Delay is like death

Delay is like death
A common speech pattern that was widely used in Russian journalism at the beginning of the 20th century. For example, from V.I. Lenin: “Delay in the uprising is like death” (“Letter to the Bolshevik comrades participating in the regional congress of Soviets of the Northern region” dated October 8, 1917), “Delay in the uprising is like death”, “Delay in the uprising of death similar” (“Letter to members of the Central Committee” dated October 24, 1917). Also from the Chairman of the State Duma M.V. Rodzianko: “Any delay is like death” (telegram to Emperor Nicholas II dated February 26, 1917).
Even earlier, this expression is found in the Russian Emperor Peter I. In preparation for the Prut campaign against the Turks, he sent a letter (April 8, 1711) to the newly established Senate. Thanking the senators for their efforts to equip the troops, Peter demanded to continue to act without red tape, “before missing the time of death is like irrevocable death” (S. M. Soloviev, History of Russia since ancient times. T. 16. M., 1962).
The primary source is the phrase periculum in mora (from Latin: delay is dangerous) from the “History” of the Roman historian Titus Livy, which in Russia was often used without translation.
It is believed that this expression was first heard in ancient times, as a “historical phrase” by the Persian king Darius I (522-486 BC). But he said it before he became the ruler of Persia.
When the first Persian king Cyrus (who conquered the fabulously rich king of Lydia Croesus) died, his eldest son Cambyses ascended the throne, becoming a cruel, reckless ruler (530-522 BC). Fearing that his angry subjects would overthrow him and place his younger brother on the throne, the king ordered his secret death. And he simply “disappeared,” which was announced to the country.
When Cambyses went on a campaign against Egypt, the Median magician Gaumata, who ruled the royal court, took advantage of the situation. He announced that the “missing” prince had returned, and he himself began to rule the country on his behalf, without leaving the royal chambers. When Cambyses found out about this, he decided to urgently return to Susa, the capital of Persia, but on the way he died of blood poisoning. So Gaumata became the sole, sovereign ruler of Persia.
Nevertheless, the noble Persian Otan, whose daughter was the wife of the murdered prince, learned the truth. Despite the fact that the “returned” prince met his wife only at night, in complete darkness, she noticed that his ears were cut off - just like Gaumata, whom Cambyses once punished in this way for some offense. Otan immediately gathered the seven most noble, respected Persians and revealed to them a secret - the country was ruled not by a prince, but by an impostor, the magician Gaumata.
It was decided to find a way to overthrow this impostor. But Darius suggested doing this immediately, since one of those gathered might report the conspiracy and then everyone else would die. “Delay is like death!” - he said and demanded that none of those initiated into the secret leave the room until the evening. And in the evening everyone must go to the palace and kill Gaumata. This was done, and the impostor magician died from the sword of Darius himself, who became the new ruler of the Persian state.

Encyclopedic Dictionary of winged words and expressions. - M.: “Locked-Press”. Vadim Serov. 2003.

Delay is like death

In 1711, before the Prut campaign, Peter I sent a letter to the newly established Senate. Thanks to the senators for their activities, he demanded that they continue not to delay the necessary orders, “before the loss of time is like death is irrevocable” (I.I. Golikov. Acts of Peter the Great... collected from reliable sources..., part III., 1788, pp. 340-341). CM. Soloviev in “History of Russia since ancient times” (vol. 16. – M., 1962, p. 445), quoting Peter’s letter dated April 8, 1711 in the original, quotes his words in the editor’s office: “Before missing the time of irrevocable death is like ". Peter’s words received winging in a more concise form: “Delay is like death.”

Dictionary of catch words. Plutex. 2004.

See what “Delay is like death” in other dictionaries:

Delay is like death- wing. sl. In 1711, before the Prut campaign, Peter I sent a letter to the newly established Senate. Thanks to the senators for their activities, he demanded that they continue to not delay the necessary orders, “before missing time is like death... ... Universal additional practical explanatory dictionary by I. Mostitsky

delay is like death- You can’t hesitate, it’s unacceptable. These are the words of Peter I in a letter to the Senate in 1711 before the Prut campaign. Peter thanked the senators for their work and asked them not to postpone important decisions in the future, “lest the time of irrevocable death pass... ... Phraseology Guide

DELAY, delay, cf. (book). Action under Ch. delay; delay, delay. “Delay in speaking is like death.” Lenin. Proceed with the implementation of the plan without further delay. Ushakov's explanatory dictionary. D.N. Ushakov. 1935… … Ushakov's Explanatory Dictionary

The abdication of Emperor Nicholas II from the throne is the abdication of the throne of the Russian Empire by the last Russian Emperor Nicholas II, which occurred on March 2 (15), 1917 and became one of the key events of the February Revolution... ... Wikipedia

Noun, g., used. max. often Morphology: (no) what? death, what? death, (see) what? death, what? death, about what? about death; pl. about death, (no) what? deaths, what? deaths, (see) what? death, what? deaths, about what? about deaths 1. Death... ... Dmitriev's Explanatory Dictionary

Uzbek Qo qon xonligi ← ... Wikipedia

PETER I- Russian Tsar* since 1682, first Russian Emperor (since 1721). The youngest son of Tsar Alexei Mikhailovich, Peter was elevated to the royal throne in 1682 in violation of the rights of his older brother Ivan. As a result, an uprising broke out in Moscow*, the main... Linguistic and regional dictionary

- (1711 1765) scientist of world significance, poet, artist, historian Dare to glorify your fatherland with courage! Only in a cheerful, hot outburst, in passionate love for one’s native country, courage and energy, will victory be born. And not only and...

- (1672 1725) the first Russian emperor, an outstanding political and military figure. Those who themselves do not know can be greatly instructed. I heal my body with waters, and my subjects with examples. In both cases, I see slow healing. Everyone... ... Consolidated encyclopedia of aphorisms

Alexey Alekseevich Manikovsky (March 13 (March 25) 1865 January 1920, Turkestan) artillery general (1916). Temporary manager of the War Ministry of the Provisional Government (1917). Head of the Artillery Department and... ... Wikipedia

Page 19 of 21

"DELAYING DEATH IS LIKE"

What did Vladimir Ilyich know about everything that was happening?

In the morning, as usual, Margarita Vasilievna brought newspapers and went to work. Newspapers wrote that Kerensky's “plan” to prevent unrest was being carried out. That trains with troops from the front are about to arrive. That the overly “soft” Minister of War Verkhovsky was dismissed. The sensation of the day was the information that the rebellious Military Revolutionary Committee was finally forced to enter into negotiations with the district headquarters. The message that the Socialist Revolutionary delegates coming to the congress were not divided into left and right, but were grouped into one faction was alarming... There was a lot to think about, and Vladimir Ilyich was extremely tense and focused all day.

At about 4 o'clock, while at Devrien's publishing house on Vasilyevskaya Side, Fofanova learned that they had begun to build bridges across the Neva. She ran to the Nikolaevsky Bridge. He really was divorced. On the next one - Sampsonievsky - the Red Guards did not let anyone through. The Palace Bridge was controlled by cadets. Margarita Vasilievna ran across the Grenadier Bridge to the Vyborg side and went to the district committee to see Krupskaya. “The committee,” she writes, “only managed to obtain very vague information, which I told Vladimir Ilyich about.” But no matter how scanty this information may be, Lenin certainly received the latest issue of Rabochiy Put, with a description of the cadets’ raid on the printing house and the appeal of the Military Revolutionary Committee.

The appeal of the Military Revolutionary Committee to the population stated that “the counter-revolution has raised its criminal head.” That “the Kornilovites are mobilizing forces to crush the All-Russian Congress of Soviets.” That “pogromists may try to cause chaos and massacre on the streets of Petrograd.” But the Petrograd Soviet “will not allow any violence or outrages.” And citizens must maintain “complete calm and self-control.” But only. And in a special message, the Military Revolutionary Committee resolutely denied rumors that he was allegedly preparing a “seizure of power” 2 .

Of course, the need to disguise the speech largely determined the style and content of these documents. But even with the most incomplete information, Lenin became increasingly convinced that the necessary “defensive” phraseology was in fact turning into defensive tactics in anticipation of the Congress of Soviets. And Stalin’s article “What do we need?” in "The Work Path" confirmed these fears.

“...In the government,” wrote Stalin, “there are enemies of the people... The current self-appointed government, not elected by the people and not responsible to the people, needs to be replaced by a government recognized by the people, elected by representatives of workers, soldiers and peasants...

If you want this, gather all your forces, stand up as one man, organize meetings, elect delegations and through them present your demands to the Congress of Soviets, which opens tomorrow in Smolny. ...No one will dare to resist the will of the people. The old government will give way to the new one, the more peacefully the stronger, more organized and powerful you are.” 3

If Lenin read this article at about 5-6 o’clock in the afternoon, then it was at this time at a meeting of the Petrosoviet that Trotsky said: “... The conflict of an uprising today or tomorrow is not included in our plans at the threshold of the All-Russian Congress of Soviets... We believe that the congress The Soviets will carry out this slogan with greater force and authority. But if the government wants to use the period that it has left to live - 24, 48 or 72 hours - and opposes us, then we will respond with a counter-offensive, blow for blow, steel for iron.” This text, published by Novaya Zhizn, omits a phrase that is in the information of The Day: “Whether this will require an armed uprising depends on the political situation, on those who will oppose the will of the All-Russian Congress” 4 . Fofanova writes that Lenin “went to his room and after a while came out to me with a letter in his hands... and asked me to convey it only through Nadezhda Konstantinovna, saying that he believed that it could not be postponed any longer. It is necessary to go to an armed uprising, and today he must be in Smolny” 5.

This Lenin letter in his complete works is entitled “Letter to the Members of the Central Committee.” In the first edition it was published as “Letter to the leading circles of the party” and, as S.I. Shulga and E.N. Gorodetsky rightly noted, this version of the title is much closer to the truth, although it needs to be supplemented. Its essence is that Lenin did not appeal to members of the Central Committee, but to the PCs, district committees, party cells in the regiments in order to provide pressure on both the Central Committee and the Military Revolutionary Committee from below. For, as Vladimir Ilyich writes, “the people have the right and obligation at critical moments of the revolution to send their representatives, even their best representatives, and not wait for them” 6 .

A comparison of the text of Lenin's letter with Stalin's article in Rabochy Put suggests that Vladimir Ilyich's letter - to a certain extent - was a reaction to the article "What do we need?" If Stalin suggested: “Gather all your forces... organize meetings, choose delegations and present your demands through them to the Congress of Soviets,” then Lenin insists that it is impossible to wait for the congress. It is necessary without delay “that all regions, all regiments, all forces mobilize immediately and immediately send delegations to the Military Revolutionary Committee, to the Bolshevik Central Committee, urgently demanding: under no circumstances should power be left in the hands of Kerensky and company until the 25th, in no way; The matter must be decided in the evening or at night. History will not forgive the delay of revolutionaries who could win today (and will certainly win today), at the risk of losing a lot tomorrow, at the risk of losing everything.” The letter ended with the words: “Delay in speaking out is like death” 7 .

Eino Rahja recalled that on the eve of the uprising - October 23 (?) - it was he who delivered a letter to Zhenya Egorova to the Vyborg district committee, in which Lenin “insisted on decisive action on the part of the party, saying: “Delay is like death.” After reprinting and distributing the letter throughout the districts, he still had the original, which was lost in 1918. This version - with the date adjusted to the 24th - was considered quite probable by Efim Naumovich Gorodetsky.

However, it contradicts not only the testimony of Fofanova, but also Krupskaya, who directly wrote that this letter was brought by Margarita Vasilievna. And the description of the events of the 24th by Rakhya himself suggests that he appeared at Vladimir Ilyich’s only in the evening. It is quite possible that when talking about the delivery of Lenin’s letter, Eino could have shifted the dates. During the first half of October, he more than once carried letters to the Vyborg district committee in which Lenin “insisted on decisive action.” And by the way, one of them - October 8 - ended with the words - “Delay is like death.” One way or another, on October 24, Lenin’s letter was duplicated and sent to the district committees of the capital. Apparently they sent it to someone personally. In any case, it is known that Trotsky had a copy of the letter 8 .

So what's next? This, so as not to diminish the role and not to deprive the laurels of, in bureaucratic language, “central authorities,” was not mentioned in the official literature. Meanwhile, this episode is of key importance for understanding the course of events on October 24.

In his memoirs, published in 1933, Ivan Gordienko says: “This letter was brought and handed to Zhenya Egorova, the secretary of the district party committee of the Vyborg region, by the woman in whose apartment Lenin was hiding... Two hours after receiving this letter, twelve responsible party officials gathered and Soviet workers..." 9 Have any decisions of this meeting been preserved? Yes, they have been preserved.

In Petrogradskaya Pravda on November 5, 1922, B. Belov’s note “The position of the Petrograd Committee on the eve of October 25” was published, and in it was a resolution adopted on the 24th at a meeting of “active workers of the Petrograd organization”: “The PC considers it a necessary task for all the forces of the revolution the immediate overthrow of the government and the transfer of power to the Soviets of Workers' and Soldiers' Deputies, both in the center and locally. To accomplish this task, the PC considers it necessary to go on the offensive with the entire organized force of the revolution, without the slightest delay, without waiting until the activity of the counter-revolution reduces the chances of our victory.”

It is enough to compare this text with Lenin’s letter to make it obvious that the resolution was a direct response to Vladimir Ilyich’s appeal. Pressure from below has become a fact.

In the same issue No. 251 of Petrogradskaya Pravda, Mikhail Lashevich, a member of the PC and the Military Revolutionary Committee, recalls that “an emergency meeting of the Military Revolutionary Committee was convened, at which only a few people were present... An order was immediately given in all areas to prevent the construction of bridges.” .

Two years later, speaking at a party meeting in the Vyborg district, Mikhail Kalinin said: “Do you remember that at the most crucial, exceptional moment, in the October days, when the question arose: to be or not to be? “Vladimir Ilyich wrote a letter to the Petrograd Committee... You remember, comrades, when we read this letter at your meeting, we said that we will not miss the moment of speech and will push all wavering elements to a revolutionary feat” 10.

At about 5 o'clock the Commissar of the Military Revolutionary Committee Stanislav Pestkovsky appeared at the Central Telegraph. The guard here was carried out by soldiers of the Kexholm Regiment. They assured that they would obey only the Military Revolutionary Committee. And without firing a single shot, Pestkovsky took control of the telegraph. An hour later, Military Revolutionary Committee Commissioner Leonid Stark with 12 sailors established control over the Petrograd Telegraph Agency. Around seven, a member of the Central Committee, Vladimir Milyutin, appeared as a commissar of the Military Revolutionary Committee with an armed detachment at the Special Presence for Food and established security for food warehouses 11.

Meanwhile, Fofanova, having returned from the district committee, informed Vladimir Ilyich that Krupskaya had contacted the Central Committee, but his request to move to Smolny was rejected: it was too dangerous. Margarita Vasilievna tried to prepare dinner, but Lenin objected: “Stop all this cooking. I’ve already eaten today and put the kettle on.” He writes a note again and sends Fofanova to Krupskaya again.

“Soon,” writes Margarita Vasilievna, “I brought an answer from her that did not satisfy him.” The Central Committee again referred to the danger and lack of security. Lenin swore mercilessly: “I don’t know - everything they told me - were they lying all the time or were they mistaken? Why are they cowards? Here they kept saying that this regiment is ours, that one is ours... And ask - do they have 100 soldiers... 50 people? I don’t need a regiment.” He again wrote a note to Krupskaya and gave it to Fofanova: “Go, I will wait for you until exactly 11 o’clock. And if you don’t come, I’m free to do what I want” 12.

Fofanova left, and soon Eino Rahja appeared. He did not go to the PC or the district committee. He spoke about the situation in the city. About the threat of raising bridges. About the fact that there are patrols on the streets and they are already shooting. “We drank tea and had a snack,” writes Rakhya. “Vladimir Ilyich walked around the room from corner to corner diagonally and thought something.”

He was sure that this time Fofanova would refuse and asked Eino to go straight to Smolny and get an answer from Stalin. But Rakhya explained that with what was going on in the city, it would take too much time. Then Lenin said that he no longer intended to sit here and they would go to Smolny together. No matter how much Eino intimidated him with the danger of such a journey, Vladimir Ilyich insisted on his own. And Rakhya, accustomed to everything, began to “disguise”: “Ilyich changed his clothes, bandaged his teeth with a rather dirty bandage, and put a cap that was lying around on his head.” Lenin left a note to Fofanova: “I went where you didn’t want me to go. Goodbye. Ilyich." And they went... 13

From the house we moved to Sampsonievsky. We rode on an empty passing tram to the corner of Botkinskaya. Vladimir Ilyich could not resist and began asking the conductor what was going on... She snapped: “Have you fallen from the moon?” They were driving towards the center from the working outskirts. The streets were quite deserted. There were only silent queues outside the shops. “Some mysterious personalities hovered around the grain and milk tails and whispered to the unfortunate women shivering in the cold rain that the Jews were hoarding food and that while the people were starving, the members of the Council were living in luxury.” Occasionally patrols of cadets and work detachments passed by, and trucks full of soldiers rushed by.

It was crowded in the factories and barracks. “The committee rooms were littered with rifles.” Groups and detachments of the Red Guard were formed. Messengers from the regional Soviets and Smolny came and went. And in all the soldiers’ barracks there were “endless and heated debates.”

The words in quotation marks are from the recordings of American journalist John Reed. All day he wandered around the capital and saw the city as if split in two. Because, unlike the outskirts, the “pure public” was in full swing in the center. “Like tidal waves, they moved up and down Nevsky.” They didn’t turn into alleys: “the robberies got to the point where it was dangerous to show up in the side streets...” All theaters and restaurants were open. “The gambling clubs worked feverishly from dawn to dusk; champagne flowed like a river, bets reached two hundred thousand rubles... In the center of the city, public women in diamonds and precious furs roamed the streets and filled coffee shops... Under the cold, piercing rain, under a gray heavy sky, a huge excited city rushed faster and faster towards... What?..» 14

The tram on which Lenin and Rakhya were traveling turned into the park and they walked to the Liteiny Bridge. At this end of the bridge there were Red Guards, but on the other side there were cadets demanding passes from the district headquarters. Workers crowded around them, the swearing was terrible and, taking advantage of the confusion, Lenin and Rakhya “slipped through the sentries to Liteiny, then turned onto Shpalernaya.”

It was then that they came across a patrol - two mounted cadets: “Stop! Passes! Eino had two revolvers in his jacket pockets. “I’ll deal with him myself, and you go,” he told Lenin and, putting his hands in his pockets, pretending to be drunk, he got into an argument with the patrolmen. “The cadets threatened me with whips,” writes Rakhya, “and demanded that I follow them. I resolutely refused. In all likelihood, they finally decided not to get involved with us, in their opinion, tramps. And in appearance we really represented typical tramps. The cadets have left" 15.

It was at this time - you can’t imagine it on purpose! - very close, literally two blocks away, at house 6 on Finlandsky Avenue, where the editorial office of Rabochiy Put was located, cars with cadets led by Lieutenant Colonel G.V. Germanonich stopped. In the previous “History of the Civil War in the USSR” they wrote that they arrived to arrest Stalin. But that's not true. According to intelligence information from the district headquarters, it was in this house on the 3rd floor that Lenin was hiding. And the order was to arrest him. However, when the cadets burst onto the 3rd floor, it turned out that the “Free Mind” workers’ club was located there. And next door is the regional headquarters of the Red Guard. Together with the workers, the Red Guards disarmed the lieutenant colonel and the cadets and sent them to the Peter and Paul Fortress 16.

Naturally, Lenin and Rakhya did not know all this and soon reached Smolny. And here is a new attack. Changed passes. No one was allowed into the old ones and a huge screaming crowd formed. Then Rakhya, experienced in street brawls, together with others began to rock this crowd “for a breakthrough.” The security could not withstand the onslaught, parted and Eino and Lenin found themselves inside Smolny. Vladimir Ilyich asked Rakhya to find someone from the Central Committee, and he sat down in the corridor on the windowsill.

What happened next is not only history, but also “politics”. For after the discussion of 1924, the question of who Lenin met with acquired “political” significance. In the first years after October it was believed that it was Trotsky. But later, even in Rakhya’s memoirs, in addition to Trotsky, Stalin began to appear, and then only Stalin, who “informed Vladimir Ilyich about the events that were taking place” 17.

If you believe Trotsky, and he spoke in 1920 at an evening of memories in the presence of active participants in the October events in St. Petersburg, he and Lenin went into some small passage room next to the assembly hall. And the first question that Vladimir Ilyich asked him was about the negotiations between the Military Revolutionary Committee and the district headquarters. The newspapers wrote that “an agreement would be reached” and, as Trotsky noted, “Vladimir Ilyich, having read these newspapers, was very vehemently opposed to us.”

"Is that really true? Are you making a compromise? - Lenin asked, his eyes drilling. I replied that we put a calming message in the newspapers on purpose, that this was just a military trick... “This is good-ro-sho-o-o,” Lenin said in a sing-song voice, cheerfully, with enthusiasm, and began to pace around the room, excitedly rubbing his hands. “This is very good!”" 18

Apparently, at this moment a funny episode occurred, which was later exploited more than once by filmmakers and artists. Dan and Skobelev suddenly entered the room. Lenin and Trotsky sat with their backs to them at the end of the long table, and Dan took out a package of grub he had brought from home and began laying them out at the other end. It was very difficult to recognize Lenin: “He was tied with a scarf, as if from a toothache, with huge glasses, in a bad cap, he looked quite strange. But Dan, who has an experienced, trained eye, when he saw us, looked from one side to the other, nudged Skobelev with his elbow, blinked his eye and...” He instantly grabbed the sandwiches and both jumped out of the room. “Vladimir Ilyich,” writes Trotsky, “also pushed me with his elbow: “The scoundrels found out!” And Rakhya adds: “This incident put Vladimir Ilyich in a cheerful mood, and he laughed heartily” 19.

We moved to another room - 36 (or 31). When members of the Bolshevik Central Committee began to gather, Lenin took off his wig, headband, cap, and glasses. It soon became a bit crowded here. There weren’t enough chairs and Rakhya set an example: “I sat down on the floor by the door in a corner, pressing my chin to my knees.” They usually sat in this position in crowded common cells. And since most of those present had experience in this regard, the placement problem was quickly resolved. Some sat down, leaning against the wall, some simply lay down on the floor, for many had not slept for the second day 20.

Meanwhile, the conversation continued. And the essence of this conversation was written reluctantly and indistinctly in our literature. In 1920, at an evening dedicated to Lenin’s 50th anniversary, in contrast to those who sang praises to the hero of the day, Stalin spoke about Vladimir Ilyich’s ability to publicly admit his mistakes. Recalling the disagreements between the Central Committee and Lenin in September-October 1917, Stalin said that the Central Committee then set the task of “convening a Congress of Soviets, opening an uprising and declaring the Congress of Soviets an organ of state power...

And, despite all Ilyich’s demands,” Stalin continued, “we did not listen to him, we went further along the path of strengthening the Soviets and brought the matter to the Congress of Soviets on October 25, to a successful uprising.” And when Lenin came out of hiding and met with members of the Central Committee in Smolny, “smiling and looking slyly at us, he said: “Yes, you were probably right”... Comrade Lenin was not afraid to admit his mistakes” 21.

In the same 1920, Trotsky illuminated this plot differently. Saying that in the October days there really were “two shades regarding the uprising,” he writes that the people of St. Petersburg - meaning primarily myself- “connected the fate of this uprising with the course of the conflict due to the withdrawal of the garrison. Vladimir Ilyich... linked the fate of this uprising not only with one course of the conflict in St. Petersburg. And it was not a shade, but rather an approach to business. Our point of view was that of St. Petersburg, that Peter would conduct things this way. And Lenin proceeded from the point of view of an uprising not only in St. Petersburg, but throughout the whole country” 22.

And only when he came to Smolny and made sure that the performance was developing successfully, “he became more silent, thought and said: “Well, it’s possible this way...” I,” Trotsky writes, “realized that only at that moment did he finally reconcile with the fact that we refused to seize power through a conspiracy (??! - V.L.). Until the last hour he feared that the enemy would cross and take us by surprise. Only now... he calmed down and finally sanctioned the path that events took” 23.

It is not difficult to notice that both memoirists strive to interpret the explanation with Lenin not only in their own way, but each in their own favor. We will return to the question of who actually turned out to be right a little lower. But then - on the night of October 25 - Vladimir Ilyich could well have told Stalin and other Tsekists that they were right, and Trotsky: “it’s possible this way...”. There was no time to sort things out. It was much more important to evaluate what was happening at the moment. Moreover, reports about the course of events, as Milyutin noted, were received continuously.

The information was varied and confusing. What Novaya Zhizn wrote about the systematic actions of government troops most likely reflected the government’s intentions rather than reality. Even in the morning, the Naval Ministry ordered the Aurora to be withdrawn from the Franco-Russian shipyard into the sea. But, at the insistence of the Military Revolutionary Committee, Tsentrobalt canceled the order and the cruiser remained in St. Petersburg.

The order to raise bridges in order to prevent the advance of work detachments to the center was not fully carried out. When the cadets of the Mikhailovsky School tried to occupy the entire Liteiny Bridge, the workers and Red Guards - without any instructions from the Military Revolutionary Committee - immediately disarmed them and forced them to return to the barracks. The soldiers who took control of the Grenadiersky and Sampsonievsky bridges declared that they would obey only the Military Revolutionary Committee. The correspondents of Novaya Zhizn were outsiders. And it was difficult for an outside observer to figure out on this day who these or those military teams and patrols were for - for the government or against it.

Two days later, Lenin’s “Decree on Peace” will talk about the “revolution of October 24-25,” that is, the 24th was included in the days of the uprising. But at first it was a “strange” uprising. As the famous journalist David Zaslavsky wrote in the Den newspaper on the 25th, “an uprising without temperament and passion.” “Day and evening in Smolny,” wrote Georgy Lomov, “one feels some kind of indecision: neither we nor Kerensky risk taking the path of the final battle... Some kind of indecision is felt in our Central Committee... then wait-and-see, as if something was still going to happen, after which the real uprising would begin... that, perhaps, we should “wait a little,” so as not to “overdo it” 24 .

There was a feeling that the warring parties were playing for time. Kerensky was waiting for reinforcements from the front. Members of the Military Revolutionary Committee were waiting for sailors from Kronstadt and Helsingfors and they had - partly conscious, partly unconscious - a desire to hold out until the Congress of Soviets without, as it seemed to them, unnecessary complications. The speech thus turned into a process of forceful confrontation, during which one side - the government - was increasingly losing ground under its feet, while the other was increasing its power.

However, Lenin understood perfectly well that the process of confrontation, with all the changes in the balance of forces favorable to the Bolsheviks, must end with a very definite act - the overthrow of the government. And it was impossible to delay it - he wrote about this in all his October articles and letters. For at any moment, with the arrival of troops loyal to the government, the balance of forces in the capital could change.

Or maybe he was afraid in vain? No - not in vain. Kerensky later wrote: “Immediately after the end of the government meeting [at 11 p.m. on October 24. - V.L.] the commander of the troops came to me along with his chief of staff. They suggested that I organize, with all the troops remaining loyal to the Provisional Government, including the Cossacks, an expedition to capture the Smolny Institute - the headquarters of the Bolsheviks... This plan immediately received my approval, and I insisted on its immediate implementation” 25. So Lenin was right. Complacency at this moment could be costly.

Zaslavsky was of course wrong about the lack of “temperament and passion” among the leaders of the uprising. The enormity of what was happening was felt by everyone. “Events,” wrote Bubnov, “rushed with lightning speed, were sharply tense and were experienced as the mighty course of a huge revolutionary wave.” This gigantic wave gave rise to many specific tasks, small but urgent matters. Everyone was in place, everyone was busy, everyone was crazy busy. And events overwhelmed me, making it impossible to grasp the whole. This is partly why the leaders of the uprising themselves, as Stanislav Pestkovsky noted, “on the occasion of the coup were in a state of ‘disheveled feelings’” 26 .

With Lenin's arrival in Smolny the situation changes. Despite the fact that everyone was excited and “extremely absent-minded,” wrote the same Pestkovsky, “Vladimir Ilyich retained extraordinary presence of mind...” The very fact that all channels of information - the Central Committee, the PC, the Military Revolutionary Committee - were now united at one point, added up motley mosaic of events into a coherent picture. And this gave purposefulness to the further actions of the rebels.

Alex Rabinovich managed to record the moment when a clear turning point occurred in the tactics of the Military Revolutionary Committee. The memories of the Military Revolutionary Committee commissar in the Pavlovsk regiment Oswald Dzenis allowed him to do this. At about 9 pm, by order of the Military Revolutionary Committee, he and the Pavlovtsy occupied the Trinity Bridge and began to do what the cadets had done before: he set up outposts, began to detain and check the vehicles. Important, in his opinion, officials heading to the Winter Palace were arrested by Dzenis and taken to Smolny.

But soon Podvoisky called him from there and gave him a dressing down for premature and unauthorized actions. He said that until tomorrow the Military Revolutionary Committee will not take any offensive or active steps. However, at about 2 a.m. Dzenis received the exact opposite order: to establish the strictest control over traffic and increase patrolling in his area 27.

Around the same time, the incapacitated guards and the commandant of Smolny itself, Socialist Revolutionary Grekov, were replaced. At about 2 o'clock in the morning, sailors, Red Guards and soldiers captured the Main Post Office. At the same time they occupied the Petrograd Power Plant. At 2 o'clock, the Nikolaevsky and Baltic stations were taken under full control, where the “shock troops” could arrive from the front.

“The night was frosty,” recalled one of the participants in these events. - The north wind penetrated to the bones. On the streets adjacent to the Nikolaevsky station, groups of sappers stood shivering from the cold... The moon made the picture fantastic. The huge houses looked like medieval castles, the sappers were accompanied by the shadows of giants, at the sight of which the statue of the penultimate emperor pulled up his horse in amazement.”

At 3:30 a.m., having sailed along the Neva, the Aurora dropped anchor at the Nikolaevsky Bridge. After the sailors pointed the searchlights at the bridge, the cadets fled. And the cruiser was turned so that its guns looked directly at the Winter Palace 28.

It was at this time, at four o’clock in the morning, that Kerensky, accompanied by Konovalov, arrived at the General Staff. The information was disappointing. Virtually all the strongholds of the capital were in the hands of the rebels. The general for assignments under Kerensky, Boris Antonovich Levitsky, telegraphed to Headquarters: “The entire city is covered with garrison posts, but there are no demonstrations on the streets... In general, the impression is as if the Provisional Government is in the capital of a hostile state that has completed mobilization, but has not begun active actions" 29.

Lenin understood that it was time to move on to these “active actions,” that is, to bring the uprising to the end, to the overthrow of the government and the creation of a new government. However, the Bolshevik Central Committee, which had to solve these problems and force the action, never managed to start a normal meeting.

We have already mentioned above a stage technique called simultaneous action, when a theatrical performance simultaneously takes place on different adjacent platforms. So - almost outside the wall of the room where the members of the Central Committee gathered, from half past one in the morning, in the large hall under the chairmanship of Gotz, an emergency joint meeting of the Central Executive Committee of the Soviets and the Executive Committee of the Council of Peasant Deputies was going on.

One had to keep one's ears open. Because all the delegates of the Second Congress of Soviets who had gathered at that moment were also invited there. Dan, Martov, the Socialist-Revolutionaries Gendelman and Kolegaev spoke before them. And members of the Bolshevik Central Committee had to leave every now and then for this meeting in order to answer the same Dan, who was acting as chairman of the Central Executive Committee instead of Nikolai Chkheidze, who left for Georgia on October 5.

The situation was quite complicated. As a result of the boycott of the congress by the Executive Committee of the Council of Peasant Deputies, many local purely peasant Soviets did not send their representatives to the Congress. According to preliminary data, out of 670 registered delegates, only 300 identified themselves as Bolsheviks.

193 considered themselves Social Revolutionaries (right, left and center). 68 - Mensheviks and 14 - Menshevik-internationalists. 95 belonged to non-party, various national and small party groups.

That is, while maintaining the integrity of the Socialist-Revolutionary and Menshevik factions, the 300 Bolsheviks could be opposed by the Socialist-Revolutionary-Menshevik bloc of 275 delegates, and 95 “non-factional” delegates opened up wide scope for various kinds of combinations, intrigues and purely personal conspiracies. This is precisely what Lenin, who monitored the registration process daily, had in mind when he wrote on the 24th about the unreliability of the “swing vote” 30 .

Meanwhile, initially, from the moment the question of the uprising was raised, Vladimir Ilyich assumed that the Bolsheviks would come to power together with the Left Socialist Revolutionaries. For “a bloc with the Left Socialist Revolutionaries,” Lenin wrote to Smilga in September, only he “can give us lasting power in Russia,” based on the majority of the people 31 .

This bloc has already begun to take shape not only in St. Petersburg, but also in a number of regions. On October 6, during negotiations between Trotsky and Kamenev with Nathanson and Grigory Schrader about leaving the Pre-Parliament, the Left Socialist Revolutionary leaders announced that although they would remain in the Pre-Parliament for now, they firmly promised “full support for the Bolsheviks in the event of a revolutionary uprising.” outside of it" 32 .

In the decisive October days in the Military Revolutionary Committee, they actually worked side by side with the Bolsheviks. Literally on the eve of the uprising, analyzing the peasant “Order”, Lenin noted with satisfaction: “The agreement with the Left Socialist-Revolutionaries is ready.” And, as noted above, on the morning of the 24th, when the performance had already begun, the Central Committee instructed Kamenev and Berzin to negotiate with the Left Socialist Revolutionaries on further actions. A few days later, Lenin would directly indicate: “We wanted a Soviet coalition government” 33.

However, it was at this moment that the leaders of the left Socialist Revolutionaries did not agree to a split with the right Socialist Revolutionaries and the leadership of the Central Executive Committee and IKKD. The rapid growth of their influence among the peasantry raised hopes that from a minority they could turn into a majority of the largest Russian party. “Despite the enormous tension in “internal relations,” wrote the left Socialist Revolutionary Sergei Mstislavsky, “the party was officially still united: the Congress faction was one. And since “on the ground” the mood of the party masses was undoubtedly to the left of the upper ranks frozen in the February mood, we had a vague hope of wresting the faction, and therefore the party entirely, from the hands of the Central Committee...” 34 .

But hoping to outplay the right in the arena of meetings so familiar to them, forced to make concessions for this, the left clearly underestimated the enemy. We must pay tribute to Fedor Dan. At this night emergency meeting, he did not deny the legitimacy of the transfer of power to the Soviets. He was just intimidating. Frightened by the Black Hundred danger...

“Never,” said Dan, “has the counter-revolution been so strong... In factories, mills and barracks, the Black Hundred press is enjoying much more significant success - the newspapers “Novaya Rus” and “Living Word” ...” And therefore, “ For anyone who thinks politically sensibly, it is clear that armed clashes on the streets of Petrograd mean... the triumph of the counter-revolution, which in the near future will sweep away not only the Bolsheviks, but all socialist parties.”

Lieber, as usual, supported Dan: “The Soviets will not hold back the authorities, it will go to the unorganized masses.” Anarchy and pogroms will begin. Recalling how in the July days the Menshevik Monoszon (S.M. Schwartz) was beaten on the street, he concluded: “Whoever carried out the violence, hooligans or Bolsheviks, this very fact speaks against a movement that takes such forms.”

Socialist-Revolutionary Mikhail Gendelman added fuel to the fire. He told how, having arrived at the Peter and Paul Fortress for a rally, he heard addressed to him: “Ah, Gendelman, that means he’s a Jew and right-wing!” There, the word “bastard” was the most common synonym for the word “intellectual.” But the same soldiers greeted the Bolsheviks Moses Volodarsky, Moses Uritsky, Leon Trotsky with delight. They were literally carried in their arms. And Gendelman warned: those who today “raise the ‘worker’ Trotsky on a shield, [tomorrow] will trample the intellectual Bronstein” 35.

In an address to the population on October 24, the Military Revolutionary Committee warned: “The garrison of Petrograd will not allow any violence or outrages... Criminals will be wiped off the face of the earth.” And Trotsky writes that upon arriving in Smolny, Vladimir Ilyich immediately noticed this poster of the Military Revolutionary Committee, “threatening the thugs, if they tried to take advantage of the moment of the coup, with extermination on the spot. At the first moment, Lenin seemed to think... But then he said: “That’s right.” 36 That is, in this case, realizing the real threat, the Bolsheviks preferred decisive counteraction to the danger rather than “horror films”. Therefore, they perceived the intimidation of pogroms as an attempt to distract the delegates of the Congress of Soviets from the main thing.

Appearing at this meeting from the room where members of the Bolshevik Central Committee had gathered, Trotsky declared: “If you do not flinch, then there will be no civil war, since our enemies will capitulate... If the All-Russian Congress of Soviets does not want to discourage the masses who want revolutionary power and revolutionary methods of struggle, then all members of the Congress must go with the headquarters of the Revolution, and not with the headquarters of its enemies" 37 .

And such a “headquarters” - in addition to the government one - has already begun to be created. The above-mentioned resolution of the Council of the Republic, adopted on October 24 after Kerensky's departure, proposed the creation of a Committee of Public Salvation to assist the government. The draft of the cadets, co-operators and Plekhanovites directly stated that the Pre-Parliament would “provide full support” to the government and demand from it “the most decisive measures” to suppress the Bolshevik rebellion.

However, the resolution adopted then by the people's socialists, right and left Mensheviks and Socialist Revolutionaries sounded somewhat softer. The Committee of Public Salvation was created “to combat the active manifestation of anarchy and the pogrom movement” and was supposed to act "in contact with the Provisional Government." Speaking in Smolny at an emergency meeting of the Central Executive Committee and the IKKSD on the night of October 25, Dan kept silent about the fact that the notice of the creation of the Committee of Public Safety had already been sent out by him on behalf of the Central Executive Committee before the start of this meeting with the delegates of the congress 38 .

Now it was necessary to somehow legitimize this decision. But Dan himself was poorly listened to. His speech was constantly interrupted by remarks. Especially after he began to protest against the “bullying of the government,” because “to govern our state at the moment is a backbreaking task and no government, neither Kerensky nor the Soviets, can fully cope with this task.” He again called for waiting! Because the Pre-Parliament has already, they say, demanded that the government immediately resolve issues about land and peace. Naturally, Dan again kept silent about the fact that Kerensky kicked them out the door with these “demands.” However, to petitions before this the delegates no longer hoped for government. "Late!" - they shouted to Dan from the hall. And when he declared that “the bayonets of the warring parties will only cross each other through the corpse of the Central Election Commission", The cry from the audience was completely insulting: “And the Central Election Commission has long since become a corpse!” 39.

In this situation, the draft resolution was assigned to be read to Martov, whose voice was listened to more carefully. He immediately stated that “among the members of the Central Executive Committee there is not a single one who would deny the right of the proletariat to speak out... And although the Menshevik-internationalists do not oppose the transfer of power into the hands of democracy, they speak out decisively against the methods by which the Bolsheviks strive for this power "

The resolution he read out said that the uprising was being used by “hidden gangs of hooligans and pogromists,” that the counter-revolution had already “mobilized its forces,” that the army was threatened by famine, and St. Petersburg by the Germans. In this regard, it was designed - but not the Committee of Public Safety, as proposed by the Council of the Republic, but Committee of Public Safety. There was no mention of his “contact with the Provisional Government”.

In other words, the draft actually repeated the main points of the Pre-Parliament resolution of October 24. And Volodarsky declared that accepting it at this meeting just before the opening of the Congress of Soviets was unauthorized and inappropriate. The Bolsheviks left the hall and the resolution was approved without them. After this, the Socialist Revolutionaries and Mensheviks dispersed to their factional meetings 40.

It was already four o'clock in the morning. It was necessary to decide. The behavior of the left Socialist Revolutionaries at the last night meeting showed that their attempts to “outplay” the right were unproductive. The experience of 1917 suggested that in the current situation there was only one way out. It is necessary to captivate those who are hesitant with your example, determination, to bring the struggle to victory, because "only our victory in the uprising,” wrote Lenin, “will put an end to the vacillations that have tormented the people, this most painful thing in the world” 41.

The fact that the capital's proletariat and the garrison are for the Bolsheviks was not disputed by anyone. But this did not mean that the government and Headquarters could not gather from the “minority” a combat-ready fist of the same front-line shock units and bring it down on Petrograd. And if “today evening, tonight” our victory is guaranteed, Lenin believed, then tomorrow “we can lose everything!!” Then the conversation will no longer be about observing democratic procedures and not even about the Congress of Soviets. “The price of taking power immediately: protection people(not the congress, but the people, the army and the peasants first and foremost) from the Kornilov government...” This is how Vladimir Ilyich posed the question 42.

And in the same room where the Tsekists had been coming, leaving, and reconvening since midnight, Lenin opened a meeting of the Bolshevik Central Committee. Its most complete analysis was given by Evgeniy Alekseevich Lutsky. He believes that “the composition of the participants changed: depending on various circumstances related to the armed uprising, some members of the Central Committee left the meeting, others came.” No minutes were kept 43.

“The Central Committee of the (Bolshevik) Party,” Milyutin recalled in 1924, “meeted in a small room No. 36 on the ground floor of Smolny. There is a table in the middle of the room, several chairs around, someone’s coat has been thrown onto the floor... In the corner, right on the floor, Comrade Berzin is lying... he is not feeling well. There are only members of the Central Committee in the room, i.e. Lenin, Trotsky, Stalin, Smilga, Kamenev, Zinoviev and me... From time to time there is a knock on the door: reports arrive about the course of events 44.”

Milyutin forgot: representatives of the PC were also present at the meeting. Olga Ravich recalled in 1927: the meeting “took place in Smolny, on the first floor, in room No. 31 (or 36). Several people were sitting at a small table: Vladimir Ilyich, Lunacharsky and someone else. The rest: Trotsky, several members of the PC stood or sat on the floor, since there were not enough chairs for everyone” 45.

The most important source illuminating the course of this meeting is the extensive Istpart questionnaires filled out by participants in the October Revolution in 1927. Only in 1957, a significant part of these questionnaires was published by R.A. Lavrov, V.T. Loginov, V.N. Stepanov and Z.N. Tikhonova in the collection “From February to October”, and then in the magazines “Historical Archive”, “New World”, etc. However, due to the censorship conditions in force at that time, it was not possible to print other questionnaires. E.A. Lutsky knew their contents, but for the same reasons could not use them 46 .

The meeting began with information about the course of events. The report was made by Ioffe, who, after the decision of the Central Committee on October 21, joined the leadership core of the Military Revolutionary Committee. He reported on which bridges were occupied, which stations were blocked, which parts of the garrison and detachments of the Red Guard were being pulled up to the Winter Palace, that ships with landing troops would leave from Kronstadt in the next few hours, and that a train with sailors left Helsingfors at 3 o’clock for St. Petersburg.. .

But something else also became clear: the Warsaw Station, where Kornilov units from the Northern Front could be delivered from Pskov, was still not occupied. The State Bank is not busy. The telegraph and the Central Telephone Station have not been taken under control, and Kerensky maintains constant contact with Headquarters...

Still, the general mood was optimistic. “...The question has not yet been resolved - whether victory is on our side or not,” wrote Milyutin, “but the balance of forces has been completely determined - the advantage is on our side.” Lomov is even more categorical: “the situation was completely determined: in fact, power was in our hands.”

And even the gloomy Kamenev said: “Well, if you did something stupid and took power, then you need to form a ministry.” Joffe writes that this remark was remembered “because after the turmoil of that night, for me personally, I think, and for many others, only after these words it became quite clear that we had really taken power” 47 .

Milyutin writes that when he also supported the proposal to form a government, it “seemed so premature to some that they treated it as a joke.” Someone even commented that we would “barely last two weeks.” Lenin replied: “Nothing, when two years have passed and we are still in power, you will say that we [are unlikely] to hold out for another two years” 48. At the insistence of Vladimir Ilyich, Milyutin “took a pencil, a piece of paper and sat down at the table.” There was no dispute about the nature of the new government. This should be, Lenin believed, a “Workers’ and Peasants’ Government.” And, as Ioffe recalled, Vladimir Ilyich expressed the wish that, if possible, “workers should be appointed to its composition, and intellectuals would be their deputies.” The present members of the Central Committee and PC were drawn into the conversation and “in the end,” writes Milyutin, “everyone took part... The question arose of what to call the new government and its members.” Lenin thinks out loud: “Not by ministers: a vile, worn-out name.” Everyone agrees. “Calling members of the government “ministers,” notes Milyutin, “smacked of bureaucratic mustiness. And here Trotsky found the word on which everyone immediately agreed.”

“It would be possible,” he suggests, “by commissars, but now there are too many commissars. Maybe high commissioners?... No, “supreme” sounds bad. Is it possible to say “folk”? - "People's Commissars"? Well, this will probably do, Lenin agrees. - And the government as a whole? Kamenev picks up, “And call the government the Council of People’s Commissars.” Vladimir Ilyich tries it out by ear: “The Council of People's Commissars?... This is excellent: it smells terrible of revolution!..”. He remembered, as Olga Ravich noted, the commissars of the Paris Commune. And “by me,” says Milyutin, “it was written down - the Council of People’s Commissars...” 49

E.A. Lutsky believes that apparently at the same time they decided to call all the legalizations of the future government, like the acts of the Paris Commune, “Decrets”. This also smelled like revolution. “And then,” Milyutin recalled, “we started to list names” 50.

The beginning was unexpected for everyone. “...At a meeting of the Central Committee of the Party,” writes Trotsky, “Lenin proposed appointing me chairman of the Council of People’s Commissars. I jumped up from my seat with protests - to such an extent this proposal seemed unexpected and inappropriate to me. “Why?” Lenin insisted. “You stood at the head of the Petrograd Soviet, which took power.”

This, as they say today, is a “good question” for the “Lenin-eaters” who have spent a lot of ink telling how Lenin strived for power all his life. But this fact is a mystery only to those who cannot break out of the boundaries of vulgarity. Vladimir Ilyich was completely deprived "personal vanity" This was witnessed by none other than Martov. For Lenin, the problem of power was not a goal, but a means of implementing the will of the people, and the question of “premiership” was only a matter of political expediency 51.

“I,” writes Trotsky, “proposed that the proposal be rejected without debate. That's what they did." Everyone agreed that Lenin himself should take the post of head of government. It was necessary to convince him, because, as Ioffe testifies, “Vladimir Ilyich at first categorically refused to be chairman of the Council of People’s Commissars and only in view of the insistence of the entire Central Committee agreed” 52 .

But he immediately proposed that Trotsky “become the head of internal affairs: the fight against counter-revolution is now the main task. I, writes Trotsky, objected and, among other arguments, put forward a national point: is it worth it, they say, to give such an additional weapon as my Jewishness into the hands of the enemies? Lenin was almost indignant: “We have a great international revolution - what significance can such trifles have?” - We had a half-joking argument on this topic. “The revolution is great,” I answered, “but there are still quite a few fools left.” - “Are we really equal to fools?” “We are not equals, but sometimes we have to make a small allowance for stupidity: why do we need this unnecessary complication at first?..”” The dispute ended with Sverdlov proposing to appoint Trotsky as Commissar for Foreign Affairs, with which everyone agreed 53 .

And Alexey Ivanovich Rykov, who once studied at the Faculty of Law of Kazan University, was appointed Commissioner for Internal Affairs. He looked quite determined at that moment. After the July days, when he was beaten by the Black Hundreds in Moscow, Alexey Ivanovich walked around with a revolver. And at the beginning of the meeting of the Central Committee, he, to the general laughter and jokes, “took a large revolver out of his pocket and put it in front of him, and when I asked,” says Joffe, “why he was carrying it with him, he gloomily answered: “so that before his death at least five shoot these scoundrels."

“When it turned out,” continues Joffe, “that I didn’t have any revolver at all, Vladimir Ilyich also joked that it was necessary for the Central Committee to buy me a revolver together. And Comrade Stasova immediately gave me a small ladies’ Browning, about which someone (I don’t remember if it was Vladimir Ilyich himself) remarked that it was just right, because it could only kill fleas” 54 .

Georgy Lomov, who was present at the beginning of this meeting, recalled: “Our situation was extremely difficult. Among us there were many devoted revolutionaries who traveled Russia in all directions, walking in shackles from St. Petersburg, Warsaw, Moscow all the way of the cross to Yakutia and Verkhoyansk... Each of us could list almost all the prisons in Russia with a detailed description of the regime.. We knew where they were beating, how they were beating, where and how they were being put in a punishment cell, but we did not know how to run the state and were not familiar with banking technology or the work of ministries... There were few people who wanted to get into the People's Commissars. Not because they were trembling for their own skins, but because they were afraid of not being able to cope with the work... All the people’s commissars tried in every possible way to avoid the appointment, trying to find other comrades who, in their opinion, could with great success take the post of people’s commissar.”

This is exactly what happened to Lomov himself. He left the meeting because the Central Committee urgently sent him to Moscow. And since Georgy Ippolitovich at one time successfully graduated from the Faculty of Law of St. Petersburg University, then, “taking advantage of my absence,” writes Lomov, “Comrade Rykov, who began to be saddled with, in addition to the title of People’s Commissar of Internal Affairs, also the Commissariat of Justice, proposed him as People’s Commissar justice me. And since I was far away, and there was still no People’s Commissar of Justice, I was included in the first Council of People’s Commissars” 55.

There was no doubt about the Commissioner of Education: Lunacharsky. By the way, he was one of those “few” who were internally ready to accept this post. There were talks that he would be the Minister of Education in the “socialist government” back in August. And when in September he became the deputy mayor of Petrograd on these issues, Anatoly Vasilyevich regarded this precisely as a “ministerial” appointment. And now he accepted the proposal with some pathos: “This took place in some small room at Smolny, where the chairs were covered with coats and hats and where everyone was crowded around a poorly lit table. We chose leaders of a renewed Russia" 56 . The conversation turned to the candidacy of a food commissioner. Since the Left Socialist Revolutionaries did not agree to join the government, they proposed Ivan Teodorovich. At one time, he successfully graduated from the Faculty of Science of Moscow University. He was the author of many articles on agricultural policy issues. The food situation in the country could not be called anything other than critical. And Lenin sadly joked: “Well, we need someone worse, otherwise he’ll be drowned in the Moika in a week anyway” 57 .

The post of Commissioner of Agriculture was supposed to become even more difficult in the “renewed Russia”. Of course, after Chernov and Maslov, it would be good to appoint a left Socialist-Revolutionary as “peasant minister.” The same Andrei Lukich Kolegaev. But for the reason already stated, the choice fell on Vladimir Pavlovich Milyutin. He himself was from the family of a rural teacher in the Kursk province. Studied at St. Petersburg University. He worked as a zemstvo statistician. He was the author of articles and brochures on land and financial and economic development of Russia. At the VI Party Congress he made a report “On the Economic Situation.”

Agreeing to take the post of Commissioner of Agriculture, Vladimir Pavlovich immediately proposed a version of the draft decree on land, developed by him together with Mikhail Larin. The text of this project has not yet been found. But then, having familiarized himself with it, Lenin immediately realized that despite all the “orthodoxy” of the document, it in no way went beyond the scope of the issues discussed at the April conference of the RSDLP.

Meanwhile, just on October 24, Rabochiy Put published an article by Vladimir Ilyich, “A New Deception of the Peasants by the Socialist Revolutionary Party,” which posed the question of land in a completely different way. His main idea was simple: recipes supposedly arising from the “doctrine” should not be imposed on the peasants. Only the peasant movement itself can provide ways to solve the agrarian problem. And there is no need to be afraid of “unorthodox” decisions. For “history, accelerated by the war, has stepped forward so far that the old formulas have been filled with new content” 58.

In 1917, a document appeared that, without unnecessary ideological layers, formulated the aspirations of the village. We are talking about the mentioned “Exemplary Order”, compiled from peasant orders. Even then, Lenin wrote that it was this document that should form the basis of agrarian reforms in Russia. And the fact that in a number of points the “Nakaz” did not coincide with the previous Bolshevik program cannot and should not interfere with this. “We are not doctrinaires,” Lenin wrote then. “Our teaching is not a dogma, but a guide to action” 59.

At a meeting of the Bolshevik Central Committee, after criticism from Lenin, the draft decree on the land of Milyutin and Larin was rejected. Vladimir Pavlovich himself confirmed this in a milder form in his memoirs: “We were deprived of the opportunity for a long discussion,” and therefore “the final formulation and writing of the draft decree on land” was entrusted to Ilyich 60 .

Natalya Ivanovna Sedova, Trotsky’s wife, wrote in her diary: “I went into the Smolny room, where I saw Vladimir Ilyich, Lev Davidovich, it seems Dzerzhinsky, Joffe and many more people. Everyone’s complexion was gray-green, sleepless, their eyes were inflamed, their collars were dirty, the room was smoky... It seemed to me that orders were being given as if in a dream.” And Natalya Ivanovna suddenly thought that if they didn’t get enough sleep and change their collars, everything would collapse 61 .

But this is an outside view. The members of the Central Committee themselves felt completely differently. “Everyone is somewhat tired from sleepless nights,” wrote the same Milyutin, “but the tension of nerves, the importance of what is happening - all this makes fatigue unnoticeable; on the contrary, cheerful conversations are interrupted by various humorous remarks” 62.

There was no question of changing collars in this whirlwind. But you could try to rest for an hour or two. They scattered in all directions. Lenin, Trotsky and Sokolnikov settled down, as Grigory Yakovlevich writes, “in one of the rooms of Smolny - apparently occupied by the publishing house of the Central Executive Committee. There was no furniture in it. There were piles of newspapers piled up. Three of us spent the night. We lay down on piles of newspapers, covered ourselves with newspaper sheets, and dozed like that for several hours.” Trotsky adds that later they brought two pillows and blankets. Trotsky writes about Lenin: “Lenin’s eyes are awake on his tired face. He looks at me friendly, softly, with angular shyness... - “You know,” he says hesitantly, “immediately after the persecution and the underground to power...” - he is looking for expression, - “es schwindelt [dizzy],” - he suddenly switches to German and points his hand around his head. We look at each other and laugh a little. All this lasts no more than a minute or two. Then a simple transition to the next tasks” 63.

So Lenin never managed to sleep. He went up to the 3rd floor, where the Military Revolutionary Committee was located. Those instructions that were given at the night at the Central Committee meeting were successfully implemented. At five in the morning we occupied the telegraph office. Around six, sailors of the Guards Fleet Crew captured the State Bank. At seven o'clock, under the leadership of Lashevich and Kalyagin, the Red Guards of the Vyborg region and the soldiers of the Kexholm regiment disarmed the cadets at the Central Telephone Exchange and cut off communications with the Winter Palace and the district headquarters. By seven o'clock, right under Kerensky's windows, the sailors threw back the cadets guarding the Palace Bridge. At eight, Warsaw Station 64 was occupied.

It sounds naive to say that the government “was lying on the road and only the Bolsheviks thought of picking it up.” Power did not lie on the road like a lady's hat that had been blown away by the wind. There were many power hunters. But it was necessary not to select it, but to conquer it. Step by step. For the Provisional Government was going to hold it to the end, regardless of anything. Just the day before, in a conversation with the British Ambassador Buchanan, Kerensky, speaking about the Bolsheviks, “exclaimed more than once: “I only want them to go out into the streets. And then I will crush them.” 65 He still hoped that the shock troops would still arrive from the front.

There were reasons for such hopes. In the morning, the Chief of Staff of the Commander-in-Chief, General Nikolai Nikolaevich Dukhonin, even before disconnecting communications with Zimny, reported from Headquarters to General Levitsky that the order to send to Petrograd the 44th Infantry Division with two batteries, the 5th Caucasian Cossack Division with artillery, the 43rd The Don Cossack Regiment, the 13th and 15th Don Regiments with artillery, the 3rd and 6th scooter battalions have already been given over 66.

Kerensky himself addressed the Cossacks stationed in the capital itself at dawn: “In the name of freedom, honor and glory of the native land, the Supreme Commander-in-Chief ordered the 1st, 4th, and 14th Cossack regiments to come to the aid of the Central Executive Committee of the Soviets, revolutionary democracy and the Provisional Government to save the dying Russia." The Cossacks requested infantry support and stated that in 15-20 minutes they would “start saddling the horses” 67 .

In the Winter Palace itself at that time there were about 3 thousand officers, Cossacks, cadets and shock workers of the women's “death battalion” 68. American journalist John Reed managed to get into the palace. “At the entrance of the palace,” he says, “the same old doormen in blue liveries with copper buttons and red collars with gold braiding politely accepted our coats and hats from us. We went up the stairs. In a dark, gloomy corridor, where there were no longer tapestries, several old servants were wandering aimlessly...

An old doorman approached us: “No, master, you can’t go in there!” - “Why, is the door locked?” “So that the soldiers don’t leave,” he answered... We opened the door... On both sides of the parquet floor were spread out rough and dirty mattresses and blankets, on which soldiers were lying here and there. Everywhere there were piles of cigarette butts, pieces of bread, scattered clothes and empty bottles of expensive French wines... The stuffy atmosphere of tobacco smoke and dirty human bodies took my breath away... I suddenly smelled the smell of alcohol from the left and someone's voice spoke in a bad language, but in fluent French: "...Americans? Very glad! Staff Captain Vladimir Artsybashev. All at your service... I would really like to leave Russia. I have decided to join the American army... Would you be kind enough to help should I contact your consul in this matter?" 69.

Since the “garrison” of Winter, which had armored cars and guns, was quite large, and inaction only disintegrated it, it was decided to intensify the defense before the arrival of front-line units. A detachment of shock officers of 32 people was sent to open the Nikolaevsky Bridge. However, seeing that he was guarded by about 200 sailors and workers, the shock troops hastily retreated. The same thing happened with half a company of the women's battalion sent to open the Trinity Bridge. Arriving at the place and seeing the machine guns of the Peter and Paul Fortress aimed at them, the shock workers went home. The attempt of the cadets, made at about 8 o'clock in the morning, to recapture the telegraph 70 was equally unsuccessful.

Having received a report from the district commander, Polkovnikov, that the situation is “critical” and “there are no troops at the government’s disposal,” Kerensky decides to leave Petrograd to meet the front-line units supposedly going to help. At 9 a.m. on October 25, he appoints temporary head of the Provisional Government Alexander Ivanovich Konovalov and orders to find a car 71 for his trip to Pskov.

Notes:

1 Memories of V.I. Lenin. In five volumes. T. 2. M., 1969. P. 447,448.

2 See: Rabinovich A. The Bolsheviks come to power. Revolution of 1917 in Petrograd. pp. 278,280.

3 Stalin I.V. Op. T. 3. M., 1947. P. 388-390.

4 Rabinovich A. Bolsheviks come to power. Revolution of 1917 in Petrograd. With. 297-280; "Day", October 22, 1917.

5 Memories of V.I. Lenin. T. 2. P. 448.

6 Lenin V.I. Full collection op. T. 34. P. 436.

8 See ibid. P. 390; “Ilyich’s last underground. Memories". pp. 23, 24, 88; Lenin and the October armed uprising in Petrograd. pp. 480-482.

9 Gordienko IM. From the military past. Moscow-Tashkent, 1933. P. 6.

10 Kalinin M.I. Selected works. T. 1. P. 147.

11 See: Lenin and the October armed uprising in Petrograd. P. 83; Rabinovich A. The Bolsheviks come to power. Revolution of 1917 in Petrograd. P. 287.

12 RGASPI, f. 4, op. 2, units hr. 5152, l. 86; Memories of V.I. Lenin. T. 2. P. 448.

13 See: “Ilyich’s Last Underground. Memories". pp. 88.89; Memories of V.I. Lenin. T. 2. P. 448.

14 Reed John. 10 days that shocked the world. M., 1957. P. 55,56.

15 “Ilyich’s last underground. Memories". pp. 89.90.

16 See: History of the Civil War in the USSR. T. 2. Ed. 2nd. M., 1947. P. 217; Lenin and the October armed uprising in Petrograd. pp. 100,103; Startsev V.I. From Razliv to Smolny. M., 1977. P. 173.

17 See: “Ilyich’s Last Underground. Memories". pp. 90.91.

18 "Proletarian Revolution". 1922. No. 10. P. 56; Trotsky L.D. About Lenin. pp. 74.75.

19 "Proletarian Revolution". 1922. No. 10. P. 56; “Ilyich’s last underground. Memories". P. 91.

20 “Ilyich’s last underground. Memories". P. 92; Milyutin V.P. About Lenin. M., 1924. S. 4-5.

21 Stalin I.V. Op. T. 4. pp. 317, 318.

22 "Proletarian Revolution". 1922. No. 10. P. 58.

23 Trotsky L.D. About Lenin. P. 75.

24 "Proletarian Revolution". 1927. No. 10. P. 170,171.

25 Kerensky A.F. From afar. Sat. articles (1920-1921). Paris, 1922. P. 200

26 See: From February to October. M., 1957. P. 64.283.

27 See: Rabinovich A. Bolsheviks come to power. Revolution of 1917 in Petrograd. pp. 292,293.

28 See: Lenin and the October armed uprising in Petrograd. P. 194; "Proletarian Revolution". 1922. No. 10. P. 55.56; Rabinovich A. The Bolsheviks come to power. Revolution of 1917 in Petrograd. P. 293.

29 Great October Socialist Revolution. T. October armed uprising in Petrograd. Documents and materials. P. 340.

30 Lenin V.I. Full collection op. T. 34. P. 436; Second All-Russian Congress of Soviets. M.-L., 1928. P. 108-109; "Pravda", 1917, October 29.

31 Lenin V.I. Full collection op. T. 34. P. 366.

32 Steinberg I. From February to October 1917. Berlin-Milan, b/g. P. 115.

33 Lenin V.I. Full collection op. T. 35. P. 36, 37; Memories of Lenin. T. 1. P. 470.

34 Mstislavsky S. Five days. 2nd ed. Berlin, 1922. pp. 121-122.

35 “Mensheviks in 1917.” T. 3. Part 2. pp. 220-223.

37 “Mensheviks in 1917.” T. 3. Part 2. P. 222; Galili Z., Heimson L., Miller V., Nenarokov A. RSDLP(o) in 1917. Documentary and historical essays. M., 2007. P. 293.

38 “Mensheviks in 1917.” T. 3. Part 2. P. 186, 252.

39 “Mensheviks in 1917.” T. 3. 4. 2. P. 221; Galili Z., Heimson L., Miller V., Nenarokov A. RSDLP(o) in 1917. Documentary and historical essays. P. 293.

40 See: “Mensheviks in 1917.” T. 3. Part 2. P. 185,224-226,252; Galili Z., Heimson L., Miller V., Nenarokov A. RSDLP(o) in 1917. Documentary and historical essays. P. 293.

41 Lenin V.I. Full collection op. T. 34. P. 245.

42 See ibid. P. 435.

43 Lutsky E.A. Meeting of the Central Committee of the RSDLP(b) on the night of October 25-26, 1917. “Questions in the history of the CPSU.” 1986. No. 11. P. 84.

44 Milyutin V.P. About Lenin. pp. 4-5.

45 RGASPI, fund No. 70, inventory No. 4, file No. 199, l. 60.

46 “Questions in the history of the CPSU.” 1989. No. 11. P. 132.

47 See: Milyutin V.P. About Lenin. S. 5; Lomov G. In the days of storm and stress. // “Proletarian Revolution”. 1927. No. 10. P. 171; "Questions in the history of the CPSU." 1986. No. 11. P. 134.

48 See: Milyutin V.P. About Lenin. S. 5; "Questions in the history of the CPSU." 1986. No. 11. P. 135-136.

49 See: Lenin collection. XXI. P. 51; Milyutin V.P. About Lenin. pp. 5.6; Trotsky L.D. My life. T. II, Berlin, 1930. P. 50, 60; Memoirs of A. Ioffe - RGASPI, fund No. 70, inventory No. 4, item. hr. 378, l. 170; "Questions of the history of the CPSU." 1986. No. 11. P. 135; O. Ravich - RGASPI, fund No. 70, inventory No. 4, storage unit. 199, l. 60.

50 See article by E.A. Lutsky in the journal. “Questions of the history of the CPSU” (1986. No. 11. P. 89).

51 See V. Loginov V.T. Vladimir Lenin. Choosing a path. P. 261.

52 RGASPI, fund No. 70, inventory No. 4, unit. hr. 378, l. 170.

53 Trotsky L.D. My life. T. II. pp. 61-63.

54 RGASPI, fund No. 70, inventory No. 4, unit. hr. 378, l. 170.

55 "Proletarian Revolution". 1927. No. 10. P. 171,172.

56 1917: private evidence of the revolution in the letters of Lunacharsky and Martov. M., 2005. P. 230,239; Lunacharsky A.V. About Vladimir Ilyich. M., 1933. P. 25.

57 RGASPI, fund No. 70, inventory No. 4, unit. hr. 378, l. 170.

58 Lenin V.I. Full collection op. T. 34. P. 114.

59 Ibid. P. 116.

60 “Questions in the history of the CPSU.” 1986. No. 11. P. 89.

61 Trotsky L.D. My life. T. II. pp. 58-59.

62 Milyutin V.P. About Lenin. S. 5.

63 "Proletarian Revolution". 1922. No. 10. P. 77; RGASPI, fund No. 70, inventory No. 4, unit. hr. 385, l. 70; "From February to October." P. 64; Trotsky L.D. My life. T. II Berlin. 1930. P. 59.

64 See: Lenin and the October armed uprising in Petrograd. P. 195; History of the Civil War. T. 2. P. 232,233.

65 Buchanan D. Memoirs of a diplomat. 2nd ed. M., 1925. P. 264.

66 See: History of the Civil War. T. 2. P. 235.

67 See: Polikarpov V.D. Military counter-revolution in Russia. 1905-1917. P. 313; Rabinovich A. The Bolsheviks come to power. Revolution of 1917 in Petrograd. P. 294.

68 See: Rabinovich A. Bolsheviks come to power. Revolution of 1917 in Petrograd. P. 303.

69 Reed John. 10 days that shocked the world. pp. 83,84,85.

70 See: Rabinovich A. Bolsheviks come to power. Revolution of 1917 in Petrograd. pp. 287,293.

71 See: “Historical Archive”. 1960. No. 6. P. 41; Rabinovich A. The Bolsheviks come to power. Revolution of 1917 in Petrograd. P. 295.

A common speech pattern that was widely used in Russian journalism at the beginning of the 20th century. For example, from V.I. Lenin: “Delay in the uprising is like death” (“Letter to the Bolshevik comrades participating in the regional congress of Soviets of the Northern region” dated October 8, 1917), “Delay in the uprising is like death”, “Delay in the uprising of death similar” (“Letter to members of the Central Committee” dated October 24, 1917). Also from the Chairman of the State Duma M.V. Rodzianko: “Any delay is like death” (telegram to Emperor Nicholas II dated February 26, 1917).

Even earlier, this expression is found in the Russian Emperor Peter I. In preparation for the Prut campaign against the Turks, he sent a letter (April 8, 1711) to the newly established Senate. Thanking the senators for their efforts to equip the troops, Peter demanded to continue to act without red tape, “before missing the time of death is like irrevocable death” (S. M. Soloviev, History of Russia since ancient times. T. 16. M., 1962).

The primary source is the phrase periculum in mora (from Latin: delay is dangerous) from the “History” of the Roman historian Titus Livy, which in Russia was often used without translation.

It is believed that this expression was first heard in ancient times, as a “historical phrase” by the Persian king Darius I (522-486 BC). But he said it before he became the ruler of Persia.

When the first Persian king Cyrus (who conquered the fabulously rich king of Lydia Croesus) died, his eldest son Cambyses ascended the throne, becoming a cruel, reckless ruler (530-522 BC). Fearing that his angry subjects would overthrow him and place his younger brother on the throne, the king ordered his secret death. And he simply “disappeared,” which was announced to the country.

When Cambyses went on a campaign against Egypt, the Median magician Gaumata, who ruled the royal court, took advantage of the situation. He announced that the “missing” prince had returned, and he himself began to rule the country on his behalf, without leaving the royal chambers. When Cambyses found out about this, he decided to urgently return to Susa, the capital of Persia, but on the way he died of blood poisoning. So Gaumata became the sole, sovereign ruler of Persia.

Nevertheless, the noble Persian Otan, whose daughter was the wife of the murdered prince, learned the truth. Despite the fact that the “returned” prince met his wife only at night, in complete darkness, she noticed that his ears were cut off - just like Gaumata, whom Cambyses once punished in this way for some offense. Otan immediately gathered the seven most noble, respected Persians and revealed to them a secret - the country was ruled not by a prince, but by an impostor, the magician Gaumata.

It was decided to find a way to overthrow this impostor. But Darius suggested doing this immediately, since one of those gathered might report the conspiracy and then everyone else would die. “Delay is like death!” - he said and demanded that none of those initiated into the secret leave the room until the evening. And in the evening everyone must go to the palace and kill Gaumata. This was done, and the impostor magician died from the sword of Darius himself, who became the new ruler of the Persian state.

Delay is like death

A common speech pattern that was widely used in Russian journalism at the beginning of the 20th century. For example, from V.I. Lenin: “Delay in the uprising is like death” (“Letter to the Bolshevik comrades participating in the regional congress of Soviets of the Northern region” dated October 8, 1917), “Delay in the uprising is like death”, “Delay in the uprising of death similar” (“Letter to members of the Central Committee” dated October 24, 1917). Also from the Chairman of the State Duma M.V. Rodzianko: “Any delay is like death” (telegram to Emperor Nicholas II dated February 26, 1917).

Even earlier, this expression is found in the Russian Emperor Peter I. In preparation for the Prut campaign against the Turks, he sent a letter (April 8, 1711) to the newly established Senate. Thanking the senators for their efforts to equip the troops, Peter demanded to continue to act without red tape, “before missing the time of death is like irrevocable death” (S. M. Soloviev, History of Russia since ancient times. T. 16. M., 1962).

The primary source is the phrase periculum in mora (from Latin: delay is dangerous) from the “History” of the Roman historian Titus Livy, which in Russia was often used without translation.

It is believed that this expression was first heard in ancient times, as a “historical phrase” by the Persian king Darius I (522-486 BC). But he said it before he became the ruler of Persia.

When the first Persian king Cyrus (who conquered the fabulously rich king of Lydia Croesus) died, his eldest son Cambyses ascended the throne, becoming a cruel, reckless ruler (530-522 BC). Fearing that his angry subjects would overthrow him and place his younger brother on the throne, the king ordered his secret death. And he simply “disappeared,” which was announced to the country.

When Cambyses went on a campaign against Egypt, the Indian magician Gaumata, who ruled the royal court, took advantage of the situation. He announced that the “missing” prince had returned, and he himself began to rule the country on his behalf, without leaving the royal chambers. When Cambyses found out about this, he decided to urgently return to Susa, the capital of Persia, but on the way he died of blood poisoning. So Gaumata became the sole, sovereign ruler of Persia.

Nevertheless, the noble Persian Otan, whose daughter was the wife of the murdered prince, learned the truth. Despite the fact that the “returned” prince met his wife only at night, in complete darkness, she noticed that his ears were cut off - just like Gaumata, whom Cambyses once punished in this way for some offense. Otan immediately gathered the seven most noble, respected Persians and revealed to them a secret - the country was ruled not by a prince, but by an impostor, the magician Gaumata.

It was decided to find a way to overthrow this impostor. But Darius suggested doing this immediately, since one of those gathered might report the conspiracy and then everyone else would die. “Delay is like death!” - he said and demanded that none of those initiated into the secret leave the room until the evening. And in the evening everyone must go to the palace and kill Gaumata. This was done, and the impostor magician died from the sword of Darius himself, who became the new ruler of the Persian state.