Tactics and strategy of the Mongol army during the reign of Genghis Khan

Marco Polo, who lived for many years in Mongolia and China under Kublai Khan, gives the following assessment of the Mongol army: “The armament of the Mongols is excellent: bows and arrows, shields and swords; they are the best archers of all nations.” Riders who grew up riding horses from an early age. They are amazingly disciplined and persistent warriors in battle, and in contrast to the discipline created by fear, which in some eras dominated European standing armies, for them it is based on a religious understanding of the subordination of power and on tribal life. The endurance of the Mongol and his horse is amazing. During the campaign, their troops could move for months without transporting food supplies and fodder. For the horse - pasture; he doesn’t know oats or stables. An advance detachment of two to three hundred strength, preceding the army at a distance of two marches, and the same side detachments performed the tasks of not only guarding the enemy’s march and reconnaissance, but also economic reconnaissance - they let them know where the best food and watering places were.

Nomadic pastoralists are generally distinguished by their deep knowledge of nature: where and at what time the herbs reach greater richness and greater nutritional value, where the best water pools are, at which stages it is necessary to stock up on provisions and for how long, etc.

The collection of this practical information was the responsibility of special intelligence, and without it it was considered unthinkable to begin an operation. In addition, special detachments were deployed whose task was to protect feeding areas from nomads not taking part in the war.

The troops, unless strategic considerations prevented this, lingered in places where there was plenty of food and water, and forced a forced march through areas where these conditions were not available. Each mounted warrior led from one to four clockwork horses, so he could change horses during a campaign, which significantly increased the length of the transitions and reduced the need for halts and days. Under this condition, marching movements lasting 10-13 days without days were considered normal, and the speed of movement of the Mongol troops was amazing. During the Hungarian campaign of 1241, Subutai once walked 435 miles with his army in less than three days.

The role of artillery in the Mongol army was played by the then extremely imperfect throwing weapons. Before the Chinese campaign (1211-1215), the number of such vehicles in the army was insignificant and they were of the most primitive design, which, by the way, put it in a rather helpless position in relation to the fortified cities encountered during the offensive. The experience of the mentioned campaign brought major improvements to this matter, and in the Central Asian campaign we already see in the Mongolian army an auxiliary Jin division serving a variety of heavy combat vehicles, which were used mainly during sieges, including flamethrowers. The latter threw various flammable substances into the besieged cities, such as burning oil, the so-called “Greek fire”, etc. There are some hints that during the Central Asian campaign the Mongols used gunpowder. The latter, as is known, was invented in China much earlier than its appearance in Europe, but it was used by the Chinese mainly for pyrotechnic purposes. The Mongols could have borrowed gunpowder from the Chinese and also brought it to Europe, but if this was so, then it apparently did not have to play a special role as a means of combat, since neither the Chinese nor the Mongols actually had firearms. did not have. As a source of energy, gunpowder was used by them mainly in rockets, which were used during sieges. The cannon was undoubtedly an independent European invention. As for gunpowder itself, the assumption expressed by G. Lam that it might not have been “invented” in Europe, but brought there by the Mongols, does not seem incredible.”

During sieges, the Mongols used not only the artillery of that time, but also resorted to fortification and the art of mines in its primitive form. They knew how to produce floods, made tunnels, underground passages, etc.

The war was usually conducted by the Mongols according to the following system:

1. A kurultai was convened, at which the issue of the upcoming war and its plan was discussed. There they decided everything that was necessary to form an army, how many soldiers to take from each ten tents, etc., and also determined the place and time for the collection of troops.

2. Spies were sent to the enemy country and “tongues” were obtained.

3. Military operations usually began in early spring (depending on the state of pasture, and sometimes depending on climatic conditions) and autumn, when horses and camels were in good body. Before the opening of hostilities, Genghis Khan gathered all the senior commanders to listen to his instructions.

The supreme command was exercised by the emperor himself. The invasion of the enemy's country was carried out by several armies in different directions. From the commanders receiving such a separate command, Genghis Khan demanded to present a plan of action, which he discussed and usually approved, only in rare cases introducing his own amendments to it. After this, the performer is given complete freedom of action within the limits of the task given to him in close connection with the headquarters of the supreme leader. The emperor was personally present only during the first operations. As soon as he was convinced that the matter was well established, he provided the young leaders with all the glory of brilliant triumphs on the battlefields and within the walls of conquered fortresses and capitals.

4. When approaching significant fortified cities, private armies left an observation corps to monitor them. Supplies were collected in the surrounding area and, if necessary, a temporary base was set up. Usually the main forces continued the offensive, and the observation corps, equipped with machines, began to invest and siege.

5. When a meeting in the field with an enemy army was foreseen, the Mongols usually adhered to one of the following two methods: either they tried to attack the enemy by surprise, quickly concentrating the forces of several armies to the battlefield, or, if the enemy turned out to be vigilant and surprise could not be counted on, they directed their forces in such a way as to achieve a bypass of one of the enemy flanks. This maneuver was called "tulugma". But, alien to the template, the Mongol leaders, in addition to the two indicated methods, also used various other operational techniques. For example, a feigned flight was carried out, and the army with great skill covered its tracks, disappearing from the eyes of the enemy until he fragmented his forces and weakened security measures. Then the Mongols mounted fresh clockwork horses and made a quick raid, appearing as if from underground before the stunned enemy. In this way, the Russian princes were defeated in 1223 on the Kalka River. It happened that during such a demonstrative flight, the Mongol troops dispersed so as to envelop the enemy from different sides. If it turned out that the enemy was staying focused and prepared to fight back, they released him from the encirclement in order to later attack him on the march. In this way, in 1220, one of the armies of Khorezmshah Muhammad, which the Mongols deliberately released from Bukhara, was destroyed.

Prof. V.L. Kotvich, in his lecture on the history of Mongolia, notes the following military “tradition” of the Mongols: to pursue a defeated enemy until complete destruction. This rule, which formed a tradition among the Mongols, is one of the indisputable principles of modern military art; but in those distant times this principle did not enjoy universal recognition in Europe. For example, the knights of the Middle Ages considered it beneath their dignity to chase after an enemy who had cleared the battlefield, and many centuries later, in the era of Louis XVI and the five-step system, the winner was ready to build a “golden bridge” for the vanquished to retreat. From everything that has been said above about the tactical and operational art of the Mongols, it is clear that among the most important advantages of the Mongol army, which ensured its victory over others, its amazing maneuverability should be noted.

In its manifestation on the battlefield, this ability was the result of the excellent individual training of the Mongol horsemen and the preparation of entire units of troops for rapid movements and evolutions with skillful application to the terrain, as well as the corresponding dressage and equestrian strength; in the theater of war, the same ability was an expression, first of all, of the energy and activity of the Mongol command, and then of such organization and training of the army, which achieved unprecedented speed in carrying out marches and maneuvers and almost complete independence from the rear and supply. It can be said without exaggeration about the Mongol army that during campaigns it had a “base with it.” She went to war with a small and unwieldy, mostly pack, train of camels, and sometimes drove herds of cattle with her. Further provisions were based solely on local funds; If funds for food could not be collected from the population, they were obtained through round-ups. Mongolia of that time, economically poor and sparsely populated, would never have been able to withstand the stress of continuous great wars of Genghis Khan and his heirs if the country had fed and supplied its army. The Mongol, who cultivated his belligerence on animal hunting, also looks at war partly as hunting. A hunter who returns without prey, and a warrior who demands food and supplies from home during a war, would be considered “women” in the Mongols’ minds.

To be able to rely on local resources, it was often necessary to conduct an offensive on a broad front; This requirement was one of the reasons (regardless of strategic considerations) why the private armies of the Mongols usually invaded an enemy country not in a concentrated mass, but separately. The danger of being defeated piecemeal in this technique was compensated by the speed of maneuvering of individual groups, the ability of the Mongols to evade battle when it was not part of their calculations, as well as the excellent organization of reconnaissance and communications, which was one of the characteristic features of the Mongol army. Under this condition, she could, without great risk, be guided by the strategic principle, which was later formulated by Moltke in the aphorism: “To move apart, to fight together.”

In the same way, i.e. With the help of local means, the advancing army could meet its needs for clothing and means of transportation. The weapons of that time were also easily repaired through local resources. The heavy “artillery” was carried by the army, partly in disassembled form; there were probably spare parts for it, but if there were a shortage of such, of course, there was no difficulty in making them from local materials by our own carpenters and blacksmiths. Artillery “shells,” the production and delivery of which is one of the most difficult tasks of supplying modern armies, were available locally at that time in the form of ready-made millstone stones, etc. or could have been extracted from associated quarries; in the absence of both, stone shells were replaced with wooden logs from plant tree trunks; to increase their weight they were soaked in water. During the Central Asian campaign, the bombardment of the city of Khorezm was carried out in this primitive way.

Of course, one of the important features that ensured the ability of the Mongol army to do without communications was the extreme endurance of men and horses, their habit of the most severe hardships, as well as the iron discipline that reigned in the army. Under these conditions, large detachments passed through waterless deserts and crossed the highest mountain ranges, which were considered impassable by other peoples. With great skill, the Mongols also overcame serious water obstacles; crossings of large and deep rivers were made by swimming: property was stored on reed rafts tied to the tails of horses, people used waterskins (sheep's stomachs inflated with air) to cross. This ability to not be embarrassed by natural adaptations gave Mongol warriors the reputation of some kind of supernatural, devilish creatures to whom the standards applied to other people are inapplicable.

The papal envoy to the Mongol court, Plano Carpini, apparently not devoid of observation and military knowledge, notes that the victories of the Mongols cannot be attributed to their physical development, in respect of which they are inferior to the Europeans, and the large number of the Mongol people, who, on the contrary, quite few in number. Their victories depend solely on their superior tactics, which are recommended to Europeans as a model worthy of imitation. “Our armies,” he writes, “should be governed on the model of the Tatars (Mongols) on the basis of the same such harsh military laws.

The army should in no way be fought in one mass, but in separate detachments. Scouts must be sent in all directions. Our generals must keep their troops day and night in combat readiness, since the Tatars are always vigilant like devils." Next, Carpini will teach various tips of a special nature, recommending Mongolian methods and skills. All the military principles of Genghis Khan, says one of the modern researchers, were new not only in the steppe, but also in the rest of Asia, where, according to Juvaini, completely different military orders prevailed, where autocracy and abuses of military leaders became customary and where the mobilization of troops required several months of time, since the command staff never maintained readiness of the required number of soldiers.

It is difficult to reconcile with our ideas about a nomadic army as a gathering of irregular gangs with the strict order and even the external gloss that dominated Genghis’s army. From the above articles by Yasa, we have already seen how strict her requirements were for constant combat readiness, punctuality in the execution of orders, etc. Setting out on a campaign found the army in a state of impeccable readiness: nothing was missed, every little thing was in order and in its place; the metal parts of weapons and harness are thoroughly cleaned, the storage containers are filled, and an emergency supply of food is included. All this was subject to strict inspection by superiors; omissions were severely punished. Since the Central Asian campaign, the armies had Chinese surgeons. When the Mongols went to war, they wore silk underwear (Chinese chesucha) - this custom has survived to this day due to its property of not being penetrated by an arrow, but being drawn into the wound along with the tip, delaying its penetration. This occurs when injured not only by an arrow, but also by a bullet from a firearm. Thanks to this property of silk, an arrow or bullet without a shell was easily removed from the body along with the silk fabric. So simply and easily the Mongols performed the operation of removing bullets and arrows from a wound.

Once the army or its main mass was concentrated before the campaign, it was inspected by the supreme leader himself. At the same time, he knew how, with his characteristic oratorical talent, to admonish the troops on the campaign with short but energetic words. Here is one of these parting words, which he pronounced before the formation of a punitive detachment, once sent under the command of Subutai: “You are my commanders, each of you is like me at the head of the army! You are like precious ornaments of the head. You are a collection of glory, you are indestructible, like a stone! And you, my army, surrounding me like a wall and leveled like the furrows of a field! Listen to my words: during peaceful fun, live with one thought, like the fingers of one hand; during an attack, be like a falcon that rushes at a robber; in During peaceful play and entertainment, swarm like mosquitoes, but during battle, be like an eagle on prey!

One should also pay attention to the widespread use that secret reconnaissance received from the Mongols in the field of military affairs, through which, long before the opening of hostile actions, the terrain and means of the future theater of war, weapons, organization, tactics, the mood of the enemy army, etc., are studied to the smallest detail. d. This preliminary reconnaissance of potential enemies, which in Europe began to be systematically used only in recent historical times, in connection with the establishment of a special corps of the general staff in the armies, was raised by Genghis Khan to an extraordinary height, reminiscent of the one at which things stand in Japan at the present time . As a result of this deployment of intelligence services, for example in the war against the Jin state, Mongol leaders often showed better knowledge of local geographical conditions than their opponents operating in their own country. Such awareness was a great chance for success for the Mongols. Likewise, during the Central European campaign of Batu, the Mongols amazed the Poles, Germans and Hungarians with their familiarity with European conditions, while the European troops had almost no idea about the Mongols.

For the purposes of reconnaissance and, incidentally, to disintegrate the enemy, “all means were considered suitable: the emissaries united the dissatisfied, persuaded them to betray with bribery, instilled mutual distrust among the allies, created internal complications in the state. Spiritual (threats) and physical terror was used against individuals.”

In carrying out reconnaissance, the nomads were extremely helped by their ability to firmly retain local signs in their memory. Secret reconnaissance, begun in advance, continued continuously throughout the war, for which numerous spies were involved. The role of the latter was often played by traders, who, when the army entered an enemy country, left the Mongol headquarters with a supply of goods in order to establish relations with the local population.

Mentioned above were the raid hunts that were organized by the Mongol troops for food purposes. But the significance of these hunts was far from being limited to this one task. They also served as an important means for the combat training of the army, as established by one of the articles of Yasa, which reads (Article 9): “In order to maintain the combat training of the army, a big hunt should be organized every winter. For this reason, it is forbidden to kill anyone from March to October deer, goats, roe deer, hares, wild donkeys and some species of birds."

This example of the widespread use of animal hunting among the Mongols as a military educational and educational means is so interesting and instructive that we consider it useful to provide a more detailed description of the conduct of such hunting by the Mongol army, borrowed from the work of Harold Lamb.

“The Mongolian raid hunt was the same regular campaign, but not against people, but against animals. The entire army took part in it, and its rules were established by the khan himself, who recognized them as inviolable. Warriors (beaters) were forbidden to use weapons against animals, and letting an animal slip through the chain of beaters was considered a disgrace. It was especially hard at night. A month after the start of the hunt, a huge number of animals found themselves herded inside a semicircle of beaters, grouping around their chain. They had to perform real guard duty: light fires, post sentries. Even the usual " pass." It was not easy to maintain the integrity of the line of outposts at night in the presence of the front excited mass of representatives of the four-legged kingdom, the burning eyes of predators, to the accompaniment of the howling of wolves and the growls of leopards. The farther, the more difficult. Another month later, when the mass of animals was already beginning to feel that she was being pursued by enemies, it was necessary to increase vigilance even more. If a fox climbed into any hole, she had to be driven out of there at all costs; the bear, hiding in a crevice between the rocks, had to be driven out by one of the beaters without harming it. It is clear how favorable such a situation was for young warriors to display their youth and prowess, for example when a lone boar armed with terrible fangs, and even more so when a whole herd of such enraged animals rushed in a frenzy at the chain of beaters.”

Sometimes it was necessary to make difficult crossings across rivers without breaking the continuity of the chain. Often the old khan himself appeared in the chain, observing the behavior of people. For the time being, he remained silent, but not a single detail escaped his attention and, at the end of the hunt, evoked praise or censure. At the end of the drive, only the khan had the right to be the first to open the hunt. Having personally killed several animals, he left the circle and, sitting under a canopy, watched the further progress of the hunt, in which the princes and governors labored after him. It was something like the gladiatorial competitions of Ancient Rome.

After the nobility and senior ranks, the fight against animals passed to junior commanders and ordinary warriors. This sometimes continued for a whole day, until finally, according to custom, the khan’s grandchildren and young princes came to him to ask for mercy for the surviving animals. After this, the ring opened and the carcasses began to be collected.

At the conclusion of his essay, G. Lamb expresses the opinion that such a hunt was an excellent school for warriors, and the gradual narrowing and closing of the ring of riders, practiced during its course, could be used in a war against an encircled enemy.

Indeed, there is reason to think that the Mongols owe a significant part of their belligerence and prowess to animal hunting, which instilled in them these traits from an early age in everyday life.

Taking together everything that is known regarding the military structure of the empire of Genghis Khan and the principles on which his army was organized, one cannot help but come to the conclusion - even completely independent of the assessment of the talent of his supreme leader as a commander and organizer - about the extreme fallacy of a fairly widespread view , as if the campaigns of the Mongols were not campaigns of an organized armed system, but chaotic migrations of nomadic masses, who, when meeting with the troops of cultural opponents, crushed them with their overwhelming numbers. We have already seen that during the military campaigns of the Mongols, the “popular masses” remained calmly in their places and that victories were won not by these masses, but by the regular army, which was usually inferior to its enemy in numbers. It is safe to say that, for example, in the Chinese (Jin) and Central Asian campaigns, which will be discussed in more detail in the following chapters, Genghis Khan had no less than double enemy forces against him. In general, the Mongols were extremely few in relation to the population of the countries they conquered - according to modern data, the first 5 million out of about 600 million of all their former subjects in Asia. In the army that set out on a campaign in Europe, there were about 1/3 of the total composition of pure Mongols as the main core. Military art in its highest achievements in the 13th century was on the side of the Mongols, which is why in their victorious march through Asia and Europe not a single people was able to stop them, to oppose them with something higher than they had.

“If we compare the great penetration into the depths of the enemy disposition of the armies of Napoleon and the armies of the no less great commander Subedei,” writes Mr. Anisimov, “then we must recognize in the latter significantly greater insight and greater leadership genius. Both of them, leading their armies, were faced with the task of correctly resolving the issue of rear, communications and supply of their hordes. But only Napoleon was unable to cope with this task in the snows of Russia, and Subutai resolved it in all cases of isolation thousands of miles from the core of the rear. In the past, covered by centuries , as in much later times, when large and distant wars were started, the question of food for the armies was raised first. This issue in the mounted armies of the Mongols (over 150 thousand horses) was complicated to the extreme. The light Mongol cavalry could not drag bulky convoys, always constraining movement, and inevitably had to find a way out of this situation. Even Julius Caesar, when conquering Gaul, said that “war should feed war” and that “the capture of a rich region not only does not burden the conqueror’s budget, but also creates for him the material basis for subsequent wars."

Quite independently, Genghis Khan and his commanders came to the same view of the war: they looked at the war as a profitable business, expanding the base and accumulating forces - this was the basis of their strategy. A Chinese medieval writer points to the ability to maintain an army at the expense of the enemy as the main sign that defines a good commander. The Mongol strategy saw the duration of the offensive and the capture of large areas as an element of strength, a source of replenishment of troops and supplies. The more the attacker advanced into Asia, the more herds and other movable wealth he captured. In addition, the vanquished joined the ranks of the victors, where they quickly assimilated, increasing the strength of the winner.

The Mongol offensive represented an avalanche, growing with every step of movement. About two-thirds of Batu's army were Turkic tribes roaming east of the Volga; When storming fortresses and fortified cities, the Mongols drove prisoners and mobilized enemies in front of them like “cannon fodder.” The Mongol strategy, given the enormous scale of distances and the dominance of predominantly pack transport on “ships of the desert” - indispensable for quick transitions behind cavalry through roadless steppes, deserts, rivers without bridges and mountains - was not able to organize proper transportation from the rear. The idea of ​​​​transferring the base to the areas that lay ahead was the main one for Genghis Khan. The Mongol cavalry always had a base with them. The need to be content primarily with local resources left a certain imprint on the Mongol strategy. Quite often, the speed, impetuosity and disappearance of their army were explained by the direct need to quickly reach favorable pastures, where the horses, weakened after passing through hungry areas, could fatten their bodies. Of course, prolongation of battles and operations in places where there were no food supplies was avoided.

At the end of the essay on the military structure of the Mongol Empire, it remains to say a few words about its founder as a commander. That he possessed a truly creative genius is clearly evident from the fact that he was able to create an invincible army out of nothing, basing it on the creation of ideas that were recognized by civilized humanity only many centuries later. A continuous series of celebrations on the battlefields, the conquest of cultural states that had more numerous and well-organized armed forces compared to the Mongol army, undoubtedly required more than organizational talent; This required the genius of a commander. Such a genius is now unanimously recognized by representatives of military science as Genghis Khan. This opinion is shared, by the way, by the competent Russian military historian General M.I. Ivanin, whose work “On the art of war and the conquests of the Mongol-Tatars and Central Asian peoples under Genghis Khan and Tamerlane,” published in St. Petersburg in 1875. , was adopted as one of the manuals on the history of military art in our Imperial Military Academy.

The Mongol Conqueror did not have so many biographers and, in general, such enthusiastic literature as Napoleon had. Only three or four works were written about Genghis Khan, and then mainly by his enemies - Chinese and Persian scientists and contemporaries. In European literature, his due as a commander began to be given only in recent decades, dispelling the fog that covered him in previous centuries. Here is what a military specialist, French Lieutenant Colonel Renck, says about this:

“We should finally discard the current opinion according to which he (Genghis Khan) is presented as the leader of a nomadic horde, blindly crushing oncoming peoples in his path. Not a single national leader was more clearly aware of what he wants, what he can. Enormous practical common sense and correct judgment constituted the best part of his genius... If they (the Mongols) always turned out to be invincible, then they owed this to the courage of their strategic plans and the infallible clarity of their tactical actions.Certainly, in the person of Genghis Khan and the galaxy of his commanders, military art reached one of its highest peaks."

Of course, it is very difficult to make a comparative assessment of the talents of great commanders, and even more so given that they worked in different eras, under different states of military art and technology and under a wide variety of conditions. The fruits of the achievements of individual geniuses are, it would seem, the only impartial criterion for evaluation. In the Introduction, a comparison was made from this point of view of the genius of Genghis Khan with the two generally recognized greatest commanders - Napoleon and Alexander the Great - and this comparison was quite rightly decided not in favor of the latter two. The empire created by Genghis Khan not only surpassed the empire of Napoleon and Alexander many times over in space and survived for a long time under his successors, reaching under his grandson, Kublai, an extraordinary size, unprecedented in world history, 4/5 of the Old World, and if it fell , then not under the blows of external enemies, but due to internal decay.

It is impossible not to point out one more feature of the genius of Genghis Khan, in which he surpasses other great conquerors: he created a school of commanders, from which came a galaxy of talented leaders - his associates during life and the successors of his work after death. Tamerlane can also be considered a commander of his school. As is known, Napoleon failed to create such a school; the school of Frederick the Great produced only blind imitators, without a spark of original creativity. As one of the techniques used by Genghis Khan to develop an independent leadership gift in his employees, we can point out that he provided them with a significant amount of freedom in choosing methods for carrying out the combat and operational tasks given to them.

"I will cast you down from the firmament,
I'll throw you up like a lion,
I will not leave anyone alive in your kingdom,
I will burn your cities, lands and lands."

(Fazlullah Rashid ad-Din. Jami-at-Tawarikh. Baku: “Nagyl Evi”, 2011. P.45)

The recent publication on Military Review of the material “Why did they create a fake about the “Mongol” invasion of Rus'” caused a lot of controversy, there is no other way to say it. And some people liked it, others didn’t. Which is natural. But in this case we will not talk about the content side of this material, but about... the “formal” side, that is, the accepted rules for writing this kind of material. In publications on a historical topic, especially if the author’s material claims to be something new, it is customary to start with the historiography of the issue. At least briefly, because “we all stand on the shoulders of giants,” or rather those who came before us. Second, any a priori statements are usually proven by reference to credible sources. As well as the statements of adherents of the material that the Mongols did not leave a trace in military history. And since the VO website focuses specifically on it, it makes sense to talk about it in more detail, based not on mythical revelations, but on the data of modern historical science.

Fight between Mongolian cavalry units. Illustration from the manuscript "Jami" at-tawarikh", 14th century. (State Library, Berlin)

We should start with the fact that there is hardly any other people about whom so much has been written, but in essence very little is known. Indeed, although the texts of Plano Carpini, Guillaume de Rubrucai and Marco Polo were repeatedly cited (in particular, the first translation of Carpini’s work into Russian was published back in 1911), from their retelling of written sources we, in general, did not gain any more.

Negotiation. Illustration from the manuscript "Jami" at-tawarikh", 14th century. (State Library, Berlin)

But we have something to compare their descriptions with, since in the East, Rashid ad-Din Fazlullah ibn Abul-Khair Ali Hamadani (Rashid ad-Dowleh; Rashid al-Tabib - “doctor Rashid”) wrote his “history of the Mongols” (c. 1247 - July 18, 1318) - famous Persian statesman, doctor and encyclopedist; former minister in the Hulaguid state (1298 - 1317). He is the author of a historical work written in Persian called “Jami at-tawarikh” or “Collection of Chronicles,” which is a valuable historical source on the history of the Mongol Empire and Iran during the Hulaguid era.

Siege of Alamut 1256. Miniature from the manuscript “Tarikh-i Jahangushay”. (National Library of France, Paris)

Another important source on this topic is the historical work “Ta'rikh-i Jahangushay” (“The History of the World Conqueror”) by Ala ad-din Ata Malik ibn Muhammad Juvaini (1226 - March 6, 1283), another Persian statesman and historian of the same Hulaguid era. His work includes three main parts:
First: the history of the Mongols, as well as descriptions of their conquests before the events that followed the death of Khan Guyuk, including the story of the descendants of the khans Jochi and Chagatai;
Second: the history of the Khorezmshah dynasty, and here is the history of the Mongol governors of Khorasan until 1258;
Third: it continues the history of the Mongols until their victory over the Assassins; and tells about this sect itself.

Conquest of Baghdad by the Mongols in 1258. Illustration from the manuscript “Jami" at-tawarikh,” 14th century. (State Library, Berlin)

There are archaeological sources, but they are not very rich. But today there are already quite enough of them to make conclusive conclusions, and texts about the Mongols, as it turns out, exist not only in European languages, but also in Chinese. The Chinese sources referred to in this case are dynastic histories, state statistics and state chronicles. And so they describe in detail and by year, with the thoroughness characteristic of the Chinese, wars, campaigns, and the amount of tribute paid to the Mongols in the form of rice, beans and cattle, and even tactical methods of warfare. Chinese travelers who went to the Mongol rulers also left their notes about the Mongols and Northern China in the first half of the 13th century. “Meng-da bei-lu” (“Complete description of the Mongol-Tatars”) is practically the oldest source written in Chinese on the history of Mongolia. This “Description” contains the story of the South Song ambassador Zhao Hong, who visited Yanjing in 1221 with the commander-in-chief of the Mongol troops in Northern China, Muhali. “Meng-da bei-lu” was translated into Russian by V.P. Vasiliev back in 1859, and for that time this work was of great scientific interest. However, today it is already outdated and a new, better translation is needed.

Civil strife. Illustration from the manuscript "Jami" at-tawarikh", 14th century. (State Library, Berlin)

There is also such a valuable historical source as “Chang-chun zhen-ren si-yu ji” (“Note on the Journey to the West of the Righteous Chang-chun”), dedicated to the travels of a Taoist monk in Central Asia during the western campaign of Genghis Khan (1219-1225). gg.). A complete translation of this work was carried out by P.I. Kafarov in 1866 and this is the only complete translation of this work today, which has not lost its significance today. There is “Hei-da shi-lyue” (“Brief information about the Black Tatars”) - an even more important source (and the richest!) of information about the Mongols compared to “Meng-da bei-lu” and “Chang-chun zhen- ren si-yu ji.” It represents the notes of two Chinese travelers - Peng Da-ya and Xu Ting, who visited Mongolia at the court of Ogedei as part of the South Sung diplomatic missions, and brought together. However, we have only half of these notes in Russian.

Enthronement of the Mongol Khan. Illustration from the manuscript "Jami" at-tawarikh", 14th century. (State Library, Berlin)

Finally, there is a Mongolian source itself, and a monument of the Mongolian national culture of the 13th century. “Mongol-un niucha tobchan” (“The Secret History of the Mongols”), the discovery of which is directly related to Chinese historiography. It tells about the ancestors of Genghis Khan and how he fought for power in Mongolia. It was originally written using the Uyghur alphabet, which the Mongols borrowed at the beginning of the 13th century, but it has come down to us in a transcription made in Chinese characters and (luckily for us!) with an exact interlinear translation of all Mongolian words and a brief commentary on each of the paragraphs , written in Chinese.

Mongols. Rice. Angus McBride.

In addition to these materials, there is a significant amount of information contained in Chinese documents from the era of Mongol rule in China. For example, “Tong-zhi tiao-ge” and “Yuan dian-chang”, which record decrees, administrative and judicial decisions on a variety of issues, starting with instructions on how to properly slaughter a sheep according to the custom of the Mongols, and ending with the decrees of those who ruled in China Mongol emperors, and descriptions of the social status of various classes of the then Chinese society. It is clear that, as primary sources, these documents are of great value for historians studying the time of Mongol rule in China. In short, there is a vast layer of sources in the field of sinology that are directly related to the history of medieval Mongolia. But it is clear that all this must be studied, like, in fact, any branch of the history of the past. “A cavalry attack on history” of the “came, saw, won” type with references only to Gumilyov and Fomenko and Co. (as we often see in accompanying comments) is completely inappropriate in this case.

The Mongol is driving away prisoners. Rice. Angus McBride.

However, it should be emphasized that when starting to study this topic, it is much easier to deal with secondary sources, including those that are based not only on the study of primary written sources of European and Chinese authors, but also on the results of archaeological excavations carried out at one time by Soviet and Russian scientists. Well, for general development in the field of the history of one’s homeland, we can recommend the 18 volumes of the “Archaeology of the USSR” series published in the public domain by the Institute of Archeology of the Russian Academy of Sciences, published over the period from 1981 to 2003. And, of course, for us the main source of information is PSRL - Complete Collection of Russian Chronicles. Let us note that today there is no real evidence of their falsification either in the era of Mikhail Romanov, Peter I, or Catherine II. All this is nothing more than fabrications of amateurs from “folk history”, not worth a damn. The most interesting thing is that everyone has heard about the chronicle stories (the latter, by the way, not just one, but many!), but for some reason few people have read them. But in vain!

Mongolian with a bow. Rice. Wayne Reynolds.

As for the weapon science topic itself, the research of a number of domestic historians, recognized both in Russia and abroad, occupies an important place here. There are entire schools created by famous historians in individual universities in our country and which have prepared a number of interesting and significant publications on this topic.

Very interesting work “and armor. Siberian weapons: from the Stone Age to the Middle Ages,” published in 2003, written by A.I. Sokolov, at the time of its publication, a candidate of historical sciences, a senior researcher at the Institute of Archeology and Ethnography of the Siberian Branch of the Russian Academy of Sciences, who has been engaged in archaeological research in Altai and in the steppes of the Minusinsk Basin for more than 20 years.

One of Stephen Turnbull's books.

English-language historians publishing in the Osprey publishing house also paid their attention to the topic of military affairs among the Mongols, and in particular, such a well-known specialist as Stephen Turnbull. Familiarity with English-language literature in this case is doubly beneficial: it gives you the opportunity to get acquainted with the material and improve your English, not to mention the fact that the illustrative side of Osprey publications is distinguished by a high level of reliability.

Heavily armed Mongol warriors. Rice. Wayne Reynolds.

Having become acquainted, even if only briefly, with the historiographical basis of the topic of Mongolian military art, we can consider it as a whole, leaving references to each specific fact for purely scientific works in this area.
However, the story about Mongolian weapons should begin not with weapons, but... with horse harness. It was the Mongols who guessed to replace the bit with cheekpieces with a bit with large outer rings - snaffles. They were at the ends of the bits, and the headband straps were attached to them and the reins were tied. Thus, bits and bridles acquired a modern look and remain so today.

Mongolian bits, snaffle rings, stirrups and horseshoes.

They also improved the saddles. Now saddle bows began to be made in such a way as to obtain a wider base. And this, in turn, made it possible to reduce the pressure of the rider on the back of the animal and increase the maneuverability of the Mongol cavalry.

As for throwing weapons, that is, bows and arrows, then, as noted by all sources, the Mongols mastered them masterfully. However, the design of their bows itself was close to ideal. They used bows with a frontal horn plate and “paddle-shaped” ends. According to archaeologists, the spread of these bows in the Middle Ages was associated specifically with the Mongols, which is why they are often even called “Mongolian”. The front plate made it possible to increase the resistance of the central part of the bow to breaking, but in general it did not reduce its flexibility. The bow stick (reaching 150-160 cm) was assembled from several types of wood, and from the inside it was reinforced with plates from the horns of artiodactyls - goat, aurochs, bull. Tendons from the back of a deer, elk or bull were glued to the wooden base of the bow on its outer side, which increased its flexibility. For the Buryat craftsmen, whose bows are most similar to the ancient Mongol ones, this process took up to a week, since the thickness of the tendon layer had to reach one and a half centimeters, and each layer was glued only after the previous one had completely dried. The finished onion was covered with birch bark, pulled into a ring and dried... for at least a year. And just one such bow required at least two years, so at the same time, probably, many bows were produced at once for storage.

Despite this, bows often broke. Therefore, the Mongol warriors took with them, as Plano Carpini reports, two or three bows. They probably also had spare bowstrings, needed in different climatic conditions. For example, it is known that a bowstring made from twisted sheep intestines serves well in the summer, but does not tolerate autumn slush. So for successful shooting at any time of year and weather, a different bowstring was needed.

Finds and their reconstructions from the Museum of the Zolotarevsky settlement near Penza.

They pulled the bow in a way that was, however, known long before the Mongols appeared on the historical scene. It was called the “ring method: “When going to string a bow, take it ... in the left hand, place the string behind the agate ring on the thumb of the right hand, the front joint of which is bent forward, keep it in this position with the help of the middle joint of the index finger pressed to him, and pull the bowstring until the left hand is extended and the right hand comes to the ear; Having outlined their target, they remove the index finger from the thumb, at the same moment the bowstring slides off the agate ring and throws the arrow with considerable force” (Uk. Soch. A.I. Solovyov - P.160).

Jade archer ring. (Metropolitan Museum of Art, New York)

Almost all written sources that have reached us note the skill with which the Mongol warriors used the bow. “It is very dangerous to start a battle with them, since even in small skirmishes with them there are as many killed and wounded as others in large battles. This is a consequence of their dexterity in archery, since their arrows pierce almost all types of defenses and armor,” wrote the Armenian prince Guyton in 1307. The reason for such successful shooting was associated with the high destructive qualities of the tips of the Mongolian arrows, which were large in size and distinguished by great sharpness. Plano Carpini wrote about them this way: “The iron arrowheads are very sharp and cut on both sides like a double-edged sword,” and those that were used “... for shooting birds, animals and unarmed people are three fingers wide.”

Arrowheads found at the Zolotarevskoye settlement near Penza.

The tips were flat in cross-section, petiolate. There are asymmetrical rhombic tips, but there are also those in which the striking part had a straight, obtuse-angled or even semicircular shape. These are the so-called cuts. Two-horned ones are less common; they were used for shooting at horses and enemies not protected by armor.

Arrowheads from Tibet, XVII – XIX centuries. (Metropolitan Museum of Art, New York)

Interestingly, many large-format tips had a zigzag or “lightning” cross-section, that is, one half of the tip protruded slightly above the other, that is, in cross-section it resembled a zigzag lightning bolt. It was suggested that such tips could rotate in flight. But no one has actually verified whether this is so.

It is believed that it was customary to shoot arrows with such massive cuts “overhead”. This made it possible to hit warriors without armor standing in the back rows of dense formations, as well as seriously wound horses. As for warriors in armor, massive three-, tetrahedral or completely round, awl-shaped, armor-piercing tips were usually used against them.

Small-sized rhombic arrowheads, which were once popular among the Turks, were also found and can be seen among archaeological finds. But three-bladed and four-bladed tips with wide blades and holes punched in them practically ceased to be found in Mongolian times, although before that they were very popular. In addition to the tips were bone “whistles” in the shape of a double cone. a couple of holes were made in them and in flight they emitted a piercing whistle.

Pursuit of fleeing people. Illustration from the manuscript "Jami" at-tawarikh", 14th century. (State Library, Berlin)

Plano Carpini reported that each Mongol archer carried “three large quivers full of arrows.” The material for the quivers was birch bark and they held approximately 30 arrows each. Arrows in quivers were covered with a special cover - tokhtuy - to protect them from bad weather. Arrows could be placed in quivers with their tips up and down, and even in different directions. It was customary to decorate quivers with horn and bone overlays with geometric patterns and images of various animals and plants applied to them.

Quiver and bow Tibet or Mongolia, XV – XVII centuries. (Metropolitan Museum of Art, New York)

In addition to such quivers, arrows could also be stored in flat leather cases, their shape similar to bows with one straight side and the other figured. They are well known from Chinese, Persian and Japanese miniatures, as well as from the exhibition in the Armory Chamber of the Moscow Kremlin, and among ethnographic material from the regions of Transbaikalia, Southern and Eastern Siberia, the Far East and the Western Siberian forest-steppe. Arrows in such quivers were always placed with the feathers facing up, so that they protruded outwards by more than half their length. They were worn on the right side so that they did not interfere with riding.

Chinese quiver from the 17th century. (Metropolitan Museum, New York)

Bibliography
1. Plano Carpini J. Del. History of the Mongals // G. Del Plano Carpini. History of the Mongals / G. de Rubruk. Travel to Eastern countries / Book of Marco Polo. - M.: Mysl, 1997.
2. Rashid ad-Din. Collection of chronicles / Trans. from Persian by L. A. Khetagurova, edition and notes by prof. A. A. Semenova. - M., Leningrad: Publishing House of the USSR Academy of Sciences, 1952. - T. 1, 2,3; Fazlullah Rashid al-Din. Jami-at-Tawarikh. - Baku: “Nagyl Evi”, 2011.
3. Ata-Melik Juvaini. Genghis Khan. History of the World Conqueror = Genghis Khan: the history of the world conqueror / Translation from the text of Mirza Muhammad Qazwini into English by J. E. Boyle, with a preface and bibliography by D. O. Morgan. Translation of the text from English into Russian by E. E. Kharitonova. - M.: “Publishing House MAGISTR-PRESS”, 2004.
4. Gorelik M.V. Early Mongolian armor (IX - first half of the 16th centuries) // Archeology, ethnography and anthropology of Mongolia. - Novosibirsk: Science, 1987. - P. 163-208; Gorelik M.V. Armies of the Mongol-Tatars of the X-XIV centuries: Military art, weapons, equipment. - M.: Eastern Horizon, 2002; Gorelik M.V. Steppe battle (from the history of military affairs of the Tatar-Mongols) // Military affairs of the ancient and medieval population of Northern and Central Asia. - Novosibirsk: IIFF SB AN USSR, 1990. - P. 155-160.
5. Khudyakov Yu. S. Armament of medieval nomads of Southern Siberia and Central Asia. - Novosibirsk: Nauka, 1986; Khudyakov Yu. S. Armament of the nomads of Southern Siberia and Central Asia in the era of the developed Middle Ages. - Novosibirsk: IAET, 1997.
6. Sokolov A.I. “Weapons and armor. Siberian weapons: from the Stone Age to the Middle Ages." - Novosibirsk: “INFOLIO-press”, 2003.
7. Stephen Turnbull. Genghis Khan & the Mongol Conquests 1190–1400 (ESSENTIAL HISTORIES 57), Osprey, 2003; Stephen Turnbull. Mongol Warrior 1200–1350 (WARRIOR 84), Osprey, 2003; Stephen Turnbull. The Mongol Invasions of Japan 1274 and 1281(CAMPAIGN 217), Osprey, 2010; Stephen Turnbull. The Great Wall of China 221 BC–AD 1644 (FORTRESS 57), Osprey, 2007.
8. It is clear that the Mongol army was never multinational, but was a motley mixture of Mongol-speaking, and later Turkic-speaking nomadic tribes. Therefore, the very concept of “Mongolian” in this case carries more collective rather than ethnic content.

To be continued…

Speaking about the weapons of Mongol warriors of the 13th century. and especially about their appearance, it should be borne in mind that in a hundred years the Mongols from a wild barbarian horde turned into the army of a civilized state. Marco Polo notes that the “Chinese” Mongols “are no longer what they used to be.”

The yurt, a characteristic dwelling of steppe nomads, consists of a wooden lattice frame covered with black felt. This picture shows a Kyrgyz yurt. (Illustration by Heather Dockeray)

Mongol light horseman, Rus', circa 1223

An episode of a long chase that the Mongols could undertake, for example, after the battle on the Kalka River: a Mongol horseman spotted a hiding Russian warrior in the coastal thickets. A Mongol wears a robe captured during the Khorezm campaign; a warm sheepskin coat is worn under the robe. A hat with fur-trimmed earmuffs, the Mongolian’s appearance was recreated from the Saransk Album (Istanbul). A coil of rope, an ax, and a wineskin with sour milk are attached to the saddle. The armor of the Russian warrior is depicted in accordance with the samples presented in the Kremlin Armory.

(The Battle of Kalka took place on May 31, 1223. The weather shown in the illustration corresponds to the authors’ ideas about the “harsh Russian winter”!)

Giovanni de Plano-Carpini, who traveled as papal ambassador to Mongolia in 1245–1247, left a more “sober” description: “Externally, the Tatars are very different from ordinary people, since their eyes are set wide apart and their cheeks are wide. Their cheekbones protrude noticeably further than their jaws; their nose is flat and small, their eyes are narrow, and their eyelids are located just under the eyebrows. As a rule, although there are exceptions, they are narrow in the waist; almost all are of average height. Few of them have a beard, although many have a noticeable mustache on their upper lip, which no one plucks. Their feet are small."

The unusual appearance of the Mongols for a European was aggravated by the traditional hairstyles of the steppe people. Monk Wilhelm Rubruk wrote that the Mongols shaved the hair on their heads in a square. This custom was also confirmed by Carpini, who compared the hairstyle of the Mongols with a monastic tonsure. From the front corners of the square, says Wilhelm, the Mongols shaved stripes to the temples, and they were shaved as well as the back of the head; as a result, a torn ring was formed, framing the head. The forelock was not cut in front, and it went down to the eyebrows. The long hair remaining on the head was braided into two braids, the ends of which were tied together behind the ears. Carpini describes the Mongolian hairstyle in a similar way. He also notes that Mongolians keep their hair long at the back. The description of the Mongols' ponytail-like hairstyle left by Vincent de Beauvais also coincides with these sources. They all date back to around 1245.

Mongols in winter clothing with a pack camel, 1211–1260.

The rich Mongol in the foreground is armed with a long spear and wears two sheepskin coats, one on top of the other, with the inner sheepskin coat worn with the fur inward and the outer one with the fur outward. Sheepskin coats and fur coats were made from fox, wolf and even bear fur. The flaps of the conical cap are lowered to protect against the cold. Poor Mongols, like the camel driver, wore sheepskin coats made of dog or horse skins. The Bactrian camel is a very useful animal, capable of carrying luggage weighing up to 120 kg. The camel's humps are covered with felt in six or seven layers, on top of which a pack saddle is attached.

Battle of Liegnitz. Pay attention to how the artist depicted Mongolian hats.

The basic elements of the Mongolian costume of the described period changed little. In general, clothing was very practical, especially fur and quilted winter clothes: they retained heat well. The usual headdress was the Mongolian hat, which was often depicted in drawings by contemporaries. The hat had a conical shape, was made of fabric and had a wide flap at the bottom of the cap, which could be lowered in cold weather. Sometimes the lapel was made of two parts. Often the hat was decorated with fox, wolf or lynx fluffy or cropped fur. In some illustrations the cap of the cap is crowned with a button or something similar to it; fur caps and hats with fur earmuffs are also mentioned. Maybe earphones mean the flaps of a cap, or maybe there were hats of a special cut. One of the later authors talks about two red ribbons hanging from the top of the cap, about 45 cm long; however, no one else mentions such ribbons. However, it is quite possible to accept (for the 13th century) another observation of the same author, who claimed that in hot weather the Mongols tied a piece of cloth around their heads, leaving the free ends hanging behind.

Mongol heavy cavalry, Liegnitz, 1241

Leather plate armor, coated with varnish to protect against moisture, is depicted according to the description of the Carpini Plan and Robinson's book "Oriental Armour". The helmet is recreated according to a Tibetan design, which fully corresponds to the descriptions of the Mongolian helmet: it is made of eight parts, fastened with leather straps, the helmet knob is also attached with leather. Horse armor is depicted according to Carpini's description. Similar armor is known from stylized, but completely reliable Arabic images made about half a century later. The tip of the spear is equipped with a hook and bears a plume of yak tail. European knights wear the surcoat of the Teutonic Order.

The clothing was generally uniform in cut; its basis was a swing robe. The left hem of the robe was wrapped over the right and secured with a button or tie located below the armhole of the right sleeve. It is possible that the right floor was also somehow secured under the left, but, naturally, this cannot be seen in the drawings. In some drawings, Mongolian robes are shown with wide elbow-length sleeves, and the sleeves of the lower clothing are visible under them. Summer robes of this cut were made from cotton fabric, but as the empire expanded, especially in Persia and China, silk and brocade clothes began to appear. But even wearing such elegant clothes did not at all give grace to the Mongols themselves, as evidenced by Persian manuscripts. All travelers mention the slovenliness and dirt of the Mongols; many describe their custom of wiping their hands on their robe or pants while eating. Many people also emphasize the heavy smell characteristic of nomads.

The Mongols tucked their wide trousers into narrow boots, which were made without heels, but with thick felt soles. The tops had lacing.

In winter, the Mongols wore felt boots and one or two fur sheepskin coats. Wilhelm Rubruk claims that they wore the inner sheepskin coat with the fur inward, and the outer sheepskin coat with the fur outward, thus protecting themselves from wind and snow. The Mongols received fur from their western and northern neighbors and tributaries; The outer fur coat of a wealthy Mongol could be made from fox, wolf or monkey fur. The poor wore sheepskin coats made of dog skins or sheepskin. Mongols could also wear fur or leather pants, with rich people lining them with silk. The poor wore cotton pants with wool that almost matted into felt. After the conquest of China, silk became more widespread.

Mongol general and drummer, circa 1240

The Mongol commander gives the order to his tumen to launch an attack on the Russian army. The military leader sits on a purebred Persian horse, the horse's headdress is of the Mongolian type, but decorated with a Persian hair brush. Saddle pad with rounded corners in Chinese style. The highly polished plate armor is depicted according to the descriptions of Carpini and Robinson. The prefabricated helmet was reconstructed from the same sources; The mace is depicted in Arabic miniatures. The naqqara drummer is depicted from an old illustration given in Colonel Yule's book "Marco Polo"; the long tassels with which the drums are decorated are visible. The drummer's chain mail is depicted according to the description of Father Wilhelm Rubruk. We can only assume that the drummer wore chain mail as a sign of his high position; It was he who conveyed the commander’s commands to the entire army.

Such clothing helped the Mongols wage war against harsh winters; but even more warriors were saved by their incredible endurance. Marco Polo tells us that, if necessary, the Mongols could go ten days without hot food. In such cases, they could, if necessary, reinforce their strength with the blood of their horses, opening a vein in their neck and directing a stream of blood into their mouths. A Mongol's usual "emergency reserve" during the campaign consisted of about 4 kilograms of evaporated milk, two liters of kumis (a low-alcohol drink made from mare's milk) and several pieces of dried meat, which were stuffed under the saddle. Every morning, the Mongol diluted half a pound of dry milk in 1-2 fat tails and hung the fat tails from the saddle; By the middle of the day, from the constant shaking at a gallop, this mixture turned into some kind of kefir.

The Mongols' habit of drinking mare's milk allowed them to significantly increase the mobility of their cavalry units. The Mongols had an excellent appetite, and the usually accurate Carpini reports that the Mongols could eat dogs, wolves, foxes, horses, rats, mice, lichens and even the afterbirth of mares. Cases of cannibalism are noted by various authors, including Carpini, who tells how during one of the sieges the Mongols ran out of food, and they killed one out of every ten in order to provide food for the rest. If this is true, it becomes clear why the Mongols were so willing to take foreigners into their service. But one cannot be sure of the presence of cannibalism among the Mongols: many chroniclers, no doubt, could simply express their disgust at the invaders in this way.

Other characteristics of the Mongols, however, are rather respectable. For example, they all had excellent eyesight. Reliable sources claim that any Mongol warrior could, in the open steppe, four miles away, see a man peeking out from behind a bush or stone, and in clear air, distinguish a man from an animal at a distance of 18 miles! In addition, the Mongols had excellent visual memory, they had an excellent understanding of the climate, the characteristics of vegetation, and easily found sources of water. Only a nomadic shepherd could learn all this. The mother began to teach the child to ride at the age of three: he was tied with ropes to the back of the horse. At the age of four or five, the boy already received his first bow and arrows, and from that time on he spent most of his life on horseback, with a bow in his hands, fighting or hunting. On campaigns, when speed of movement became a decisive factor, a Mongol could sleep in the saddle, and since each warrior had four horses for a change, the Mongols could move without interruption for a whole day.

Mongol camp, around 1220

A typical Mongolian horse archer wearing a simple long robe. Please note that the robe wraps from left to right. The warrior's property is suspended from the saddle. The quiver, as well as the method of “transporting” prisoners, is described in the chronicles of that time. The boy in the foreground is dressed the same as the adults. He plays with a baby roe deer - illik. The women in the background are setting up a yurt, covering it with faded felt.

Mongolian horses were not inferior in endurance to their owners. They were, and still are, short, stocky animals, 13–14 hands high. Their thick coat protects them well from the cold, and they are able to make long treks. There is a known case when a Mongol on a single horse covered 600 miles (about 950 kilometers!) in nine days, and with the system of mounted support provided by Genghis Khan, an entire army in September 1221 covered 130 miles - about 200 km - in two days without stopping. In 1241, Subedei's army completed a 180-mile march in three days, moving through deep snow.

Mongolian horses could pluck grass as they walked, feed on roots and fallen leaves; according to Matthew of Paris, these “mighty horses” could even feed on wood. The horses served their riders faithfully and were trained to stop instantly so that the warrior could aim his bow more accurately. The durable saddle weighed about 4 kilograms, had high bows and was lubricated with sheep fat so that it would not get wet when it rained. The stirrups were also massive and the stirrup straps were very short.

The main weapon of the Mongol was a composite bow. For the Mongolian bow, the pulling force was 70 kilograms (noticeably more than that of a simple English bow), and the effective firing range reached 200–300 meters. Carpini reports that Mongol warriors had two bows (probably one long and one short) and two or three quivers, each containing approximately 30 arrows. Carpini talks about two types of arrows: light ones with a small sharp tip for long-range shooting and heavy ones with a large broad tip for close targets. The arrowheads, he says, were tempered in the following way: they were heated red-hot and then thrown into salt water; as a result, the tip became so hard that it could pierce armor. The blunt end of the arrow was feathered with eagle feathers.

Mongol camp, 1210–1260

The horse hunter (on the right) tied a scarf around his head instead of a hat (such headdresses are described by Hoyaert in “History of the Mongols”). Falconry was and continues to be a popular pastime in Mongolia. The Mongol sitting next to him is depicted without a headdress, so that his intricate hairstyle is visible (it is described in detail in the text). A large cauldron and a screen (protecting from the wind) are described in the History of Wen Chi, a 12th-century source kept in the Museum of Fine Arts, Boston. Pay attention to the folding door of the yurt and the way of wearing trousers tucked into the tops of boots.

In addition to bows, other weapons were also used, depending on whether the warrior belonged to light or heavy cavalry. Heavy cavalry used long pikes with hooks to pull the enemy out of the saddle and could use shields. In some drawings, the Mongols are depicted with small round shields, but more reliable sources claim that shields were used only on foot. Large leather or wicker shields were used by guards, and large shields similar to turtle shells were used when storming fortress walls. Heavily armed cavalry could also use a mace. The swords had a curved shape, repeating the shape of the sabers of the Muslim Turks. Lightly armed cavalry used a sword, a bow and sometimes javelins.

All Mongols on the campaign had with them a light hatchet, a tool for sharpening arrowheads (it was fastened to a quiver), a horsehair lasso, a coil of rope, an awl, a needle and thread, an iron or other material pot and two wineskins, which were mentioned higher. Every ten warriors was given a tent. Each warrior kept a bag of provisions with him, and Carpini mentions a large leather skin in which clothes and property were hidden from moisture when crossing rivers. Carpini describes how this wineskin was used. It was filled with things and a saddle was tied to it, after which the waterskin itself was tied to the horse's tail; the rider had to swim next to the horse, controlling it with the help of the reins.

Mongol heavy cavalry commander, China, 1210–1276.

The source for reconstructing the appearance and weapons of the Mongol warriors presented here, preparing for an attack on a Chinese city, was mainly the records of Rashid ad-din. The warrior in the foreground is dressed as shown by the illustrators of Rashid ad-din. The sleeveless robe allows the mantles of the plate armor worn underneath to be seen. Persian type helmet; a wide "flap" at the base of the helmet is often shown in the above-mentioned drawings, but its purpose is not precisely known. Some believe that this is an analogue of the lapels of the traditional Mongolian hat, others go as far as to explain it in completely unlikely ways. The cheetah's tail on the quiver is also shown in some illustrations of the time; perhaps they used it to wipe off the collected arrows.

The mounted Mongol is dressed in a completely different style than his standing commander. In drawings for Rashid ad-din, artists constantly emphasize that the Mongols did not wear armor under a robe or sheepskin coat. The military commander watches the firing of a catapult, the description of which is given in the text. Our reconstruction is based on the most reliable sources possible; most likely, these weapons were powered by prisoners, although this could partly limit the action of the catapult itself. Dr Joseph Needham (Times Library Supplement, 11 January 1980) believes that the trebuchets with counterweights familiar to Europeans are an Arab-improved Chinese catapult.

Large yurts were not dismantled, but were transported on carts following the moving army. The installation of yurts is shown in the background.

It is difficult to describe in detail the armor of the Mongols, since they were completely unusual for eyewitnesses who left descriptions, and the drawings may date back to a later period. Three types of armor are mentioned: leather, metal scales and chain mail. Leather armor was made by fastening parts together so that they overlapped each other - thus achieving sufficient strength with the necessary flexibility; The skin for the inner layer of dospskha was boiled so that it became soft. To give the armor water-repellent properties, they were coated with varnish extracted from resin. Some authors say that such armor protected only the chest, others believe that it also covered the back. Carpini described iron armor, and left a detailed description of the technology for their manufacture. They consisted of numerous thin plates the width of a finger and the length of a palm with eight holes. Several plates were connected with a leather cord, forming a shell. In fact, Carpini describes lamellar armor, widespread in the East. Carpini noted that the records were polished so thoroughly that one could look in them as if in a mirror.

1 and 2. Warriors of the Korean auxiliary units, around 1280.

The illustrations are based on drawings from the Japanese “Scroll of the Mongol Invasion.” Here are depicted soldiers of the auxiliary detachment of the Mongol army during the unsuccessful invasion of Japan. Koreans wear quilted protective weapons; Mongolian weapons - bows, spears and swords. Note the rectangular shield woven from reeds with a bamboo frame.

3. Japanese samurai, circa 1280

The samurai is also depicted from a drawing from the Mongol Invasion Scroll; This shows typical Japanese weapons of the period. Please note that the samurai's right shoulder is not protected by armor to make it easier to use the bow, and a spare bowstring rolled into a skein is attached to the belt on the left.

Reconstructions of Tibetan lamellar armor, very similar to that worn by the Mongols. (Tower Arsenal, London)

Full armor was made from such plates. Some drawings made at the end of the period described have survived, namely miniatures from Rashid ad-din's World History (written about 1306) and from the Japanese Scroll of the Mongol Invasion (about 1292). Although both sources may contain certain inaccuracies due to the specific view of the Mongols of their authors, they agree well in detail and make it possible to recreate the appearance of a typical Mongol warrior, at least of the last period - the era of Kublai Khan. The armor was long, below the knees, but in some paintings clothing is visible from under the armor. In front, the shell remained solid only up to the waist, and below it had a slit so that the floors would not interfere with sitting in the saddle. The sleeves were short, almost reaching the elbow, like Japanese armor. In Rashid ad-din's illustrations, many Mongols wear decorative silk surcoats over their armor. In the Japanese scroll, the armor and surcoat are almost the same, the main difference between the Mongols in the Japanese scroll is their fierce appearance. Rashid al-Din gives very stylized and clean miniatures!

Rashid ad-din depicts metal helmets with the top curved slightly back. In the Japanese scroll the helmets are shown with a ball at the top, surmounted by a plume, and with a wide backplate reaching to the shoulders and chin; on Persian miniatures the backplates are much smaller.

It can be assumed that the Mongols acquired armor no later than the European campaign; There is too little evidence for an earlier period. Without a doubt, the Mongols wore armor before, but most likely these were simpler versions.

In winter, fur coats were worn over the armor. Light cavalry may have had no armor at all, and as for horse armor, there is about as much evidence in favor of its existence as against it. This, again, may simply indicate the differences between heavy and light cavalry. Carpini describes plate leather horse armor made of five parts: “... One part is on one side of the horse, and another on the other, and they are connected to each other from the tail to the head and attached to the saddle, and in front of the saddle - on the sides and also on the neck; another part covers the upper part of the croup, connecting to the two side ones, and there is a hole in it through which the tail is passed; The chest is covered by the fourth piece. All of the above parts hang down and reach the knees or pasterns. An iron plate is placed on the forehead, connected to the side plates on either side of the neck.”

Father William (1254) speaks of meeting two Mongols who wore chain mail. The Mongols told him that they received chain mail from the Alans, who, in turn, brought them from the Kubachi people from the Caucasus. William also adds that he saw iron armor and iron caps from Persia and that the leather armor he saw was clumsy. Both he and Vincent de Beauvais argue that only important warriors wore armor; according to Vincent de Beauvais - only every tenth warrior.

Notes:

This must have been very surprising to the Europeans: mounting a heavily armed European knight required very long stirrups. - Note scientific ed.

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The huge Mongol Empire created by the great Genghis Khan was many times larger than the empires of Napoleon Bonaparte and Alexander the Great. And it fell not under the blows of external enemies, but only as a result of internal decay...
Having united the disparate Mongol tribes in the 13th century, Genghis Khan managed to create an army that had no equal in Europe, Rus', or the Central Asian countries. No ground force of that time could compare with the mobility of his troops. And its main principle has always been attack, even if the main strategic objective was defense.

The Pope's envoy to the Mongol court, Plano Carpini, wrote that the victories of the Mongols depended largely not so much on their physical strength or numbers, but on superior tactics. Carpini even recommended that European military leaders follow the example of the Mongols. “Our armies should be managed on the model of the Tatars (Mongols - author's note) on the basis of the same harsh military laws... The army should in no way be conducted in one mass, but in separate detachments. Scouts should be sent out in all directions. And our generals must keep their troops day and night in combat readiness, since the Tatars are always vigilant, like devils.” So where did the invincibility of the Mongol army lie, where did its commanders and rank and file originate from those techniques of mastering the martial art?

Strategy

Before starting any military operations, the Mongol rulers at the kurultai (military council - author's note) developed and discussed in the most detailed manner the plan for the upcoming campaign, and also determined the place and time for the collection of troops. Spies were required to obtain “tongues” or find traitors in the enemy’s camp, thereby providing military leaders with detailed information about the enemy.

During Genghis Khan's lifetime, he was the supreme commander. He usually carried out an invasion of the captured country with the help of several armies and in different directions. He demanded a plan of action from the commanders, sometimes making amendments to it. After which the performer was given complete freedom in solving the task. Genghis Khan was personally present only during the first operations, and after making sure that everything was going according to plan, he provided the young leaders with all the glory of military triumphs.

Approaching fortified cities, the Mongols collected all kinds of supplies in the surrounding area, and, if necessary, set up a temporary base near the city. The main forces usually continued the offensive, and the reserve corps began preparing and conducting the siege.

When a meeting with an enemy army was inevitable, the Mongols either tried to attack the enemy suddenly, or, when they could not count on surprise, they directed their forces around one of the enemy flanks. This maneuver was called “tulugma”. However, the Mongol commanders never acted according to a template, trying to extract maximum benefit from specific conditions. Often the Mongols rushed into feigned flight, covering their tracks with consummate skill, literally disappearing from the eyes of the enemy. But only until he let his guard down. Then the Mongols mounted fresh spare horses and, as if appearing from underground in front of the stunned enemy, made a swift raid. It was in this way that the Russian princes were defeated on the Kalka River in 1223.
It happened that in a feigned flight, the Mongol army scattered so that it enveloped the enemy from different sides. But if the enemy was ready to fight back, they could release him from the encirclement and then finish him off on the march. In 1220, one of the armies of Khorezmshah Muhammad, which the Mongols deliberately released from Bukhara and then defeated, was destroyed in a similar way.

Most often, the Mongols attacked under the cover of light cavalry in several parallel columns stretched along a wide front. The enemy column that encountered the main forces either held its position or retreated, while the rest continued to move forward, advancing on the flanks and rear of the enemy. Then the columns approached each other, the result of which, as a rule, was the complete encirclement and destruction of the enemy.

The amazing mobility of the Mongol army, allowing it to seize the initiative, gave the Mongol commanders, and not their opponents, the right to choose both the place and time of the decisive battle.

To streamline the movement of combat units as much as possible and quickly convey to them orders for further maneuvers, the Mongols used signal flags in black and white. And with the onset of darkness, signals were given by burning arrows. Another tactical development of the Mongols was the use of a smoke screen. Small detachments set the steppe or dwellings on fire, which concealed the movements of the main troops and gave the Mongols the much-needed advantage of surprise.

One of the main strategic rules of the Mongols was the pursuit of a defeated enemy until complete destruction. This was new in the military practice of medieval times. The knights of that time, for example, considered it humiliating for themselves to chase an enemy, and such ideas persisted for many centuries, until the era of Louis XVI. But the Mongols needed to make sure not so much that the enemy was defeated, but that he would no longer be able to gather new forces, regroup and attack again. Therefore, it was simply destroyed.

The Mongols kept track of enemy losses in a rather unique way. After each battle, special detachments cut off the right ear of each corpse lying on the battlefield, and then collected it in bags and accurately counted the number of killed enemies.
As you know, the Mongols preferred to fight in winter. A favorite way to test whether the ice on the river could withstand the weight of their horses was to lure the local population there. At the end of 1241 in Hungary, in full view of starving refugees, the Mongols left their cattle unattended on the eastern bank of the Danube. And when they were able to cross the river and take away the cattle, the Mongols realized that the offensive could begin.

Warriors

Every Mongol from early childhood prepared to become a warrior. Boys learned to ride a horse almost earlier than to walk, and a little later they mastered the bow, spear and sword to the subtleties. The commander of each unit was chosen based on his initiative and courage shown in battle. In the detachment subordinate to him, he enjoyed exceptional power - his orders were carried out immediately and unquestioningly. No medieval army knew such cruel discipline.
Mongol warriors did not know the slightest excess - neither in food nor in housing. Having acquired unprecedented endurance and stamina over the years of preparation for military nomadic life, they practically did not need medical care, although since the time of the Chinese campaign (XIII-XIV centuries), the Mongol army always had a whole staff of Chinese surgeons. Before the start of the battle, each warrior put on a shirt made of durable wet silk. As a rule, the arrows pierced this tissue, and it was drawn into the wound along with the tip, significantly complicating its penetration, which allowed surgeons to easily remove the arrows along with the tissue from the body.

Consisting almost entirely of cavalry, the Mongol army was based on the decimal system. The largest unit was the tumen, which included 10 thousand warriors. The tumen included 10 regiments, each with 1,000 people. The regiments consisted of 10 squadrons, each of which represented 10 detachments of 10 people. Three tumens made up an army or army corps.


An immutable law was in force in the army: if in battle one of the ten fled from the enemy, the entire ten were executed; if a dozen escaped in a hundred, the entire hundred were executed; if a hundred escaped, the entire thousand were executed.

The light cavalry fighters, who made up more than half of the entire army, had no armor except for a helmet, and were armed with an Asian bow, spear, curved saber, light long pike and lasso. The power of curved Mongolian bows was in many ways inferior to large English ones, but each Mongolian horseman carried at least two quivers of arrows. The archers had no armor, with the exception of a helmet, and it was not necessary for them. The tasks of the light cavalry included: reconnaissance, camouflage, supporting the heavy cavalry with shooting and, finally, pursuing the fleeing enemy. In other words, they had to hit the enemy from a distance.
Units of heavy and medium cavalry were used for close combat. They were called nukers. Although initially nukers were trained in all types of combat: they could attack scattered, using bows, or in close formation, using spears or swords...
The main striking force of the Mongol army was heavy cavalry, its number was no more than 40 percent. Heavy cavalry had at their disposal a whole set of armor made of leather or chain mail, usually taken from defeated enemies. The horses of the heavy cavalrymen were also protected by leather armor. These warriors were armed for long-range combat - with bows and arrows, for close combat - with spears or swords, broadswords or sabers, battle axes or maces.

The attack of the heavily armed cavalry was decisive and could change the entire course of the battle. Each Mongol horseman had from one to several spare horses. The herds were always located directly behind the formation and the horse could be quickly changed on the march or even during the battle. On these short, hardy horses, the Mongol cavalry could travel up to 80 kilometers, and with convoys, battering and throwing weapons - up to 10 kilometers per day.

Siege
Even during the life of Genghis Khan, in the wars with the Jin Empire, the Mongols largely borrowed from the Chinese some elements of strategy and tactics, as well as military equipment. Although at the beginning of their conquests Genghis Khan's army often found itself powerless against the strong walls of Chinese cities, over the course of several years the Mongols developed a fundamental system of siege that was almost impossible to resist. Its main component was a large but mobile detachment, equipped with throwing machines and other equipment, which was transported on special covered wagons. For the siege caravan, the Mongols recruited the best Chinese engineers and created on their basis a powerful engineering corps, which turned out to be extremely effective.

As a result, not a single fortress was any longer an insurmountable obstacle to the advance of the Mongol army. While the rest of the army moved on, the siege detachment surrounded the most important fortresses and began the assault.
The Mongols also adopted from the Chinese the ability to surround a fortress with a palisade during a siege, isolating it from the outside world and thereby depriving the besieged of the opportunity to make forays. The Mongols then launched an assault using various siege weapons and stone-throwing machines. To create panic in the enemy ranks, the Mongols rained down thousands of burning arrows on the besieged cities. They were fired by light cavalry directly from under the fortress walls or from a catapult from afar.

During a siege, the Mongols often resorted to cruel, but very effective methods for them: they drove a large number of defenseless captives in front of them, forcing the besieged to kill their own compatriots in order to get to the attackers.
If the defenders offered fierce resistance, then after the decisive assault the entire city, its garrison and residents were subjected to destruction and total plunder.
“If they always turned out to be invincible, this was due to the boldness of their strategic plans and the clarity of their tactical actions. In the person of Genghis Khan and his commanders, the art of war reached one of its highest peaks,” as the French military leader Renck wrote about the Mongols. And apparently he was right.

Intelligence service

Reconnaissance activities were used by the Mongols everywhere. Long before the start of campaigns, scouts studied the terrain, weapons, organization, tactics and mood of the enemy army to the smallest detail. All this intelligence gave the Mongols an undeniable advantage over the enemy, who sometimes knew much less about himself than he should have. The Mongol intelligence network spread literally all over the world. Spies usually acted under the guise of merchants and merchants.
The Mongols were especially successful in what is now commonly called psychological warfare. Stories about cruelty, barbarity and torture of the rebellious were deliberately spread by them, and again long before the fighting, in order to suppress any desire of the enemy to resist. And even though there was a lot of truth in such propaganda, the Mongols were very willing to use the services of those who agreed to cooperate with them, especially if some of their skills could be used to benefit the cause.

The Mongols did not refuse any deception if it could allow them to gain an advantage, reduce their casualties or increase the enemy's losses.

Army of Genghis Khan

Even during the great kurultai, which proclaimed him Emperor of Mongolia, Genghis Khan declared: “We have an enemy everywhere - from sunset to sunrise.” Therefore, he considered the most important task to be the creation of a combat-ready army. For this purpose, the entire population of the country was divided into right and left wings. In turn, they were divided into tumens (darkness), consisting of 10 thousand warriors, who were led by temniks. Under the command of the Temniks were the commanders of thousands, who commanded a thousand warriors. They, in turn, were subordinate to the centurions, and the centurions were subordinate to the tens.

According to the order established by Genghis Khan in the Mongol army, each horseman knew his place in the ten, in the hundred and in the thousand. Thousands of soldiers were gathered into large detachments subordinate to the governors. During marching conditions, the army was divided into kurens, each of which numbered about a thousand people. This division was based on an old Mongol custom: during migrations of individual tribes, the Mongols placed their tents for the night in a closed ring, in the center of which the leader’s yurt was placed. Such a kuren was convenient for defense on all sides, while at the same time protecting the leader from being captured by the enemy.

The army had the most severe discipline. The warriors received orders from the commander of the right or left wing of the troops, and sometimes directly from the khan's headquarters. The slightest disobedience was punishable by death. For example, if one warrior fled from the battlefield, all ten were executed. Death also awaited traitors.

Military units were not only accounting units. A hundred and a thousand could carry out an independent combat mission. Tumen acted in the war at the tactical level. Genghis Khan appointed his sons and representatives of the tribal nobility from among the military leaders to the highest positions of temniks. These people proved to him their devotion and experience in military affairs.

To assert personal power and suppress any discontent in the country, Genghis Khan created a ten-thousand-strong horse guard. The best warriors were recruited from the Mongol tribes. The Guard enjoyed great privileges. The guards were also the emperor's bodyguards; as necessary, from among them he appointed commanders to the troops.

The main branch of Genghis Khan's troops was heavily armed cavalry. The main types of weapons were the sword, saber, pike and bow with arrows. Mongolian sabers were light, thin and curved, arrow shafts were made of willow, and bows and saddles were made of wood. Initially, Mongol warriors protected their chest and head in battle with leather helmets and breastplates. Later they acquired more reliable equipment in the form of various metal armor.

The second most important branch of the army was light cavalry. Mainly it consisted of horse archers, who were recruited from the warriors of the conquered steppe peoples. As a rule, they were the ones who started the battle. Bombarding the enemy with thousands of arrows, they brought confusion into his ranks. Then the heavily armed cavalry of the Mongols themselves went on the attack in a dense mass. Their attack dealt a ramming blow, which was very difficult to resist.

A Mongolian warrior is necessarily a horseman. Therefore, horses played a huge role in Genghis Khan’s army. Mongolian horses delighted contemporaries with their obedience and endurance. Geldings were most often used for riding. Each warrior had several horses on the campaign. Men from the age of 20 were recruited into the Mongolian army. They came to service with a horse (or several), weapons and armor. Reviews were regularly held in dozens and hundreds, where the availability and condition of equipment was checked. And in peacetime, the Mongols worked on the farm and were engaged in hunting, which, according to Genghis Khan, helped them acquire military skills and develop endurance and strength.

Each warrior participating in a military campaign had his own share of the spoils, from which only the part due to the khan was deducted. No boss had the right to confiscate it through punishment or threat. A family whose member fell on the battlefield was exempted for a year from mobilization of other men liable for military service into the army, but a deserter was subject to the death penalty, which was usually carried out before the formation.

So, Genghis Khan deservedly entered military history as a talented commander and military leader, a gifted strategist and tactician. For his military leaders, he developed rules for waging war and organizing military service, which were strictly followed. First of all, careful conduct of long-range and close-range reconnaissance, then a surprise attack on an enemy, even one superior in strength. Genghis Khan always sought to dismember the enemy army in order to then destroy it piece by piece. At his instigation, the Mongol military leaders began to widely and skillfully use ambushes and traps, luring the enemy into them. And on the battlefield they skillfully maneuvered large masses of cavalry. If the enemy retreated, he was necessarily pursued, and the goal was his complete destruction, and not the capture of booty.

Genghis Khan ordered his commanders to adhere to traditional Horde battle tactics. It boiled down to the sequential implementation of a number of operations. First, to disorient the enemy by simulating the supposedly disorderly flight of Mongol warriors. Then to provoking the enemy to launch a counter-offensive and finally to organizing the encirclement of his army, which found itself in a trap due to these maneuvers.

When preparing for a campaign, Genghis Khan did not always blow the trumpet for a large gathering. At first, scouts, scouts and spies brought him important information about the new enemy, the location and number of his troops, and movement routes. All this allowed the emperor to determine further actions and quickly respond to the behavior of the enemy.

The greatness of Genghis Khan’s leadership talent also lay in the fact that he knew how to change his tactics depending on the prevailing circumstances. When his troops began to encounter strong fortifications, he began to use all kinds of throwing and siege engines during the siege. They were transported to the army disassembled and quickly assembled during the siege of the fortress. It should be taken into account that there were no mechanics among the Mongols and Genghis Khan brought them from other countries or captured them. While dealing with the defeated enemy, he left alive artisans and other specialists (for example, doctors), who, although they became slaves, were kept in good conditions. With their help, the Mongols established the production of stone-throwing and battering guns that ejected vessels with gunpowder or flammable liquid. Thus, during a military campaign in Central Asia, the Mongol army had 3000 ballistas (machines for targeted action, which threw mainly large arrows), 300 catapults (mounted-action machines that threw stones and wooden balls), 700 machines for throwing pots of ignited oil . To storm cities and fortresses, there were 4,000 ladders and 2,500 packs (bags) with small stones for filling the fortress moat. All this made it possible to successfully besiege and capture fortified settlements. In the Mongolian army, infantrymen and wall beaters did this. The first detachment of stone throwers, led by the Mongol Almukhai, consisted of 500 people. In addition, when storming cities, the Mongols used prisoners, who were driven ahead of their troops.

At his headquarters, Genghis Khan lived in a yellow silk tent. On one side of him stood a white stallion named Sater tied to a golden peg. He never knew the rider. According to the interpretation of shamans, during the emperor’s campaigns, the invisible mighty god of war Sulde, the patron of the Mongol army, rode this snow-white horse, the patron of the Mongol army, who led the Mongols to great victories. Next to Seter was attached a tall bamboo pole with a folded white banner of Genghis Khan. On the other side of the tent, the broad-chested Naiman, the favorite war horse of the emperor, was always saddled. Around the tent there were Thargaudas on patrol - bodyguards clad in armor, with iron helmets on their heads. They made sure that not a single living creature came close to the habitat of the Great Ruler. Only those who had special gold plates with the image of a tiger’s head could pass the sentry outposts and go to the imperial camp home.

At a distance from the tent, black and red woolen yurts were scattered in a ring. This was the camp of a thousand chosen guards of Genghis Khan. He selected all of them personally, and they always fully justified his trust. These chosen ones had special privileges, in particular, an ordinary guardsman was considered a rank higher than an army commander.

It should be noted that Genghis Khan appointed the most faithful and devoted nukers to his apparatus for managing the horde and army, whom he valued even higher than his brothers. The command of the army and the guard of the horde was entrusted to three archers. These persons were required to carry a bow and arrow as signs of authority. Among them was Boorchu’s younger brother, Ogolay-cherbi. The three swordsmen also included the younger brother of Genghis Khan himself, Khasar. Four nukers were appointed as scouts and messengers. They carried out personal assignments for the emperor. By the way, as already mentioned, communication in the horde was established very clearly. On the main routes of his possessions, Genghis Khan set up postal posts, where messengers and horses were always ready to transport the khan's orders. Belts with bells were put on the postal horse so that oncoming people would give him way.

The military glory of Genghis Khan is inextricably linked with the names of his talented commanders. All his life he will be accompanied by his childhood friend Boorchu, who eventually became the first “marshal” of the Mongolian army. Muhali will help the emperor conquer Northern China. The equally famous military leaders Jebe and Subutai would cover themselves with special glory, and the names of Kublai and Jelme would make the blood in any opponent’s veins run cold. Each of them was an extraordinary personality, differing from the others in character traits and military skills. Intentionally surrounding himself with people of different temperaments and life experiences, Genghis Khan highly valued and skillfully used both these differences and what was common to them - loyalty and devotion to their emperor. For example, Subutai, who came from the Uriankhai tribe, was an extremely brave warrior, an excellent horseman and archer. He defined his duties in Genghis Khan’s squad as follows: “Turning around as a mouse, I will collect supplies with you.

Having turned into a black raven, I will clean up everything outside with you.” Speaking about the talent of his commander, Genghis Khan emphasized: “Subutai is a support and shield. In bloody battles, he devotes all his strength to the service of my family. I really appreciate him." Let's say Subutai did not have the ardor of Jebe's character and his passion for adventure - his actions were rather dominated by precise calculation and pragmatism - but, fighting together, they successfully complemented each other.

And here is how Genghis Khan’s irreconcilable rival Jamukha characterized these commanders: “These are four dogs of my Temujin, fed on human meat; he tied them to an iron chain; These dogs have copper foreheads, carved teeth, awl-shaped tongues, and iron hearts. Instead of a horse whip, they have crooked sabers. They drink dew, ride in the wind; in battles they devour human flesh. Now they are unleashed, they are drooling, they are rejoicing. These four dogs: Jebe, Kublai, Jelme, Subutai."

So, thanks to Genghis Khan, at the beginning of the 13th century, the Mongol army, numbering more than 300 thousand people, turned into one of the strongest armies in the world - with a strict hierarchy, its own strategy and tactics, aimed solely at conquering new possessions. A characteristic feature of her policy of conquest was the destruction of settlements and cities in the occupied territory, and the wholesale extermination of rebellious tribes and peoples who dared to defend themselves with arms in hand. Such a huge military machine, of course, could not stand idle for long. Therefore, literally six months after ascending the imperial throne, Genghis Khan conceived a new large-scale campaign, the ultimate goal of which was the conquest of China. He understood perfectly well that this war would be a very difficult undertaking. Therefore, he needed to provide himself with a reliable rear by securing the eastern border of the Mongol Empire by capturing the Tangut state of Xi Xia.

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