IN Oloshin Lavrenty Ivanovich - commander of the 316th Temryuk Red Banner Rifle Division of the 23rd Rifle Corps of the 46th Army of the 2nd Ukrainian Front, colonel.
Born on August 10, 1897 in the city of Berezan, Kyiv province, now a city in the Kyiv region of Ukraine, in a working-class family. Ukrainian. Primary education.
Since 1916 - in the Russian Imperial Army. Served in the 9th Reserve Cavalry Regiment: private, platoon non-commissioned officer. In February 1917 he was demobilized.
In the Red Army since February 1920, by conscription. Served as platoon commander of a separate cavalry division at the headquarters of the 14th Army, head of the cavalry detachment of the Southwestern Front for the elimination of banditry, from June - platoon commander of a shock cavalry squadron in the 14th Army on the Southwestern Front, from November - head of the train security team Revolutionary Military Council of the 14th Army. Participant in the Civil War against anti-Soviet formations, troops of General A.I. Denikin and the Polish army.
In 1922 he graduated from the Omsk Higher Military School. From April 1922 - squadron commander of the 28th Cavalry Regiment of the 4th Siberian Separate Cavalry Brigade, as part of which he fought in Transbaikalia against the troops of General R.F. Ungern von Sternberg. From December 1922 - course commander of the 3rd Samara Cavalry School, from September 1924 - course commander of the United Kyiv Military School named after S.S. Kameneva. From September 1927 - assistant commander, from November 1929 - squadron commander at the Ukrainian Cavalry School named after S.M. Budyonny. From April 1931 to April 1932 - chief of staff of the 2nd cavalry regiment of the 1st cavalry division in the Ukrainian Military District. Then - at school. Member of the CPSU(b) since 1928.
In 1936 he graduated from the Military Academy of the Red Army named after M.V. Frunze. Since April 1936 - head of the military translator course at the intelligence department of the headquarters of the Transcaucasian Military District. Since November 1938 - head of the intelligence department of the headquarters of the army cavalry group of troops of the Kyiv Special Military District. In September 1939, he took part in the Red Army campaign in Western Ukraine. In the fall of 1939, he was transferred to the special missions department of the General Staff of the Red Army, and from December 1939 he was on a business trip to China, where he participated in hostilities in East Turkestan. district, front.
He returned from his business trip only in 1943. Participant of the Great Patriotic War - since July 1941, when he was appointed deputy head of the intelligence department for military intelligence and information of the Bryansk Front (from October 1, renamed the Baltic Front, from October 20 - the 2nd Baltic Front). On October 30, 1944, he was appointed commander of the 316th Infantry Division in the 46th Army of the 2nd Ukrainian Front. Participant of the Bryansk offensive operation, winter battles of 1943-1944 in the Polotsk direction, Leningrad-Novgorod, Rezhitsa-Dvina offensive operation.
Commander of the 316th Rifle Division (23rd Rifle Corps, 46th Army, 2nd Ukrainian Front) Colonel L.I. Voloshin. distinguished himself during the Budapest offensive operation. On November 21, 1944, the division under his command, with heavy fighting, crossed the Csepeli Dunaag River (another name is the “Shorokshar Danube”), seized a bridgehead and successfully continued to advance on the capital of Hungary, the city of Budapest. On November 25, the division reached the near approaches to Budapest.
On December 5, 1944, entrusted to Colonel L.I. Voloshin. The division crossed the Danube River south of Budapest and inflicted significant damage on the enemy in manpower and military equipment. During the offensive near Budapest, the division's fighters destroyed over 4,000 enemy soldiers and officers, 15 tanks and self-propelled guns, 56 field guns, and 18 mortars. About 1,000 soldiers were captured, 17 guns and an ammunition depot were captured.
On the day of the crossing, December 5, Colonel L.I. Voloshin became seriously ill and died on December 11, 1944. He was buried in a mass grave in the Central Park of the city of Chernivtsi (Ukraine).
Z and exemplary performance of command assignments on the front of the fight against German invaders and the courage and heroism shown by the Decree of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR of April 28, 1945 to Colonel Voloshin Lavrentiy Ivanovich posthumously awarded the title of Hero of the Soviet Union.
Colonel (1938). He was awarded the Order of Lenin (04/28/1945, posthumously), the 2nd Order of the Red Banner (02/23/1928, 11/3/1944), the Order of the Red Star (10/27/1943), the medal "XX Years of the Red Army", a foreign award - the Chinese Order.
Original biography provided by N.V. Ufarkin (Ufa).
When you start studying the history of the 316th (later 8th Guards) Panfilov Division, you are faced with a paradox. The recognition of this formation is almost absolute; the word “Panfilov’s men” was heard even by people completely unfamiliar with military history. However, judging by the publications in the media, the attention of researchers and writers, we can conclude that the entire division was formed solely for the sake of one battle in November 1941. Thanks to the efforts of the writer Alexander Bek and the Panfilov battalion commander Bauyrzhan Momyshuly, the defense of the Volokolamsk Highway is quite widely known, and the battle at the Dubosekovo stronghold has received scandalous fame.
Meanwhile, having taken up the history of the Panfilov division in detail, we find that only the actual battles near Volokolamsk are widely known. But the Panfilov division went through several significant battles of the Great Patriotic War, and one of the most acute episodes in its history occurred in the spring of 1945. Life studied the combat path of the 316th Rifle Division, which later became the 8th Guards Division.
Brainchild of 1941
The beginning of the war turned, as we know, into a grandiose disaster for the country and the army. Pre-war plans did not provide for the massive formation of new formations, but in the chain of “cauldrons” not only battalions and regiments, but entire armies disappeared. Already in July 1941, in the depths of the country, the creation of new divisions began to replace the destroyed ones. The mobilization mechanism worked without interruption. Fresh formations lacked full-fledged command personnel; they were often headed by precocious officers or, conversely, commanders who quietly met old age in rear positions. There was chronically not enough time to study and put together things.
The decision of the Headquarters on the massive introduction of new formations into the business is as cruel as it is devoid of alternatives: troops were needed as soon as possible. This new cohort also included the 316th Division. It began to be formed in July 1941 from conscripts and volunteers from among the residents of the Kazakh and Kyrgyz SSR. The national composition of the division does not give much reason for speculation: out of more than 11 thousand soldiers and officers, Russians made up about 4.5 thousand, Kazakhs - 3.5 thousand, Ukrainians - 2 thousand people. Subsequently, the division was actively replenished with Kyrgyz conscripts.
The division was headed by Major General Ivan Panfilov. Previously, he held the unpretentious position of military commissar of Kyrgyzstan. However, he was a battle-hardened soldier who had behind him the First World War, the Civil War and experience in the fight against the Basmachi in the 20s. He had never led a division into battle before, but it cannot be said that the formation was led by a random person. His eighteen-year-old daughter also served in the division as a nurse. She survived the war and was demobilized after being seriously wounded at the very end.
Colonel Ivan Serebryakov became a little-known, but very important officer for the division. The chief of staff of the division, qualified and energetic, he took the division through all the key battles of 1941 and 1942, leaving it only in the middle of the war for a position at army headquarters.
Panfilov began, in fact, with the formation of the division that he was to command. He himself participated in the selection of commanders from the battalion commander and above, so that the division accumulated many officers with good service or military experience.
However, a serious problem remained: there was only about a month of training, although most of the division's soldiers still did not have even basic combat training. And she had to fight against the most qualified, unforgiving, powerful opponent. Already in August, the fresh 316th Infantry Division went into the active army.
Writers rarely mention what Panfilov’s men did in August and September. The fact is that the division was located deep in the battle formations of the Red Army east of Novgorod. However, these were the most important weeks. Panfilov had the opportunity to train his subordinates in close proximity to the enemy, without immediately throwing them into the meat grinder. During the remaining time, Ivan Vasilyevich trained soldiers and officers at a frantic pace.
Training took place daily for 8 hours or more. Commanders were further trained in battlefield planning, field fortification, orientation, and interaction. The privates were further trained in the use of weapons, especially carefully - which would later turn out to be extremely important - preparations were carried out for battle in difficult conditions, at night and in the forest. At the same time, references to practicing actions against tanks appeared in the orders. By the way, the order of construction of fortifications established by Panfilov’s order is characteristic: anti-tank obstacles were erected first.
Separately, officers were trained to act in a situation where they had to defend themselves on a wide front. In general, Ivan Vasilyevich looked into the water: even near Novgorod, his soldiers and officers practiced actions in exactly the same situation in which they had to actually fight some time later.
The result was worth the effort: the 316th Infantry entered the battle much better prepared than many others.
On a broad front
The military field idyll near Novgorod ended in early October. Operation Typhoon began near Moscow - the Wehrmacht's breakthrough to Moscow. In essence, its first stage became a “harvest” for the Germans: the Soviet troops, weakened by previous battles, had no real opportunity to disrupt this offensive and were quickly overturned. Several armies immediately fell into pockets near Vyazma and Bryansk, and Army Group Center began to quickly advance towards the capital.
The 316th Rifle became one of the divisions that was supposed to save the situation. The battles near Moscow became the division's finest hour. Although her most famous battle dates back to mid-November, her most successful battle dates back to October '41.
On October 10, the division left the echelons in Volokolamsk. She had to fight in the 16th Army of Konstantin Rokossovsky on the Volokolamsk Highway. Since there was a catastrophic shortage of troops near Moscow, the division’s defense front turned out to be many times longer than it should be in a normal situation - 41 kilometers.
In a normal situation, this in itself would mean inevitable defeat. However, a specific feature of the Red Army was the flexible structure of the artillery: many separate artillery units made it possible to quickly strengthen the desired direction. Rokossovsky understood perfectly well that Panfilov’s men were defending a key sector, so he transferred to the 316th division forces that were simply colossal by the standards of the fall of the 41st - 7 artillery regiments in addition to the only regular one.
In total, Panfilov now had 207 guns, and it was on gun fire that the division’s defense system was built. The division commander himself arrived at the future battlefield before the soldiers, and even before that, a group of headquarters officers went to the future defense area to study the area. So upon arrival, battalions and regiments received detailed instructions on where and how to set up defense units.
Already on October 16, Panfilov’s positions were tested to their strength. The “examiner” was the 2nd Panzer Division of the Wehrmacht: a powerful, well-equipped unit for which “Typhoon” was the first operation on the Eastern Front. Before the start of the offensive on Moscow, the division had 194 tanks, and by the middle of the month it was unlikely that many vehicles were out of action. This power was concentrated on a narrow front against one of the Panfilov rifle regiments - the 1075th. In theory, the impact of such a mass of tanks was irresistible.
However, the attacks on October 16 and 17 unexpectedly failed. The attackers were stuck in front of anti-tank ditches under fire and suffered heavy losses from artillery batteries that were not detected in time. On the third day of fighting, the Germans found a weak spot in the ranks of the defenders. However, the throw to the near rear turned out to be fatal: behind the front line, “Rokossovsky’s gift” was discovered - heavy guns in direct fire. Of course, the Wehrmacht remained the Wehrmacht, and these battles cost a lot of blood. In addition, the small number of infantry led to heavy losses among the gunners. The hot pursuit report contained the following remark:
The artillery had absolutely no losses from tanks and had completely insignificant losses from enemy aviation (despite the intensive bombing of 25 aircraft) both in personnel and in materiel until it suffered heavy losses from enemy infantry and machine gunners who entered the flanks and rear of artillery battle formations. If our infantry had been normally available to cover the guns, the artillery would not have suffered such heavy losses. Infantry units, due to their small numbers, were unable to provide the front, flanks and even rear of the artillery battle formations.
However, by the standards of the autumn of 1941, what happened looked amazing: a full-blooded Wehrmacht tank division gave in to the Red Army rifle division. On October 23, the German tank division was caught up with infantry, and Panfilov’s reinforced forces were pushed away from Volokolamsk by the 27th, but the onslaught of three divisions (tank + 2 infantry) should have led to this result. However, a retreat of no more than 15 kilometers (in some areas Panfilov’s division retreated only a kilometer) in seven days of fighting was a completely unexpected and gratifying result.
In addition, the division was not torn apart, did not lose control, and retained its combat potential - and this in a battle of one against three. It was this battle on the Volokolamsk Highway that brought glory to the 316th Division and soon the Guards rank.
Between Volokolamsk and Moscow
Soon the division had to survive the second stage of the Typhoon. The successes of individual units (Panfilov's troops near Volokolamsk, the 4th Tank Brigade near Mtsensk) looked like bright flashes against the overall bleak background. In the fall of the 41st, the Red Army had a huge disadvantage: it completely lacked large mobile formations. The mechanized corps, which made it possible to support the front in the summer of 41, burned down in battle and were disbanded; only tank brigades of direct infantry support remained on the battlefield, while among the armies of the Center group advancing on Moscow there were three tank brigades at once. They were all seriously exhausted, but the energy of the next blow still had to be extinguished.
For Panfilov’s troops, the situation was complicated by the fact that the artillery was partly lost in the October battles, partly withdrawn in favor of other directions. In addition, after heavy fighting, the division's strength left much to be desired. The defense was built on a chain of company strongholds capable of supporting each other with small arms fire on a limited scale. At the same time, the area defended by the 316th and Dovator’s cavalry group located to the south was attacked by units of 5 Wehrmacht divisions at once. Under other conditions, this would have meant instant defeat, but the word “unit” was used for a reason: the Wehrmacht experienced supply shortages, so it could not attack at full strength.
Nevertheless, the situation did not become simple. The entire 16th Army was planning a counterattack, but on November 16, the division's positions came under fierce attack. Actually, on this day the most famous battle of Panfilov’s men took place.
Around this particular battle, spears are being broken with might and main. Meanwhile, if we abandon a priori sympathies and assessments, we will see the following. 
On November 16, there was frankly not the most successful battle for Panfilov’s men. The battle group of the German 2nd Panzerdivision - the same one that broke its teeth on the Soviet redoubts in October - this time managed to achieve success. The Germans attacked not the Dubosekovo stronghold itself, defended by the 4th company, but a neighboring position.
From the side of Dubosekovo it was supported by fire, but soon the battle moved beyond the forest on the flank, and the 4th company could no longer provide assistance to its comrades. The division's flank was bypassed, and the 4th company itself was soon attacked. By this time, not only in the company, but in the entire 1075th Infantry Regiment, there were almost no anti-tank weapons left: one light anti-tank gun and 4 anti-tank guns were frankly unimportant protection.
At least two companies, including the 4th, withdrew to the forest edges and continued the battle there. During the day, the regiment was scattered, suffered heavy losses, and the results of its actions (the entire regiment, not just the 4th company) turned out to be modest: 4-5 tanks at its own request. The moderation of the declared successes may indirectly indicate the veracity of the report.
On the one hand, this battle is very different from the canonical legend. On the other hand, tanks are much less likely to be knocked out by hand weapons than you might think if you imagine war from films. The battle was unsuccessful, despite the fact that the soldiers and officers did what they could.
Actually, the German review of the battle does not allow us to say that it did not happen at all or that the Germans did not notice Panfilov’s men: “ The enemy, who is not too strong, stubbornly defends himself using forested areas.". However, success in defense was also not achieved, and the history of the battle took on a life of its own.
The Red Star workers Koroteev, Ortenberg and Krivitsky, without going to the front line, formed a classic legend, which included 28 soldiers, 18 destroyed German tanks, and the successful defense of a line that was actually broken into by the Germans. In essence, the Red Star did a disservice to the entire division. Without any exaggeration, Panfilov’s men covered themselves with glory at Volokolamsk.
Actually, on November 16, the soldiers of the 1075th regiment did everything that depended on them to at least detain the enemy, however, given the actual circumstances of the event, they simply could not do anything outstanding against the general background of the war (we emphasize - against the general background of the war).
However, the emphasis on the battle at Dubosekovo led to a kind of obscuring of other military episodes. It was the glorification of 28 people to the detriment of all others that became the reason why subsequently the officers of the Panfilov division reacted quite sourly to questions about this battle. Note that 28 participants in the defense of the Dubosekovo OP were nominated for the country's highest award - the title of Hero of the Soviet Union. Against the background of, say, the Podolsk cadets, who actually destroyed a dozen and a half “Panzers” near Ilyinsky in the same fall, but did not receive a single “Gold Star” for their feat, or the much less well-known battles of the Panfilovites themselves in October - this is really a rather political decision.
In November, Panfilov’s men did not have time to discuss with journalists. The battle continued. The commander of the 1075th regiment, Kaprov, gathered the remnants of the regiment around him and retreated to the east. The battalion of Bauyrzhan Momyshuly, which was surrounded, made its way through the forests. The division retreated, but retained controllability and did not allow its front to be completely destroyed. The heaviest losses affected not only the rank and file. A day later, Ivan Panfilov was killed by an accidental mine. The division was soon named after its deceased commander, respected and loved by both the soldiers and the command. His colleagues had to fight themselves.
What did Panfilov’s men achieve near Volokolamsk? The Wehrmacht fell just short of Moscow. Access to the outskirts of the city automatically meant monstrous losses of the civilian population and enormous difficulties associated with turning the Moscow transport hub into a battlefield. It was impossible to stop the colossus of Army Group Center at once, but it depended on the soldiers and officers who fought and died in the fall of 1941 how quickly the enemy would stop, at what point the flow of wounded, killed and damaged equipment would make it impossible to continue the offensive.
A numb enmity
The battle near Volokolamsk made the name of the division - no longer the 316th, but the 8th Guards. Now she had to confirm her title.
At the end of November, the exhausted division was removed from the Volokolamsk direction, but was not transferred to the rear at all. Panfilov's men, led by the new commander Vasily Revyakin, moved towards the village of Kryukovo (now within the boundaries of Zelenograd). Revyakin's pre-war career did not contain any sharp turns. At the beginning of the war, he was deputy commander of the 43rd Army, and now received an independent appointment. The newly minted guardsmen received the task of returning the Kryukovo station, lost on November 30. The Wehrmacht had exhausted its offensive strength, and German troops were digging in on the approaches to Moscow. The division proved itself to be excellent, and success was expected from it. 
However, Panfilov’s absence immediately showed how much depends on one person. In addition, fresh recruits did not always meet all the requirements for a soldier. The reconnaissance before the attack was carried out carelessly, the tactical offensive quickly degenerated into frontal attacks, so that from December 3 to 6 it was not possible to take Kryukovo.
Unfortunately, on average, the Wehrmacht at that time demonstrated significantly better efficiency at the tactical level than the Red Army. However, Revyakin quickly showed the ability to learn from mistakes. In addition, Panfilov's men were reinforced with cavalry (formally - a division, in reality - in terms of strength - a complete battalion), an artillery regiment and a tank battalion (14 tanks). A night bomber regiment was assigned for air support. At that time, the division had a very small number - only 3,800 people. There was no trace left of the 11 thousand in October.
However, the enemy was not in the best condition either: reconnaissance counted 7 depleted battalions in the Kryukovo area. This time Revyakin planned to cover Kryukovo from two sides.
This plan was a success. The 1077th and 1075th rifle regiments bypassed the defense center near Kryukovo from the north-west, and the attached rifle brigade covered it from the south. The division formed assault groups from the most trained infantrymen, and used them in a non-trivial way - for a night attack. In the morning the Russians burst into Kryukovo. The German counterattack was repulsed by throwing in their few tanks. Kryukovo remained with the Red Army.
The significant claim for trophies is interesting: Panfilov’s men announced the capture of 29 tanks. This might seem implausible, but for December 1941 such a relationship looks quite realistic. The fact is that in the immediate rear of the Wehrmacht a huge amount of equipment has accumulated with damage that is not fatal, but precludes combat operations without repair, maintenance or even basic refueling.
Army Group Center put all its strength into the rush to Moscow and now had neither fuel reserves nor a reserve of spare parts. This circumstance made the rollback from Moscow catastrophic: the withdrawal meant that all equipment that could not be evacuated remained with the victors. The analytical report on the results of the battles for Kryukovo especially notes the mass of abandoned equipment. It is characteristic, by the way, that in the battle for Kryukovo the Germans used tanks as fixed firing points - precisely because of the inability to maneuver them. Well, the creation of specialized assault groups became a widely used tactical technique in the Red Army much later, so here the guard really showed their class.
Kryukovo became the last operation of the 8th Guards in the Moscow region. Since the beginning of the war, the division has lost 3,620 people killed, missing and captured and 6,300 wounded. In fact, almost all the soldiers of the first conscription were out of action. The division had to be moved to the rear for replenishment. The rest lasted until the end of January 1942. The division's next destination was the Kholm area. 
By January 1942, the Red Army and the Wehrmacht stood against each other like two boxers ready to be knocked out. Near Demyansk there was a struggle to encircle the German group. Here Panfilov’s men had to act again with a new commander at their head. In general, the division's leaders changed quite often. Under Kholm, the 8th Guards became, in fact, a raid group.
The attack of the fresh division in itself turned out to be unstoppable: the enemy front held out with all its strength. In the depths of the Wehrmacht's defense, Panfilov's men had to meet with units of an equally famous German division - the SS men from the "Death's Head". The head-on confrontation did not work out: the “Head” retreated inside the resulting cauldron. The Germans held the cauldron thanks to skillful and energetic resistance and effective air supply, but the head became truly dead: during the siege of Demyansk it lost more than 2/3 of its strength.
Panfilov's men marched south. They also managed to participate in the formation of a small entourage near the Hill. In general, the winter campaign of 1942 looked bizarre: parts of the warring parties were mixed up, the front line looked on the map like the fruit of an abstract artist’s creativity, both the Germans and the Russians constantly found themselves in large and small encirclements.
This page of the war of the 8th Guards is almost unknown to the general reader, and yet it achieved enormous success, and if Kholm and Demyansk had subsequently been defeated, then it was with this raid that the 8th Guards would have entered the history of the war in the first place. However, what happened happened: the fruits of the guards’ success were never reaped, because the Germans held Demyansk and Kholm.
The time when “boilers” were quickly and effectively destroyed came much later. The hill was skillfully defended, and, as was usually the case with the Germans, it was supplied by air. The 8th Guards was stuck in positional battles near Kholm for a very long time. Until mid-1944, it fought almost exclusively local positional battles without much success. In the spring of 1944, she was transferred to another site, but the situation there did not change.
For more than two years the division conducted almost no active operations. Private operations ended with relatively small losses - the Volokolamsk Highway meat grinder, thank God, did not happen again. But the successes also looked very modest. Some breakthrough emerged only in January 1944, when Panfilov’s men liberated more than a hundred previously populated areas. The grandiose battles of the turning point in the war have passed. It seemed that Panfilov’s men would remain the “canned food” of the front.
Salty wind of the Baltic
Everything changed in the summer of 1944, when the German front in the east collapsed within just a few months throughout the entire space from the Baltic to the Black Sea. The Baltic states seemed to both sides to be a "bearish angle". The soldiers of the German Army Group North, with the usual rude humor of the military, hung a poster on one of the roads behind their positions: “Here the ass of the world begins” - the endless trench sitting was tormenting them too. In the summer of 1944, however, no one was bored.
On July 10, Panfilov’s men went into battle in Latvia. The Dvina-Rezhitsa operation remained in the shadow of the grandiose offensives of that summer, but it was a major battle. The Russians' goal was the city of Rezekne in the east of the republic. Here the guards quickly demonstrated that they had not lost their grip.
It was 1944, the level of training of the Red Army had increased significantly, and technical equipment - radically. The breach of the Wehrmacht's defensive formations turned out to be quick and clean. This time the cauldrons did not work out, but within three weeks the Soviet troops covered 200 kilometers, which is a very good pace of advance for infantry. The enemy of the Red Army in this battle turned out to be interesting.
We managed to break through to Latvia over the cold corpses of the 2nd Latvian SS Division (also known as the 19th Grenadier Division). For Panfilov’s men, this operation became a neat solution to standard tasks: offensive, breaking into field defenses, pursuit, storming small towns. It was the 8th Guards that stormed the final target of the operation - the city of Rezekne, otherwise Rezhitsa. Now the division had to solve a new serious task: to fight in the swamps of the Baltic states. 
The Luban-Madon operation was also a private battle of the 2nd Baltic Front. She went under the most difficult conditions: she had to break into the Wehrmacht’s defenses in continuous swamps. Breaking through the swamps was expectedly not an easy task. This time there was no such spectacular breakthrough as at Rezhitsa. The tasks were often not so much combat as engineering: the division constantly made detours through the quagmire, making its way along the gullies and pontoons. Using flanking maneuvers, the Germans were gradually forced to retreat from their usual lines, but the advance was slow and did not bring any major successes. In a word, the guards acted as a kind of laborers of the war: they slowly squeezed the enemy out of convenient positions.
Panfilov's men were not given any rest. Within two weeks, the division was chewing through the front line in the Baltic operation. This time we are talking about one of the largest offensives of the war. Riga became the front's common goal. The battle, however, developed slowly. In October, Panfilov’s men took part in the capture of Riga, but this time they were not in the leading roles.
After the cleansing of Latvia, a large Wehrmacht bridgehead remained in the Baltic states - Courland. In this area, German units pressed to the sea defended themselves until the very end of the war and surrendered only after May 9, 1945. Supplies came by sea. The Courland Cauldron, in the words of one modern historian, became “a battle between disabled people on rough terrain.”
Neither for the USSR nor for Germany this impasse was a priority. Headquarters strengthened the troops in Courland on a residual basis, but nevertheless, periodic attempts were made to throw the Germans into the Baltic Sea. One of the most dramatic episodes in the history of the division took place here.
Anyone who considers acute situations and battles surrounded as an attribute exclusively of the initial period of the war will be deeply mistaken. Just as Wehrmacht units happened to find themselves in local encirclement in the summer of 1941, so the Red Army found itself in equally acute situations in the spring of 1945. The last military March was the only case of the entire encirclement of the 8th Guards Division during the entire war. Another local offensive in an attempt to break through the defenses of Army Group Kurland gradually became bogged down in the swamps. The front command decided to take a risky step: Panfilov’s men were ordered to advance without looking back at their neighbors. A breakthrough was achieved, but it was very narrow. On the night of March 18, the Germans in the Kaupini area cut off the main forces of the division in the depths of their defense.
However, it was 1945, and the collapse of those surrounded in the cauldron did not take place. Marshal Govorov personally came to the command post of the 10th Guards Army. The main forces of the army concentrated on saving the guards division. One of the regiments remained outside the cauldron, and it was he who, with the help of his neighbors, took the first step towards breaking through the ring. However, the situation was simply critical: although there was no continuous front of encirclement, all the paths along which supplies went remained under the fire control of the Wehrmacht.
Fortunately, the advance of Panfilov’s men before the encirclement was so successful that the encirclement could quite actively fire back using captured weapons and ammunition. However, it was not possible to rescue those surrounded, and the situation became tense. On March 25, the Germans attempted to crush the boiler. Due to the extreme degree of exhaustion on both sides, these attacks failed, and by the second of March, having overwhelmed the Germans with a mass of steel (large artillery forces took part in the counterattack), the Russians made their way to the encircled units. The week-long epic struggle in the encirclement ended.
This essentially ended the war of the Panfilov division. After May 9, Army Group Kurland began to lay down its arms.
The 316th, then the 8th Guards Division rightfully became one of the most famous in the Red Army. A kind of recognition of merit was the inclusion of the actions of this division in post-war collections summarizing the combat experience of the Great Patriotic War. These materials were intended for military cadets and active army officers, and they were not propaganda, but military analytics. Of course, the 8th Guards did not always achieve success, but even strong critics of the legend about the 28 fighters of November 41st agree that the division as such, with its combat history, has earned the eternal memory of grateful posterity.
“Russia is great, but there is nowhere to retreat - Moscow is behind us” - with these words of political instructor Klochkov, the immortal feat of 28 Panfilov heroes was forever inscribed in the history of Russia.
On November 16, 1941, a group of tank destroyers of the 2nd platoon of the 4th company of the 1075th regiment of the 316th Infantry Division entered into an unequal battle with dozens of German tanks and machine gunners. Platoon commander D. Shirmatov was wounded on the eve of the battle and was evacuated to the rear, so platoon deputy commander I.E. Dobrobabin took command. Within 3-4 hours from the start of the battle, it was he who commanded Panfilov’s men.
Panfilov's men competently prepared to meet the enemy: they dug five trenches in advance, reinforced them with sleepers, prepared weapons - rifles, a machine gun, anti-tank grenades, Molotov cocktails, two anti-tank rifles (ATR). They decided to fight to the death. In the morning, German machine gunners launched an attack on the village of Krasikovo. When they appeared on a hillock in front of Panfilov’s trenches, Dobrobabin gave a signal (whistle loudly) and the soldiers opened fire from 100-150 meters. Dozens of Nazis were killed. The fighters then repulsed a second infantry attack, accompanied by artillery fire. When two tanks, accompanied by machine gunners, moved towards Panfilov’s position, the soldiers set one tank on fire, and there was a short lull. And finally, in the afternoon, the Germans opened artillery fire and the German tanks again went on the attack, in a deployed front, in waves, about 15-20 tanks in a group.
Major General Ivan Panfilov Political instructor Vasily Klochkov Sergeant Ivan Dobrobabin
Over 50 tanks attacked the sector of the entire 1075th regiment, but their main attack was directed at the positions of the 2nd battalion, more precisely, at the positions of the 4th company, and even more specifically at the positions of Dobrobabin’s platoon. This sector was most accessible to enemy tanks. The battle with the tanks began at approximately two o'clock in the afternoon. The surviving Panfilov soldier, I.R. Vasiliev, writes that when the tanks got very close, a German officer appeared from the hatch of one of them and shouted: “Rus, surrender.” Panfilov's shots killed him. At that moment, a cowardly soldier jumped out of Panfilov’s trenches. He raised his hands up, but Vasiliev shot the traitor.
A mortal battle with armored vehicles began. We had to let the tanks get closer and jump out of the trenches in order to be sure to throw anti-tank grenades under the tracks of the tanks and bottles with a flammable mixture on the engine part of the armored vehicles. And it was also necessary to shoot at the German machine gunners and at the tank crews jumping out of the damaged tanks. There was a curtain of snow, soot and earth in the air from the explosions of enemy shells. Panfilov’s men did not notice that our units from the right flank had retreated to other lines. One after another, the soldiers broke down, but the tanks they had shot down burst into flames and burned. Dobrobabin sent the seriously wounded to the dugout at the trench. 14 German tanks were shot down and set on fire, dozens of Nazis were killed, and the attack failed.
However, Dobrobabin himself, in the midst of the battle, lost consciousness from a terrible explosion and no longer knew that the political instructor of the 4th company, V.G. Klochkov, sent by the company commander Gundilovich, managed to get to the Panfilov men. He took command, inspiring the soldiers during short respites. As Vasiliev testifies, noticing the approach of the second group of German tanks, Klochkov said: “Comrades, we will probably have to die here for the glory of the Motherland. Let the Motherland know how we fight here, how we defend Moscow. Moscow is behind us, we have nowhere to retreat.” The main battle with tanks lasted 40-45 minutes.
At the end of the battle, four tanks were destroyed at the cost of the lives of the last soldiers remaining in the ranks, who jumped out of the trench with grenades in their hands, led by Klochkov. 28 heroes delayed the breakthrough of a large German tank group to Moscow for more than four hours, allowing the Soviet command to withdraw troops to new lines and bring up reserves.
Most of the legendary warriors who accomplished this unprecedented feat, including Vasily Klochkov, died a brave death in that battle. The rest (D.F. Timofeev, G.M. Shemyakin, I.D. Shadrin, D.A. Kozhubergenov and I.R. Vasiliev) were seriously wounded. The battle of Dubosekovo went down in history as a feat of 28 Panfilov men; in 1942, all its participants were awarded the title of Heroes of the Soviet Union by the Soviet command...
Panfilov’s men became a terrible curse for the Nazis; there were legends about the strength and courage of the heroes. On November 17, 1941, the 316th Rifle Division was renamed the 8th Guards Rifle Division and awarded the Order of the Red Banner. Hundreds of guardsmen were awarded orders and medals.
On November 19, the division lost its commander... For 36 days it fought under the command of General I.V. Panfilov 316th Rifle Division, defending the capital on the main direction.
Having failed to achieve decisive successes in the Volokolamsk direction, the main enemy forces turned to Solnechnogorsk, where they intended to break through first to Leningradskoye, then to Dmitrovskoye Highway and enter Moscow from the north-west.
The remains of the fallen Panfilov heroes were buried with military honors in the spring of 1942 in the village of Nelidovo. In 1967, the Museum of Panfilov Heroes was opened in the village of Nelidovo (1.5 km from Dubosekovo). In 1975, a memorial ensemble “Feat 28” was erected at the site of the battle (granite, sculptors N.S. Lyubimov, A.G. Postol, V.A. Fedorov, architect V.E. Datyuk, Yu.G. Krivushchenko, I.I. Stepanov, engineer S.P. Khadzhibaronov), consisting of 6 monumental figures personifying warriors of six nationalities who fought in the ranks of 28 Panfilovites.
The Panfilov heroes, all soldiers of the 316th Infantry Division of 30 different nationalities, who in the difficult days of the autumn of 1941 did not allow the Germans to reach Moscow, are all in the Immortal Regiment of a thousand years of Russian history.
Connection history:
The division was formed in July - August 1941 in Alma-Ata as part of the control, 1073rd, 1075th and 1077th rifle and 857th artillery regiments. The commander, Major General I.V. Panfilov, served as military commissar of the Kirghiz SSR. The main core of the division was made up of residents of the city of Alma-Ata - the 1075th Infantry Regiment, residents of the villages of Nadezhdenskaya and Sofiyskaya - the 1073rd Infantry Regiment, as well as residents of the city of Frunze - the Kyrgyz 1077th Infantry Regiment. The formation of the division began on July 13, 1941. The division was staffed by the best representatives of Kazakhstan (members of the All-Union Communist Party (Bolsheviks), Komsomol members, Stakhanovites, order bearers, athletes, engineers and poets). When formed, the command and command staff consisted of 60-65% reserve personnel. The conscripts were mainly Kazakhs and Kyrgyz. The percentage of Russians was approx. 20-25% of the total number of hp. By social status: 27% workers, 58% collective farmers, 14% office workers, 1% others. Combat training continued from July 17 to August 17.
On August 18, 1941, the division was loaded into echelons and sent to Novgorod at the disposal of the 52nd Reserve Army planned for formation. On August 27, 1941, the division was completely unloaded in Borovichi and on the march came under an air raid, suffering its first losses. At this time, the enemy, having occupied Novgorod, developed an offensive along the river. Volkhov in the direction of Chudovo and Lyuban. By August 30, having completed a 100 km march, the division took up defense along the Msta River in the Bol area. Pekhovo-Mstinsky bridge. Due to the enemy’s breakthrough in sector 11A in the Demyansk area, the division marches to the Kresttsy area, where it takes up defensive positions with the possible involvement in a counterattack against the enemy units that had broken through. During long marches and while standing on the defensive, work was carried out to practice the tactical actions of the division in defense and attack. The division's units continued to improve in the use of weapons, shooting, and organizing marches. Here the division has been equipping the defense line for almost a month, taking up positions in the second echelon of the army (after representatives of the 11A Northwestern Front took over the defensive site, however, the poor equipment of the defensive line by the 316th regiments was noted). However, the NWF units managed to independently repel the enemy’s attack and prevent his breakthrough to Kresttsy.
At the beginning of October '41. After the German troops began their offensive on Moscow and broke through the defenses of the Western Front, an order was received to transfer the formation to the Moscow direction. On October 6, 1941, an order came to reassign the division to the Moscow Military District. Immediately after receiving the order, the division was to move to the station. Sacrums for loading into trains and transfer to Moscow, where they were originally supposed to join the 5th Army (by order of October 11, 1941). From October 7 to October 12, 1941 it was unloaded in Volokolamsk. Here, in the Volokolamsk direction, the 16A directorate of Lieutenant General K.K. Rokossovsky was deployed, emerging from encirclement in the Vyazma area. It occupied a 41-kilometer-long defense line from the village of Lvovo to the Bolychevo state farm in the Volokolamsk direction. Together with units of the 316th Infantry Division, the Volokolamsk section of the Mozhaisk Leningrad Region was defended by: 302nd Pulbat, Infantry School named after. Verkhovgogo Soviet, 488 and 584ap pto, bn. 108sp, 41back, division of Moscow art. schools, 41 and 42 flamethrower companies, tank company. According to the 1939 regulations, the division could defend a strip along a front of 8-12 km and a depth of 4-6 km. The defense zone allocated to the division was single-echelon.
Lacking combat experience, the division was reinforced by two artillery regiments and a tank company, and thus had powerful artillery: with the assets assigned to the division, there were 207 guns, of which: 25 mm - 4; 45 mm - 32; 76 mm regimental guns - 14; 76 mm divisional guns - 79; 85 mm - 16; 122 mm howitzers - 8; 122 mm guns - 24 and 152 mm guns - 30. For comparison, the division’s own artillery was: regimental artillery (45 mm cannons - 16 pieces, 76 mm PA-14 pieces) - a total of 30 guns, artillery in 857ap (76 mm DA-16 pieces, 122 mm howitzers - 8 pieces) - only 24 guns.
On the right flank of the division, farthest from the Volokolamsk highway, the 1077th Infantry Regiment under the command of Major Z. S. Shekhtman equipped its positions. This unit was the last to be formed and did not have time to undergo full training at the divisional training ground, so I.V. Panfilov placed it where a serious enemy attack was not expected.
In the center of the division is the 1073rd Infantry Regiment of Major G.E. Elin. Directly at the regiment's combat positions was located one of the attached artillery regiments - a regiment of 45-mm anti-tank guns.
On the left flank, where General Panfilov expected the attack of the main forces of the 4th Tank Group, the 1075th Infantry Regiment of Colonel I.V. Kaprov was stationed, along with an attached artillery regiment of 16 76-mm divisional guns and a battery of four 85-mm millimeter anti-aircraft guns.
The 857th artillery regiment under Lieutenant Colonel G. F. Kurganov was divided into divisions among rifle units. The 1st division (three batteries of four 76-mm cannons) was assigned to the 1077th rifle regiment, the second and third divisions (one battery of four 76-mm cannons and two batteries of 122-mm howitzers) were assigned to the 1073rd and the 1075th rifle regiments, respectively.
Based on the study of the experience of organizing anti-tank defense of Soviet troops in previous battles, anti-tank defense in the division zone was built on the principle of organizing anti-tank points and anti-tank areas with the allocation of anti-tank reserves in the main directions. The division's anti-tank defense system included all artillery located in closed firing positions, as well as all anti-tank barriers. A total of ten anti-tank strongholds were created in the division's zone. On average, the number of anti-tank guns in anti-tank strong points was slightly more than 8 guns, and in anti-tank strong points located in the most likely directions, it increased to 18 guns. Thus, having on average no more than three gun barrels per 1 km of front, General I.V. Panfilov concentrated up to 14 gun barrels per 1 km of front in the most tank-dangerous directions. Also, by order of the commander of the 16th Army, anti-tank fighter detachments were created in the division's regiments, consisting of a platoon and a company of sappers in vehicles with a supply of anti-tank mines and petrol bottles.
The division's reserve consisted of a separate engineer battalion and a tank company of two T-34 tanks and two light machine-gun tanks. The division headquarters was located directly at the positions of the 1073rd Infantry Regiment, two kilometers from the front line.
In the division zone, the enemy's 35th Infantry Division, 2nd, 5th and 11th Tank Divisions developed their offensive. The offensive of the German troops began on October 15, 1941, when the 11th Panzer Division of the XXXXVIMK began an offensive from the Gzhatsk area in the direction of Volokolamsk. The 316th Rifle Division entered into fierce battles. During October 16-17, units of the left flank 1075th Regiment fought off fierce attacks in the direction of the Bolychevo state farm. By the end of October 17, the Germans managed to capture Bolychev and wedged themselves in at the junction of the 16th and 5th armies. Due to the serious situation in zone 5A, the 552nd cannon-artillery regiment and 22tbr were transferred from 16A, and from the right flank, the 316th infantry regiment, where the enemy was not active, was transferred to the left 138th cannon-artillery regiment. Together with the tank crews of the 22nd Tank Brigade, on the evening of October 17, a counterattack was launched in the Knyazhevo area. The enemy was stopped, but on October 18, the 22nd Tank Brigade was transferred to the district. Mozhaisk, where the situation was even worse.
On the morning of October 18, 1941, the Germans resumed their offensive in the direction of Knyazhevo-Ostashevo. Despite fierce fighting, by 2 pm Knyazhevo was taken and the Germans broke through to the bank of the Ruza River near Ostashevo. Units of the 1075th rifle regiment suffered heavy losses. 1st division 857ap supporting 1075sp retreat routes were cut off and the guns, which turned out to be impossible to remove off-road, had to be destroyed. In the current situation, the division commander ordered the 1075th rifle division to withdraw to the northern bank of the river. Ruza and prevent the enemy from crossing the Ruza River in the Ostashevo area. However, having a significant superiority in forces, he crossed to the northern bank of the Ruza River and by the end of the day the enemy managed to completely capture Ostashevo. Artillery units of the 138th and 523rd cannon artillery regiments and especially the 296th anti-tank artillery regiment suffered heavy losses in these battles. There was a threat of an enemy breakthrough to Volokolamsk from the south. Moreover, by this time the division commander had no reserves for maneuver left at his disposal.
From the 16A reserve, the 768th anti-tank regiment and several divisions of guards rocket mortars were transferred to the 316th infantry division, and through regroupings it was possible to somewhat strengthen the defense of the thinned 1075th infantry regiment.
On the morning of October 19, the Germans tried to resume their attack on Volokolamsk from the south. Enemy tank units managed to break through to Spas-Ryukhovsky, but the enemy was driven out by a counterattack with heavy support from artillery and guards mortars. From October 20 to 23, the enemy made no active attempts to attack, restoring damaged equipment and bringing up new forces. However, a new danger began to threaten parts of the division on the previously calm right flank. Units of the German 35th Infantry Division were concentrated here. Anticipating this threat, Panfilov returned units of the 138th cannon to the right flank of the division, and the 1st division of the 358th artillery regiment of the 126th rifle division, which emerged from the encirclement, was concentrated in reserve in the Volokolamsk area.
On October 18, the division was also assigned the 1st Guards Tank Brigade, urgently transferred from near Mtsensk on Stalin’s personal instructions.
On October 23, he went on the offensive with the forces of the 35th Infantry Division from the Sereda area in the defense sector of the 1073rd Infantry Regiment in the direction of Kr. Mountain, Klishino. At the same time, the enemy launched an offensive from the Ostashevo area against the 1075th Infantry Regiment in the direction of Stanovishche. By the end of the day, the Germans managed to cross the Ruza in the Kr region. Mountain and wedge into the defense of 1073sp. In sector 1075sp the attacks were repulsed. In the morning, units of the 1073rd Infantry Division attempted to restore the situation with counterattacks and push the enemy back beyond Ruza, but due to the superiority of the German troops in strength, the attacks were repelled, and the German 35th Infantry Division continued to expand the breakthrough and reached Safatovo and Gorbunovo towards the end. Due to the lack of communication with the left neighbor of the division (133rd Rifle Division of the 5th Army defending in the Ruza area), Rokossovsky asked to withdraw the left flank of the 316th Rifle Division or give it at least a rifle division from the reserve. The front commander replied that there was no new division. 16A was assigned to K.K., who had recently escaped encirclement along with K.K. Rokosovsky 18SD (formerly 18Dno) and was instructed to take forces from unattacked areas.
On the morning of October 25, the Germans went on the offensive along the entire defense front of the 316th Rifle Division. From the Ostashevo area, units of the 1073rd Infantry Division attacked the 2nd and 11th German tank divisions, and from the Gorbunovo area, the 35th Infantry Division continued to advance on Spas, while the positions of the 1077th Infantry Division and the infantry school on the right flank of the division were attacked by units of the 110th Infantry Division. Possessing an overwhelming superiority in forces, German troops broke through the defenses of the weakened previous battles of the 1075th and 1073rd infantry regiments, and the offensive on the right flank, where the 1077th infantry regiment and the infantry school were defending, was also successful. The 316th Rifle Division, which had suffered significant losses in previous battles, had difficulty holding back the onslaught of superior enemy troops. By the end of the day, parts of the division were withdrawn across the Lama River, where from October 26, together with the 690th Infantry Regiment of the 126th Infantry Division (approx. 1000 people, 4 mortars, 2 76mm, 2 45mm guns) organized a defense. The 1077th Infantry Regiment (approx. 2000 people, 6 mortars, 4 122mm, 12 76mm and 6 45mm guns) with the attached 525th anti-tank artillery regiment entrenched at Alferyevo, 1075th Infantry Regiment (approx. 700 people, 3 mortars, 2 45mm guns) with the 289th and 296th anti-tank artillery regiments in Zhdanovo, the 1073rd rifle regiment (approx. 800 people, 1 120mm mortar, 2 76mm mountain guns, 4 76mm, 4 45mm guns) was put into reserve as the most battered .
On October 27, 1941, German troops broke through the defenses of the neighboring 690th Infantry Regiment, and the 316th Infantry Division was forced to leave Volokolamsk and take up defense east and southeast of the city at the line Maleevka - Chentsy - Bolshoye Nikolskoye - Teterino.
According to the head of the operational department of the headquarters of the Western Front, Lieutenant General Malandin, the main reasons for the surrender of Volokolamsk:
1) The weak composition of the 316th Infantry Division, which, having waged continuous battles for 12 days, suffered heavy losses and was not replenished. 2) The mistake of the division commander, who placed the unstable 690th Infantry Regiment in the main direction, which did not complete its formation. 3) The lack of direct organization of the defense of Volokolamsk on the part of the Military Council of the Army and the division command, which did not allow delaying the enemy on the approaches to the city and gaining time to bring the 690th Infantry Regiment into order and concentrate the necessary forces at the expense of the 1077th Infantry Regiment and Dovator’s group for organizing a counterattack. 4) Weak leadership of the command of the 690th Infantry Regiment, which lost control of the regiment and allowed the regiment to withdraw in disorder; failure by the division and regiment command to use the prepared defense line directly south of Volokolamsk and failure to comply with the conditions of the street struggle for the city. 5) Insufficient maneuver on the part of the division command with anti-personnel artillery fire at the expense of artillery operating in other sectors of the division. - On the approaches to Moscow / The hidden truth of the war: 1941: unknown documents. 1992
By the end of October 30, the battered 316th Rifle Division had retreated to the line: Bortniki, Avdotino, Chentsy, Petelino. The division's losses were estimated as: in the 1073rd rifle division 70% (198 killed, 175 wounded, 1,098 missing), 1077th division 50%, 1075th division 50% (525 killed, 275 wounded, 1,730 missing), overall for the division 50%. 4th brigade Katukova came to the aid of 1077sp in the Avdotino area. On November 1, German troops stopped the offensive both in the 316th Rifle Division and along the entire Western Front. Convinced of the tenacity of the defense of our troops, the enemy troops were forced to take an operational pause to rest, replenish and regroup their formations.
On November 16, Army Group Center resumed its attack on Moscow. 316sd again found itself in the direction of the main attack of 4 TGr. The division was attacked by the forces of one infantry and two tank divisions of the Wehrmacht - the 2nd Panzer Division of the 40th Motorized Corps (General of Tank Forces G. Stumme) attacked the positions of the 316th Infantry Division in the center of defense, and the 11th Panzer Division of the 46th motorized corps (General of Tank Forces G. von Fittinghof-Scheel) struck in the Dubosekovo area, at the positions of the 1075th Infantry Regiment. In the south of the position, at the junction with the Separate Cavalry Group of Colonel L.M. Dovator, with the support of the tank battalion of the 5th Tank Division, the 252nd Silesian Infantry Division attacked.
Units of the division, together with tank crews of the 1st Guards Tank Brigade, fought heavy defensive battles with superior enemy forces, in which the personnel showed massive heroism. It was on this day that events took place at the Dubosekovo crossing, which became known as the feat of the 28 Panfilov heroes.
At the Dubosekovo crossing, the 4th company of the 2nd battalion of the 1075th Infantry Regiment was located under the command of Captain P. M. Gundilovich and political instructor V. G. Klochkov. On the morning of November 16, German tank crews conducted reconnaissance in force. According to the memoirs of the commander of the 1075th Infantry Regiment, Colonel I.V. Kaprov, “in total, 10-12 enemy tanks were in the battalion’s sector. I don’t know how many tanks went to the 4th company’s site, or rather, I can’t determine... In the battle, the regiment destroyed 5-6 German tanks, and the Germans retreated.” Then the enemy brought up reserves and attacked the regiment's positions with renewed force. After 40-50 minutes of battle, the Soviet defense was broken through, and the regiment was essentially destroyed. Kaprov personally collected the surviving soldiers and took them to new positions. According to the commander of the 1075th Infantry Regiment, Colonel I.V. Kaprov, “in the battle, Gundilovich’s 4th company suffered the most. Only 20-25 people survived. led by a company of 140 people. The remaining companies suffered less. More than 100 people died in the 4th Rifle Company. The company fought heroically."
According to the memoirs of Zinovy Shekhtman, the former commander of the 1077th regiment, only “in two days of fighting, the regiment lost 400 people killed, 100 wounded and 600 missing. Of the 4th company that defended Dubosekovo, barely a fifth remained. In the 5th and 6th companies, the losses were even heavier."
Thus, it was not possible to stop the enemy at the Dubosekovo junction; the positions of the 1075th Infantry Regiment were crushed by the enemy, and its remnants retreated to a new defensive line. According to Soviet data, in the battles of November 16, the entire 1075th regiment knocked out and destroyed 9 enemy tanks.
On November 18, the enemy offensive continued. The division, conducting fierce defensive battles, retreated to Novo-Petrovskoye. German tanks reached the division headquarters, which was located in the village of Gusenevo (Volokolamsk district, Moscow region). As a result of the mortar shelling, the division commander, Major General I.V. Panfilov, was killed by fragments of a German mortar mine. On the same day, the division was reorganized into the 8th Guards Rifle Division. In difficult defensive battles near Moscow, the division will prove its belonging to the Soviet guard...
Throughout the history of the existence of the armed forces of the Soviet Union only two divisions were named after their commanders. During the Civil War it was the Chapaev Division, during the Great Patriotic War it was the 8th Guards Order of Lenin Red Banner Order of Suvorov Rezhitskaya Rifle Division named after I.V. Panfilov.
On July 12, 1941, by order of the government, the formation of the 316th Infantry Division, later the heroic Panfilov Division, began in Alma-Ata. Within a month, the division was replenished with teams of conscripts from different regions of Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan. The division consisted of three rifle regiments, an artillery regiment, a communications battalion, a separate engineer battalion, a separate auto company, a medical battalion, a separate reconnaissance motorized rifle company, a field bakery, a field postal service and a herd of cattle. The 316th division was formed and headed by the military commissar of Kyrgyzstan, Major General I.V. Panfilov. Personal acquaintance with Stalin allowed the general to select the best personnel when forming the division. So its ranks included not boy recruits, but mature family men - representatives of 28 nations of the USSR.
Guard Major General Ivan Vasilievich P Anfilov began his military career in the First World War, in 1915, when he was drafted into the 168th reserve battalion (Inzara, Penza province). With the rank of non-commissioned officer, he was sent to the active army on the Southwestern Front in the 638th Olpinsky Infantry Regiment, where he rose to the rank of sergeant major (senior sergeant in modern forces).
After the February Revolution of 1917, Panfilov was elected a member of the regimental committee. Voluntarily joining the Red Army in October 1918, he was enlisted in the 1st Saratov Infantry Regiment, which later became part of the 25th Chapaevskaya Rifle Division. Commanding a platoon and a company of the legendary division, from 1918 to 1920 he fought against formations of the Czechoslovak corps, the White Guards of generals Denikin, Kolchak, Dutov and the White Poles. In September 1920, Panfilov was sent to fight banditry in Ukraine, and in 1921 he led a platoon of the 183rd border battalion.
After graduating from the Kyiv Higher School of Red Army Commanders in 1923, Panfilov was sent to the Turkestan Front, where he actively participated in the fight against the Basmachi movement. From 1927 to 1937 he headed the regimental school of the 4th Turkestan Rifle Regiment, commanded a rifle battalion, and then the 9th Red Banner Mountain Rifle Regiment. In 1937, he was appointed to the post of head of the staff department of the Central Asian Military District, and a year later - to the post of military commissar of the Kirghiz SSR. In January 1939, Panfilov received the rank of brigade commander (from 1940 - major general).
Formed in 1941 by Panfilov 316th Infantry Division in August of the same year, it began its combat journey near Novgorod, and in October it was transferred to the Volokolamsk direction. Waging continuous battles, for a month units of the division not only held their positions, but with swift counterattacks they defeated the 2nd Tank, 29th Motorized, 11th and 110th Infantry Divisions, destroying a total of up to 9,000 German soldiers and officers , more than 80 tanks and other enemy equipment. On October 27, the situation at the front no longer allowed holding the occupied line; Volokolamsk had to be abandoned. Despite the retreat, for services in the October battles The 316th division was one of the first to be called the Guards Division, number 8.
In November the 8th Guards became famous for the feat of 28 Panfilov heroes. According to the version published in the same year in the central press, on November 16, a group of 29 tank destroyers met their death at a railway siding Dubosekovo, destroying 18 enemy tanks. The enemy struck from the south at the junction of the division and the 50th Cavalry Corps, trying to surround Panfilov's men and capture the headquarters. Despite the exceptional resilience of the soldiers of the 1075th regiment, the Germans broke through to the headquarters. Our units were drained of blood: in the 4th company, out of 140 fighters, no more than 25 remained, in other companies even less. Having accepted the battle, the 8th Guards Division managed to stop the enemy in the Volokolamsk direction. A week later, reporters learned about this feat; Krasnaya Zvezda published several articles on the events at the Dubosekovo crossing.
The day after the terrible battle, the division received the Order of the Red Banner.
And on November 18, the division commander died - he was wounded by shrapnel during a mortar attack. This was a real tragedy for the division's fighters, who treated Panfilov very warmly, calling him Batya.
On November 23, at the request of the division’s fighters, the 8th Guards was named after Major General I.V. Panfilova.
The media have “promoted” the story of the 28 Panfilov men so much that only a few know the real truth about it. In 1948 the military prosecutor's office conducted an inspection authenticity of the feat of 28 Panfilov men described in the press. Based on the inspection carried out by the chief military prosecutor of the USSR Armed Forces, Lieutenant General of Justice Afanasyev, on May 10, 1948, a “Certificate-report “About 28 Panfilovites” was compiled.
However, a closer look at the document reveals the following: |
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From which it follows that the number of Panfilov heroes in the “Red Star” of November 28, 1941 was determined approximately.
The following is said about the events after December 20, 1941, when our troops returned their temporarily lost positions: | “When it became known that the place where the battle took place was liberated from the Germans, Krivitsky, on behalf of Ortenberg, went to the Dubosekovo crossing. Together with regiment commander Kaprov, commissar Mukhamedyarov and commander of the 4th company Gundilovich, Krivitsky went to the battlefield, where they discovered three corpses of our soldiers under the snow. However, Kaprov could not answer Krivitsky’s question about the names of the fallen heroes: “Kaprov did not tell me the names, but instructed Mukhamedyarov and Gundilovich to do this, who compiled the list, taking information from some kind of statement or list. Thus, I have a list of the names of 28 Panfilov men who died in battle with German tanks at the Dubosekovo crossing.” |