What would have happened to the USSR if Trotsky had defeated Stalin. Reasons for Stalin's victory in the internal political struggle

Why did Stalin win in the struggle for leadership after Lenin's death (January 1924)?

Contenders:

1. I. Stalin (Dzhugashvili)

2. Leon Trotsky (Leiba Bronstein)

3. L. Kamenev (Rosenfeld)

4. E. Zinoviev (Radomylsky-Apfelbaum)

5. N. I. Bukharin.

After the death of Lenin, at least four main ideological movements emerged in the party - Trotskyists, Zinovievites, Stalinists, Bukharinists. Each of the groupings within the party was based on a specific ideological platform. And each had influential supporters in the party, highest government bodies, regions, public organizations, etc.

The Trotskyists, who had the strongest positions in the army, advocated pushing the world revolution to revolution by any means, the accelerated introduction of socialist principles in the economy, including the curtailment of the NEP, industrialization and the fight against the kulaks. The Zinoviev-Kamenev faction, which dominated in the capitals - especially in Leningrad - and in the Comintern and the All-Russian Central Executive Committee, considered Trotsky's views too radical, disagreeing with him on the pace and means of achieving the same goals. The Stalin faction, which controlled, first of all, the party apparatus (it was in the hands of Molotov) and the special services (Dzerzhinsky), had already cooled to the ideas of world revolution and until the end of the 1920s did not believe that the time to curtail the NEP had come. The Bukharinites, who had support in the government (it was headed by Rykov), trade unions (they were led by Tomsky), as well as in the party press and the university sphere, were supporters of continuing the NEP policy with its reliance on the potential of the private sector and the growing rich peasantry. Today, many of the disagreements of those years seem microscopic or strange, but then in the eyes of leading Bolsheviks they were of great importance.

And this would be another reason for the growing influence of the Stalinists - their line was quite in tune with the sentiments of the party masses, tired of the troubles.

Pitirim Sorokin, expelled from the country and later making Harvard famous, at the same time identified a general pattern: “People, taught by an inexorable teacher - hunger, cold, disease, poverty and death, are faced with a dilemma: die, continuing the revolutionary debauchery, or all find another way out. Bitter and tragic experience forces people to look at the world differently... And so the demand for unlimited freedom is replaced by a thirst for order; praise to the “liberators” from the old regime is replaced by praise to the “liberators” from the revolution, in other words, the organizers of order. "Order!" and “Long live the creators of order!” - such is the general impulse of the second stage of the revolution.”

In the mid-1920s, it was the Stalinist group that did NOT have a strong desire, unlike the more left-wing factions, to continue the “revolutionary debauchery.” This was the basis of the short-term “thaw” of the mid-1920s. Signs of the “thaw” were noticeable in the 1924 USSR Constitution, which lacked a special chapter on the dictatorship of the proletariat.

The intensification of the struggle between the Stalinists and Zinovievites in 1925 changed the situation on the Bolshevik chessboard. The main stumbling block was the theory of building socialism in one country. In April 1925, at a meeting of the Politburo, Kamenev, supported by Zinoviev, stated that “the technical and economic backwardness of the USSR is an insurmountable obstacle to building socialism.” Help and loans from the West could come to the USSR only if the proletarian revolutions won there. On the eve of the XIV Party Conference, Zinoviev proposed at the Plenum of the Central Committee theses “On the tasks of the Comintern and the RCP(b)”, where he argued that the victory of socialism is possible only on a global scale, and at the Party Conference itself he almost openly went into battle against Stalin, warning about the danger of a “national limitations”: “We are talking about sentiments that can be reduced to the formula: what do we care about the international revolution, we can build ourselves a cell under a spruce tree.” The commission of the Central Committee (Stalin) for drafting the resolution, also without naming the names of Zinoviev and Kamenev, rejected as “Trotskyist” the opinion that building a complete socialist society is impossible in the USSR without the help of more developed countries. On the contrary, “the party of the proletariat must make every effort to build a socialist society in the confidence that this construction can and will certainly be victorious if it is possible to defend the country from any attempts at restoration.” The Zinovievites’ offensive was undermined by the obvious decline in the revolutionary wave in the world and was easily repulsed.

The XIV Congress was one of the hottest in the history of the party. At the forum, which went down in history as the industrialization congress, little was said about industrialization itself. Stalin’s main strategic idea: “We must make every effort to make our country an economically self-sufficient country, independent, based on the domestic market, a country that will serve as a center of attraction for all other countries that are gradually falling away from capitalism and joining the mainstream of socialism.” farms." At the same time, Stalin spoke about two deviations: one is pulling towards the world revolution and reprisals against the NEP, meaning the Trotskyists and Zinovievites; the other is the defense of the kulak, the denial of industrialization and planning, meaning the Bukharinites. Stalin said: “You ask, which deviation is worse? You can't pose the question like that. Both of them are worse, the first and second slopes.” But at the same time he emphasized that the party must concentrate its efforts on combating the deviation that exaggerates the kulak danger, since these ideas are much more popular in the party and behind them stands the authority of prominent leaders, meaning Kamenev and Zinoviev.

Stalin's line was supported by the congress, which marked the beginning of the ousting of the Zinoviev group from power, which would be forced to draw closer to Trotsky, which would predetermine their joint decline. Then it was the turn of the rightists - the Bukharinites.

“Russia would not have experienced many of the terrible misfortunes that befell it if it had been led by right-wing communists (proponents of the market) rather than Stalin.” Many authors agree with these words of the Menshevik Nikolai Valentinov, who emigrated to Paris in 1928. But this is unlikely to be the case. The market could not carry out forced modernization. Besides, did the Bukharinites have a chance to lead the country? There are different opinions on this topic. Such experts of the era as V.L. Danilov and E.N. Gimpelson, we are confident that the “Bukharin alternative” (refusal of accelerated industrialization, collectivization and a course towards world revolution through market development) was initially doomed to failure, since by the end of the 20s the balance of forces in the leadership of the party, and therefore the country, was completely in favor of the Stalinist majority.

The “right” (i.e., Bukharinites) capitulated at the XVI Congress of the CPSU (b) in June 1930.

The defeat of the “right” helped clear the way for the “great turning point” - complete collectivization - which became the final moment in the establishment of Stalin’s sovereignty. However, it is hardly a matter of Stalin alone. The tightening of government regimes was not only a Soviet phenomenon, but almost universal. The interwar period was marked by an increasing narrowing of the scope of democracy in Europe. It was dealt a crushing blow by the Great Depression of 1929-1933, which deprived people of their savings and discredited the postulates of the free capitalist market. While in 1920 constitutional and elected representative bodies existed throughout the continent west of Soviet Russia, by the outbreak of World War II they had been dissolved or stripped of effective powers in 17 of the 27 European states, and in another five they had ceased to have powers when the war began. In many countries, fascists came to power. Only Britain and Finland, as well as Ireland, Sweden and Switzerland, which remained neutral, supported the activities of democratic institutions all this time.

The final completion of the process of subordination of the Politburo to Stalin can be dated to approximately 1930.

Based on materials from the book “Russian Matrix” by V. A. Nikonov. M. 2014.

Why did Stalin win in the struggle for leadership after Lenin's death (January 1924)?

Contenders:

1. I. Stalin (Dzhugashvili)

2. Leon Trotsky (Leiba Bronstein)

3. L. Kamenev (Rosenfeld)

4. E. Zinoviev (Radomylsky-Apfelbaum)

5. N. I. Bukharin.

And this would be another reason for the growing influence of the Stalinists - their line was quite in tune with the sentiments of the party masses, tired of the troubles.

The “right” (i.e., Bukharinites) capitulated at the XVI Congress of the CPSU (b) in June 1930.

The final completion of the process of subordination of the Politburo to Stalin can be dated to approximately 1930.

Based on materials from the book “Russian Matrix” by V. A. Nikonov. M. 2014.

Prepared

Victor Shapovalov

So, what were the reasons for Joseph Stalin’s victory in the internal political struggle for power of the 20s? At first glance, everything looks quite simple. An old-school Bolshevik, Stalin, enjoying the trust of Lenin and some other party leaders, becomes the General Secretary of the Central Committee. At the same time, Lenin’s illness takes him out of big politics, and it becomes obvious that someone must become his successor, but since Vladimir Ilyich did not officially have time to prepare his replacement, there is a clear understanding that a big struggle for power is looming. Realizing this, Stalin, using his position, begins to rapidly pump up the party apparatus with cadres loyal to himself, tries with all his might to create for himself the image of the most faithful and devoted follower of Lenin’s ideals, and also strengthens the alliance with Zinoviev and Kamenev, forming the so-called “troika”. Thus, he strengthens his position and creates a springboard for the upcoming political battle. It is quite possible that at that time Stalin did not set himself the main goal of gaining sole power, and all his actions were initially aimed at maintaining his current positions, strengthening himself in the central committee and defending against the attacks of all other “Lenin’s heirs”. Although, on the other hand, everything could have been the other way around, but given the unpredictability in the party and the country, even with all the ambition of the General Secretary, the most important thing seemed to be to withstand the initial blows of his political opponents, which, however, did not prevent him from making long-term plans and nourishing illusions about personal domination. In fairness, it is worth noting that similar illusions were most likely harbored by all other politicians of that time, including Trotsky, Zinoviev, Kamenev, Bukharin, Rykov and others. Stalin's main opponent, Trotsky, had something completely different at his disposal - not a set of top government positions, but popularity and charm, a certain halo of the leader of the revolution, inherent only to Lenin and him, as a result of which any appearance of Trotsky at the congress was invariably greeted with stormy applause. Some party members, like Trotsky himself, believed that, if necessary, only he was worthy of replacing Lenin.

After Lenin finally turns into a “vegetable,” the struggle for power becomes not so much obvious as inevitable. Trotsky, who led the “left opposition,” was the first to attack the “troika.” He sent an open letter to the Central Committee, in which he criticized bureaucratization and called for a reorganization of the country's governance, which, in fact, was a gentle hint at the removal of Stalin and his associates from key positions. He was supported by 46 prominent Bolsheviks of the time. The “troika” held the blow, and almost immediately the speeches of Trotsky and the “46” were condemned by the Central Committee and the Politburo; he was accused of factionalism and “personal ambitions.” After Trotsky tried to strike with the help of journalism by publishing the article “Lessons of October,” he was finally removed from all posts, but remained in the party, since he still had great authority among the Bolsheviks. Thus, Stalin won this round of the struggle for power, weakening and depriving his opponent of almost all instruments of pressure. Everything looks quite simple and logical if we consider the struggle between Stalin and Trotsky as a chess match or a sports competition. But there were also several other factors that may have played a decisive role in the outcome of the struggle. Many, if not the majority, members of the Central Committee of the RCP (b), the RCP (b), and the entire swollen bureaucratic apparatus as a whole, were openly afraid of Trotsky’s victory, since, firstly, they saw impulses for personal power in him, and secondly , his speeches against bureaucratization did not suit the established state apparatus, and thirdly, yesterday’s revolutionaries and today’s representatives of the new political elite were not at all impressed by Trotsky’s crazy ideas about the impossibility of building socialism in a single state, and the need to export the revolution to the whole world. Stalin, on the other hand, was a true friend of the bureaucracy, an opponent of kindling the fire of the world revolution and a supporter of building socialism in a single country. And even though the general secretary also had a clear desire for dictatorship, choosing between two evils, the majority of party members and bureaucrats supported him, which in no case also excludes people who sincerely support Stalin and see the future of the party in him. It follows that in the initial stages of the struggle, most likely it was the apparatus that created Stalin, but of course not without the latter’s efforts.

There is a version that in 1922, the rise of Joseph Vissarionovich to the post of General Secretary was facilitated by a group of party members led by Zinoviev and Kamenev, who considered him an obedient and dutiful person who would represent their interests in the secretariat, without attempts to lead, that is, again, it was not he who nominated himself, and he was nominated. It is impossible to say whether it was true or not, but there are definitely rational grains in this version. However, Stalin got rid of them too almost immediately after Trotsky’s removal. Stalin moves closer to Bukharin, thereby destroying the alliance with Kamenev and Zinoviev. The latter, having united with Trotsky, are trying to create a “united opposition”, but suffer a fiasco, lose their posts and are expelled from the party. Their defeat can be explained by the increased support of Stalin by the apparatus, as well as his increased influence.

Next, the General Secretary burns the last bridges in alliance with Bukharin, and destroys the remnants of the opposition, removing them from positions, expelling them from the party, and in some cases, repressing all its representatives. He appointed people loyal to himself to all key government posts, and already in the late 20s and early 30s he finally formed the regime of personal power in the country. After this, it can be argued that Stalin himself begins to form and change the system that supported him during the struggle for power. Thus, I come to the conclusion that Stalin’s victory is not solely his personal merit, but represents the sum of the prevailing circumstances and his personal contribution.

After concentrating sole power in his hands, Leon Trotsky would hardly have betrayed communist ideals, but, quite likely, he would have put them into practice in a tougher and more uncompromising form than Stalin.

Power struggle

When Lenin’s health deteriorated at the beginning of 1923, a serious struggle for power began within the leadership of the CPSU(b). The situation was aggravated by the “Letter to the Congress”, in which Lenin sharply criticized his closest associates - Stalin and Trotsky, calling the first “rude and disloyal”, the second “boastful and self-confident”. It was Trotsky who found himself in a disadvantageous position in the upcoming battle: the “troika” consisting of Stalin, Zinoviev and Kamenev, armed with the term “Trotskyism”, was preparing to give a serious battle to their main political opponent.
To begin with, the membership of the Central Committee was expanded to include supporters of the “troika,” which allowed the main Bolshevik body to make decisions bypassing Trotsky’s position. Subsequently, Stalin, who headed the Organizing Bureau and the Secretariat of the Central Committee, began to appoint his proteges to key party posts, which ultimately neutralized the competitor.
The XIII Congress of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks, held in May 1924 in Moscow, could have saved Lev Davidovich, but having lost the debates preceding the congress, he remained in the absolute minority and soon completely lost control over the Central Committee. And yet, if we assume that Trotsky defeated Stalin, what path could the USSR take? Let's think about it.

Chaos of a bright future

Trotsky, unlike the restrained and pragmatic Stalin, was an impulsive and categorical person. It is his political ideals that can best be characterized by the lines from the International: “We will destroy the whole world of violence to the ground, and then we will build ours, we will build a new world - those who were nothing will become everything.”
Speaking at a rally in Kazan in 1918, Trotsky said: “We highly value science, art, we want to make art, science, all schools and universities accessible to the people. But if our class enemies want to show us once again that all this exists only for them, we will say: death to theater, science, art.”
Such populist statements, and possibly inconsistent actions in the future, would most likely complicate the building of socialism in the country with serious distortions, which could cause dissatisfaction with Trotsky’s policies both in the ranks of party comrades and among the broad masses of the population.
“We, comrades, love the sun that shines for us, but if the rich and exploiters want to monopolize the sun, we will say: let the sun go out and darkness, eternal darkness reign,” Trotsky painted frightening prospects for social construction to the people.

Father of Terror

Despite the fact that many associate the repressive methods of Soviet politics exclusively with the name of Stalin, Bolshevik terror is the invention of Lenin and Trotsky. If the latter had inherited power in the USSR, the scale of repression would have been no less, and perhaps even more widespread, than under Stalin.
In 1920, Trotsky wrote a book with the ominous title “Terrorism and Communism,” which was a response to the theses of the German Marxist Karl Kautsky. In it, Lev Bronstein not only justifies the Red Terror during the Civil War, but also calls not to abandon it after its end. Even in the political struggle, Trotsky advises to be guided not by arguments, but by force and one’s own interests: “The conquest of power by the proletariat does not complete the revolution, but only opens it.”
Of course, the idealist Trotsky explained the coercive policy of the state by the interests of the working masses, without whom the government cannot do anything. However, no one would guarantee that with the concentration of all power in the hands of Trotsky, he would not introduce an absolute dictatorship.
Trotsky's political methods were most clearly demonstrated by the suppression of the Kronstadt rebellion, where more than 1,000 killed sailors testified to the true attitude towards democracy of the chairman of the Revolutionary Military Council.
It is curious that Stalin repeatedly turned to the book “Terrorism and Communism” and more than once used excerpts from it to justify political repression. Without sinning against the truth, we must admit that Trotsky may well share with Stalin the title of ideologist of the Great Terror.

United states of the world

Trotsky repeatedly stated that he was not going to limit himself to building socialism in a single state, as Stalin was inclined to do. His ideal is the fire of world revolution. It is likely that, having come to power, he would have continued to support the Comintern, as well as any communist uprisings around the globe. So, if Stalin and Zinoviev reacted very coolly to the uprising of the Hamburg communists, Trotsky was convinced that this was the beginning of the communist revolution in Germany.
Until the end of his life, Trotsky believed that a communist state, the “United States of Europe and Asia,” would be built in the eastern hemisphere of the earth, in which citizens freed from bourgeois shackles would live and enjoy the fruits of universal equality and prosperity.
If the state led by Trotsky had waged a consistent campaign to communize the planet, then it is quite possible that Western countries would have taken up arms against the USSR through a broad anti-Soviet coalition. Without reliable allies, our country would most likely have to enter into a protracted military conflict with the leading powers of the world - the USA, Great Britain, Germany, France, Japan, and no one knows how this confrontation would end.
Argentine writer Marcos Aginis in his book “Young Leva” writes: “If Trotsky’s theses had prevailed over Stalin’s, then everything would have gone differently in Europe.” However, the Argentine overly idealizes his idol. The “beautiful and idealistic” character of the young Trotsky gives him the feeling that the revolutionary would never have become what Stalin later turned into.

Freedom of the individual

However, one can partly agree with Aginis. Trotsky did not suffer from leaderism; the cult of personality was unacceptable to him. Indicative in this regard are Trotsky’s words about society’s attitude towards Lenin, which made him not a revolutionary leader, but “the head of the church hierarchy,” simultaneously cutting up Lenin’s quotes for “false sermons.”
Completely different from how Stalin perceived Trotsky’s position of individuals in the classless state built by the Bolsheviks. Even at the dawn of the Soviets, Trotsky became interested in Freud and psychoanalytic experiments, the purpose of which was to create a “new man.” So, on the initiative of Trotsky, the house-laboratory “International Solidarity” was opened, where the younger generation was freed from all kinds of psychological complexes. An important element of education was the exclusion of parents from this process.
And now the outdated institution of the family is being replaced by the commune, which was supposed to eliminate the line between personal and public, no matter whether it is material property or human feelings. It is unknown what path Soviet society would have taken if all of Trotsky’s social experiments had not been stopped.

Industrial breakthrough

The concept of super-industrialization of the country put forward by Trotsky was initially rejected by Stalin. The leader of the USSR was more attracted to the reform model proposed by Nikolai Bukharin, which involved the development of private entrepreneurship by attracting foreign loans. However, already in 1929, the Bukharin approach was replaced by the Trotskyist one, although without the extremes inherent in the methods of military communism, on which Lev Davidovich intended to rely.
According to Trotsky’s concept of forced industrialization, the rapid growth of the national economy was to be achieved by relying exclusively on internal resources, using agricultural and light industry resources for the development of heavy industry. With such a one-sided approach, the costs of rapid industrial growth had to be “paid” by the peasantry. One can only imagine what excesses and shocks industrialization would have caused for the country if the process had been managed by the author of the idea himself.

War cannot be avoided

The most tragic page of the Stalin era and all Soviet history was the Great Patriotic War. Would Trotsky have been able to prevent this catastrophic event if he had taken the post of head of state?
It is known that Trotsky treated Hitler with hostility, but the Fuhrer, on the contrary, showed the prominent revolutionary every respect. Hitler biographer Konrad Heyden recalled how highly the German leader praised Trotsky’s memoirs, calling them “a brilliant book” and noting that he “learned a lot from their author.”
The Reich documents even contained the fact that the German government was making plans to create a collaborationist government of the USSR led by Trotsky. However, Germany was prompted to aggression against the USSR not by Stalin’s personality, but by Hitler’s irrepressible ambitions. It is not difficult to imagine that if Trotsky had been Stalin, the staunch anti-Semite Hitler would have found additional arguments for attacking the Soviet state.

Marx, Engels and Lenin never believed that the victory of the proletarian revolution guarantees the inevitable victory of socialist society over the capitalist world.

“Creating world history,” wrote K. Marx in a letter to L. Kugelman, “it would, of course, be very convenient if the struggle were undertaken only under the condition of infallibly favorable chances. On the other hand, history would have a very mystical character if” “accidents” did not play any role. These accidents are, of course, themselves an integral part of the general course of development, balanced by other accidents.” (PSS, vol. 33, p. 175)

The fact of the existence of the proletariat and the bourgeoisie, their hostile clashes, as well as the contradiction between the development of the productive forces and arbitrariness! relations, do not in themselves predetermine the victory of one and the defeat of another social system.

The birth of a new socialist society can occur only through class struggle (during which the proletariat accumulates the necessary experience, goes through the stage of organizing its forces, forms trade unions and a revolutionary party, etc.) and the victory of the proletariat over the bourgeoisie - through revolutionary or parliamentary means. But this does not mean at all that the victory of the working class in one country or another will necessarily ensure the spread of the socialist revolution to all capitalist countries that are ripe for the transition to socialism. The experience of both the Paris Commune and the October Revolution in Russia proves that there is no such predetermination. The accomplished proletarian revolution, isolated from other countries, without receiving the support of the world proletariat, may then suffer defeat or degenerate.

Taking power in October 1917, the Bolsheviks, in accordance with Lenin’s strategy, believed that the world had entered an era of wars and socialist revolutions, that capitalism was in a state of collapse and was no longer able to lead humanity out of a period of permanent crises. Therefore, they believed, the socialist revolution in backward Russia, although it would not have independent significance, could not be premature, for it would be a prologue, a torch that would ignite the world revolution.

In the internal party struggle that unfolded in the RCP(b) after Lenin’s illness and death and resulted in a struggle for power, the initial significance was irreconcilable differences regarding the “questioning about the nature of the October Revolution.

Trotsky and the group of Central Committee members adjacent to him continued to take a traditional Marxist position, viewing the October Revolution as the first stage of the world revolution. Stalin and the majority of members of the Central Committee began to assign an independent role to the October Revolution, a self-sufficient intranational and intrastate significance. They argued that Lenin and the party viewed the Russian revolution, first of all, as opening the way to the direct construction of socialism in Russia, that a new socialist society could be created in Russia regardless of the coming of the world revolution.

From two opposing positions flowed two different tactics formulated by Stalin and Trotsky.

It followed from Trotsky’s position that the internal tasks of socialist construction in Russia must be subordinated to the main task - the world revolution. The spearhead of Trotsky’s tactics was aimed at strengthening the role of the Comintern, at preparing and organizationally strengthening the communist parties of capitalist (especially Western European) countries to prepare

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ki them to the second, after the October Revolution, assault on capitalism. Trotsky’s tactics in relation to internal construction in the USSR were no different from the plan set out by Lenin in his articles and letters to the Party Congress. In them, Vladimir Ilyich recommended using the time before the approach of the revolution in Western countries for the industrialization of the country and a powerful rise in agriculture through the gradual cooperation of peasant farms, to raise the cultural level of the working people and to involve the broad masses in governing the country, which was supposed to serve as the best means for a decisive fight against bureaucracy.

The tactics of Stalin and the majority of the Central Committee he headed were based on the belief that the world revolution was a chimera, that capitalism had emerged from the crisis and had finally stabilized. Therefore, Stalin’s foreign policy was aimed mainly at making it clear to the powerful capitalist countries surrounding the USSR that the USSR had moved away from its adventurist bet on world revolution. Stalin's domestic policy was aimed, first of all, at strengthening the country's state power, at increasingly centralizing the management of economic, political and social activities, and at increasingly tightening the methods of this management.

In the letter to L. Kugelman quoted above, Marx, speaking about “accidents” that can eliminate or slow down the revolution, mentions among them “such a “case” as the character of the people standing ... at the head of the movement.” The theoretical and tactical differences between the two factions of Bolshevism were immeasurably complicated and aggravated by the fact that such an immoral person as Stalin was at the head of the party.

Stalin caused incalculable harm to the cause of communism. Not only because he carried out the Thermidorian coup in the USSR, destroyed the old Bolshevik guard and most of the ideological communists in the USSR (as well as the main cadres of the Comintern) and disintegrated most of the rest. His main crime is the destruction of millions of innocent people - and in the name of communism, the destruction of the party, communist ideas. Thus, he discredited communist ideology in the eyes of the people of the whole world (especially advanced, developed countries), equating it with totalitarianism, calling a socialist society anti-democratic, inhumane, built on violence and exploitation of workers. The damage inflicted on the world labor movement by Stalin is incomparable to any other.

And in the times we are talking about here, and even now, there is a widely spread point of view that identifies Stalinism with Bolshevism and with Marxism, from which Bolshevism grew. This point of view, according to which Stalinism is a legitimate product of Bolshevism, is shared by the entire world reaction, and all the socialist parties that opposed Bolshevism were proclaimed by Stalin himself, and are now proclaimed by both his modern followers and supporters of Solzhenitsyn’s point of view. It was consistently defended, in particular, by Russian Mensheviks, Socialist Revolutionaries and anarchists.

We always predicted this, they said. Having started with the prohibition of other socialist parties, with the establishment of the dictatorship of the Bolsheviks in the Soviets, the October Revolution could not help but lead to the dictatorship of the bureaucracy. Stalinism is a continuation and at the same time the bankruptcy of Bolshevism.

Trotsky strongly objected to the identification of Stalinism with Bolshevism. The error of such reasoning, he said, begins with the silent identification of the October Revolution and the Soviet Union. The historical process, consisting in the struggle of hostile forces, is thus replaced, in his opinion, by the evolution of Bolshevism in an airless space.

Meanwhile, Bolshevism was only a political movement that closely merged with the labor movement, but was not even identical with it. And besides the working class in the USSR there were then more than a hundred million peasants, heterogeneous nationalities, as well as a legacy of oppression, poverty and ignorance. The state created by the Bolsheviks reflected not only the thought and will of Bolshevism, but also everything that resulted from the above: the cultural level of the country, the social composition of the population, the pressure of the barbaric past and no less barbaric world capitalism. Therefore, Trotsky believed, to portray the process of degeneration of the Soviet state as the evolution of pure Bolshevism means to ignore social reality in the name of one logically isolated element. When the Bolsheviks made concessions to the possessive tendencies of the peasants, established strict rules for joining the party, purged this party of alien elements, banned other parties, introduced the NEP, resorted to

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When they granted concessions to enterprises or entered into diplomatic agreements with imperialist governments, they, the Bolsheviks, drew particular conclusions from the basic fact that was clear to them from the very beginning. This fact can be formulated as follows: the conquest of power, no matter how important it is in itself, does not at all transform the party into the absolute master of the historical process.

Having taken possession of the state, the party, however, receives the opportunity to influence the development of society with a force previously inaccessible to it, but it itself is subject to tenfold influence from all its other elements. It can be thrown out of power by a direct blow from hostile forces; at a more protracted pace, it, having retained power, may degenerate. The Bolsheviks always took this theoretical possibility into account and spoke openly about it. Let us recall Lenin's forecast on the eve of the October Revolution and his statements after its occurrence. A special grouping of forces on a national and international scale created the preconditions for the fact that the proletariat was able to come to power in such a backward country as Russia. But the same grouping of forces testifies that without a more or less rapid victory of the proletariat in the advanced countries, the workers’ state will not survive. Left to its own devices, the Soviet regime will fall or degenerate. More precisely: first it will degenerate, then it will fall. Not only can the Soviet state leave the socialist path, but also the Bolshevik Party can, under unfavorable historical conditions, lose its Bolshevism.

From a clear understanding of such a danger, said L.D. Trotsky, came the left opposition, which finally took shape in 1923.

Registering the symptoms of degeneration day after day, she sought to oppose the approaching Thermidor with the conscious will of the proletarian avant-garde. However, this subjective factor was not enough. Those “giant masses” who, according to Lenin, decide the outcome of the struggle, are tired of internal deprivation and from waiting too long for the world revolution. The masses lost heart. Bureaucracy took over. She forced the proletarian vanguard to come to terms, trampled Marxism, and prostituted the Bolshevik Party. Stalinism won. In the person of the opposition, real Bolshevism broke with the Soviet bureaucracy and its Comintern. This is the actual course of development.

True, in a formal sense, Stalinism emerged from Bolshevism. The Moscow bureaucracy even today continues to call itself the Bolshevik party. True, she rarely uses this label now, but on occasion she uses it in order to better deceive the masses, passing off the shell as the core, the appearance as the essence.

The elimination of all other parties from the political arena would inevitably lead to the fact that the contradictory interests and tendencies of different sections of the population, to one degree or another, began to find their expression within the ruling party. As the political center of gravity moved from the proletarian vanguard to the bureaucracy, the party changed - both in social composition and in ideology. Thanks to the rapid course of events, it (the party) underwent a much more radical degeneration within 15 years (from 1922 to 1937) than Social Democracy did in half a century.

The “purge” that Stalin carried out in 1936-937 paved not even a bloody line between Bolshevism and Stalinism, but a whole river of blood. The extermination of the entire old generation of Bolsheviks, a significant part of the middle generation who participated in the civil war, and that part of the youth who most seriously took the Bolshevik traditions, clearly showed not only the political, but also the almost physical incompatibility of Stalinism and Bolshevism.

Above I outlined the views of L.D. Trotsky on the reasons for the degeneration of the party. But, as it seems to me now, there is a fair amount of fatalism in these views.

“Anyone who is at all familiar with history,” he writes in the article “Why Stalin defeated the opposition,” “knows that each the revolution gave rise to a counter-revolution, which... Always took away from the people a significant, sometimes the lion's share of their political gains. As a general rule, the victim of the first reactionary wave was that layer of revolutionaries who stood at the head of the masses in the first, offensive, “heroic” period of the revolution. This is already a general historical observation must lead us to think that it is not just a question of dexterity, cunning, skill of two or more persons, but about reasons incomparably deeper order.

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Marxists, unlike superficial fatalists... do not at all deny the role of the individual, his initiative and courage in the social struggle. But unlike idealists, Marxists know that consciousness in the end subordinate to being."

There is a lot of truth in this. However, Trotsky did not provide here a specific analysis of the positions taken by individual prominent members of the Party’s Central Committee, nor did he examine the balance of forces that had developed in the Central Committee before and after Lenin’s death. In his analysis of the reasons for the defeat of the opposition and Stalin’s victory, he proceeds only from the objective conditions prevailing in the world and in the USSR - and therefore his explanations smack of fatalism.

“The fact is absolutely undeniable and full of significance,” wrote L.D. Trotsky, “that the Soviet bureaucracy became more powerful the more severe the blows fell on the world working class. The defeat of the revolutionary movements in Europe and Asia gradually undermined the workers’ faith in an international ally. There was always an acute need inside the country. The most courageous and selfless representatives of the working class either managed to die in the civil war, or rose several levels higher and for the most part assimilated into the ranks of the bureaucracy, losing their revolutionary spirit.

Tired of the terrible tension of the revolutionary years, having lost perspective, poisoned by the bitterness of a series of disappointments, the broad masses fell into passivity. This kind of reaction was observed, as already said, after every revolution. The immeasurable historical advantage of the October Revolution as a proletarian revolution lies in the fact that the fatigue and disappointment of the masses was taken advantage not by the class enemy in the person of the bourgeoisie and the nobility, but by the upper layer of the working class itself and the intermediate groups associated with it, who joined the Soviet bureaucracy."

It is true that the Bolsheviks, Lenin and Trotsky himself foresaw the possibility of such a version of history when the proletarian revolutionary party, having taken power in an isolated and, moreover, backward country, with the world revolution delayed and under the influence of tired and passive masses, forced will cede power to another class or be degenerated.

But was there really such a situation in Russia after Lenin’s illness and death?

If Trotsky at the Tenth Party Congress, as Lenin insisted on this, had spoken on behalf of Lenin and his own against Stalin on organizational and national issues, would he have been able to remove Stalin from the post of General Secretary?

Or, if all members of the Politburo did the same. Couldn't they have fulfilled Lenin's will and removed Stalin from the post of General Secretary?

And if this had happened, a completely different situation could have developed in the party, a different atmosphere, which Lenin wanted to create and which he outlined in his letters to the congress. And this, in turn, could change both the international situation and the internal situation in the USSR in a revolutionary direction.

“Our party relies on two classes, and therefore its instability is possible and its fall is inevitable if an agreement could not take place between these two classes. In this case, it is useless to take certain measures, in general it is useless to talk about the stability of our Central Committee. No measures in this regard In any case, they will not be able to prevent a split. But I hope that this is too distant a future and too incredible an event to talk about...

I think that the main ones on the issue of sustainability from this point of view are such members of the Central Committee as Stalin and Trotsky. The relationship between them, in my opinion, constitutes more than half the danger of a split that could have been avoided..." (PSS, vol. 45, pp. 344-345)

Consequently, Vladimir Ilyich at that time saw the immediate danger threatening the party not in the prolongation of the world revolution, not in the backwardness of the country and not in the decline in the mood of the tired masses, but in the likelihood of personal struggle between the party leaders. Trotsky himself in the twenties and early thirties in the book "My Life" and in articles published

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In "Bulletins" during these years, he repeatedly expressed himself in the sense that if he had acted in a bloc with Lenin at the Tenth Congress, then their victory would have been completely assured. And it is true. After all, their joint action in defense of the monopoly of foreign trade quickly ended in their victory. Trotsky's speech in a bloc with Lenin on the organizational issue would undoubtedly have ended with the same victory. This would mean the removal of Stalin from the post of General Secretary, which would immediately deprive him of what he was strong at - his connection with the apparatus.

In the article “Why Stalin defeated the opposition” quoted above, Trotsky wrote:

“One of the most important achievements of the proletarian leadership must be the ability to distinguish when it is possible to advance and when it is necessary to retreat. This ability constituted Lenin’s main strength. The success or failure of the left opposition against the bureaucracy, of course, depended to one degree or another on the quality of the leadership of both fighting camps.” .

This one quality, Trotsky did not have this ability at the decisive moment. Despite the fact that on the eve of Lenin’s death the two of them examined the situation in detail and agreed on tactics, Trotsky was unable to bring the line they adopted to a victorious end. A negative role here was played, of course, by the behavior of the remaining members of the Politburo, who were carried away by their personal interests and therefore did not follow Lenin’s advice - to remove Stalin from his post at the only favorable time when this was still possible.

This seemingly “private” question, this “accident” of history (who will be the general secretary?) had a huge impact on the entire subsequent history of the party and the country. Therefore, we consider it necessary to specifically examine the question of what position each of the political leaders took in this short but decisive period of time.

Readers who wish to become more familiar with the political situation and balance of power on the eve of the XII Party Congress, with the nature of the disagreements discussed then in the party leadership (about the monopoly of foreign trade, about national and organizational problems, etc.), should study Lenin’s letters during this period (to Trotsky , Stalin, Zinoviev, Kamenev, Mdivani, N. Okudzhava, K. Tsintsadze); his own letters addressed to the XII Congress; records of V.I.’s secretaries Lenin; his notes to L. Fotieva. All this is contained in vol. 45 and 54 of the Fifth Complete Works of V.I. Lenin. You should also read the IML editorial notes for these documents.

From these documents we learn, in particular, that on March 5, 1923, V.I. Lenin dictated to M.A. Volodicheva two letters: one to Trotsky with a request to take upon himself the defense of his views on the national question at the plenum of the Central Committee and at the XII Party Congress, and the other to Stalin regarding his rude behavior towards N.K. Krupskaya. The next day, March 6, he inquired whether a response had been received from Trotsky, looked again at yesterday’s letter to Stalin and gave instructions to send it.

On the same day, Lenin suffered a blow, after which he never returned to political life.

This outcome favored Stalin's intentions. People close to Lenin had the impression that, under the pretext of following the advice of doctors, Stalin was trying to isolate Lenin from his comrades, from the flow of information to him. This system of prohibitions worried Lenin and harmed him more than any information. So, in the recording of L.A. Fotieva dated February 12, 1923 says:

“Vladimir Ilyich is worse. Severe headache... According to Maria Ilyinichna, the doctors upset him to such an extent that his lips were trembling... ... the impression was created that it was not the doctors who gave instructions to the Central Committee, but the Central Committee gave instructions to the doctors,”(emphasis mine, PSS, vol. 45, p. 485)

It was at this time that Stalin took decisive measures to take control of the central apparatus, carefully studied every major party worker, his weaknesses and strengths, and all this from the angle that was most important to him: how this comrade treated him, Stanin, and other members of the Politburo (especially to Trotsky). For such a study, methods such as eavesdropping on telephone conversations were used, as described above. The formation of the “troika”, directed against Trotsky, also dates back to this time.

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On the eve of the Twelfth Congress, Stalin suddenly made a proposal: in the face of Vladimir Ilyich’s illness, stop the feuds and go to the congress united.

It sounded very noble. But what did this mean practically? This meant: in view of Lenin’s mortal illness, to stop the struggle for Lenin’s principled position on national and organizational issues, to approve the theses of Stalin’s reports on these issues, directly directed against Lenin’s views expressed in his letters to the congress, to leave Stalin as General Secretary and thereby hand over his hands are the fate of the party and the country.

It’s strange how Trotsky could fall for such a primitive bait! And, nevertheless, he agreed with Stalin’s proposal not to bring disagreements to the congress and, together with other members of the Politburo, approved the theses of Stalin’s reports on national and organizational issues.

This was Trotsky's biggest political mistake. And he did it, despite the fact that Lenin warned him: do not make any compromise with Stalin. This mistake played a fatal role in the life of the party and the country; it allowed Stalin to retain his post, gain time and consolidate his power in the party and state apparatus.

What was the root of the mistake? Why did Trotsky make concessions to Stalin?

It seems to me that during that period several unfavorable circumstances (“accidents”) immediately coincided with some of Trotsky’s individual traits, which in his personal life are positive, but for a political figure they certainly turn out to be disadvantages.

Trotsky underestimated the organizational side of the activities of the leading bodies of the party in comparison with the political, and even more so did not attach importance to behind-the-scenes intrigues, which, in his opinion, could not have a decisive influence on politics. Therefore, he did not attach the same importance to the post of General Secretary and to the person who occupied it as Lenin did. Moreover, he underestimated Stalin’s personality, considering him a secondary figure, and assigned the main role in distorting the fundamental policy of the party to Zinoviev. In the conditions of Lenin’s mortal illness, he considered it impossible to reject Stalin’s proposal for a “truce”, for the party leadership to come out united for the congress, and postponed fundamental disputes.

This delay became fatal. Accustomed to open political struggle, Trotsky was not sufficiently experienced in the intricacies of the behind-the-scenes game of political figures, he was disdainful of all kinds of organizational and political combinations, and even more so he considered it beneath his dignity to delve into the intricacies of such combinations or to participate in them. Stalin, on the other hand, played his entire game behind the scenes; in this area he was extremely cunning and dexterous, had a taste for intrigue and maneuvers, and attached decisive importance to the organizational consolidation of his power in the post of General Secretary.

Not seeing the main danger for the party in the continuation of Stalin’s activities as General Secretary, Trotsky did not understand and did not feel that it was precisely in this and precisely at the moment when Lenin was already irretrievably lost for political life that it was impossible to give in and retreat. It was at this moment that Trotsky had to take upon himself both at the plenum of the Central Committee and at the congress to openly and actively defend Lenin’s views on changing the organizational structure and composition of the central institutions of the party, and on the removal of Stalin, and on the national question. Moreover, he had in his hands such a document as Lenin’s letter dated March 5, 1923, which allowed him to speak not only on his own behalf, but also on Lenin’s behalf:

"Dear comrade Trotsky!

I would ask you very much to take upon yourself the defense of the Georgian cause at the Party Central Committee. This matter is now under persecution by Stalin and Dzerzhinsky, and I cannot rely on their impartiality. Quite the opposite. If you agreed to take on his protection, then I could be calm. If for some reason you do not agree, then return the whole matter to me. I will take this as a sign of your disagreement. With best comradely greetings Lenin. March 5, 1923." (PSS, vol. 54, p. 329).

Trotsky did not have time to respond to this letter: the next day Lenin suffered an irreversible blow. But he still has the letter!

Perhaps Trotsky did not share Lenin’s views on the National Question? Judging by his subsequent speeches, this is not the case. In 1926, listing at the VII plenum of the ECCI

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Stalin's mistakes, he mentions his mistakes in the national question. In 1930, in Bulletin No. 14, outlining the history of Stalin’s political mistakes, Trotsky writes: “On the national question, he took a position that Lenin accused of bureaucratic and chauvinistic tendencies...”

So, Trotsky understood everything, but on the eve of the XII Congress, and during the congress, and after it, he was silent about Stalin’s mistakes. Neither during the discussion of Stalin's theses at the pre-congress plenum, nor at the congress itself, nor after it did Trotsky come out with support for Lenin's anti-Stalinist views and did not report Lenin's letter to him on the national question. He was not even present at the congress meeting that adopted the resolution on this issue. Some of the major party workers (Bukharin, Rakovsky, Skrypnik, Mdivani and others) tried to introduce amendments to this resolution proposed by Stalin in the spirit of Lenin’s views expressed in his letter “On Autonomization...”. But these attempts were not successful: the congress considered both the report and the resolution not as Stalin’s personal opinion, but as the opinion of the Central Committee. Trotsky's speech and his publication of Lenin's letter could have played a decisive role in the turning point at the congress. But Trotsky did not speak.

After the XII Party Congress, when Zinoviev felt that the power of Stalin, who held the apparatus in his hands, had grown enormously, he turned to Trotsky with a proposal to unite to fight for such a change in the structure of the central institutions of the party that would put the secretariat (and therefore Stalin) under control Politburo.

One can understand that L.D. Trotsky did not trust G.E. Zinoviev. It is impossible not to take into account the fact that Zinoviev, like Stalin, viewed the organizational principles of Bolshevism exclusively pragmatically: as the most effective means of mastering the party machine - voting, elections, selecting the “right” people. Both of them cared very little about increasing the activity and initiative of party members, although only this could be the only guarantee against the degeneration of the leadership.

All this is true. But Trotsky did not understand that the position of General Secretary and Stalin’s personal qualities made him more dangerous than Zinoviev. Up until the XIV Party Congress, Trotsky associated the opportunist policy of the Central Committee with Zinoviev and Kamenev, and considered the role of Stalin to be secondary. Therefore, seeing another combination in Zinoviev’s proposal, he rejected it.

Only when, after the Tenth Party Congress, it becomes clear to Trotsky that time has been lost and victory went to his opponents, he, under pressure from his like-minded people, launches an attack. The 1923 debate begins.

How did L.D. behave then? Trotsky?

He did not openly lead the left opposition, did not actively participate in the discussion, in the struggle of the party masses, among whom he enjoyed enormous authority. Having withdrawn from direct participation in the discussion, he shifted this task onto the shoulders of his supporters - Preobrazhensky, Radek, Pyatakov, I.N. Smirnov, Mrachkovsky, Beloborodov and others.

The basis for his line of behavior was the fear of a split in the party. His closest associates believed that there was no need to fear a split and did not approve of his behavior.

The discussion is over. On January 16, 1924, the Tenth Party Conference met, at which Stalin and Zinoviev accused the opposition of petty-bourgeois deviation. The conference adopts a resolution “On petty-bourgeois deviation”, as well as a decision to publish the previously unpublished paragraph 7 of the resolution of the Tenth Party Congress “On Unity” - a point directly directed against any criticism of the Central Committee. And this despite the fact that less than a month ago, on December 5, 1923, the Central Committee adopted the resolution “On Workers’ Democracy” agreed upon between the majority and the opposition.

In addition, the conference decides to purge military and university cells, the majority of which voted for the left opposition.

How does Trotsky react to all these events? He is not present at the conference, does not speak anywhere, does not protest anywhere against the treacherous policy of the majority, that is, in essence, he betrays his like-minded people.

Three days after the end of the XIII Conference, Lenin died. Four months later, in May 1924, the XIII Party Congress convened.

How did Trotsky behave at the congress that confirmed the resolution of the Thirteenth Party Conference “On the petty-bourgeois deviation”?

As a soldier, not as a party leader. He declared that “the party is always right” and called on his like-minded people to discipline and submit to the party. Notes of justification prevailed in his speech, although he later argued that the degeneration of the party was predetermined

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already at the XII Congress.

When was Trotsky right?

Then, when he argued that his victory would have been ensured at the Twelfth Party Congress if he had opposed Stalin on his and Lenin’s behalf (and even only on his own behalf)?

Or when he began to assert that the defeat of the opposition was predetermined by the historical course of events?

In 1935, in the same article “Why Stalin defeated the opposition,” Trotsky wrote:

“Stalin, a minor figure of the proletarian revolution, revealed himself as the undisputed leader of the Thermidorian bureaucracy - nothing more... Those sages who retroactively accuse us of losing power due to indecision...they think that there are some these are special technical “secrets” with the help of which one can win or maintain revolutionary power, regardless of the action of the greatest objective factors: victory or defeat of the revolution in the West and East, the rise or decline of the mass movement in the country, etc.

Power is not a prize that goes to the more dexterous. Power is a relationship between people, and ultimately between classes. Proper leadership, as already said, is an important lever for success. But this does not mean at all that the leadership can ensure victory under all conditions."

True, not in front of everyone. But given the specific conditions that developed in the country and in the party at the time of Lenin’s illness, before the XII Party Congress, it was possible to certainly ensure Trotsky’s victory if he had taken the correct and decisive line that Lenin intended to take when preparing for the congress.

Apparently, Trotsky himself thought so when he wrote his book “My Life,” but by 1935 he changed his point of view. Here is what he writes about this in the mentioned article:

“The question of how the course of the struggle would have developed if Lenin had remained alive cannot, of course, be answered with mathematical precision. That Lenin was an irreconcilable opponent of the greedy conservative bureaucracy and the policies of Stalin, who increasingly linked his fate with it, is indisputably clear from a number of letters, articles and proposals of Lenin for the last period of his life, in particular from his “Testament”, in which he recommended removing Stalin from the post of General Secretary, and finally, from his last letter, in which he broke off with Stalin “all personal and comradely relations." In the period between the two attacks, Lenin invited me to create a faction with him to fight against the bureaucracy and its main headquarters, the Organizing Bureau of the Central Committee, where Stalin led. For the 12th Party Congress, Lenin, in his own words, was preparing a "bomb" against Stalin. All this is told on the basis of accurate and indisputable documents - in my autobiography and in a separate work, “Lenin’s Testament.”

So, Trotsky himself declares that Lenin was preparing a “bomb” against Stalin at the XII Party Congress, recommended Stalin’s removal from the post of General Secretary and proposed a bloc against Stalin to Trotsky.

Why didn’t Trotsky implement this Leninist plan either at the next plenum of the Central Committee or at the XII Party Congress?

Maybe he tried to do this, spoke on these points, but remained in the minority, was defeated for reasons of an objective nature?

No, as we know, nothing like that happened. Trotsky's behavior throughout this entire period, from the December plenum of the Central Committee of 1922 to the XIV Party Congress (1925) inclusive, was, as I have shown with specific examples, passive and indecisive. And this is precisely why he suffered defeat, and also because he treated his opponent superficially and arrogantly.

We see that subsequently Trotsky not only overlooked his mistakes, but also misjudged Lenin. He argues that Lenin, if he had remained alive and entered into the fight with Stalin, most likely would have been defeated.

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“Lenin’s preparatory measures show,” writes Trotsky, “that he considered the upcoming struggle very difficult - not because, of course, he was afraid of Stalin personally as an enemy (it’s ridiculous to talk about this), but because behind Stalin’s back he clearly discerned a network of blood relations interests of the powerful layer of the ruling bureaucracy (when did it manage to form and gain strength?).

It is safe to say that if Lenin had lived longer, the onslaught of bureaucratic omnipotence would have been achieved - at least in the first years - more slowly. But already in 1926, Krupskaya said in a circle of left-wing oppositionists: “If Ilyich were alive, he would probably already be in prison.” Lenin’s fears and alarming foresights were then still fresh in her memory, and she had no illusions at all about Lenin’s personal omnipotence, understanding, in his own words, the dependence of the best helmsman on fair or headwinds and currents.”

Of course, if Lenin had behaved as passively and indecisively as Trotsky, if he had not achieved the removal of Stalin from the post of General Secretary, the same thing that happened to his comrades in the Politburo could have happened to him. But I think that Lenin, by the very nature of his character, could not do this.

The facts presented, I think, are enough to confirm the main idea of this chapter: Stalin’s victory over the opposition was not predetermined by the nature of the era, as Trotsky later claimed. This victory - over Trotsky and other members of the Politburo - was thought out, organized and carried out by Stalin.

This is not contradicted by Trotsky’s statement - very precise and correct - that the era was working towards a decline in the revolutionary movement, that fatigue was increasingly affecting the mood of the working masses. The fact of fatigue and passivity of the working masses does not at all imply the predetermination of Stalin's victory. With the correct policy of the party towards the peasantry and industrialization, with the improvement of the material situation of the working class, with a decisive struggle against bureaucracy on the basis of broad internal party democracy, the party could lead the country along the path of socialist construction without abandoning its main goal - world revolution.

Lenin, in his letters to the congress and in his last, dying articles, outlined a plan, the implementation of which would give the Russian proletariat the opportunity to hold out until the approach of the world revolution. Stalin, having seized power, gave the party's policy the opposite direction, oriented not towards the world revolution, but towards strengthening the Russian state, towards strengthening the new bureaucracy. The reactionary tendencies of the era contributed to this direction and made it easier for Stalin to defeat his revolutionary opponents. His desire for personal power coincided with the reactionary tendencies of the era.

It is characteristic that Stalin shunned international problems, had little understanding of the issues of the international labor movement, did not study them and, due to his narrow-mindedness and provincialism, did not even have a taste for them. If he had to touch on these problems in his speeches, he either unsuccessfully copied Lenin, or used the analysis of his more educated allies. His suspicious, distrustful character could not have been more in keeping with the xenophobia, dislike and distrust of everything foreign that had been instilled in Russia for centuries. This also fit well with distrust of foreign communist parties, of foreign communists.

Trotsky put it this way: Stalin “sought a simpler, more national, more reliable policy.” The reactionary course of abandoning the international goals of the revolution and building socialism in one country was not predetermined by the internal situation in the country; it was a consequence of a turn in party policy, outlined and prepared by Statny during Lenin’s lifetime and carried out by him at the XII-XVII party congresses.

Let us once again summarize the means by which he achieved this and the circumstances that made his task easier.

First of all - the enormous power of the General Secretary of the Party Central Committee. Using it, Stalin gradually, day after day, month after month, year after year, strengthened his undivided influence in the party apparatus. The party masses gradually withdrew from participation in party life; from the local and central bodies of the party, at first slowly, then more quickly, cadres of old ideological Bolsheviks were forced out; an obedient majority was formed through various organizational measures; expelled from leadership positions

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there were thinking and dissenting communists.

Then - carefully studying your opponents, present and potential, capable of interfering with his sole power, and the skillful use of both their positive qualities (gullibility, devotion to the party) and personal weaknesses.

Stalin skillfully created situations for them to clash with each other, for a sharp aggravation of relations between them, and thus prepared the ground for their discredit and gradual removal from the political arena.

To what extent all opponents of Stalin turned out to be inexperienced and gullible politicians!

At first L.D. showed his short-sightedness and indecisiveness. Trotsky, who, for fear of disrupting the unity of the party, withdrew from the struggle at the XII Party Congress, and then refused first the alliance with Zinoviev (in 1923 and 1925), and then the alliance with Bukharin (1928).

In all of the above cases, Trotsky remains a passive contemplator of Stalin’s reprisal against his opponents - yesterday’s allies in the fight against Trotsky. Finding themselves in trouble, they should have become natural allies of Trotsky and indeed offered him this alliance. Trotsky's decisive intervention on the side of the minority could lead to success in the fight against Stalin. However, Trotsky was unable to rise above yesterday’s disputes and infighting; he could not draw the line between Zinoviev, Kamenev and Bukharin on the one hand, and Stalin on the other. And he silently allowed reprisals against them, which subsequently facilitated the final defeat of all Stalin’s opponents - and, above all, the defeat and physical destruction of the left opposition.

The behavior of Zinoviev and Kamenev was even less principled. If we carefully analyze all their speeches during the period of struggle against the left opposition, it will become clear that these speeches were not caused by serious theoretical or practical disagreements. But the struggle for power, for the “inheritance” to Lenin, is clearly visible, especially inflamed on the eve of the imminent death of the recognized leader of the party. The most authoritative member of the Politburo after Lenin was then Trotsky - and that is why Zinoviev and Kamenev directed a blow against him, concluding an alliance with Stalin, who seemed to them a harmless “practitioner”. That is why Trotsky’s historical “non-Bolshevism,” which Lenin in his “Testament” did not consider possible to blame, began to be exaggerated and propagated in the party. It was precisely in order to isolate and eliminate Trotsky and those who supported him that Zinoviev and Kamenev, disregarding Lenin’s advice, defended the retention of Stalin as General Secretary, which Zinoviev later belatedly repented of.

In 1926, Trotsky, Kamenev and Zinoviev finally came to their senses and formed a bloc. But it's' too late. Zinoviev and Kamenev believed then that in an alliance with the opposition of 1923 they would be able to quickly take control of the situation, restore the Leninist line in the party and their personal prestige. They were wrong this time too. Time had already been lost; Stalin had already taken complete control of the apparatus, and through it the majority of the party.

The last fatal and shameful mistake was made by Zinoviev and Kamenev immediately after the XV Congress, capitulating on an issue in which no self-respecting politician has the right to capitulate: renouncing their views. Having achieved this from them, Stalin achieved his main goal: he publicly humiliated and discredited them before the party and the working class and established himself in the eyes of those old Bolsheviks who wavered in their attitude towards the “new opposition”. This capitulation, which Zinoviev and Kamenev thoughtlessly considered a means of preventing a split in the party and a condition for their return to political activity, was essentially their political suicide, which came long before Stalin killed them physically. All their (especially Zinoviev’s) further behavior is the result of demoralization, the beginning of which was their rejection of their views.

As for the “right opposition,” Bukharin, Rykov, and Tomsky were used three times by Stalin: first against Trotsky, then against the Leningrad opposition, and finally against the united opposition.

It should be noted here that, unlike others, between Bukharin and Trotsky there really were fundamental, ideological, theoretical disagreements. It was Bukharin, and not Stalin at all, who was the author of the theory of building socialism in one single country, which

When someone reproached Zinoviev and Kamenev for abandoning their ally Trotsky after the XV Congress, Kamenev replied, “Trotsky was needed to form a government, and he is ballast for returning to the party.”

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which Trotsky considered anti-revolutionary and nationalist. It was Bukharin who acted as its defender during the struggle with Zinoviev: Stalin was incapable of this even at his theoretical level; but he was perfectly suited to pitting first Zinoviev and Kamenev against Trotsky, then Bukharin against Zinoviev and Kamenev, and, in the end, one by one removing all his rivals with each other’s hands.

After all, the “right” not only conducted theoretical discussions with the left oppositionists, they helped Stalin justify the need for police repressions against his party comrades, covered up with their authority this dirty deed, of which, in the end, they themselves became victims. The reprisal against Trotsky, Zinoviev and Kamenev and their supporters (arrests and exiles) until 1928 took place not only before the eyes of the right, but also with their direct participation.

Could it be that they really considered “Trotskyism” a petty-bourgeois deviation, and Trotsky and the Trotskyists as anti-Leninists? I think it's possible. But what is seemingly impossible is to continue to trust Stalin, to continue to consider him a Bolshevik, a Leninist, observing his political kitchen from day to day at close range, his treachery towards yesterday’s allies, his unprincipledness and cruelty.

However, until 1928, when it was the turn of Bukharin, Rykov and Tomsky to be squeezed out by Stalin and thrown out of the leadership - right up to these very times they marched with Stalin against their old party comrades. And they also realized that they had made a major political miscalculation only when it was already too late.

But Trotsky, back in 1926, repeatedly invited Bukharin to join him “in the general demand to restore a healthy internal party regime.”

In the party under Lenin, over the years of joint work, a core of middle-level leadership cadres formed and grew. These were workers and proletarian intellectuals, most of them devoted to the cause of the proletarian revolution, ideological, selfless, many very capable people. After the revolution, it was they who took the posts of people's commissars, secretaries of national communist parties, provincial committees (later regional committees and regional committees), major military and economic leaders. The internal party regime created by Stalin disintegrated them. At first, Stalin temporarily used these people in the fight against the opposition under the guise of fighting for party unity, and then destroyed them.

I am constantly tormented by the question: why did Stalin manage to carry out his plan so relatively easily? How and with what did he seduce some in order to set them against others? Why didn’t any of the members of the Politburo, who worked with Stalin for many years, suspect the provocative nature of Stalin’s activities?

Svetlana Alliluyeva wrote about her father in her book “Only One Year”:

“He treated people without any romanticism: there are strong people who are needed, equal people who get in the way, and weak people who are not needed by anyone.”

I think that these words of Stalin’s daughter contain the grain of an answer to the question that is tormenting me.

Here I am reading how Stalin charmed his famous guests: H. Wells, L. Feuchtwanger, R. Rolland, B. Shaw, F. Roosevelt, W. Churchill and others who enjoyed enormous influence in their countries and throughout the world. These were all strong people, and he needed them. And he knew how to find the key to their hearts, he knew how to make them believe in themselves when he needed stumps. He charmed some with his Georgian hospitality and cordiality, playing a sincere and broad-minded person, he knew how to convince others of his devotion to the ideas of socialism, and he impressed others as a statesman.

Wasn’t this the way he attracted members of the Politburo to his side, taking turns pitting members of the Politburo against each other, playing an attentive friend, a sympathetic like-minded person, whose support against ideological opponents you can count on? After all, when he entered the fight, these were strong people who he “really needed.”

When Stalin was preparing an attack against Trotsky in 1922-923, in order to win over Zinoviev, he frightened him with the “non-Bolshevism” of Trotsky, who, after Lenin’s death, could seize the leadership of the party and, using the mistake of Zinoviev and Kamenev in October 1917, remove him from this leadership both of them. At the same time, Stalin presented his own plan (which he later implemented) as Trotsky’s plan, and presented himself as a modest

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a person who does not pretend to be the first role, but only cares about the outstanding leader Zinoviev.

When Stalin set Bukharin, Rykov and Tomsky against Zinoviev and Kamenev, he presented himself as a person who most of all defended the unity of the party and wanted to retain all members of the Politburo in the leadership. Hypocritically objecting to the demands of Zinoviev and Kamenev to expel Trotsky from the Central Committee and intensify the struggle against Bukharin, Stalin seemed to be saying to Bukharin:

You see, today they demand to cut off Trotsky, tomorrow, when they deal with Trotsky, they will demand your blood... Don’t trust them, trust only me...

Of course, that was only a rough scheme, everything was subtler, more complicated, but this was precisely the basis of Stalin’s tactics and strategy in his struggle for power: to set one against the other, and with a cue to throw away his yesterday’s allies when they were used. This is the tactics and strategy of all unprincipled politicians, all tyrants and dictators, all mafia leaders - political and criminal.

The biggest mistake of Lenin's former comrades - and the mistake was not only political, but also psychological - was that they all viewed Stalin as a member of the same party, as their ideological comrade, even if he stood on erroneous positions. And he never was. Its goal was not socialism, it was not a world revolution, it was not the liberation of working humanity from social and national oppression. He had one goal - power. Personal, unlimited power, power as such, regardless of its social content.

I don’t know whether he was ever a communist or whether he joined the revolutionary movement, guided by the same basic passion. Let us quote his daughter’s book again:

“... My father had the wounded pride of a poor man, capable of moving mountains in his path... The firm conviction that any means are good to achieve the goal promised more real results than political ideals... My father remained internally the same as he left the doors of the seminary. Nothing was added to his character, only the same qualities developed to the limit.”

He dreamed of emerging from the bottom, and not just emerging to a more worthy human life, but rising to the top, achieving higher power. He had no hope of achieving this under the old regime; instinctively sensing the proximity of the fall of the monarchy, he realized that the revolutionary era provides unlimited opportunities for advancement. So he became a Bolshevik.

An interesting detail that Trotsky notes more than once in his articles, books and memoirs: Stalin, who many times took a position opposite to Lenin’s, never entered into a fight with Lenin. He always, as Trotsky put it, “rebounded in time.” Not because Lenin convinced him, but because Stalin was really afraid of him. He was afraid that Lenin would recognize him and unravel his inner essence.

Unfortunately, it did not happen. Only shortly before his death did Lenin come closer to solving this phenomenon. He approached, but did not fully recognize him.

And then death came.