Crime: archive. The betrayal of Lieutenant Colonel Zayats: the darkest case of the Afghan war

1984 So, new year. I worked out, but I lost a lot of time due to my own weakness... And it’s very difficult to recover, the feeling of being out of shape is unbearable. “The Philistines” received a good response, I played the premiere (Tanya too), that cast then rehearsed for two weeks.

1984 February 2 While conducting reconnaissance near the village of Fuloli-Pine (Ishkamysh county), tank 1 pp 783 orb was destroyed by fire from dushmans from an 82-mm recoilless rifle; the following died from an explosion of ammunition: - Sergeant Gainullin R.V. – tank commander – Sergeant Shumilov V.V. - Deputy Commander

1984 January 4, the Leningrad departmental newspaper “Svetlana” publishes an interview with BN. From: BNS. A genre that can do anything<…>- Some scientists, literary critics, and readers themselves argue that science fiction has “exhausted”, that today it is confined only to

1984 The memory of victorious Russian history (Russia has seen and survived everything, and therefore nothing mortally terrible can happen) is destructive today. Because here, too, everything has changed: Russia won’t stand it either! And they live with the old, and this is maintained. 7.1.84 Prayer for

1984 ... Now - the atomic theme. But it’s enough to persuade others with words (journalism), you need to do it yourself (with a story that’s been lying around on the table). Return, friend, to “The Heroic Blood of Cain.” 8.8.84 “Atomic Winter” - ice, snow. “Martian” dust, a storm will cover the earth with ice

The list of Soviet military personnel missing in action now includes 264 people. One of them is a native of the Odessa region. Journalists managed to shed light on the circumstances of the soldier’s disappearance.

Denis Kornyshev and Oleg Konstantinov write about this in Dumskaya.

When we first started developing this topic, we planned to time the publication of the article to coincide with the next “Afghan” date - say, the anniversary of the withdrawal of troops from the mountainous republic. It seemed to us that a story about a rarely remembered category of victims of that war - prisoners of war - would not be at all out of place. After all, sometimes their stories are an example of real courage. Take, for example, the famous uprising of Soviet prisoners in the Badaber camp, which ended with the destruction of the Pakistani base. What if, we thought, looking for the guy’s colleagues, fellow villagers and relatives, sending out requests for information, it would suddenly turn out that he was not just “missing”, but a forgotten hero, whom God himself ordered to tell the public about.

Alas, when the editors received more information about our fellow countryman, it became clear that the material would not turn out to be “heroic” for a number of reasons, which are discussed below. For the same reasons, we decided to change the first and last name of the person involved, and also not to indicate the locality from which he was drafted and where his relatives still live. “Dumskaya” could not refuse the publication completely - after all, the facts we obtained cover one of the many blind spots in the history of the local conflict in the DRA. In addition, there is every reason to believe that Alexander N. (as we will call the serviceman) is still alive, although he is unlikely to be eager to return to his homeland... But first things first.

“RED TULIPS”, HARE HUNT AND LIST-92

The fact that our prisoners of war remained in Afghanistan became known to the general Soviet public only a year after the withdrawal of the “limited contingent”. Before this, the topic of “missing people” was modestly ignored, statistics were not made public, and only combatants and relatives of the “missing” knew that such a category of losses existed at all.

The information vacuum began to be filled in 1990. The first to shoot was the departmental “Red Star”, which, without naming names, spoke about the uprising in Badaber. At the same time, the press began to publish terrible evidence about the fate of those captured. The fragile psyche of Soviet citizens was traumatized by stories about how the unfortunate had their arms and legs cut off, their tongues cut out, their eyes gouged out, or they were made into “red tulips” - they cut the skin on the stomach, pulled it up and tied it over the head, after which the person died in terrible agony .

Igor Rykov and Oleg Khlan in a prisoner of war camp, 1983. Soldier Of Fortune Magazine

A little later, information appeared that some soldiers and officers ended up in the hands of the Mujahideen of their own free will. Some fled out of political convictions, some from hazing, and some from criminal prosecution when facts of theft and other illegal actions were revealed.

The highest-ranking fugitive is the intelligence chief of the 122nd regiment of the 201st motorized rifle division, Lieutenant Colonel Nikolai Zayats. During one of the operations, he shot two members of the Afghan security service KHAD. The officer was removed from duty, an investigation began, but he stole a BRDM and drove it to the enemy’s location. Then it became known that the intelligence officer was killed by the Mujahideen. According to one version - for refusal to cooperate. However, in his memoirs, the former intelligence chief of the 201st division, and now a professor at the intelligence department of the National Defense University of Ukraine, Nikolai Kuzmin, claims that Zayats not only collaborated - he directed some of the enemy’s operations. And they “slapped” him when Soviet troops blocked the zone where the traitor was located.

“They tried to take the hare to the mountains several times, but it didn’t work,” writes Kuzmin. - It became clear that its capture by ours was a matter of time. The council of leaders decided that since it was impossible to get him out, and he had been with them for almost 1.5 months, had seen many of the leaders, their bases and caches, then it was advisable to eliminate him as an unwanted witness. Which was done immediately. He was taken to the river bank. Kunduz, shot, the body was stripped naked and thrown into the river. Now, after 1-2 days, it would no longer be possible to identify him: the heat, fish and crayfish will do their job. And there were plenty of ownerless corpses in the rivers of Afghanistan in those years. This is how Lieutenant Colonel Zayats disappeared and died.”

Be that as it may, neither Hare nor other deserters can be called criminals, since in 1988 the Supreme Soviet of the USSR, “guided by the principles of humanism,” issued an unprecedented decree that exempted from criminal liability all persons who committed crimes during military service. services in Afghanistan. Regardless of the nature of these crimes! This amnesty is comparable only to the mass release of prisoners by Kerensky and Beria.

In February 1992, the same “Red Star” finally published the full list of missing people. By that time, public and government structures were already working hard to return the prisoners. Many - like, for example, the future vice-president of Russia and leader of the anti-Yeltsin opposition, General Rutskoi - were ransomed, while some were handed over to the militants for free. To coordinate this activity, the Committee for the Affairs of Internationalist Soldiers was formed in the CIS (unofficial name - Committee-92). Over the first ten years of work, employees of this organization found 29 former military personnel, 22 of whom returned to their homeland, and seven remained to live in Afghanistan.

Last, but hopefully not the last, in March of this year we managed to find a private of the 101st motorized rifle regiment, Uzbek Bakhretdin Khakimov, who went missing in the province of Herat in September 1980. In a battle with the dushmans, he was seriously wounded and was unable to withdraw with his unit. Local residents picked him up and took him in. The former soldier remained to live in Afghanistan. Gradually, he learned the secrets of herbal medicine from the elder and himself became a respected physician under the name Sheikh Abdullah. I didn’t want to go back...

MISSING ON NEW YEAR'S NIGHT

But let's return to our fellow countryman. Junior Sergeant Alexander Mikhailovich N. was born in 1964 in a small village on the border of Odessa and Nikolaev regions. Graduated from a local school. The guy was drafted into the ranks of the Soviet Army on March 27, 1982. In August of the same year, he ended up in the artillery division of the 122nd motorized rifle regiment of the 201st Gatchina division, which was stationed in the province of Kunduz.

Alexander N. Photo from the conscript’s personal file, website salambacha.com

According to official data, from December 31, 1983 to January 2, 1984, serviceman N. went missing. For 30 years now there has been no word about him. His old mother and sister are still waiting for him.

“Immediately after school I joined the army. I wanted to serve myself. No one was forced there at that time. Sasha was one of three who were called up from the entire region to Afghanistan. A good, strong and kind person. Mom dreams of him every night and says that he will return soon,” says sister N. Valentina Mikhailovna.

When the family learned about the disappearance of the soldier, the mother traveled to Kyiv and Moscow, wrote numerous letters to all authorities, but the answer was the same: “There is no information about your son.” And only in 1992 did they find out that Sasha was alive, but in captivity. Neither they nor local authorities were given details. To this day, every February 15 - the day of the withdrawal of troops from Afghanistan - junior sergeant N. is mentioned at official events in the region as a hero.

Unfortunately, he was not a hero, as evidenced by both the criminal case closed after the announcement of the “Afghan” amnesty and the testimony of his colleagues.

“Sergeant N. is a traitor who left the Ak-Mazar garrison (until the end of 1985, there was a control platoon and three guns of the second fire platoon of the 3rd howitzer battery of the regiment’s artillery division - Ed.) My platoon stood three kilometers from them. I remember very well how the search for him went, what intelligence information came in and how negotiations were conducted with the spirits about his extradition, although unsuccessfully,” says former platoon commander Sergei Polushkin.

According to him, junior sergeant N. was the commander of the gun crew. His unit guarded the Termez-Kabul highway in the area of ​​the city of Aibak, Samangan province (and not in Kunduz, as indicated in the Red Star list).

“Artillerymen, unlike motorized riflemen, were involved in operations only when it was necessary to shell the territory within the radius of destruction of howitzers - about 15 kilometers. The rest of the time, the artillery battalion’s fighters sat on the high-rise without moving out and had no contact with other units. No one knew what was happening there,” recalls the commander of the 3rd battalion of the regiment, Mikhail Teteryatnikov.

“He left on New Year’s Eve and was reported missing on January 2. I talked to a soldier who saw the guy just a few minutes before his escape. Alexander was absolutely calm. He took with him a machine gun and six magazines, two of which he put in his boots. Why he ran away is unclear. Anything could have happened - from hazing to ideological convictions. But it was a shock to everyone when he left. The Uzbeks and Tajiks were leaving, and here was a Slav! I can say one thing: he did this intelligently, because after that he fought against us,” says Sergei Polushkin.

Artillerymen of the 122nd MRR, photo from 1985

Alexander N. defected to a gang of Mujahideen that acted against the regiment.

“After his desertion, the enemy group sharply became more active, they began to behave quite daringly - the traitor knew our tactics and could predict our moves. He spoiled a lot of blood for us. Whether he personally killed Soviet soldiers or not, I don’t know. We need to ask him if this creature is alive,” Polushkin does not hold back his emotions.

Other veterans of the 122nd regiment say that N. worked for the Mujahideen for quite a long time. He taught them to lay mines, attack transport convoys and other military wisdom. He took an active part in military clashes. Sometimes he would break into the air using a walkie-talkie and mockingly invite his former comrades to surrender.

Viktor Rodnov, who served in the communications company of the 122nd Motorized Rifle Regiment, says that immediately after the sergeant disappeared, the entire regiment was sent out to search for him:

“I don’t know of a single case when we abandoned our own. Even corpses were taken out of gorges and prisoners were sometimes ransomed. But only those who want to be free can be freed. N. himself came into radio contact with us during the battle on those frequencies that only his own knew, and cursed at us. The fact that because of him the spirits then calmly passed our posts and laid mines is a fact,” says the veteran.

“KHAD employees negotiated with the Mujahideen to hand over the deserter - at first there was hope that this was an accident. But when Alexander refused the transfer, everything became clear. The group sent to recapture him was ambushed. Several people were injured,” adds Polushkin.

Dumskaya's sources in the Ukrainian special services confirmed that in their archives there are references to the escape of Sergeant N. For some time, despite the amnesty, he appeared in the orientations as a particularly dangerous criminal, during whose arrest weapons can and should be used. However, in the early 1990s, according to our interlocutors, the man was taken to Canada by CIA officers, and since then his trace has been lost. Whether Alexander is alive now is unknown. The motives that prompted the young man from a small Ukrainian village on the shore of the Tiligul estuary to forget about the oath also remained unclear...

Current page: 11 (book has 20 pages total) [available reading passage: 14 pages]

I led the armored group myself, and on February 20, 1984, at 14.00, we entered the Khanabad road in a small column of 4 infantry fighting vehicles. We quickly covered the distance to Khanabad and by 15.30 we were in the garrison with the tankers. The crews of our infantry fighting vehicles included only driver mechanics and gunners, and I was the only officer.

Arriving at the garrison, I informed the commander of the tank company that we were a divisional commission to inspect the security service on the Kunduz-Talukan road section. Since it was already late (in Afghanistan, all traffic on the roads ended at 16.00), we will spend the night with them, and tomorrow morning we will move on. Several Afghan officers and soldiers who were right there heard all this (the Afghan company was located across the fence from ours).

The “performance” we staged was beyond doubt. Everyone saw that there were no infantry in the BMP. Our calculation was that the “spiritual” informants, and they were probably among local residents and Afghan soldiers, would not be alerted by the very fact of the sudden arrival of an armored group at the garrison. Scheduled checks of garrisons on the roads are commonplace; the armored group does not have infantry, only crews, and even then reduced numbers. So the dushmans had no reason to worry.

At 22.00, a foot reconnaissance group of about 25 people under the command of the chief of staff of the reconnaissance battalion, Captain Vladimir Tereshchenko, with two Afghan guides, crossed the military guard of the garrison and went deeper into the green zone. We walked along the trails in complete darkness, but the guides completed their task perfectly and by about 1.30 a.m. they reached the designated ambush area. They contacted me and reported their readiness for action.

That's it, the ambush was ready for action. There was a distance of no more than 2 km between the foot scouts and the armored group, so we could arrive at them along the asphalt in 4–5 minutes.

I woke up the tank company commander, conveyed to him our true plan of action and set the task of preparing 3 tanks in case we needed to support us.

The night passed at the radio station. Tereshchenko periodically reported on the situation, everything was quiet, only in the morning several horse-drawn carts with peasants passed by, apparently going to the market in Kunduz.

Dawn was close, it was necessary to make a decision on further actions. Shoot an ambush? It's logical, but something kept me from doing it.

I knew the ambush area well, so on the radio I set the task for Tereshchenko to go out and quietly occupy the water mill, which was located 300–400 m from him right next to the highway. Task: to observe what is happening on the road during the day, when our checkpoints are absent. If an obvious gang appears, destroy it.

It must be said that Tereshchenko approached the task creatively. He not only organized observation, but also sent both Afghan guides directly onto the road. And they, by the way, were former dushmans themselves, dressed in semi-military national clothes, shaggy, bearded, with weapons and bandoliers, and there was absolutely no doubt that they belonged to the “fighters for the faith.”

They stood by the road for half an hour, became bolder, began to stop carts and cars, and check documents. Further - more, they got into character, began to search, take money from the peasants. Collect “road tax”, as was customary among the dushmans.

In short, after about another hour of their “work,” a PAZ bus arrives from Khanabad, armed people get out of it and go to our guides.

It turns out that the residents had already complained to the local leaders that robbers were operating on the road outside Khanabad, and asked to protect them. Here the field commanders Tsaranvol and Jeilani with 16 militants personally arrived to deal with the bandits.

Tsaranvol, a tall and healthy man, approached one of our guides, Khamidkhan, and immediately, silently, punched him in the bearded face. The rest of the “spirits” stood behind. Hamidkhan and the second guide rushed from them to the mill. The leaders slowly followed them, where would they escape from the reprisals?

Then the ambush opened fire. It is clear that from 25 machine guns from a distance of 50 m, in a few minutes they made 18 holey “spiritual” corpses. And again, not a single prisoner, since by my arrival the guides, apparently in retribution for their fear and shame, had already managed to finish shooting 3-4 wounded dushmans.

Hearing intense shooting, I and an armored group immediately went to the battlefield and was there in a few minutes.

I see the following picture: the bus is burning on the road, dead dushmans are lying around it and on the side of the road, the conductors are kicking the corpses of Tsaranvol and Jailani with curses, our people are collecting captured weapons.

The trophies were 4 Spanish Star pistols, several AK-47 assault rifles, a dozen Bur rifles and an English-made Bren light machine gun, 1937.

As I already said, the leader Tsaranvol (prosecutor) was a prominent figure among the rebels not only in the Khanabad district, but throughout the entire Kunduz province. The other leader, Jeilani, was a smaller figure and was part of Tsaranvol’s group, but was also known as our irreconcilable enemy.

In short, the fish was big and the destruction of two leaders of active gangs was a serious success for us.

However, the matter is not over yet. We must leave here now, because from experience I knew that the local “spirits” would not forgive us for killing their leaders and would definitely try to take revenge. The road we were on was the only one we could take to get back to Kunduz. And although the scouts had a rule - never return along the same road as they came, we had no other choice. The only hope was the speed with which we had to leave the battle area.

Therefore, I immediately reported the situation and the results of the ambush to the division’s combat control center and asked them to send us a platoon or company in an infantry fighting vehicle for backup. They loaded the corpses of Tsaranvol and Jeilani, captured weapons and the “three crosses gait” towards Kunduz onto one of the infantry fighting vehicles.

We left on time; literally after us, several bursts of fire were heard from afar from the greenery, which did not bring us any harm.

I thought they were all gone. However, no. Kunduz had already appeared in the distance, suddenly shots were fired from a nearby ditch, I saw one RPG grenade flying 10 meters ahead, the other hit the side of the BMP in front, it stopped, the soldiers from it jumped into the ditch, lay down, and a firefight ensued.

The “Spiritual” ambush was clearly organized in a hurry, within 20–30 minutes, the task was set by radio: to recapture the valiant Mujahideen Tsaranvol and Jeilani, captured by the “infidels.” That's why they prepared it in the wrong place - an open field, and only on one side. If they had “pinned us down” in the green, and fired from both sides: I am sure that, of course, they would not have defeated us, but our losses would have been significant and would have nullified the results of our ambush.

When a grenade hit the lead infantry fighting vehicle, two people were seriously wounded: a paramedic-warrant officer in the face, he lost one eye, and a soldier, whose cumulative jet of a grenade went straight through his leg and practically tore it off. The vehicle itself, although a grenade penetrated its troop compartment and middle fuel tank, did not catch fire.

I believe that what allowed us to quickly deal with the ambush was the fact that out of the 4 available infantry fighting vehicles, two were BMP-2 with a 30-mm automatic cannon. Quickly turning around on the road, they drove into the field and opened heavy fire on the ambush. The “spirits” also hit well several times, seeing that with a machine gun you can’t trample against the armor, leaving 2 dead and 2 wounded, they fled along the dry ditches into the “greenery”.

Their grenade launchers were apparently killed or wounded, because not a single RPG shot was fired again. We did not pursue them; we had to urgently send the wounded and clear the road, since the damaged infantry fighting vehicle did not allow passage. Having hooked it with a cable to another infantry fighting vehicle, they began to tow it. And the wounded in one of the infantry fighting vehicles were immediately sent to the medical battalion.

The corpses of Tsaranvol and Jailani had to be abandoned at the scene of the battle, since while the infantry fighting vehicles were maneuvering along the road, they fell from the vehicles onto the road and were run over several times up and down, so they were clearly not suitable for display in the KhAD.

So we arrived at the garrison: on one there is a crowd of our soldiers, about 20 people. On the other there are two captive “spirits”, guides and several of our people, a damaged infantry fighting vehicle on a cable backwards.

This story has a small continuation. Through an intelligence network, we received information that the next day a magnificent funeral of the leaders we killed took place in one of the villages near Khanabad. There were many other leaders there, all of whom vowed to avenge the dead.

For a long time afterwards they looked for the traitors who set up their leaders for an ambush, and it seems they even shot someone. But this happened absolutely by accident - this was, as they say, the will of Allah!

And further. Dushmans trumpeted everywhere that their leaders were treacherously captured alive, and their guards were shot on the road. When the courageous Mujahideen attacked the column and almost repulsed them, the cowardly “infidels” threw the “fighters for the faith” under the tanks.

At the site of the battle, the dushmans erected a memorial sign - a metal poster made of tin, where it was written who died here, and an oath of vengeance. We didn’t touch him, but after a couple of weeks he was like a sieve: none of the columns passing by deprived themselves of the pleasure of pumping several dozen bullets from machine guns into him.

Already in the late 90s, I had to see the American film “The Beast,” which showed scenes of Soviet tank crews executing Afghan civilians in this way. Surely this or a similar case “came to the pen” of their screenwriters?

Hare Hunting

I want to tell you about another person with whom fate brought me together in Afghanistan.

Lieutenant Colonel Nikolai Leonidovich Zayats, at the time of my first meeting with him in March 1983, was the intelligence chief of the 108th Motorized Rifle Division.

Then we, all the heads of intelligence units, were called to the expanded Military Council of the army, where we were given a good “prochukhon” for the increased activity of “spirits” on the Termez-Bagram pipeline. Daily (or rather nightly) sabotage, hundreds of tons of fuel spilled onto the ground and no actions of the Limited Contingent could prevent this.

As always in such cases, the intelligence officers were blamed for everything. Chief of Staff 40A Major General N.G. Ter-Grigoryants, almost foaming at the mouth, accused us of criminal negligence and unwillingness to conduct reconnaissance: why don’t we know who will break through the pipeline and where? In short, we found the switchmen.

But it would have been necessary, as it turned out later, to simply restore order in the pipeline crew. After all, only they benefited from accidents and sabotage on the pipeline. Blaming the huge losses of fuel (aviation kerosene) on the dushmans, they actually traded it left and right, selling it for next to nothing to the Afghans. By the way, when six months later they imprisoned a large group of soldiers, officers and warrant officers of this brigade, for some reason the activity of dushmans on the pipeline immediately decreased significantly.

I got a little distracted from the main topic. So, after this meeting, we met with the Hare one more time, again in Kabul.

Lieutenant Colonel Zayats, short in stature and densely built, impressed me then as a thrifty and thorough man. However, these qualities, necessary for an officer, especially a commander in peacetime, were absolutely not valued in war. There, personal courage, the ability to organize a battle and take care of soldiers were especially valued.

Protect in the sense that, again, organize and conduct battle wisely, not make a career out of other people’s lives, so that the soldier is provided with everything, from dry rations to artillery and air support.

Not to mention the organization of medical support, helping the wounded is sacred! In war, no one is immune from this. This is the kind of commander his subordinates will literally carry in their arms and follow him through thick and thin. And doubly so in intelligence.

The hare was not eager to fight, did not show initiative. If he had been deputy commander for logistics or weapons, I am absolutely sure that he would have served his term in Afghanistan very well, received his order and left with honor for the Union. But he was a scout and something completely different was required of him.

Knowing well the chief of staff of the 108th Motorized Rifle Division, Colonel Gennady Ivanovich Kandalin, who was my regiment commander in Kushka, his exactingness, intolerance of lack of initiative, I was not particularly surprised when at the end of August 1983 I learned that, on Kandalin’s initiative, Zayats was removed from his post with the wording “for the loss of intelligence leadership and personal unpreparedness.” In addition, he developed some mental disorders and he even underwent treatment for this. Who needed such an intelligence chief?

This was not uncommon in Afghanistan. As I wrote earlier, in our 201st Motorized Rifle Division, in just over two years, two division intelligence chiefs with a similar formulation were replaced. The first was Lieutenant Colonel Ryzhenko in 1981, the second was my predecessor Lieutenant Colonel R.S. Zakharov at the end of 1982.

In Afghanistan (as in the Great Patriotic War) it was very popular to take revenge on intelligence officers. Then I was convinced of this from my own experience, but that, as they say, is another story.

Therefore, I greeted the news of Zayets’ appointment calmly. Although in 122 SMEs the situation in intelligence was paradoxical. The commander of the reconnaissance company there was also the removed chief of staff of the 1083 road commandant battalion from Surubi, Major Boris Aldokhin. True, he was removed not for official omissions, but because, after drinking with friends, they were driving around Kabul in an armored personnel carrier and ran into a member of the Army Military Council.

Nevertheless, I knew that Zayats was an experienced officer, he had held all positions in intelligence, was the commander of a reconnaissance battalion in the GSVG and had established himself well there. So you never know what happens in life!

About two weeks later I met with him, we talked, he was optimistic, I supported him and we parted mutually satisfied.

And then I was almost not alarmed by Major Aldokhin’s statement that the Hare was a coward and anything could be expected from him. As a human being, I understood that Hare was almost 40 years old, he had two children, and besides, he was not quite fairly removed from his position, i.e., it was stupid to expect any special enthusiasm from him. A man does his job - and that’s fine.

However, subsequent events showed that I was wrong, and the Hare was not a hare at all, but was looking like a good wolf.

On October 16, the following happened. The reconnaissance company of the regiment in full force, led by Hare, went out to ambush. As a guide, they took a captive dushman from the local residents of the area, who was serving his sentence in a local prison. He reported a caravan carrying weapons passing that night. The data was so important that the “spirit” was accompanied by a KHAD officer with the rank of major. We went out at night in pouring rain.

Then I tell you in the words of the Hare himself: “...we walked 10 kilometers, I decided to get my bearings using the map. I stopped the column and, together with the Afghans, retreated about 50 meters behind the dune to determine the direction using the compass. I look at the map, and suddenly I see that the captured spook has attacked a KHAD officer and is trying to snatch his machine gun. I instinctively gave a burst in the spirit, but both fell. I see they’re both dead...”

The platoon commander and the soldiers who witnessed this testified that after the Hare and the Afghans left behind the dune, they soon heard shots. Having run there, they saw that the Afghans were lying dead, and the Hare was standing next to him with a machine gun in his hands. All this was more or less true, although here and there questions arise.

But what follows is completely absurd. The hare orders the Khadovets to take the machine gun, they throw the corpses of those killed in the steppe and return to the regiment. There he reports to the regiment commander that the Afghans turned out to be traitors, they wanted to kill him, but he got ahead of them and shot them both on the spot.

The regiment commander, Lieutenant Colonel Ivan Vasilyevich Zubko, did not look into this too much; there were many cases of Afghans betraying him, and he reported this to the division commander in the morning. The question seemed to be settled, but in the middle of the day a Soviet KHAD adviser arrived at the regiment with Afghan Khad officers and asked where the dushman and the officer accompanying him were. They didn't come back in the morning, what happened to them?

They definitely did not believe Zayets’ version; the adviser demanded that the regiment commander bring the corpses and called an Afghan doctor who examined them. Then he interrogated the officers and soldiers of the company, and clearly proved that the Hare committed the deliberate murder of two people.

They reported to the top, there was a loud scandal, the division commander immediately removed him from his post and summoned him to Kunduz for investigation.

I later spoke with the Hare more than once. I asked him, because everything could have been imagined completely differently. All that was needed was not to throw the dead Afghans into the steppes, but to bring them to the regiment and report that the company itself was ambushed and the Afghans were killed by dushmans. After all, there were no other Afghans with them anymore, and the officers and soldiers of the company would confirm everything that they were told. That's all!

Nobody would bother to look into it anymore. Although, of course, if we had taken out 5.45-mm bullets from the Afghans from the AKS-74 assault rifle, which only ours had, then this would have raised the first doubts. Well, if they had also carried out a ballistic examination of the company’s weapons, they would definitely have found the weapon with which they were killed. But this is under normal conditions, but here it is unlikely that they would do this.

The hare then told me, “I didn’t want to deceive.” Quite a naive explanation for a 40-year-old man. But I think that, on the contrary, he wanted publicity.

Now I think that Aldokhin was right then. The hare was a terrible coward in the 108th division, where he was the chief of intelligence, and even more so in the regiment, where it was already much more dangerous. Apparently, this animal fear pushed him to commit a crime. He thought that who would make a fuss about some Afghans? They will remove him from this position, send him quietly to the Union away from the scandal, and there he will make up for his time.

He did not take into account the fact that he killed not an ordinary Afghan, but a state security officer with the rank of major, and these, as they say in Odessa, are two big differences. The Hare had no high patrons, and no one was going to “slow down” his business.

The issue was decided at the very top, but they didn’t know what to do. Judge him or limit himself to administrative measures: expel him from the party, dismiss him from the army. Of course, according to the law, for a double murder there is no trial.

But again, putting in prison a senior officer, a lieutenant colonel, who has honestly fulfilled his duty in Afghanistan for a year, is also somehow not right.

Therefore, for about three months the Hare was, as it were, between heaven and earth. He was removed from his post; they did not decide what to do with him. To keep him busy, the division chief of staff, Colonel V.I. Chernov assigned him to the operational department, where he began to engage in military service, checking security, etc.

I refused to take him on reconnaissance missions. I quickly found a replacement. A few days later, the head of intelligence of the TurkVO, Colonel I.Kh., arrived at the division. Taushanov with an inspection of intelligence issues. He listened carefully to my report and looked at the documentation.

He was favorably impressed by the card index of the gangs in the division's area of ​​responsibility. The card index was my brainchild and my pride. I led it personally, not trusting my assistants.

It was a regular metal box, divided into 6 compartments (according to the number of provinces in the area of ​​responsibility). In each compartment there were standard cards, which indicated information about the gang and its leader: numbers, national composition, weapons, area of ​​​​operation, where, when and how they showed themselves. Some of the cards contained photographs of the leaders, obtained from the state security agencies and Tsarandoy.

This file cabinet always made an impression on senior commanders, since it was obvious that the intelligence officers in the division took their work seriously, and records of gangs were kept.

Accounting for gangs and forecasting their activities was a serious matter. Only to the uninitiated it may seem that the bandits around are all the same. My analysis showed that of the 380 gangs existing in our area of ​​​​responsibility, only about 60 had a clear anti-government orientation. They committed sabotage, mined roads, attacked authorities, fired at our columns and locations.

The rest are just self-defense units. Each village collected money, bought weapons, hired young guys and maintained this small detachment of 10-12 people. After all, the police and prosecutor's office in Afghanistan existed only in cities, and only during the day. And at night the dushmans ruled there. What can we say about villages?

Anyone who came there with a machine gun could do whatever he wanted. Kill, rob, rape - there were many such cases. Therefore, without relying on the authorities, residents resolved this issue this way.

Such detachments did not pose any harm to us, unless, of course, sometimes out of ignorance, and sometimes out of malicious intent, “werewolves” from among the local authorities, we struck and carried out “cleansing operations” against them. Any such force action means killed, wounded, maimed civilians, destroyed houses, burned crops. And then the self-defense squad became an active squad of avengers.

It was this card index that made it possible to divide gangs into active and passive ones. After all, we received combat orders for airstrikes and “cleansing operations” from Kabul, received from intelligence sources among the Afghans. And these sources, often for provocative purposes, exposed those who did not want to cooperate with the dushmans to blows. And they created our enemies with our own hands.

Having received a combat order for action, I always turned to the card index, and if it contained information that this formation was not fighting against us and the authorities, then I turned to the division commander and reported the state of affairs.

Shapovalov was an intelligent and experienced commander; he did not want to increase the number of our opponents. Therefore, often, instead of airstrikes and combat troops, he sent a BAPO (combat propaganda and propaganda detachment) to a given village, whose translators and officers talked with the elderly, and sometimes with the leaders of self-defense, and convinced them to sign a cooperation agreement.

It is a pity that this was not always possible, since the majority of village representatives agreed to sign such an agreement with the Soviet troops, but with the authorities - not at all! Local authorities were considered corrupt and unreliable. And we did not have the right to conclude such agreements. Also a kind of vicious circle.

So then, at the end of my report to General Taushanov, I reported on the difficulties in the intelligence of the 122nd Motorized Rifle Regiment: the old intelligence chief, Major Mikhailov, left in June to be replaced, the new one, Major V.F. Bondarenko died a month after his arrival, Lieutenant Colonel Zayats, who was appointed in his place, was removed from office a little over a month later and a criminal case was initiated against him.

The district intelligence chief was sympathetic to our difficulties, and literally a week later I was introduced to the regiment’s new intelligence chief, Captain Alexander Vasilyevich Grishchenko, who had arrived from the officer reserve in Tashkent.

Looking ahead, I will say that Alexander Vasilyevich successfully won his term in Afghanistan, first in the 122nd, then in the 149th Guards. SME, was awarded the Order of the Red Star. We met in 1992 already in the national army of Ukraine; he served in my department until 1996. Now retired, lives in Kyiv. Sometimes we meet at “Afghan” events.

However, let's return to the story of Lieutenant Colonel Zayets.

Somewhere at the end of January 1984, they finally made a decision on him, definitely - to judge! They didn’t arrest him, they said, where would he go from the submarine? But as it later turned out, it was in vain, since he deserted.

From meetings with the investigator, he realized that, with all the mitigating circumstances, he was facing 9-10 years in prison, and trial could not be avoided. He was very confused, he did not expect this. Apparently out of confusion, out of helplessness to change something, but something had to be done. So he decided to illegally sneak into the Union, and see how it turns out. In Volyn, where he was from, was he going to sit out in the former Bandera caches?

However, these are all my fantasies. What he planned and what he decided, only he himself knew. The only fact was that on March 15, 1984, he deserted.

A convenient opportunity helped him in this. The division went into combat in the province of Badakhshan. Over the course of the previous few days, there was the usual turmoil and confusion in such cases. Columns are formed, groups of vehicles scurry from garrison to garrison - which was not allowed under normal conditions.

This is the picture. Standing near the road is the BRDM-2 of the commandant's company of the division, there is only one driver in the car. The Hare approaches, and the following dialogue took place between them: “... is your car going out for an operation? - It turns out. – Ready to leave, is the car in good working order and fueled? - Everything is fine. “Let me check.” The driver knows the lieutenant colonel as a division headquarters officer who has been in their company more than once. Without any second thought, he gets out of the car, the Hare takes his place, starts the engine and drives away.

A soldier costs an hour, or two. It’s already getting dark, there’s no car. Their company commander drives by and asks why he is standing here. The soldier explains the situation. The garrison has only one road around the airfield, so there is nowhere to get lost.

The company commander drove around the garrison, nothing. I got worried. I reported to the division chief of staff, who ordered the search to begin. It turns out that the BRDM of the commandant's company of the division at 15.30 passed through the checkpoint in combat guard with a small column to Northern Kunduz, which is recorded in the log.

They called there and found out that the BRDM was indeed in a convoy, but did not arrive at the garrison. In the morning, they sent a couple of helicopters, which soon found him 20 km northeast of Kunduz in the green zone of Kalai-Zol county near the village of Saksacol, a place in the full sense of a bandit.

The battalion of the 149th Motorized Rifle Regiment was immediately sent there, and after a while the results were reported: the BRDM was completely disassembled, the weapons were removed, all the components were removed, even the wheels - only one armored box remained. There are no signs of battle.

Interrogated local residents testified that this car was stuck in this place in the evening. An officer came out and tried to explain himself to the boys who ran up. Seeing that besides the officer there were no more “shuravi”, and the officer was unarmed, the leader of the local group, Mullo Rahim, came up, with him about 5 local dushmans, and took him away with them. We couldn't find out anything else.

That's it, emergency! They reported to the army and the district. We started searching. But the difficulty was that just on that day, in the morning, the division went to Badakhshan for a planned operation (essay “On the Roof of the World”), there were few remaining forces and it was not possible to organize large-scale searches “hot on the heels”.

I also left with the main staff of the headquarters and returned only a month later. I learned that the Hare had not been found, although the search gradually expanded, and significant forces of 40A already took part in them. Suffice it to say that the search was personally led by the chief of staff of the TurkVO, Colonel General Krivosheev.

I immediately joined this search, went with scouts to villages, interviewed local residents, interrogated prisoners and detainees. During these very days, I personally had an incident with a “representative of higher headquarters.” I'll tell you about this in more detail.

These representatives came to Afghanistan like flies to honey. The reasons for this are very prosaic. Firstly, high travel allowances - about 40 checks per day (for comparison, we received 11 checks). Secondly, the opportunity to distinguish yourself and receive an order. Thirdly, receive a “baksheesh” (gift) from your auditees.

To the credit of our OKSVA officers, especially the combat units, they did not pay much attention to these inspectors, because in the central districts and groups of troops abroad they could frighten officers by transferring them to places “where Makar did not herd calves.” But there was something to scare us - and so we walked on the edge of life.

The most unpleasant thing was that the “newcomers” tried their best to distinguish themselves, they presented stupid ideas, which, naturally, we had to implement.

I already wrote in the essay “On the Roof of the World” how such a visiting general from the General Staff demanded that I take his “language”, absolutely not understanding either the local conditions in particular or the peculiarities of the war in Afghanistan in general.

The assistants of these chiefs tried especially hard. Having no combat experience, they tried to teach us how to fight, what to do, but they didn’t know how to do it.

And then one day I received a combat mission: with a group of scouts, 20–25 people, in two helicopters to fly to the green zone of Kalai-Zol county. There, comb the group of houses in which the dushmans allegedly hid the Hare. The data was obtained from a “very reliable” source and the division commander decided to entrust this responsible task to me.

The chief of staff of the division, Colonel Chernov, assigning me a combat mission, warned that a representative of the operational department of the district headquarters, a lieutenant colonel, I don’t remember his last name, would fly with us. Why is it flying? Ostensibly to see how we act.

In fact, this guy really wanted to “cut down” the order easily. What if the Hare is there and we take him? That's it, if there is a hole for the order!

Of course, I didn’t care, and I didn’t believe in this information. We received such “disinformation” every day in batches and several times. And always false when tested. Therefore, I was very skeptical about this information, but for some reason the “newcomers” believed it so much that they all vying with each other to ask to join the landing party. Their boss appointed the one I mentioned. Well, it flies, it flies, what do I care?

However, as soon as we got into the helicopter, the lieutenant colonel began to show activity, almost setting me tasks. I kept quiet and didn’t “emerge.” I’m sitting, thinking about how I can complete the task.

The helicopters dropped us off at the edge of the desert, 400-500 meters from the “green zone”. I assigned a task to the helicopter pilots to hover over the zone and see if there were any armed people nearby.

The helicopters took off and went in circles. Soon I hear cannon and machine gun fire. Helicopter commanders report that they see several groups of armed people scattering in different directions.

It’s clear, it means there are dushmans in this area. I got my bearings, found these houses, or rather a small village that we must comb. I assigned tasks to the commanders and checked communications. The lieutenant colonel tried to intervene several times, but I stopped him rather impolitely. He pouted and walked away.

The scouts lined up in battle groups and began to move toward the target in rolling motions. So, in dashes, we reached the outskirts, surrounded the village and began checking the houses. The helicopters got in touch, reported that they were running out of fuel, and left for the airfield.

SCAVEBACK HARE

Treason to the Motherland is a dark matter.

At all times and from all sides.

Glory to the Creator, there weren’t even sixty people in Afghanistan during the ten years of war.

What is interesting about their destinies?

They fell from the frying pan into the fire.

During the war years they kept quiet about this, why confuse military minds?

The few returned by the Mujahideen (for diesel fuel, flour, sugar or an agreement not to bomb) were not shot in front of the line - the war is not the same, the Motherland is no longer so cruel.

And later, when the introduction of troops was recognized in Moscow as a mistake, everyone was forgiven, some alive, some posthumously.

This is, of course, a good balm for the soul, but a bad bleach!

How did Soviet soldiers end up with the Mujahideen dushmans?

Anything has happened.

They abandoned theirs (in the confusion of the burning column).

Got away from the group (while combing).

I went to the melon patch (very close to the military outpost).

The old-timers muzzled (no explanation required).

Brazhki got drunk and (“to the village, listen to the muezzin”).

I squandered military property, sold ammunition (they are pressing their own, and there is also a court and a zone ahead!).

It's simple.

Everything is like in an “undeclared” war.

The memory of the “changers” is short and vague. Here a good soldier is sometimes called “vanka”!

However, there are no rules without exceptions. There was one Lieutenant Colonel Nikolai Zayats (in some sources - Zayets) who was declared a “traitor to the Motherland” by the troops. He was not forgotten even after a quarter of a century. In the memoirs of internationalist soldiers, he is either a traitor, or a hero, or a victim, or the cause of many military failures drenched in the blood of soldiers. The hare, planning treacherous ambushes, was used to scare people in Afghanistan for four years, right up to the withdrawal of troops. Still would! Intelligence Lieutenant Colonel! Is it necessary to talk about the magical effect of these two words on the consciousness of Soviet people? And in combination with the word “treason”? That's the same! The country, of course, knew one intelligence officer-colonel-spy, Oleg Penkovsky, but that was when!

In February 1983, Lieutenant Colonel Nikolai Zayats arrived from the Carpathian Military District to the 40th Army with an appointment to the post of chief of intelligence of the 108th motorized rifle division (Bagram). A year later, he was transferred to the 201st motorized rifle division as the chief of intelligence of the 122nd motorized rifle regiment (Tashkurgan). And a little later they were completely seconded to the division headquarters. Why such disfavor? Here, for the sake of truth, you have to be very careful. There were no official documents about the lieutenant colonel’s sins in available sources, and there are none. And here is what is, according to rumors, based on oral creativity.

During the operation on October 16, 1984, Lieutenant Colonel Zayats personally shot and killed two Afghan informants. True, none of the group saw the execution scene; the dune was in the way! Next, the lieutenant colonel honestly reports the incident to the command. Perhaps this confession will someday emerge in written form. Unfortunately, again according to recollections, one of the killed Afghans had an influential relative in the Afghan Security Service (KHAD) and he vowed to take revenge on the Hare at the first opportunity. The Afghan oath is a serious matter! The hare was “hidden” on the other side of Afghanistan, but was not removed from his favorite job - military reconnaissance. While the menacing specter of “treason to the Motherland” looms? Is not it? What about the prosecutor's office? Spent six months investigating the circumstances surrounding the appearance of two corpses? Yes, of course, because it happened behind the dune!

In the spring of 1984, we find the Hare no longer in the 122nd regiment, but at the headquarters of the 201st division. The following is known for certain: on March 15, Hare, having “lulled the driver’s vigilance” of an armored reconnaissance patrol vehicle, got behind the wheel of this same BRDM and drove outside the unit. Military equipment was found two days later several kilometers from the Afghan-Soviet border without weapons, radios or ammunition. Some eyewitnesses say that the wheels remained, others that the wheels, although burnt, were in place. So, after this discovery, no one ever saw or heard of Lieutenant Colonel Zayets. Is there any corpus delicti here other than unauthorized abandonment of a unit, aggravated by the theft of military equipment? And then the “information law of the zone” came into play: the fewer opportunities to check, the higher the awareness.

In the notes of veterans one can find references to the fact that Zayats was recruited by foreign intelligence during his years of service in a group of Soviet troops in Germany. It was for this reason that he arranged:

- on the night of August 7-8, 1983, the extermination of Soviet paratroopers by the forces of their own reconnaissance company,

- inflicted heavy losses on his own reconnaissance battalion in November near Gulbahor,

Escaped to the Panjshir Gorge, with the execution of the crew of the armored vehicle, and then slipped away to Pakistan,

- attack on column 0016, in which two tanks, several infantry fighting vehicles and twenty cars were destroyed

- escorting a gang of 400 people to the very Soviet border in the area of ​​the river port of Sherkhan-Bandar, and shelling Afghan “burbuhays” with goods.

- attacks on airfields and the organization of round-the-clock flights, precisely because of his escape

Among these exciting reports from 1984-87, there are several that suggest that the Hare card was successfully played by our Afghan friends. It was from them that rumors circulated about that. That the Hare is alive, gives interviews, gives lectures in Pakistan, leads gangs from the far south to the far north of Afghanistan. And when reliable information was received (from the Afghans) that the Hare stopped to stay with the gang leader in a village somewhere between the provinces of Farah and Helmand, a bombing attack was carried out on the place (to quote a veteran). "long-range strategic bombers."

If there was such a task to make a “scapegoat” out of Lieutenant Colonel Zayets, then it was solved brilliantly. Under the guise of searching for him, in the spring of 1984, a number of successful operations were carried out in the north of Afghanistan, and later, in the name of the Hare, vigilance and hatred of traitors to the Motherland were awakened, military failures were justified, etc. What if the person was simply not himself? Let's imagine that the division intelligence chief, even a former one, does not read maps well, and drives an armored vehicle into a network of ditches, rivulets, and into the March thaw. Some kind of “March hare”, it turns out.

Future defenders of the Fatherland and its interests abroad, I conjure you with all the saints: be afraid of going missing in “undeclared wars.”

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What? - the inspector did not understand.

Stormy, prolonged applause,” the soldier repeated with a pure heart.

The inspector looked at the head of the PO in bewilderment, and he threw lightning at Solonenko.

For those who have never read the materials of the party congress, I will explain. This brochure clearly reproduced the atmosphere of this forum. After each significant speech or statement by the speaker, according to the convention script, there was a reaction from the audience. Something like: “Stormy applause”, “Stormy and prolonged applause”, “Stormy and prolonged applause, turning into ovation. Everyone stands up and continues to give a standing ovation.”

This was written in parentheses. But the soldier, tired of getting paid for saying something wrong, for not learning something, decided to learn absolutely everything that the company commander had outlined for him in the brochure. And he learned and told.

Ivan Ignatievich Zaitsev, being a senior officer of the third department of the district intelligence department, was a frequent visitor to the Lagodekhi brigade.

He also came with inspections for the exercises. The officers respected him very much for his inexhaustible humor, deep knowledge of his business and human qualities.

Ivan Ignatievich had a lisp when speaking, so I will try to convey the flavor of this speech.

During the exercises

There is such a wonderful place in Transcaucasia - Karayazy. What is called a real mountain-desert area. In these “blessed” places, which the wits called Karlovy Yazy, exercises and shootings of the Trans-KVO took place. The recently created 173rd Special Forces Detachment was a frequent guest at this “resort”. Colonel Zaitsev, due to his duty, had to oversee his active combat training. During that period, a wave of accidents related to careless handling of weapons swept across the district.

The battalion was preparing to shoot. The cold fog of the early morning did not lift my spirits. Zaitsev lit a cigarette.

Battalion commander, is blinding set?

Yes sir.

Have the soldiers been instructed so that not a single cape gets into the shooting field?

Yes sir.

All is ready?

Yes sir.

Okay, let's give the command.

The battalion commander said something, and a signal familiar to every military man was heard over the training ground: “Po-pa-di!” The first bursts of fire were already heard over the field, when suddenly a soldier appeared from the bushes on the left and headed across the field. For a second Zaitsev froze, his eyes popped out of their sockets, and then he burst. Despite his short stature and modest build, Ivan Ignatievich shouted so loudly that even a soldier on the field could easily hear him. Moreover, among what was said, only prepositions were censored. Suddenly finishing shouting, Zaitsev, in a clear, calm voice, gave the order to stop shooting and send the car into the field to deliver this fighter to the checkpoint. Taking a drag from a very tiny cigarette butt that burned his lips and fingers, Ivan Ignatievich turned to the other officers at the command post and, as if apologizing for his incontinence, said: “After all, for him, damn it, you’ll have to pay for him like a villager!”

At the races

Competitions of special forces groups, or simply “platoon races,” were held annually. They were called horse races because during these competitions groups sometimes walked, and more often ran, up to two hundred kilometers in three days. Of course, not all groups could withstand such loads. Ivan Ignatievich was always on the panel of judges. This is how he recounted one of the episodes of the competition: “We are driving a UAZ. I look - he’s crawling along the road in a masked coat with a backpack and a machine gun. I tell the driver: “Stop!” I drove to the probable direction of crawling out and stopped. He crawled to me, saw the officer’s boots and then stopped. He climbs and sniffles. I ask: “Group number?” - He's begging. - “The commander’s last name?” - He's begging. - I think: “Okay, pray.” They loaded him into a UAZ, drove him back about ten kilometers, and threw him out. I say: “Next time I’ll answer the judge’s questions, you damn partisans.”

According to combat calculations

When Ivan Ignatievich Zaitsev was the chief of staff of the Lagodekhi brigade, he was responsible for the service of the troops and, of course, for serving on guard. He loved checking the guard and sometimes carried it out in a very unusual way.

Senior Lieutenant Solonenko was on guard. A man who was always very scrupulous about his service. After lunch, having arrived at the guardhouse, Ivan Ignatievich inquired whether the combat crew was being brought to the attention of the guard personnel. Solonenko replied that this is done every shift.

“Good,” said Zaitsev. - Here’s an introduction: “Attack on the guardhouse!”

Solonenko commanded: “Guard in the gun! Attack on the guardhouse! The fighters, as taught, quickly took up their positions to repel the “enemy’s” attack.

“Okay,” said Zaitsev, “but a hundred things need to be done?”

Report to the duty officer,” Solonenko answered and turned the handle of the TA-57 telephone: “Comrade captain!” Attack on the guardhouse! Chief of the guard, senior lieutenant Solonenko.

Zaitsev suggested a continuation: “Two killed and three wounded.” Captain Salei, wise from service experience, was on duty. Therefore, he calmly asked: “Is this an introductory one? Who do you have there?

Zaitsev didn’t hear the question, but he understood and said:

No need to say, this is an introductory one.

Solonenko obediently repeated the story about the dead and wounded and hung up.

Since there was no reaction from the duty officer, Zaitsev asked to call the duty officer again, but this time the number of those killed had increased. To this, Salei calmly answered the chief of the guard: “Victor, I used to naively believe that you would go on guard duty sober.” And he hung up.

Did you say a hundred? - Zaitsev asked keenly.

“He said that I was drunk,” the nachkar replied.

“Okay,” Zaitsev did not let up, “call again and tell him that five were killed and all were wounded.”

It is difficult to say what exactly the duty officer thought, but the reserve group was raised to the gun and, led by captain Salei, jumped out of the unit. The duty officer looked very determined, and he had a pistol in his hands. At this time, Vitaly Yaroslavovich Yarosh, commander of the 12th Special Special Forces Brigade, approached the unit. Quite puzzled by what was happening, he still managed to grab the last fighter by the jacket.

Son, for God's sake, tell me what's going on.

Oh, Comrade Colonel! There's something like that on guard duty! Five killed and a bunch of wounded!

Yarosh did not listen to him. The next moment he was already running into the guardhouse ahead of the reserve group and the unit on duty.

When it was all over, Solonenko watched as the tall and slender Yarosh walked into the unit, who was excitedly saying something without turning around, and little Ivan Ignatievich walked behind him, looking at the ground in front of him. After another half hour, he dejectedly walked home.

With faith in the future

Ivan Ignatievich Zaitsev was an extraordinary, but very competent officer, whose soul was rooted in the cause. He often stayed late in the unit, working on some official documents.

Solonenko was on duty. A patrol in the city caught three soldiers drunk. Solonenko, without hesitation for a long time, put them in the guardhouse, but so far without a note about the arrest.

Since the chief of staff was in the unit, he decided to report to him about what had happened.

After listening to the report, Ivan Ignatievich lit a cigarette. And he smoked in a very peculiar way. He held the cigarette with his thumb and forefinger, and smoked it to the very end, always burning his fingers.

Taking another puff, he said: “Tell me, Solonenko, Someday, for example, in the year two thousand, the rural thought will reach such perfection, one hundred, as soon as a soldier approaches the fence without a dismissal note, two will immediately jump out of it.” green hands, they will tie you up and send you to the guardhouse. And from the computer of the guard commander, a note about the arrest will come out with five notes and the signature of the guard commander?