation under Soviet power.
At the end of 1920, the Soviet people victoriously completed the war against foreign interventionists and internal counter-revolution. Our country has the opportunity to return to peaceful creative work. The historical transition from solving military problems to peaceful economic construction at the end of 1920 - beginning of 1921 took place under extremely complex and difficult conditions.
The First World Imperialist and Civil Wars brought the country's national economy to ruin. Industry, agriculture, and transport were in extremely difficult condition at the beginning of the recovery period.
The economy of our country continued to remain multi-structured. It intertwined elements of five socio-economic structures: patriarchal, small-scale, private capitalism, state capitalism, socialism.
All these socio-economic structures did not exist in isolation, but in close interconnection; there was an acute, fierce struggle between them.
The internal situation of the young republic was extremely difficult. Severe devastation, the result of 7 years of continuous wars, set the country's economy back several decades. Here are a few figures that give an idea of the internal situation of the country: the total volume of industrial production fell 7 times. Pig iron smelting was 2 times less than in 1862. Due to the lack of fuel, most enterprises were inactive. Cotton fabrics were produced 20 times less than in 1913. Devastation also reigned in agriculture. Grain production was halved. The number of livestock has decreased significantly. The country lacked bread, potatoes, meat, butter, sugar, and other necessary food products. The irreparable human losses were enormous: since 1914, 19 million people have died.
The long war and devastation affected the social composition of the country: the size of the working class decreased by 2 times (in Petrograd - by 4.3 times).
The active part of the workers performed management work and held positions in Soviet government bodies; up to 30% of the workers went to the villages to escape hunger. The process of declassification threatened the social base of Soviet power.
Since the end of 1920, the position of the ruling Bolshevik Party in Russia began to rapidly deteriorate. The multimillion-dollar Russian peasantry, having defended their land in battles with the White Guards and interventionists, more and more persistently expressed their reluctance to put up with the economic policy of the Bolsheviks, which stifled any economic initiative.
The latter persisted because they did not see anything wrong in their actions. This is understandable: after all, they regarded “war communism” not simply as a sum of emergency measures forced by the war, but also as a breakthrough in the right direction - towards the creation of a non-commodity, truly socialist economy. True, the Bolsheviks advanced towards a new economy along the path of radically breaking the previous market structures much further and faster than originally planned, and explained this by the fact that the bourgeoisie resisted militarily, and it was necessary to immediately deprive it of economic power in order to protect the revolution. In the new, peaceful conditions, the peasants had to be patient, regularly supply grain to the city according to surplus appropriation, and the authorities would “distribute it to plants and factories”, promptly restore on this basis the industry almost completely destroyed during the years of hard times, return the debt to the peasantry, and then - then, according to Lenin, “we will have communist production and distribution.”