Crimean strategic offensive operation. Strengths and composition of the parties

Crimean operation 1944
	Crimea, USSR
	Victory of the USSR
Opponents
Commanders
Fedor Tolbukhin	Erwin Gustav Jenecke
Andrey Eremenko	Karl Allmendinger
Philip Oktyabrsky
Strengths of the parties
462,400 people 5,982 guns and mortars 559 tanks and self-propelled guns	195,000 people approx. 3600 guns and mortars 215 tanks and self-propelled guns
84 thousand people, of which 17.7 thousand are irrevocable	Soviet data: 140 thousand killed and captured. German data: more than 100 thousand killed and captured.

Crimean operation 1944- an offensive operation of Soviet troops with the aim of liberating Crimea from German troops during the Great Patriotic War. It was carried out from April 8 to May 12, 1944 by the forces of the 4th Ukrainian Front and the Separate Primorsky Army in cooperation with the Black Sea Fleet and the Azov Military Flotilla.

General situation before the operation

As a result of the Lower Dnieper offensive operation, Soviet troops blocked the 17th German Army in Crimea, while capturing an important bridgehead on the southern bank of Sivash. In addition, troops of the Separate Primorsky Army captured a bridgehead in the Kerch region during the Kerch-Eltigen landing operation. The top leadership of the Wehrmacht believed that, under the conditions of the land blockade, further military retention of Crimea seemed inappropriate. However, Hitler ordered Crimea to be defended to the last possible extent, believing that leaving the peninsula would push Romania and Bulgaria to leave the Nazi bloc.

Strengths and composition of the parties

USSR

• 4th Ukrainian Front under the command of Army General F.I. Tolbukhin, consisting of:
• 51st Army (commander Lieutenant General Ya. G. Kreizer)
• 2nd Guards Army (commander Lieutenant General G. F. Zakharov)
• 19th Tank Corps (commander: Lieutenant General of Tank Forces I. D. Vasilyev, since April 11, Colonel I. A. Potseluev)
• 8th Air Army (commander: Colonel General of Aviation T. T. Khryukin)
• Separate Primorsky Army under the command of Army General A. I. Eremenko, and from April 15, Lieutenant General K. S. Melnik
• Black Sea Fleet under the command of Admiral F. S. Oktyabrsky
• Azov military flotilla under the command of Rear Admiral S. G. Gorshkov

A total of 470,000 people, 5,982 guns and mortars, 559 tanks and self-propelled guns, 1,250 aircraft.

Germany

• The 17th Army was commanded by General E. Jenecke, and from May 1, General of Infantry K. Allmendinger, consisting of 5 German and 7 Romanian divisions. In total there are about 200,000 people, about 3,600 guns and mortars, 215 tanks and assault guns, 148 aircraft.

Progress of the operation

On April 8, at 8.00, artillery and aviation preparation began in the zone of the 4th Ukrainian Front, with a total duration of 2.5 hours. Immediately after its completion, the front troops went on the offensive, delivering the main blow with the forces of the 51st Army from the Sivash bridgehead. On the same day, the 2nd Guards Army, operating in an auxiliary direction, liberated Armyansk. For three days, the troops of the 4th Ukrainian Front fought fierce battles and by the end of the day on April 10 they broke through the enemy’s defenses on the Perekop Isthmus and south of Sivash. It became possible to bring the front's mobile formations - the 19th Tank Corps - into the operational space. To conduct reconnaissance and organize interaction with the infantry, the commander of the 19th Tank Corps, Lieutenant General I. D. Vasiliev, arrived at the observation post of the 63rd Rifle Corps of the 51st Army. There, as a result of an air raid, Vasiliev was seriously wounded and his deputy, Colonel I. A. Potseluev, took command of the corps. Tank units entered a breakthrough in the 51st Army sector and rushed to Dzhankoy. On April 11, the city was liberated. The rapid advance of the 19th Tank Corps put the Kerch enemy group in danger of encirclement and forced the enemy command to begin a hasty retreat to the west. On the night of April 11, simultaneously with the 19th Tank Corps, the Separate Primorsky Army went on the offensive, which, with the support of aviation from the 4th Air Army and the Black Sea Fleet, captured Kerch by the morning.

Developing the offensive, Soviet troops liberated Feodosia, Simferopol and Yevpatoria on April 13, Sudak and Alushta on April 14, and reached Sevastopol on April 15. The attempt to take the city on the move failed and the Soviet armies began to prepare to storm the city. It was advisable to unite all the ground armies under one command, so on April 16, the Primorsky Army was included in the 4th Ukrainian Front and K. S. Melnik became its new commander (A. I. Eremenko was appointed commander of the 2nd Baltic Front). From April 16 to April 30, Soviet troops repeatedly attempted to storm the city, but each time they achieved only partial success. On May 3, General E. Jenecke, who did not believe in the possibility of successfully defending the city, was removed from office. The general assault on Sevastopol was scheduled by the Soviet command for May 5. Having started it according to plan, after four days of heavy fighting, on May 9, front troops liberated the city. On May 12, the remnants of enemy troops at Cape Chersonesus laid down their arms.

Kurt Tippelskirch describes the events of the last days of the battle as follows:

The remnants of three German divisions and a large number of scattered groups of German and Romanian soldiers fled to the Chersonese Cape, the approaches to which they defended with the desperation of the doomed, never ceasing to hope that ships would be sent for them. However, their persistence proved useless. On May 10, they received the stunning news that the promised loading onto the ships was delayed by 24 hours. But the next day they searched in vain for rescue ships on the horizon. Trapped on a narrow piece of land, suppressed by continuous air raids and exhausted by attacks from vastly superior enemy forces, the German troops, having lost all hope of getting rid of this hell, could not stand it. Negotiations with the enemy about surrender put an end to the now meaningless wait for help. The Russians, who usually did not respect any limits of plausibility in their reports, were perhaps right this time in placing the losses of the 17th Army at 100 thousand killed and captured and reporting a huge amount of captured military equipment.

Throughout the operation, Crimean partisans provided active assistance to the Soviet troops. Detachments under the command of P. R. Yampolsky, F. I. Fedorenko, M. A. Makedonsky, V. S. Kuznetsov disrupted enemy communications, staged raids on Nazi headquarters and columns, and participated in the liberation of cities.

During the retreat of the 17th Army from Crimea to Sevastopol on April 11, 1944, one of the detachments of Crimean partisans captured the city of Old Crimea. Thus, the road to the units of the 98th Infantry Division from the 5th Army Corps of the 17th Army retreating from Kerch was cut off. In the evening of the same day, one of the regiments of this division, reinforced with tanks and assault guns, approached the city. During the night battle, the Germans managed to capture one of the city blocks (Severnaya, Polina Osipenko, Sulu-Darya streets), which was in their hands for 12 hours. During this time, German infantry destroyed its entire population - 584 people. Since the conditions of the battle did not allow, as was usually done, to herd the doomed to one place, the German infantrymen methodically combed house after house, shooting everyone who caught their eye, regardless of gender and age.

Results

The Crimean operation ended in the complete defeat of the 17th German Army, whose irretrievable losses during the fighting alone amounted to 120 thousand people (of which 61,580 were prisoners). To this number we must add significant losses of enemy troops during the sea evacuation (during which the Romanian Black Sea flotilla was virtually destroyed, losing 2/3 of its available naval personnel). In particular, the sinking of the German transports Totila and Teya by attack aircraft, which is included in the list of the largest maritime disasters of all time in terms of the number of casualties of all times (up to 8 thousand dead), dates back to this time. Thus, the total irretrievable losses of the German-Romanian troops are estimated at 140 thousand soldiers and officers. As a result of the liberation of Crimea, the threat to the southern wing of the Soviet-German front was removed, and the main naval base of the Black Sea Fleet, Sevastopol, was returned. Having recaptured Crimea, the Soviet Union regained full control over the Black Sea, which sharply undermined Germany’s position in Romania, Turkey, and Bulgaria.

Liberation of Crimea in 1944

The troops of the 4th Ukrainian Front (commander - Army General F.I. Tolbukhin) during the Melitopol operation on October 30, 1943 occupied Genichesk and reached the coast of Sivash, crossed the bay and captured a bridgehead on its southern shore. And on November 1, having overcome the fortifications of the Turkish Wall, they broke into the Perekop Isthmus. 19th Tank Corps under the command of Lieutenant General of Tank Forces I.D. Vasilyev managed to fight his way through the fortifications on the Turkish Wall and reach Armyansk. Using the separation of the tankers from the cavalry and infantry, the German command managed to close the gap in its defense and temporarily block the tank corps. But by November 5, the main forces of the 51st Army, Lieutenant General Ya.G. The cruisers also overcame Perekop and linked up with the tankers fighting in the encirclement. The fighting in this direction gradually ceased. Thus, by November 1943, Soviet troops reached the lower reaches of the Dnieper, captured a bridgehead in Crimea on the southern bank of the Sivash and the approaches to the Crimean isthmuses.

The entry of Soviet troops to the immediate approaches to the Crimean Peninsula put on the agenda the task of liberating it from the Nazi invaders. Back in early February 1944, when Soviet troops were fighting for the Nikopol bridgehead, Marshal of the Soviet Union A.M. Vasilevsky presented to the Supreme Command Headquarters ideas developed jointly with the command of the 4th Ukrainian Front for organizing an offensive operation to liberate Crimea. They believed that such an operation could begin on February 18-19. However, the Supreme High Command decided to carry it out after the lower reaches of the Dnieper to Kherson were cleared of the enemy and the 4th Ukrainian Front was freed from solving other problems.

In connection with the defeat of the Nikopol enemy group on February 17, Headquarters ordered the start of an offensive in Crimea no later than March 1, regardless of the progress of the operation to liberate the right bank of the Dnieper. However, due to inclement weather and storms in the Sea of ​​Azov, which delayed the regrouping of front troops and their crossing of the Sivash, the operation had to be postponed. Therefore, the Supreme Command Headquarters decided to begin active actions to liberate Crimea after the troops of the 4th Ukrainian Front captured the Nikolaev region and access to Odessa.

The Supreme High Command headquarters planned joint participation in the operation to liberate Crimea by the troops of the 4th Ukrainian Front, the Separate Primorsky Army, the Black Sea Fleet, the Azov Military Flotilla and the Crimean partisans.

During the Kerch-Eltigen landing operation, carried out from November 1 to November 11, 1943, although the troops of the North Caucasus Front did not achieve the planned result, they created an operational bridgehead north of Kerch. After its completion, the North Caucasus Front was liquidated, and the 56th Army located on the bridgehead was transformed into the Separate Primorsky Army. Its troops were supposed to attack the enemy from the east.

The Soviet Black Sea Fleet, deprived of the possibility of basing in the ports of the Crimean Peninsula, experienced great difficulties in conducting operations at sea. Therefore, the Supreme Command Headquarters, taking into account the importance of the actions of Soviet warships in the Black Sea, at the beginning of the operation to liberate the Crimean Peninsula, issued a special directive outlining the tasks of the Black Sea Fleet. The main task was to disrupt enemy communications in the Black Sea by submarines, bomber aircraft, mine-torpedo aircraft, attack aircraft and torpedo boats. At the same time, the operational zone of the Black Sea Fleet must constantly expand and consolidate. The fleet had to protect its sea communications from enemy influence, primarily by providing reliable anti-submarine defense. For the future, it was ordered to prepare large surface ships for naval operations, and fleet forces to be redeployed to Sevastopol.

In conditions when the Soviet Army cleared the entire Northern Tavria from the invaders, the enemy’s Crimean group threatened the Soviet troops operating in Right Bank Ukraine and pinned down significant forces of the 4th Ukrainian Front. The loss of Crimea, in the opinion of Hitler’s command, would mean a sharp decline in Germany’s prestige in the countries of South-Eastern Europe and Turkey, which were sources of valuable and critically scarce strategic materials. Crimea covered the Balkan strategic flank of Nazi Germany and important sea communications leading through the Black Sea straits to the ports of the western coast of the Black Sea, as well as up the Danube.

Therefore, despite the loss of Right Bank Ukraine, the 17th Army under the command of Colonel General E. Eneke was entrusted with the task of holding Crimea until the last opportunity. For this purpose, the army was increased by two divisions at the beginning of 1944. By April, it consisted of 12 divisions - 5 German and 7 Romanian, two brigades of assault guns, various reinforcement units and numbered more than 195 thousand people, about 3,600 guns and mortars, 250 tanks and assault guns. It was supported by 148 aircraft based at Crimean airfields and aviation from airfields in Romania.

The main forces of the 17th Army, the 49th German mountain rifle and the 3rd Romanian cavalry corps (four German - 50, 111, 336, 10th, one Romanian - 19th division and 279th assault gun brigade) , defended themselves in the northern part of Crimea. The 5th Army Corps (73rd, 98th German Infantry Divisions, 191st Assault Gun Brigade), 6th Cavalry and 3rd Mountain Rifle Divisions of the Romanian Army operated on the Kerch Peninsula. The southern and western coasts were covered by the 1st Mountain Rifle Corps (three Romanian divisions).

The enemy took all measures to create a strong defense, especially in the most important directions where he expected the advance of Soviet troops.

On the Perekop Isthmus, three defense lines were equipped to a depth of 35 km: the first line, the Ishun positions and the line along the Chatarlyk River. In front of the bridgeheads of the Soviet troops on the southern bank of the Sivash, the enemy equipped two or three strips in narrow inter-lake defiles. On the Kerch Peninsula, four defensive lines were built along its entire 70-km depth. In operational depth, defense was being prepared at the line of Saki, Sarabuz, Karasubazar, Belogorsk, Stary Krym, Feodosia.

Soviet troops occupied the following position.

On the Perekop Isthmus, on the 14-km front, the 2nd Guards Army was deployed, which included 8 rifle divisions. The bridgehead on the southern bank of the Sivash was occupied by the 51st Army, which had 10 rifle divisions. The front commander's reserve included the 19th Tank Corps (four tank and one motorized rifle brigade), which located its main forces on the Sivash bridgehead. To the left of the 51st Army, the 78th fortified area was defended to Genichesk.

To support the troops on the bridgehead, the engineering troops of the 51st Army built two crossings across the Sivash: a bridge on frame supports with a length of 1865 m and a carrying capacity of 16 tons, two earthen dams with a length of 600-700 m and a pontoon bridge between them with a length of 1350 m. In February - March In 1944, the bridge and dams were strengthened, their carrying capacity increased to 30 tons, which made it possible to ensure the crossing of T-34 tanks and heavy artillery. The crossing of the tanks of the 19th Tank Corps was extremely difficult. It was held from March 13 to March 25. Several tanks were transported from the corps at night, which were carefully camouflaged and hidden from enemy observation in the shortest possible time. The German command failed to detect the crossing and concentration of the tank corps, which subsequently played a role.

The Separate Primorsky Army was concentrated on the Kerch Peninsula (commander - Army General A.I. Eremenko).

The Black Sea Fleet (commander - Admiral F.S. Oktyabrsky) was based at the ports of the Black Sea coast of the Caucasus, the Azov Military Flotilla (commander - Rear Admiral S.G. Gorshkov) - at the ports of the Taman Peninsula.

A group of Soviet partisans, numbering 4.5 thousand people, operated on the Crimean Peninsula.

In the second half of 1943, general dissatisfaction with the occupation regime began to increasingly manifest itself on the peninsula; more and more Crimean Tatars began to desire the return of the previous government. This dissatisfaction was expressed primarily in the fact that they began to support her “long arm” on the peninsula - the partisans. As Soviet troops approached the peninsula, partisan attacks on the occupiers began to intensify. The Soviet command began to provide them with increasing assistance. Constant communication with the population was established. Residents of many villages took refuge in the forests, hundreds of them joined partisan detachments. Crimean Tatars made up approximately a sixth of the number of these detachments.

In total, by January 1944, Soviet partisans in the amount of about 4 thousand people were operating on the Crimean Peninsula. But these were not scattered partisan groups and separate detachments. In January-February 1944, 7 partisan brigades were formed. These brigades were united into three formations: Southern, Northern and Eastern. There were two brigades in the South and East, and three in the North.

The largest in composition was the Southern Unit (commander - M.A. Makedonsky, commissioner - M.V. Selimov). This formation operated in the mountainous and forested area of ​​the southern part of Crimea and numbered more than 2,200 people. In the mountainous and forested area southwest of Karasubazar, the Northern Unit (commander - P.R. Yampolsky, commissar - N.D. Lugovoy) operated with a strength of 860 people. To the south and southwest of Old Crimea there was an area of ​​operations of the Eastern Union (commander - V.S. Kuznetsov, commissar - R.Sh. Mustafaev) in the amount of 680 people.

The partisans controlled large areas of the mountainous and wooded terrain of the south of Crimea, which gave them the opportunity to strike at units of German-Romanian troops moving along the roads leading from the southern coast to the northern and eastern regions of the peninsula.

Underground organizations of Soviet patriots operated in various cities of Crimea - Yevpatoria, Sevastopol, Yalta.

The activities of the partisans were controlled by the Crimean headquarters of the partisan movement, which had reliable communication with formations and detachments by radio, as well as with the help of aircraft of the 2nd Aviation Transport Regiment of the 1st Aviation Transport Division, located in the 4th Air Army. The Po-2 and P-5 aircraft of the 9th Separate Aviation Regiment of the Civil Air Fleet were most widely used for communication and supply of partisans.

The partisan formations, which were operationally subordinate to the command of the Separate Primorsky Army during the offensive operation, received orders to strike the rear units of the invaders, destroy nodes and communication lines, preventing the systematic withdrawal of enemy troops, destroying individual sections of railways, setting up ambushes and creating blockages in mountainous areas. roads, preventing the enemy from destroying cities, industrial enterprises and railways. The main task of the Southern Connection was control over the Yalta port and disruption of its work.

By the beginning of the operation, the 4th Ukrainian Front and the Separate Primorsky Army had 470 thousand people, 5982 guns and mortars, 559 tanks and self-propelled guns. The 4th and 8th Air Armies had 1,250 aircraft. Comparing the forces of the parties, it is clear that the Soviet command was able to achieve a serious superiority over the enemy (2.4 times in personnel, 1.6 times in artillery, 2.6 times in tanks, 8.4 times in aircraft ).

The general idea of ​​defeating the enemy in Crimea was to carry out simultaneous attacks by troops of the 4th Ukrainian Front from the north, from Perekop and Sivash, and the Separate Primorsky Army from the east, from a bridgehead in the Kerch region, with the assistance of the Black Sea Fleet, DD aviation formations and partisans , in the general direction of Simferopol, Sevastopol, dismember and destroy the enemy group, preventing its evacuation from Crimea.

The main role in defeating the enemy in Crimea was assigned to the 4th Ukrainian Front, whose troops were supposed to break through enemy defenses in the northern part of the Crimean Peninsula, defeat the troops of the German group and develop a rapid offensive on Sevastopol in order to prevent the enemy from organizing a strong defense in the area of ​​​​this city .

The Separate Primorsky Army was entrusted with the task of breaking through the enemy’s defenses on the Kerch Peninsula and developing success in Simferopol and Sevastopol. The army was supposed to go on the offensive a few days later than the 4th Ukrainian Front, when a threat was created to the rear of the enemy’s Kerch group.

The Black Sea Fleet was entrusted with the task of blockading Crimea, disrupting the enemy's sea communications, assisting ground forces on the coastal flanks and being ready for tactical landings. The fleet was also involved in assisting the ground forces with its aviation, and in the coastal zone with naval artillery fire. Brigades of torpedo boats from Anapa and Skadovsk were supposed to destroy enemy ships on the near approaches to Sevastopol and directly in the ports; a submarine brigade - on distant approaches and aviation - along the entire length of enemy communications. The Azov military flotilla, operationally subordinate to the commander of the Separate Primorsky Army, provided all transportation through the Kerch Strait.

Aviation support in the 4th Ukrainian Front was assigned to the 8th Air Army (commander - Lieutenant General of Aviation T.T. Khryukin) and the aviation group of the Black Sea Fleet Air Force. The Air Army was supposed to support the offensive of the troops of the 51st Army and the 19th Tank Corps, and the Black Sea Fleet Air Force - the 2nd Guards Army. The troops of the Separate Primorsky Army were to be supported by aircraft of the 4th Air Army (commander - Major General of Aviation N.F. Naumenko).

In the Crimean operation, the Air Force was tasked with conducting aerial reconnaissance, striking enemy ships and transports in communications and ports, and supporting the combat operations of the 19th Tank Corps while developing success in the depths of the enemy’s defense. During the air offensive, enemy ground force groups, strongholds, and artillery were to be hit.

Crimean partisans received the task of smashing the rear of the invaders, destroying their nodes and communication lines, disrupting control, preventing the organized withdrawal of fascist troops, disrupting the work of the Yalta port, and also preventing the enemy from destroying cities, industrial and transport enterprises.

The coordination of the actions of all forces and means involved in the operation was carried out by the representative of the Supreme Command Headquarters, Marshal of the Soviet Union A.M. Vasilevsky. The representative of the Headquarters in the Separate Primorsky Army was Marshal of the Soviet Union K.E. Voroshilov. General F.Ya. was appointed as the representative for aviation. Falaleev.

In accordance with the plan of the operation, the commander of the 4th Ukrainian Front, Army General F.I. Tolbukhin decided to break through the enemy’s defenses in two directions - on the Perekop Isthmus with the forces of the 2nd Guards Army and on the southern bank of the Sivash with the forces of the 51st Army. The front delivered the main blow in the 51st Army zone, where, firstly, the enemy considered the delivery of the main blow to be unlikely; secondly, the attack from the bridgehead would lead to the rear of the enemy fortifications on the Perekop Isthmus; thirdly, a strike in this direction made it possible to quickly capture Dzhankoy, which opened up freedom of action towards Simferopol and the Kerch Peninsula.

The operational formation of the front was single-echelon. The mobile group consisted of the 19th Tank Corps, which was supposed to enter the breakthrough in the 51st Army zone from the fourth day of the operation, after breaking through the enemy’s tactical and operational defenses. Developing success in the general direction of Dzhankoy, Simferopol on the fourth day after entering the breakthrough, the corps was supposed to capture Simferopol. Having moved part of its forces to Seitler, Karasubazar, the corps was supposed to protect the left flank of the front from a possible attack by the enemy group from the Kerch Peninsula.

The entire operation of the 4th Ukrainian Front was planned at a depth of up to 170 km, lasting 10-12 days. The average daily rate of advance was planned for the rifle troops to be 12-15 km, and for the 19th Tank Corps - up to 30-35 km.

Commander of the 2nd Guards Army, General Zakharov G.F. The basis of his decision was the idea of ​​​​cutting the enemy group defending in Perekop positions into two parts, and then, by developing an offensive in the south-eastern and south-western directions, press these groups to Sivash and Perekop Bay, where they would be destroyed. It was planned to land troops on boats as part of a reinforced rifle battalion in the rear of the enemy defending in Perekop positions.

Commander of the 51st Army, General Kreiser D.G. decided to break through the enemy’s defenses, delivering the main blow with two rifle corps on Tarkhan and auxiliary attacks by the 63rd Rifle Corps on Tomashevka and Pasurman 2; subsequently develop success with the 10th Rifle Corps on Ishun, in the rear of the Ishun positions, and with the 1st Guards Rifle Corps on Voinka (10 km south of Tarkhan) and on Novo-Alexandrovka. The forces of one rifle division were planned to develop an offensive from Pasurman 2nd to Taganash.

In the 2nd Guards Army, it was planned to break through the main defense line to a depth of 20 km in the first two days, then, developing the offensive, in the next two days, break through the second and army lines to a depth of 10-18 km.

In both armies, to increase efforts and develop success, the corps built battle formations in two or three echelons, and the first echelon divisions had the same formation.

Almost 100% of all forces and assets were concentrated in the breakthrough areas, creating densities of 3 to 9 rifle battalions, from 117 to 285 guns and mortars, 12-28 tanks and self-propelled guns per 1 km of the breakthrough area. At such densities, rifle corps outnumbered the enemy by 1.8-9 times in rifle battalions, by 3.7-6.8 times in guns and mortars, and by 1.4-2.6 times in tanks and self-propelled guns.

The commander of the Separate Maritime Army decided to launch two strikes. One blow, the main one, was planned to be delivered by the adjacent flanks of two rifle corps, breaking through the defenses north and south of the strong stronghold of Bulganak and developing an offensive in the direction of Kerch-Vladislavovka. The second strike with the forces of one rifle corps was planned on the left flank, along the Black Sea coast, and with the joint efforts of the two groups, defeat the enemy and liberate the Kerch Peninsula. After this, the main forces of the army should attack Simferopol, and the rest of the forces should continue the offensive along the coast, cutting off the enemy’s escape route to the sea coast.

The offensive zones of rifle formations were narrow: 2.2-5 km for rifle corps, 1-3 km for rifle divisions. There were also areas where formations could break through: 2-3 km of rifle corps and 1-1.5 km of rifle divisions.

During the preparation of the operation, the command and political agencies, party and Komsomol organizations carried out extensive educational and propaganda work with personnel. In this work, much attention was paid to the heroic past associated with the struggle for Crimea during the Civil War, with the defense of Perekop and Sevastopol in the first period of the Great Patriotic War. Examples were given from the experience of battles of the troops of the Southern Front under the command of M.V. Frunze in 1920, recalled the heroic defense of Sevastopol in 1941-1942. Participants in the assault on Perekop, heroic Sevastopol residents who defended the city at the beginning of the war, were invited for such conversations. Rallies of personnel, party and Komsomol meetings were held.

The transition of the troops of the 4th Ukrainian Front to the offensive was preceded by a period of destruction of long-term enemy structures on the Perekop Isthmus. Heavy artillery fired at them for two days. The use of 203 mm guns here convinced the enemy command that the main attack of the Soviet troops would come from the Perekop area. General E. Eneke wrote in his memoirs: “The longer time dragged on, the more clearly the grandiose preparatory measures of the Russians for the offensive near Perekop and somewhat less at the Sivash bridgehead emerged.”

On April 7 at 19.30, reconnaissance in force was carried out throughout the entire front line, as a result of which it was possible to clarify the enemy’s fire system, and in the zone of the 267th Infantry Division (63rd Rifle Corps) - to capture a section of its first trench, where three rifle battalions advanced from composition of the main forces of the first echelon regiments.

On April 8 at 10.30, after 2.5 hours of artillery and aviation preparation, the troops of the 2nd Guards and 51st armies simultaneously went on the offensive. During the artillery preparation, carried out with a number of false fire transfers, part of the enemy's fire weapons were destroyed or suppressed. In the 2nd Guards Army, when a false transfer of fire was carried out, 1,500 soldiers with scarecrows rushed forward along the previously dug “whiskers”. The enemy, deceived by this false attack, took up their positions in the first trench and was immediately covered by artillery fire.

On the Perekop Isthmus, during the first day, the enemy was driven out of the first two trenches of the main defense line; units of the 3rd Guards and 126th Rifle Divisions captured Armyansk. In the center of the Perekop Isthmus, the enemy’s defenses were broken through to a depth of 3 km. By the end of the second day of the operation, the troops of the 2nd Guards Army had completely broken through the enemy's first defensive line. The enemy began, under the cover of rearguards, a gradual withdrawal of troops to the Ishun positions. The success of the offensive by the troops of the 2nd Guards Army was facilitated by the decisive actions of the troops of the 51st Army on its left flank, as well as the landing behind enemy lines as part of a reinforced rifle battalion from the 387th Rifle Division.

This landing was prepared in the 1271st Infantry Regiment as part of the 2nd Infantry Battalion under the command of Captain F.D. Dibrov, reinforced by personnel from other units who had combat experience. The battalion had more than 500 personnel, two 45-mm cannons, six 82-mm mortars, 45 machine guns, rifles, and machine guns. The fighters had fragmentation and anti-tank grenades. They were transported on boats by designated sappers. At midnight on April 9, the boats set sail from the piers, and at 5 a.m. the battalion in full force landed on shore at the designated location. Having landed, the battalion began striking the enemy. A battery of six-barreled mortars was captured, three tanks were knocked out, and damage was caused to manpower. Having discovered the retreat of the enemy infantry, the battalion commander began pursuit and defeated a large group of the enemy. At the end of the day, the battalion linked up with the advancing units of the 3rd Guards Rifle Division. For their courage, all soldiers and officers were awarded orders and medals. The battalion commander, Captain Dibrov, was awarded the title of Hero of the Soviet Union.

In the 51st Army zone, the enemy put up strong resistance. The main strike group of the army, consisting of the 10th and 1st Guards Rifle Corps, advancing in the Tarkhan direction, during the first day of the operation, due to insufficient suppression of the enemy’s defense by artillery fire, was able to capture only its first trench.

The greatest success on April 8 was achieved by units of the 63rd Rifle Corps, advancing on Karanki and Pasurman 2nd, where the enemy was knocked out of all three trenches of the first line and the advance was more than 2 km.

The results of the first day of the offensive made it possible to identify the places of the most stubborn enemy resistance. The front commander immediately gave instructions to reinforce the troops in the Karankino direction, which had previously been considered auxiliary. To develop the success, it was decided to introduce into the battle the second echelon (417th Rifle Division) of the 63rd Rifle Corps and the 32nd Guards Tank Brigade from the 1st Guards Corps.

In addition, two self-propelled artillery regiments were transferred here. To assist units in this direction, part of the forces of the 346th Infantry Division was supposed to cross Lake Aigul and go to the flank of the defending enemy troops. The main forces of the 8th Air Army were aimed at the same direction and almost four artillery brigades were transferred. The density of guns and mortars increased by one and a half times.

The transfer of the main efforts to the Karankino-Tomashevsky direction, where the less stable units of the 10th Romanian Infantry Division were defending, allowed the troops of the 51st Army to build on their success on April 9. The divisions of the 63rd Rifle Corps (commander - Major General P.K. Koshevoy), overcoming the resistance of the Romanians, repelling the counterattacks of their infantry, supported by assault guns, advanced from 4 to 7 km. This was helped by the actions of the 1164th Infantry Regiment of the 346th Infantry Division, which forded Lake Aigul and struck the enemy’s flank, and the timely introduction into battle of the second echelon division of the corps, reinforced by the 32nd Guards Tank Brigade. The main line of enemy defense was broken through, and the troops of the 63rd Corps reached its second line.

As a result of intense fighting by the troops of the 2nd Guards and 51st armies, a maneuver to shift efforts to the direction of the designated success, on April 10, a turning point was outlined in the course of hostilities in the northern part of Crimea. The troops of the 2nd Guards Army reached the approaches to the Ishun positions. To quickly capture these positions, the army commander ordered the divisions of the 13th Guards and 54th Rifle Corps to form mobile forward detachments consisting of rifle battalions and anti-tank fighter regiments in vehicles. But the composition of these advanced detachments turned out to be weak, and they did not fulfill their task. By the end of April 10, the army troops were detained in front of the Ishun positions and began to prepare for their breakthrough.

On the same day, the 10th Rifle Corps, advancing on Karpova Balka (11 km southeast of Armyansk), broke through the main enemy defense line and linked up in the area of ​​Karpova Balka with the left flank units of the 2nd Guards Army.

On the morning of April 11, the troops of the 63rd Rifle Corps went on the offensive. In the resulting breakthrough in the direction of Karanka, a mobile front group consisting of the 19th Tank Corps, two regiments of the 279th Infantry Division (mounted on vehicles) and the 21st Anti-Tank Artillery Brigade was brought into battle. Infantry vehicles in the amount of 120 units were allocated from the front rear.

The mobile group, and above all the 19th Tank Corps, defeated the opposing enemy troops and launched a rapid offensive. This forced the enemy command to begin a hasty withdrawal of units of the 19th Romanian Infantry Division holding positions on the Chongar Peninsula.

Already at 11 o'clock on April 11, the forward detachment of the 19th Tank Corps (202nd Tank Brigade of Colonel M.G. Feshchenko, 867th Self-Propelled Artillery Regiment of Major A.G. Svidersky) and the 52nd Motorcycle Regiment of Major A.A. . Nedilko reached the northern outskirts of Dzhankoy. Fighting ensued to capture the city. The enemy, with the strength of up to an infantry regiment with artillery, supported by the fire of an armored train, offered stubborn resistance. The battle dragged on. But then the 26th motorized rifle brigade under Lieutenant Colonel A.P. reached the southwestern outskirts. Khrapovitsky, which struck the southern outskirts of the city. The pilots of the 6th Guards Bomber Air Division carried out their air strikes. This predetermined the end of enemy resistance. Having suffered heavy losses, abandoning artillery, warehouses with ammunition, food, the remnants of the Dzhankoy garrison began a hasty retreat to the south. Almost simultaneously, the 79th Tank Brigade destroyed the enemy airfield in the Veseloye area (15 km southwest of Dzhankoy), and the 101st Brigade captured the railway bridge 8 km southwest of Dzhankoy.

With the capture of Dzhankoy, the enemy’s defenses in the northern part of the Crimean Peninsula finally collapsed. In the steppe expanses of Crimea, the enemy was not able to hold Soviet troops. The German command still had hopes of stopping the advance of Soviet troops at the Evpatoria-Saki-Sarabuz-Karasubazar-Feodosiya line. But the enemy did not have the opportunity to implement this decision.

The success of the troops of the 4th Ukrainian Front in the northern part of Crimea and access to the Dzhankoy area threatened the encirclement of the enemy group on the Kerch Peninsula. The enemy command was forced to make a decision to withdraw troops from the Kerch Peninsula to the Akmonai positions. The removal of military property and the destruction of the remaining part began. The enemy artillery intensified its activity.

Intelligence of the Separate Primorsky Army discovered enemy preparations for withdrawal. In this regard, the army commander decided to launch a general offensive on the night of April 11. It was supposed to begin on the evening of April 10 with an attack on the enemy by the forces of the advanced battalions, and the advanced detachments and mobile groups at this time were preparing to pursue the enemy. The 4th Air Army received an order to intensify reconnaissance of the enemy.

At 22:00 on April 10, the forward battalions, after a fire raid, attacked the front line of the enemy’s defense. At 4 o'clock in the morning on April 11, following the advanced battalions, the advanced detachments and mobile groups of divisions, corps and the army entered the battle.

In the zone of the 11th Guards Corps (commander - Major General S.E. Rozhdestvensky), by 4 o'clock in the morning on April 11, they captured the entire first enemy defense position. Then, with the support of artillery fire, a mobile group of the corps was brought into battle, which overcame the resistance of the covering units and began pursuing the retreating enemy.

Events in the offensive zone of the 3rd Mountain Rifle Corps (commander - Major General N.A. Shvarev) developed in a similar way.

The 16th Rifle Corps, operating on the left flank of the army (commanded by Major General K.I. Provalov), liberated the city of Kerch by 6 a.m. on April 11. The 318th Mountain Rifle Division under Major General V.F. took part in the liberation of Kerch. Gladkova, who distinguished herself as part of the Eltigen landing force in 1943.

The captured commander of the 9th Cavalry Regiment of the 6th Romanian Cavalry Division testified: “My regiment occupied the defense south of the city of Kerch. When the Russians broke through the German defenses and reached the Kerch-Feodosia highway, the threat of encirclement loomed over the regiment. The Germans ran away headlong, and I gave the order to retreat to the Turkish Wall line. Before we had time to take up defense in a new place, Russian tanks appeared on the left flank. Seeing that the Germans had fled, the Romanian soldiers began to surrender in entire squadrons... The 9th Cavalry Regiment was completely destroyed, not a single soldier left the Kerch Peninsula. All the equipment of the regiment and the artillery attached to it were captured by the Russians.”1

In the liberated cities and villages of Crimea, the restoration of normal life began. So, Kerch again became Soviet at 4 a.m. on April 11. On the first day after liberation, there were only about three dozen residents in the city. Gradually, people began to return to the city from the liberated regions of Crimea. Families hiding in the quarries were taken out. The city authorities were faced with difficult problems of resettling returning people, restoring destroyed houses, water supply, and the electrical network. And by the end of the month the post office and telegraph were operational. Then an ever-increasing number of the population began to receive bread from the restored bakery, and a canteen and fish shop opened their doors. Water supply has improved. We received our first electricity in April. The Kerch shipyard was cleared of mines, the surviving equipment began to be transported there, and 80 workers were recruited.

We began to restore the iron ore plant, the coking plant, and the Kerch-Feodosia railway. Enterprises serving the needs of the population began to operate: shoemakers, carpenters, tinsmiths, saddlers, sewing workshops, and a bathhouse began to operate. Fishing and fish processing enterprises are being restored. The shipyard began work on lifting and repairing ships. Three hospitals and consultations began to function in the city.

The whole country provided assistance to the heroic city. Cars with timber, cement, food, and repair materials went from different areas to Kerch. The command of the Black Sea Fleet donated a ship to the city, from which the restoration of the fishery began.

Starting from April 11, the pursuit of retreating enemy troops began throughout Crimea. The enemy rearguards tried to cover the withdrawal of troops and the evacuation of military equipment. The enemy sought to break away from the Soviet troops, retreat to Sevastopol and organize a defense there. However, Soviet troops quickly moved forward, trying to reach the flanks behind the enemy rearguards and prevent the enemy from accomplishing their plans.

The 2nd Guards Army, having completed the breakthrough of the Ishun positions, began pursuing the enemy with strong forward detachments, placing infantry on vehicles and reinforcing it with tanks and artillery. Having reached the second line of enemy defense on the Chatarlyk River, the army troops began to prepare for its breakthrough. But there was no need to break through it, since as a result of the successful actions of the troops of the 51st Army, a threat was created for the entire Perekop enemy group, and on the night of April 12 it was forced to begin withdrawing across the Chatarlyk River. Mobile detachments of the right-flank corps, having crossed Chatarlyk and fought more than 100 km, captured the city and port of Yevpatoria on the morning of April 13. Units of the 3rd Guards Rifle Division liberated the city of Saki on the morning of April 13. On April 14, the cities of Ak-Mosque and Karaja were liberated. The entire western part of Crimea was cleared of the enemy, and the 13th Guards Rifle Corps, which liberated this area, was withdrawn to reserve.

The main forces of the 2nd Guards Army (54th and 55th Rifle Corps) continued to develop their offensive in the general direction of Sevastopol. They immediately crossed the Alma and Kacha rivers and on April 15 reached the Belbek River, where they met stubborn enemy resistance on the approaches to Sevastopol.

In the 51st Army zone, the enemy was pursued by a front mobile group. The pursuit was carried out along the railway and the Dzhankoy-Simferopol-Bakhchisarai highway. To the left, two more advanced detachments were pursuing the enemy. One advanced on Zuya, the second - through Seitler to Karasubazar. Both of these detachments had the task of cutting the Feodosia-Simferopol road and blocking the enemy’s escape route from the Kerch Peninsula.

By the end of April 12, the front mobile group was reaching the approaches to Simferopol. The first advance detachment in the Zuya area defeated a large enemy column and, having captured Zuya, organized a perimeter defense, preventing the movement of enemy troops to the west. The second advanced detachment captured Seytler that day.

The main forces of the 19th Tank Corps on the morning of April 13 approached Simferopol. Having burst into the city, the tankers, together with the partisans of the 1st brigade (commander - F.I. Fedorenko) of the Northern Unit (17th detachment under the command of F.Z. Gorban and the 19th detachment under the command of Y.M. Sakovich) by 16 Hours later, the city was completely liberated from the occupiers. In honor of the liberation of Simferopol from the fascist invaders, an artillery salute was given in Moscow.

After capturing Simferopol, the mobile group continued to pursue the retreating enemy. On the morning of April 14, two tank brigades of the 19th Tank Corps, together with partisans of the 6th Brigade of the Southern Unit (commander - M.F. Samoilenko), after a short battle, liberated the city of Bakhchisaray. The 26th motorized rifle brigade from Simferopol was sent through the mountains to Alushta to assist the troops of the Separate Primorsky Army in capturing the southern coast of Crimea. The 202nd Tank Brigade from Simferopol was sent to the city of Kacha, which it captured by 18:00, defeating the enemy garrison and joining forces with the troops of the 2nd Guards Army.

Units of the 19th Tank Corps advanced detachments reached the Belbek River east of Mekenzia, where the enemy put up stubborn resistance. The troops of the 51st Army soon arrived here.

It should be noted that during the pursuit, the troops of the 51st Army and the 19th Tank Corps were actively exposed to enemy aircraft, which caused losses in personnel and equipment and slowed down the pace of the offensive. The actions of Soviet aviation were hampered by limited fuel supplies.

A separate Primorsky Army pursued the enemy with advanced detachments. In the middle of the day on April 12, they approached the Ak-Monay positions and tried to break through them on the move. The attempt failed. It was necessary to quickly transfer rifle units, bring up artillery and launch a concentrated air strike. After strong artillery preparation, a powerful air bombing strike, and an attack by infantry and tanks, the enemy’s last fortified position was broken through. Having broken through the Ak-Monai positions in stubborn 8-hour battles, the troops of the Separate Primorsky Army rushed to Feodosia, which they liberated on April 13. The Kerch Peninsula was completely liberated from the invaders. In honor of this victory, artillery salutes were fired again in Moscow.

After the liberation of the Kerch Peninsula, the troops of the Separate Primorsky Army began to develop an offensive with the main forces in the general direction of Old Crimea, Karasubazar, and with part of the forces along the coast along the Primorskoye Highway to Yalta, Sevastopol. On April 13, its troops liberated Old Crimea and, together with the troops of the 51st Army, with the assistance of partisans (5th partisan brigade of the Northern Union under the command of F.S. Solovey), on April 13 they liberated Karasubazar. In this area there was a connection between the troops of the 4th Ukrainian Front - the 51st Army and the Separate Primorsky Army.

Developing an offensive along the Primorskoye Highway, part of the troops of the Separate Primorsky Army occupied Sudak on April 14, Alushta and Yalta on April 15, Simeiz on April 16, and by the end of the 17th they reached fortified enemy positions near Sevastopol. The troops fought more than 250 km in 6 days. During the liberation of Yalta, partisans of the 7th brigade of the Southern Unit under the command of L.A. acted together with the troops. Vikman.

By order of the Supreme Command Headquarters, on April 18, the Separate Primorsky Army was transferred to the 4th Ukrainian Front and renamed the Primorsky Army. Lieutenant General K.S. became the commander of the army. Miller.

As a result of the pursuit of the retreating enemy, the troops of the 4th Ukrainian Front and the Separate Primorsky Army, with the assistance of ships and aviation of the Black Sea Fleet, advanced to the approaches to Sevastopol. Attempts by the German command to delay the advance of Soviet troops at intermediate lines in the central part of Crimea were a complete failure.

Hitler's command, having been defeated in a defensive battle, decided to evacuate its troops and rear personnel from the peninsula. In the current situation, there could be no talk of a systematic evacuation of the troops of the 17th Army without organizing a strong defense of Sevastopol. With a strong defense on the approaches to the city and in the city itself, during defensive battles it sought to pin down significant forces of the Soviet troops, inflict losses on them and ensure the evacuation of the remnants of its troops by sea.

To defend the city, the enemy prepared three defensive lines, each of which consisted of two or three trenches, cut-off positions and a large number of structures made of earth and stones. The first, most powerful, defensive line was established 7-10 km from the city and ran along heights 76, 9; 192.0; 256.2; and Mount Sugarloaf, the eastern slopes of Sapun Mountain and nameless heights west of Balaklava. Three to six kilometers from the city there was a second line and a third on the outskirts of Sevastopol. Of particular importance for holding the first line was Sapun Mountain, which was turned by the enemy into a powerful node of resistance.

The enemy group near Sevastopol consisted of eight divisions of the 49th and 5th Army Corps of the 17th Army. Their total number was more than 72 thousand soldiers and officers, 3414 guns and mortars, 50 tanks and assault guns. 70% of the forces and means were located on the first defensive line, which ensured the presence of up to 2,000 people and 65 guns and mortars along 1 km of the front in areas where the main efforts were concentrated. Having decided to hold Sevastopol, the German command strengthened its group in this area, transporting about 6 thousand German soldiers and officers by air.

Thus, the enemy had a large group on the approaches to Sevastopol, which relied on natural lines that were very advantageous for defense and well-equipped engineering positions.

Moreover, the continuous retreat of the Nazi troops forced Hitler to change the commander of the 17th Army. At the beginning of May, General E. Eneke was replaced by the commander of the 5th Army Corps, Colonel General K. Almendinger. On May 3, the new commander demanded in his order: “... that everyone defend in the full sense of the word, that no one retreat, that they hold every trench, every crater, every trench... The 17th Army in Sevastopol is supported by powerful air and naval forces. The Fuhrer will give us enough ammunition, aircraft, weapons and reinforcements. Germany expects us to fulfill our duty."2

Notes

1. Grylev A.N. Dnieper - Carpathians - Crimea. M.: Nauka, 1970. P. 237.

V. Runov, L. Zaitsev.

In 1903, the French writer L. Boussenard, the author of famous adventure novels, argued: “The masters of the Crimea will always be the rulers of the Black Sea.” 40 years later, representatives of the military command of the USSR and Germany agreed with his opinion. The Crimean offensive operation of 1944 was designed to provide the Soviet fleet with unambiguous dominance in the local waters and finally turn the tide of the war in favor of the anti-Hitler coalition.

Preliminary schedule

The situation that developed in Crimea at the beginning of 1944 was somewhat reminiscent of the situation in which he found himself. The forces of the aggressive bloc were blocked from land as a result of the successful USSR carrying out two landing operations - Melitopol and Kerch-Etilgen at the end of 1943. But they had reliable fortification systems and were numerous, about 200 thousand people in total:

• 17th Army,
• several mountain rifle and cavalry corps and divisions,
• 215 tanks,
• more than 3,500 pieces of artillery.

True, almost half of the personnel represented Romanian units, and Romanian leader Antonescu protested against their use in Taurida and even demanded evacuation. The Odessa operation put an end to these demands - it became simply impossible to withdraw the Romanians from Crimea.

Disposition of forces before the start of the Crimean operation

Some German soldiers also suggested that Hitler leave Crimea. But he resisted, saying that then Romania, Bulgaria, etc. would inevitably fall away from Germany. In this he was absolutely right.

The Union troops were in a much better position than in 1920. By the beginning of the year, they already had bridgeheads in the Kerch region and on the southern shore of the Rotten Sea, and also crossed the. Naval power was important - the Black Sea Fleet and the Azov flotilla operated from the sea coast.

They all had a significant advantage over the enemy in the number of soldiers who had the appropriate attitude - during the year the Red Army won significant victories. The Union sought to return Crimea as an ideal base for the Black Sea Flotilla - then it would really be possible to control the Black Sea region. Ideology also played a role - the Nazis should have “remembered” the 255 days of the Second Sevastopol Defense.

Strategic plans

The leadership of the operation was entrusted to experienced commanders. The main force was to be the 4th Ukrainian Front (under the command of General F.I. Tolbukhin) and the Primorsky Army (with General A.I. Eremenko). Troops, guardsmen and a tank corps also took part. General management and control from the headquarters was carried out by marshals K.E. Voroshilov and A.M. Vasilevsky.

Initially, the start of the operation was planned for mid-February. But then it was postponed several times - both for tactical and natural reasons. First, it was decided to finally gain a foothold on the right bank of the Dnieper region (the Odessa operation can also be considered a part of this idea). Then a storm and prolonged heavy rains interfered, preventing the crossing of troops.

The balance of power of Nazi Germany

The last option for launching the offensive was a new date - April 8. By this time, Odessa was almost over: the “pearl by the sea” was taken by the Red Army on the 9th, therefore, enemy units were completely blocked in Crimea.

Wide grip

The beginning of the operation also resembled the actions of M.V. Frunze in 1920. After a powerful artillery barrage, on 8.04 the Fourth Ukrainian Front went on the offensive simultaneously from the Sivash bridgehead and on Perekop. On the 11th, the coastal army attacked and took the city on the same day.

In a week (from April 8 to April 16), our troops also liberated Armyansk and Evpatoria and Simferopol, and Dzhankoy, Belogorsk, and Sudak, and reached Sevastopol. The last city on the list required three assaults. Attempts made on April 19 and 23 did not produce tangible results, bringing only minor success. The greatest difficulty was the capture, from where the Germans were firing artillery.

The final assault was scheduled for May 5th. By this time, the USSR could already afford to regroup its troops, since a significant part of the combat missions in Crimea had already been resolved. The 2nd Guards Army went to the forefront of the attack - such detachments did not retreat. But still, the final liberation of the “pride of Russian sailors” took 4 days. The remnants of the Nazis retreated to the Chersonesus region. They were promised evacuation, but the attack aircraft of the Land of the Soviets thwarted all plans - instead of saving the Nazis, the Black Sea became the grave for 42 thousand of them.

The Crimean partisans made a huge contribution to the success of the offensive. They cut communication channels and lines of communication, obtained intelligence information, and prevented the destruction of enterprises and infrastructure. One of the formations liberated the city of Old Crimea; the partisan scouts did not give it up, although the Nazis, when attempting a counteroffensive, captured one city block and killed everyone they found there - almost 600 people. On May 12, 1944, the Crimean operation ended with the unconditional victory of the Soviet troops.

Further, to the west!

The results of the operation were impressive. In general, the aggressor's losses in Crimea are estimated at 140,000 irretrievable losses (killed and captured). Despite the fierce resistance of the enemy, the losses of the Red Army soldiers were noticeably less - about 40 thousand killed and less than 70 thousand wounded. The entire operation took 35 days. At one time, one resisted the enemy for more than 250 days.

Hitler was not mistaken - Germany’s authority among the allies fell sharply after the defeat in Crimea. And the Red Army, on the contrary, once again proved its strength. Now safe rear areas and a reliable base for the fleet opened up opportunities for further advancement - to the Balkans, beyond the Danube, to the west. It’s symbolic - the day of liberation of Sevastopol is celebrated on May 9! So convincingly the Crimean operation predicted the Great Victory over fascism and Nazism!

The fascist German command attached great military and political importance to the retention of Crimea. The enemy troops stationed there pinned down significant forces of the Red Army. The Black Sea Fleet, deprived of the possibility of basing on the Crimean coast, experienced great difficulties in conducting operations. The occupation of Crimea was used by Nazi Germany to put pressure on Turkey and keep Romania and Bulgaria in the fascist bloc. Therefore, despite the loss of Ukraine, the 17th Army (Colonel General E. Jenecke) was entrusted with the task of holding Crimea until the last possible opportunity.

Erwin Jenecke

This army consisted of 12 divisions (5 German and 7 Romanian), 2 brigades of assault guns and various reinforcement units - a total of about 200 thousand people, up to 3 thousand guns and mortars, over 200 tanks and assault guns. It was supported until 150 aircraft that were based in Crimea, and aviation from airfields in Romania. On the favorable defense lines of the Northern Crimea and on the Kerch Peninsula, the enemy created a powerful defense consisting of 3-4 lines. The main forces of the 17th Army defended in the northern part of Crimea (5 divisions) and on the Kerch Peninsula (4 divisions). 3 divisions defended the coast.

The idea was that by simultaneous strikes by troops of the 4th Ukrainian Front from the north, from and, and the Separate Primorsky Army from the east, from a bridgehead in the Kerch region, in the general direction, with the assistance of long-range aviation and partisans, to dismember and destroy the group enemy, to prevent its evacuation from Crimea. The main role in the operation was assigned to the 4th Ukrainian Front (Army General), which delivered the main blow from a bridgehead on the southern bank of the Sivash in the direction of Simferopol. An auxiliary attack was carried out on the Perekop Isthmus. A separate Primorsky Army (Army General) was supposed to break through the enemy’s defenses on the Kerch Peninsula and deliver the main blow to Simferopol, Sevastopol, and with part of its forces along the southern coast of the Crimean Peninsula.

F.I. Tolbukhin A.I. Eremenko

The main task of the Black Sea Fleet (admiral) in the operation was to disrupt the enemy’s sea communications with Crimea. The fleet was also involved in assisting the ground forces with its aviation, and in the coastal zone with naval artillery fire.

F.S. Otyabrsky

The Azov military flotilla (rear admiral), operationally subordinate to the commander of the Separate Primorsky Army, provided all transportation through the Kerch Strait. Crimean partisans received the task of smashing the enemy’s rear, as well as preventing the enemy from destroying cities, ports, industrial enterprises and other national economic facilities. The coordination of the actions of all forces involved in the operation was carried out by a representative of the Supreme Command Headquarters, Marshal.

By the beginning of the Crimean operation (April 8 - May 12, 1944), the 4th Ukrainian Front and the Separate Primorsky Army had 470 thousand personnel, 6 thousand guns and mortars, about 600 tanks and self-propelled guns. They were supported from the air by the 4th (Colonel General of Aviation) and 8th (Lieutenant General of Aviation T.T. Khryukin) air armies, numbering 1,250 aircraft.

Preparations for the operation took place under extremely difficult conditions. Large regroupings of troops were carried out in muddy conditions, with no roads. Through Sivash, formations and units were transported to the bridgehead along two 2-km dams and bridges built by sappers under artillery fire and enemy bombing, often in a storm

The small bridgehead was completely open and was shot right through by enemy artillery. Nevertheless, by the beginning of the operation, the Soviet command managed to secretly deploy and entrench large forces of troops on it, including a lot of artillery and a tank corps.

As part of the 4th Ukrainian Front, two armies deployed for the offensive: the 2nd Guards (lieutenant general) on the Perekop Isthmus and the 51st (lieutenant general) on the Sivash bridgehead. The front troops were supported by the 8th Air Army and part of the Black Sea Fleet aviation. Taking into account the positional nature of the enemy’s defense, the front command created high densities of artillery in the breakthrough areas, reaching 122-183 guns and mortars per 1 km of the front. The Separate Primorsky Army had approximately the same density of artillery.

Meanwhile, passions were heating up in the enemy camp. For several months now, the commanders of the army groups in Ukraine, field marshals and Kleist, the chief of the general staff of the Wehrmacht ground forces, Colonel General K. Zeitzler, realizing the doom of the 17th Army, suggested that Hitler leave Crimea and evacuate the troops from there, but the Fuhrer each time rejected all of them out of hand arguments. “Abandonment of Crimea,” he declared to his military leaders, “will mean Turkey, and then Bulgaria and Romania, leaving us.”

Erich von Manstein (left) and A. Hitler

Thus, he made it clear to the military leaders that the issue of Crimea is an area of ​​higher politics where generals should not meddle. At the end of March, the Romanian dictator Marshal I. Antonescu demanded that Hitler evacuate Romanian troops from Crimea while Odessa was still in their hands. But even here the Fuhrer remained adamant. Moreover, he ordered to strengthen the troops defending Crimea. So the 17th Army could only wait for its fate to be decided. And the denouement was not long in coming...

Offensive

Having completed all the prepared measures, the Soviet troops went on the offensive. On April 8, he began to storm powerful enemy fortifications. This was preceded by a two-day artillery bombardment of enemy defenses on the Perekop Isthmus. By concentrating heavy artillery here, including 203 mm caliber guns, the Soviet command sought to create the impression among the enemy that the main blow would be delivered here. However, despite the powerful 150-minute artillery preparation, the successes of the first day of the operation turned out to be quite modest: the troops of the 2nd Guards Army managed to capture only two trenches of the first position of the enemy’s main defense line, and in the main direction - in the zone of the 51st Army - infantry was only able to break into the first trench.

The front troops were forced to “gnaw through” enemy defenses for three days, overcoming trench after trench, position after position. Only by the evening of April 10 did both armies complete the breakthrough of the enemy’s defenses. On the morning of April 11, the front commander brought the 19th Tank Corps (Lieutenant General) into the breakthrough, which on the same day immediately captured Dzhankoy - a powerful stronghold in the enemy’s defense and an important road junction. The advance of part of the forces to the rear of the Ishun positions forced the enemy, under the threat of losing escape routes, to hastily abandon the fortifications on the Perekop Isthmus and begin a retreat along the entire front. The troops of the 4th Ukrainian Front began pursuit: the 2nd Guards Army along the western coast of Crimea to Yevpatoria, and the 51st in the central part of the peninsula to Simferopol.

The entry of the 4th Ukrainian Front into the Dzhankoy area threatened the retreat routes of the enemy’s Kerch group and thereby created favorable conditions for the offensive of the Separate Primorsky Army. Fearing encirclement, the enemy decided to withdraw troops from the Kerch Peninsula. Having discovered preparations for withdrawal, on the night of April 11 she went on the offensive. Its main forces bypassed Kerch from the north, and (Major General K.I. Provalov) liberated the city after heavy street fighting. The 18 units and formations that most distinguished themselves during the liberation of Kerch were given the honorary name of Kerch.

On the morning of April 11, army troops began pursuing the enemy. Strong forward detachments were brought forward, created both in the army and in each corps. Aviation of the 4th Air Army crushed the retreating enemy columns with massive air strikes. On April 12, units of the Separate Primorsky Army immediately broke through the enemy’s defenses in positions blocking the exit from the Kerch Peninsula, and the next day in the area (60 km west of Feodosia) they linked up with the advanced detachments of the 4th Ukrainian Front.

Part of the army pursued the enemy along the Primorskoye Highway. The forward detachments acted quickly, thwarting all the enemy’s attempts to gain a foothold on lines advantageous for defense. The defeated formations of the 17th German Army hastily retreated to Sevastopol. On April 13, Soviet troops liberated the cities of Simferopol and.

The partisans worked closely with the regular troops of the Red Army. They set up ambushes on mountain roads, assisted troops in capturing cities with attacks from the rear, supplied the Soviet command with intelligence data, and saved many resorts, cities and historical monuments from destruction.

The aviation of the Black Sea Fleet (Lieutenant General of Aviation V.V. Ermachenkov) was active. She struck at concentrations of watercraft in ports, sank transports on the open sea, depriving the enemy of the last opportunity for salvation.

On April 15-16, the Soviet armies reached the approaches to Sevastopol, where they were stopped by organized enemy defenses on the outer perimeter of the former Sevastopol defensive region. Preparations began for the assault on the heavily fortified line. The remnants of the 17th Army numbering 72 thousand people, more than 1.8 thousand guns and mortars, up to 50 tanks and assault guns were “locked” in Sevastopol, occupying defenses on a front of 35 km and a depth of 10 to 16 km.

The evacuation of German-Romanian troops that had begun by order of Hitler was stopped. They were instructed to pin down the enemy's forces until the last possible opportunity and inflict as many losses on him as possible. General E. Jenecke, who did not believe in the possibility of holding Sevastopol, was removed from command of the 17th Army. Hitler appointed Infantry General K. Allmendinger as its new commander.

Karl Allmendinger

On April 18, the Separate Primorsky Army was renamed (Lieutenant General) and included in the 4th Ukrainian Front. On April 19, Soviet troops tried to capture the Sevastopol positions, but were unsuccessful. The front command did everything necessary to avoid heavy losses when breaking through the Sevastopol fortifications and ensure success was achieved as soon as possible.

The enemy's defense consisted of three lines. It was most strongly fortified, dominating the surrounding area.

During the preparatory period, artillery methodically destroyed the enemy's long-term defensive structures. The enemy defenses were subjected to massive air strikes. In addition to the front aviation and the Black Sea Fleet, three corps and a long-range aviation division, which consisted of over 500 aircraft, were involved for these purposes.

From April 19 to May 5, front-line and naval aviation alone carried out 8.2 thousand sorties. As the day of the assault approached, the force of fire strikes against the enemy continuously increased. In the last six days, preliminary air preparation for the offensive was carried out, during which over 2 thousand tons of fragmentation and high-explosive bombs and about 24 thousand anti-tank bombs fell on the enemy. Preparations for the assault on Sevastopol lasted 12 days.

After preparing for the assault, Soviet troops liberated Sevastopol. The city that the Germans stormed for 250 days and nights (10/30/41—07/02/42), using over 2 thousand guns and mortars, including 56 batteries of heavy artillery, one battery of super-heavy 615-mm mortars and an 800-mm Dora cannon ", the length of the trunk was 30 meters. There was no such massive use of artillery by the Germans in any other operation of the Second World War.

On May 5, the troops of the 2nd Guards Army were the first to go on the offensive. They launched an auxiliary attack from the north. Their persistent attacks were supported by the entire power of artillery and the main aviation forces of the front. As a result, the opposing enemy was not only firmly pinned down, but the enemy command had to strengthen its left flank. On May 7, after a 90-minute artillery preparation and with the support of all front aviation in the Sapun-Gora, Karan sector, the troops of the Primorsky Army and the left-flank formations of the 51st Army launched the assault, delivering the main blow. The most brutal battles took place over Sapun Mountain, which was the key to the enemy defense of Sevastopol.

Assault on Sapun Mountain

Units of the 10th (Major General K.P. Neverov), 11th Guards (Major General S.E. Rozhdestvensky) and 63rd (Major General P.K. Koshevoy - future Marshal of the Soviet Union) fought here. rifle corps. In the end, the enemy could not withstand the powerful onslaught of Soviet soldiers and retreated. On the same day, the victorious red banner soared over Sapun Mountain. Having broken three defensive lines one after another, troops of the 4th Ukrainian Front broke into the city from the north, east and southeast on May 9 and cleared it of the enemy by evening.

Railway station in Sevastopol

The remnants of the defeated 17th Army (about 30 thousand people) fled to the cape. To pursue them, the front commander allocated the 19th Tank Corps, which quickly advanced to the defensive line covering this cape, but was unable to advance further. Hoping to escape by sea, the Nazis stubbornly defended their positions. However, the Black Sea Fleet, artillery and aviation from the front disrupted their evacuation. Having pulled up their forces, the front troops broke through the last defensive line of the enemy on Crimean soil and on May 12 completed their defeat. At Cape Chersonesos, 21 thousand enemy soldiers and officers were captured, and a large amount of weapons and military equipment was captured.

End of operation

The Crimean operation ended in the complete defeat of the 17th German Army. Its losses on land amounted to 100 thousand people, including about 62 thousand prisoners. In addition, a large number of German and Romanian soldiers and officers died at sea during the evacuation. Thus, according to the German side, from May 3 to May 13 alone, 42 thousand people died at sea. The Germans managed to evacuate several tens of thousands of people by sea and by air. The 17th Army lost all its military equipment. The Black Sea Fleet and aviation sank many enemy ships during the operation. The operation in Crimea was distinguished by well-organized interaction between ground forces, aviation and navy, which largely predetermined the achievement of decisive success. Our aviation carried out more than 36 thousand sorties, of which up to 60% were to support troops. In 599 air battles, Soviet pilots shot down 297 enemy aircraft. About 200 enemy aircraft were destroyed and damaged at airfields.

In the battles for the liberation of Crimea, Soviet troops showed massive heroism, high offensive spirit and combat activity, which were created and supported by effective political and educational work. If in 1941-1942 it took fascist German troops 250 days to capture Sevastopol, then in 1944 the Red Army broke through powerful enemy fortifications in Crimea in 35 days, and the assault on Sevastopol took only 3 days. The Motherland highly appreciated the courage and bravery of its soldiers. Moscow, on behalf of the Motherland, saluted seven times the valiant army and naval forces that liberated Crimea. Many units and formations were given the honorary names of Perekop, Sivash, Kerch, Feodosia, Simferopol and Sevastopol. Only the honorary name of Sevastopol was assigned to 118 units and formations that distinguished themselves during the liberation of the city. Many units, ships and formations were awarded orders. Thousands of soldiers and officers of the army and navy were awarded orders and medals, and 126 of the most courageous were awarded the title of Hero of the Soviet Union.

Having liberated Crimea, Soviet troops returned an economically and strategically important area to the country. The Black Sea Fleet received its main base - Sevastopol. The enemy lost a critical strategic position on the southern flank of the Eastern Front. Conditions improved for the Soviet offensive in the Balkans.

Return of the Black Sea Fleet to Sevastopol

During the Crimean operation, Soviet troops lost about 85 thousand people (including 18 thousand irretrievable losses), over 500 guns and mortars, more than 170 tanks and self-propelled guns, about 180 aircraft.

The significance of the Crimean operation

The Red Army's offensive in the winter and spring of 1944 on the southern wing of the strategic front played a decisive role in disrupting Nazi Germany's plans to stabilize the Eastern Front and prolong the war. In Right Bank Ukraine and Crimea, from the end of December 1943 to mid-May 1944, 99 enemy divisions and 2 brigades were defeated, of which 22 divisions and 1 brigade were completely destroyed, 8 divisions and 1 brigade were disbanded due to heavy losses, 8 divisions were lost up to 2/3 and 61 divisions - up to 1/2 of their strength. The defeat of the enemy's main strategic grouping and the split of its front into two parts in the Carpathian region not only radically changed the situation on the southern wing of the Soviet-German front, but also undermined the stability of the Wehrmacht's defense on the Eastern Front as a whole, as well as in other theaters of military operations.

Outstanding victories in Right Bank Ukraine and Crimea once again demonstrated the high level of military art of the Red Army and the massive heroism of the Soviet troops. For military exploits on the battlefields during the Dnieper-Carpathian and Crimean strategic operations, 662 particularly distinguished units and formations were awarded honorary titles in honor of the cities they liberated and crossing water barriers, and 528 were awarded orders.

With a successful offensive in the southwestern direction, the troops of the Ukrainian fronts created an advantageous situation for the deployment of offensive operations in other strategic directions of the Soviet-German front. At the same time, plans of the Wehrmacht High Command to accumulate forces to repel the landing of Allied troops in Western Europe were thwarted. The weakening of the grouping of fascist German troops in the West due to the transfer of large forces to Ukraine undoubtedly contributed to the success of the Allied landing operation in Normandy, which began a month after the end of the battles in Right Bank Ukraine.

The entry of the Red Army to the southwestern border of the USSR and the transfer of hostilities to the territory of Romania sharply aggravated the military-political situation of the states allied with Nazi Germany and radically changed the situation in South-Eastern Europe. The ruling circles of the satellite countries of Nazi Germany intensified their search for ways out of the fascist bloc, and the liberation struggle of the peoples occupied and dependent on the Third Reich in European countries intensified significantly.

Monument to the Black Sea people in Sevastopol

Exactly 70 years ago, on March 16, 1944, the headquarters of the Supreme Commander-in-Chief ordered the start of the operation to liberate Crimea. The Crimean operation itself was carried out from April 8 to May 12, 1944 by the forces of the 4th Ukrainian Front and the Separate Primorsky Army in cooperation with the Black Sea Fleet and the Azov Military Flotilla.

On May 5-7, 1944, troops of the 4th Ukrainian Front (commander - Army General F.I. Tolbukhin) stormed German defensive fortifications in heavy battles; On May 9, they completely liberated Sevastopol, and on May 12, the remnants of enemy troops at Cape Chersonesos folded.

I dedicate this photo collection to this significant event, friends.

1. The facade of the Sevastopol Palace of Pioneers damaged by shells after the liberation of the city. May 1944

2. German minesweeper in the bay of Sevastopol. 1944

3. German attack aircraft Fw.190, destroyed by Soviet aviation at the Kherson airfield. 1944

4. Meeting of Soviet partisans and boat sailors in liberated Yalta. 1944

5. The commander of the 7th Romanian Mountain Corps, General Hugo Schwab (second from left), and the commander of the XXXXIX Wehrmacht Mountain Corps, General Rudolf Conrad (first from left), at the 37-mm RaK 35/36 cannon in Crimea. 02/27/1944

6. Meeting of Soviet partisans in liberated Yalta. 1944

7. The Soviet light cruiser "Red Crimea" enters Sevastopol Bay. 05.11.1944

8. The commander of the 7th Romanian Mountain Corps, General Hugo Schwab (second from left), and the commander of the XXXXIX Wehrmacht Mountain Corps, General Rudolf Conrad (center right) pass by a mortar crew during a review in the Crimea. 02/27/1944

9. The Black Sea squadron returns to liberated Sevastopol. In the foreground is the guards light cruiser "Red Crimea", behind it the silhouette of the battleship "Sevastopol" is visible. 05.11.1944

10. Soviet soldiers with a flag on the roof of the destroyed Panorama building “Defense of Sevastopol” in liberated Sevastopol. 1944

11. Tanks Pz.Kpfw. 2nd Romanian Tank Regiment in Crimea. 03.11.1943

12. Romanian General Hugo Schwab and German General Rudolf Conrad in Crimea. 02/27/1944

13. Romanian artillerymen fire from an anti-tank gun during a battle in Crimea. 03/27/1944

14. The commander of the XXXXIX Mountain Corps of the Wehrmacht, General Rudolf Conrad, with Romanian officers at an observation post in Crimea. 02/27/1944

15. Pilots of the 3rd squadron of the 6th Guards Fighter Aviation Regiment of the Black Sea Fleet Air Force study a map of the combat area at the airfield near Yak-9D aircraft. In the background is the plane of Guard Lieutenant V.I. Voronov (tail number “31”). Saki airfield, Crimea. April-May 1944

16. Chief of Staff of the 4th Ukrainian Front, Lieutenant General Sergei Semenovich Biryuzov, member of the State Defense Committee, Marshal of the Soviet Union Kliment Efremovich Voroshilov, Chief of the General Staff, Marshal of the Soviet Union Alexander Mikhailovich Vasilevsky at the command post of the 4th Ukrainian Front. April 1944

17. Representative of the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command, Marshal of the Soviet Union S.K. Tymoshenko with the command of the North Caucasus Front and the 18th Army is considering the plan for the operation to cross the Kerch Strait. From left to right: Marshal of the Soviet Union S.K. Timoshenko, Colonel General K.N. Leselidze, Army General I.E. Petrov. 1943

18. The Black Sea squadron returns to liberated Sevastopol. In the foreground is the guards light cruiser "Red Crimea", behind it the silhouette of the battleship "Sevastopol" is visible. 05.11.1944

19. Soviet boat SKA-031 with a destroyed stern, abandoned at low tide in Krotkovo, awaiting repairs. A boat from the 1st Novorossiysk Red Banner Sea Hunter Division of the Black Sea Fleet. 1944

20. Armored boat of the Azov military flotilla in the Kerch Strait. Kerch-Eltingen landing operation. December 1943

21. Soviet troops transport military equipment and horses through Sivash. In the foreground is a 45 mm anti-tank gun. December 1943

22. Soviet soldiers transport a 122-mm M-30 model 1938 howitzer on a pontoon across the Sivash Bay (Rotten Sea). November 1943

23. T-34 tanks on the street of liberated Sevastopol. May 1944

24. Marine soldiers at the arch of Primorsky Boulevard in liberated Sevastopol. May 1944

25. The Black Sea squadron returns to liberated Sevastopol. In the foreground is the guards light cruiser "Red Crimea", behind it the silhouette of the battleship "Sevastopol" is visible. 05.11.1944

26. Partisans who participated in the liberation of Crimea. The village of Simeiz on the southern coast of the Crimean Peninsula. 1944

27. Sapper, Lieutenant Ya.S. Shinkarchuk crossed Sivash thirty-six times and transported 44 guns with shells to the bridgehead. 1943.

28. Architectural monument Grafskaya pier in liberated Sevastopol. 1944

29. Fireworks at the grave of fellow pilots who died near Sevastopol on April 24, 1944. 05/14/1944

30. Armored boats of the Black Sea Fleet are landing Soviet troops on the Crimean coast of the Kerch Strait on the bridgehead near Yenikale during the Kerch-Eltigen landing operation. November 1943

31. The crew of the Pe-2 dive bomber “For the Great Stalin” of the 40th Bomber Aviation Regiment of the Black Sea Fleet after completing a combat mission. Crimea, May 1944. From left to right: crew commander Nikolai Ivanovich Goryachkin, navigator - Yuri Vasilyevich Tsyplenkov, gunner-radio operator - Sergei (nickname Knopka).

32. Self-propelled gun SU-152 of the 1824th heavy self-propelled artillery regiment in Simferopol. 04/13/1944

33. Soviet soldiers cross Sivash in December 1943.

34. A Marine installs the Soviet naval flag in liberated Sevastopol. May 1944

35. T-34 tank on the street of liberated Sevastopol. May 1944

36. Transportation of Soviet equipment during the Kerch-Eltigen landing operation. November 1943

37. Destroyed German equipment on the shore of Cossack Bay in Sevastopol. May 1944

38. German soldiers killed during the liberation of Crimea. 1944

39. Transport with German soldiers evacuated from Crimea docks in the port of Constanta, Romania. 1944

40. Partisans in Yalta. 1944

41. Armored boat. The Crimean coast of the Kerch Strait, most likely a bridgehead near Yenikale. Kerch-Eltigen landing operation. Late 1943

42. Yak-9D fighters over Sevastopol. May 1944

43. Yak-9D fighters over Sevastopol. May 1944

44. Yak-9D fighters, 3rd squadron of the 6th GvIAP of the Black Sea Fleet Air Force. May 1944

45. Liberated Sevastopol. May 1944

46. ​​Yak-9D fighters over Sevastopol.

47. Soviet soldiers pose on a German Messerschmitt Bf.109 fighter abandoned in the Crimea. 1944

48. A Soviet soldier tears off a Nazi swastika from the gates of the metallurgical plant named after. Voykova in liberated Kerch. April 1944

49. At the location of the Soviet troops - a unit on the march, washing, dugouts. Crimea. 1944

57. Liberated Sevastopol from a bird's eye view. 1944

58. In liberated Sevastopol: an announcement at the entrance to Primorsky Boulevard, left over from the German administration. 1944

59. Sevastopol after liberation from the Nazis. 1944

60. In liberated Sevastopol. May 1944

61. Soldiers of the 2nd Guards Taman Division in liberated Kerch. Soviet troops began crossing the Kerch Strait following the Germans fleeing the Taman Peninsula on October 31, 1943. On April 11, 1944, Kerch was finally liberated as a result of a landing operation. April 1944

62. Soldiers of the 2nd Guards Taman Division in the battles to expand the bridgehead on the Kerch Peninsula, November 1943. With the defeat of German troops on the Taman Peninsula, the path to the Kerch Strait opened, which the guards took advantage of when landing to seize the bridgehead in the Crimea still occupied by the Germans . November 1943

63. Marine landing in the Kerch area. On October 31, 1943, Soviet troops began crossing the Kerch Strait. As a result of the landing operation on April 11, 1944, Kerch was finally liberated. The severity and fierceness of the battles during the defense and liberation of Kerch is evidenced by the fact that for these battles 146 people were awarded the high title of Hero of the Soviet Union, and 21 military units and formations were awarded the honorary title “Kerch”. November 1943