At the intersection of the road from Kakhovka to Crimea with the Perekopsky shaft, a rather original monument was erected, dedicated to the three assaults on Perekop. The first assault took place back in 1920 - the Reds attack, the Whites defend, then there will be the Great Patriotic War, there will be the Red Army against the Germans and Romanians, even later there will be a labor assault, but today we are talking about the beginning of the last century.
November 8, 2010 will mark the 90th anniversary of the first assault on Perekop. Of course, there were much more than three assaults in the history of the Turkish Wall. We are, of course, talking about those assaults that the Soviet state cared about perpetuating the memory of.
The civil war, caused in the Russian Empire by the well-known events of 1917, was nearing its end in 1920. The storming of the Perekop fortifications ends the last stage of the struggle on the Wrangel Front, the last major front of the Civil War. Ukraine had powerful grain reserves. But the presence of Wrangel’s troops in Ukraine and a widely developed insurgent movement in the Ukrainian countryside eliminated “Ukrainian bread” from the food funds of the country of the Soviets. The proximity of Wrangel to the industrial Donetsk-Krivoy Rog region paralyzed the work of this only coal and metallurgical base at that time.
It is worth noting that already in August 1920, Wrangel’s government was officially recognized by France. In September, there were already missions of all the most important capitalist states in Crimea, including distant Japan and the USA.
The organizer of the expulsion of the troops of General P.N. Wrangel from Crimea was the Bolshevik M.V. Frunze, commander of the Southern Front at that time. Frunze fought against the Wrangelites together with the Insurgent Army of Father Makhno (N.I. Makhno), with whom in October 1920 he signed an agreement on unity of action against the white troops and established good personal relations.
Since the ideas of Bolshevism, both declarative and propaganda, and actual, are well known, let us dwell a little on the ideas of their Crimean opponent.
On July 5, 1920, the newspaper “Great Russia” published an interview with newspaper correspondent N.N. Chebyshev with General P.N. Wrangel.
“What are we fighting for?”
To this question, said General Wrangel, there can only be one answer: we are fighting for freedom. On the other side of our front, in the north, arbitrariness, oppression, and slavery reign. You can hold the most varied views on the desirability of this or that state system, you can be an extreme republican, a socialist and even a Marxist, and still recognize the so-called Soviet republic as an example of the most unprecedented sinister despotism, under the yoke of which Russia is perishing, and even its new supposedly the ruling class, the proletariat, pressed to the ground, like the rest of the population. Now this is no secret in Europe either. The veil has been lifted over Soviet Russia. Nest of reaction in Moscow. There are enslavers sitting there, treating the people as a herd. Only blindness and dishonesty can consider us reactionaries. We are fighting for the emancipation of the people from the yoke, which they have not seen in the darkest times of their history.
For a long time in Europe they did not understand, but now, apparently, they are beginning to understand what we clearly understand: the entire global significance of our domestic feud. If our sacrifices go in vain, then European society, European democracy will have to stand up in armed defense of its cultural and political gains against the enemy of civilization, inspired by success.
I long for an end to the civil war with all my soul. Every drop of spilled Russian blood resonates with pain in my heart. But the struggle is inevitable until consciousness clears up, until people understand that they are fighting against themselves, against their rights to self-determination, until real state power is established in Russia, based on the principles of legality, security of personal and property rights, on the principles of respect for international obligations; there will never be any lasting peace or improvement in economic conditions in Europe. It will be impossible to conclude any more or less durable international agreement and agree on nothing properly. The cause of the Russian Army in Crimea is a great liberation movement. This is a holy war for freedom and right.
Baron Pyotr Nikolaevich Wrangel (08/15/1878 - 04/25/1928) - Russian, general, Knight of St. George, commander-in-chief of the Russian Army in Crimea (1920) - advocated a federal structure of the future Russia. He was inclined to recognize the political independence of Ukraine. He developed a number of legislative acts on agrarian reform, including the “Land Law,” adopted by the government on May 25, 1920. He recognized the legal seizure of landowners’ lands by peasants in the first years of the revolution (albeit for a certain contribution to the state). He carried out a number of administrative reforms in Crimea, as well as a reform of local self-government. Promulgated a number of decrees on regional autonomy of Cossack lands.
Negotiations with the Bolsheviks, which the British government, which supported the Whites, insisted on, were absolutely unacceptable and even insulting to the White command. It was decided to continue the fight to the end. Wrangel's successes in the summer of 1920 alarmed the Bolsheviks. The Soviet press sounded the alarm, calling for the destruction of the “baron entrenched in the Crimea” and to drive him into the “Crimean bottle.”
In September 1920, the Wrangelites were defeated by the Reds near Kakhovka. On the night of September 8, the Red Army launched a general offensive, the goal of which was to capture Perekop and Chongar and break through to Crimea.
Attack of Perekop positions.
The battle began on November 8 at dawn on the approaches to the Lithuanian Peninsula. Having crossed the Sivash at night, the vanguards of the 52nd and 15th rifle divisions approached unnoticed 1 km to the Lithuanian Peninsula. Here they were already discovered by the enemy and got involved in a battle for the northern exits of this peninsula. By 7 o'clock the Red Army soldiers had overcome the resistance of the Kuban White Brigade and occupied the entire northern part of the peninsula. At about 8 o'clock the Reds occupied the entire Lithuanian peninsula.
By 10 o'clock, the Whites brought the nearest reserves into battle and launched a counterattack with the Drozdovskaya brigade from Karadzhanai, and with units of the II Corps from Karpova Balka to the southern exits from the peninsula. The counterattack was initially successful, parts of the Reds were pushed back, but then the Reds restored the position. The Turkish Wall, which was the basis of the line of fortifications, found itself under a decisive threat from the rear.
In the morning, due to thick fog, the artillery could not begin artillery preparation. Only at 9 o'clock the artillery preparation began. By 13:00, units of the 51st Infantry Division tried to advance to the wire barriers, but the White fire system was unbroken. Artillery preparation was extended by an hour. Meanwhile, by 1 p.m. the artillery began to feel a shortage of shells. The firing calculation was made before 12 o'clock, but it took much longer to shoot, and it turned out to be impossible to transport shells due to the completely open rear. Units of the 15th and 52nd Infantry Divisions were pushed back by a white counterattack, and in their rear areas the rising waters in Sivash became visible (they crossed the Sivash at low tide).
At 1 p.m. 25 min. units of the 51st Division were ordered to "simultaneously and immediately attack the Turkish Wall." At 1 p.m. 35 min. parts of the division went on the offensive, but were repulsed by destructive machine-gun and artillery fire.
Around 10 p.m. The attackers managed to overcome the wire fences and get to the ditch, but here, in front of the wire running along the outer slope of the ditch, the attack again floundered, despite the exceptional heroism of the Red Army soldiers. Some regiments suffered up to 60% losses.
The Red Command gathered at dawn on November 9 to resume the attack along the entire front. All orders for this decision have been made. But the enemy assessed the situation differently: on the night of November 8-9, he hastily retreated to his Ishun positions. His departure was discovered by the Red units only on the morning of November 9. The Turkish rampart was taken, but the enemy still left, although broken, but not defeated.
Before the battles for the isthmuses of the Crimean peninsula, the number of whites, according to the intelligence data of the reds (subsequently confirmed by battles), was 9850 bayonets, 7220 sabers.
The number of Reds (according to V. Trandafilov’s “Perekop Operation of the Red Army”) was 26,500 bayonets and sabers on the Perekop Isthmus. The Whites on the isthmus had 467 machine guns against the Reds' 487 machine guns and 128 guns against the Reds' 91 guns.
However, ideas do not become true or false depending on the availability of military equipment and military success.
In July 1919, the Southern Front was declared the main front by the Bolsheviks. Fresh units were transferred to him, and party mobilization was carried out. V. Yegoriev (a member of the Front's Revolutionary Military Council) became the commander of the front, and S. Kamenev was appointed commander-in-chief of the armed forces. The slogan “Proletarian, on horseback!” was put forward, after which Red cavalry corps appeared, and then cavalry armies. This made it possible to nullify the white advantage in cavalry. For some time the Whites still moved forward, but by the end of October a turning point in the course of the campaign appeared. The shock corps of generals Kutepov, Mamontov and Shkuro were defeated, which was the beginning of the end of Denikin’s entire army.
The cavalry corps of S. Budyonny, then deployed to the 1st Cavalry Army, struck Voronezh and moved towards Donbass. Denikin’s men, cut in two by him, retreated to Odessa and Rostov-on-Don. In January 1920, troops of the Southwestern Front under the command of A. Egorov and the Southern Front under the command of V. Shorin recaptured Ukraine, Donbass, Don and the North Caucasus. Only uncoordinated actions near Novorossiysk by M. Tukhachevsky and S. Budyonny allowed the remnants of the Volunteer Army (about 50 thousand people) to evacuate to Crimea, held by the small formations of General Ya. Slashchev. Denikin handed over overall command of the white forces in the south to General Baron P. Wrangel.
In June-August 1920, Wrangel's troops, leaving the Crimea, occupied Northern Tavria to the Dnieper and western Donbass. Thus, they provided great assistance to the Polish troops. Wrangel proposed leaving the landowner's land to the peasants and cooperation to the Ukrainian and Polish nationalists, but these measures were late and did not meet with confidence.
The end of hostilities with Poland allowed the Red Army to concentrate its main forces in the Crimean direction. In September 1920, the Southern Front (M. Frunze) was formed, which outnumbered the enemy. At the end of September - beginning of November, Wrangel made the last attempt to attack the Donbass and Right Bank Ukraine. Fighting began for Kakhovka. V. Blucher's units repulsed all the White attacks and launched a counter-offensive. In Northern Tavria alone, the Reds captured about 20 thousand people. Wrangel was locked up in Crimea. The entrance to it lay through the Perekop Isthmus, where the main line of defense ran along the 8-meter-high Turkish Wall, in front of which there was a deep ditch. Dozens of guns and machine guns guarded all approaches to it. The Lithuanian peninsula of Crimea came close to the mainland, but it could only be reached by crossing the Sivash (Rotten Sea).
On the night of November 8, 1920, several divisions of the Red Army crossed the Sivash ford, thereby diverting the White reserves. At the same time, other forces (Blücher's units and Makhno's detachments) attacked the Turkish Wall. With heavy fighting and thousands of casualties, the White positions at Perekop were broken through, and their attempts to organize resistance were unsuccessful. The Wrangel troops quickly retreated, having managed to evacuate about 150 thousand military and civilians to Turkey on French ships and taking away the remnants of the Black Sea military and merchant fleet. The last commander-in-chief of the White movement left Sevastopol on November 14. On November 15-17, the Red Army entered Sevasto-pol, Feodosia, Kerch and Yalta. Hundreds of officers who did not have time to evacuate were shot.
The capture of Crimea and the defeat of Wrangel meant the end of the largely civil war, although it continued in the Far East until 1922.
M. V. FRUNZE. IN MEMORY OF PEREKOP AND CHONGAR
The armies of the Southern Front, having successfully completed their initial task - the defeat of the enemy's living forces north of the isthmuses, by the evening of November 3, stood close to the coast of Sivash, starting from Genichesk and ending with the Khorda area.
Eager, feverish work began to prepare for the crossing of the Chongar and Perekop isthmuses and the capture of Crimea.
Since, due to the rapid advance of our armies and the lack of established new lines of communication, command and control of troops from the location of the front headquarters (Kharkov) was impossible, I, with the field headquarters and members of the RVS Comrade. Vladimirov and Smilga went to the front on November 3. I planned Melitopol as the location of the field headquarters, where we set the task of getting there as soon as possible...
As you know, Crimea is connected to the mainland by 3 points: 1) the Perekop Isthmus, which is about 8 km wide, 2) the Salkovsky and Chongarsky bridges (the first railway), which are strings of bridge structures, partly erected on a dam, up to 8 m wide and long. up to 5 km, and 3) the so-called Arabat Spit, coming from Genichesk and having a length of up to 120 km with a width of 1/2 km to 3 km.
The Perekop and Chongar isthmuses and the southern bank of the Sivash connecting them represented one common network of fortified positions erected in advance, reinforced by natural and artificial obstacles and barriers. Construction began during the period of Denikin’s Volunteer Army, these positions were improved with special attention and care by Wrangel. Both Russians and, according to our intelligence data, French military engineers who used all the experience of the imperialist war in their construction took part in their construction. Concreted gun barriers in several rows, flanking buildings and trenches located in close fire communication - all this in one general system created a fortified zone, seemingly inaccessible to attack by open force...
On the Perekop Isthmus, our units of the 6th Army, even before October 30, building on the success achieved in the battles north of the isthmuses, captured two fortified lines of defense and the city of Perekop in a raid, but were unable to advance further and lingered in front of the third, most heavily fortified line the so-called Turkish Wall (an earthen rampart several fathoms high, built during the time of Turkish rule and closing the isthmus at its narrowest point).
By the way, in the rear of this position, at a distance of 15-20 km to the south, another line of fortifications was erected, known as the Yushun positions.
On Chongar, having captured all the fortifications of the Chongar Peninsula, we stood close to the blown up Salkovsky railway bridge and the burned Chongarsky one.
Thus, when determining the direction of the main attack, it was necessary to choose between Chongar and Perekop. Since Perekop, due to its large width, opened up wider opportunities in terms of deploying troops and generally provided more convenience for maneuvering, then, naturally, our decisive blow was aimed here.
But since, on the other hand, there were very strong enemy fortifications in front of us, and, naturally, his best units were supposed to be concentrated here, the attention of the front command was turned to finding ways to overcome the enemy’s line of resistance with a blow from our left flank.
In these views, I planned a detour along the Arabat spit of the Chongar positions with a crossing to the peninsula at the mouth of the river. Salgir, which is 30 kilometers south of Genichesk.
This lateral maneuver was carried out by Field Marshal Lassi in 1732. The armies of Lassi, having deceived the Crimean Khan, who stood with his main forces at Perekop, moved along the Arabat Spit and, having crossed to the peninsula at the mouth of Salgir, went to the rear of the Khan’s troops and quickly captured the Crimea.
Our preliminary reconnaissance in the direction south of Genichesk showed that here the enemy had only weak security from horse units...
We spent November 7 and 8 at the location of units of the 6th Army. On the 8th at about 4 o'clock. day, taking with us the commander of the 6th Army, Comrade Kork, we arrived at the headquarters of the 51st division, which was entrusted with the task of storming the Perekop Wall head-on. The headquarters was in the village. Chaplinka. The mood at the headquarters and among the division commander, Comrade Blucher, was elated and at the same time somewhat nervous. Everyone recognized the absolute necessity of attempting an assault, and at the same time it was clear that such an attempt would cost considerable casualties. In this regard, the division command felt some hesitation regarding the feasibility of the order for a night assault in the coming night. In the presence of the army commander, I directly, in the most categorical form, ordered the division commander to carry out the assault...
The fire from the enemy is intensifying, individual shells hit the area of the road running along the northern bank of the Sivash, along which we are driving. A strong fire breaks out ahead and slightly to the left of us...
Developing its offensive further into the flank and rear of the enemy’s Perekop positions, the division, after its first successes, encountered stubborn resistance in the Karadzhanai area, who launched one of its best divisions, Drozdovskaya, into a counterattack, reinforced by a detachment of armored vehicles...
A very advantageous circumstance for us, which greatly facilitated the task of crossing Sivash, was a strong drop in the water level in the western part of Sivash. Thanks to the winds blowing from the west, the entire mass of water was driven to the east, and as a result, fords were formed in a number of places, although very muddy and viscous, but still allowing the movement of not only infantry, but also cavalry, and in some places even artillery. On the other hand, this point completely fell out of the calculations of the White command, which considered Sivash impassable and therefore kept relatively insignificant and, moreover, little-fired units, mainly from among the newly formed, in the areas of our crossings.
As a result of the first battles, the entire Kuban brigade of the general was surrendered to us. Fostikov, who just arrived from Feodosia...
I cannot forget the following fact: when I, at the headquarters of the 4th Army, informed the chief of the 30th Infantry Division, Comrade Gryaznov, and one of the brigade commanders who was with him, that Blucher (he, by the way, was previously Gryaznov’s commander on the Eastern Front) took Perekop, then both turned pale. A few minutes later I saw that Gryaznov and his brigade commander were no longer there, they had rolled off to their position. And a few hours later, the famous night assault by the regiments of the 30th division of the enemy’s Chongar positions began. On the morning of November 11, after a bloody battle, units of the division were already on the other side and, having overthrown the enemy, were rapidly advancing towards Dzhankoy.
This is how the fate of Crimea was decided, and with it the fate of the entire South Russian counter-revolution.
Victory, and a brilliant victory, was won along the entire line. But we got it at a high price. With the blood of 10 thousand of their best sons, the working class and peasantry paid for their final, fatal blow to the counter-revolution. The revolutionary impulse turned out to be stronger than the combined efforts of nature, technology and deadly fire.
OFFICIAL REPORT OF THE STAFF OF THE COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF OF THE RUSSIAN ARMY. No. 661.
Having made peace with Poland and thereby freeing their troops, the Bolsheviks concentrated five armies against us, placing them in three groups near Kakhovka, Nikopol and Polog. By the beginning of the offensive, their total number had reached over one hundred thousand fighters, of which a quarter were cavalry.
Having pinned down our army from the north and northeast, the Red command decided to attack our left flank with its main forces and throw a mass of cavalry from Kakhovka in the direction of Gromovka and Salkovo in order to cut off the Russian army from the isthmuses, pressing it to the Sea of Azov and opening up a free access to Crimea.
Taking into account the current situation, the Russian army made an appropriate regrouping. The main cavalry mass of the enemy, the 1st Cavalry Army with Latvian and other infantry units, numbering more than 10,000 sabers and 10,000 bayonets, fell from the Kakhovsky bridgehead to the east and southeast, sending up to 6,000 cavalry to Salkovo. Having been shielded from the north by part of our forces, we concentrated a strike group and, attacking the Red cavalry that had broken through, pressed it to Sivash. At the same time, the glorious units of General Kutepov completely destroyed two regiments of the Latvian division, captured 216 guns and a lot of machine guns, and the Don captured four regiments and captured 15 guns, many weapons and machine guns. However, the overwhelming superiority of forces, especially cavalry, brought by the enemy to the battlefield in the amount of up to 25,000 horses, which attacked the army from three sides for five days, forced the Commander-in-Chief to decide to withdraw the army to the previously fortified Sivash-Perekop position, which provided all the benefits of defense . The continuous blows delivered by our army in the past battles, accompanied by the destruction of a significant part of Budyonny’s cavalry that broke through to our rear, gave the army the opportunity to retreat to a fortified position almost without losses.
ORDER OF THE RULER OF THE SOUTH OF RUSSIA AND THE COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF OF THE RUSSIAN ARMY
Russian people. Left alone in the fight against the rapists, the Russian army is waging an unequal battle, defending the last piece of Russian land where law and truth exist. Conscious of the responsibility that lies with me, I am obliged to anticipate all contingencies in advance. By my order, we have already begun evacuating and boarding ships in the ports of Crimea of all those who shared the way of the cross with the army, the families of military personnel, officials of the civil department, with their families, and individuals who might be in danger if the enemy came. The army will cover the landing, remembering that the ships necessary for its evacuation are also in full readiness in the ports, according to the established schedule. To fulfill the duty to the army and the population, everything within the limits of human power has been done. Our further paths are full of uncertainty. We have no other land except Crimea. There is no state treasury either. Frankly, as always, I warn everyone about what awaits them.
May the Lord grant everyone strength and intelligence to overcome and survive the Russian hard times.
General Wrangel.
FROM THE MEMORIES OF P. N. WRANGEL
I headed towards the boat. The crowd waved handkerchiefs and many cried. A young girl came up. She, sobbing, pressed the handkerchief to her lips:
- May God bless you, Your Excellency. God bless you.
- Thank you, why are you staying?
- Yes, I have a sick mother, I can’t leave her.
- May God grant you happiness too.
A group of city government representatives approached; I was surprised to recognize some of the most prominent representatives of the opposition public.
“You said it right, Your Excellency, you can walk with your head held high, in the consciousness of your duty accomplished.” Let me wish you a safe journey.
I shook hands, thanked...
Suddenly, the head of the American mission, Admiral McCauley, who was present there, approached. He shook my hand for a long time.
— I have always been a fan of your work and more than ever I am today.
The outposts sank. At 2 hours 40 minutes my boat left the pier and headed towards the cruiser General Kornilov, on which my flag flew up. “Hurrah” sounded from the loaded ships.
"General Kornilov" weighed anchor.
The ships, one after another, went to sea. Everything that barely floated on the water abandoned the shores of Crimea. There are several unusable ships left in Sevastopol, two old gunboats “Terets” and “Kubanets”, an old transport “Danube”, steam schooners “Altai” and “Volga” blown up by mines in the Sea of Azov and old military ships with damaged mechanisms, even unusable for transporting people. Everything else was used. We anchored at Streletskaya Bay and stayed here until two and a half o'clock in the morning, waiting for the last people to load in Streletskaya Bay and all the ships to go to sea, after which, weighing anchor, we went to Yalta, where we arrived on November 2 at nine o'clock morning.
Around noon, the transports with the troops left. The ships, surrounded by people, passed by, and “Hurray” thundered. Great is the Russian spirit and vast is the Russian soul... At two o'clock in the afternoon we took off and went to Feodosia. We were followed by Admiral Dumesnil on the cruiser Waldeck-Rousseau, accompanied by a destroyer. Soon we met a huge transport “Don”, and “hurray” came from there. Hats flashed. General Fostikov and his Kuban men were on the transport. I ordered the boat to be lowered and went to the Don. In Feodosia, loading was less successful. According to General Fostikov, the tonnage was not enough and the 1st Kuban division of General Deinega, without having time to dive, went to Kerch. General Fostikov's report raised doubts about the diligence he showed. Returning to the cruiser General Kornilov, I sent a radio telegram to General Abramov in Kerch, ordering him to wait and load the Kuban ships at all costs.
At two o'clock in the afternoon, "Waldeck-Rousseau" weighed anchor, firing a 21-shot salute - the last salute to the Russian flag in Russian waters... "General Kornilov" responded.
Soon a radio was received from Captain 1st Rank Mashukov: “The landing is complete, every last soldier has been taken. I’m bringing General Kusonsky to report to the commander-in-chief. I'm going to connect. Nashtaflot." — At 3:40 a.m. “Gaydamak” returned. The landing went well. Troops from barges were reloaded onto the Rossiya. The ships went to sea. (On 126 ships, 145,693 people were transported, not counting the ship’s crews. With the exception of the destroyer Zhivoy, which was lost in a storm, all ships arrived safely in Constantinople).
Night has fallen. The stars shone brightly in the dark sky and the sea sparkled.
The single lights of the native shore dimmed and died. The last one has gone out...
Assault on Perekop
“The decisive battle in Northern Tavria ended. The enemy captured the entire territory captured from him during the summer. Large military booty fell into his hands: 5 armored trains, 18 guns, about 100 wagons with shells, 10 million cartridges, 25 locomotives, trains with food and quartermaster's property and about two million poods of grain in Melitopol and Genichesk. Our units suffered severe losses in killed, wounded and frostbitten. A significant number were left behind as prisoners and stragglers, mainly from among the former Red Army soldiers brought into service at different times. There were isolated cases and mass surrender. So one of the battalions of the Drozdovsky division surrendered entirely. However, the army remained intact and our units, in turn, captured 15 guns, about 2000 prisoners, many weapons and machine guns.
The army remained intact, but its combat effectiveness was no longer the same. Could this army, relying on a fortified position, withstand enemy attacks? Over six months of hard work, fortifications were created that made the enemy’s access to Crimea extremely difficult: trenches were dug, wire was woven, heavy guns were installed, and machine-gun nests were built. All technical means of the Sevastopol fortress were used. The completed railway line to Yushun made it possible to fire at the approaches with armored trains. Only dugouts, shelters and dugouts for the troops were not completed. The lack of labor and the lack of forest materials slowed down the work. The frosts that arrived at an unprecedentedly early time created especially unfavorable conditions, since the defense line lay in a sparsely populated area and the housing problem for the troops became especially acute.
Even in the first days after the conclusion of peace with the Poles, having decided to take the battle in Northern Tavria, I took into account the possibility of an unfavorable outcome for us and that the enemy, having won, would burst into Crimea on the shoulders of our troops. No matter how strong a position is, it will inevitably fall if the spirit of the troops defending it is undermined.
I then ordered General Shatilov to check the evacuation plan drawn up by the headquarters, together with the fleet commander. The latter was designed to evacuate 60,000 people. I ordered that calculations be made for 75,000; ordered the urgent delivery of the missing supply of coal and oil from Constantinople.
As soon as it became clear that our departure to the Crimea was inevitable, I ordered the urgent preparation of ships in the ports of Kerch, Feodosia and Yalta for 13,000 people and 4,000 horses. The assignment was explained by the supposed landing in the Odessa area to establish contact with Russian units operating in Ukraine. In order to completely conceal my assumptions, all measures were taken to ensure that the version about the preparation of ships for a future landing operation was believed. Thus, the headquarters was ordered to spread rumors that a landing was planned for Kuban. The very size of the detachment was planned in accordance with the total number of troops, so it could not arouse any special doubts in those even knowledgeable about the size of the army. The ships were ordered to load food and military supplies.
Thus, having a certain amount of free tonnage in the Sevastopol port, in case of an accident, I could quickly load 40-50 thousand people in the main ports - Sevastopol, Yalta, Feodosia and Kerch and, under the cover of retreating troops, save those under their protection women, children, wounded and sick” - this is how Wrangel assessed the situation that had developed by the time the Reds reached Perekop.
Back on September 21, 1920, by order of the Revolutionary Military Council, the Southern Front was formed, headed by M.V. Frunze. The new front included the 6th (formed from the Right Bank Group), 13th and 2nd Cavalry Armies. At the same time, the 12th and 1st Cavalry Armies were transferred to the Southwestern Front, and the latter was preparing to be transferred to the Southern Front.
In October 1920, the Reds concluded the Starobel Agreement with Nestor Makhno. Makhno received “some internal autonomy” and the right to recruit into his army on the territory of Soviet Russia. All units of the Makhnovist army were operationally subordinate to the Southern Front. Now a number of incompetent authors have gone so far as to claim that it was the Makhnovists who took Perekop and liberated Crimea. In fact, by the beginning of 1920, Makhno had about four thousand bayonets and a thousand sabers, as well as a thousand non-combatants. They had 12 cannons and 250 machine guns.1
Wrangel chose Dzhankoy for his bet. On October 22 (November 4), the baron gave the troops a directive:
“The defense of Crimea was entrusted to General Kutepov, in whose hands the troops united; from the Sea of Azov to the Chuvash Peninsula inclusive, the 3rd Don Division was located, until it was replaced in this sector by the 34th Infantry Division, which in turn was to be replaced on the right section of the Perekop Wall by the 1st Brigade of the 2nd Kuban Division on October 24;
The 1st and 2nd Don divisions were to concentrate in reserve in the area north of Bohemka; The 3rd Don Division was supposed to be deployed to the same area after the shift;
the middle section of Sivash was defended by the Don Officer Regiment, the Ataman Junker School and dismounted rifle squadrons of the cavalry corps;
the cavalry corps with the Kuban division was ordered to concentrate in reserve in the area south of Chirik;
By October 26, the Kornilov division was supposed to replace the 13th Infantry Division on the left section of the Perekop rampart; the latter temporarily, until the arrival of the Markov division, remained in the reserve of the 1st Army Corps in the Voinka area; The Drozdov division was supposed to concentrate in the Armenian Bazaar by October 26;
The Markov Division, retreating along the Arbat Spit to Akmanai, was to be transported by rail to the Yushuni area.
Upon completion of the regrouping of all units of the 1st Army by October 29, the right combat sector from the Sea of Azov to the Chuvash Peninsula inclusive was to be defended by units of the 2nd Army Corps of General Vitkovsky; the left section, from the Chuvash Peninsula to the Perekop Bay, was transferred to the 1st Army Corps of General Pisarev.”
And that same night the baron, just in case, went to Sevastopol. As Slashchev quipped: “Closer to the water.”
On October 25 (November 7), Wrangel declared Crimea under a state of siege. In the Notes, the baron paints a rosy picture:
“The measures taken managed to dispel the emerging anxiety. The rear remained calm, believing in the inaccessibility of the Perekop strongholds. On October 26, a congress of representatives of cities opened in Simferopol, in its resolution welcoming the policy of the government of the South of Russia and expressing its readiness to help the government with all its might. A congress of press representatives was being prepared for October 30th in Sevastopol. Life went on as usual. Shops were trading briskly. The theaters and cinemas were full.
On October 25, the Kornilov Union organized a charity concert and evening. Having drowned out the painful anxiety in my heart, I accepted the invitation. My absence at the evening organized by the union of the regiment, on whose lists I was a member, could give rise to alarming explanations. I stayed at the evening until 11 o’clock, listening and not hearing musical numbers, straining every effort to find a kind word to the wounded officer, a courtesy to the lady manager...”
In mid-October, Wrangel, having examined the Perekop fortifications, smugly declared to the foreign representatives who were with him: “Much has been done, much remains to be done, but Crimea is already impregnable for the enemy.”
Alas, the baron was wishful thinking. The construction of fortifications at the Perekop-Sivash position was led by General Ya.D. Yuzefovich. Then he was replaced by General Makeev, who was the head of work on the fortifications of the Perekop Isthmus. Back in July 1920, Makeev in a report addressed to Wrangel’s assistant, General P.N. Shatilov reported that almost all capital work to strengthen Perekop is carried out mainly on paper, since building materials are supplied “in pharmaceutical doses.” There were practically no dugouts or dugouts where troops could take refuge in the autumn-winter period on the isthmus.
The head of the French military mission, General A. Brousseau, who inspected the Chongar fortifications from November 6 to 11 (NS), wrote in a report to the French Minister of War: “... the program allowed me to visit the location of the Cossack division in Taganash and three batteries located near the railway bridge via Sivash. These are the following batteries:
Two 10-inch guns east of the railroad;
Two old-style field guns on the very bank of the Sivash;
The 152 mm Kane guns are slightly behind the previous ones.
These batteries seemed to me to be very well equipped, but little suited, with the exception of field guns, to the role which the troops were to play in the coming battles. The 10-inch battery had concrete shelters and consisted of at least 15 officers among its personnel. Her fire was well prepared and could fit well into the entire organization of artillery fire, in which the defense of positions at close range would be carried out by field guns. But these were precisely the guns that were missing! Fire support for the infantry was also poorly organized. On the bank of the Sivash, near the stone embankment of the railway, there were approximately up to a company of personnel; the nearest military units were located five miles from there, in Taganash. In response to the remark I made, they answered that the lack of equipped positions forced the troops to be withdrawn to places where they could get shelter from the cold.
It must be agreed that the temperature remained very low in early December, that the soldiers were very poorly dressed, and that there was a shortage of firewood in the area.
The terrain otherwise made the defense easier, despite the poor disposition of the troops. From this point of view, Crimea is connected to the continent only through a dam and a railway bridge (the bridge was blown up). Of course, there are fords across Sivash, but the shore is a clay mountain with peaks 10 to 20 meters high, absolutely insurmountable.
In the division that I saw in Taganash, there was no confidence in victory. The commander-in-chief told me that the Cossacks were not suitable for this trench warfare and that it was better to take them to the rear and reorganize them into more serious units. The division's personnel had the same number of fighters in the rear as on the front line.
Meanwhile, I crossed three lines of defense established in the rear of Sivash; the first two of them were an insignificant network of fortifications, the third line was a little more serious, but they were all located in one line, without flanking positions, on the slopes facing the enemy, or on the very crest of the hill, too close to each other (from 500 to 800 m) and did not have any trenches in depth."
Soviet military historians significantly exaggerated the power of the enemy fortifications. Nevertheless, I think it is worth citing their opinion. Moreover, the question of defense capabilities on the isthmus is very important, and not so much for the Civil War as for the Great Patriotic War.
“The main line of defense of the Perekop positions was created on an artificially poured ancient Turkish rampart, which had a width at the base of over 15 m and a height of 8 m and crossed the isthmus from southwest to northeast. The length of the shaft reached 11 km. The rampart was equipped with strong shelters, trenches, machine gun nests, as well as firing positions for light guns for direct fire. In front of the rampart there was a ditch 20-30 m wide and 10 m deep. A wire fence with 5-6 rows of stakes was installed along the entire length in front of the fortified position. All approaches to the wire fences and the ditch were flanked by machine-gun fire.
The second line of fortifications on the Perekop Isthmus ran northwest of Ishun, 20-25 km southeast and south of the Turkish Wall. At this position, 4-6 lines of trenches with wire fences and long-term defensive structures were built.
Behind the Ishun positions there was long-range enemy artillery, capable of keeping the entire depth of the defense under fire. The artillery density at the Perekop positions was 6-7 guns per 1 km of front. There were about 170 guns at the Ishun positions, which were reinforced by artillery fire from 20 ships from the sea.
The positions of the Lithuanian Peninsula were not completely completed. They consisted of trenches and in some areas had wire fences.
The Chongar fortifications were even more impregnable, since the Chongar Peninsula itself is connected to the Crimea by a narrow dam several meters wide, and the Sivash railway and Chongar highway bridges were destroyed by the Whites.
On the Taganash Peninsula, the enemy created two fortified lines, and on Tyup-Dzhankoysky - six fortified lines. All fortified lines consisted of a system of trenches (in a number of areas connected into continuous trenches), machine-gun nests and dugouts for sheltering manpower. Wire fences were built in all areas. On the Arabat Strelka, the enemy prepared six fortified lines that crossed the spit along the front. The Chongar Isthmus and the Arabat Spit had a small width, which made it difficult for the attacking troops to maneuver and created advantages for the defenders. Chongar positions were reinforced with a large amount of artillery, armored trains and other equipment.”2
Indeed, white armored trains played an important role in the defense of Crimea. By 1914, only one railway line, Salkovo - Dzhankoy, led to Crimea, passing through the Chongar Peninsula and Sivash. In 1916, the Sarabuz-Evpatoria line was put into operation. And in 1920, the Whites completed the construction of the Dzhankoy - Armyansk branch in order to be able to deliver equipment and troops to Perekop. It is clear that this was not enough. It was necessary to build several rolling railways near the isthmus for the transfer of troops and the operation of armored trains.
Exactly how many guns there were at the Perekop-Sivash position is not available in the historical literature; I was not able to find them in the archives. True, I found a file about the removal of heavy White guns from Perekop positions at the end of 1924. There we were talking about three 203-mm English howitzers MK VI, eight 152/45-mm Kane guns, two 152-mm fortress guns of 190 pounds3 and four 127 mm English guns.
I will outline the Reds’ plan for capturing the Crimean Isthmus according to the Soviet official closed publication “History of Domestic Artillery”: “Planning the operation to defeat Wrangel in Crimea, M.V. Frunze based it on a historical example. Using it, he planned to bypass the enemy's Chongar positions along the Arabat Spit with crossing Sivash at the mouth of the Salgir River. “This maneuver to the side,” wrote M.V. Frunze, “was carried out by Field Marshal Lassi in 1737. Lassi’s armies, having deceived the Crimean Khan, who stood with his main forces at Perekop, moved along the Arabat Spit and, having crossed to the peninsula at the mouth Salgir, went to the rear of the khan’s troops and quickly captured Crimea.”
Preliminary reconnaissance showed that the enemy had a relatively weak defense on the Arabat Spit, and the eastern coast of the peninsula was guarded only by horse patrols.
For the safe movement of troops along the Arabat Spit, it was necessary to ensure an operation from the Sea of Azov, where a flotilla of small enemy vessels was operating. This task was assigned to the Azov flotilla, located in Taganrog. However, the Azov flotilla, due to the ice that bound Taganrog Bay in early November, was unable to arrive in the Genichesk area. Therefore, Frunze abandoned the original plan of using the Arabat Spit for the main attack and made a new decision. New decision by M.V. Frunze's conclusion was that the 6th Army should, no later than November 8, with the forces of the 15th and 52nd rifle divisions, the 153rd brigade of the 51st division and a separate cavalry brigade, cross the Sivash in the Vladimirovka, Stroganovka, Cape Kugaran section and strike a blow to the rear of the enemy occupying the Perekop fortifications. At the same time, the 51st Division was supposed to attack the Perekop positions from the front. To develop success, the 1st and 2nd Cavalry Armies were brought up to the Perekop direction. The start of the operation was scheduled for the night of November 7–8.
The troops of the 4th Army were supposed to break through the Chongar fortifications.
Thus, the troops of the Southern Front struck in two directions with a concentration of forces on the right wing of the front, where the main task of the operation was being solved...
The strike group of the 6th Army, intended to cross Sivash and bypass the Perekop fortifications, concentrated 36 light guns of the 52nd division. This gave triple superiority over the artillery of the Kuban-Astrakhan brigade of General Fostikov, which occupied the Lithuanian Peninsula and had only 12 guns.
For direct artillery support of the first echelon of troops that were supposed to cross Sivash, two escort platoons were allocated from the 1st and 2nd divisions of the 52nd Infantry Division. These platoons, to assist them in moving through Sivash, received half a company of riflemen each. The rest of the artillery of the strike group occupied firing positions in the area of Vladimirovka and Stroganovka with the task of supporting the infantry advance with battery fire from the northern bank of Sivash. After the strike group captured the 1st line of fortifications of the Lithuanian Peninsula, it was planned to move the 1st and 2nd divisions to the peninsula: the 3rd division was supposed to support the infantry advance from its previous positions and cover the retreat of the strike group in case the crossing failed.
The 51st Rifle Division, operating against the Perekop positions, was reinforced by the artillery of the 15th Division and had 55 guns, which were united in the hands of the chief of artillery of the 51st Division V.A. Budilovich and are reduced to four groups: right, middle, left and anti-battery.
The first group, consisting of twelve light and three heavy guns under the command of the commander of the 2nd division of the 51st division, had the task of ensuring a breakthrough by the 152nd brigade of the 51st division of the Perekop fortifications.
The middle group, consisting of ten light and four heavy guns, also had the task of ensuring a breakthrough by the 152nd brigade of the Perekop fortifications and therefore it was subordinate to the commander of the right artillery group. Consequently, the right and middle groups actually constituted one group of 29 guns, which had a single mission and a common command.
The left group, consisting of twelve light and seven heavy guns, had the task of ensuring a breakthrough of the Perekop positions by the shock and fire brigade of the 51st division.
The anti-battery group consisted of seven guns (42 mm - two and 120 mm - five) and had the task of fighting artillery and suppressing enemy reserves."4
From these very unconvincing quotes it follows that the Reds had seventy 76-mm field guns for the assault5. In addition, Frunze had as many as twenty-one “heavy guns”. Of the latter, the most powerful were the 107-mm guns mod. 1910, 120 mm French guns mod. 1878 and 152-mm howitzers mod. 1909 and 1910
Under the Tsar Father, 107-mm cannons and 152-mm howitzers were considered heavy field artillery and were intended to destroy light field (earthen) fortifications. French guns were more of a museum value than a combat one.
The Southern Front did not have more powerful guns. In the deep rear of the Reds, several guns of high and special power were stored in warehouses, inherited from the royal TAON (special purpose heavy artillery corps). But by November 1920, they were in a deplorable technical condition; there were no trained crews or means of propulsion for them. Only by March 24, 1923, the Reds with difficulty managed to introduce eight 280-mm Schneider howitzers and three 305-mm howitzers mod. 1915
With the available artillery, Frunze could still win a battle in an open field against Wrangel’s troops or the Poles. But the assault on well-fortified positions was doomed to failure. 19 years later, the Red Army stormed the relatively well-defended Mannerheim Line and suffered huge losses due to the disdainful attitude of incompetent strategists like Tukhachevsky and Pavlunovsky towards special-power artillery.
On the Karelian Isthmus, even the powerful 203-mm B-4 howitzers could not penetrate the Finnish pillboxes. Four years later, in the summer of 1944, 305-mm howitzers coped with them perfectly.
So what happens? “Red Eagles” accomplished an inhuman feat by capturing the Crimean Isthmus? Yes, indeed, many heroic deeds were accomplished on both sides. But in general, the Reds fought with an enemy programmed to flee, and most importantly, the “Wrangel Line” turned out to be a “Potemkin village.” Our baron’s classmate and drinking buddy, Baron Mannerheim, turned out to be much smarter. But in “Notes” Wrangel will shamelessly lie when speaking about the fight at Perekop: “The Reds concentrated colossal artillery, which provided powerful support to their units.” By this time, the Soviet “Agitprom” had begun to fabricate legends and myths about the storming of Perekop.
So how did the assault on Perekop take place?
On the night of November 8, in difficult weather conditions - with strong winds and frost of 11-12 degrees - the strike group of the 6th Army (153rd, 52nd and 15th rifle divisions) crossed the seven-kilometer water barrier - Sivash. On the afternoon of November 8, the 51st Division, which attacked the Turkish Wall head-on, was driven back with heavy losses.
The next day, the Reds resumed their assault on the Turkish Wall, and at the same time the strike group of the 6th Army captured the Lithuanian Peninsula. White's defense was completely broken.
In the battles for Crimea, I wanted to particularly focus on the actions of the fleet and armored trains. The 3rd detachment of the Black Sea Fleet was introduced into Kartinitsky Bay. The detachment included: the minelayer “Bug”, on which the detachment commander, Captain 2nd Rank V.V., held the flag. Wilken, gunboat "Alma", messenger ship "Ataman Kaledin" (former tugboat "Gorgipia") and four floating batteries.
Floating batteries (former barges), armed with five 130-152 mm guns, took up positions at Kara-Kazak to support troops in the Ishun positions. Already during the first attempt of the Reds to break into the Crimea, the B-4 floating battery helped repulse their attacks with its rapid fire. On the night of November 8, 1920, the red units crossed the Sivash and approached the Ishun positions. On November 9 and 10, the floating batteries and the gunboat Alma, receiving target designations and adjustments by telephone, fired intensely at the advancing enemy. The movements of the ships and partly the shooting were hampered by a northeast storm, and the bay was covered with a 12-centimeter layer of ice. Despite the unfavorable conditions, the fire from the ships was effective, and units of the Red 6th Army suffered losses from flanking fire from Karkinitsky Bay.
On the night of November 11, the Yishun positions were abandoned by the Whites, but the ships remained in their positions and bombarded the Yishun station in the morning. On the afternoon of November 11, a detachment of ships received orders to go to Yevpatoria, but due to dense ice, the floating batteries could no longer move from their positions.
The next morning, November 12, the detachment entered dense fog, and due to an error in timing at 9:40 a.m. four miles from Ak-Mechet, the minelayer "Bug" ran aground. It was not possible to refloat the minesail with the help of tugs, and on the night of November 13, the crew was removed from it, and the ship itself was rendered unusable.
Armored trains played an important role in the struggle for Crimea. By October 1920, the Reds at Perekop had 17 armored trains, but used only part of them. Armored trains were running in the area of the Salkovo station, fortunately the bridge over the Sivash was blown up by the Whites and the tracks were dismantled. So the Red armored trains never managed to break into Crimea.
Nevertheless, the heavy armored trains of the Reds provided significant support to the units advancing on the Chongar Peninsula. The most powerful armored train of the Reds was armored train No. 84, built at the end of 1919 - beginning of 1920 in Sormovo. It consisted of two armored platforms with 203-mm naval guns, created on the basis of a 16-axle and 12-axle platform. Armored train No. 4 “Kommunar”, which included 4 armored platforms, was also active. On one of them there was a 152-mm howitzer, and on the others - one 107-mm cannon mod. 1910
White armored trains were much more active. The light armored train “St. George the Victorious” (formed on July 27, 1919 in Yekaterinodar) was on the Ishun branch (Dzhankoy - Armyansk line) from October 12 to October 26, 1920. The armored train "Dmitry Donskoy" arrived on October 26 at the Ishun position under the command of Colonel Podoprigor and fought against the advancing Reds together with units of the Markov and Drozdov divisions.
At dawn on October 27, the armored train “St. George the Victorious” moved to Armyansk, north of Ishuni, already occupied by the Reds. There he found himself among the advancing units of the red cavalry. The cavalrymen, supported by artillery fire and armored vehicles, attacked the armored train with several lavas and surrounded it. The armored train hit the attackers with artillery and machine-gun fire at point-blank range. The Red Army suffered heavy losses, but did not stop attacks. The Reds' mounted patrol tried to blow up the railway track on the armored train's retreat route, but was destroyed by machine-gun fire from the armored train. At this time, "St. George the Victorious" came under fire from a three-inch Soviet battery. As a result of being hit by a shell, the boiler of the locomotive was damaged and the officer and mechanic were shell-shocked.
With the engine fading, the armored train slowly moved back, without stopping the battle with the Red battery and cavalry. At the northern points of the siding, the damaged locomotive died out. Before darkness fell, the armored train, unable to maneuver, nevertheless drove back the attacking enemy with its fire. In the evening, a serviceable locomotive arrived and took the combat personnel of the armored train to the Yishun station.
During the battle on October 27, the head gun of the armored train “Dmitry Donskoy” was smashed, one officer was wounded and one volunteer was killed.
On October 28, the armored train “St. George the Victorious” entered position with an unarmored locomotive. The Reds advanced in large forces, occupying two lines of trenches and pursuing the retreating white units. The armored train suddenly crashed into the thick lines of the Reds and shot them with machine-gun and grapeshot fire from a distance of up to 50 steps. The Reds showered the white armored train with bullets and rushed to attack it with unprecedented tenacity, but, having suffered huge losses, they began to retreat, and “St. George the Victorious” pursued them. This allowed the white infantry to launch a counterattack.
Meanwhile, the armored train that had advanced was again attacked by fresh infantry forces. A chain of Reds lay down near the railway track. On the armored train, 4 soldiers and a mechanic were wounded and the only working injector on the locomotive was broken, as a result of which the water supply to the boiler stopped. But the armored train nevertheless threw back the Red chains with its fire, inflicting heavy losses on them. After the arrival of the white armored car "Gundorovets", "St. George the Victorious" managed to withdraw with the dying locomotive to the Yishun station.
Meanwhile, the White command learned that the Reds were preparing an invasion of Crimea by their other troops from the northeast, along the main railway line laid along a dam near the Sivash station. The heavy armored train "United Russia" (new, built in Crimea) was on October 28 at the Sivashsky bridge in the area of the 134th Feodosia infantry regiment and was exchanging fire with Red units.
The light armored train "Officer" arrived on the morning of October 28 at the Dzhankoy junction station. By order of the chief of staff of the 1st Corps, he went from there to the Taganash station, about 20 versts from the Dzhankoy station, to participate in the defense of the Sivash positions.
On October 29, at 9 a.m., the “Officer” entered the Sivash dam consisting of one armored platform with two 3-inch cannons, one platform with a 75-mm cannon, and an unarmored locomotive. Despite the fire from the Red batteries standing in shelter on the opposite bank, the “Officer” moved towards the bridge. When the armored train was 320 meters from the bridge, a landmine exploded under its second safety platform. The explosion tore out a piece of rail about 60 cm long. By inertia, one armored platform and the tender of a steam locomotive passed through the exploded area. The stopped armored train partially killed and dispersed the Reds who were at the blown-up bridge with grapeshot and machine-gun fire. Then the “Officer” opened fire on the positions of the Red artillery, which continued to fire at him.
Despite the damaged tracks, the "Officer" managed to return to his trenches. There he remained until one o'clock in the afternoon, maneuvering under fire from enemy guns. After this, on the orders of the head of the armored train group, Colonel Lebedev, the “Officer” went to Taganash station.
At this time, units of the Reds broke through the Chongar Peninsula and launched an offensive from the east, bypassing the Taganash station. The armored train "Officer" fired at their columns advancing from the direction of the village of Abaz-kirk. By the fire of white armored trains (including the heavy armored train "United Russia"), as well as positional and field artillery, the Reds, who attacked in large forces, were stopped in the evening south of the village of Tyup-Dzhankoy. Until dark, the armored train "Officer" remained at Taganash station.
On the evening of October 29, the “Officer” again went to the Sivash dam, but soon returned back and met with the “United Russia” armored train. Then both armored trains moved towards the dam. “United Russia” walked behind “Officer” at a distance of just over 200 meters. Not reaching 500 meters from the line of the Whites' forward trenches, Captain Labovich stopped the "Officer" armored train, as he received a warning from an officer of the Feodosia Regiment, who was passing along the railroad bed at that time, that the Reds were apparently preparing to undermine the track, as they could hear hitting the rails with a pickaxe. The “officer” began to slowly retreat to discover the digging site.
Suddenly there was an explosion from behind. The explosion occurred under the safety platforms of the United Russia armored train following behind. Two safety platforms flew into the air. "United Russia" was thrown back along the rails at a distance of about half a mile. The rear platform with the 75-mm cannon of the “Officer” armored train, which did not have time to brake, fell into the hole formed by the explosion. The "officer" stopped. Then, in complete darkness, the Reds opened fire from seven machine guns, stationed mainly on the left side of the railway track.
The United Russia armored train returned fire. On the "Officer" armored train, two guns could not fire: the rear 75-mm gun could not fire due to the inclined position of the combat platform, which had fallen into a hole, and the middle three-inch gun did not have a sufficient number of crew numbers. Thus, the "Officer" opened fire with only one main three-inch gun and all machine guns.
A few minutes later, the Reds, and these were soldiers of the 264th regiment of the 30th division, launched an attack on the armored train. With shouts of “hurray,” they began throwing grenades at the “Officer’s” armored platform. However, there the team had already fled to the armored train “United Russia”, which went to the rear to the Taganash station.
On the same day, October 29, from 7 o’clock in the morning, the armored trains “Dmitry Donskoy” and “St. George the Victorious”, located on the Ishun branch, entered into battle with the advancing Soviet units and restrained the enemy’s advance from Karpova Balka. Around noon, the armored train "Dmitry Donskoy" was hit. Its armored platforms were so seriously damaged that the armored train could not continue the battle and retreated towards the Dzhankoy junction station.
The armored train "St. George the Victorious" was left alone. However, he managed to hold back the advance of the Red units until the retreating White troops reached the great Simferopol road. Then “St. George the Victorious” withdrew to the Yishun station and from there repelled the attacks of the red cavalry, which tried to begin the pursuit of the white units.
When the armored train “St. George the Victorious” was leaving, one of its safety platforms came off the rails. Late in the evening, about two miles from the Dzhankoy junction station, a collision occurred between the armored trains “St. George the Victorious” and “Dmitry Donskoy”. The armored platforms were not damaged, and only the reserve car of the armored train “St. George the Victorious” and three workshop cars that were attached to the armored train “Dmitry Donskoy” derailed.
Apparently, on the same night, the armored train “Ioann Kalita”6 passed through the Dzhankoy station to Kerch, with the task of covering the withdrawal of units of the Don Corps towards Kerch.
On the morning of October 30, the armored train "St. George the Victorious", having joined one of the combat platforms of the armored train "United Russia", moved together with the reserve from the Dzhankoy station towards Simferopol. About 5 versts south of Dzhankoy, the reserve armored train was abandoned, as it turned out that its locomotive did not have time to receive supplies.
The United Russia armored train was the last to leave the Taganash station. When United Russia approached the Dzhankoy station, it had to stop and wait for the damaged track to be repaired. “United Russia” moved on when part of the city of Dzhankoy was already occupied by the Reds. At the siding south of the Dzhankoy station, the armored trains “St. George the Victorious” and “United Russia” connected and moved on as a united train.
At about 2 o'clock in the afternoon on October 30, the armored trains approached the Kurman-Kemelchi station, which is 25 versts south of the Dzhankoy station. At this time, the red cavalry unexpectedly appeared, coming from the Ishun positions, bypassing the retreating white troops. The united white armored trains opened fire on the advancing cavalry, drove them back and gave the white units the opportunity to move on in order.
During their further movement towards Simferopol, the connected white armored trains were blocked by an obstacle made of stones and sleepers piled on the rails. A four-gun battery of the Reds opened fire on the armored trains, and their cavalry was a thousand paces from the railway track.
The red cavalrymen moved to attack the white armored trains, but were driven back with heavy losses. With further withdrawal, the teams of white armored trains had to clear the path several times from sleepers and stones, which the red ones managed to throw in order to cause a crash. By nightfall, the armored train “Dmitry Donskoy” and the reserve armored train “Officer” arrived at the Simferopol station. Later, the combined armored trains “St. George the Victorious” and “United Russia” arrived in Simferopol.
At 11 o'clock on October 31, the armored train "St. George the Victorious" was the last to leave the Simferopol station. Upon arrival at the Bakhchisarai station, a locomotive was launched on its northern switches. Then, on the orders of the commander of the 1st Army, General Kutepov, the railway bridge over the Alma River was blown up and the bridge on the highway was burned. At night the order was received to depart to Sevastopol for loading onto ships.
At dawn on October 31, the armored train “Dmitry Donskoy” and the reserve armored train “Officer” approached the Sevastopol station and stopped near the first piers. It was impossible to move further, since at the turn the combat platform of the Dmitry Donskoy came off the rails and the track needed to be repaired.
Meanwhile, information was received that troops were already being loaded onto the Saratov steamer at the neighboring pier. This ship was boarded by the crew of the armored train "Grozny", which, before landing, rendered the guns that had just been repaired unusable and threw the locks into the sea.
At about 9 o’clock in the morning on November 1, the armored trains “St. George the Victorious” and “United Russia” reached Sevastopol, in the Kilen Bay area. Along the way, the material on the armored platforms was damaged. At about 10 o'clock the derailment was carried out so that the armored trains would not fall to the Reds in their entirety. The combat trains of the armored trains “St. George the Victorious” and “United Russia” were launched as quickly as possible towards each other.
The team of the armored train "St. George the Victorious" with six machine guns boarded the steamer "Beshtau". The team of the armored train "United Russia", which arrived on the combat unit, was also loaded onto the steamer "Beshtau". Part of the team, which was part of the reserve, was loaded earlier onto the ship "Kherson".
The heavy armored train “Ioann Kalita” arrived on November 1 in Kerch, covering the brigade marching in the rearguard of the Don Corps under the command of General Fitzkhelaurov. Since it was not allowed to blow up the combat structure of the armored train, its materiel was rendered unusable without an explosion. On the night of November 2, the crew of the armored train “Ioann Kalita” was loaded onto the floating craft “Mayak number 5”.
The armored train "Dmitry Donskoy" arrived on November 2 in Kerch, where the light armored train "Wolf" was already located. The crews of these two armored trains removed the locks from the guns and damaged the materiel on the combat sites, after which they loaded onto the ships.
General Slashchev stated: “On November 11, on Wrangel’s orders, I was at the front to see and report on his condition. The units were in complete retreat, that is, or rather, they were not units, but separate small groups; for example, in the Perekop direction 228 people and 28 guns were leaving for Simferopol, the rest was already near the ports.
The Reds did not press at all, and the retreat in this direction took place in peacetime conditions.”7
I note that this was written when Yakov Aleksandrovich was already in the service of the Reds and participants in the battles for Crimea could easily catch him in a lie.
In emigration, a number of officers spoke about mounted columns of Reds and Whites, which for a long time walked along the steppe in parallel at a distance of several kilometers from each other and did not try to attack.
Personally, I am sure that the French and Soviet commands for the second time in Crimea (the first time in April 1919) entered into a secret agreement: “... we are leaving, you do not touch us.” Naturally, it is still not profitable for either the USSR (Russia) or France to publish the text of the agreement.
The rebels attacked the rear of the Wrangel troops in the Ishuni area. They also cut off the Simferopol-Feodosia highway to the retreating Cossack units. On November 10, the underground revolutionary committee raises an uprising, the rebels capture Simferopol - three days before the arrival of the Red Army. In addition, fighters of the Crimean Insurgent Army captured the cities of Feodosia and Karasubazar (now Belogorsk). I note that the French destroyer Senegal fired at the rebels who occupied Feodosia.
Several motor boats came to the aid of the partisans from Novorossiysk to Crimea. The new landing was commanded by Ivan Papanin, already known to us. In the fall of 1920, he was taken to the mainland with secret documentation captured from the Whites and now he again found himself in the Crimean Insurgent Army.
It is curious that 20 years later, in the fall of 1941, Mokrousov again led the partisan movement in Crimea, and his closest assistant was “His Excellency’s adjutant” Makarov. The German occupiers knew about Makarov’s past adventures and distributed among the population a leaflet specially dedicated to him with the eloquent title “Chameleon.” Papanin in Crimea in 1941-1944. was not a partisan, at that time he served as the “chief of the Arctic.”
Notes
1. Kakurin N.E., Vatsetis I.I. Civil War. 1918-1921. St. Petersburg: Polygon, 2002. P. 614.
2. History of domestic artillery. T. III. Artillery of the Soviet Army before the Great Patriotic War (October 1917 - June 1941). Book 7. Soviet artillery during the years of foreign military intervention and civil war in the USSR (1917-1920), M. - L-d: Voenizdat, 1963. P. 608-609.
3. The Russian fortress artillery had 152-mm cannons of the 1877 model, weighing 190 and 120 pounds, and they were officially called that.
4. History of domestic artillery. T. III. Book 7. pp. 610-613.
5. Perhaps there were some 76-mm mountain guns mod. 1909, but the shells for them were the same as field shells, only the firing range was shorter.
6. The old armored train “Ioann Kalita” was abandoned on March 12, 1920. On its basis, red armored train No. 40 was formed. The new armored train “Ioann Kalita” was formed in the early summer of 1920 in Crimea on the basis of the 2nd battery of the 1st heavy artillery battalion.
7. Slashchev-Krymsky Ya.A. Crimea, 1920 // Civil war in Russia: defense of Crimea. P. 141.
A.B. Shirokorad
Photos of beautiful places in Crimea
Read 12988 times, written 05/04/2010 at 09:15
The storming of Perekop on November 8-10, 1920, being an event that seemed quite clear in historical terms, nevertheless gave rise to a number of myths that have been migrating from textbook to textbook for more than 75 years, from one reputable monograph to an even more reputable one. 
These myths are characterized by the following stereotypes: “The strongest fortifications made of concrete and steel, built based on the experience of the First World War under the supervision of French and English engineers who turned the Perekop Wall into a white Verdun”, “Units of the Red Army lost 10 thousand people only killed during the assault on the Perekop fortifications” .
What was it really like? The construction of Perekop fortifications was based on the experience of the civil war. There were no projects and leadership of the British and French. The construction was carried out by Russian military engineers who served in the White Army. General management was carried out by the commandant of the Sevastopol fortress, military engineer General Subbotin, his assistant in construction was the professor of the field fortification department of the Engineering Academy, General Shcheglov. Military engineer Colonel Protsenko directly supervised the construction. All these officers were participants in the Russo-Japanese and World War I and had extensive combat and military engineering experience.
The commanders of the sapper companies carrying out the construction were colonels. The companies themselves were half staffed by officers. With such a surplus of personnel, there was absolutely no need for foreign specialists. The only thing that was missing was labor, since the peasants stubbornly evaded mobilization, as well as building materials, which were rampantly plundered and sold in the rear.
Construction of the fortifications began at the end of July 1919, a month after the Whites captured Crimea, and proceeded very sluggishly until the beginning of October. On October 8, 1919, construction was stopped, as the white command expected the fall of Moscow and the final defeat of Bolshevism any day now. A few days later, the defeat actually occurred, but not of the Reds, but of the Whites, and in December 1919 the construction of fortifications was resumed again. By this time, only a line of trenches had been built in front of the rampart on the northern side of the Perekop ditch. 
In January-March 1920, when Perekop became the scene of maneuver battles between warring parties, construction work was not carried out. They resumed in April and continued until the end of October 1920. 
As a result, the main fortifications continued to be a shaft 8 kilometers long, 6 to 10 meters high, up to 10 meters wide, and the ditch itself, 8-10 meters deep and 10-20 meters wide.
Let us remember that both the ditch and the rampart were built 3 thousand years BC.
The defensive engineering structures themselves were represented by a line of trenches in front of the rampart on the northern side of the ditch and four rows of wire fences in front of them. The trenches on the rampart and in front of it were equipped with machine-gun nests and wood-earth shelters; behind the rampart there were artillery positions.
The passages through Sivash, bypassing the rampart, were practically not fortified; the matter was limited to several wire barriers, several searchlights and a dozen machine guns.
Commander of the White Guard troopsin Crimea, Lieutenant General Wrangel
The White command ignored the lessons of the assault on Perekop in April 1918 by German troops bypassing Sivash and a similar maneuver by the Red troops in April 1919.
This carelessness, or rather, disregard for the enemy, became the main reason for the loss of Perekop positions by the Whites in November 1920 (Karbyshev. “White Verdun” - magazine “Army and Revolution” - 1921 - No. 5 - pp. 52-107.).
How did the assault take place and at what cost was Perekop taken? The first to begin the operation were units of the 15th Division of the Red Army, operating around the Perekop Wall through Sivash. Three teams of foot scouts at two o'clock in the morning on November 8, 1920, along the fords across the Sivash, indicated by local residents, went to the wire fences on the coast of the Lithuanian Peninsula and began to cut the wire, but lay down under machine-gun fire.
Commander of the Southern Front of the Red Army Mikhail Vasilyevich Frunze
The operation began to drag on, and the water in Sivash was rising, flooding the fords. Decisive action was required. Therefore, the commander of the 45th brigade of the 15th rifle division went to the battlefield and raised the scouts in thick chains to attack through the wire fences.
Thanks to the soft muddy soil, the stakes of the wire barriers were torn out or knocked down, and units of the 45th Brigade poured into the resulting passage, followed by other brigades of the 15th Division. 
Painting "Transition of Red Army units through Sivash"
The second echelon went to units of the 52nd Infantry Division. By the evening of November 8, 1920, they occupied the entire Lithuanian peninsula and went to the rear of the white divisions located on the Perekopsky Val, which at that time was unsuccessfully stormed by the 51st Infantry Division.
What was happening at this time on the line of the Perkop fortifications? At 10 a.m. on November 8, 1920, the artillery of the 51st Division began artillery preparation, which lasted 4 hours.
However, the deterioration of the material part of the red artillery did not allow it to destroy not only the fortifications, but even the wire fences in front of the ditch. Therefore, having started cutting the wire at 14:00 on November 8, units of the 51st Division came under heavy machine-gun fire and retreated, suffering losses.
Artillery preparation began again, which also lasted 4 hours, and at 18:00 on November 8, the 51st Division repeated the attack, which was also repulsed.
Finally, at 20:00 on November 8, after the third attack, units of the 51st Division broke through the wire fences and occupied the line of trenches in front of the ditch and rampart, went down into the ditch, but were unable to climb the rampart. 
At midnight from November 8th to November 9th, 1920, the Whites, under the threat of a blow to the rear from the 15th and 52nd rifle divisions, withdrew their units from the rampart, leaving only cover, which was knocked down from the rampart at 2 am on November 9th The 51st division, units of which occupied Armyansk at 8 a.m. on November 9, 1920. Thus, the first, most difficult stage of the assault on the Perekop positions was completed.
Despite the ferocity of the fighting, the losses of those who stormed were relatively small. The commander of the 6th Army, August Kork, in his report “The Capture of the Perekop-Yushun positions by the troops of the 6th Army in November 1920.” - magazine "Revolutionary Army" - 1921 - No. 1 - p. 29.
claimed that the total losses of the army during the assault on Perekop amounted to 650 people killed and 4,700 wounded.
The 15th and 51st divisions suffered the greatest losses. 15th Division - 390 killed and 2900 wounded, 51st Division - 208 killed and 1300 wounded.
Konstantin Kolontaev
"Southern News":
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The biggest drama of the 20th century is the civil war in Russia. This armed struggle between various groups of the population, which lasted several years, with the active intervention of foreign forces, went through various stages and stages, taking various forms, including uprisings, rebellions, isolated clashes, large-scale military operations with the participation of regular armies, and actions of armed detachments in the rear of existing governments and government entities. (Civil War in Russia. Crossroads of Opinions. M-, 1994. P. 43.) The war was fought on fronts, the total length of which reached 8 thousand km.
The victory of the October Revolution of 1917 divided Russian society into three major forces that had different attitudes towards the new government. Soviet power was actively supported by most of the industrial and rural proletariat, the urban and rural poor (small artisans, small trade employees, etc.), some of the officers (usually lower ranks) and the intelligentsia.
The large industrial and financial bourgeoisie, landowners, a significant part of the officers, ranks of the former police and gendarmerie, and part of the highly qualified intelligentsia actively opposed it. The largest group is the wavering part, and often simply passively observing events, but continuously drawn into the class struggle by the active actions of the first two forces. These are the urban and rural petty bourgeoisie, the peasantry, the proletarian strata who wanted “civil peace,” part of the officers and a significant number of representatives of the intelligentsia. (Shevotsukov P. A. Pages of the history of the civil war: A look through the decades. M., 1992. P. 10-11.)
This division must be considered conditional. During the civil war, all these forces were closely intertwined, mixed together and scattered throughout the country. After the victory of the October armed uprising in Petrograd and Moscow and the establishment of Soviet power in Russia, the Red Guard and revolutionary detachments of sailors and soldiers eliminated individual pockets of resistance to the new government. In March 1918, the Brest-Litovsk Peace Treaty with Germany was completed. Soviet Russia emerged from the First World War.
The foreign intervention that began in the spring of 1918 contributed to the development of the civil war in Russia. Entente troops landed in Murmansk, Vladivostok, and invaded Central Asia and Transcaucasia. German troops occupied Crimea and landed in Finland and Novorossiysk. At the end of May, the mutiny of the Czechoslovak corps began. A few weeks later the Czechs took control of some cities along the Trans-Siberian Railway. The rebellion revived the activities of opponents of Soviet power. The Eastern Front was created to fight them. The white movement was gaining strength in the south of the country: the Cossacks on the Don, led by Ataman P.N. Krasnov, the Volunteer Army of General A.I. Denikin in the Kuban, the Dashnaks and Musavatists in Transcaucasia.
In 1918, the created Red Army achieved its first victories. During the offensive of the Eastern Front in September-October 1918, the Middle Volga and Kama regions were liberated. Soviet troops repelled Krasnov's attack on Tsaritsyn.
The end of the First World War intensified foreign intervention against Soviet Russia. In mid-November 1918, squadrons of French and English ships arrived in the Black Sea. Troops were landed in Novorossiysk, Odessa, and Sevastopol. With the consent of the nationalist governments, British troops entered Azerbaijan and Georgia. Help for the white movement increased. On November 18, 1918, Admiral A.V. Kolchak carried out a coup in Omsk, overthrowing the created “All-Russian Provisional Government”, and proclaimed himself the “Supreme Ruler of Russia”. At the end of 1918: launched an offensive on the northern sector of the eastern front and took Perm. But, as a result of the success of the Red Army on the southern sector of the front, Kolchak was unable to strengthen his troops and develop a further offensive. During 1918, the White Guards launched offensives against Soviet power. In March, Admiral Kolchak moved from the Urals to the Volga and achieved some success, but was defeated by the Red Army and was forced to retreat. Pursued by Soviet units and partisan detachments, Kolchak was captured and executed in Irkutsk in February 1920.
In June 1919, General Denikin, having gathered an army of 150 thousand people, launched an attack on Moscow. In September, his troops reached Voronezh, Kursk, and Orel. At this time, the troops of General N.N. Yudenich advanced from the Baltic side. This offensive, supported by Latvian and Estonian units, as well as British units, was stopped at the end of October less than 100 km from Petrograd (Bert N. History of the Soviet State. M., 1995. P. 145), Yudenich’s troops were thrown back to Estonia .
In October, the Red Army launched a counter-offensive against Denikin, and at the beginning of 1920 his army was defeated. The troops retreated to Crimea, where Denikin handed over command of the remaining army (less than 40 thousand people) to Baron P. N. Wrangel.
In April 1920, Poland began a war against Soviet Russia. The fighting on the Soviet-Polish front took place with varying degrees of success and ended with the conclusion of an armistice and preliminary peace agreement in October.
The Polish offensive reignited the fading civil war. Wrangel's units went on the offensive in Southern Ukraine. The Revolutionary Military Council of the Soviet Republic issued an order to create a Southern Front against Wrangel. As a result of heavy fighting, Soviet troops stopped the enemy.
On August 28, 1920, the Southern Front, having a significant superiority of forces over the enemy, went on the offensive and by October 31 defeated Wrangel’s forces in Northern Tavria. “Our units,” Wrangel recalled, “suffered severe losses in killed, wounded and frostbitten. A significant number were left behind as prisoners...” (White Case. The Last Commander-in-Chief. M.: Golos, 1995. P. 292.)
Soviet troops captured up to 20 thousand prisoners, more than 100 guns, many machine guns, tens of thousands of shells, up to 100 locomotives, 2 thousand carriages and other property. (Kuzmin T.V. The defeat of the interventionists and the White Guards in 1917-1920. M., 1977. P. 368.) However, the most combat-ready units of the Whites managed to escape to the Crimea, where they settled behind the Perekop and Chongar fortifications, which, according to the Vran -Gel command and foreign authorities, were impregnable positions.
Frunze assessed them as follows: “The Perekop and Chongar isthmuses and the southern bank of the Sivash connecting them represented one common network of fortified positions erected in advance, reinforced by natural and artificial obstacles and barriers. Construction began during the period of Denikin’s Volunteer Army, these positions were improved with special attention and care by Wrangel. Both Russian and French military engineers took part in their construction, using all the experience of the imperialist war in the construction.” (Frunze M.V. Selected works. M., 1950. P. 228-229.)
The main line of defense on Perekop ran along the Turkish Wall (length - up to 11 km, height 10 m and ditch depth 10 m) with 3 lines of wire barriers with 3-5 stakes in front of the ditch. The second line of defense, 20-25 km from the first, was the heavily fortified Ishun position, which had 6 lines of trenches covered with wire fences. In the Chongar direction and the Arabat Spit, up to 5-6 lines of trenches and trenches with wire barriers were created. Only the defense of the Lithuanian Peninsula was relatively weak: one line of trenches and wire fences. These fortifications, according to Wrangel, made “access to Crimea extremely difficult...”. (White Case. P. 292.)
The main group of Wrangel's troops, with a force of up to 11 thousand bayonets and sabers (including reserves), defended the Perekop Isthmus in the Chongar and Sivash sectors of the front. Wrangel's command concentrated about 2.5-3 thousand people. Over 14 thousand people were left in the reserve of the main command and were located near the isthmuses in readiness to strengthen the Perekop and Chongar directions. Part of Wrangel's troops (6-8 thousand people) fought with partisans and could not participate in the battles on the Southern Front. Thus, the total number of Wrangel’s army located in Crimea was about 25-28 thousand soldiers and officers. It had more than 200 guns, many of which were heavy, 45 armored vehicles and tanks, 14 armored trains and 45 aircraft.
The troops of the Southern Front had 146.4 thousand bayonets, 40.2 thousand sabers, 985 guns, 4435 machine guns, 57 armored vehicles, 17 armored trains and 45 aircraft. (Soviet military encyclopedia. T.6. M.: Voenizdat, 1978. P. 286). There are other data on the number and composition of Wrangel’s troops, that is, they had a significant superiority in strength over the enemy. However, they had to operate in extremely difficult conditions, breaking through the powerful layered defense of the Wrangel troops.
Initially, Frunze planned to deliver the main blow in the Chongar direction with the forces of the 4th Army (commander V.S. Lazarevich), the 1st Cavalry Army (commander S.M. Budyonny) and the 3rd Cavalry Corps (commander N.D. Kashirin) , but due to the impossibility of support from the sea by the Azov flotilla, it was moved to the Perekop direction by the forces of the 6th Army (commander A.I. Kork), 1st and 2nd (commander F.K. Mironov) Cavalry Armies. The 4th Army and the 3rd Cavalry Corps launched an auxiliary attack on Chongar.
The greatest difficulty was the assault on the Wrangel defense in the Perekop direction. The command of the Southern Front decided to attack them simultaneously from two sides: with one part of the forces - from the front, in the forehead of the Perekop positions, and the other, after crossing Sivash from the side of the Lithuanian Peninsula, - in their flank and rear. The latter was critical to the success of the operation.
On the night of November 7-8, the 15th, 52nd rifle divisions, 153rd rifle and cavalry brigade of the 51st division began crossing the Sivash. The first was the assault group of the 15th division. The movement through the “Rotten Sea” lasted about three hours and took place in the most difficult conditions. Impassable mud sucked in people and horses. Frost (up to 12-15 degrees below zero) froze wet clothes. The wheels of the guns and carts cut deep into the muddy bottom. The horses were exhausted, and often the soldiers themselves had to pull out guns and wagons with ammunition stuck in the mud.
Having completed an eight-kilometer march, Soviet units reached the northern tip of the Lithuanian Peninsula, broke through the wire fences, defeated the Kuban brigade of General M.A. Fostikov and cleared almost the entire Lithuanian Peninsula of the enemy. Units of the 15th and 52nd divisions reached the Perekop Isthmus and moved towards the Ishun positions. The counterattack launched on the morning of November 8 by the 2nd and 3rd infantry regiments of the Drozdov division was repulsed.
On the same day, the 13th and 34th Infantry Divisions of the 1st Army Corps of General V.K. Vitkovsky attacked the 15th and 52nd Infantry Divisions and, after fierce fighting, forced them to withdraw to the Lithuanian Peninsula. The Wrangel troops managed to hold the southern exits from the Lithuanian Peninsula until the night of November 8th. (History of military art. Collection of materials. Issue IV. Vol. 1. M.: Voenizdat, 1953. P. 481).
The offensive of the main forces of the 51st Division under the command of V.K. Blucher on the Turkish Wall on November 8 was repulsed by Wrangel's troops. Its parts; They lay down in front of a ditch, at the bottom of the northern slope of which there was a wire fence.
The situation in the area of the main attack of the Southern Front became more complicated. At this time, preparations were still underway in the Chongar direction for crossing Sivash. The advance of the advanced units of the 9th Infantry Division along the Arabat Spit was stopped by artillery fire from Wrangel's ships.
The command of the Southern Front is taking decisive measures to ensure the success of the operation. The 7th Cavalry Division and a group of rebel troops N.I. Makhno under the command of S. Karetnikov (ibid., p. 482) (about 7 thousand people) are crossing the Sivash to reinforce the 15th and 52nd divisions. The 16th Cavalry Division of the 2nd Cavalry Army was sent to help Soviet troops on the Lithuanian Peninsula. On the night of November 9, units of the 51st Rifle Division launched the fourth assault on the Turkish Wall, broke the resistance of the Wrangelites and captured it.
The battle moved to the Ishun positions, where the command of Wrangel's Russian Army sought to delay the Soviet troops. On the morning of November 10, stubborn battles broke out on the approaches to the positions and continued until November 11. In the sector of the 15th and 52nd rifle divisions, Wrangel tried to take the initiative into his own hands, launching a counterattack on November 10 with the forces of the horse corps of Gene I. G. Barbovich and the remnants of units of the 13th, 34th and Drozdovsky infantry divisions. They managed to push back the 15th and 52nd rifle divisions to the southwestern tip of the Lithuanian Peninsula, threatening the flank coverage of the 51st and the Latvian divisions transferred here, which approached the third line of trenches of the Ishun position.
The 16th and 7th cavalry divisions entered the battle against Barbovich's cavalry corps, stopping the enemy's cavalry and throwing it onto the fortification line.
On the night of November 11, the 30th Infantry Division (headed by N.K. Grunov) began an assault on the Chongar fortified positions and to the end; Having broken the enemy's resistance, she overcame all three lines of fortifications. Units of the division began to bypass the Ishun positions, which affected the course of the battles near the Ishun positions themselves. On the night of November 11, the last line of the Ishun fortified position was broken through by the 51st Infantry and Latvian divisions. On the morning of November 11, the 151st brigade of the 51st division successfully repelled the counterattack of the Tereko-Astrakhan brigade of the Wrangelites in the area of the Ishun station, and then the furious bayonet attack of the Kornilov and Markovites, launched on the approaches to the station. By the evening of November 11, Soviet troops broke through all the Wrangel fortifications. “The situation was becoming dangerous,” Wrangel recalled, “the hours remaining at our disposal to complete preparations for evacuation were numbered.” (White Case, p. 301.) On the night of November 12, Wrangel’s troops began to retreat everywhere to the ports of Crimea.
On November 11, 1920, Frunze, trying to avoid further bloodshed, turned to Wrangel on the radio with a proposal to stop resistance and promised amnesty to those who laid down their arms. Wrangel did not answer him. (History of the Civil War in the USSR. T.5. M.: Politizdat, 1960. P. 209.)
The red cavalry rushed through the open gates into the Crimea, pursuing the Wrangelites, who managed to break away by 1-2 marches. On November 13, units of the 1st Cavalry and 6th armies liberated Simferopol, and on the 15th - Sevastopol. The troops of the 4th Army entered Feodosia on this day. On November 16, the Red Army liberated Kerch, and on the 17th, Yalta. Within 10 days of the operation, the entire Crimea was liberated.
The victory of the Soviet troops over Wrangel was achieved at a heavy price. During the assault on Perekop and Chongar alone, the troops of the Southern Front lost 10 thousand people killed and wounded. The divisions that distinguished themselves during the assault on the Crimean fortifications were given honorary names: 15th - "Sivashskaya", 30th Infantry and 6th Cavalry - "Chongarskaya", 51st - "Perekopskaya".
The defeat of Wrangel ended the period of foreign military intervention and civil war in Soviet Russia.