SURRENDER TO SELF-GOVERNMENT One day, on the way out to sea, I went up to the wheelhouse to smoke and involuntarily heard a dialogue between the commander and the young senior assistant commander: “Chief mate! It's been 3 months already! When will you pass the test to operate a submarine?” “Comrade commander! I'm not ready yet, no

The years of World War II were marked not only by a huge number of casualties, but also by a large number of prisoners of war. They were captured individually and in entire armies: some surrendered in an organized manner, while others deserted, but there were also very funny cases.

Italians

The Italians turned out to be not the most reliable ally of Germany. Cases of Italian soldiers being captured were recorded everywhere: apparently, the inhabitants of the Apennines understood that the war into which the Duce dragged them did not meet the interests of Italy.
When Mussolini was arrested on July 25, 1943, the new Italian government led by Marshal Badoglio began secret negotiations with the American command to conclude a truce. The result of Badoglio's negotiations with Eisenhower was the massive surrender of Italians into American captivity.
In this regard, the recollection of the American General Omar Bradley, who describes the elated state of the Italian military personnel when surrendering, is interesting:

“Soon a festive mood reigned in the Italian camp, the prisoners squatted around the fires and sang to the accompaniment of the accordions they had brought with them.”

According to Bradley, the Italians' festive mood was due to the prospect of a "free trip to the States."
An interesting story was told by one of the Soviet veterans, who recalled how in the fall of 1943, near Donetsk, he encountered a huge peasant cart with hay, and six “skinny, dark-haired men” were harnessed to it. They were driven by a “Ukrainian woman” with a German carbine. It turned out that these were Italian deserters. They “buttered and cried” so much that the Soviet soldier had difficulty guessing their desire to surrender.

Americans

The US Army has an unusual type of casualty called “battle fatigue.” This category includes primarily those who were captured. Thus, during the landing in Normandy in June 1944, the number of those “overworked in battle” amounted to about 20% of the total number of those who dropped out of the battle.

In general, according to the results of World War II, due to “overwork,” US losses amounted to 929,307 people.

More often than not, Americans found themselves captured by the Japanese army.
Most of all, the command of the US armed forces remembered the operation of the German troops, which went down in history as the “Bulge Breakthrough”. As a result of the Wehrmacht counteroffensive against the Allied forces, which began on December 16, 1944, the front moved 100 km. deep into enemy territory. American writer Dick Toland, in a book about the operation in the Ardennes, writes that “75 thousand American soldiers at the front on the night of December 16 went to bed as usual. That evening, none of the American commanders expected a major German offensive." The result of the German breakthrough was the capture of about 30 thousand Americans.

There is no exact information about the number of Soviet prisoners of war. According to various sources, their number ranges from 4.5 to 5.5 million people. According to the calculations of the commander of Army Group Center von Bock, by July 8, 1941 alone, 287,704 Soviet military personnel, including division and corps commanders, were captured. And at the end of 1941, the number of Soviet prisoners of war exceeded 3 million 300 thousand people.

They surrendered primarily due to the inability to provide further resistance - wounded, sick, lacking food and ammunition, or in the absence of control on the part of commanders and headquarters.

The bulk of Soviet soldiers and officers were captured by the Germans in “cauldrons”. Thus, the result of the largest encirclement battle in the Soviet-German conflict - the “Kyiv Cauldron” - was about 600 thousand Soviet prisoners of war.

Soviet soldiers also surrendered individually or in separate formations. The reasons were different, but the main one, as noted by former prisoners of war, was fear for their lives. However, there were ideological motives or simply a reluctance to fight for Soviet power. Perhaps for these reasons, on August 22, 1941, almost the entire 436th Infantry Regiment, under the command of Major Ivan Kononov, went over to the enemy’s side.

Germans

If before the Battle of Stalingrad, Germans being captured was rather an exception, then in the winter of 1942-43. it acquired a symptomatic character: during the Stalingrad operation, about 100 thousand Wehrmacht soldiers were captured. The Germans surrendered in whole companies - hungry, sick, frostbitten or simply exhausted. During the Great Patriotic War, Soviet troops captured 2,388,443 German soldiers.
In the last months of the war, the German command tried to force the troops to fight using draconian methods, but in vain. The situation on the Western Front was especially unfavorable. There, German soldiers, knowing that England and the United States were observing the Geneva Convention on the Treatment of Prisoners of War, surrendered much more willingly than in the East.
According to the recollections of German veterans, defectors tried to go over to the enemy’s side immediately before the attack. There were also cases of organized surrender. Thus, in North Africa, German soldiers, left without ammunition, fuel and food, lined up in columns to surrender to the Americans or the British.

Yugoslavs

Not all countries of the Anti-Hitler coalition could give a worthy rebuff to a strong enemy. Thus, Yugoslavia, which, in addition to Germany, was attacked by the armed forces of Hungary and Italy, could not withstand the onslaught and capitulated on April 12, 1941. Units of the Yugoslav army, formed from Croats, Bosnians, Slovenes and Macedonians, began to go home en masse or go over to the enemy’s side. In a matter of days, about 314 thousand soldiers and officers were in German captivity - almost the entire armed forces of Yugoslavia.

Japanese

It should be noted that the defeats that Japan suffered in World War II brought many losses to the enemy. Following the code of samurai honor, even the units besieged and blocked on the islands were in no hurry to surrender and held out to the last. As a result, by the time of surrender, many Japanese soldiers simply died of starvation.

When in the summer of 1944, American troops captured the Japanese-occupied island of Saipan, out of a 30,000-strong Japanese contingent, only a thousand were captured.

About 24 thousand were killed, another 5 thousand committed suicide. Almost all the prisoners are the merit of 18-year-old Marine Guy Gabaldon, who had an excellent command of the Japanese language and knew the psychology of the Japanese. Gabaldon acted alone: ​​he killed or immobilized sentries near the shelters, and then persuaded those inside to surrender. In the most successful raid, the Marine brought 800 Japanese to the base, for which he received the nickname “Pied Piper of Saipan.”
Georgy Zhukov cites a curious episode of the captivity of a Japanese man disfigured by mosquito bites in his book “Memories and Reflections.” When asked “where and who butchered him like that,” the Japanese replied that, together with other soldiers, he had been put in the reeds in the evening to observe the Russians. At night they had to endure terrible mosquito bites without complaint, so as not to give away their presence. “And when the Russians shouted something and raised their rifle,” said the prisoner, “I raised my hands, because I could no longer endure this torment.”

French people

The rapid fall of France during the lightning strike in May-June 1940 by the Axis countries still causes heated debate among historians. In just over a month, about 1.5 million French soldiers and officers were captured. But if 350 thousand were captured during the fighting, the rest laid down their arms in connection with the order of the Petain government on a truce. Thus, in a short period one of the most combat-ready armies in Europe ceased to exist.

"Unknown tragedies of the First World War. Prisoners. Deserters. Refugees." M.V. Oskin.

The order for the 2nd Army of the North-Western Front, No. 4 dated July 25, 1914, read: “In one of the reports, I saw that several lower ranks had gone missing. In most cases, those missing in action are subsequently captured. captivity is shameful. Only a seriously wounded person can find an excuse to explain this in all parts.”
General A.V. Samsonov, suffering from the severity of the defeat, shot himself on August 17 while trying to escape from the encirclement. It is characteristic that the officers of his headquarters who were with him could not even say how exactly this happened, they only heard the sound of a shot and could not find his body, which was subsequently buried by the Germans in a common grave. But only the army commander himself did this! The subordinates were in no hurry to follow the example of their commander.
Commander of the 23rd Army Corps, Gen. K. A. Kondratovich managed to escape from his troops to the rear, where he declared himself sick. Komkor-15 General N. N. Martos was captured in the general confusion of skirmishes in the Russian rear. Moreover, with weapons in hands, without resistance.

But here is Komkor-13 gen. N.A. Klyuev led the divisional column, which made its way out of the loose “bag”. Before the last chain of German machine guns, General Klyuev ordered to capitulate. Question: who is to blame for the fact that twenty thousand Russian soldiers surrendered here unwounded? They personally or their superiors who ordered their capitulation?
General Klyuev himself ordered his orderly to go to the Germans with a white handkerchief in his hands. To whom then does the characteristic apply: being captured is shameful? Here, for the first time, that disastrous tendency in the quality of a small part of the pre-war Russian officer corps, which surrendered the soldiers subordinate to them, appeared for the first time.
General P. N. Krasnov quotes a phrase from a Russian prisoner who did not even understand what was happening, but acted “like everyone else”: “To the end he was faithful to the Tsar and the Fatherland and was not taken prisoner of his own free will. Everyone surrendered, me and I didn’t know it was already captivity.”

What is the fault of the soldiers of Samsonov’s army, who were hostages of the wrong strategic decision of pre-war planning and its mediocre execution on the part of the generals of the North-Western Front?
Alexander Vasilyevich Samsonov himself, who realized his pre-war unpreparedness too late, acted as required by the code of officer honor. It’s probably impossible to say that suicide is the only way out of the situation. Not everyone will dare to do this, and it is not necessary.
But it’s one thing to surrender in a hopeless situation, when you can’t break through and you really don’t want to die. And it’s quite another thing to surrender the people entrusted to you when you have an entire corps behind you. This is already a military crime.

What is the fault of the privates, before whose eyes the generals, including the corps commanders, easily surrendered (in total, fifteen generals surrendered in the 2nd Army)? When were the two most numerous groups that made their way out of encirclement led not by generals, but by a colonel and a staff captain?
Yes, two-thirds of the personnel of the 13th Army Corps consisted of reserves, that is, they were actually non-personnel. However, most of the corps were “surrendered” by their own commanders, who did not show an example of fidelity to duty.
Of the top ranks of the 13th Army Corps, only the chief of staff of the 36th Infantry Division, Colonel Vyakhirev, emerged from encirclement. And in total, only one hundred and sixty-five men of Staff Captain Semechkin and Second Lieutenant Dremanovich and a team of reconnaissance made it out of the 13th Army Corps.
These people simply did not lay down their arms on the orders of their corps commander, but went into the forest and, after trying their luck, achieved it. Who would condemn those who surrendered on the orders of a superior commander? But there were officers who went against their boss in the name of fulfilling military duty and demanding the oath.

The total losses of the Russian 2nd Army during the East Prussian offensive operation amounted to about 8,000 killed, 25,000 wounded and up to 80,000 prisoners. The enemy also captured up to five hundred guns and two hundred machine guns.
German losses during the operation against the 2nd Army from August 13 amounted to about thirteen thousand people. Let's pay attention to the loss ratio. Obviously, some of the wounded were included in the mass of prisoners, because most of the wounded ended up in German captivity.
In this case, against 13,000 losses among the Germans, the Russians have no more than 20,000, which is explained both by the defensive battles of the Germans in pre-prepared terrain, and by the Germans’ advantage in technology. The rest are prisoners.
That is, those who were “expended” solely by an enemy maneuver - those who surrendered in the “cauldron”. Or - “surrendered” by the commanders. Why didn't fifteen generals lead the breakthrough? Moreover, they ordered their people to surrender.

The harmfulness of the misperception of captivity in relation to command personnel was understood immediately after the Russo-Japanese War of 1904-1905. But, unfortunately, it was not raised to an axiom within the Russian military machine itself.
Assessing the results of the Far Eastern conflict, the former commander of the Manchurian Army, Gen. A. N. Kuropatkin wrote: “Along with true feats, there are also cases of low tenacity of individual units and, in particular, individuals. Cases of surrender unwounded in the last war were frequent not only among the lower ranks, but also among officers.
Unfortunately, existing laws were not applied to these individuals to the fullest extent. Upon returning from captivity, some officers who had previously been convicted had already received command of individual units and, returning to the regiments, took command of companies and battalions.
Directly from Japan, former prisoners received orders from the military department and were even appointed as division chiefs. Meanwhile, there can only be one circumstance justifying surrender: injury. Still, those who surrendered unwounded must be held accountable for not fighting to the last drop of blood.”
To be fair, it should be said that with the level of leadership shown by General Kuropatkin, defeats and captures were not surprising.

The essence of the problem is different: why did the officers who surrendered uninjured then receive high command posts? They have already disdained the oath and the requirements of military legislation, which means they would not hesitate to do so in the future.
First, it was necessary to figure it out, and only then restore such officers to the army, and even with a promotion. In comparison with the USSR, this is clearly a lost situation: Soviet generals who returned from captivity were carefully checked, but those who were not subjected to reprisals, but reinstated in the army, did not receive high positions.
The main thing here is the example shown by the attitude of the political leadership of the Russian Empire towards such cases. An example that stood in stark contrast to the reprisals against surrendering privates during the First World War.
If you look closely at the documents of that time, you cannot help but note the efforts of the generals who issued repressive orders to cover up their own confusion caused by the fact that the war did not go according to the scenario planned before the war. Now I had to learn during the war itself and, gritting my teeth, do everything to achieve victory. But this is not easy.

It is enough to remember only the justification of the gene. A. A. Blagoveshchensky, who fled from his troops of the 6th Army Corps during the East Prussian operation. The flight of the commander forced the corps to retreat, which exposed the right flank of the central corps of the 2nd Army, which found itself surrounded - “double envelopment.”
In his defense, General Blagoveshchensky stated that he was “not used to being with the troops.” As A. A. Kersnovsky says about this: “We see, therefore, that in the Russian army there could be commanders “not accustomed to being with the troops,” that such commanders were entrusted with corps and that they did not have enough honesty to admit their “unaccustomed” in peacetime and give up your place in advance to those more worthy.”
In such practice it was almost impossible to determine whether all possibilities of resistance had been exhausted or not. As well as determining the extent of responsibility of each surrendered fighter, thrown not so much into battle as “to slaughter” by his commanders.
The same 6th Corps rolled back in panic to the rear, but isn’t this a natural reaction to the commander’s behavior? On the other hand, why did none of the senior officers of the retreating corps, who understood perfectly well that the retreat would expose the rear of the army center, take responsibility and hold back the troops?
Again, everyone probably remembered that captivity is more likely a misfortune than a shame, as the Russo-Japanese War showed. Since they forgave not only those who surrendered (they “take” prisoners - wounded or unarmed), but also those who surrendered.

What punishment did generals Stoessel, Fock and Reise suffer when they surrendered Port Arthur in 1904? After a long and closed trial - minimal. This attitude of the authorities towards those who, without hesitation, surrendered thousands of soldiers to the enemy, only encouraged surrender.
Hence the general who surrendered the entire corps. N.A. Klyuev, and its commandant, Gen., who had already given the order for the surrender of the Novogeorgievsk fortress. N.P. Bobyr, and its commandant, Gen., who fled from the Kovno fortress. V. N. Grigoriev.
In peacetime, they were all considered good servants, and General Klyuev, since 1909, generally held the post of chief of staff of the Warsaw Military District, that is, he was directly preparing for the fight against Germany. Well prepared, nothing to say.

How, in this case, should we treat the lower ranks who surrendered, who, by the orders of their commanders, were placed not just in a hopeless, but downright suicidal position? For example, can a couple of platoons remaining from a battalion advancing on flat terrain and now stuck in front of barbed wire, in which the artillery did not make any passages, be considered cowards and traitors?
About such a case (the unsuccessful offensive of the 7th and 9th armies of the Southwestern Front on the Strypa River in a vain attempt to help dying Serbia) is reported, for example, by A. A. Svechin:
“I had to observe the work of the staff bureaucrats in January 1916. The exhausted attacking units of the neighboring corps, coming under heavy machine-gun fire 300 m from the Austrian position, dropped their rifles, raised their hands and, in this form, continued to move through the wire and the Austrian trenches.
The authorities believed that the trenches had been taken, but the attacking units, not supported by reserves, were unable to resist the counterattack and surrendered. Three attacks were carried out in the evening twilight for several days in a row.
Instead of recognizing the inadequacy of artillery preparation, the bureaucrats believed that the whole problem was that the reserves were following at too great a distance, and insisted on a closer advance of the latter, which only increased losses and confusion with each new assault."

At the same time, the death of hundreds of our own soldiers can be presented in a report in such a way that it will be possible to count on the next award or promotion. An example of such a situation is given in February 1915 - the 1st Prasnysh operation in East Prussia.
A participant in those battles, which were characterized by large and senseless losses, since the attack on Prasnysh could not provide any operational bonuses, the officer shows:
“We had to advance across completely open terrain, with a rise towards the German trenches, the ground was frozen, and the chains, lying under unbearable fire, could not dig in and were shot without exception.
The Germans even did even better. When the attackers approached a completely intact wire fence, they were ordered to drop their rifles, which had to be done willy-nilly, and then one by one they were allowed into the trenches as prisoners."
From a formal point of view, this amounts to the voluntary surrender of soldiers into captivity. This means some kind of reprisals. What if it’s human? Who is to blame for the fact that Russian riflemen hung on a wire that was not destroyed by artillery?
Who is to blame for the fact that the Russian artillery did not have shells (already in December 1914, orders from the Supreme High Command prohibited the expenditure of more than one shell per gun per day)? Are these the same riflemen advancing across open terrain head-on at machine guns?

For comparison: in November 1915, the commander of the German 82nd reserve infantry division, General Faberius, was captured by a partisan detachment of Captain Tkachenko.
While being escorted to the rear, taking advantage of the mistake of the convoy commander, who met an old comrade on the way and decided to celebrate the meeting with strong drinks, Faberius grabbed a revolver and shot himself, unable to bear the shame of captivity.
How many Russian generals acted in a similar way, if you remember that sixty-six Russian generals were captured, and only one dared to escape from captivity - the commander of the 48th general. L. G. Kornilov?
True, both age and the trials of captivity took their toll. Of the sixty-six captured generals, eleven died in captivity, which amounted to 16%, with the overall mortality rate of Russian prisoners of war being 5.6%. According to S.V. Volkov, seventy-three Russian generals were captured.
It is obvious that most of the generals were captured in the "cauldrons", since the general is by no means in the forefront directly on the battlefield.
In particular, fifteen generals were captured in German captivity near Tannenberg in August 1914, eleven in the Augustow Forest in February 1915, and finally seventeen in the Novogeorgievsk fortress.
Thus, two-thirds of the captured Russian generals were captured at just three points in the huge theater of military operations that was the Eastern Front of the First World War.

Again, about parallels. The first commander of the First World War to be removed from his post was a German - Army Commander-8th Gen. M. von Prittwitz und Gaffron, who defended the same East Prussia from the Russians.
He just dared to doubt the success of the struggle for the province, sending a telegram to the Main Apartment about his intention to withdraw beyond the Vistula after the first lost battle at Gumbinnen, and was immediately dismissed.
Some were removed for incompetence. But the difference, again, is in the timing of replacement. Such mediocrity as the Commander-in-Chief of the armies of the North-Western Front, General. Y. G. Zhilinsky, was removed only after a lost operation, when the losses of the front amounted to the same number as at the beginning of the operation - a quarter of a million, including one hundred and fifty thousand prisoners.
This requires truly outstanding mediocrity, and someone made General Zhilinsky not only the chief of the Warsaw Military District, but before that also the chief of the General Staff.

The pre-war selection of commanders itself shows that the Russian Empire at the beginning of the twentieth century was in a broken state, which was objectively caused by the bourgeois modernization of the country. The situation was exactly the same in Austria-Hungary, which is confirmed by the results of the clash between Austro-Hungarian and Russian weapons on the fields of the First World War.
The experience of the war allowed the best people to come forward, as evidenced by the simple fact that in the summer campaign of 1916 (Brusilovsky breakthrough) the losses of the Russian army in prisoners were five times less than the bloody losses. But how many people had to be lost before that?
And, even if we ignore the calculation of patriotism and talk about monarchical statehood, how many career officers were lost in vain - the support of the existing regime?