Why did Stalin win in the struggle for leadership? Why did Stalin win? (instead of conclusion).

WHY DID STALIN WIN?

(INstead of a CONCLUSION)

In April 1929, from the Leninist Politburo, which was formed in the early 1920s, only Stalin remained in this highest body of power of the ruling party. Why did Stalin manage to prevail over all other inhabitants of the Soviet political Olympus?

From the point of view of some of the vanquished, it turned out that their defeat was accidental, since Stalin had no merits. One of the prominent Trotskyists, I. Smirnov, in a conversation with Trotsky, said that Stalin was “a completely gray and insignificant person,” L.B. Kamenev considered Stalin “a leader of a district scale,” and Trotsky called Stalin “the most outstanding mediocrity.”

In his unfinished book about Stalin, Trotsky wrote: “He has neither theoretical imagination, nor historical farsightedness, nor the gift of anticipation... In the field of knowledge, especially linguistics, Stalin’s sedentary mind always looked for the line of least resistance... Stalin’s willpower is not inferior , perhaps, Lenin’s willpower. But his mental abilities will be measured by some ten to twelve percent, if we take Lenin as the unit of measurement. In turn, in the field of intellect, Stalin has a new disproportion: the extraordinary development of practical insight and cunning at the expense of the ability to generalize and creative imagination.” Trotsky assured that Stalin’s “primitiveness of mind” was also combined with many spiritual shortcomings that manifested themselves in his behavior: “He feels like a provincial, moves forward slowly, steps heavily and looks around enviously.” “Rudeness represents Stalin’s organic quality.” From the reasoning of Trotsky, who rated himself very highly, it turned out rather illogically that he was defeated by a man distinguished by many mental and spiritual defects.

In order to somehow explain his defeat, his opponents often repeated that Stalin achieved victories over them thanks to secret

ny behind-the-scenes intrigues. Bukharin spoke about Stalin’s “intrigue.” Trotsky assured: “The apparatus created Stalin.” There is no doubt that, having learned the precept “be wise as serpents” back in theological schools, Stalin showed exceptional ingenuity when he needed to isolate his political opponents and deprive them of the levers of control. However, its success can hardly be attributed solely to hardware games.

Stephen Cohen also rejected this explanation: “Stalin’s triumph was ensured not only by the political machine. As far as the Central Committee is concerned, it could count on the loyalty or benevolent neutrality of the delegates of lower and middle rank, nominated thanks to Stalin's patronage... However, despite the fact that these junior party workers were members of the Central Committee, in 1928-1929 their role was secondary. In fact, they only approved decisions made by a narrower, unofficial group of senior members of the Central Committee - an oligarchy of twenty to thirty influential persons, such as senior party leaders and heads of the most important delegations to the Central Committee (representing, first of all, Moscow, Leningrad, Siberia , Northern Caucasus, Urals and Ukraine)... As administrators and political figures, they were often associated with the General Secretary, but for the most part they were not thoughtless political creatures, but were themselves major, independently-minded leaders... By April 1929, these influential people preferred Stalin and provided him with a majority in the top leadership.”

Last but not least, the choice in favor of Stalin was made because he was much more responsible for his work and coped with it much better than his opponents. While they were relaxing at resorts and writing articles about art, he was forced to deal alone with difficult issues of the national economy. Stalin's opponents often avoided solving complex issues, preferring bright declarations from the stands.

People who were accustomed to seeing Trotsky, Zinoviev, Bukharin and others not only in the stands, but where the most important decisions for the Soviet state were made, had no illusions about their business qualities. They knew that Trotsky's noisy reputation was largely exaggerated, and his organizational "talents" were manifested mainly in orders threatening executions. Roy Medvedev cited an excerpt from a letter from army worker V. Trifonov, who at the height of the Civil War called Trotsky “a most mediocre organizer” and emphasized: “The army was not created by Trotsky, but by us, ordinary army workers. Where Trotsky tried to work, confusion immediately began. Confusion has no place in an organism, and military affairs is precisely such an organism.”

Zinoviev was also characterized as a weak worker. Trotsky was not exaggerating much when he said: “In favorable periods... Zinoviev very easily climbed to seventh heaven. When things went badly, Zinoviev lay down on the sofa, not in a metaphorical, but in a real sense.” Trotsky confirmed this characterization with the words of Sverdlov: “Zinoviev is panic.” Summarizing these and other assessments of Zinoviev, Roy Medvedev, who was by no means inclined to denigrate Stalin’s opponents, wrote: “Many people who knew Zinoviev well, not without reason, noted not only his great activity, but also his lack of restraint, unscrupulousness in means, and a tendency to demagoguery.” , as well as exceptional ambition and vanity. “He was a man who few people aroused sincere sympathy.”

Having rated Zinoviev's business qualities low, Medvedev rated Kamenev's abilities even lower, noting that he was "inferior to them (Zinoviev and Stalin) as an administrator." Although Lenin relied on his diligence, Kamenev was not distinguished by business zeal and more than once stated among his friends that it would be much better if the Bolsheviks did not take power, but limited themselves to remaining in the parliamentary opposition. Prone to sybarism, Kamenev believed that it would be easier for him to make an accusatory speech in the Duma and then take a break from righteous labors than to solve the endless business of governing the country, which did not give a moment of rest.

Regarding why members of the party leadership preferred Stalin to Bukharin, S. Cohen wrote: “To some extent, their choice was certainly determined by the fact that they felt a kinship with the General Secretary, as with a strong-willed “practical politician,” while a soft, immersed in theory, Bukharin could perhaps seem “just a boy” in comparison. Stalin had a huge advantage over Bukharin, who characterized himself as “the worst organizer in Russia.” Commenting on this remark by Bukharin about himself, Cohen wrote: “Although this is undoubtedly an exaggeration, Bukharin appears to have greatly skimped on his organizational responsibilities.”

People who constantly observed the top Soviet leaders could not help but notice that, unlike his rivals, Stalin took upon himself a huge burden of assignments, the execution of which was often associated with intense and often thankless work. It was for these qualities that Lenin valued Stalin.

Stalin's passion for work was organically combined with his efficiency and willingness to discuss complex state issues with people of different positions. Deutscher wrote: “His appearance and behavior personified modesty. He was more accessible to the average clerk or party worker than other leaders... Although reserved, he was an unrivaled master of listening patiently to others.

Sometimes you could see him sitting in the corner, puffing on his pipe and not moving, listening to the excited narrator for an hour, or even two hours, only occasionally breaking his silence with a couple of questions. This was one of his qualities that demonstrated his lack of selfishness.”

Many testified to Stalin’s high demands on himself and in his personal life. Deutscher noted that “Stalin’s personal life was impeccable and did not arouse suspicion.” His personal secretary, who fled abroad, Bazhanov wrote: “This passionate politician has no other vices. He does not like money, pleasures, sports, or women. Women other than his wife do not exist.”

Although Stalin’s position did not allow him to devote much time to his family and raising children, as was almost always the case with major statesmen, he was an exemplary family man and tried his best to fulfill parental responsibilities even after the suicide of Nadezhda Alliluyeva in 1932. Stalin's kind and gentle attitude towards children did not prevent him from being strict towards his children, especially when he saw that they took for granted the benefits due to their family. In June 1938, he sent a letter to V.V. Martyshin, a teacher at the flight school where his son Vasily studied. Stalin regretted that his son was “spoiled by all sorts of godfathers and godmothers,” who constantly emphasized that he was “Stalin’s son.” He gave the teacher “advice: demand stricter from Vasily and not be afraid of the capricious man’s false, blackmailing threats about “suicide.” You will have my support in this."

His nephew Vladimir Alliluyev recalled how indignant Stalin was when, while visiting his relatives, he discovered that the chocolates in the box were covered with mold. “Then everyone got it - the children for being too greedy and not eating even such sweets, the adults for not taking care of the children well and rotting food that was not yet abundant in the country.” Stalin believed that his children and the children of his relatives should not perceive themselves as “special” due to the position of their parents.

Stalin's lifestyle corresponded to popular ideas about a proletarian leader, unlike, for example, Trotsky, who loved to organize noisy parties in the Kremlin, which were crowned with collective hunting trips in the Moscow region. Deicher wrote that Stalin and Alliluyeva “lived in a small apartment in a house that was intended for servants in the Kremlin... The stamp of everyday life and even asceticism lay on the personal life of the General Secretary, and this circumstance made a favorable impression on the party, whose members were guided by Puritan principles.” morals and therefore were concerned about the first signs of corruption and debauchery in the Kremlin.”

The fact that this style of behavior of the spouses was preserved even after Stalin became the first leader of the party and the country confirms the transfer.

squeak between Nadezhda Alliluyeva and Stalin. So, in September 1929, Alliluyeva, who at that time was studying at the Industrial Academy, wrote from the Kremlin: “Joseph, send me, if you can, rubles. 50, they will give me money only on 15/IX at the Industrial Academy, and now I’m sitting without a penny. If you send it, it will be good. Nadia". Ten days later, Stalin answers her from Sochi: “I forgot to send you money. I am sending them (120 rubles) with a comrade who is leaving today, without waiting for the next courier. Kiss. Your Joseph." Since we are talking about an amount that amounted to about a month's salary of a skilled worker, it is quite clear that the spouses did not have any cash savings. And apparently, Stalin’s wife did not even think about purchasing anything on credit.

From the correspondence it is clear that in many cases spouses are accustomed to doing without outside help. So, while in Sochi, Stalin asked not the secretaries serving him, but Alliluyeva, so that she could find him an English language self-instruction manual, a textbook on metallurgy and a textbook on electrical engineering, and she, without turning to anyone for help, looked for these books herself. At the same time, Stalin sent his letters to his wife by regular mail. One day, Stalin’s letter from Sochi disappeared, and the search for it led nowhere.

Of course, the financial situation of the spouses was incomparably better than that of ordinary Soviet citizens. And yet, many aspects of the family’s life were no different from the lives of most Muscovites. From Alliluyeva’s letters it follows that members of Stalin’s family used public transport, and not personal cars, to move around Moscow, like other residents of the capital. Alliluyeva shared with Stalin her impressions of her trips on the Moscow tram. She informed Stalin about the queues for milk that arose at the end of 1929, and about the mood of people in the fall of 1930, about construction in Moscow and the condition of Moscow streets. She also wrote to Stalin in Sochi that, despite the sub-zero temperature at the beginning of October 1930, the Moscow authorities ordered not to heat houses until October 15 and she, like the rest of the Industrial Academy students, had to wear a coat to class.

After Alliluyeva's death, Stalin did not change his lifestyle. He, as before, made do with a minimum of servants. Security guard M. Starostin recalled: “I worked under Stalin from 1937 to 1953... I declare that Stalin never had an orderly.” A. Rybin testifies: “Stalin usually did not bother others, serving himself. He shaved with a safety razor and trimmed his mustache with scissors.” He mentioned only Matryona Butuzova, who “was in charge of the dishes in the closet at the nearby dacha, looked after Stalin’s shoes, ironed his jacket and cleaned the office. Stalin respected her very much for her hard work and even gave her his portrait with the inscription.”

Marshal Zhukov recalled: “As you know, Y.V. Stalin led a very modest lifestyle. The food was simple - from Russian cuisine, sometimes Georgian dishes were prepared. There are no frills in the furnishings, clothing and life of I.V. Stalin was not there." Air Chief Marshal Golovanov had a similar impression: “I had the opportunity to observe Stalin in everyday life. This life was amazingly modest. Stalin owned only what he was wearing. He didn’t have any wardrobes.”

Stalin was completely unpretentious in his clothes. In his diary M.A. Svanidze wrote on November 4, 1934 about Stalin: “He always has difficulty changing clothes according to the seasons, wears summer clothes for a long time, which he obviously gets used to, and the same story in the spring and also with suits, when they wear out and you need to put on a new one.” A. Rybin told what tricks the staff of Stalin’s dacha had to go to in order to change the collapsed furniture or at least force the generalissimo to put on new low shoes. In response, Stalin sternly demanded that his old, worn-out shoes be returned to him, and the maids had difficulty “managing to hide the dilapidation of the shoes with the shine of cream.”

Referring to the memoirs of the chief of government security, General B.C. Ryasny, Felix Chuev wrote that after his death “it became clear that there was nothing to bury Stalin in. Ryasnoy opened the closet, and there were only four suits - two Generalissimo and two civilian, gray and black. They made it black when Mao Zedong came, it was specially made, by force, and Stalin never wore it. Moreover, there was a bekesha hanging - old, shabby, faded. “She was probably a hundred years old, by God,” says Ryasnoy. - He would put on a bekesha or an arkhaluk, like a fur coat, and walk around the garden. (Apparently, Ryasnoy meant the famous Turukhansk dokha. - Note auto) One Generalissimo jacket was all dirty and greasy, and the other was shredded... A new suit was not sewn. Stalin lay in a coffin in his old, but tolerable one: the sleeves had been hemmed, the jacket had been cleaned.”

It is unlikely that such unpretentiousness in clothing could be explained by the desire to cultivate asceticism for show, if only because the personal lives of leaders in Soviet times were hidden from the public. Stalin led a lifestyle that basically met the needs of a person brought up in poverty and taught in theological schools to moderation and modesty, which was very different from many leaders who had the opportunity, due to their position, to satisfy any desires. Considering his work to be the most important thing in his life, Stalin did not attach much importance to how he looked from the outside and whether his outfit corresponded to ideas about fashion or not. For example, his reluctance to buy new shoes was explained by his chronic pain in his feet. Therefore he probably

I preferred worn-out shoes. He even made holes in his boots himself so as not to injure his sore feet.

He preferred cheap and simple convenience. Rybin wrote about Stalin’s “nearby” dacha: “There were no swimming pools or massage rooms at the dacha. No luxury either.” Although Stalin used state cars and lived in various dachas, they were not his personal property. Not a single one of the expensive gifts presented to him as the leader of the country, not a single one of the household items from the Kremlin apartment or dachas remained the property of his children. Stalin's monetary savings, inherited by his children, also turned out to be small. A. Rybin said that after Stalin’s death, an employee of his personal security, Starostin, “discovered a savings book. Only nine hundred rubles had accumulated there - all the leader’s wealth (at that time such an amount was approximately half a month’s wages of a skilled worker. - Note ed.). Starostin handed over the savings book to Svetlana.”

Summarizing his impressions of Stalin’s life and personal life, Air Chief Marshal Golovanov noted: “There was nothing remarkable or special in his personal life. It seemed gray and colorless to me. Apparently because, in our usual understanding, he simply didn’t have it.”

However, Stalin was valued not only as a modest and conscientious worker who devoted himself entirely to work. Prominent leaders of the USSR saw in him the author of original and necessary government decisions. S. Cohen wrote: “It seems clear that they did so not because of the bureaucratic power that he possessed, but because they preferred his leadership and his policies.”

This opinion was shared by other Sovietologists. Without discounting the importance of the post of General Secretary for Stalin’s success, Robert Tucker pointed out that only this circumstance “cannot explain the events of that time. A candidate for the role of leader would need to propose an attractive program and make it convincing to the highest party circles.” Agreeing with him, Jerry Hough noted that “only 45 percent of the members of the Central Committee were party functionaries, while the industrialization program proposed by Stalin was attractive to the growing number of economic leaders on the Central Committee. (They were 20 percent of the total number of members of the Central Committee in 1927.)"

It should be taken into account that the struggle on the Soviet political Olympus required considerable knowledge of Marxist theory and good knowledge of current information on various domestic and foreign policy issues. In addition, the guidelines in the internal party struggle were constantly changing. At first, Zinoviev, Kamenev and Stalin branded Trotsky for

betrayal of Leninism, and Trotsky accused members of the triumvirate of the same sedition, but soon Zinoviev, Kamenev and Trotsky renounced their accusations against each other. At first, Bukharin accused Kamenev and Zinoviev of apostasy from Leninism, and they saw Bukharin as a dangerous “deviator” from Lenin’s course, but then these former opponents created a common bloc against Stalin.

During the internal party struggle, Stalin also changed his position more than once. Either he condemned Trotsky for his attacks on Zinoviev and Kamenev on the eve of the October uprising, or he spoke of the justice of Lenin’s accusations of “strikebreaking” against Zinoviev and Kamenev. Either Stalin defended Bukharin from Zinoviev and Kamenev’s accusations of “kulak deviation” and said that he would not give them “Bukharin’s blood,” then he himself accused Bukharin of encouraging the kulaks and demanded his resignation from prominent posts. Either Stalin condemned Preobrazhensky for his calls for the robbery of the village, then he announced the need to impose a “tribute” on the peasantry. To understand these disputes, it was necessary not only to have great general cultural knowledge and to be well informed, but also to understand the true background of the positions of political leaders. And to do this, one had to be a member of the Central Committee, as D. Hough believed, or be part of a narrow circle of the most influential persons in the party leadership, as S. Cohen believed.

And yet there were issues that were equally acute for both the party elite and ordinary party members. From its very beginning, the history of the Bolshevik Party was marked by incessant intra-party struggle, fraught with splits. The prospect of a split in the party, which had overcome the enormous difficulties of underground life, and after coming to power found itself surrounded by the overwhelming non-party majority of the country, caused alarm among all its members, and therefore the “schismatics” were resolutely condemned by its majority. Mensheviks, otzovists, liquidators, ultimatists, left communists, the military opposition, the workers' opposition, decisists, all kinds of "national deviationists", the authors of various "letters" and "platforms", that is, everyone who, for several decades, opposed "general line" of the party.

Since the early 1920s Trotsky had been such a troublemaker, and it is not surprising that the vast majority of party members at various levels opposed him and his supporters. Zinoviev and Kamenev were the first to oppose Stalin, Bukharin and other members of the Politburo and organized a “revolt” of the Leningrad organization against the majority of the congress delegates. Their association with Trotsky, that eternal rebel against Lenin and then against Stalin, the renunciation of the decisions for which they voted, the refusal of their own fierce criticism of Trotsky only strengthened the impression of them as schismatics.

kakh party and unprincipled politicians seeking to usurp power, regardless of the will of the majority.

Likewise, Bukharin, Rykov and Tomsky were the first to oppose the Politburo's decisions on emergency measures for which they had recently voted. It seemed that they were sabotaging coordinated work aimed at resolving state issues, dragging the party into an unconstructive discussion. Negotiations with Kamenev showed the unscrupulousness of Bukharin and his supporters in his struggle for personal power. Stalin’s opponents’ violation of agreed decisions, their opposition of their “platforms” to the “general line” of the party, their alliances with former political opponents prevented the attraction of wavering members of the Politburo and the Central Committee, and then the rest of the party members, to their side.

In contrast to his opponents, Stalin for the overwhelming majority of the party leadership and its ordinary members personified unity in the party. This position flowed organically from all his party activities. He stood firmly in the position of the Leninist majority since 1903. In 1909, in Baku, he sounded the alarm about the threat of the party splitting “into separate organizations.” Then he constantly supported the Leninist majority, even in those cases when he clearly did not agree with the prevailing opinion.

To ensure party unity during the discussions of the 1920s, Stalin repeatedly demonstrated his readiness to overcome differences, seek compromise and the ability to forget past heated disputes in the name of a common cause. Deutscher wrote that “at that time it seemed to many people that, compared with other Bolshevik leaders, Stalin was not the most intolerant. He was less vicious in his attacks on his opponents compared to the other triumvirs. His speeches always contained notes of good-natured and slightly cheerful optimism, which corresponded to the prevailing complacent mood. In the Politburo, when important political issues were discussed, he never imposed his views on his colleagues. He followed the debate closely to see which way the wind was blowing, and invariably voted with the majority unless he first ensured that the majority acted as he saw fit. Therefore, it has always been acceptable to the majority. To the party audience, he did not seem like a man who had personal gain or harbored a personal grudge. He seemed to be a devoted Leninist, a guardian of doctrine who criticized others solely in the name of the cause. He gave such an impression even when he spoke behind closed doors of the Politburo.”

While being active in the fight against Trotsky, Stalin at the same time objected to harsh measures that could provoke

unnecessary unrest among party members, and, contrary to the position of Zinoviev and Kamenev, insisted on leaving Trotsky in the Politburo. From the very first days of the emergence of the “new” opposition, Stalin tried to stop the development of the conflict, offering a compromise before the start of the XIV Congress. In his report at this congress, he ignored the differences that had arisen and drew attention to the common features that united the party. Although Stalin was harsh in his assessments and accusations, during two years of polemics with the “new” and then “united” opposition, he more than once advocated compromise solutions, objecting to the immediate expulsion of Trotsky, Zinoviev, Kamenev from the party.

Party members saw that Stalin dealt with his opponents in much the same way as they always dealt with “deviators” in the past history of the party. After being severely condemned and admitting their mistakes, opposition leaders could expect to be retained in their previous posts. At first, Stalin refrained from “cutting off” prominent figures, and only a protracted struggle with Trotsky, Zinoviev and their supporters led to a change in the methods of punishing them. In addition, it was obvious that no matter what accusations were thrown at him, Stalin was ready to turn a blind eye to it if the discussion was of a private nature and “the dirty linen was not washed in public.” For this reason, he was ready to forgive Bukharin both “Genghis Khan” and the “schemer” and offer him a compromise.

Later, these actions of Stalin were regarded as a manifestation of Jesuit cunning, aimed at breaking up his rivals piece by piece and then destroying them. However, in contrast to this statement, examples can be given that Stalin was ready to ignore past participation in the opposition, hesitation, behind-the-scenes intrigues and harsh words addressed to him and leave people in high positions if they stopped the internal party struggle. Despite the fact that N.S. Khrushchev was a Trotskyist, and A.A. Andreev played a prominent role in the Trotskyist opposition, Stalin contributed to their election to the Politburo. And although Andreev promised support to the “right,” as follows from Bukharin’s conversation with Kamenev, he remained in the Politburo until 1952, until he lost his ability to work. Both Kalinin, who was considered “right,” and Kuibyshev, who “vacillated” between Stalin and the “right,” remained the leaders of the country until their death. Stalin did not try to get rid of Ordzhonikidze, who more than once “abusively scolded” him and insisted on removing Stalin from the post of General Secretary, or Voroshilov, who had a reputation as either “right-wing” or “vacillating” (and Trotsky even saw in him a potential Bonaparte, who will overthrow Soviet power). Only Jesuit cunning cannot explain why Rykov, who together with Bukharin participated in the opposition protests of 1928-

1929, remained as chairman of the Council of People's Commissars until the end of 1930. Of course, this post could have been occupied by many of Stalin’s consistent supporters already at the beginning of 1929.

It is unlikely that Stalin’s willingness to compromise with yesterday’s opponents or to forget past hesitations and harsh words addressed to himself was explained by his kindness or gentleness. Most likely it was a sober political calculation. Firstly, it was obvious to Stalin that if the party’s “general line” failed, those who were not involved in its implementation would get trump cards. Therefore, it was important to achieve not the overthrow of one’s opponents from the political Olympus, but their renunciation of political views, to ensure that they support the “general line” of the party and even actively participate in the work of a single “team.” Secondly, Stalin was aware that the expulsion from the leadership of everyone who had ever shown hesitation or spoken out against him could turn unsteady supporters into fierce enemies not only of him personally, but also of the government, and then of the system. Thirdly, frequent and large-scale overthrows of the country’s illustrious leaders from the political Olympus would indicate the instability of the “general line” and would discredit the party. The position of the party in the country has never been absolutely unshakable, and discord in the leadership could become a reason for protests against the system. Therefore, even in cases where separation from former Politburo colleagues was inevitable, Stalin tried to make it gradual and not turn it into a group exile.

Fourthly - no matter how much it contradicts the most stable ideas about Stalin - he was not interested in being surrounded by those who agreed with him on everything. Contrary to popular belief, Stalin not only did not suppress dissent in the process of discussing various issues, but actively encouraged it. This was recognized even by his opponents, such as Mikoyan and Khrushchev after his death. Describing the course of Politburo meetings under Stalin, A.I. Mikoyan testified: “Each of us had every opportunity to express and defend our opinion or proposal. We openly discussed the most complex and controversial issues (for myself, I can speak about this with full responsibility), meeting Stalin’s understanding, reasonable and tolerant attitude in most cases, even when our statements were clearly not to his liking. He was also attentive to the generals' suggestions. Stalin listened to what he was told and advised, listened with interest to the debates, skillfully extracting from them the very truth that later helped him formulate the final, most appropriate decisions, thus born as a result of collective discussion. Moreover, it often happened when,

Convinced by our arguments, Stalin changed his initial point of view on this or that issue.”

Even a memoirist as averse to Stalin as Khrushchev admitted: “And here’s what’s interesting (which was also characteristic of Stalin): this man, in an angry outburst, could cause great evil. But when you prove that you are right and if at the same time you give him sound facts, he will eventually understand that the person is defending a useful cause and will support... There have been cases when you persistently object to him, and if he is convinced that you are right, he will retreat from his point of view and will accept the point of view of his interlocutor. This is, of course, a positive quality.”

Stalin's concern for party unity ensured him widespread support among ordinary communists. Jerry Hough had reason to recognize Stalin as “the exponent of powerful tendencies in Bolshevism (especially the nationalist trend and the desire for industrialization).”

The defeat of the opposition leaders was explained by the fact that they did not understand these tendencies and sentiments in the party, opposing them with theoretical schemes of the world revolution and purely personal political interests. Explaining Trotsky's defeat, Stalin, unlike his opponent, first of all spoke about his merits: “Does Trotsky have no will, no desire to lead?.. Is he a lesser speaker than the current leaders of our party? Would it not be more correct to say that, as an orator, Trotsky stands above many of the current leaders of our party? How can we explain in this case that Trotsky, despite his oratory, despite his will to lead, despite his abilities, found himself thrown away from the leadership of the great party called the CPSU (b)? Stalin believed that all of Trotsky’s merits were negated by his separation from ordinary party members. Assessing Trotsky’s arrogant statements about the party masses, Stalin said: “Only people who despise it and consider it the rabble can speak about our party in this way. This is the view of a seedy party aristocrat on the party as a voting baranta.”

Stalin was always alien to “aristocrats”, divorced from life, but imagining themselves as “high priests”. Coming from the people, Stalin, from the time of his underground revolutionary activities, tried to take into account the aspirations of the working people and respond to them. (Trotsky noted with contempt: “Only in the circle of primitive people, decisive and not bound by prejudices, did he become smoother and more friendly.”)

Of course, Stalin’s opponents, whom he condemned for “deviating” from proletarian positions, and later for betraying the cause of the working class, also considered themselves spokesmen for the interests of the proletariat. However, unlike Stalin, Trotsky, Zinoviev, Kamenev, Bukharin perceived

the Mali proletariat is largely in a bookish way, in isolation from Russian reality. This was greatly facilitated by the fact that they lived abroad for a long time and formed as prominent party figures in foreign emigration, where they were also divorced from the real life of the workers. In accordance with their purely theoretical ideas, only the proletariat of a highly developed capitalist country, which constituted the majority of its population and had accumulated centuries of experience in class struggle, could carry out a socialist revolution and, relying on the help of the proletarians of the same developed countries, build socialism. The Russian proletariat did not meet these ideas.

Knowing the theoretical principles of Marxism and possessing book information about the labor movement of Western countries, the most prominent opponents of Stalin had no experience in fighting for the rights of Russian workers. They knew little about the problems of Russian workers, had a more abstract idea of the characteristics of the Russian proletariat, and therefore underestimated its capabilities. To a large extent for this reason, Trotsky and Bukharin, during the negotiations in Brest, proceeded from the fact that the fate of the Russian revolution would be decided by the international proletariat. Disbelief in the ability of the working people of the Soviet country to build a developed socialist society lay at the heart of the platforms of the united opposition of Trotsky, Kamenev, and Zinoviev.

Trotsky wrote that the Russian proletariat “was formed under the barbaric conditions of tsarism and backward capitalism, and therefore in no way corresponded to the tasks of the socialist revolution.” The “backward” proletariat of Russia, according to Trotsky, exhausted its potential in the October Revolution, after which came “a long period of fatigue, decline and disappointment in the results of the revolution.”

Unlike Trotsky and other oppositionists, Stalin saw enormous creative potential in the country's working class. He declared “the question of the cultural forces of the working class... one of the decisive issues,” and “therefore, any means that can raise the level of development of the cultural forces of the working class, any means that can facilitate the development of skills and ability in the working class to manage the country and industry , - any such means must be used to the fullest by us.” The country's working class, which Stalin tried to rely on, was a minority of the population, but a rapidly growing minority. As Stalin noted in his report at the XV Congress, in just two years (from the 1924/25 economic year to the 1926/27 economic year) the number of hired workers increased from 8,215,000 to 10,346,000. “An increase of 25 percent,” summarized Stalin. During the same period, the number of manual workers, including agricultural and seasonal workers, increased from 5,448,000 to 7,060,000 - an increase of 29.6 percent.

cent." During these same years, the number of workers in large-scale industry increased from 1,794,000 to 2,388,000, and Stalin summed up: “An increase of 33 percent.”

Millions of recent inhabitants of peasant communities came to the country's rapidly growing cities and new enterprises. They brought with them to the cities and factories many outdated and erroneous ideas about the world, absurd prejudices against “outsiders.” At the same time, they were carriers of the powerful “cultural forces” that Stalin spoke about. They entered the new Soviet life with enormous potential for physical and mental health, possessing powerful fortitude. Stalin contributed to the development of the “cultural forces” of the working class, encouraging the “Leninist call”, the study of party members of this call, and promoting the most talented people from the people to responsible positions. The new bosses, like the new employees and workers, were free from many rigid and conservative habits, but at the same time, being people from the people, they brought into city life a love of folk culture, a commitment to traditional moral principles, and deep patriotism. .

It can hardly be considered that AC. Ratiev, a descendant of the Russian branch of the ancient Georgian family of Ratishvili, greatly distorted the words of L.D. Trotsky in a speech he gave in December 1918 in Kursk: “Patriotism, love for the homeland, for one’s people, for those around him, distant and close, for those living at this very moment, for those thirsting for small, imperceptible happiness, self-sacrifice, heroism - what value are all these empty words!..”

Trotsky particularly disliked the pride of the Russian people for the achievements of their national culture. He wrote that Russia was “sentenced by nature itself to a long period of backwardness,” that the pre-revolutionary culture of Russia “was only a superficial imitation of the highest Western models and contributed nothing to the treasury of humanity.” Although Bukharin acted as an opponent of Trotsky, he was also inclined to belittle the importance of the Russian people and their potential, which was clearly manifested in his attacks on Yesenin’s work, and in his thesis about the need to put the Russian people, that is, the majority of the country’s population, in an unequal position on on the basis that before the revolution the Great Russians were an “oppressive nation.”

Being a recognized party expert on the national issue, Stalin understood the role and importance of the national factor and condemned the nihilistic attitude towards national culture and patriotism. Stalin rejected the disdain for the Russian historical and cultural heritage, so widespread in the country after 1917, seeing this as a humiliation and insult to the Russian proletariat. In a letter to the poet Demyan Bedny dated December 12, 1930, Stalin wrote:

“The whole world now recognizes that the center of the revolutionary movement has moved from Western Europe to Russia... The revolutionary workers of all countries unanimously applaud the Soviet working class, and above all Russian to the working class, the vanguard of Soviet workers, as their recognized leader... And you? Instead of comprehending this greatest process in the history of the revolution and rising to the height of the tasks of the singer of the advanced proletariat, they went somewhere into the hollow and, confused between the most boring quotes from the works of Karamzin and no less boring sayings from Domostroi, began to proclaim to the whole world , that Russia in the past represented a vessel of abomination and desolation, ... that “laziness” and the desire to “sit on the stove” is almost a national trait of Russians in general, and therefore of Russian workers, who, having carried out the October Revolution, of course, did not stopped being Russian." The value of these remarks was enhanced by the fact that they were written by a Georgian, addressing a Russian intellectual.

Being a bearer of the traditions of folk culture, Stalin was well aware that pride in his people, in his culture, in the history of his country was a powerful driving force, more effective than the dream of a world revolution. Party members of the “Leninist call” and Stalin’s nominees were the same people who came from the people’s environment. Their thoughts and moods were consonant with the sentiments of Stalin, and therefore they supported the course of building a prosperous society of social justice in their country, without waiting for the victory of the world revolution.

Their peasant social origin and their current social status as urban workers and employees were reflected in the contradictions and zigzags of the party's policy on the peasant question. Like yesterday's peasants, they supported Stalin when he condemned the course of exploitation of the countryside, advocated a “connection with the countryside,” for caring for the peasant economy and attentive attitude towards the peasants. At the same time, leaving the village, they were leaving the attraction of property and market relations. By becoming city dwellers, they gained a sense of superiority over the peasants, who remained in the vicious circle of their village ideas and the hardships of peasant labor. They willingly accepted Soviet ideology, which convinced them of the superiority of the urban worker over the rural owner, and quickly turned into supporters of deep socialist transformations in the countryside.

The zigzags of the general party line pursued by Stalin, as well as the contradictory justifications for its implementation, ultimately reflected the changeable and contradictory reality of those years. The policy of “war communism”, NEP, and then the transition from NEP to building socialism in one country were perceived by a significant part of the country’s population as necessary ways to strengthen the situation

Soviet power and solving important problems of society in a specific historical situation.

When NEP helped to get out of the devastation after the Civil War, it suited all the working people of the country. However, in the late 1920s it became obvious to Stalin and his supporters that the interests of the rapidly growing working class were in conflict with the new economic policy. Food shortages in many cities in 1927 increased dissatisfaction with the NEP on the part of the working class. Remembering his youth in the 1920s, member of the Brezhnev Politburo K.T. Mazurov said: “The NEP brought prosperity to trade and small business, and peasants began to live better. But it was still very difficult for the workers. There was often no bread on their table. Their discontent grew... The workers thought: let them put pressure on those who are hiding the bread, and it will appear to us.” As noted by historians G.A. Bordyugov and V.A. Kozlov: “The working class did not become the social force that clung to and fought for the principles of NEP... When social problems worsened in 1927, food difficulties arose, when “fence books” (ration card system of food supply) were introduced in 1928, “Nothing tied the workers to the NEP anymore.” However, a significant part of the peasantry did not support the NEP and market relations. Bordyugov and Kozlov wrote that “35% of peasants exempt from paying agricultural taxes, proletarian, semi-proletarian and poor elements of the village - were they interested in preserving the NEP? Those benefits and class guarantees that the rural poor enjoyed in the 1920s were guaranteed to them by direct government intervention in the economy.”

The transition of the party leadership from defending NEP in the fight against the Trotskyists, and then Zinovievites, to abandoning NEP was perceived positively by the majority of the country's working class when the NEP crisis began. By proposing a radical solution: to build socialism in one country in the shortest possible time, Stalin received the support of the most dynamic and least affluent sections of the population. Stalin's successes in this activity were the successes of these strata, his failures and failures were largely a consequence of the class and social psychology of those who represented his main social support.

Stalin was supported not only by the party and the proletariat, but also by patriotic representatives of the peasantry, scientific and creative intelligentsia, military specialists, and civil servants, who saw in Stalin a consistent and decisive defender of the country's national interests.

This can be doubted, citing the fact that at that time in the USSR there were no real opportunities for expressing public views through representative elections. However, this doubt is refuted

contradicts the opinion of such an opponent of Soviet power as Pitirim Sorokin, who believed that the stability of any system serves as the best evidence that it enjoys the support of the most politically active part of the population. He wrote: “It is naive to believe that the so-called absolute despot can afford whatever he pleases, regardless of the desires and pressure of his subordinates. To believe that there is such an “omnipotence” of despots and their absolute freedom from public pressure is nonsense.” At the same time, Pitirim Sorokin referred to Herbert Spencer, who argued: “As practice shows, the individual will of despots is an insignificant factor, its authority is proportional to the degree of expression of the will of others.” P. Sorokin also referred to Renan, who noted that every day of the existence of any social order is in fact a constant plebiscite of members of society, and if society continues to exist, this means that the stronger part of society answers the question posed with a silent “yes”. Commenting on these words, P. Sorokin stated: “Since then, this statement has become a banality.” In fact, Stalin was elected with the tacit consent of the “stronger part” of Soviet society.

It should be taken into account that Stalin was chosen by the ruling party and politically active forces of Soviet society when the threat of a new world conflict arose and an arms race began in capitalist countries. In this situation, political leaders who had risen in the wake of the First World War began to come to the political forefront.

Despite his partial paralysis, F.D. returned to active political life. Roosevelt, who in November 1928, having received powerful financial support from billionaire B. Baruch, won the election for governor of New York State. He soon became the most likely contender for the presidency of the United States, which meant that the world's leading financial magnates were betting on Roosevelt as a potential leader of the most powerful country in the world. Like many politicians born of the First World War, F.D. Roosevelt saw his goal as defeating communism. In mid-1930, he wrote: “There is no doubt that communist ideas will gain strength in our country if we fail to maintain the old ideals and original goals of democracy.”

The ardent enemy of Soviet power and communists around the world, W. Churchill, intensified his political activity, calling for tough methods of strengthening the British Empire, which continued to remain the largest in the world. At the invitation of Benito Mussolini, Churchill visited Italy (and did not hide his delight at the fascist regime). Later, at the invitation of B. Baruch, he arrived to lecture in the USA.

At the same time, plans for a new world war were being developed at headquarters and military academies. One of the prominent theorists of the upcoming tank battles was Charles de Gaulle, who at that time served on the staff of the vice-chairman of the Supreme Military Council of France, Henri Pétain, and taught at various military educational institutions. De Gaulle's theoretical works on the creation of a maneuverable shock army became widely known outside France and especially in Germany. Soon de Gaulle's ideas were picked up by Guderian and other theorists of lightning war - "blitzkrieg".

Politicians of a number of powers did not hide their intentions to reshape the world in their favor at the expense of our country. In 1927, Japanese Prime Minister Baron Giichi Tanaka prepared a memorandum stating that within the next ten years, "Japan should adopt a policy of Blood and Iron." This meant that Japan intended to conquer all of Asia or a significant part of it, half of which was within the USSR.

Shortly before this memorandum, in December 1926, the second volume of A. Hitler’s book “Mein Kampf” was published in Munich, which proclaimed: “We stop the eternal German movement to the south and west of Europe and turn our gaze to the lands in the east... When we talk today about territory in Europe, we can think first of all about Russia and the border states that are its vassals.” In May 1928, in the elections to the Reichstag, Hitler's National Socialist Party, which no one had taken seriously until now, received 800 thousand votes. With the support of influential German industrialists, the Nazis had become the country's leading political force by July 1932, ranking first in the number of votes cast for them and the number of seats in the Reichstag.

These internal political processes in the leading countries of the world and the foreign policy statements of their leaders indicated that the world was on the verge of a new, even more destructive war, which would not bypass the USSR. Since the Crimean War of 1853-1856, Russia has had the opportunity to verify the readiness of the leading countries of the world to rally against it, speaking under the banner of the struggle against “Russian despotism.” The leading Western European countries, which Russia had saved more than once from external aggression or internal revolts, invariably expressed their readiness to stab them in the back in “gratitude” for Russian help. The moral support of the world powers for the Japanese aggression of 1904, their reluctance to help Russia during the First World War, the desire of these countries to take advantage of the Civil War in Russia to plunder and weaken it - all this left an indelible mark on the minds of politically active people in Russia. The overthrow of the monarchy did not change anything in the attitude towards our country of the leading

Why did Stalin win in the struggle for leadership after Lenin's death (January 1924)? Contenders: 1. I. Stalin (Dzhugashvili) 2. Leon Trotsky (Leiba Bronstein) 3. L. Kamenev (Rosenfeld) 4. E. Zinoviev (Radomylsky-Apfelbaum) 5. N. I. Bukharin. After the death of Lenin, at least four main ideological movements emerged in the party - Trotskyists, Zinovievites, Stalinists, Bukharinists. Each of the groupings within the party was based on a specific ideological platform. And each had influential supporters in the party, the highest bodies of state power, in the regions, public organizations, etc. The Trotskyists, who had the strongest positions in the army, advocated pushing the world revolution of the revolution by any means, the accelerated introduction of socialist principles in the economy, including the curtailment NEP, industrialization and the fight against fists. The Zinoviev-Kamenev faction, which dominated in the capitals - especially in Leningrad - and in the Comintern and the All-Russian Central Executive Committee, considered Trotsky's views too radical, disagreeing with him on the pace and means of achieving the same goals. The Stalin faction, which controlled, first of all, the party apparatus (it was in the hands of Molotov) and the special services (Dzerzhinsky), had already cooled to the ideas of world revolution and until the end of the 1920s did not believe that the time to curtail the NEP had come. The Bukharinites, who had support in the government (it was headed by Rykov), trade unions (they were led by Tomsky), as well as in the party press and the university sphere, were supporters of continuing the NEP policy with its reliance on the potential of the private sector and the growing rich peasantry. Today, many of the disagreements of those years seem microscopic or strange, but then in the eyes of leading Bolsheviks they were of great importance. And this would be another reason for the growing influence of the Stalinists - their line was quite in tune with the sentiments of the party masses, tired of the troubles. Pitirim Sorokin, expelled from the country and later making Harvard famous, at the same time identified a general pattern: “People, taught by an inexorable teacher - hunger, cold, disease, poverty and death, are faced with a dilemma: die, continuing the revolutionary debauchery, or all find another way out. Bitter and tragic experience forces people to look at the world differently... And so the demand for unlimited freedom is replaced by a thirst for order; praise to the “liberators” from the old regime is replaced by praise to the “liberators” from the revolution, in other words, the organizers of order. "Order!" and “Long live the creators of order!” - such is the general impulse of the second stage of the revolution.” In the mid-1920s, it was the Stalinist group that did NOT have a strong desire, unlike the more left-wing factions, to continue the “revolutionary debauchery.” This was the basis of the short-term “thaw” of the mid-1920s. Signs of the “thaw” were noticeable in the 1924 USSR Constitution, which lacked a special chapter on the dictatorship of the proletariat. The intensification of the struggle between the Stalinists and Zinovievites in 1925 changed the situation on the Bolshevik chessboard. The main stumbling block was the theory of building socialism in one country. In April 1925, at a meeting of the Politburo, Kamenev, supported by Zinoviev, stated that “the technical and economic backwardness of the USSR is an insurmountable obstacle to building socialism.” Help and loans from the West could come to the USSR only if the proletarian revolutions won there. On the eve of the XIV Party Conference, Zinoviev proposed at the Plenum of the Central Committee theses “On the tasks of the Comintern and the RCP(b)”, where he argued that the victory of socialism is possible only on a global scale, and at the Party Conference itself he almost openly went into battle against Stalin, warning about the danger of a “national limitations”: “We are talking about sentiments that can be reduced to the formula: what do we care about the international revolution, we can build ourselves a cell under a spruce tree.” The commission of the Central Committee (Stalin) for drafting the resolution, also without naming the names of Zinoviev and Kamenev, rejected as “Trotskyist” the opinion that building a complete socialist society is impossible in the USSR without the help of more developed countries. On the contrary, “the party of the proletariat must make every effort to build a socialist society in the confidence that this construction can and will certainly be victorious if it is possible to defend the country from any attempts at restoration.” The Zinovievites’ offensive was undermined by the obvious decline in the revolutionary wave in the world and was easily repulsed. The XIV Congress was one of the hottest in the history of the party. At the forum, which went down in history as the industrialization congress, little was said about industrialization itself. Stalin’s main strategic idea: “We must make every effort to make our country an economically self-sufficient country, independent, based on the domestic market, a country that will serve as a center of attraction for all other countries that are gradually falling away from capitalism and joining the mainstream of socialism.” farms." At the same time, Stalin spoke about two deviations: one is pulling towards the world revolution and reprisals against the NEP, meaning the Trotskyists and Zinovievites; the other is the defense of the kulak, the denial of industrialization and planning, meaning the Bukharinites. Stalin said: “You ask, which deviation is worse? You can't pose the question like that. Both of them are worse, the first and second slopes.” But at the same time he emphasized that the party must concentrate its efforts on combating the deviation that exaggerates the kulak danger, since these ideas are much more popular in the party and behind them stands the authority of prominent leaders, meaning Kamenev and Zinoviev. Stalin's line was supported by the congress, which marked the beginning of the ousting of the Zinoviev group from power, which would be forced to draw closer to Trotsky, which would predetermine their joint decline. Then it was the turn of the rightists - the Bukharinites. “Russia would not have experienced many of the terrible misfortunes that befell it if it had been led by right-wing communists (proponents of the market) rather than Stalin.” Many authors agree with these words of the Menshevik Nikolai Valentinov, who emigrated to Paris in 1928. But this is unlikely to be the case. The market could not carry out forced modernization. Besides, did the Bukharinites have a chance to lead the country? There are different opinions on this topic. Such experts of the era as V.L. Danilov and E.N. Gimpelson, we are confident that the “Bukharin alternative” (refusal of accelerated industrialization, collectivization and a course towards world revolution through market development) was initially doomed to failure, since by the end of the 20s the balance of forces in the leadership of the party, and therefore the country, was completely in favor of the Stalinist majority. The “right” (i.e., Bukharinites) capitulated at the XVI Congress of the CPSU (b) in June 1930. The defeat of the “right” helped clear the way for the “great turning point” - complete collectivization - which became the final moment in the establishment of Stalin’s sovereignty. However, it is hardly a matter of Stalin alone. The tightening of government regimes was not only a Soviet phenomenon, but almost universal. The interwar period was marked by an increasing narrowing of the scope of democracy in Europe. It was dealt a crushing blow by the Great Depression of 1929-1933, which deprived people of their savings and discredited the postulates of the free capitalist market. While in 1920 constitutional and elected representative bodies existed throughout the continent west of Soviet Russia, by the outbreak of World War II they had been dissolved or stripped of effective powers in 17 of the 27 European states, and in another five they had ceased to have powers when the war began. In many countries, fascists came to power. Only Britain and Finland, as well as Ireland, Sweden and Switzerland, which remained neutral, supported the activities of democratic institutions all this time. The final completion of the process of subordination of the Politburo to Stalin can be dated to approximately 1930. Based on materials from the book “Russian Matrix” by V. A. Nikonov. M. 2014. Prepared by Victor Shapovalov