Where is Prokhorovka tank battle. Hell on Prokhorovsky Field

Official Soviet historiography called the battle of Prokhorovka legendary. A battle broke out on the battlefield, which was recognized as the greatest oncoming tank battle in history, without, however, specifying the number of armored vehicles participating in it.

For a long time, the main story about this episode of the war was I. Markin’s book “The Battle of Kursk,” published in 1953. Then, already in the seventies, the epic film “Liberation” was shot, one of the episodes of which was dedicated to the Battle of Kursk. And its main part was. Without exaggeration, it can be said that Soviet people studied the history of the war from these works of art. For the first ten years there was no information at all about the world's greatest tank battle.

Legendary means mythical. These words are synonyms. Historians are forced to turn to myths when other sources are unavailable. The battle of Prokhorovka took place not in Old Testament times, but in 1943. The reluctance of honored military leaders to tell details about events so distant in time indicates that they made tactical, strategic or other miscalculations.

At the beginning of the summer of 1943, in the area of ​​​​the city of Kursk, the front line was formed in such a way that an arc-shaped protrusion was formed deep into the German defense. The German General Staff reacted to this situation in a rather stereotypical manner. Their task was to cut off, encircle, and subsequently defeat the Soviet group, consisting of the Central and Voronezh fronts. According to the Citadel plan, the Germans were going to launch counter strikes in the direction from Orel and Belgorod.

The enemy's intentions were guessed. The Soviet command took measures to prevent a breakthrough of the defense and was preparing a retaliatory strike, which was supposed to follow after exhausting the advancing German troops. Both warring sides made movements of armored forces to implement their plans.

It is reliably known that on July 10, the Second SS under the command of Gruppenführer Paul Hausser collided with units of the Fifth Panzer of Pavel Rotmistrov, who was preparing for an offensive. The resulting confrontation lasted almost a week. It culminated on July 12th.

What is true in this information and what is fiction?

Apparently, the battle of Prokhorovka came as a surprise, both to the Soviet and German commands. Tanks are used for the offensive, their main function is to support infantry and overcome defense lines. The number of Soviet armored vehicles outnumbered the enemy, so at first glance, a counter battle was unprofitable for the Germans. However, the enemy skillfully took advantage of the favorable terrain, which made it possible to fire from long distances. Soviet T-34-75 tanks, which had an advantage in maneuver, were inferior to the Tigers in turret armament. In addition, every third person in this battle was a light reconnaissance T-70.

The factor of surprise was also important; the Germans discovered the enemy earlier and were the first to attack. Their best coordination of actions was due to well-organized radio communications.

In such difficult conditions the battle of Prokhorovka began. The losses were huge, and their ratio was not in favor of the Soviet troops.

According to the plan of the commander of the Voronezh Front Vatutin and member of the military council Khrushchev, the result of the counterattack should have been the defeat of the German group that was trying to make a breakthrough. This did not happen, and the operation was declared a failure. However, it later turned out that there was still a benefit from it, and a huge one. The Wehrmacht suffered catastrophic losses, the German command lost the initiative, and the offensive plan was thwarted, albeit at the cost of great blood. Then a fictitious plan for the battle of Prokhorovka appeared in hindsight, and the operation was declared a major military success.

So, the official description of these events near Kursk is based on three myths:

Myth one: a premeditated operation. Although this was not the case. The battle occurred due to lack of awareness of the enemy's plans.

Myth two: the main reason for the loss of tanks by both sides was the oncoming battle. That wasn't true either. Most of the armored vehicles, both German and Soviet, were hit by anti-tank artillery.

Myth three: the battle took place continuously and on one field - Prokhorovsky. And that was not the case. The battle consisted of many separate combat episodes, from July 10 to July 17, 1943.

The battle near the small station of Prokhorovka during the Great Patriotic War became an example of a grandiose tank battle in the entire history of the war. The Battle of Prokhorovka became the personification of the courage and heroism of Soviet tank crews. But the outcome of this battle is still hotly debated. The amount of equipment and the scale of the operation have been called into question, which, according to some historians, were exaggerated by Soviet propaganda.

Revenge for the loss in Stalingrad

The battle near Prokhorovka station in the Belgorod region became the largest battle of the Kursk defensive operation, which went down in history as the Kursk Bulge. The Germans planned here to conduct one of the most important operations of their Citadel plan, encircling the Soviet army group.

The battle began on July 10

The staff documents contain evidence of the first battle, which took place on July 10 near Prokhorovka. This battle was fought not by tanks, but by rifle units of the 69th Army, which, having exhausted the enemy, themselves suffered heavy losses and were replaced by the 9th Airborne Division. Thanks to the paratroopers, on July 11, the Nazis were stopped near the outskirts of the station. They occupied all advantageous positions in the station area: they deployed artillery. Natural fortifications - ravines and gullies - reliably hid German soldiers and equipment.

Prokhorovskoe field, rugged with beams and ravines

The Soviet units of the 5th Guards Tank Army were in a notoriously difficult position: the tank strike group was located between the girders southwest of Prokhorovka and was deprived of the opportunity to deploy the tank group to its full width. Soviet tanks were forced to advance in a small area, limited on one side by the railway, and on the other by the floodplain of the Psel River (this is the left tributary of the Dnieper). German tank crews had much greater operational space.

Unnoticed German regrouping

Despite the fact that the official start date of the battle is considered to be July 12 - the fighting continued until July 15 - the culmination of the battle is considered to be July 12.

On July 12, a huge number of German and Soviet tanks collided on a narrow section of the front, only 11-12 kilometers wide.

Tank units “Adolf Hitler”, “Totenkopf”, division “Reich” and others were able to regroup their forces on the eve of the decisive battle. The Soviet command did not know about this. Only one German division fought in the direction of Prokhorovka - the Leibstandarte SS Adolf Hitler.

The offensive was postponed several times

The time of the offensive of the Soviet units was postponed several times. Finally, at 8.30 am the units went into battle. However, aviation was unable to provide cover and began to operate in the combat area only at 13.00, with 2-10 fighters appearing in the sky.

The Soviet offensive came in waves of tanks, and the attacks were frontal, in contrast to the German commanders, who were accustomed to the judicious use of manpower and equipment. Such waves appeared because, due to small passages through minefields, a large number of tanks could not be brought into battle immediately. The tanks passed in a line, one after another, which held back the attack of the first wave. The Germans saw all these preparations and were able to effectively line up their artillery fire.

Tank ratio

The Red Army did not have a single analogue tank in service that could withstand the 56-ton heavy Tiger tank.

Medium tanks T-34 manufactured in 1942, T-70, Lendlease Churchill tanks and self-propelled guns confronted German heavy Tigers, medium tanks T-IV, assault and anti-tank self-propelled guns.

Soviet tank crews sat in narrow and cramped booths, while the Germans sat quite comfortably in tanks equipped with radios and the latest surveillance devices.

Not only tanks took part in this battle. Historians insist on the term armored forces, which also includes wheeled or tracked vehicles and motorcycles.

The number of tanks participating in the battle on both sides is not known exactly. Various sources contain information from 1110 to 1500 tanks and self-propelled guns.

On a burning tank

The Soviet T-34 tank under the command of Pyotr Skripnik was shot down. The crew, having pulled out their commander, took refuge in the crater. The tank was on fire. The Germans noticed him. One of the tanks moved towards the Soviet tankers to crush them under its tracks. Then the mechanic, in order to save his comrades, rushed out of the saving trench. He ran to his burning car and pointed it at the German Tiger. Both tanks exploded.

Special commission for Rotmistrov

At the end of the Battle of Prokhorovka, Supreme Commander Joseph Stalin ordered the creation of a special commission to investigate the circumstances of the defeat. By August 1943, the commission completed its work and presented a large report. They were preparing to hold a show trial and shoot the commander of the Fifth Tank Army, Pavel Rotmistrov. But Vasilevsky’s intercession saved his life. Later, in his memoirs, Rotmistrov admitted that his army did not fulfill its task.

The number of losses of Soviet soldiers, according to some German historians, compared to the enemy is approximately 5:1, some historians insist on a different proportion - 6:1. The number of destroyed German tanks, the Germans claim, does not exceed 25 units, and Soviet ones - 170-180 vehicles. The Soviet military spoke of 350 destroyed enemy tanks.

The remains of soldiers and ammunition are still found here, and legendary world groups compose songs about this battle.

Pavel Rotmistrov lived out his life safely in Moscow. In the 70s, he became an honorary resident of the Prokhorovka station.

When did the world learn about the “tank duel”

Ivan Markin first wrote about a tank duel in the late 50s in his book. He called the battle of Prokhorovka the largest tank battle of the 20th century. At the time this book was published, the country was headed by Nikita Khrushchev. During the war, he was a member of the Military Council in the southern section of the Kursk Bulge.

USSR

Germany Germany

Commanders Losses Audio, photo, video on Wikimedia Commons

Direct command of the tank formations during the battle was carried out by: Lieutenant General Pavel Rotmistrov from the Soviet side and SS Oberstgruppenführer Paul Hausser from the German side.

Neither side managed to achieve the goals set for July 12: German troops failed to capture Prokhorovka, break through the defenses of Soviet troops and gain operational space, and Soviet troops failed to encircle the enemy group.

The situation on the eve of the battle

Initially, the main German attack on the southern front of the Kursk Bulge was directed to the west - along the Yakovlevo-Oboyan operational line. On July 5, in accordance with the offensive plan, German troops as part of the 4th Panzer Army (48th Panzer Corps and 2nd SS Panzer Corps) and Army Group Kempf went on the offensive against the troops of the Voronezh Front, in position 6- On the first day of the operation, the Germans sent five infantry, eight tank and one motorized divisions to the 1st and 7th Guards armies. On July 6, two counterattacks were launched against the advancing Germans from the Kursk-Belgorod railway by the 2nd Guards Tank Corps and from the Luchki (northern) - Kalinin area by the 5th Guards Tank Corps. Both counterattacks were repelled by the 2nd SS Panzer Corps.

Strengths of the parties

Traditionally, Soviet sources indicate that about 1,500 tanks took part in the battle: about 800 from the Soviet side and 700 from the German side (eg TSB). In some cases, a slightly smaller number is indicated - 1200.

Many modern researchers believe that the forces brought into the battle were probably significantly smaller. In particular, it is indicated that the battle took place in a narrow area (8-10 km wide), which was limited on one side by the Psel River and on the other by a railway embankment. It is difficult to introduce such significant masses of tanks into such an area.

It must be said that the overestimation of enemy forces also took place at the preliminary stage. So Shtemenko S.M. in his work points out: “ By April 8, the enemy concentrated 15-16 tank divisions with 2,500 tanks against the Voronezh and Central Fronts. ... On April 21, N.F. Vatutin already counted up to 20 infantry and 11 tank divisions just in front of the Voronezh Front in the Belgorod region.“G.K. Zhukov assesses the situation more realistically. We read from him: " In the Battle of Kursk, the troops of the Central and Voronezh Fronts, as I have already said, were somewhat superior to the enemy in strength and means. ... in people - 1.4 times, in guns and mortars - 1.9 times, in tanks - 1.2 times, in airplanes - 1.4 times. However, placing the main emphasis on tank and motorized troops, the German command grouped them in narrow areas..."There is a version that the command of the Voronezh Front also tried to group tank forces near Prokhorovka.

Germany

From the western direction, the 2nd SS Panzer Corps (2 SS Tank Corps) was advancing on Prokhorovka, while the SS Division “Adolf Hitler” was operating in the zone between the Psel River and the railway, and from the southern direction - the 3rd Panzer Corps (3 Tank Corps) . Known for the presence of tanks and assault guns without self-propelled guns: Grille, Vespe, Hummel and Marder 2, the data for which is being clarified, in the divisions of the 2nd SS Tank as of the evening of July 11 and 3rd Tank as of the morning of July 12 is indicated in the table.

The strength of units and formations of the 2nd SS Panzer Corps 4 TA and the 3rd Panzer Corps AG "Kempf" on July 11, 1943
Pz.II Pz.III
50/L42		 Pz.III
50/L60		 Pz.III
75 mm		 Pz.IV
L24		 Pz.IV
L43 and L48		 Pz.VI "Tiger" T-34 StuG III Bef.Pz. III Total tanks and StuG
2nd SS Panzer Corps
TD Leibstandarte SS "Adolf Hitler" (at 19.25 11.07) 4 - 5 - - 47 4 - 10 7 77
TD SS "Das Reich" (at 19.25 11.07) - - 34 - - 18 1 8 27 7 95
TD SS "Totenkopf" (at 19.25 11.07) - - 54 - 4 26 10 - 21 7 122
2nd SS Panzer Corps, total 4 - 93 - 4 91 15 8 58 21 294
3rd Tank Corps
6th Panzer Division (on the morning of July 11) 2 2 11 ? - 6 - - - 2 23 (?)
7th Panzer Division (on the morning of July 12) - - 24 2 1 9 - - - 3 39
19th Panzer Division (on the morning of July 12) - - 7 4 - 3 - - - 1 15
503rd separate heavy tank battalion (on the morning of July 11) - - - - - - 23 - - - 23
228th separate battalion of assault guns (on the morning of July 12) - - - - - - - - 19 - 19
3rd Tank Corps, total 2 2 42 6 1 18 23 - 19 6 119
Total armored units 6 2 135 6 5 109 38 8 77 27 413

It should be noted that “Panther” tanks did not take part in the Battle of Prokhorovka on July 12, continuing to operate as part of the “Great Germany” division in the Oboyan direction. In the post-war press, instead of the company of captured T-34 tanks that actually participated in the battle near Prokhorovka (8 units as part of the 2nd SS Panzer Division "Das Reich"), Panther tanks were indicated. About the “Panthers” allegedly operating against his 5th Guards. TA, said P. A. Rotmistrov.

USSR

Commander of the Voronezh Front, General of the Army, Representative of the Supreme High Command Headquarters A. M. Vasilevsky - until 07.14.43. From July 14, Zhukov G.K. was already involved in coordinating the actions of the front with Headquarters.

The Soviet group included the following forces:

  • 2nd Air Army (2nd VA, Aviation Lieutenant General Krasovsky S.A.);
  • 5th Guards Army (5th Guards A, Lieutenant General Zhadov A.S.);
  • 5th Guards Tank Army (5th Guards TA, Lieutenant General t/v Rotmistrov P.A.) consisting of:
    • 18th Tank Corps (18 Tank Corps, Major General T/V Bakharov B.S.), 148 tanks:
Part T-34 T-70 "Churchill"
110th Tank Brigade (110th Tank Brigade, Lieutenant Colonel M. G. Khlyupin) 24 21
170th Tank Brigade (170 Tank Brigade, Lieutenant Colonel Tarasov V.D.) 22 17
181st Tank Brigade (181st Tank Brigade, Lieutenant Colonel Puzyrev V.A.) 24 20
36th Separate Guards Heavy Tank Breakthrough Regiment (36 Separate Guards TPP) 0 0 20

32nd Motorized Rifle Brigade (32nd Motorized Rifle Brigade, Colonel I. A. Stukov).

    • 29th Tank Corps (29 Tank Corps, Major General T/V Kirichenko I.F.), 192 tanks and 20 self-propelled guns:
Part T-34 T-70 SU-122 SU-76
Units of equipment combat-ready and temporarily under repair as of July 11
25th Tank Brigade (25th Tank Brigade, Colonel Volodin N.K.) 26 32
31st Tank Brigade (31st Tank Brigade, Colonel Moiseev S.F.) 32 38
32nd Tank Brigade (32nd Tank Brigade, Colonel Linev A.A.) 64 0
1446th self-propelled artillery regiment (1146 glanders) 12 8

53rd Motorized Rifle Brigade (53rd Motorized Rifle Brigade, Lieutenant Colonel Lipichev N.P.). 1529th heavy self-propelled artillery regiment SU-152 (1529 tsap. The regiment, consisting of 11 vehicles out of 12, arrived at the site only in the evening of July 12 without shells. Did not take part in the tank battle on July 12).

    • 5th Guards Mechanized Corps (5th Guards Mk, Major General t/v Skvortsov B.M.)
Part T-34 T-70 SU-122 SU-76
10th Guards Mechanized Brigade (10th Guards Mechanized Brigade, Colonel Mikhailov I.B.) 29 12
11th Guards Mechanized Brigade (11th Guards Mechanized Brigade, Colonel N.V. Grishchenko) 42 22
12th Guards Mechanized Brigade (11th Guards Mechanized Brigade, Colonel Borisenko G. Ya.)
24th Guards Separate Tank Brigade (24th Guards Separate Tank Brigade, Lieutenant Colonel Karpov V.P.) 51 0
1447th self-propelled artillery regiment (1147 glanders) 12 8
  • 5th Guards The TA was reinforced by formations that became part of it from July 10:
    • 2nd Guards Tatsinsky Tank Corps (2nd Guards Tank Corps, Colonel Burdeyny A.S.),
Part T-34 T-70 "Churchill"
Units of equipment combat-ready and temporarily under repair as of July 11, units
4th Guards Mechanized Brigade (4th Guards Mechanized Brigade, Colonel A.K. Brazhnikov) 28 19
25th Guards Mechanized Brigade (25th Guards Mechanized Brigade, Lieutenant Colonel Bulygin S.M.) 28 19
26th Guards Mechanized Brigade (26th Guards Mechanized Brigade, Lieutenant Colonel Nesterov S.K.) 28 14
47th Guards Separate Breakthrough Tank Regiment (47 Guards Separate TPP, Lieutenant Colonel Shevchenko M. T.) 0 0 21
    • 2nd Tank Corps (2nd Tank Corps, Major General T/V Popov A.F.):
      • 26th Tank Brigade (26 Tank Brigade, Colonel Piskarev P.V.) (as of 07/11/43 T-34 1 1 unit + 7 under repair and T-70 33 units + 2 under repair)
      • 99th Tank Brigade (99 Tank Brigade, Colonel L. I. Malov),
      • 169th Tank Brigade (169 Tank Brigade, Colonel I. Ya. Stepanov).
The state of the equipment and support of the 5th Guards Tank Army at 17:00 on July 11, 1943
Combat vehicles 29 tk 18 tk 2 tk 2nd Guards tk 5th Guards mk army units Total
T-34 120 68 35 84 120 36 463
T-70 81 58 46 52 56 8 301
"Churchill" - 18 4 3 - - 25
SU-122 12 - - - 10 - 22
SU-76 8 - - - 7 - 15
Total tanks and self-propelled guns 221 144 85 139 193 44 826
On the way to the station Prokhorovka 13 33 - - 51 4 101
Under repair 2 6 9 - 1 6 24
Total armored units 236 183 94 139 245 54 951

G. A. Oleynikov, as of July 10, has 790 tanks in the 5th Guards Tank Army - 260 T-70, 501 T-34, 31 Mk IV "Churchill" (modifications of Churchill IV). And 40 (two regiments) SU-122 self-propelled assault howitzers and light infantry support assault guns based on the T-70 SU-76.

Rotmistrov himself assessed the amount of equipment as follows: “ The 5th Guards Tank Army was reinforced by the 2nd Guards Tatsinsky and 2nd Tank Corps, 1529th Self-Propelled Artillery, 1522nd and 1148th Howitzer, 148th and 93rd Cannon Artillery Regiments, 16th and 80th guards mortar regiments. In general, in our army with attached tank formations there were about 850 tanks and self-propelled guns.»

The assessment of the forces of the parties is highly dependent on the assessment of the geographical scope of the battle. In the area of ​​the Oktyabrsky state farm, the 18th and 29th tank corps were advancing - a total of 348 tanks.

Plans of the parties

1. The enemy in the Belgorod direction, having brought large forces of tanks into battle, is trying to develop success in the north. direction - to Oboyan, Kursk (up to 400 tanks) and to the east. direction - to Aleksandrovsky, Skorodnoye, Stary Oskol (up to 300 tanks).

To the commander of the 29th Tank Tank, Lieutenant General T. Kirichenko

1. The task of the corps is the same...
2. Start of the attack - 8.30 July 12, 1943. Artillery preparation begins at 8.00.
3. I authorize the use of the radio from 7.00 on July 12, 1943. Commander of the 5th Guards. TA Lieutenant General P. A. Rotmistrov

2 SS tanks defeat the enemy in the south. Prokhorovka and thereby creates the preconditions for further advancement through Prokhorovka. Division assignments:

Division "MG" go on the offensive from the bridgehead at dawn, capture the heights of the north-east. and first of all go to the road Prokhorovka, Kartashevka. Take possession of the river valley. Psel attacked from the southwest, securing the left flank of the AG division.

The “AG” division, holding the occupied line on the left flank, occupied Storozhevoye and the forest to the north, the branch of the “Stalinskoe” state farm, etc. on the right flag. Pits, as well as heights of 2 km east. With the onset of a threat from the river valley. Psel, together with MG units, captured Prokhorovka and height 252.4.

Division "R", holding the achieved lines on the right flank, occupy Vinogradovka and Ivanovka. After capturing the right-flank units of the AG division Storozhevoye and the forest to the north, using their success, move the main efforts in the direction of the heights of the southwest. Right-handed. Hold the new line of Ivanovka, the heights of the southwest. Right, height 2 km east. Sentry (lawsuit).

Progress of the battle

There are different versions of this battle.

The first clash in the Prokhorovka area occurred on the evening of July 11. According to the memoirs of Pavel Rotmistrov, at 17:00, he and Marshal Vasilevsky, during reconnaissance, discovered a column of enemy tanks that were moving towards the station. The attack was stopped by two tank brigades.

At 8 am the next day, the Soviet side carried out artillery preparation and at 8:15 went on the offensive. The first attacking echelon consisted of four tank corps: 18th, 29th, 2nd and 2nd Guards. The second echelon was the 5th Guards Mechanized Corps.

At the beginning of the battle, the Soviet tank crews gained some advantage: the rising sun blinded the Germans advancing from the west. Very soon the battle formations were mixed. The high density of the battle, during which tanks fought at short distances, deprived the Germans of the advantage of more powerful and long-range guns. Soviet tank crews were able to target the most vulnerable spots of heavily armored German vehicles.

When Soviet tanks, during a counterattack, came within direct range of their guns and were met with heavy fire from German anti-tank guns, the tankers were simply stunned. Under hurricane fire, it was necessary not only to fight, but first of all to psychologically restructure from a breakthrough deep into the enemy’s defense to positional combat with enemy anti-tank weapons.

To the east of the battle area, the German tank group Kempf was advancing, which sought to enter the advancing Soviet group on the left flank. The threat of envelopment forced the Soviet command to divert part of its reserves to this direction.

At about 1 p.m., the Germans withdrew the 11th Tank Division from reserve, which, together with the Death's Head division, struck the Soviet right flank, on which the forces of the 5th Guards Army were located. Two brigades of the 5th Guards Mechanized Corps were sent to their aid and the attack was repulsed.

By 2 p.m., Soviet tank armies began to push the enemy south. By evening, Soviet tankers were able to advance 10-12 kilometers, thus leaving the battlefield in their rear. The battle was won.

According to the memoirs of German generals

People learn history lessons poorly, and perhaps because there are no truthful and accurate textbooks. The views of domestic historians on some events of the past largely depend on the official point of view. Now there are more opportunities to express one’s own opinion, and heated debates are flaring up around global historical phenomena and individual episodes.

Some call the battle of Prokhorovka the decisive part of the defensive phase of the Battle of Kursk, while others call it an accidental skirmish of motorized units that ended in terrible losses for the Red Army.

Fire Arc

The Stalingrad defeat shook the military machine of Nazi Germany, but its power still remained great. The main striking force of the Wehrmacht, which had not failed the Nazi command until now, was the tank corps, which included the elite - the SS armored divisions. It was they who were supposed to break through the echeloned Soviet defense during the liquidation of the Kursk salient; it was with their participation that the battle of Prokhorovka took place on the southern front of the Kursk Bulge (“front” is the side of the defensive fortifications facing the enemy).

The fact that the main events would take place near Kursk became clear to both sides by the spring of 1943. Intelligence data spoke of the concentration of powerful military groups in this area, but further showed that Hitler was surprised by the number and power of the defensive lines prepared by the Red Army, the number of Soviet “thirty-fours”, which became the main force of the tank armies of the Red Army, which influenced the course of the Battle of Kursk, progress of the battle near Prokhorovka.

The operation of the German troops, called “Citadel,” was aimed at returning Germany’s strategic initiative, but it was the result of the final turning point in the course of the war. The tactical plan of the German command was simple and logical and consisted of two converging attacks from Orel and Belgorod with a connection at Kursk. If successful, there would be one and a half million Soviet soldiers in the cauldron.

Participants in the confrontation

In the southern section of the Kursk Bulge, Soviet troops operated as part of the Voronezh Front, commanded by Army General N.F. Vatutin. The main force was armored units, which were used to cement the defense and launch counterattacks: the 1st Tank Army under the command of Lieutenant General M. E. Katukov and the 5th Guards Tank Army under Lieutenant General P. A. Rotmistrov, with the participation of The battle of Prokhorovka took place. In the 5th Guards Army under the command of Lieutenant General A. S. Zhadov, operating with the support of the 2nd Air Army of General S. A. Krasovsky, all Soviet infantry and anti-tank weapons were concentrated in this area.

They were opposed by two German tank corps - the 3rd and 2nd, which were part of the SS field troops, and the tank divisions "Adolf Hitler", "Das Reich" and "Totenkopf" ("Totenkopf") that were part of it were to the elite units of the German army.

Number of tanks and self-propelled guns

Different sources provide different information about the number of tanks and self-propelled artillery units involved in the battles near Prokhorovka. The official version, which was based on the memoirs of some Soviet commanders, depicted a great tank battle near Prokhorovka with the participation of one and a half thousand tanks, of which 700 were German, including the newest Tiger T-VI and Panther.

In any case, what happened in the field at Prokhorovka was a very extraordinary event in the history of armored forces, although more independent studies showed that the Wehrmacht tank corps included about 400 armored vehicles, of which 250 were light and medium tanks, heavy " "Tigers" - about 40. There were no "Panthers" near Prokhorovka, and the tank corps, which included 200 of the latest vehicles, operated in the northern section of the arc.

Rotmistrov's army included 900 tanks and self-propelled guns, including 460 T-34s and 300 light T-70s.

High-quality composition

Military factories evacuated to the rear began operating in record time. T-34 with a 76 mm gun - the main tanks of the battle of Prokhorovka. By 1943, German tank crews had already appreciated the Soviet “thirty-four”, and among them a call was born to the command: instead of expensive developments, simply copy the T-34, but make it in German factories and with a new gun. The insufficiency of the armament of the main Soviet tank was clear to our specialists, and especially clear after the battles on the Kursk Bulge. Only in 1944 did the T-34 gain the ability to confidently hit enemy tanks with a long-barreled 85 mm gun,

In addition to the fact that the battle of Prokhorovka showed the still tangible qualitative superiority of the enemy’s tank technology, shortcomings in the organization of the battle and in the management of crews became clear. The official instructions ordered the T-34 crews to use the main advantages of the tank: speed and maneuverability - to fire on the move, approaching the German vehicles at a lethal distance. It was impossible to achieve a reliable hit without special fire stabilizers, which appeared only thirty years later, which reduced the effectiveness of the combat use of tanks during an attack.

In addition to a more powerful weapon, which made it possible to hit targets at a distance of up to 2 km, Wehrmacht tanks were equipped with wireless communications, and it was poor coordination of actions in battle conditions that became one of the most important reasons for the huge losses in Rotmistrov’s army.

Southern section of the arc

The course of events on the southern front of the Kursk Bulge showed that the command of the Central Front (Colonel General K.K. Rokossovsky), defending the northern section of the Kursk salient, more accurately guessed the direction of the main attack. The Germans managed to overcome the defense lines to a depth of 8 km, and the defense of the Voronezh Front was penetrated in some areas by 35 km, although the Germans were unable to enter the operational space. The battle of Prokhorovka was the result of a change in the main direction of the German offensive.

Initially, the German tank corps rushed to the west of Kursk, towards Oboyan, but got stuck in the defensive formations of the 6th and 7th Guards Armies under powerful counterattacks from Katukov’s 1st Tank Army. The heroism and military skill of the tank crews of the 1st Army are considered by many historians to be underestimated, although it was in battles with them that the Germans lost the strength to further push towards Kursk.

The choice of Prokhorovka as a new target for the attack of the Nazi army is considered by some to be forced, and in some sources it is indicated as planned, foreseen during the development of Operation Citadel in the spring of 1943. The capture of the Prokhorovka railway station also led to a critical difficulty in supplying the troops of the Voronezh Front. The German division "Adolf Hitler" and the units of the 2nd SS Panzer Corps, which covered it from the flanks, reached the attack line on Prokhorovka by July 10.

To eliminate the threat of a breakthrough, Rotmistrov's 5th Guards Tank Army was sent against them, marching to the outskirts of Prokhorovka and engaging in combat with tank divisions under the command of P. Hausser - this is how the tank battle near Prokhorovka began. The date considered to be the day of the great tank battle - July 12, 1943 - cannot fully reflect the events; fierce fighting lasted for several days.

Different look

There are several options for describing what later became known as the battle of Prokhorovka. A brief summary of these descriptions shows the different attitudes of official Soviet historiography, Western European and American historians to the events of the Great Patriotic War. A special opinion is found in the memoirs of German generals, who laid all the blame for their military defeats on the inadequate decisions of the Fuhrer, who hindered them with his ambitions as a great commander. Where is the truth?

Rotmistrov’s memoirs depict the events of July 12, 1943 as a counter battle involving a huge number of tanks, during which irreparable damage was inflicted on the Nazis’ elite tank units, after which they retreated, without thinking about further advances towards a breakthrough from the north. Moreover, the battle of Prokhorovka can briefly be called the largest defeat of the Wehrmacht tank forces, from which they never recovered.

The ideological opponents of Soviet historians present events in their own way. In their presentation, the Red Army suffered a terrible defeat, losing a huge number of manpower and armored vehicles. German tanks and anti-tank guns, being in well-prepared positions, shot at Soviet tanks from afar, unable to inflict significant damage on the enemy, and the advance of the German troops was stopped by a balanced decision of the command, including due to the beginning of the offensive of the Allied forces in Italy.

Progress of the battle

Now it is difficult to restore in detail the true order of events, to discern it among the varnished pages of Soviet textbooks and among the memoirs of beaten Wehrmacht generals - subjectivity and politicization distort the historical view, aimed even at global events such as the Great Patriotic War. The tank battle near Prokhorovka can be presented in the form of specific facts.

The 2nd SS Panzer Corps under the command of P. Hausser, which was part of the 4th Panzer Army, following the order of its commander, General G. Hoth, goes to the vicinity of the Prokhorovka railway station to strike in the rear of the 69th Soviet Army and break out to Kursk.

German generals assumed that tank units from the reserve of the Voronezh Front might meet on their way, and chose the location of a possible collision taking into account the combat qualities of their armored vehicles.

The counterattack of the 5th Guards Tank Army hit tangentially, almost head-on. The tank battle near Prokhorovka (date - July 12 - the day of the culmination of the battles) began on July 10 and lasted about a week.

The meeting with the elite SS tank divisions came as a surprise, and the battlefield did not allow the Soviet tanks to be deployed in a single avalanche - deep ravines and the bank of the Psel River prevented this. Therefore, German tanks and self-propelled guns with long-range guns that had taken up convenient positions could first shoot groups of 30-35 combat vehicles coming at them. The greatest damage to the German tank corps was caused by the high-speed T-34s, which managed to get within striking distance.

Having lost a large amount of equipment, Rotmistrov’s army retreated from the battlefield, but Prokhorovka was not captured by the bloodless Germans, who by July 17 began to retreat to the positions they occupied before the start of the Battle of Kursk.

Losses

The exact number of losses suffered is a matter of dispute for everyone who wrote about the history of tank battles, which abounded in the Great Patriotic War. The battle of Prokhorovka became the bloodiest of them. The latest research says that on July 12, Soviet troops lost 340 tanks and 19 self-propelled guns, and the Germans lost 163 combat vehicles. The difference in the number of irretrievable losses is even greater: 193 tanks for Rotmistrov and 20-30 for the 2nd SS Panzer Corps. This is explained by the fact that the battlefield remained with the Germans and they were able to send most of their damaged equipment for repairs, while mining and blowing up Soviet tanks.

The 5th Guards Tank Army was to become the main force of the Soviet counteroffensive planned after the end of the defensive phase of the battle in the south near Kursk. Therefore, when in one day - July 12 - more than half of the tanks and self-propelled guns burned down in the battle near Prokhorovka, Stalin ordered the creation of a commission of the State Defense Committee designed to find the reasons for such losses.

Results

Recent publications by military historians, based on research into archives that have become available only recently, destroy the myths of Soviet history of World War II. The Battle of Prokhorovka does not look like the largest confrontation between the armored units of the two armies, in which the Wehrmacht lost the main forces of this type of troops, which was the main reason for subsequent defeats. But the conclusion about the complete defeat of the Soviet tank army, which accidentally stumbled upon selected SS divisions, looks unjustified.

The Germans drove the enemy out of the “tank field”, knocked out most of the Soviet armored vehicles, but did not complete the main task - they did not capture Prokhorovka, did not meet the northern group of their troops in order to close the encirclement. Of course, the battle at Prokhorovka was not the main reason that forced the Germans to retreat; it did not become the final turning point in the Great War. It is known that the decision to end Operation Citadel was announced at a meeting with Hitler on July 13, and Field Marshal Manstein names in his memoirs the main reason for the landing of Allied troops in Sicily. However, he points out that only one SS Panzer division was sent to Italy, which gives this reason minimal significance.

It is more logical to conclude that the German offensive in the area of ​​the Kursk salient was stopped by the successful defensive actions of the Soviet fronts and a powerful counter-offensive, which began in the Central Front zone in the northern section of the arc, and was soon supported in the Belgorod region. The battle of Prokhorovka also made a great contribution to the collapse of Operation Citadel. The year 1943 was the year of the final transfer of strategic initiative to the Soviet troops.

Memory

An event of real historical significance does not need additional ideological justification. In 1995, during the celebration of the half-century anniversary of the Victory, at an altitude of 252.2, in the Belgorod region, a memorial complex was opened.

Its main topic was the tank battle near Prokhorovka. A photo of a tall, 60-meter belfry is sure to be present in the gadgets of tourists passing by this memorable field. The monument turned out to be worthy of the greatness of courage and perseverance shown on the legendary Russian field.

It is well known that the Battle of Prokhorovka was won by the Red Army, but few people know that it lasted not one, but six whole days, and the tank battle on July 12, 1943 was only its beginning. But who won it - Rotmistrov or Hausser? Soviet historiography declares an unconditional victory, while delicately keeping silent about the price that the tank crews of the 5th Guards Tank Army paid for it. German historians put forward their own arguments: by the evening of July 12, the battlefield remained with the Germans, and the ratio of losses was clearly not in favor of the Red Army. Modern Russian researchers also have their own vision of the events that took place in July 1943. Let's try to figure out who won this battle. As an evidence base, we will use the opinion of Candidate of Historical Sciences V.N. Zamulin, a former employee of the Prokhorov Field Museum and, perhaps, the most prominent specialist in the history of the Battle of Kursk.

First, you need to understand the main myth of the Soviet era - the number of tanks that directly took part in the battle. The Great Soviet Encyclopedia, citing the works of Soviet military leaders, gives a figure of 1,500 tanks - 800 Soviet and 700 German. In fact, on the Soviet side, the strike group included only the 29th and 18th tank corps of the 5th Guards TA of Lieutenant General Rotmistrov with a total of 348 vehicles (2).

It is more difficult to quantify the forces of the German side. The II SS Panzer Corps included three motorized divisions. As of July 11, 1943, the motorized division “Leibstandarte CC Adolf Hitler” had 77 tanks and self-propelled guns in service. Motorized SS division "Totenkopf" - 122 and motorized SS division "Das Reich" - 95 tanks and self-propelled guns of all types. Total: 294 cars (1). The position in the center (in front of the Prokhorovka station) was occupied by the Leibstandarte, its right flank was covered by Das Reich, the left by the Totenkopf. The battle took place on a relatively small area of ​​terrain up to 8 kilometers wide, crossed by ravines and bounded on one side by the Psel River and on the other by a railway embankment. It is necessary to take into account that most of the tanks of the “Dead Head” division solved tactical tasks of capturing the bend of the Psel River, where the infantrymen and artillerymen of the 5th Guards Army held the defense, and the tanks of the “Das Reich” division were located behind the railroad tracks. Thus, the Soviet tankers were opposed by the Leibstandarte division and an unknown number of tanks from the Totenkopf division (in the area along the river), as well as the Das Reich division on the left flank of the attackers. Therefore, indicate the exact number of tanks that participated in repelling the attack of two tank corps of the 5th Guards. TA, it is not possible.

Before the attack, on the night of July 11-12. Due to the fact that the 5th Guards. The TA changed its initial positions for the attack twice; its command, concentrating forces in the area of ​​the Prokhorovka station, did not conduct reconnaissance - there was no time. Although the current situation urgently required it: on the eve of July 11, SS units ousted Soviet infantrymen and dug in half a kilometer from the southern outskirts of Prokhorovka. By bringing up artillery, they created a powerful line of defense overnight, strengthening themselves in all tank-dangerous directions. About three hundred guns were deployed in a 6-kilometer area, including rocket-propelled mortars and 8.8 cm FlaK 18/36 anti-aircraft guns. However, the main German “trump card” on this section of the front was the 60 tanks of the Leibstandarte division, most of which were in reserve by the morning (behind the anti-tank ditch at an altitude of 252.2).

Self-propelled guns of the SS division "Das Reich" fire at the positions of the 183rd SD in the Belenikhino area.
July 11, 1943
Source: http://militera.lib.ru/h/zamulin_vn2/s05.gif

At 5 o'clock in the morning, before the offensive of the 5th Guards. TA, the Soviet infantry tried to dislodge the SS men from their positions, but, coming under heavy German artillery fire, retreated, suffering heavy losses. At 8.30 the command was sounded: “Steel, steel, steel,” and Soviet tanks began to advance. The Soviet tank crews did not succeed in a swift attack, as it seems to many to this day. First, the tanks had to make their way through the infantry battle formations, then carefully move forward along the passages in the minefields. And only then, in full view of the Germans, did they begin to deploy into battle formations. In total, the first echelon operated 234 tanks and 19 self-propelled guns of two corps - the 29th and 18th. The nature of the terrain forced the forces to be gradually introduced into battle - in some places battalion-by-battalion, with significant time intervals (from 30 minutes to an hour and a half, which, as it turned out later, allowed the Germans to destroy them one by one). The main task for the Soviet tank crews was to capture the powerful center of the German defense - the Oktyabrsky state farm, in order to gain further opportunity for maneuver.

From the very beginning the battle became extremely fierce. Four tank brigades, three batteries of self-propelled guns, two rifle regiments and one battalion of a motorized rifle brigade rolled into the German fortified area in waves, but, encountering powerful resistance, retreated back again. Almost immediately after the start of the attack, active bombing of Soviet troops by groups of German dive bombers began. Considering that the attackers did not have air cover, this sharply worsened their situation. Soviet fighters appeared in the sky very late - only after 13.00.


Attack of the brigades of the 18th TC in the area of ​​​​the village of Andreevka. July 12, 1943
Source: http://militera.lib.ru/h/zamulin_vn2/36.jpg

The first, main attack of two Soviet corps, which looked like a single attack, lasted until approximately 11.00 and ended with the 29th Tank Corps moving to the defense, although units of the 18th Tank Corps continued to try to take the state farm, outflanking it. Another part of the tanks of the 18th Corps, supporting the infantry, advanced on the right flank and fought in the villages on the river bank. The purpose of this tank group was to strike at the junction between the positions of the Leibstandarte and Totenkopf divisions. On the left flank of the troops, tankmen of the 32nd Tank Brigade of the 29th Tank Corps made their way along the railway track.

Soon the attacks of the main forces of the 29th Corps resumed and continued until approximately 13.30–14.00. The tankers nevertheless drove the SS men out of Oktyabrsky, suffering colossal losses - up to 70% of their equipment and personnel.

By this time, the battle had acquired the character of separate battles with enemy anti-tank defenses. The Soviet tank crews did not have a unified command; they attacked in the indicated directions and fired at enemy tanks and artillery positions that appeared in the firing sectors of their guns.

“...There was such a roar that blood flowed from my ears. The continuous roar of engines, the clanging of metal, the roar, the explosions of shells, the wild rattle of torn iron... From point-blank shots, turrets collapsed, guns twisted, armor burst, tanks exploded. We lost the sense of time; we felt neither thirst, nor heat, nor even blows in the cramped cabin of the tank. One thought, one desire: while you are alive, beat the enemy. Our tankers, who got out of their wrecked vehicles, searched the field for enemy crews, who were also left without equipment, and beat them with pistols and grappled hand-to-hand. I remember the captain who, in some kind of frenzy, climbed onto the armor of a damaged German “Tiger” and hit the hatch with a machine gun in order to “smoke out” the Nazis from there...”(GSS G.I. Penezhko).

By noon, it became clear to the Soviet command that the counterattack plan had failed.

At this time, in the bend of the Psel River, the German division “Totenkopf”, having captured a section of the eastern bank of the river, pulled up artillery and opened fire on the strike wedge of the 18th Tank Corps, which was operating on the right flank of the advancing Soviet troops. Observing the advance of the corps and unraveling the plan of the Soviet command, the Germans launched a series of counterattacks, using compact tank groups supported by artillery, aviation and motorized infantry. Fierce oncoming battles began.



Source: http://history.dwnews.com/photo/2014-01-31/59393505-44.html

It was units of the 18th Corps that made the deepest and most massive breakthrough in the German defense zone, going to the rear of the Leibstandarte positions. The headquarters of the 2nd SS TC reported on the situation: “Large enemy forces, 2 regiments with about 40 tanks, attacked our units east of Vasilyevka, through Prelestnoye, Mikhailovka, Andreevka, then, turning south, advanced to the area north of the Komsomolets state farm.” The situation has been restored. It is obvious that the enemy intends to attack from Storozhevoy in the direction of the bend of the railway line and from the north in the direction of the Komsomolets state farm to cut off our forces that have advanced to the northeast.”


Attack of Soviet tanks and infantry in the Prokhorovka area, July 1943
Source: http://history.dwnews.com/photo/2014-01-31/59393505-49.html

Real maneuver battles of tank groups flared up after formations of the 18th and 29th Tank Corps pushed the SS men to the southwestern slopes of height 252.2. This happened around 14.00–14.30. Then groups of tanks from both Soviet corps began to break through to the west of Andreevka, to Vasilyevka, as well as to the area of ​​​​height 241.6, where fierce oncoming tank battles also took place at short distances. On the left flank, separate groups of Soviet tanks broke through along the railroad, also in a southwestern direction.

“...The situation has become extremely tense,– recalled the former commander of a tank platoon of the 170th Tank Brigade, at that time Lieutenant V.P. Bryukhov. – The battle formations of the troops were mixed up, it was not possible to accurately determine the front line. The situation changed hourly, even minutely. The brigades then advanced, then stopped, then retreated back. It seemed that the battlefield was crowded not only with tanks, armored personnel carriers, guns and people, but also with shells, bombs, mines and even bullets. Their soul-chilling paths flew, intersected and intertwined into a deadly ligature. The terrible blows of armor-piercing and sub-caliber shells shook, pierced and burned through the armor, broke out huge pieces of it, leaving gaping holes in the armor, maimed and destroyed people. Tanks were burning. The explosions caused five-ton towers to break off and fly off to the side 15–20 meters. Sometimes the upper armor plates of the tower were torn off, flying high into the air. Slamming their hatches, they somersaulted in the air and fell, instilling fear and horror in the surviving tankers. Often, strong explosions caused the entire tank to fall apart, instantly turning into a pile of metal. Most of the tanks stood motionless, their guns mournfully lowered, or were on fire. Greedy flames licked the red-hot armor, sending up clouds of black smoke. Tankers who were unable to get out of the tank were burning along with them. Their inhuman cries and pleas for help shocked and clouded the mind. The lucky ones who got out of the burning tanks rolled on the ground, trying to knock the flames off their overalls. Many of them were overtaken by an enemy bullet or shell fragment, taking away their hope for life... The opponents turned out to be worthy of each other. They fought desperately, harshly, with frantic detachment. The situation was constantly changing, it was confusing, unclear and uncertain. The headquarters of corps, brigades and even battalions often did not know the position and condition of their troops ... "

By 1500, the strength of both Soviet tank corps had exhausted itself. The brigades have 10-15 vehicles left in service, and some have even less. However, the counterattack continued, as the Soviet command at all levels received orders not to stop and to continue the offensive. It was at this time that the greatest danger arose of German tank units launching a counteroffensive, which jeopardized the entire outcome of the battle. From this point on, the attacks continued mainly by infantry, supported by small groups of tanks, which, naturally, could not change the course of the battle in favor of the attackers.

Judging by reports from the front line, the fighting ended between 20.00 and 21.00. However, on the Storozhevoy farm the fighting continued even after midnight, and the Soviet troops were unable to hold it.


Scheme of combat operations in the offensive zone of the main counterattack group of the front on July 12, 1943



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