As always, on June 22, we celebrate the day of remembrance and sorrow, when we remember the day the Great Patriotic War began, and those truly countless sacrifices on the part of our people. And as always on this day, people with inflamed liberalism experience incontinence of conscience, and they are eager to remind us of their “truth”
“I would like to remind you once again that the Soviet Union entered World War II not on June 22, 1941, but on September 17, 1939. It seems to me that we should not forget this,” writes Tamara Natanovna Eidelman, a history teacher at one of the Moscow schools.
The old song is that the USSR was the aggressor in World War II, Stalin was “Hitler’s ally,” and that means we got June 22 rightly so. In propaganda publications, one can, of course, write anything, even that Luna was founded by the first hetmans of Ukraine in the 10th millennium BC. But what is allowed to a careless schoolchild or teacher is still a little indecent.
The Second World War was a war of two coalitions, one of which is traditionally called the “Axis”, the core of which was Nazi Germany, which was gradually joined by Italy, Japan and other countries. The other in our and world historiography is traditionally called the “Allies” - the basis of this coalition was the Anglo-French alliance, which in September 1939 declared war on Germany after its attack on Poland. These allies were also gradually joined by other countries, of which by 1945 there were very, very many.
The Second World War was a war of these two coalitions - the Allies and the Axis. And to enter this war it was necessary to be in a state of war with one of the sides and join the other. In order to enter the war on September 17, 1939, the Soviet Union had to be at war with either Germany or England-France-Poland. But neither one nor the other happened.
Yes, the USSR sent its troops into Polish territory (most of it, however, was captured from Russia after the Soviet-Polish war of 1920, according to the Riga Peace Treaty). But the Soviet government justified these actions by the collapse of Polish statehood and the cessation of the functioning of the Polish government, which by that time had moved to Romania. Neither the Soviet Union declared war on Poland, nor Poland, although its officials called the USSR's actions an act of violence and a violation of international law, did not declare war on the USSR. Moreover, many Poles viewed the actions of the USSR as an attempt to limit the area occupied by Germany and, at least at first, welcomed the actions of the Soviet government.
Moreover, the British and French did not plan to declare war on the USSR. The pragmatic motivation for the actions of the Soviet government after the defeat of Poland by Germany was obvious and did not in any way dispose the allies to push the Soviet Union to the Axis side by declaring war or making any unfriendly steps. On September 18, 1939, the British cabinet stated that British guarantees for Poland apply only to the threat from Germany and there are no reasons to aggravate Soviet-British relations. Therefore, not even a protest was sent to the Soviet Union. Moreover, part of the allied press began to express the opinion that the establishment of a line of contact between the Soviet Union and Germany would inevitably bring the clash of these powers closer and objectively contribute to the entry of the USSR into the Allied camp.
Of course, the Allied camp at that moment did not know about the secret agreements between the USSR and Germany attached to the non-aggression pact, but it is extremely doubtful that these agreements, even if they were known, would have pushed the British and French to declare war on the USSR.
Thus, no entry of the USSR into World War II on September 17, 1939 occurred. The Soviet Union did not find itself in a state of war either with Germany, with which it maintained secret agreements on a number of issues (but there was no general alliance between the countries), nor with the Allies, who did not consider the actions of the USSR towards Poland a casus belli, or even with Poland itself , which, having been defeated, had neither the desire nor the ability to complicate its position by declaring war on the USSR.
Not being at war with any of the parties to the world conflict, the USSR was, of course, not a participant in World War II, regardless of what military actions it carried out separately. Just like Japan, although continuously fighting in China, did not become a participant in World War II until December 7, 1941, when it attacked the United States and Great Britain. And no matter how monstrous a crime the Nanjing Massacre was, it cannot be considered “one of the crimes of the Second World War.”
It would make sense for a history teacher to remember this, without accustoming either schoolchildren or readers to arbitrary interpretations of dates and facts. Moreover, if we leave chronological boundaries to the imagination of the creative imagination, then there is no reason to start the Second World War on September 1, 1939. Why not start it with the Anschluss of Austria? Or from the dismemberment of Czechoslovakia? And then, for example, Poland has been a participant in this war since September 30, 1938, when it annexed the Cieszyn region from Czechoslovakia? You can move the historical framework for a long time and with passion, although all this will have very little relation to science.
World War II began on September 1, 1939, and ended on September 2, 1945. And the USSR joined it on June 22, 1941, when Germany declared war on us and the Great Patriotic War began.
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September 1, 1939 Without declaring war, Germany attacked Poland. The Second World War began. September 28, 1939 In Moscow, Molotov and Ribbentrop signed another document. It was a treaty of friendship and border, which, like the non-aggression pact, was accompanied by a secret additional protocol. In accordance with it, the territory of Lithuania was included in the sphere of interests of the USSR, and Germany received in return the Lublin and part of the Warsaw Voivodeship. On September 17, 1939, under the pretext of protecting Western Belarus and Ukraine, they crossed the Soviet-Polish border. In the fall of 1939, Soviet troops entered the Baltic states. In 1940, popular governments were formed in the republics, taking power into their own hands. In 1940, the Supreme Soviet of the USSR accepted the Baltic republics into its composition.
The Finnish border was only thirty kilometers from Leningrad. The government's attempts to move the border peacefully, on the basis of mutual territorial concessions, were unsuccessful. A military conflict arose, ending on March 12, 1940. A peace treaty was signed in Moscow. Finland ceded the entire Karelian Isthmus and Vyborg to the USSR. The border from Leningrad was moved 150 km.
In the summer of 1940, Bessarabia and Northern Bukovina, seized by Romania in 1918, were included in the USSR. The Moldavian SSR was created. As a result of all these actions, the borders of the USSR were moved to the West by 250 - 300 km.
The USSR's positions in the east were also strengthened. In April 1941, a neutrality treaty was concluded with Japan.
On June 22, 1941, Nazi Germany and its allies attacked the USSR. The Great Patriotic War began.
In terms of quantitative production of weapons and equipment, the USSR surpassed Germany already in 1940; the qualitative characteristics of domestic weapons were still inferior to German ones, but even here the Soviet Union was reducing its gap, ahead of the enemy in a whole series of new technical developments. Further specialization of the industry was continued and a new economic base for the military industry was created in the Urals and other eastern regions of the USSR. The completion of the economic and military program was scheduled for 1942 - the last year of the third five-year plan. However, such calculations were refuted by the defeat and capitulation of France in the summer of 1940, which inevitably led to a reduction in the terms allotted to the USSR, but was not fully realized by the Soviet leadership. In the field of military-political leadership. There were gross miscalculations in determining the timing of the start of fascist aggression and the direction of the main attack, in overestimating the combat effectiveness and degree of combat training of one's troops and underestimating the enemy. Unjustified repressions against the leading personnel of the Armed Forces and the national economy also had a negative impact, which led to personnel confusion, especially in the highest echelon of military leadership. The army experienced a significant shortage of command and political personnel.
Despite a number of evidence of Germany’s preparation for war with the USSR, no adequate measures were taken, and the news of hostilities that began on June 22, 1941 came as a shock to I. V. Stalin and his entourage, especially in light of the famous statement on June 14, 1941 TASS about the groundlessness of rumors about a possible war. In an effort to compensate for mistakes made and prevent panic and paralysis of power. By 9 o'clock in the morning, the General Staff had prepared a draft decree of the Presidium of the USSR Armed Forces on general mobilization and the formation of Headquarters. On June 22, the mobilization of military personnel was announced, and on June 30, 1941. – a national economic mobilization plan was adopted. On June 23, the Headquarters of the High Command was created, which included People's Commissar of Defense Marshal S. G. Timoshenko (chairman), Chief of the General Staff G. K. Zhukov, I. V. Stalin, V. M. Molotov, Marshals S. M. Budyonny and K. E. Voroshilov, People's Commissar of the Navy N. G. Kuznetsov. The actual leadership of the Headquarters, which never met in full force, was in the hands of Stalin. On June 24, an Evacuation Council (L.M. Kaganovich) and the Sovinformburo were created under the Council of People's Commissars.
As a result of the unfavorable outcome of the border battles, fascist German troops advanced 350-600 km within a few weeks, captured the territory of Latvia, Lithuania, part of Estonia, Ukraine, almost all of Belarus and Moldova, part of the territory of the RSFSR, and reached Leningrad, Smolensk and Kyiv. The territory of the USSR occupied by the enemy soon exceeded 1.5 million square meters. km.
The entire course of the Great Patriotic War is divided into the following periods:
I. June 22, 1941 - November 18, 1942. This is a period of strategic defense of the Soviet Armed Forces, which ended with the transition of Soviet troops to the offensive at Stalingrad.
III. January 1944 - May 9, 1945. The defeat of the fascist bloc, the expulsion of enemy troops from the USSR, liberation from the occupation of European countries.
A separate period of the Second World War is the defeat of Japan (August 9 - September 2, 1945)..
The German army advanced forward in the main directions and by September 1941 blocked Leningrad, captured Kyiv and reached the approaches to Moscow. The first major battle, during which the fascist troops were defeated, was the battle of Moscow. It lasted from September 30, 1941 to April 20, 1942. 3 million people took part in it on both sides. As a result, Soviet troops pushed the enemy back 100 - 350 km from Moscow, but the strategic initiative continued to remain with Germany.
The Battle of Stalingrad played a decisive role. (July 17, 1942 - February 2, 1943), which marked the beginning of a radical change in the war. At some stages, over 2 million people took part in it on both sides. As a result, a group of German-Romanian troops numbering 330 thousand people was surrounded and defeated, 80 thousand German soldiers and officers, along with the commander Field Marshal von Paulus, were captured.
The Battle of Kursk, which took place from July 5 to August 23, 1943, completed the radical turning point in the war. More than 4 million people, 13 thousand tanks and self-propelled guns, and more than 12 thousand aircraft took part in it on both sides. The strategic initiative completely passed to the Soviet Army.
In the winter of 1944, Soviet troops defeated the Nazis near Leningrad, in Right Bank Ukraine, and in March entered the territory of Romania. In May 1944, Crimea was liberated. During these operations, more than 170 divisions were destroyed.
The largest operation of 1944 was the Belarusian offensive operation "Bagration", carried out from June 23 to August 29, 1944. It was carried out by troops of the Soviet 4 fronts consisting of 168 divisions and 20 brigades numbering 2.3 million people. As a result of the operation, 80 enemy divisions were defeated, 17 divisions and 3 brigades were completely destroyed, and 50 lost more than half of their strength. The Belarusian operation, having pulled back more than 50 German divisions from the western front, contributed to the opening of a second front, which began with the Normandy landing operation, which began on June 6, 1944. Landed Anglo-American troops consisting of 15 divisions broke through the German defenses and began the liberation of France. At the end of August 1944, Paris was liberated.
The fascist bloc collapsed. Fascist troops were expelled from Belgium and Northern Italy. Romania, Bulgaria, Finland and Hungary withdrew from the war. Soviet troops liberated Poland and, together with the People's Liberation Army of Yugoslavia, entered Belgrade.
In January 1945, Soviet troops began the Vistula-Oder operation, completed the liberation of Poland and reached the approaches to Berlin. In April 1945, Soviet troops launched a decisive offensive against Berlin. As a result of the 23-day operation, Soviet troops defeated the Berlin group of enemy troops and on May 2 captured the city of Berlin by storm. On May 9, Soviet troops entered Prague. The German command capitulated, the Great Patriotic War ended victoriously.
The Great Patriotic War was an integral part of the Second World War. But the Soviet Union and its Armed Forces played a decisive role in the victorious outcome of the world war. For almost 4 years, the Soviet-German front attracted the bulk of the forces and resources of fascist Germany. The USSR's losses in this war amounted to more than 20 million people.
Topic 8. The Soviet Union in the second half of the twentieth century
On September 1, 1939, fascist Germany, dreaming of world domination and revenge for defeat in the First World War, launched military operations against Poland. Thus began the Second World War - the largest military conflict of our century.
On the eve of these events, the USSR and Germany signed non-aggression and friendship treaties. There were also secret protocols that discussed the division of spheres of influence between the two states, the contents of which became public knowledge only four decades later.
The signed documents promised benefits to both parties. Germany secured its eastern borders and could calmly carry out military operations in the West, while the Soviet Union could concentrate military power in the East relatively safely for its western borders.
Having divided spheres of influence in Europe with Germany, the USSR entered into agreements with the Baltic states, into whose territory Red Army troops were soon introduced. Together with Western Ukraine, Western Belarus and Bessarabia, these lands soon became part of the Soviet Union.
As a result of hostilities with Finland, which took place from November 30, 1939 to March 1940, the Karelian Isthmus with the city of Vyborg and the northern coast of Ladoga went to the USSR. The League of Nations, defining these actions as aggression, excluded the Soviet Union from its ranks.
The short military clash with Finland revealed serious shortcomings in the organization of the USSR Armed Forces, in the level of equipment they had, as well as in the training of command personnel. As a result of mass repressions, many positions among the officer corps were occupied by specialists who did not have the necessary training.
Measures to strengthen the defense capability of the Soviet state
In March 1939, the XVIII Congress of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks adopted the fourth five-year plan, which outlined ambitious, difficult to achieve rates of economic growth. The plan focused on the development of heavy engineering, defense, metallurgical and chemical industries, and an increase in industrial production in the Urals and Siberia. The costs of producing weapons and other defense products increased sharply.
Even stricter labor discipline was introduced at industrial enterprises. Being late for work by more than 20 minutes could result in criminal penalties. A seven-day working week was introduced throughout the country.
The military and political leadership of the country did not do everything possible in strategic terms. The experience of military operations was not sufficiently analyzed; many talented high-ranking commanders and major military theorists were repressed. In the military environment of J.V. Stalin, the prevailing opinion was that the coming war for the USSR would only be offensive in nature, military operations would only take place on foreign soil.
During this period, scientists developed new types of weapons, which were soon to enter the Red Army. However, by the beginning of the Great Patriotic War this process was not completed. Many types of new equipment and weapons lacked spare parts, and the personnel of the armed forces had not yet adequately mastered the new types of weapons.
Beginning of the Great Patriotic War
In the spring of 1940, the German military command developed a plan for an attack on the USSR: the Reich army was supposed to defeat the Red Army with lightning strikes from tank groups in the North (Leningrad - Karelia), in the center (Minsk-Moscow) and in the South (Ukraine-Caucasus-Lower Volga). before winter comes.
By the spring of 1941, a military group of unprecedented scale, numbering more than 5.5 million people and a huge amount of military equipment, was brought to the western borders of the Soviet Union.
The Soviet Union was aware of the desire of German fascism to begin hostilities thanks to intelligence work. Throughout 1940 - early 1941, the government of the country received convincing information about the plans of a potential enemy. However, the leadership led by I.V. Stalin did not take these reports seriously; until the last moment they believed that Germany could not wage war in the west and in the east at once.
Only around midnight on June 21, 1941, People's Commissar of Defense S.K. Timoshenko and Chief of the General Staff G.K. Zhukov gave the order to bring the troops of the western military districts to full combat readiness. However, the directive reached some military units already at the moment when the bombing began. Only the Baltic Fleet was brought into full combat readiness, and met the aggressor with a worthy rebuff.
Guerrilla warfare
During the Great Patriotic War, a nationwide partisan struggle unfolded. Gradually, fighters and commanders from encircled units and formations joined the partisan detachments. In the spring of 1942, the Central Headquarters of the partisan movement was created in Moscow. With the expansion of the offensive operations of the Red Army, joint military operations of partisans and regular military units were increasingly carried out.
As a result of a well-executed “rail war” operation, partisan formations, disabling railways, disrupted the movement of enemy formations, and inflicted significant material damage on the enemy.
By the beginning of 1944, a large number of partisan detachments joined the army formations. The leaders of the partisan detachments S.A. Kovpak and A.F. Fedorov were twice awarded the title of Hero of the Soviet Union.
Underground groups were active together with the partisans. They organized sabotage and carried out educational work among residents of the occupied regions. Numerous information about the deployment of enemy military units, thanks to the actions of the underground, became the property of army intelligence.
Heroic home front work
Despite the sudden enemy invasion, thanks to the clear organization and heroism of millions of citizens of the country, a significant number of industrial enterprises were evacuated to the East in a short time. The main industrial production was concentrated in the Center and the Urals. Victory was forged there.
It took only a few months to not only establish the production of defense products in new areas, but also to achieve high labor productivity. By 1943, Soviet military production had significantly surpassed German production in terms of quantitative and qualitative indicators. Large-scale serial production of T-34 medium tanks, KV heavy tanks, IL-2 attack aircraft and other military equipment was established.
These successes were achieved through the selfless labor of workers and peasants, the majority of whom were women, old people and teenagers.
The patriotic spirit of the people who believed in victory was high.
Liberation of the territory of the USSR and Eastern Europe from fascism (1944-1945)
In January 1944, as a result of the successful operation of the Leningrad, Volkhov and 2nd Baltic fronts, the blockade of Leningrad was lifted. In the winter of 1944, through the efforts of three Ukrainian fronts, Right Bank Ukraine was liberated, and by the end of spring the western border of the USSR was completely restored.
Under such conditions, at the beginning of the summer of 1944, a second front was opened in Europe.
The headquarters of the Supreme High Command developed a plan, grandiose in scale and successful in tactical ideas, for the complete liberation of Soviet territory and the entry of Red Army troops into Eastern Europe with the aim of liberating it from fascist enslavement. This was preceded by one of the major offensive operations - the Belarusian one, which received the code name "Bagration".
As a result of the offensive, the Soviet Army reached the outskirts of Warsaw and stopped on the right bank of the Vistula. At this time, a popular uprising broke out in Warsaw, brutally suppressed by the Nazis.
In September-October 1944, Bulgaria and Yugoslavia were liberated. The partisan formations of these states took an active part in the hostilities of the Soviet troops, which later formed the basis of their national armed forces.
Fierce battles broke out for the liberation of the lands of Hungary, where a large group of fascist troops was located, especially in the area of Lake Balaton. For two months, Soviet troops besieged Budapest, the garrison of which capitulated only in February 1945. Only by the middle of April 1945 was the territory of Hungary completely liberated.
Under the sign of the victories of the Soviet Army, from February 4 to 11, a conference of the leaders of the USSR, USA and England was held in Yalta, at which issues of the post-war reorganization of the world were discussed. Among them are the establishment of the borders of Poland, the recognition of the USSR's demands for reparations, the question of the USSR's entry into the war against Japan, the consent of the Allied powers to the annexation of the Kuril Islands and South Sakhalin to the USSR.
April 16 - May 2 - The Berlin operation is the last major battle of the Great Patriotic War. It took place in several stages:
-capture of the Seelow Heights;
-fighting on the outskirts of Berlin;
- assault on the central, most fortified part of the city.
On the night of May 9, in the Berlin suburb of Karlshorst, the Act of Unconditional Surrender of Germany was signed.
July 17 - August 2 - Potsdam Conference of Heads of State - members of the anti-Hitler coalition. The main question is the fate of post-war Germany. Control was created. nal council is a joint body of the USSR, USA, Great Britain and France to exercise supreme power in Germany during the period of its occupation. He paid special attention to issues of the Polish-German border. Germany was subject to complete demilitarization, and the activities of the Social Nazi Party were prohibited. Stalin confirmed the USSR's readiness to take part in the war against Japan.
The US President, who had received positive results from nuclear weapons tests at the beginning of the conference, began putting pressure on the Soviet Union. Work on the creation of atomic weapons in the USSR also accelerated.
On August 6 and 9, the United States nuclear-bombed two Japanese cities, Hiroshima and Nagasaki, which had no strategic significance. The act was of a warning and threatening nature, primarily for our state.
On the night of August 9, 1945, the Soviet Union began military operations against Japan. Three fronts were formed: Transbaikal and two Far Eastern. Together with the Pacific Fleet and the Amur Military Flotilla, the selected Japanese Kwantung Army was defeated and North China, North Korea, South Sakhalin and the Kuril Islands were liberated.
On September 2, 1945, the Second World War ended with the signing of the Japanese Surrender Act on the American military cruiser Missouri.
Results of the Great Patriotic War
Of the 50 million human lives claimed by the Second World War, about 30 million fell to the Soviet Union. The material losses of our state are also enormous.
All the country's forces were thrown into achieving victory. Countries participating in the anti-Hitler coalition provided significant economic assistance.
During the Great Patriotic War, a new galaxy of commanders was born. It was rightfully headed by four-time Hero of the Soviet Union, Deputy Supreme Commander-in-Chief Georgy Konstantinovich Zhukov, twice awarded the Order of Victory.
Among the famous commanders of the Great Patriotic War are K.K. Rokossovsky, A.M. Vasilevsky, I.S. Konev and other talented military leaders who had to bear responsibility for the wrong strategic decisions made by the political leadership of the country and personally by I.V. Stalin, especially during the first, most difficult period of the Great Patriotic War.
23. USSR in the Second World War. The history of homeland23. USSR in World War II
The historiography of the war until the mid-1980s was extremely ideological, dogmatic and opportunistic. Standard formulations and assessments of events migrated from book to book. Sometimes they changed to please the ruling officials. Under Stalin, much was written about the generalissimo’s military genius; under Brezhnev, the events near Novorossiysk occupied almost the central place in the war.
Starting from the second half of the 80s, the situation with the study of the Great Patriotic War began to improve. New sources, works of foreign authors have been published, some memoirs of Soviet military commanders and economic leaders have been published without distortion, new and different approaches to the most important problems of this period have appeared: Soviet-German relations in the pre-war period, the reasons for the defeats of the Red Army at the first stage, the role of the allies and their supplies , sources of Victory, etc. There is a refusal of unambiguous assessments.
Historians have paid attention to new problems - collaborationism, mass consciousness during the war, etc.
23.1. On the eve of the war
The causes and origins of the Great Patriotic War should certainly be sought in the complex tangle of international relations of the pre-war years, especially in the events of 1939, which culminated in the division of Poland and the annexation of Western Ukraine and Western Belarus (September 1939), the war with Finland (November 1939). - March 1940), inclusion of the Baltic states, Northern Bukovina and Bessarabia into the USSR (summer 1940). All these actions clearly confirm Stalin's imperial aspirations during this period.
Among the arguments in favor of rapprochement with Germany, apparently, was the calculation of taking advantage of the contradictions in the camp of imperialism. Stalin hoped that the war between the two imperialist groups would lead to the weakening of both Germany and England and France, which the Soviet Union could take advantage of.
Of course, the Soviet leadership understood the inevitability of war with Germany and prepared the country for this war. The period of actual cooperation with the Nazi Reich was quite short. Already in November 1940, a gradual cooling of Soviet-German relations was observed. The USSR is making diplomatic moves (albeit very cautious) for the German invasion of Greece and Yugoslavia, the entry of German troops into Romania and Finland and other similar actions.
The preparations for war are also evidenced by the internal policies of the Soviet leadership: tightening legislation in the field of labor relations, introducing criminal liability for violations in this area. Efforts were made to equip the army with modern technology; strengthening the officer corps (in 1940, 42 new military schools were created, the number of students at military academies was almost doubled, and numerous courses for training junior lieutenants were established).
In the spring of 1941, a wide stream of information flowed to the Soviet leadership about Germany’s preparations for an attack on the USSR. This was reported by Soviet intelligence officers from different countries, figures of the international communist movement, information about this went through diplomatic channels. Closer to the summer, the exact date of Germany's attack on the USSR even became known - June 22, 1941. But at the same time, a number of steps by Stalin and his entourage in the last pre-war months may cause bewilderment. Already having an idea of Hitler's intentions, Stalin concludes a trade agreement with Germany on January 10, 1941, according to which he supplies it with food and strategic raw materials. Diplomatic representatives of Belgium, Norway, and Yugoslavia are expelled from Moscow. Thus, the Soviet Union seems to agree with the inclusion of these countries in the German Reich. And the most odious step:
TASS message dated June 14, 1941, which spoke of the invariably friendly relations of the USSR with Germany. The message published in the press clearly disoriented the population and was seemingly illogical on the eve of the inevitable war with Germany. This also includes permission for the Germans to “search for the graves” of German soldiers who died in the First World War and were buried on our territory. As a result, just before the war, groups of German intelligence officers walked around the rear of our troops under the guise of “searching for graves.”
The most common point of view explaining all these “oddities” is as follows. Stalin perfectly understood the country’s unpreparedness for war and wanted to delay it, to gain some more time to increase its defense capability.
And for this it was decided to demonstrate friendliness towards Germany, so as not to give it a reason to start a war. Moreover, ultimately, the fear of provocations and the desire to avoid war in 1941 grew in Stalin into a manic confidence in the fulfillment of this desire, into “blinded stubbornness”, which comes into conflict with the arguments of the mind. As a result, Stalin, despite all the information that came to him in the last days and hours before the German attack and testified to the imminent outbreak of war, did not dare to take the only right step - to bring the army into full combat readiness and declare mobilization.
Recently, the theory of Germany's preventive war against the Soviet Union, set out in a number of books by V. Suvorov, has become widely circulated and has caused great controversy. According to this theory, Stalin really wanted to delay the time the USSR entered the war and was ready to pay the highest price for this. But he did not need this time to prepare the country for defense. Stalin hoped to strike Germany himself. This desire is actually a logical conclusion to the actions of the Soviet leadership in 1939-1940. By concluding a non-aggression pact in 1939, Stalin hoped that Germany and England and France would exhaust each other in a protracted war. And the Soviet Union will join the war at the final stage, defeating both weakened capitalist groups and realizing the long-standing Bolshevik dream of a world revolution in the Stalinist sense.
A number of facts seem to indicate that the USSR is preparing for an offensive: the appointment in 1941 of the Chief of the General Staff G.K. Zhukov, the winner at Khalkhin Gol, who showed himself well during the January headquarters game, where options for offensive actions were practiced; increasing replenishment, but not yet in mobilization order, of units in the western districts; the movement of five armies from the interior of the country to the west; the creation in Ukraine of a strong operational force of 60 divisions, the formation of an airborne corps there, the reorganization of four rifle divisions of the Ukrainian district into mountain divisions (in mostly flat Ukraine); the construction of airfields near the western border, the movement of military warehouses to the border, which makes sense in preparation for an offensive; disarmament of fortified areas on the old border and neglect of their construction on the new one; Stalin’s speech on May 5, 1941 to graduates of military academies, in which the Soviet leader formulated the main task as follows: the time has come “to move from defense to a military policy of offensive actions.” After this speech in May-June 1941, steps were taken to change party and political propaganda among the population and in the Red Army. The essence of these changes is that the most serious enemy of the USSR is Germany, a military clash with it is not far off, and it is necessary to prepare for offensive actions. The only dissonance in this series is the mentioned TASS message of June 14, 1941; at the General Staff in May 1941, after Stalin’s speech on May 5, a plan for a “preemptive strike” of the Red Army was developed, according to which it was planned to deliver the main blow from the territory of Ukraine through Czechoslovakia, cutting off Germany from its southern allies and Romanian oil.
And it seems that this plan has begun to be implemented in practice. But to complete the preparation of the army, to complete the concentration of troops for the offensive in June 1941, some more time was required, perhaps several months. It was this time that Stalin wanted to win by demonstrating friendliness towards Germany. But all these facts have another explanation. Stalin did not intend to attack Germany first, but in the event of its aggression against the USSR, he planned to repel the first blow on the border and, with the help of powerful offensive actions, defeat the enemy on its territory.
In any case, in the summer of 1941, two large-scale plans collided, each of which carried enormous dangers for all of humanity. Hitler was only ahead of Stalin at the beginning of the implementation of his plan. Our troops turned out to be unprepared for either offensive or defensive actions.
23.2. Entry of the USSR into the Second World War. The first period of the Great Patriotic War
On June 22, 1941, Nazi Germany attacked the USSR. According to the “Barbarossa” plan (a plan for Germany’s attack on the USSR), the German command expected to capture the most important industrial and political centers of our country - Moscow, Leningrad, Donbass and others - in a few months, defeat the main forces of the Red Army in the first battles and prevent their retreat inland. It intended to achieve its goals through coordinated actions of four groupings - the Finnish group, army groups “North”, “Center”, “South”, delivering powerful attacks with their tank and mechanized formations on the flanks and rear of the Red Army.
Germany and its allies concentrated on the borders of the USSR 164 divisions numbering 4,733,990 people, 41,293 artillery pieces and mortars, 3,899 tanks, 4,841 aircraft.
The Soviet Union in the border districts had 174 divisions numbering 2,780,000 people, 43,872 guns and mortars, 10,394 tanks (of which 1,325 were T-34 and KV) and 8,154 aircraft (of which 1,540 were new designs).
In border battles, Soviet troops suffered a crushing defeat and were forced to retreat. By mid-July, 28 Soviet divisions were completely defeated, 70 divisions lost over 50% of their personnel and equipment. The total human losses amounted to over 1 million people. In total, 3,468 aircraft, about 6 thousand tanks, more than 20 thousand guns, 30% of all ammunition reserves, 50% of all fuel and fodder reserves were lost. The troops of the Western Front suffered the greatest losses. By July 10, German troops advanced deep into Soviet territory: in the main, western direction by 450-600 km, in the north-west - by 450-500 km, in the south-west - by 300-350 km.
For comparison: German losses during the same period amounted to about 100 thousand people, 900 aircraft, less than 1 thousand tanks. What are the reasons for such a catastrophic start to the war for our country?
First of all, it is worth saying about the degree of readiness of the USSR for war, and real, and not according to the assessment of Soviet leaders. This, first of all, should include the combat readiness of the armed forces: their deployment, technical equipment, and combat training.
From the data presented it is clear that in quantitative terms the Germans had an advantage only in personnel, but in the main types of weapons there was either equality or even our advantage. At the same time, we can definitely talk about the qualitative superiority of only fascist aviation over Soviet aircraft of old brands. There were few new aircraft (Yak-1, MiG-3, LaGG-3). In all other types of weapons, the Germans did not have a noticeable qualitative superiority. We were already armed with tanks such as the T-34 and KV, which in some respects were even superior to enemy tanks, and in sufficient quantity - 1325 against 1634 German medium tanks T-111, T-1U.
Thus, there was no great qualitative superiority of German technology. This means that the first place comes to the question of using the available forces of the Red Army, of the ability to properly dispose of them. This is the skill that our military-political leadership lacked. A number of major political mistakes and military-strategic miscalculations were made. Among such miscalculations and mistakes the following are traditionally named.
1. Miscalculation in determining the possible time of attack by Git-Yaer Germany. As a result, we fell behind in the concentration of troops and in the creation of powerful offensive groupings; the enemy achieved superiority in forces and means in the main directions.
2. Miscalculation in determining the direction of the enemy’s main attack. Stalin insisted that the Germans would concentrate their main forces in the south to capture Ukraine, Donbass - large agricultural and industrial areas. And that is why Soviet troops strengthened primarily the southern direction. However, the Germans delivered the main blow in the Smolensk-Moscow direction.
3. Another major mistake of a military-strategic nature was the Soviet command’s incorrect assessment of the initial period of the war. It was believed that during this period both sides would begin hostilities with only part of their forces, while the main forces would enter the war in two weeks, i.e. The Soviet command set limited goals at the first stage of the war. The Nazis immediately brought all available forces into battle in order to seize the strategic initiative and defeat the enemy.
4. The offensive mood also had an effect - they were going to beat the enemy on foreign territory, having stopped him in border battles, they immediately intended to go on the offensive. Therefore, the troops were not taught to defend themselves, they did not build sufficiently powerful defensive structures on the new border, and all this had an effect already in the first hours and days of the war.
Even if we accept the version that the USSR was preparing to attack Germany first, the listed mistakes and miscalculations did not make it possible to achieve success in 1941 in this case either. The Soviet military command made timid attempts to show Stalin the need to put troops on combat readiness, announce mobilization and other measures. However, Stalin categorically forbade this.
And here we come to the root of all troubles. Whether we accept the version that the Soviet Union is preparing offensive actions or adhere to the traditional point of view, in both cases the main sources of errors and miscalculations lie in the system of power that developed in the USSR in the 30s, in dictatorial autocracy, when the mistakes of the first person took on a fateful character for the country. Many decisions with far-reaching consequences were made by Stalin alone, and any fundamental disagreement with his views could quickly be regarded as “opposition”, “political immaturity” with all the ensuing consequences. The intimidation of the people, the affirmation of the stereotype about the genius of only one person, the need for mandatory approval of any decisions of Stalin practically did not allow the possibility of a multivariate analysis of the real situation, the search for possible alternatives. Thus, the channels for receiving objective information, original proposals, and searching for non-standard solutions were blocked. The Secretary General, as a rule, was told what he wanted to hear. Often they tried to guess his wishes. Such a system of power demanded not intelligence, talent and independence, but the ability to please the authorities and quickly carry out his “brilliant” instructions. And, as a result, incompetence triumphed in all echelons of power.
It was this incompetence that fatally affected the combat training of the Red Army before the war. During the pre-war years, the People's Commissariat of Defense was headed by the amateur K.E. Voroshilov, his deputy was S.M. Budyonny. The head of the Main Artillery Directorate of the People's Commissariat was G.I. Sandpiper. All of them were awarded the rank of marshal, although none of them had military knowledge to the extent of a battalion commander. Under their leadership, shagism was introduced into the army; many simplifications and conventions were allowed in the training of troops, and all this significantly reduced the combat readiness of the army. S.K. Tymoshenko, who replaced Voroshilov as People's Commissar after the inglorious war with Finland, took measures to improve combat training, but it was impossible to make up for many years of lost time in a year. As a result, all this had to be learned on the battlefield, which cost the lives of hundreds of thousands of people.
The real crime of Stalin and his entourage against the country was the repressions of the 30s, which were an important tool in the establishment and functioning of dictatorial autocracy. They most directly affected the quality of the Red Army officer corps before the war. In 1937-1938 About 40 thousand officers were purged from the army. Repression continued in subsequent years, although its scope decreased. The senior command staff suffered especially hard. From 1937 to 1941, 9 deputy people's commissars of defense, 2 people's commissars of the Navy, 4 heads of the Intelligence Directorate of the General Staff, 4 air force commanders, all fleet and district commanders and many others died. In total, about 600 senior officials were killed. On the fronts of the Great Patriotic War, 294 generals and admirals were killed or died from wounds over four years. The repression led to a huge turnover of personnel: tens of thousands of officers received new appointments every year. In the summer of 1941, in a number of military districts, up to half of the officers were in their positions from 6 months to one year. The level of their military education did not meet the requirements of the time. Only 7% of the commanders of the Red Army had a higher military education in 1941, and 37% did not even complete a full course of study at secondary military educational institutions. For high-quality training of mid-level officers, even in the presence of a well-organized training system, experience shows that it takes 5-10 years, not to mention the high command. The quality of training during that period decreased, since the works of the most prominent Soviet military theorists who were repressed during these years were removed from the training programs - M.N. Tukhachevsky, A.A. Svechina, A.I. Egorova, etc.
The bloody purges also affected those officers who remained in the army. Many were afraid to take the initiative and make serious decisions, since if they failed, they could be accused of deliberate sabotage. In an atmosphere of mistrust and suspicion, careerists and demagogues quickly advanced through the ranks.
Public defamation of commanders undermined the confidence in them on the part of the Red Army soldiers. The most detrimental phenomenon for a military organization arose - distrust in command personnel, which again affected the level of combat training of units and formations.
All this manifested itself in the most terrible way during the difficult days of 1941 and became one of the main reasons for the defeats of our troops. The commanders were afraid to take the initiative, make independent decisions, waited for orders from above, the rank and file did not trust their commanders, did not know how to defend themselves, and were terrified of enemy aircraft. In conditions of a highly maneuverable war with the massive use of tanks and aircraft by the enemy, these factors led to the fact that Soviet troops were surrounded, and there were frequent cases of panic and flight.
The question arises: how could one prepare for some kind of offensive war given such a situation in the army? Apparently, this is again a consequence of complete incompetence and amateurism in the country's top political leadership. Did Stalin understand how difficult it was to train a regiment commander, much less an army or front commander? Did you understand that of the 29 mechanized corps that he spoke about in his speech on May 5, 1941, most had not yet become a real military force and were not fully equipped with equipment and people? Apparently not completely. Stalin was essentially an amateur in military matters, but nevertheless considered himself entitled to command. And his intervention in the conduct of hostilities during the war, as a rule, led to huge casualties and major defeats. The most famous case is his categorical ban on the retreat of Soviet troops from Kyiv in August-September 1941, which led to the encirclement and capture of more than 600 thousand of our soldiers.
The failures of the first months at the front led to the destabilization of local and military government in many areas and caused socio-political tension in the rear. In the first weeks and months of the war, there were repeated cases of desertion from the Red Army, evasion of mobilization, and surrender. There were especially many such cases with conscripts from the western regions of Ukraine and Belarus. In the rear, facts of negative sentiment and statements criticizing the actions of the regime were noted. For example, from a secret report from the NKVD about the mood in the Arkhangelsk region, we learn that there is talk among workers, peasants and even leading party officials: “Everyone said that we would beat the enemy on his territory. It turns out the other way around... Our government fed the Germans for two years, it would be better to stockpile food for its army and for the people, otherwise now we will all face hunger.” Similar statements were recorded by internal affairs and state security agencies in Moscow and other places. They said that there was no united rear in the country, and even predicted anti-Soviet uprisings. There was a defeatist mood. Some even had certain hopes for the arrival of the Germans. It was often repeated in such statements that the German occupation did not threaten the common people, only Jews and communists would suffer. They hoped that the Germans would abolish the collective farm system.
Of course, there is no point in talking about the widespread, mass character of such sentiments, especially defeatism. The predominance was patriotic statements, the desire of the Soviet people to defend their Motherland, as evidenced by the large number of volunteers who wanted to join the army ahead of schedule. However, the very fact of the existence of such sentiments, anti-Soviet statements, which are still not isolated, indicates the presence of crisis phenomena in the relationship between the ruling regime and the people. And this, again, was a consequence of the regime’s policies in the pre-war years. Throughout the 30s, the Stalinist leadership practically waged a war against its own people (collectivization, dispossession, mass repression), thereby not at all contributing to the unity of society.
To overcome the growing crisis of power, Stalin took the path of tightening repression. On August 26, 1941, the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command issued Order No. 270, calling for deserters to be shot on the spot, and their families to be arrested if they are officers, and to be deprived of state benefits and assistance if they are Red Army soldiers. No less cruel was the resolution of the State Defense Committee of November 17, 1941, authorizing the NKVD to carry out capital sentences of military tribunals without their approval by the highest judicial authorities, and also authorizing the Special Meeting of the NKVD to impose appropriate penalties, up to and including execution, according to facts about counter-revolutionary crimes, especially dangerous acts of state. Moreover, almost any action could fit into this category during the war. Criminal liability was established for failure to fulfill government tasks, unauthorized departure from an enterprise was equated to desertion, etc.
At the front, NKVD troops were sent to the front line to combat panic and desertion, and barrage detachments were created. It is difficult to give an unambiguous assessment of all these decrees and measures. In conditions of disorganization, military defeats, and the presence of negative sentiments among the population, the regime was forced to take these brutal measures. And they yielded results, helping to reduce the number of negative moods. But we must not forget that it was the actions and inactions of the Stalinist regime in the pre-war years that led to the catastrophic situation in the first months of the war.
Along with tough measures to restore order in the army and rear, other measures were taken to transfer the country to a war footing. A reorganization of the administration of the army and the country was carried out: on June 23, 1941, the Headquarters of the Main Command (later the Supreme High Command) was created under the chairmanship of Stalin. She was entrusted with the leadership of the Armed Forces during the war. On June 30, the State Defense Committee was formed - an emergency body in whose hands all power in the country was concentrated. Stalin also became the chairman of the State Defense Committee. Thus, there was a further concentration of power in the hands of one person - Stalin.
One of the most important tasks for the country was the restructuring of the economy on a war footing: the evacuation of enterprises, equipment, and livestock from the western regions; the fastest possible expansion of military production (especially in view of the huge losses of weapons and equipment in the initial period of the war); solving the problem of providing the national economy with workers (most of the male population was drafted into the army).
Already on June 24, 1941, the Evacuation Council was created, and on June 30, the Labor Distribution Committee was created. During the war, the final touches were made to the system of barracks economy with the mechanism of total mobilization, the foundations of which arose in the pre-war period. June 26, 1941 The decree allowed the establishment of mandatory overtime work lasting from 1 to 3 hours per day. The decree also provided for tougher penalties for leaving the enterprise. By January 1942, the number of people convicted of leaving the enterprise was about 311 thousand people. In February 1942, it was announced that the entire working-age urban population would be mobilized to work in production and construction. Other sources of replenishment of the national economy with labor were: military conscription for alternative service of reservists, unfit for military service for health reasons, but fit for physical labor, as well as the human resources of the NKVD Gulag. The presence of a large contingent of prisoners and the ease of managing the camp labor system made it possible to quickly create and expand specialized or independent enterprises. By the beginning of 1945, among the enterprises that manufactured F-1, RG-42 grenade bodies and parts for other grenades, there were 6 enterprises of the People's Commissariat of Ammunition and 9 factories of forced labor colonies of the NKVD Gulag. Prison labor was widely used in the construction of factories, railways, etc.
In agriculture, working conditions were also tightened. Since February 1942, the mandatory minimum workdays for collective farmers increased by 1.5 times. The minimum extended to children 12-16 years old, criminal penalties were introduced for failure to meet it, and even a simple list of relevant violators, certified by an accountant, could serve as the basis for prosecution. Mobilization of the population for agricultural work was practiced. Refusal to do so was again subject to criminal penalties. Moreover, the authorities were guided by the principle “it is better to over-bend than to under-bend.”
However, the tightening of labor relations was combined during the war years with incentives to complete tasks. Its methodology was based on the use of the low standard of living of the population with rationed rationing and difficult wage conditions. As incentives, they used food (additional rations, cold breakfasts, etc.), closed rationed trade in manufactured goods, and resorted to financial levers (bonus, piecework wages). The sale of alcohol was also used to stimulate labor. In the active army, the process of promotion in rank was accelerated, and the awarding of orders and medals was widely used as incentives.
Moreover, during the war, serious changes occur in the functioning mechanism of the state apparatus itself, economic policy, and ideology. Along with the strengthening of centralization, opposite processes also took place - the expansion of the powers of lower bodies and structures, the encouragement of initiative from below. On July 1, 1941, the resolution of the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR “On expanding the rights of the People's Commissars of the USSR in wartime conditions” was adopted. They began to pay less attention to various bureaucratic procedures. In a critical situation for the country, and for the regime in particular, efficiency came first, rather than following instructions. During the war, at the front and in the rear, the demand for initiative, independence, and competence increased sharply. The criteria for the formation of command personnel in the army have changed especially noticeably.
During the war years, there was a more tolerant attitude of the authorities towards the personal farms of collective farmers and towards the sale of their products on the free market. The peasants did not die of hunger only thanks to their personal farming, since they received practically nothing on collective farms. At the same time, the free market was a very important source of food for the urban population: it provided up to 50% of the food consumption of city residents.
No less important changes have occurred in politics and ideology. There is a rejection of revolutionary, internationalist terminology in propaganda. The authorities are now appealing to traditional Russian patriotism, turning to the heroic past, which the revolution surrounded with contempt. In Stalin's speech on July 3, 1941, in his speech at the parade on November 7, 1941, there is a call to be inspired by the courageous images of our great ancestors - Alexander Nevsky, Dmitry Donskoy, Kuzma Minin and Dmitry Pozharsky, Suvorov and Kutuzov. In line with these changes, there was also an expansion of the scope of the church’s activities during the war years, especially since 1943, permission to open new churches, and the restoration of the patriarchate. The explanation for these changes lies in the desire of the authorities to maximally mobilize the forces of the people to repel the enemy. In conditions of constant deprivation, for many Soviet citizens, religion gave strength for life and work.
23.3. A turning point during the war
Despite the truly catastrophic start of the war for the Soviet Union, it should be said that the plans of the German command were not fully implemented. The enemy hoped, having defeated the main forces of our troops in border battles, thereby demoralizing the population and army and moving towards Moscow without encountering much resistance. His calculations were not destined to come true. Having overcome the shock of border defeats, our units resisted the enemy with ever-increasing strength.
The decisive event of the first year of the Great Patriotic War was the Battle of Moscow, which took place from October 1941 to March 1942 and included two stages: defensive - until December
1941 and the counter-offensive of Soviet troops from December 6, 1941, as a result of which the enemy was thrown back 100-200 km from Moscow. This battle finally buried the hopes of the fascist command for a quick outcome of the war. The war became protracted. As a result of a successful counteroffensive, Soviet troops seized the strategic initiative. The victory near Moscow, naturally, affected the mood and morale of the Soviet people.
After the victory near Moscow, the strategic initiative passed to the Soviet Union. However, once again the influence of Stalin’s dictatorial autocracy took its toll. At his insistence, despite the protests of the command, in the spring of 1942, offensive operations were undertaken simultaneously in several directions - attempts to unblock Leningrad (April-June), offensives in the Crimea and near Kharkov (May). This led to a scattering of forces and resources. The consequences of miscalculations in the planning of these operations were severe defeats. The strategic initiative again passed to the German command. From the end of June 1942, it launched an offensive on the southern sector of the Soviet-German front. Again there were cases of escape, panic, again encirclement and captivity. By the autumn of 1942, the Wehrmacht reached the foothills of the Caucasus, German units entered Stalingrad. And again, to restore order, the authorities resort to repressive measures (the famous decree No. 227 “Not a step back”). And again, the courage and tenacity of an ordinary soldier, the growing tenacity of the resistance stopped the enemy, allowed the Soviet command to gather reinforcements and prepare a counter-offensive. As a result of the successful counter-offensive at Stalingrad (November 1942 - February 1943), the Germans lost up to 1.5 million people. The counteroffensive grew into a general offensive in many sectors of the Soviet-German front: fascist troops rolled back from the Caucasus, most of the Donbass was liberated, and the blockade of Leningrad was broken. The Battle of Stalingrad marked the beginning of a radical change in the course of the war. The completion of this turning point was the Battle of Kursk (July-August 1943), when the German command tried to once again seize the strategic initiative. But his plans were not destined to come true; the Germans suffered a crushing defeat. As a result of the summer-autumn offensive of 1943, Soviet troops reached the Dnieper and liberated Kyiv and Novorossiysk. Until the end of the war, German troops no longer succeeded in major offensive operations.
In 1944, Soviet troops consistently carried out major strategic offensive operations along the entire front. In January, the blockade of Leningrad was finally lifted. At the same time, an offensive was launched in Ukraine. During the spring, Right Bank Ukraine, Crimea, and Moldova were liberated. In the summer, Soviet troops drove out the invaders from Belarus and the Baltic states, completely clearing Soviet land. In the fall, successful operations were carried out in Eastern and Southeastern Europe. The Nazis were expelled from Romania, Bulgaria, large parts of Poland and Hungary. In January 1945, a new offensive of our units began in Poland, which ended with the Berlin operation (April 16 - May 8, 1945). The last battles took place on May 9 in Prague.
On May 8, 1945, under the chairmanship of G.K. Zhukov, representatives of all allied countries in the Berlin suburb of Karlhorst signed an act of unconditional surrender of Germany. The terrible war, which claimed millions of lives, destroyed thousands of settlements and industrial enterprises, has ended.
23.4. Origins of Victory
What allowed the Soviet Union, despite the severe defeats of the first stage of the war, to survive and win? For a long time, the same formulations circulated in our literature as the reasons for our Victory - about the unshakable friendship of peoples, the leading role of the party, the indestructible power of the socialist economy, the patriotism of the Soviet people. But the real picture, of course, was much more complicated. There is still a fairly widespread point of view that one of the conditions for Victory was the economic system that developed in the USSR back in the 30s - the barracks economy with its strict centralization and system of total mobilization. But this same economic system led to mistakes and miscalculations, which resulted in delays in the development and mass production of the latest types of weapons, including the famous Katyushas, T-34 tanks, etc. Nevertheless, the Soviet economy allowed, albeit at the cost of enormous efforts and sacrifices on the part of the people, quickly concentrate material and human resources in key areas (which was especially important in conditions when industrial potential as a result of the loss of a huge territory decreased, and human reserves were limited). And already in 1943, the Soviet Union was able to surpass Germany in the production of military equipment, which was of enormous importance for the Second World War, the war of technology.
It should be noted that during the war years there were tendencies towards abandoning some features of this economy - formalism, excessive bureaucratization. Initiative and independence of lower-level structures are encouraged, without which it was simply impossible to evacuate industrial enterprises in such a short time and establish production in a new location. In addition, none of the countries that participated in the Second World War knew such imbalances between production and consumption, between the military and civilian sectors of the economy. And this further reduced the standard of living of the people. Of course, the decline in well-being during the war occurred in all countries, but, perhaps, nowhere as severely as in ours.
Of course, the effective functioning of such an economy was possible only if the people agreed to endure all these hardships and understood the need for military mobilization measures to achieve Victory. That is, the decisive role was played by the position of the people, their attitude towards the war, towards the enemy, towards the authorities. The policies of the Stalinist elite in the 30s did not contribute to the unity of society. The existence of socio-political opposition and separatist tendencies among a number of nationalities was manifested in the so-called “negative” sentiments of the population in the first months of the war, in a fairly significant number of people who collaborated with the fascists in the occupied territory. Suffice it to say that about 1 million former Soviet citizens fought on the side of the Germans. Perhaps for the first time since the internecine wars of the XII-XIV centuries. Russians fought on the side of the enemy against their own state (of course, not only for political reasons).
However, patriotism still prevailed in the mood of the overwhelming majority of the population. Another question is what kind of patriotism? What was the subject of patriotic loyalty, for which Motherland did the Soviet people fight and work? For some people, especially for those whose adult life fell in the 30s, the Motherland merged with the political regime of Stalin; they saw great advantages in the socio-political system of the USSR in the 30s; significant social gains were associated with it: free education, medical care, the absence of obvious unemployment, which they went to defend in the war.
But, apparently, traditional Russian patriotism, traditional folk readiness for courage and selfless defense of the Fatherland from an external enemy played a much larger role in people’s behavior. The top Soviet leadership understood this very well. According to the former special representative of the American President in the USSR A. Harriman, in September 1941 Stalin told him: “We have no illusions that they (Russian people) are fighting for us. They are fighting for their mother Russia.” And the most striking confirmation of this is that at the most critical moments of the war, official propaganda resorted to heroic images and events of Russia’s past, appealed specifically to the national feelings of the population and practically did not use the term “socialist homeland.” Russian and Soviet patriotism could well be combined with a critical attitude towards the country's leadership. Among the negative statements there are quite a lot of critical characteristics of the country's leadership and its policies in the pre-war period, but the need to fight against the fascists is not questioned. For example, the words of a worker from the Kaluga region that he will go to defend Soviet land, but not those who sit in the Kremlin. The dominant people's attitude to the events were the following thoughts: a war is going on on our land, an enemy has attacked, cruel, merciless, who has set himself the goal of destroying our state, our culture, exterminating a significant part of the population, the enemy is pushing further and further, the country, our native land, your home needs to be protected, saved - what kind of disputes and conversations can there be? And the people stood up to defend the Motherland, as they stood up in the Patriotic War of 1812, as they stood up centuries earlier. Famous words of L.N. Tolstoy’s talk about the “club of the people’s war,” which nailed the French until the entire invasion was destroyed, can be fully attributed to the war of 1941-1945. It was truly a people's war, which was recognized by the political regime that existed in the USSR at that time. The authorities could only rely on the mass patriotism of the Soviet people, on their willingness to endure material hardships and deprivations, their willingness to sacrifice their lives to protect the Motherland and thereby save themselves.
The Stalinist regime took full advantage of these sentiments of the people, while not really trusting them, mediocrely squandering the fruits of mass patriotism. The government systematically withheld information from the people about the true situation in the war, and widely used the most brutal repressive methods of management, even when it was quite possible to do without them. The NKVD played no less a role during the war than before it. Just look at the fate of the people's militia, when in the summer and autumn of 1941 many qualified specialists, workers who were very necessary for the military economy, were sent to the front, poorly trained and equipped, in order to die there without much damage to the enemy. The Stalinist regime did not spare people in peacetime, and was even less ready to take care of human lives in wartime, saving its own existence. The principle of achieving goals at any cost triumphed. Time after time, units were sent into the bloody meat grinder of poorly organized battles to die there to the last man. Even at the last stage of the war, having a colossal advantage in technology and weapons, we often did not use this advantage. Infantry often attacked enemy defenses head-on without sufficient air and artillery support; the capture of cities was timed to coincide with the dates of revolutionary holidays, etc. The last major operation of the Soviet troops - Berlin - was carried out rather for political reasons - to prevent the Allies from getting ahead of the USSR and being the first to enter the German capital. As a result, more than 100 thousand were killed, victims that could have been avoided.
The formation of an anti-fascist coalition, in which the leading positions were occupied by the USSR, England, the USA and France, played a major role in the defeat of fascism. In the face of a terrible danger, ideological differences were temporarily forgotten. The Soviet people received significant support from supplies of equipment, weapons, and food from the allies, especially at a critical moment in the first period of the war; the diversion of German troops to conduct combat operations in other regions of the world also had an impact. The anti-fascist coalition was the basis of the post-war world order, which made it possible, despite all the difficulties, to avoid sliding into a new world war. But mutual distrust and ideological contradictions reappeared as soon as the final turning point in the war took place. The USSR's allies deliberately delayed the opening of a second front in Europe, which clearly prolonged the war. The motives of the Allies can be understood and explained, but they cannot be justified, since Soviet soldiers paid for this with millions of their lives.
The exact number of our losses during the Great Patriotic War is still unknown. The latest more or less reliable figure is 26.6 million total human losses directly from the fighting, who died of hunger and disease, who perished in captivity. Of these, the losses of the armed forces of the USSR were 11,944,100 people. The losses of the Wehrmacht and its allies on the Soviet-German front, according to various sources, ranged from 6 million to 8 million people. This unfavorable ratio of losses between the Wehrmacht and the Red Army is largely a consequence of the Soviet Union waging a war with “big blood.” And this is another crime of the Stalinist regime against the people.
Our people won the Great Patriotic War. It was his original patriotism, readiness for self-sacrifice, willingness to selflessly endure need and deprivation, ability to fight and work without thinking about himself that played a decisive role in the Victory. With their blood, the people paid for the mistakes and crimes of the Stalinist leadership in the pre-war and war years, but it was not this leadership that saved and saved, not Stalin and the Communist Party, but the Motherland and themselves.
Plan
1.World War II: beginning, causes, nature, scale, main stages.
2. Domestic and foreign policy of the Soviet state in 1939 – 1941.
3. Attack of Nazi Germany on the USSR. Failure of the “blitzkrieg” war plan (June 1941 – November 1942).
4. A radical turning point during the Great Patriotic War (November 1942-1943).
5. Liberation of Soviet territory. The victorious conclusion of the Great Patriotic War (1944-1945).
6. Sources of the victory of the Soviet people in the Great Patriotic War.
1. World War II: beginning, causes, nature, scale, main stages.
The start date of World War II is September 1, 1939, when Germany treacherously attacked Poland. England, which provided Poland with guarantees, and France, bound with Poland by a non-aggression pact, declared war on Germany on September 3, 1939. Thus began the Second World War.
What are the causes of war? Historians have differing opinions on this issue. Some (mostly Western historians) argue that the war was caused by the extremism of the Fuhrer, the intractability of neighboring states, the injustice of the Versailles Treaty, overpopulation in Germany, etc. Others are trying to blame the Soviet Union. Allegedly, it was his fault that negotiations on the creation of a collective security system in Europe were disrupted. He is accused of signing a non-aggression pact (August 23, 1939) with Germany.
The true causes of the war are hidden by bourgeois historiography. There are two trends at work in the world of capital: the desire for unification in the fight against socialism and the deepening of contradictions between individual capitalist states and their coalitions. The second trend turned out to be stronger. The expansionist interests of the Nazi Reich came into conflict with the interests of the monopolies of the Western powers.
By its nature, the war was imperialist, reactionary, aggressive, and unjust.
The culprits of this war are not only the fascist states: Germany, Italy and militaristic Japan, but also England and France, who refused to take joint steps with the USSR to create a system of collective security in Europe and sought to pit Germany against the Soviet Union. This is evidenced by the Munich Agreement of Germany, England, France and Italy in 1938, which was discussed in the previous lecture.
The war began in 1939 and lasted 6 years. 72 states took part in it. 110 million people were mobilized in the army. The area of military operations was five times larger than during World War I, the number of aircraft was 4 times larger, the number of guns was 8 times larger, and the number of tanks was 30 times larger.
During the Second World War, historians distinguish five periods.
The first period (September 1939 – June 1941) – the beginning of the war and the invasion of German troops into Western Europe.
The second period (June 1941 - November 1942) - the attack of Nazi Germany on the USSR, the expansion of the scale of the war, the collapse of Hitler's blitzkrieg doctrine and the myth of the invincibility of the German army.
The third period (November 1942 – December 1943) was a radical turning point in the course of the entire Second World War, the collapse of the offensive strategy of the fascist bloc.
The fourth period (January 1944 - May 1945) - the defeat of the fascist bloc, the expulsion of enemy troops from the USSR, the creation of a second front, liberation from the occupation of European countries, the complete collapse of Germany and its unconditional surrender.
Fifth period (May - September 1945) – the defeat of imperialist Japan, the liberation of the peoples of Asia from Japanese occupation and the end of World War II.
2. Domestic and foreign policy of the Soviet state in 1939 – 1941.
In the context of the outbreak of World War II, the USSR continued to implement the third five-year plan, the main objectives of which were the further development of industrial production, agriculture, transport, defense power, and increasing the living standards of the population. Particular attention was paid to the development of the production base in the East.
In 1940, the country's industry produced 45% more output than in 1937. Compared to 1913, the output of large-scale industry in 1940 was almost 12 times greater, and that of mechanical engineering - 35 times greater (History of the USSR. 1917-1978, M., 1979, p. 365).
Defense expenditures grew: in 1938 they amounted to 21.3% of the budget expenditures (57 billion rubles).
The government has taken a number of measures to strengthen the country's defense capabilities.
· The Red Army switched to personnel status;
· Its number increased to 5.3 million people;
· The law on universal conscription was adopted (September 1939);
· The production of military equipment has increased and its quality has improved.
From 1939 to June 1941 alone, 125 new divisions were formed. More than 105 thousand light and heavy machine guns, 100 thousand machine guns, more than 7 thousand tanks, 29,637 field guns, 52,407 mortars, 17,745 combat aircraft entered service. (Pravda, 1995, April 12).
But it was not possible to fully complete the planned measures.
Foreign policy was aimed, on the one hand, at strengthening the country's defense capability, and on the other, avoiding a one-on-one military clash with Germany.
After attempts to create a system of collective security in Europe and to conclude an effective mutual assistance pact with England and France failed, the USSR, acting for the purposes of self-defense and to disrupt the attempts of the imperialists to push the USSR against Germany in conditions of international isolation, accepted Germany’s proposal to conclude a treaty on non-aggression, which was signed on 08/23/39. With this, the USSR secured peace for a year and a half and the opportunity to strengthen its defense capabilities. On September 1, 1939, Germany attacked Poland.
In an effort to secure its borders and take the peoples of Western Ukraine and Belarus under protection, on September 17, 1939, by order of the government, the Red Army entered the territory of Poland. The people's assemblies of Western Ukraine and Belarus, elected by secret universal suffrage, in October 1939 asked to be accepted into the USSR.
In September - October 1939, mutual assistance agreements were signed between the USSR and the Baltic republics. The USSR received the right to build military bases and airfields, and introduce military units to protect them.
The city of Vilna and the Vilna region, which were forcibly captured by Poland, were transferred to Lithuania.
November 30, 1939 Finnish reactionaries provoked a conflict on the Soviet-Finnish border. The Soviet-Finnish war began. Finland refused to move the border away from Leningrad - one of the reasons for the conflict. On March 12, 1940, a peace treaty was signed with Finland. The Karelian Isthmus and the northern and western coasts of Lake Ladoga passed to the USSR. The USSR received the right to lease the Hanko Peninsula for 30 years. The treaty provided for mutual non-aggression and non-participation in coalitions hostile to each other.
Fearing German penetration into the Baltic states, the Soviet government in June 1940 presented a demand to the governments of the Baltic republics to remove reactionary, pro-fascist elements from the governments and to introduce Soviet military units into the territory of these states. These demands were supported by the masses. Violent demonstrations began.
Bourgeois governments were removed from power by force. In the second half of June, people's democratic governments were formed. On July 14-15, elections were held to the people's diets of Latvia and Lithuania and to the State Duma of Estonia. The Union of Working People won the victory.
New parliaments in July 1940 proclaimed the restoration of Soviet power, which had been eliminated with the help of interventionists in 1919, and decided to ask the Supreme Soviet of the USSR to accept the new Soviet republics into the USSR. On August 3-6, 1940, the 7th session of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR granted their request.
06/26/1940 The Soviet government demanded that Romania return Bessarabia, which was torn away from Russia in 1918, and transfer the northern part of Bukovina to the USSR. Romania accepted the demands of the USSR.
The Supreme Soviet of the USSR adopted (August 2, 1940) a law on the reunification of the Moldavian population of Bessarabia and the Moldavian ASSR and the formation of the Moldavian SSR. The northern part of Bukovina, as well as its Khotyn, Ankerman and Gumanovsky districts of Bessarabia, were included in the Ukrainian SSR.
Thus, the border was pushed to the west, and its strengthening began. From a strategic point of view, such a measure was necessary to strengthen the defense capability of the USSR. Statesmen in the West also understood this.
The USSR tried to stop Hitler's aggression: it warned Germany about the inadmissibility of violating Sweden's neutrality; offered Bulgaria to sign a treaty of friendship and mutual assistance, but was refused by Tsar Boris, who agreed to the entry of German troops into Bulgaria. April 5, 1941 A treaty of friendship and non-aggression was signed with Yugoslavia, but 3 hours later the German army attacked Yugoslavia.
In the spring and summer of 1941, relations improved with England (at this time the government was headed by W. Churchill), with the United States, which lifted the “moral embargo” on trade with the USSR, introduced during the conflict between Finland and the USSR.
The Soviet government did everything to avoid war with Germany, strictly complied with treaties, and eliminated all the reasons that Nazi Germany could use to justify a “preventive war” against the USSR. Although it was not possible to prevent the German attack, but with its policy the USSR deprived Germany of the slightest opportunity to justify this attack. Germany appeared as an aggressor, and the USSR received a huge political gain as a peace-loving country that was attacked.
3. Attack of Nazi Germany on the USSR. Failure of the “blitzkrieg” war plan (June 1941 – November 1942).
Germany's goals: to eliminate the socialist system, restore capitalism, dismember the USSR into a number of small states and their enslavement, and exterminate tens of millions of Soviet people. Germany saw the defeat of the USSR as a decisive condition for gaining world domination.
“Plan Barbarossa,” developed in 1940, provided for a surprise attack on the Soviet Union, encircling Soviet troops at the border and destroying them, quickly advancing deep into the territory, capturing Leningrad, Moscow, Kyiv within 6-8 weeks, reaching the Arkhangelsk line - Astrakhan and the victorious end of the war.
By the summer of 1941, Germany concentrated 190 divisions, 5.5 million soldiers, up to 50 thousand guns and mortars, 430 tanks and almost 5 thousand aircraft on the border with the USSR (History of the Second World War. 1939 -1945. Vol. IV. M ., 1975, p. 21).
On the part of the USSR, this war was fair, liberating, people's.
The war began under favorable conditions for Germany: its army was mobilized, had two years of experience in warfare, the economy had already been transferred to a war footing, it had at its disposal large resources of the countries it occupied, there was no second front in Europe, it had allies (Italy, Romania, Finland, Hungary), she was helped by Japan, Bulgaria, Spain, Turkey. The USSR was forced to maintain large forces in the Far East and Transcaucasia. The surprise of the attack also gave her an advantage. But these benefits were temporary.
The enemy met heroic resistance from the Red Army. Brest, defensive battles on the Bug and Prut. The heroism of the Soviet people: D. V. Kokorev - the first ram, N. Gastello - directed a burning plane towards a cluster of tanks.
The country's leadership was not at a loss and took a number of measures aimed at repelling aggression.
· Stalin concentrated all power in his hands: Chairman of the Council of People's Commissars, State Defense Committee, People's Commissar of Defense, Supreme Commander-in-Chief.
· Evacuation of enterprises to the East -1500.
· Self-government bodies were restructured, new ones were created: the Evacuation Council, the Labor Distribution Committee, etc., the rights of the People's Commissars were expanded, local defense committees were created, etc.
· At the call of the All-Union Communist Party (Bolsheviks), a partisan movement began in enemy-occupied territory.
· A massive collection of funds and items for the defense fund began in the Soviet rear.
· The restructuring of industry on a war footing began.
· The diplomatic activity of the USSR intensified.
In 1941, the main battles took place in the Leningrad, Moscow and Kiev directions. The enemy had the initiative. The enemy met stubborn resistance in the area of Smolensk, Yelnya, Kyiv, Odessa, which defended for 73 days, and Leningrad.
By the end of 1941, the enemy had captured vast territory. The Nazis established a brutal occupation regime. However, the plan for a “lightning” war was not implemented.
In early December 1941, the Soviet armies launched a successful counter-offensive near Moscow. 11 thousand settlements, including cities, were liberated, up to 50 enemy divisions were defeated, 1,300 tanks and much other equipment were destroyed. The plan for a “lightning” war was thwarted. Under the influence of the victory of the Soviet troops, the liberation struggle of the peoples of Europe is intensifying. The anti-Hitler coalition strengthened. The Allies promised to open a second front in 1942 and increase assistance to the USSR.
1942 The Allies did not fulfill their promise: the second front was not opened. The initiative was still in the hands of Germany. In July 1942, the fortress of Sevastopol fell. At the same time, a powerful German offensive began from the Kharkov region towards Stalingrad and the North Caucasus.
Thus, by the end of 1942, the enemy managed to capture part of the Soviet territory, where before the war 80 million people lived, over 70% of cast iron and 60% of steel were produced, and 47% of the USSR's crop area was sown. (History of the Second World War 1939-1945. T. V. M., p. 318).
Despite this, already in 1942 the USSR surpassed Nazi Germany in the production of aircraft, tanks, and guns, and the gross industrial output of the USSR in 1942 increased by more than 1.5 times. Relying on its strengthening rear, the Red Army was able to achieve a radical change in the course of the war. (History of the USSR. 1917-1978. M., 1979, p. 365).