From Marx to Paulus. Creation of a strike force. Plans for a German attack on the USSR Plan of an attack on the USSR in July 1940

On August 1, 1940, Erich Marx presented the first version of the plan for war against the USSR. This option was based on the idea of a fleeting, lightning-fast war, as a result of which it was planned that German troops would reach the Rostov-Gorky-Arkhangelsk line, and subsequently to the Urals. Decisive importance was given to the capture of Moscow. Erich Marx proceeded from the fact that Moscow is “the heart of Soviet military-political and economic power, its capture will lead to the end of Soviet resistance.”

This plan provided for two strikes - north and south of Polesie. The northern attack was planned as the main one. It was supposed to be applied between Brest-Litovsk and Gumbinen through the Baltic states and Belarus in the direction of Moscow. The southern strike was planned to be carried out from the southeastern part of Poland in the direction of Kyiv. In addition to these attacks, a “private operation to capture the Baku region” was planned. The implementation of the plan took from 9 to 17 weeks.

Erich Marx's plan was played out at the headquarters of the Supreme High Command under the leadership of General Paulus. This check revealed a serious flaw in the presented option: it ignored the possibility of strong flank counterattacks by Soviet troops from the north and south, capable of disrupting the advance of the main group towards Moscow. The Supreme Command headquarters decided to reconsider the plan.

In connection with Keitel’s message about the poor engineering preparation of the bridgehead for an attack on the USSR, the Nazi command on August 9, 1940 issued an order called “Aufbau Ost”. It outlined measures to prepare a theater of military operations against the USSR, repair and construction of railways and highways, bridges, barracks, hospitals, airfields, warehouses, etc. The transfer of troops was carried out more and more intensively. On September 6, 1940, Jodl issued an order that stated: “I order an increase in the number of occupation troops in the east over the next weeks. For security reasons, Russia should not create the impression that Germany is preparing for an offensive in the eastern direction.”

On December 5, 1940, at the next secret military meeting, Halder’s report was heard on the “Otto” plan, as the war plan against the USSR was originally called, and on the results of staff exercises. In accordance with the results of the exercises, it was planned to destroy the flank groupings of the Red Army by developing an offensive on Kyiv and Leningrad before the capture of Moscow. In this form the plan was approved. There were no doubts about its implementation. Supported by all those present, Hitler said: “It is to be expected that the Russian army, at the very first blow of the German troops, will suffer an even greater defeat than the French army in 1940.”3. Hitler demanded that the war plan provide for the complete destruction of all combat-ready forces on Soviet territory.

The meeting participants had no doubt that the war against the USSR would be ended quickly; CPOK~ weeks were also indicated. Therefore, it was planned to provide only a fifth of the personnel with winter uniforms, Hitler’s General Guderian admits in his memoirs published after the war: “In the High Command of the Armed Forces and in the High Command of the Ground Forces, they so confidently expected to finish the campaign by the beginning of winter that in the ground forces Winter uniform was provided only for every fifth soldier." German generals subsequently tried to shift the blame for the unpreparedness of the winter campaign troops to Hitler. But Guderian does not hide the fact that the generals were also to blame. He writes: “I cannot agree with the widespread opinion that Hitler alone is to blame for the lack of winter uniforms in the fall of 1941.”4.

Hitler expressed not only his own opinion, but also the opinion of the German imperialists and generals when, with his characteristic self-confidence, he said in the circle of his entourage: “I will not make the same mistake as Napoleon; when I go to Moscow, I will set out early enough to reach it before winter.”

The day after the meeting, December 6, Jodl instructed General Warlimont to draw up a directive on the war against the USSR based on the decisions made at the meetings. Six days later, Warlimont presented the text of Directive No. 21 to Yodel, who made several corrections to it, and on December 17 it was handed to Hitler for signature. The next day the directive was approved under the name Operation Barbarossa.

When meeting with Hitler in April 1941, the German ambassador in Moscow, Count von Schulenburg, tried to express his doubts about the reality of the plan, a war against the USSR. BUT he only achieved that he fell out of favor forever.

The fascist German generals developed and put into effect a plan for war against the USSR, which met the most predatory desires of the imperialists. Germany's military leaders unanimously supported the implementation of this plan. Only after Germany’s defeat in the war against the USSR, the beaten fascist commanders, for self-rehabilitation, put forward a false version that they objected to the attack on the USSR, but Hitler, despite the opposition shown to him, still started a war in the East. For example, the West German general Btomentritt, a former active Nazi, writes that Rundstedt, Brauchitsch, and Halder dissuaded Hitler from war with Russia. “But all this did not bring any results. Hitler insisted on his own. With a firm hand he took the helm and led Germany onto the rocks of complete defeat.” In reality, not only the “Führer”, but also the entire German generals believed in the “blitzkrieg”, in the possibility of a quick victory over the USSR.

Directive No. 21 stated: “The German armed forces must be prepared to defeat Soviet Russia through a quick military operation even before the end of the war with England” - the main idea of the war plan was defined in the directive as follows: “The military masses of the Russian army located in the western part of Russia armies must be destroyed in bold operations with deep advances of tank units. It is necessary to prevent the retreat of combat-ready units into the vastness of Russian territory... The ultimate goal of the operation is to fence off the common Arkhangelsk-Volga line from Asian Russia.”

On January 31, 1941, the headquarters of the main command of the German ground forces issued the “Troop Concentration Directive,” which set out the general plan of the command, defined the tasks of army groups, and also gave instructions on the location of headquarters, demarcation lines, interaction with the fleet and aviation, etc. This directive, defining the “first intention” of the German army, set before it the task of “splitting the front of the main forces of the Russian army, concentrated in the western part of Russia, with quick and deep strikes of powerful mobile groups north and south of the Pripyat swamps and, using this breakthrough, destroy the separated groupings of enemy troops."

Thus, two main directions for the advance of German troops were outlined: south and north of Polesie. North of Polesie the main blow was delivered by two army groups: “Center” and “North”. Their task was defined as follows: “North of the Pripyat marshes, Army Group Center is advancing under the command of Field Marshal von Bock. Having brought powerful tank formations into battle, it makes a breakthrough from the Warsaw and Suwalki area in the direction of Smolensk; then turns the tank troops to the north and destroys them together with the Finnish army and the German troops sent from Norway for this purpose, finally depriving the enemy of his last defensive capabilities in the northern part of Russia. As a result of these operations, freedom of maneuver will be ensured to carry out subsequent tasks in cooperation with German troops advancing in southern Russia.

In the event of a sudden and complete defeat of Russian forces in the north of Russia, the turn of troops to the north will no longer be necessary and the question of an immediate attack on Moscow may arise.”

It was planned to launch an offensive south of Polesie with Army Group South. Its task was defined as follows: “South of the Pripyat marshes, Army Group “South” under the command of Field Marshal Rutstedt, using a swift strike of powerful tank formations from the Lublin area, cuts off Soviet troops located in Galicia and Western Ukraine from their communications on the Dnieper, captures crossing the Dnieper River in the Kiev area and to the south of it thus provides freedom of maneuver to solve subsequent tasks in cooperation with troops operating to the north, or to carry out new tasks in the south of Russia.”

The most important strategic goal of Plan Barbarossa was to destroy the main forces of the Red Army concentrated in the western part of the Soviet Union and capture militarily and economically important areas. In the future, German troops in the central direction hoped to quickly reach Moscow and capture it, and in the south - to occupy the Donetsk basin. The plan attached great importance to the capture of Moscow, which, according to the German command, was supposed to bring decisive political, military and economic success to Germany. Hitler's command believed that his plan for war against the USSR would be carried out with German precision.

In January 1941, each of the three army groups received a preliminary task under Directive No. 21 and an order to conduct a war game to test the expected course of battles and obtain material for a detailed development of the operational plan.

In connection with the planned German attack on Yugoslavia and Greece, the start of military operations against the USSR was postponed by 4-5 weeks. On April 3, the high command issued an order that stated: “The start of Operation Barbarossa, due to the operation in the Balkans, is postponed by at least 4 weeks.” On April 30, the German High Command made a preliminary decision to attack the USSR on June 22 1941. The increased transfer of German troops to the Soviet border began in February 1941. Tank and motorized divisions were brought up last, so as not to reveal a premature attack plan.

On June 17, 1941, the German High Command issued the final order, which stated that the implementation of Plan Barbarossa should begin on June 22. The headquarters of the High Command was moved to the Wolfsschanze command post, established in East Prussia near Rastenburg.

Long before the attack on the USSR, Gestapo chief Himmler, on behalf of the German government, began developing the Ost master plan - a plan for the conquest of the peoples of Eastern Europe, including the peoples of the Soviet Union, by fire and sword. The starting points of this plan were reported to Hitler as early as May 25, 1940. Himmler expressed confidence that as a result of the implementation of the planned measures, many peoples would be completely exterminated, in particular the Poles, Ukrainians, etc. To completely eliminate the national culture, it was planned to destroy all education except primary in special schools. The program of these schools, as Himmler proposed, should have included: “simple counting, up to 500 at the most; the ability to sign, the inculcation that the divine commandment is to obey the Germans, to be honest, diligent and obedient. “The ability to read,” Himmler added, “I consider unnecessary.” After reviewing these proposals, Hitler fully approved them and approved them as a directive.

Special teams and “equipment” were created in advance for the mass extermination of civilians. The German armed forces and authorities in the occupied territories had to be guided by the corresponding instructions of Hitler, who taught: “We are obliged to exterminate the population - this is part of our mission to protect the German population. We will have to develop the technique of exterminating the population... If I send the flower of the German nation into the heat of war, shedding precious German blood without the slightest pity, then, without a doubt, I have the right to destroy millions of people of the lower race who multiply like worms.”

Bibliography

To prepare this work, materials from the site http://referat.ru were used

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The art of war is a science in which nothing succeeds except what has been calculated and thought out.
Napoleon

Plan Barbarossa is a plan for a German attack on the USSR, based on the principle of lightning war, blitzkrieg. The plan began to be developed in the summer of 1940, and on December 18, 1940, Hitler approved a plan according to which the war was to end in November 1941 at the latest.

Plan Barbarossa was named after Frederick Barbarossa, the 12th century emperor who became famous for his campaigns of conquest. This contained elements of symbolism, to which Hitler himself and his entourage paid so much attention. The plan received its name on January 31, 1941.

Number of troops to implement the plan

Germany was preparing 190 divisions to fight the war and 24 divisions as reserves. 19 tank and 14 motorized divisions were allocated for the war. The total number of troops that Germany sent to the USSR, according to various estimates, ranges from 5 to 5.5 million people.

The apparent superiority in USSR technology is not worth taking into account, since by the beginning of the wars, Germany's technical tanks and aircraft were superior to those of the Soviet Union, and the army itself was much more trained. Suffice it to recall the Soviet-Finnish war of 1939-1940, where the Red Army demonstrated weakness in literally everything.

Direction of the main attack

Barbarossa's plan determined 3 main directions for attack:

Army Group "South". A blow to Moldova, Ukraine, Crimea and access to the Caucasus. Further movement to the line Astrakhan - Stalingrad (Volgograd).
Army Group "Center". Line "Minsk - Smolensk - Moscow". Advance to Nizhny Novgorod, aligning the Volna - Northern Dvina line.
Army Group "North". Attack on the Baltic states, Leningrad and further advance to Arkhangelsk and Murmansk. At the same time, the “Norway” army was supposed to fight in the north together with the Finnish army.

Table - offensive goals according to Barbarossa's plan

	SOUTH	CENTER	NORTH
Target	Ukraine, Crimea, access to the Caucasus	Minsk, Smolensk, Moscow	Baltic states, Leningrad, Arkhangelsk, Murmansk
Number	57 divisions and 13 brigades	50 divisions and 2 brigades	29th Division + Army "Norway"
Commanding	Field Marshal von Rundstedt	Field Marshal von Bock	Field Marshal von Leeb
common goal	Get on line: Arkhangelsk – Volga – Astrakhan (Northern Dvina)

Around the end of October 1941, the German command planned to reach the Volga - Northern Dvina line, thereby capturing the entire European part of the USSR. This was the plan for the lightning war. After the blitzkrieg, there should have been lands beyond the Urals, which, without the support of the center, would have quickly surrendered to the winner.

Until about mid-August 1941, the Germans believed that the war was going according to plan, but in September there were already entries in the diaries of officers that the Barbarossa plan had failed and the war would be lost. The best proof that Germany in August 1941 believed that there were only a few weeks left before the end of the war with the USSR was Goebbels’ speech. The Minister of Propaganda suggested that the Germans collect additional warm clothes for the needs of the army. The government decided that this step was not necessary, since there would be no war in the winter.

Implementation of the plan

The first three weeks of the war assured Hitler that everything was going according to plan. The army rapidly moved forward, winning victories, but the Soviet army suffered huge losses:

28 divisions out of 170 were put out of action.
70 divisions lost about 50% of their personnel.
72 divisions remained combat-ready (43% of those available at the start of the war).

Over the same 3 weeks, the average rate of advance of German troops deep into the country was 30 km per day.

By July 11, the Army Group “North” occupied almost the entire Baltic territory, providing access to Leningrad, the Army Group “Center” reached Smolensk, and the Army Group “South” reached Kiev. These were the latest achievements that were fully consistent with the plan of the German command. After this, failures began (still local, but already indicative). Nevertheless, the initiative in the war until the end of 1941 was on the side of Germany.

Germany's failures in the North

Army “North” occupied the Baltic states without any problems, especially since there was practically no partisan movement there. The next strategic point to be captured was Leningrad. Here it turned out that the Wehrmacht was beyond its strength. The city did not capitulate to the enemy and until the end of the war, despite all efforts, Germany was unable to capture it.

Army Failures Center

Army "Center" reached Smolensk without problems, but was stuck near the city until September 10. Smolensk resisted for almost a month. The German command demanded a decisive victory and the advancement of troops, since such a delay near the city, which was planned to be taken without large losses, was unacceptable and called into question the implementation of the Barbarossa plan. As a result, the Germans took Smolensk, but their troops were pretty battered.

Historians today assess the Battle of Smolensk as a tactical victory for Germany, but a strategic victory for Russia, since it was possible to stop the advance of troops towards Moscow, which allowed the capital to prepare for defense.

The advance of the German army deep into the country was complicated by the partisan movement of Belarus.

Failures of the Army South

Army “South” reached Kyiv in 3.5 weeks and, like Army “Center” near Smolensk, was stuck in battle. Ultimately, it was possible to take the city due to the clear superiority of the army, but Kyiv held out almost until the end of September, which also hampered the advance of the German army and made a significant contribution to the disruption of Barbarossa’s plan.

Map of the German advance plan

Above is a map showing the German command's offensive plan. The map shows: in green – the borders of the USSR, in red – the border to which Germany planned to reach, in blue – the deployment and plan for the advancement of German troops.

General state of affairs

In the North, it was not possible to capture Leningrad and Murmansk. The advance of the troops stopped.
It was with great difficulty that the Center managed to reach Moscow. At the time the German army reached the Soviet capital, it was already clear that no blitzkrieg had happened.
In the South it was not possible to take Odessa and seize the Caucasus. By the end of September, Hitler's troops had just captured Kyiv and launched an attack on Kharkov and Donbass.

Why Germany's blitzkrieg failed

Germany's blitzkrieg failed because the Wehrmacht prepared the Barbarossa plan, as it later turned out, based on false intelligence data. Hitler admitted this by the end of 1941, saying that if he had known the real state of affairs in the USSR, he would not have started the war on June 22.

The tactics of lightning war were based on the fact that the country has one line of defense on the western border, all large army units are located on the western border, and aviation is located on the border. Since Hitler was confident that all Soviet troops were located on the border, this formed the basis of the blitzkrieg - to destroy the enemy army in the first weeks of the war, and then quickly move deeper into the country without encountering serious resistance.

In fact, there were several lines of defense, the army was not located with all its forces on the western border, there were reserves. Germany did not expect this, and by August 1941 it became clear that the lightning war had failed and Germany could not win the war. The fact that the Second World War lasted right up to 1945 only proves that the Germans fought in a very organized and brave manner. Thanks to the fact that they had the economy of the whole of Europe behind them (speaking of the war between Germany and the USSR, many for some reason forget that the German army included units from almost all European countries) they were able to fight successfully.

Did Barbarossa's plan fail?

I propose to evaluate the Barbarossa plan according to 2 criteria: global and local. Global(reference point - the Great Patriotic War) - the plan was thwarted, since the lightning war did not work out, the German troops were bogged down in battles. Local(landmark – intelligence data) – the plan was carried out. The German command drew up the Barbarossa plan based on the assumption that the USSR had 170 divisions on the country’s border and there were no additional echelons of defense. There are no reserves or reinforcements. The army was preparing for this. In 3 weeks, 28 Soviet divisions were completely destroyed, and in 70, approximately 50% of the personnel and equipment were disabled. At this stage, the blitzkrieg worked and, in the absence of reinforcements from the USSR, gave the desired results. But it turned out that the Soviet command had reserves, not all troops were located on the border, mobilization brought high-quality soldiers into the army, there were additional lines of defense, the “charm” of which Germany felt near Smolensk and Kiev.

Therefore, the failure of the Barbarossa plan should be considered as a huge strategic mistake of German intelligence, led by Wilhelm Canaris. Today, some historians connect this man with English agents, but there is no evidence of this. But if we assume that this is really the case, then it becomes clear why Canaris palmed Hitler off with the absolute lie that the USSR was not ready for war and all the troops were located on the border.

There is one little-known detail in the history of the Patriotic War.

The fact is that the Barbaros operational plan was by no means the first operational plan developed for an attack on the USSR, and the attack itself was planned in the fall of 1940.
Hitler believed that the British would quickly conclude a truce (or peace), he would turn towards the USSR and quickly end the war in the east.
But England persisted and the plan eventually failed. That's what it was.

INTENTION
On July 21, Hitler categorically stated: “The Russian problem will be solved by an offensive.

Following the German ground forces, Brauchitsch was ordered to prepare a plan for war against the USSR, taking into account that the attack would be launched 4–6 weeks after the end of the concentration of troops.
»
It was at this meeting on a state scale that the decision to attack the Soviet country was approved.
For the first time, the question of war with the USSR was raised on the basis of operational calculations.
Here is the commander-in-chief of 0 divisions.
Hermann Hoth, who commanded the 3rd Panzer Group during the attack on the USSR, notes in his memoirs “Tank Operations” that on July 29, 1940, the chief of staff of the 18th Army (this post was previously held by Lieutenant General Marx - the author of the very first plan attack on the USSR) was called to Berlin, “where he was given the task of developing a plan for an operation against Russia.”
Goth wrote:
“At this time, Hitler, who was about to launch an attack on Russia in the fall (autumn of 1940), was informed that the concentration and deployment of troops along the eastern border would take from four to six weeks...
On July 31, Hitler outlined his intentions more specifically and stated that he would most likely launch an attack on Russia this year.
But this cannot be done, since hostilities will also take over the winter, and a pause is dangerous; the operation makes sense only if we defeat the Russian state with one blow.”

Hermann Got
About the same General Tippelskirch:
“The beginning of military preparations can be traced back to the summer of 1940. At the end of July, before the order for an air attack on England was given, Jodl informed one of his closest collaborators that Hitler had decided to prepare for war against the Soviet Union.
This war had to begin under all circumstances, and then it would be better to fight it within the framework of the war already going on; in any case, it is necessary to prepare for it.
At first, the possibility of starting a new war in the coming autumn (i.e. in 1940) was even discussed. However, one would have to face insurmountable difficulties associated with strategic concentration, and such an idea had to be abandoned soon.”
Only time constraints - the Germans did not have time to carry out a strategic concentration for aggression against the USSR - kept them from attacking the Soviet Union in 1940.
Simply put, the decision to attack the USSR was made in the summer of 1940. Everything else was technical developments.
CREATION OF A SHOCK FORCE
In the summer and autumn of 1940, the high command of the German Wehrmacht began to intensively transfer to Poland, closer to the Soviet borders; your troops. Hitler planned to throw 120 divisions against the USSR, leaving 60 divisions in the West, in France and Belgium, as well as in Norway

To this end, the railway network in Poland was improved, old tracks were repaired and new ones were laid, and communication lines were installed.
Immediately after the defeat of France, three Nazi armies of the von Bock group - 4th, 12th and 18th - numbering up to 30 divisions were sent to the East, to the Poznan region
Of the 24 formations that were part of the 16th and 9th armies of Group A, intended to strike England according to the Sea Lion plan, 17 were transferred to the East
The headquarters of the 18th Army was deployed in Poland, uniting all German troops in the East. In the period from July 16 to August 14 alone, more than 20 Nazi divisions were redeployed, making marches along a mysterious curve.

They went from central France to the coast of the English Channel and Pas de Calais, and then through Belgium and Holland to Germany and further to Poland, to the borders of the Soviet Union. However, everything will become extremely clear if we consider that the Hitlerite command, which carried out these mysterious marches, pursued a single goal: to cover up Germany’s preparations for an attack on the Soviet Union.

According to German data, by September 20, 1940, about 30 divisions were transferred from France to the borders of the USSR, East Prussia, Poland, Upper Silesia
To wage war against the USSR, the German command formed new infantry, tank, and motorized divisions.
Since the decisive task for Germany in the autumn of 1940 was preparing a war against the Soviet Union, on October 12, 1940, an order was given to stop all activities to prepare the Sea Lion plan until the spring of 1941.
Tank, mechanized and infantry divisions, including the “Totenkopf” division of selected thugs, as well as Himmler’s terrorist apparatus, which were intended for landing in England, were loaded into wagons in the late summer and autumn of 1940 and moved to the borders of the Soviet Union.

Preparations for the attack on the USSR were carried out with German punctuality. Operational and strategic plans were developed very carefully and comprehensively. Tens of thousands of pages were written, thousands of maps and diagrams were drawn. The most experienced field marshals, generals, and General Staff officers methodically developed an aggressive plan for a treacherous attack on the socialist state, which was engaged in peaceful, creative work.

The slowness and thoughtfulness of this preparation indicate that Nazi Germany was not afraid of an attack from the USSR, and the legends of German politicians, generals, and “historians” about Germany’s “preventive war” against the USSR are simply falsification and lies.
After a meeting with Hitler at the Berghof, E. Marx on August 1, 1940 presented Halder with the first version of a plan for a war against the USSR. It was based on the idea of “lightning war”. Marx proposed forming two strike groups that were supposed to advance to the Rostov-on-Don - Gorky - Arkhangelsk line, and then to the Urals. Decisive importance was given to the capture of Moscow, which would lead, Marx pointed out, to the “cessation of Soviet resistance”

Only 9–17 weeks were allotted for the implementation of the plan to defeat the USSR.
After Keitel’s report about the insufficient engineering preparation of the bridgehead for an attack on the USSR, Jodl on August 9 issued the top secret order “Aufbau Ost”. It outlined the following preparatory activities: repair and construction of railways and highways, barracks, hospitals, airfields, training grounds, warehouses, communication lines; provided for the formation and combat training of new formations
By the end of August 1940, a preliminary version of the plan for the war of Nazi Germany against the USSR was drawn up, which received the code name “Barbarossa” plan
Marx's plan was discussed at operational meetings with the participation of Hitler, Keitel, Brauchitsch, Halder and other generals. A new option was also put forward - an invasion of the USSR with 130–140 divisions; its final development was entrusted to the Deputy Chief of the General Staff of the Ground Forces, Colonel General Paulus. The purpose of the invasion was to encircle and defeat Soviet units in the western part of the USSR, to reach the Astrakhan-Arkhangelsk line

Paulus considered it necessary to create three army groups: “North” - to attack Leningrad, “Center” - to Minsk-Smolensk, “South” - to reach the Dnieper near Kyiv. The development of the preliminary plan "Barbarossa", which began in August 1940, according to General Paulus, ended with the holding of two war games.

At the end of November - beginning of December 1940, these large operational games were held at the General Headquarters of the Ground Forces in Zossen under the leadership of Paulus.
They were attended by Colonel General Halder, the Chief of Operations of the General Staff, Colonel Heusinger, and specially invited senior staff officers from the OKH.
Field Marshal Paulus testified at the Nyurber Tribunal
“The result of the games, taken as the basis for the development of directives for the strategic deployment of the Barbarossa forces, showed that the envisaged disposition on the Astrakhan-Arkhangelsk line - the distant goal of the OKW - was supposed to lead to the complete defeat of the Soviet state, which, in fact, was what the OKW sought in its aggression and what, finally, was the goal of this war: to turn Russia into a colonial country"
At the end of the war games, in December, a secret meeting was held with the chief of the general staff of the ground forces, who used the theoretical results of the games with the involvement of individual headquarters of army groups and armies responsible for unleashing aggression against the USSR.
Issues that were not resolved during the war games were discussed.

At the end of the meeting, Colonel Kindel, head of the department of foreign armies “East”, made a special report. He gave a detailed economic and geographical description of the Soviet Union, as well as the Red Army, although he could not really assess its true strength.
Paudus testified:
“The conclusions of the rapporteur are noteworthy opponents that there was no information about special military preparations and that the military industry, including the newly created one east of the Volga, was highly developed.”
As Tippelskirch will note, this was essentially the first step towards the strategic deployment of German armed forces against the Soviet Union. In July, the direct development of plans for an attack on the USSR began.
The following remark by Tippelskirch, relating to the beginning of the development of German plans for the eastern campaign, is interesting:
“The hitherto known grouping of enemy forces, as well as general considerations independent of this, allowed us to assume that the Russians would retreat no further than the Dnieper and Western Dvina, because with further retreat they would no longer be able to provide protection for their industrial regions.
Based on this, it was planned to use tank wedge strikes to prevent the Russians from creating a continuous defensive front west of the indicated rivers.”
Those. The information about the Soviet group that the Germans possessed at the time they began developing plans for war against the USSR did not at all cause them to fear that they might be subject to a military attack from the east.
On the contrary, they assume that the Russians will retreat, and are considering how to prevent the Red Army from retreating too far - to defeat them in border battles. General Marks
The same thing is said in the very first draft of the plan for Operation Ost, developed by the chief of staff of the 18th Army, Major General Marx, who, according to Hoth, enjoyed “special authority” with Hitler.
MARX'S PLAN
On August 5, 1940, General Marx presented his project. Now this document was declassified in the 90s, by the international foundation "Democracy", "Documents", book 1, pp. 232-233;
Its very first lines stated:
“The goal of the campaign is to defeat the Russian armed forces and make Russia unable to act as an enemy of Germany in the foreseeable future.” And not a word about the threat of a Soviet attack and that the campaign is designed to prevent it. Vice versa! The document states in black and white: “The Russians will not do us any favors by attacking us.”
But the Russians won’t provide such a service, don’t worry – the Germans will attack themselves.
How will the enemy (i.e., Soviet troops) behave in response to a German attack? General Marx outlined his considerations: “We must count on the Russian ground forces to resort to defense, while only aviation and naval forces, namely the submarine fleet, will act offensively.
Therefore, the conduct of the war on the part of Soviet Russia will consist in the fact that it will join the blockade (of Germany).

To this end, a Russian invasion of Romania is likely to take away our oil. Therefore, one should count, at a minimum, on strong Russian air raids on the Romanian oil regions.
On the other hand, the Russian will not be able, as in 1812, to evade any decision on the battlefield. Modern armed forces, numbering 100 divisions, cannot abandon the sources of their strength. It should be assumed that Russian ground forces will take a defensive position to fight in order to protect Great Russia and Eastern Ukraine."
After the frank indication of General Marx that “the Russians will not do us any favors by attacking us” (i.e., the Germans initially assumed that they would be the aggressors, and the Soviet Union was assigned the role of a victim of aggression), it is quite obvious: any forecasts of German strategists about the possible actions of the Red Army are reflections on retaliatory, defensive actions on the Soviet side.

General Marks
And, of course, completely legal and natural for a country that has been attacked by an aggressor.
This means that Rezun quite often exaggerates the topic of the “Soviet threat to the Romanian oil fields” - they say, poor and unfortunate Hitler, who depended on fuel supplies from Romania, was afraid that the USSR would cut off these supplies.
But we see, from the thoughts of the German strategists themselves, under what circumstances something similar could happen - “a Russian invasion of Romania to take away our (German) oil” - only in the event (and condition) of a German attack on the USSR.
The fact that the Germans were not at all afraid of any blow from the USSR - even a preemptive one (!), even in a situation if Germany’s aggressive intentions were figured out in Moscow, is evidenced by the indisputable fact that the German troops concentrated near the Soviet border were not even given tasks in case the Red Army strikes first.
German strategists, in principle, did not consider this option and completely ruled it out!
And this despite the fact that the Germans noted the concentration of Soviet troops and perceived this fact as retaliatory, defensive measures of the USSR.
For example, the commander of Army Group Center, Field Marshal von Bock, wrote in his diary on March 27, 1941:
“A meeting took place at OKW headquarters on the issue of acting against Russia... No decision was made regarding the issuance of the necessary instructions in the event of an unexpected Russian offensive on the border in the sector of the army group.
Although such a development of events seems unlikely, we must be prepared for any surprises, since any attempt to attack in the direction of the German border poses a threat to the huge reserves of ammunition, food and weapons concentrated there, intended to support our planned operation.
As we can see, von Bock, although he considers any unexpected attack by the Red Army “unlikely,” would still consider it necessary to play it safe - one must, they say, be prepared “for any surprises.”
Which, in general, is logical. But even for reinsurance purposes, the OKW does not give any appropriate instructions (to cover the border in case of a Soviet attack) to the German troops - prepare calmly for the implementation of the Barbarossa plan, do not be distracted by “unlikely” scenarios (and the OKW, apparently, had reason consider the Soviet offensive completely incredible), do not bother your head with unnecessary problems.

So all the rezunism can be sent to the landfill...

DEVELOPMENT OF OKV
All Soviet border districts (in the west of the country) received orders from their command to cover the border in case of a German attack; German army groups were not given similar tasks.
As they say, feel the difference! So the Germans were “afraid” of a Soviet attack.
A most curious document - “ Strategic development of the OKW operational department for preparing and conducting a campaign against the USSR."
The head of the OKW operations department was Alfred Jodl, who was also Hitler's chief military adviser on operational and strategic issues.
The document is dated September 15, 1940.
Among the goals of the campaign against the USSR, we again do not find even a hint of a “threat of Soviet invasion”, which should have been prevented. In general, not a single word that the Soviet Union is plotting something against Germany.
“The goal of the campaign against Soviet Russia,” the document said, “is: to quickly destroy the mass of ground forces located in western Russia, to prevent the withdrawal of combat-ready forces into the depths of Russian space, and then, cutting off the western part of Russia from the seas, to break through to such a line which, on the one hand, would secure the most important regions of Russia for us, and on the other, could serve as a convenient barrier from its Asian part.”
This strategic development of the OKW operational department was accompanied by a map that schematically showed “the grouping of forces of the Russian ground forces according to data at the end of August 1940.”
Perhaps in the grouping of Soviet troops “at the end of August 1940” was there something threatening for Germany?
No. The Soviet group did not pose any threats to Germany at a time when the Germans were no longer even making a decision (this happened back in July 1940), but were in full swing developing their plans for the upcoming attack on the USSR.
What worries German military strategists?

And they are worried that the USSR can unravel the aggressive German plans and regroup its forces in such a way that it will not be possible to implement the above-mentioned plan: “to destroy the mass of ground forces located in western Russia, to prevent the withdrawal of combat-ready forces into the depths of Russian space.” This is the only thing that worries the Germans.

A document from Jodl's office (later hanged by the Nuremberg Tribunal) stated:
“It should, however, be taken into account that it is in Russia that it is difficult to obtain more or less reliable information about our future enemy. These data on the distribution of Russian forces will be even less reliable by the time our aggressive intentions are discovered on the other side of the border. At the moment, the distribution of Russian forces may still bear traces of previous events in Finland, Limitrophe and Bessarabia.”
As we see, in their documents for internal use, the Germans already in 1940 did not hesitate to call themselves aggressors.
So, in the operational department of the OKW they assumed that the USSR would notice the “aggressive intentions” of the Germans. And these are quite reasonable assumptions: completely hiding preparations for an event of such gigantic proportions as an attack on the Soviet Union is a matter of fantasy.
At the very least, one must be prepared for the fact that aggressive German plans will be revealed in the USSR. And in this case, Jodl’s department compiled 3 options for possible actions of the USSR:
"I. The Russians will want to forestall us and, for this purpose, will launch a preventive strike on the German troops that are beginning to concentrate near the border.
II. The Russian armies will take on the blow of the German armed forces, deploying close to the border in order to hold in their hands the new positions they have captured on both flanks (Baltic and Black Seas).
III. The Russians use a method that had already proven itself in 1812, i.e. will retreat into the depths of their space in order to impose on the advancing armies the difficulties of extended communications and the associated difficulties of supply, and then, only in the further course of the campaign, will they launch a counterattack.”
And then the views of German strategists were expressed on each of the possible options for the USSR’s response.

THREE OPTIONS
It’s worth talking about these three options; they are very important.
“Option I. It seems incredible that the Russians would decide to launch a large-scale offensive, for example, an invasion of East Prussia and the northern part of the General Government, while the bulk of the German army is not tied down for a long time by fighting on another front.
Apparently, neither the command nor the troops will be capable of this. Smaller scale operations are more likely. They can be directed either against Finland or against Romania..."
Those. In Germany, not only were they not afraid of a Soviet attack, but it seemed “incredible” to the Germans that the Soviet Union would decide on a preemptive strike even when it realized that it was facing German aggression.
And this forecast of the OKW operational department came true. When the Soviet military becomes convinced that Germany is systematically concentrating its forces against the USSR, they will have the idea of launching a preventive (pre-emptive) strike.
But what did the Germans consider more likely?

It seemed most likely to the Germans that the USSR would act according to option “II”, i.e. when the Red Army takes “the blow of the German armed forces, deploying near the border.” Those. stubborn defense will hold the new border (with the annexed Baltic states, Western Belarus and Ukraine, Bessarabia). "
“This decision,” the OKW document said, “seems to be the most likely, since it cannot be assumed that such a strong military power as Russia will cede its richest regions, including recently conquered ones, without a fight.”

And in the discussion about this option it was said:
“If the Russians settle on option II, then the disposition of their forces will apparently have a certain similarity with the present one. At the same time, most likely, even larger forces will concentrate on the territory of Russian Poland, and the main reserves will remain in the Moscow region, which is due at least to the structure of the Russian railway network.”
“For us, such a decision, in which the enemy would take the battle with large forces at an early stage, would be favorable because after defeats in border battles, the Russian command is unlikely to be able to ensure an organized withdrawal of the entire army,” added the German strategists.

This document - compiled not by Soviet propagandists or Soviet historians, but by the Germans themselves - also contains a direct answer to Rezunov’s numerous “perplexities” about “why such a large concentration of Soviet troops on the border?”

The Germans understood perfectly well why and why.
Because (I answer in the words of German strategists) “Russian armies will take the blow of the German armed forces, deploying near the border in order to retain in their hands the new positions they have captured on both flanks (the Baltic and Black Seas).”

The Germans calculated quite well the train of thought of the Soviet military-political leadership. And they planned their attack based on this forecast, which turned out to be accurate (according to the second option of possible actions of the Red Army, which seemed to them “the most likely”).
Finally, option III - if the Red Army acts on the model of the Russian army of 1812 - was characterized by the Germans as extremely unfavorable for them (which is understandable: it meant a protracted war). But at the same time how unlikely.
The OKW noted:
“If the Russians build their war plan in advance on first accepting the attack of German troops with small forces, and concentrating their main group in the deep rear, then the boundary of the latter’s location north of the Pripyat swamps may most likely be a powerful water barrier formed by the Dvina rivers ( Daugava) and Dnieper. This barrier has a gap only approximately 70 m wide - in the area south of Vitebsk. Such a decision, unfavorable for us, should also be considered as possible. On the other hand, it is absolutely incredible that south of the Pripyat marshes the Russians will leave the regions of Ukraine that are almost irreplaceable for them without a fight.”
So, let us emphasize once again: neither at the moment when the Germans made the decision to attack the USSR, nor when planning for a future aggressive war against the Soviet Union was already in full swing in Germany, was such a motive as protection from Soviet aggression completely absent.
He was completely absent and that's it.

On July 31, 1940, Franz Halder again took notes on the results of the next meeting with Hitler, who had already decided on how to “force England to make peace” (as Hitler put it at the above-mentioned meeting in Berghof on July 13, 1940) - defeat Russia and establish complete German hegemony in Europe.
“The hope of England is Russia and America,” Hitler explained to his military leaders.
But, he added, if hope in Russia disappears, then the British will not have to rely on America either - “for the fall of Russia will unpleasantly increase the importance of Japan in East Asia, Russia is the East Asian sword of England and America against Japan.” Hitler loved these analogies with the “sword”.
Russia, Hitler emphasized, is the factor on which England places the most emphasis. However, if Russia turns out to be defeated, then “England’s last hope will fade away.” And then the prospects are much more tempting: “Germany will then become the ruler of Europe and the Balkans.” Well, stubborn England will have to come to terms with this.

Hence the conclusion:
“Russia must be finished,” and “the sooner Russia is destroyed, the better.” Hitler also sets a target date: spring 1941

DECISION IS MADE
On October 15, 1940, Franz Halder recorded in his war diary Hitler’s thoughts expressed during a meeting in Brenner, a highland place on the Austro-Italian border, after the Anschluss of Austria - German-Italian.
In Brenner, Hitler often held business meetings (for example with Mussolini) and meetings.

This meeting took place two weeks after the conclusion of the Berlin Pact (also known as the Three Power Pact of 1940, or the Tripartite Pact).
"On September 27, 1940, in Berlin, Germany, Italy and Japan signed an agreement for a period of 10 years, which contained obligations regarding mutual assistance between these powers; in addition, zones of influence between the Axis countries were demarcated in establishing a “new order” in the world. Germany and Italy were intended the leading role in Europe, and Japan in Asia.
The Fuhrer expresses confidence that the war has been “won”, and bringing it to complete victory is “only a matter of time.” The reason for England's resilience, says Hitler, lies in its double hope: in the USA and the USSR. But to America, he says, by the fact of the conclusion of the Tripartite Pact, “a warning has been given”; the United States is faced with “the prospect of waging a war on two fronts.” Accordingly, American assistance to England will be limited.
England's hopes for the Soviet Union, Hitler continues, are also not justified. At the same time, he notes, “it is incredible that Russia itself would start a conflict with us.”

Which, however, does not stop the Fuhrer from developing plans for an attack on the Soviet Union.
On December 5, 1940, Halder wrote:
“Notes on a meeting with Hitler 5.12.1940... If England is forced to sue for peace, it will try to use Russia as a “sword” on the continent...
The question of hegemony in Europe will be resolved in the struggle against Russia.”
Again, no “Soviet threat”. The USSR is seen as a factor that (according to Hitler) will play a role in concluding peace with England.

If the USSR is present as a player on the continent, peace with England will be less profitable.
If the USSR is taken out of the game, England will have no choice but to recognize German hegemony in Europe.
December 13, 1940 - meeting with the chiefs of staff of army groups and armies.
“In the first half of the day,” writes Halder, “discussion under the leadership of Paulus of the problems of the operation in the East.”
Thus, the plan for war against the Soviet Union is being discussed in full swing. Perhaps this is due to the aggravation of the military-political situation on the Soviet-German border and the growing threat from the east?
Not at all. Quite the contrary.

Halder writes:
"Military-political situation: Our assessments are based on the Fuhrer's statements." What kind of ratings are these? For example: “Russia, which is pinned (meaning in London) with hopes that it will not tolerate Germany’s sole domination on the continent.
There is still no result in this sense.” Those. The USSR does not pose any threats to Germany. However…
However, “Russia is a complicating factor.” What does this factor “make difficult”? All the same: “The solution to the question of hegemony in Europe rests on the struggle against Russia”
Those. The presence of Russia in itself (regardless of its intentions) is a problem and a “complicating factor.” And that's enough.
Therefore, although Hitler “still” has no reason to fear from the east, after 5 days he signs the well-known directive No. 21, the “Barbarossa” plan (Weisung Nr. 21. Fall Barbarossa).

On January 8 - 9, 1941, at Berghof, Hitler holds a large meeting with the Commander-in-Chief of the Ground Forces in the presence of the Chief of Staff of the Supreme High Command of the Armed Forces, the Chief of Staff of the OKW Operations Command, the Chief of Operations of the General Staff of the Ground Forces and the 1st Chief Quartermaster (i.e. first deputy chief of the general staff), chief of the operational department of the main command of the naval forces and chief of the general staff of the air force.

January 16, 1941 Halder writes in his diary:
“About the Fuhrer's report 8-9.1 at the Berghof... Selected points: England's goal in the war? England strives for dominance on the continent. Consequently, she will try to defeat us on the continent. This means that I [Hitler] must be so strong on the continent that this goal could never be achieved. Hope for England: America and Russia...
We will not be able to completely defeat England only by landing troops (air force, navy). Therefore, in 1941 we must strengthen our positions on the continent so much that in the future we will be able to wage war with England (and America) ...
Russia:
Stalin is smart and cunning. He will constantly increase his demands. From the point of view of Russian ideology, a German victory is unacceptable. Therefore, the solution is to defeat Russia as soon as possible. In two years England will have 40 divisions. This could encourage Russia to move closer to it.”
Once again, we do not see such a motive as the “threat of Soviet attack.” Hitler does not like that the “smart and cunning” Stalin is trying to use the circumstances that prevailed at that time in the interests of the USSR.
But more noteworthy is Hitler’s indication of the time frame when, in his opinion, an Anglo-Soviet alliance dangerous for Germany could take shape: “in two years.” It is not difficult to calculate when this (and at that time purely hypothetical) situation could have developed: at the beginning of 1943.

Those. Hitler actually admitted that until 1943 there was no threat from the east.

CONCLUSION
The German command developed a plan and strategy for attacking the USSR in the summer of 1940 and at the same time began to create a strike force on the border with the USSR.
The Germans were not at all afraid of the USSR, they were only worried about the question of how the USSR would respond to aggression.
They themselves made the decision long before the aggression itself.