More than 70 opposition parties, organizations and groups fought against the Kabul government. The immediate goal of their struggle was the overthrow of the democratic system in the DRA. Regarding the further prospects for the development of Afghan society, there was no unity in their leadership: one part advocated the declaration of Afghanistan as an “Islamic republic” on the model of Pakistan or Iran (which is not the same thing), and the other supported the restoration of the old pre-revolutionary order, including and monarchy. There were also various other differences (national, tribal, etc.). Therefore, the definition of “opposition” is applicable to the rebels purely conditionally and generally, since their leaders pursued different goals, and often did not recognize each other at all. The result: during the struggle they did not put forward a single leader who was able to lead the rebellious movement.

To counter the Soviet Union in Afghanistan, the United States created a corresponding system in this region. The Afghan opposition was completely dependent financially on NATO countries and Muslim orthodox regimes. Along with the United States, Pakistan, China, Iran, Saudi Arabia, and a number of Western European countries took the most active part in providing all possible assistance and support to anti-government forces in Afghanistan.

The main areas of assistance to the Afghan opposition were financing, supplies of weapons, ammunition and military equipment for the rebels, participation of military instructors and advisers in the military training of the Mujahideen, and provision of conditions for the withdrawal of Soviet troops from the territory of Afghanistan. For example, in September 1981, representatives of military intelligence reported: “Recently, the United States, Western European countries, Egypt, together with Pakistan, have noticeably stepped up their assistance to the Afghan counter-revolution. In order to coordinate activities in this direction, a working group was created in Islamabad, which included members of the General Staff and military intelligence of Pakistan and representatives of the embassies of the United States, England and Egypt. At the group meeting, they mainly discuss specific subversive operations and the participation of individual countries in organizing the rebel movement on the territory of the DGA. In particular, the training of saboteurs and terrorists is carried out in Germany, where since the end of 1980 a number of centers have been operating to train people of Afghan nationality and Pakistani military personnel in the methods of guerrilla warfare. The preparation period is 1.5 months. In the first half of September this year. Another group of saboteurs flew to Germany to study.

Egypt is increasing the supply of modern types of weapons to the Afghan counter-revolutionaries (Kalashnikov assault rifles, surface-to-air missiles, light anti-aircraft guns, explosives, timed mines, etc.). Weapons are delivered to Peshawar at night on C-130 planes; instructors, including American ones, periodically fly on these planes for the military training of counter-revolutionaries on Pakistani territory.

Recently, England has also intensified its participation in subversive activities against the DRA government. So, in the first half of September this year. A group of 10 British experts on organizing guerrilla warfare arrived in Pakistan. The task of the group, which is now located in the areas bordering the DRA, is to conduct a comprehensive on-site study of the current state of the “civil war” in the DRA and prepare a report with specific proposals on the forms of practical participation of England in assisting the “rebel movement.”

The most active struggle against the PDPA regime and the Soviet military presence in Afghanistan was carried out by opposition organizations whose headquarters were in Pakistan and Iran. They had an established structure, including governing bodies, armed formations, a system of training centers and supply bases, organs and means of propaganda (radio stations, printed publications), and in rebel-controlled areas of Afghanistan - the so-called Islamic committees.

In addition, in the USA, Western Europe and in some Muslim countries, the opposition had an extensive network of its representative offices, branches, societies, foundations, etc., through which the financing and material support of its various parties and groups was provided. The Mujahideen were based and acted extremely disunitedly. They, as a rule, did not conduct combat operations with government forces in “foreign” provinces and zones, and opposed any attempts to unite, strengthen discipline, or develop elements of a common strategy. Only the leaders of their own party were recognized. This disunity did not allow them to achieve tangible victories: inter-party hostility, localism, religious and national differences interfered. Thousands, perhaps tens of thousands, of Mujahideen died in internecine clashes. The struggle between the leaders in Peshawar led to military clashes throughout the country.

In addition, there were deep disagreements among the opposition regarding the distribution of aid received from abroad and the division of spheres of influence in Afghanistan. Often, military clashes arose between armed detachments of different party and national affiliations, from which they suffered losses no less than in the fight against government forces and Soviet troops.

In this regard, great efforts were made by countries supporting the opposition to achieve the unity of the Mujahideen. But this turned out to be an impossible task. The rebels faced the same difficulties as the PDPA, because the main feature of Afghan society is its disunity.

The first attempt to unite the opposition was made at the end of 1979, even before the entry of Soviet troops into the DRA. The “alliance” that took shape at that time - the Islamic Revolution Movement of Afghanistan - collapsed immediately after its creation. Then efforts to unite the Mujahideen were made constantly.

The US and Islamic countries have put constant pressure on Afghan opposition leaders in Pakistan to unify. As a result, on the eve of the opening of an emergency conference of foreign ministers of member countries of the Organization of the Islamic Conference (January 1980), the opposition announced the creation of the Islamic Union for the Liberation of Afghanistan, which included six parties.

On April 27, 1980, at a press conference in Islamabad, in which the leaders of six united opposition organizations took part, the main goals of the new alliance were announced - the liberation of Afghanistan from the power of the “atheistic regime” and the creation of a true Islamic state in accordance with the provisions of the Koran and the teachings of the prophet Mohammed.

The leaders of the “six” pledged to cooperate with those organizations that are fighting in their countries to establish Islamic rule, and called on the heads of state members of the Organization of the Islamic Conference to provide them with political support, money and weapons. This union lasted until December 1980, and then also collapsed.

But under pressure from certain external forces and at the request of Muslim, including Afghan, theologians, negotiations soon began again on the revival of the alliance. By June 1981, they culminated in the creation of the Islamic Mujahideen Union of Afghanistan (ISMA). On June 25, the leaders of the organizations took an oath on the Koran of allegiance to the new union and accepted its charter. According to the charter of the alliance, all six opposition organizations - members of the union were to dissolve themselves, transfer to the union all material resources, sources of income, real estate, weapons, after which their independent activities were to cease. However, this was the first and last meeting of the ISMA founders. Already in August 1981, a meeting of the union members was held without Gilani (NIFA). Then he went abroad and did not return M. Nabi (DIRA), left the Mojaddadi Union (NFSA). And only in May 1985, all the opposition parties - there were already seven of them then - located in Pakistan reunited into an alliance that again took the name of the Islamic Union of the Mujahideen of Afghanistan. However, despite the earlier decision to dissolve Islamic opposition organizations, all parties included in the alliance retained their structures. Armed detachments and groups continued to submit not to Alliance-7 in general, but to their party leaders and centers in Pakistan.

The areas where detachments and groups of various opposition parties operated very often became the scene of armed clashes between their so-called field commanders. These clashes took place on the basis of a struggle for spheres of control, sources of replenishment of people, material resources, and food. The leaders of the Mujahideen, while verbally advocating an end to such clashes and condemning them, in fact in every possible way encouraged and stimulated the commanders who managed to defeat or oust the “rival” detachments from their zone of control, much less expand them. For example, the order of the IPA military committee back in 1981 directly stated: “The Mujahideen brothers of the IPA must make efforts to discover warehouses of weapons, uniforms and equipment of other political groups, under favorable circumstances, seize them and use them in the interests of Muslim jihad. In addition to warehouses, they can carry out operations to seize weapons and food on the roads.”

The duties of a member of the Islamic Society of Afghanistan explicitly stated: “Do not maintain connections with members of other parties if these connections do not benefit the party.”

In all subsequent years, many attempts were made to achieve unity in the opposition camp, but this turned out to be an insurmountable task. Indicative in this regard is the report of the head of the intelligence center of the 40th Army:

“Recently in Pakistan, the headquarters of five parties (IOA, IPH, DIRA, NIFA, NFSA) have made another attempt to unite with the aim of organizing centralized leadership of armed gangs of various party orientations, developing a joint plan for the fight against people’s power and forming an interim government of Afghanistan in exile. IOA leader Burhanuddin Rabbani was elected chairman of the new “alliance of five” and was entrusted with forming a government cabinet.

Due to personal claims to leadership in the counter-revolutionary movement, the new “union” did not include: the leader of the IPA, Gulbuddin Hekmatyar, under whose command is the largest group of rebels (1,193 detachments and groups with a total number of 40,570 people, which is 33% of the total number rebels in the DRA) and the leader of the ISOA Abdul Rasul Sayaf (125 detachments and groups, 4285 rebels, which is 3.5% of the total number of rebels) - the not yet re-elected leader of the “alliance of seven”, who enjoys great authority in the counter-revolution camp.

In our opinion, another attempt to unite is only a demonstration of the unity of the Afghan counter-revolutionary leadership before foreign creditors...”

(Colonel Chernyavsky, August 1986.)

Even after the fall of Najibullah's regime, this problem proved insoluble for opposition leaders, and it resulted in fierce fighting between various mujahideen factions in the struggle for power in Kabul. The national basis turned out to be more significant than ideological and religious factors.

In general, according to sources of information from the Ministry of State Security of the DRA, the RU General Staff of the Armed Forces of the DRA, Soviet embassies in Afghanistan, Iran, Pakistan, the headquarters of the 40th Army, the GRU General Staff of the USSR Armed Forces, Soviet and Afghan special services, the rebellious movement in Afghanistan was characterized as follows.

Afghan opposition forces in Pakistan

The counter-revolutionary association "Alliance-7" was created in May 1985 under direct pressure from the USA, China and Pakistan. The Alliance included:

Islamic Party of Afghanistan (IPA).

Islamic Society of Afghanistan (ISA).

Islamic Party of Khales (IKH).

Islamic Union for the Liberation of Afghanistan (ILU).

National Islamic Front of Afghanistan (NIFA).

Islamic Revolution Movement of Afghanistan (DIRA).

National Front for the Salvation of Afghanistan (NFSA).

At the same time, the “Union of Seven” and “Union of Three” groups that had existed since 1983 were dissolved. The “Union of Seven” included the IPA, IOA, ISOA, IPH and three factions that broke away from NIFA and DIRA. The “Union of Three” included NIFA, DIRA and NFSA.

As a program of its activities, the Alliance proclaimed an irreconcilable struggle against the state power of the DRA and the creation of a “true Islamic state” in Afghanistan.

The structure of Alliance-7 had a supreme council, an executive council and six committees, the main of which were: political, military, international and refugee affairs. However, all these bodies (with the exception of the Supreme Council, which included the leaders of the seven organizations themselves) were not staffed and were practically inactive.

At the same time, it should be noted that a distinctive feature of the Afghan resistance was the absence of a single political ideology at its core. Its roots were deeply rooted in folk culture and consisted of three main components: clear and binding ideas about personal honor and self-respect, as a necessary basis for the identity and value of the individual; the desire to live in accordance with local, very diverse traditions and customs; faith in Islam.

Therefore, there was no single leader in the Afghan resistance. Each party leader claimed power, and contradictions remained between them. The basis of disagreements among the leadership of Alliance-7 was the rivalry between the leaders of various parties and groups for supremacy in the rebellious movement and the right to represent it in the international arena. In this regard, inter-party disagreements constantly existed, including between the extremist section of the counter-revolution, led by G. Hekmatyar (IPA, IOA, IPH, ISOA), and the pro-monarchist group (DIRA, NFSA, NIFA). For them, the question of the possible participation of the former king Zahir Shah in the “transitional government” of Afghanistan became almost insoluble. This was mainly due to the desire of the most numerous and militarily powerful organizations (IPA, IOA) for sole leadership in the rebellious movement.

The inability of the opposition to resolve organizational and other issues in Alliance-7 confirmed the lack of real unity among the ranks of the opposition. The bodies within it were practically inactive for a number of years and had no influence on the activities of the rebellious movement. The decisions of the twice-monthly meetings of the Alliance's supreme council were not binding. Each opposition organization reserved the right to make independent decisions. In this regard, planning for armed struggle was carried out by the headquarters of individual parties.

A factor of paramount importance in this process was the possibility of placing the leadership, material and training base of the opposition in close proximity to the Afghan border, which for 10 years was practically open to the rebels.

Opposition Islamic organizations have never had clearly demarcated spheres of influence and areas of activity in Afghanistan. However, their greatest activity was observed in the following areas:

IPA - Kabul, provinces of Kabul, Kunduz, Baghlan, Kunar, Badakhshan, Nuristan.

IOA - in the provinces of Herat, Badghis, Faryab, Jawzjan, Balkh, Samangan, Kunduz, Takhar, Baghlan, Badakhshan, Panjshir Valley.

IPH - Paktika, Paktia, Kunar, Nangarhar, Khost district.

ISOA - areas of activity are not clearly expressed. Smaller groups operate in the central and southeastern provinces.

DIRA - Kabul, Logar, Ghazni, Kandahar, Paktia, Zabol.

NFSA - Kabul, Logar, Kunar, Nangarhar, Paktia.

NIFA - Zabol, Paktika, Paktia, Kandahar.

Opposition organizations had a clear organizational structure, which was similar for everyone. The governing body was the executive committee, consisting of the party chairman, his deputies for ideological, political, military and administrative issues, as well as committee chairmen.

The party headquarters, as a rule, consisted of committees: political, military, financial, administrative, organizational issues and recruitment, information, refugee affairs, legal proceedings and counterintelligence.

The headquarters monitored the actions of armed formations on the territory of Afghanistan and the situation in their zone of responsibility, planned armed actions, prepared and transferred caravans with weapons, ammunition, logistics equipment to the territory of the republic, and financed detachments; ensured the creation of bases, the construction of fortifications, warehouses, and the crossing of trained groups across the border; organized interaction between formations of different party affiliations and performed other tasks.

The intermediate level of management, performing the role of local authorities, were Islamic committees, which usually consisted of a chairman, one or two deputies, a judge, a mullah, tax collectors, the headman of a locality and the leaders of rebel detachments, one of whom, as a rule, was the chairman of the committee . The quantitative composition of Islamic committees was determined by the scale of their activities and included from 5 to 30 people.

The Islamic committees of several villages or volosts were subordinate to the central Islamic committee, which was created in the district. The largest of them united into unions, the activities of which extended over a significant territory. In the course of their work, Islamic committees monitored the situation in the area of ​​responsibility, directed the military operations of the detachments, resolved controversial issues between individual leaders, and collected taxes and funds from the population. They also recruited reinforcements for rebel units and groups from among local residents and persons who had undergone military training in Iran and Pakistan, organized and carried out ideological indoctrination of the population and personnel of armed opposition units.

There was no clear organizational structure in the armed formations. What they had in common was that these formations were divided into groups, detachments (regiments) and gangs, the leaders of which were persons who had undergone special and military training, who knew local conditions well and had authority among the population.

Food for thought

Excerpts from the dossier on the leaders of the parties included in Alliance-T.

1. Gulbuddin Hekmatyar- leader of the Islamic Party of Afghanistan (IPA), comes from the family of a large landowner. Born in the village of Vartapur, Imamsahib district, Kunduz province in 1944. He comes from the Pashtun Haruti tribe. In 1971, he graduated from the Imamsahib Lyceum in Kunduz. After graduating from the lyceum, he studied for some time at the Faculty of Engineering of Kabul University, but for extremely harsh statements about the royal family and the Afghan aristocracy in 1972, Hekmatyar was sent to prison, from which he was released after the overthrow of the monarchy in 1973.

Among the Afghan leadership there are a number of people who knew G. Hekmatyar and observed the beginning of his political activities at Kabul University. In their opinion, his views at that time were characterized by elements of patriotism and reflection on the progressive future of Afghanistan and its role in the region. Hekmatyar's current intransigence and extremism resulted from a confluence of unfavorable circumstances.

Hekmatyar's promotion to the ranks of the leaders of the opposition Islamic movement occurred in 1973–1975, when, on the instructions of M. Daoud, repressions were carried out against representatives of the clergy. In 1976, he emigrated to Pakistan, where he created the IPA on the basis of the extremist faction of the Muslim Brotherhood and the Muslim Youth organization. He received financial and other assistance for creating the party from Pakistani military circles and intelligence services. Since then he has been a Pakistani Secret Service man. He is characterized by a penchant for extremist actions, imperiousness, high ambition and eccentricity, which put him to some extent in an isolated position among other leaders of the Afghan opposition. An ardent Pashtun nationalist.

He stated more than once: “I am a Pashtun first, and then a Muslim.” However, due to the fact that he was born in northern Afghanistan, where Pashtuns are a minority, Hekmatyar was never closely associated with the tribal system. Apparently, this is why he enjoys the greatest support from Pakistan, which is not interested in strengthening the Pashtun tribes.

At the same time, G. Hekmatyar closely followed the progress of the Iranian Islamic revolution, trying to determine the direction of his political platform. In 1979, he visited Iran, where he met with Ayatollah Khomeini.

Sharp disagreements with the leaders of almost all opposition parties, constant control and pressure from the Pakistani authorities (even to the personal claims of Zia-ul-Haq), as well as in the interests of receiving maximum financial assistance from the United States and other Western countries, force him to often speculate on the possibility of relocation its headquarters from Pakistan to Iran, on the threat of reducing IPA ties with the United States and establishing closer cooperation with various Muslim countries, primarily Iran.

He is the owner of enterprises for the processing of precious stones, the production of drugs, as well as two factories producing water pumps and porcelain tableware. In addition, it has 150 rickshaws in Peshawar. Appropriating money from funds intended for the supply of food, medicine and clothing to Afghan refugees, he buys up shares of industrial and trading companies in his own name, and places hundreds of thousands of dollars in his personal accounts in Western European and American banks. Thus, only one “American Express Bank” in Basel (Switzerland) in February and March 1987 accepted 245 thousand dollars from Hekmatyar. He keeps part of his funds in Habib Bank (Pakistan). He pays up to 18 thousand Pakistani rupees monthly for rent of his house.

In his financial and trading operations, Hekmatyar does not disdain anything. Through an extensive network of front men and small sales agents, it sells wholesale and retail shipments of medicines, clothing and food intended for Afghan refugees in Pakistan and Iran. He does not refuse to sell second-hand clothes or, in general, anything that brings profit. It works on the principle: money doesn’t smell bad.

He is the owner of drug production enterprises. According to some available data, G. Hekmatyar and his inner circle have organized a network of laboratories for processing opium poppy into heroin in the North-West Frontier Province of Pakistan (NWFP). Drugs are exported through the Pakistani port of Karachi to Europe and America (including the USA). Their wholesale sales there give fabulous profits. The interests of Hekmatyar's drug business explain the stubborn persistence shown by the armed forces of the IPA, who are trying to capture the cities of Jalalabad and Khost in southeastern Afghanistan. It is in these border provinces with Pakistan, as well as in the NWFP, that the main plantations of opium poppy cultivated by the IPA rebels are located.

In one of his letters to the commander of a subordinate armed unit, Hekmatyar reported that “international friends” provided his group with toxic chemicals. In this regard, he gave instructions to send several soldiers to acquire skills in their use from American specialists.

2. Burhanuddin Rabbani- leader of the Afghan counter-revolutionary party Islamic Society of Afghanistan (IOA). Born in 1940 in Fayzabad, northern Badakhshan province into a religious family. He is a Tajik from the Yaftali tribe, so he is especially attractive to many non-Pashtuns.

After graduating from school, where he showed extraordinary abilities and a penchant for religious disciplines, he entered the Abu Hanifiya Islamic School in Kabul. Since 1958 he has been a member of the Muslim Brotherhood organization. In 1959 he graduated from school and received holy orders. In 1963 he graduated from the Faculty of Theology and Law of Kabul University. Then he taught at the Faculty of Theology at Kabul University. He was one of the leaders of the Muslim Brotherhood organization in Afghanistan. On behalf of the leadership of this organization, he headed a youth group at the university, which was called “Muslim Youth”.

In 1965, he left for Egypt and entered Al-Azkar University, where he showed extraordinary abilities. In 1968 he received an academic degree in Islamic philosophy. Upon returning to Afghanistan, he was appointed as a lecturer at Kabul University. Published several printed works on Islam.

Speaks Persian, Arabic, Urdu, English and Turkish.

However, in moral terms, despite his pious appearance of a “righteous man,” he is an odious and immoral figure, hiding his deeds behind the guise of a “defender of Islam.” His corruption dates back to his youth, when he became close friends with the family of Kerim Bay, who was known at that time in Afghanistan for his depravity. Orgies were often held in Kerim Bai's house, which ended in violence against young girls.

In 1973, Rabbani was elected leader of the Afghan Muslim Brotherhood organization and held this post until 1976.

Since coming to power, M. Dauda was persecuted by the authorities. In 1974, he escaped arrest and took refuge in the territory of tribes that continued to oppose the Saudi regime.

Until April 1978, B. Rabbani was one of the largest traders and exporters of carpets and was involved in smuggling. He owns a poultry farm and carpet and fabric manufacturing enterprises in Pakistan, receiving a profit of up to 20 million rupees annually from them. Another source of Rabbani’s income is the trade in contraband goods and drugs carried out in Iran and Pakistan by the leaders of his gang’s gangs. Now he is one of the largest suppliers of opium and heroin to Muslim countries. In addition, with his participation, lapis lazuli is smuggled from Badakhshan and emeralds from Panjshir.

To operate his secret syndicate, Rabbani uses the funds and organizational structure of the IOA, shamelessly embezzling large sums intended to assist Afghan refugees. In particular, over six months at the end of 1988 - beginning of 1989, his personal deposits in banks in the United States and European countries in the name of “Tafil Mohammad” were replenished by more than 600 million Pakistani rupees. In the Dara Adam Khel and Cherat regions of Pakistan, clandestine opium processing laboratories operate under his control. A network of agents has been created to organize drug smuggling abroad. The main transit points are Quetta and Karachi.

For Pakistani residents, where Afghan refugee camps are located, it is no secret that a third of Rabbani militants sent to Afghanistan are chronic drug addicts, and about half use drugs occasionally. These “warriors of Islam,” while intoxicated, openly boast that during raids in Afghanistan they are entrusted with the most responsible actions - arson of hospitals, poisoning of wells, murder of children and women, as well as robbery on the roads and robbery of civilians. The lion's share of the loot goes to the same B. Rabbani, who invests these funds in his business, improves the production and transportation of drugs, trying to reliably hide this obscene activity for a “defender of Islam” from the eyes of Interpol.

Rabbani advocates the creation of an Islamic republic in Afghanistan, based on unquestioning compliance with Sharia law. In his activities, he focuses on developing relations with Muslim countries, while at the same time trying to make maximum use of the help and support of the United States and the West in his competition for leadership in the “Alliance-7” with Hekmatyar. Rabbani enjoys the strongest influence among the population of the central and northern regions of the country.

3. Sebhatullah Mojaddadi- leader of the National Front for the Salvation of Afghanistan (NFSA). Born in 1925 in Kabul. He comes from the most influential family clan of Afghanistan - the hereditary Hazrat (heirs of the prophet). He was educated at the famous Al-Azhar University in Cairo, then taught at the Habibiya, Ghazi, Isteklal lyceums and was a professor of Islamic law at Kabul University.

In 1960, for anti-government activities and an attempt to organize an assassination attempt on the Soviet delegation, which was at that time in Kabul, he was sentenced to 4 years in prison, but a few weeks later he was released from custody. Subsequently, he became known in Afghanistan as a scholar-theologian and a skilled speaker. In his speeches and printed publications, he argued for the need for “the revival of Islam in its true form and giving it an offensive (militant) character.”

He was an ardent opponent of the reforms carried out by the royal government. He opposed the king. With his direct participation in Afghanistan in 1966, the Islamic extremist radical organization “Muslim Brotherhood” was created and later its branch “Muslim Youth”, into whose leadership (on the recommendation of S. Mojaddadi) G. Hekmatyar was once introduced.

In 1976–1977, while in Pakistan, he created the Society of Muslim Theologians from members of the moderate wing of the Muslim Brotherhood. From 1977 to February 1979 he lived in the Netherlands, where he was rector of a mosque.

In March 1979, S. Mojaddadi addressed an appeal to all Muslims of Afghanistan, calling on them to “jihad” against the PDPA regime.

S. Mojaddadi is considered a supporter of the “Western option” for solving the Afghan problem. The ultimate goal of the organization he heads is the creation of a bourgeois-clerical state based on the teachings of Islam and its own democratic principles.

S. Mojaddadi is the leader of the Naqshbandi Sufi order. Speaks five foreign languages. After the Saur Revolution, 75 members of the S. Mojaddadi family were repressed, of which more than thirty were executed by the Taraki-Amin regime. With the help of his relatives, S. Mojaddadi established close ties with the Islamic circles of Saudi Arabia, Iran, Egypt, Pakistan, and India. His cousin Hashem and his sister, who married one of the princes of the ruling dynasty, live in Saudi Arabia. His large family lives in luxury thanks to the profits received from the transport company Mojaddadi Gudeh Transport Company. This company was acquired at one time for money ($750 thousand) from the refugee assistance fund, from where it still receives “subsidies.”

Mojaddadi has four sons from Merkhnegor (elder sister of Suleiman Layek, Minister of Nationalities and Tribal Affairs). One of his sons (Azizullah) was killed by IPA terrorists, which is one of the reasons for his father’s personal extreme hostility towards the IPA leader G. Hekmatyar. The National Archives of India contains materials from the English Intelligence Service on individuals from the Mojaddadi clan who collaborated to varying degrees with the British intelligence services.

Mojaddadi has long valued only wealth. The fate of the Afghans suffering in a foreign land does not touch his heart, which is callous and cold to human grief, as evidenced by many facts. For example, this case. When the residents of two camps in the Arawoli and Alizai areas, exhausted by hunger and disease, raised a voice of protest, their indignation was mercilessly suppressed with the help of militants directly subordinate to S. Mojaddadi. Those who were dissatisfied were simply accused of treason and shot on the spot.

In general, thanks to the existing political, business, financial connections of his clan, as well as religious authority, Sebhatullah Mojaddadi is one of the leading figures of the Afghan counter-revolution, enjoying special influence in the area of ​​settlement of Pashtun tribes in the eastern and south-eastern provinces of Afghanistan, as well as in a number of provincial areas Samangan and Baglap. He rejected the proposal of the Afghan leadership to form a coalition government. He is a supporter of entrusting the functions of the head of state to Zahir Shah.

4. Said Ahmad Gilani- leader of the National Islamic Front of Afghanistan (NIFA) party, claiming to be an ideological mentor and inspirer of the Afghan nation. Born in 1931 into a family of hereditary hazrat (heirs of the prophet), Arabs of Iraqi origin. Gilani is the hereditary spiritual leader (pir) of the worldwide Qadiriya Sufi order, which he inherited from his father Hezrat Sehab, and to which most Afghans, especially Pashtuns, belong. Gilani received his secular education in the West, his spiritual education in Iraq, and visited Egypt and Saudi Arabia for the same purpose. Fluent in five languages.

His father maintained close relations with the family of Nadir Shah, father of King Zahir Shah. Constantly and actively collaborated with British intelligence. With the active assistance of the British, he was elected the supreme representative of the Sunni Qadiriya order in Afghanistan. Gilani's mother, Martha Richter, is the daughter of a prominent German police official.

The Gilani family was rich and influential in Kabul. Before the overthrow of the monarchy, he was close to the king (until 1973, Gilani was a personal unofficial adviser to Zahir Shah). It had equally close ties to high-ranking government officials and senior army officers who joined NIFA after 1978.

From his father, he inherited land plots in the Jalalabad region, had large incomes from the astrakhan trade, and owned real estate in Kabul, Kunduz and other cities of the country. In the capital, he was also the owner of a store selling Peugeot cars on a commission basis. Before April 1978, his personal fortune was estimated at $7 million. Subsequently, after fleeing to Pakistan, using the loot, Gilani acquired two villas in Rawalpindi (Mall Road) and Islamabad (Garden Road), several comfortable cars, repair shops and shops in Quetta and Peshawar.

Gilani often travels to the United States, where he leads an idle and riotous lifestyle, spending funds allocated to refugees.

Thanks to his extensive connections with the royal family, the clergy of the Pashtun tribes, as well as his personal fortune, he enjoys great authority among the Pashtun population of the provinces of Nangarhar, Paktia, Logar, and Paktika. S. Gilani is characterized as a religious and political figure of moderate views. Supports the idea of ​​establishing a new type of “Muslim democracy”, creating a government and a republican system led by Zahir Shah or a person from his inner circle. Married to the granddaughter of the former King of Afghanistan Zahir Shah.

5. Muhammad Nabi (Mohammadi)- leader of the Islamic Revolution Movement of Afghanistan (DIRA), born in 1937 in Baraki district, Logar province, Pashtun from the Andar tribe. Coming from a wealthy family of clergy. He studied at madrassas in the provinces of Logar, Ghazni and Laghman. He has a higher theological education, is an orthodox Muslim, knows the Koran and Sharia law well, is an excellent speaker, and speaks Arabic. Until 1973, Nabi worked as a teacher in a madrasah in Logar province and was elected as a member of parliament. Using his position as a deputy, he illegally acquired about 100 hectares of irrigated land in Helmand province.

In 1973, with the coming to power of M. Daoud, dissatisfied with the overthrow of King Zahir Shah and the loss of his seat in parliament, he preached against the reforms and the Daoud regime, wrote and distributed anti-government poems among his circle, for which he was arrested and detained for a short time in one of the police administrative buildings.

In 1975, he was recruited by the police into the intelligence network of political intelligence agencies on a patriotic basis.

In 1978, he fled to Pakistan, where he founded his own party on the basis of the Servants of the Koran organization.

Being an ardent supporter of the armed struggle against the government of Afghanistan, Nabi, at the same time, does not share Hekmatyar’s extremism and advocates the active participation of Zahir Shah in resolving the Afghan problem. He embezzled about 300 thousand Pakistani rupees from the DIRA cash register. I ordered a gold crown for my bride.

6. Muhammad Yunus (Khales)- leader of the Islamic Party (IPH), born in 1919 in the village of Deh Kazi, Khugiani district, Nangarhar province, in the family of a wealthy religious leader and landowner. He is a Pashtun by nationality, a native of the Khugiani tribe, the Ibrahimkhail clan, the Nabikhail clan. He received religious education from his father, then from his uncle, a prominent clergyman in the Nangarhar province, Abdul Rezak.

He does not have a higher spiritual education, although he passes himself off as a scholar and theologian and has appropriated the title “mulavi” to himself. He was a mullah of one of the mosques in Kabul, was a member of the Muslim Brotherhood organization, and committed a number of crimes. He is a paid intelligence agent.

He had a number of publications on political and religious topics. Maintained contacts with the family of former king Zahir Shah. During the reign of Daud, he worked as a clergyman in the provinces of Kunar, Paktia, and Paktika.

After April 1978, he joined the Islamic Party of Afghanistan. However, at the end of 1979, due to personal differences with Hekmatyar, he left the IPA and created his own party with the same name. He sent his first wife and two children to Saudi Arabia, and, despite the dissatisfaction of his entourage, in May 1982 he married an 18-year-old girl from a wealthy family of the famous religious authority of the province of Kandahar, Qadir Kandahari, thus hoping to strengthen his connections and improve his financial position.

7. Abdul Rasul Sayaf- leader of the Islamic Union for the Liberation of Afghanistan (ISLA), born in Paghman district, Kabul province, in 1944. He is characterized as an insidious and cruel person. In 1963 he graduated from the Abu Hanifa Islamic School in Kabul, and in 1967 he graduated from the Faculty of Theology at Kabul University.

After graduating from university, he served in the army for a year. In 1970, according to the quota provided to the Afghan clergy, Sayaf (as a member of the Seyid family - according to legend, descendants of the prophet) was sent to receive higher theological education at Al-Azhar University in Cairo, where he studied together (in the same group) with King Fahd of Saudi Arabia. In 1974, Sayaf was arrested and sentenced to 6 years on charges of preparing and conducting anti-government protests, as well as carrying out brutal reprisals against the population.

He arrived in Pakistan in early 1980 after being released from prison. He is a high-ranking member of the Muslim Brotherhood. Prone to intrigue, he is characterized by the ability to commit any crime in order to achieve personal goals. Seen in smuggling and drug trafficking. He widely uses bribery in his methods of work. He does not enjoy any authority among the leaders of the counter-revolution. An attempt to unite opposition parties under his leadership ended in failure.

He purchased land plots in the Babu region (Peshawar) at a high price and is building 500 houses on them, which he intends to rent out. Along with this, he owns 10 trucks that are rented out.

These excerpts from the dossier on the leaders of Alliance-7 clearly show that the Afghan opposition was led by extraordinary and extraordinary people. And although many of them have now come to power, I deliberately left the assessments and characteristics that guided us at that time.

Independent Western journalists actually also confirmed the information obtained by the intelligence and special services of the Republic of Armenia and the USSR, and gave their characterization to the leaders of Alliance-7. Compared to other leading resistance leaders, "Hekmatyar is the most cunning and sneaky," according to one American official. Well-known journalist David Klein, in the article “The United States must tighten control over its assistance to the Afghan insurgents,” wrote on this issue: “While real combat commanders, such as the legendary Ahmad Shah Massoud (“Lion of Panjshir”) and Ismail Shah, endured hardships for years on the battlefield due to lack of supplies, party functionaries and bureaucrats in Peshawar, a city on the Pakistani border, were always ready to grab an easy loot from the $600 million annually allocated by the CIA. These “men of Peshawar,” as they call themselves, are rarely seen in the battle zone. They can be seen driving around the city in expensive Pujaro jeeps, making propaganda statements at press conferences or plotting intrigues against their richer and more famous rivals. Not far from some of their offices you can see American army ammunition and grain being sold."

But with the increasing number of attacks and robberies, developments that could affect the future of Afghanistan are taking a very unpleasant turn. Two months ago, the well-known and respected head of the independent Afghan Information Center, Syed Majrukh, was killed in front of his office in Peshawar. The former dean of the Faculty of Literature at Kabul University, Professor Majrukh, intended to make public documents containing revelations about the activities of the most extremist anti-government fundamentalist party, Hezbeh Islami (IPA), led by Gulbuddin Hekmatyar. Virtually everyone in Peshawar holds Hezb Islami responsible for the murder.

Hezbe Islami has already announced its intention not to recognize the Geneva peace agreement on Afghanistan. This group is generously funded and favored by American and Pakistani authorities and receives a disproportionate share of weapons and other funds from the United States. Recently, this and other rebel groups have increased the number of brazen attacks on Western journalists and technical workers whenever their level of press coverage has decreased or their priority position in aid distribution is perceived to be threatened.

Last September, Hezbe Islami detained members of a French medical aid mission heading to an area controlled by a rival faction. Seven French doctors and three technical staff were detained for ten days; Property and medicines worth $70 thousand were stolen from them. In October and December they ambushed two other French relief missions.

However, the most disturbing reports came last month: members of Hezbe Islami killed English television cameraman Andy Szpkowiak. Eyewitnesses testify that Szpkowiak, who was one of the most courageous and experienced cameramen covering military operations from the battle zone, was ambushed by four militants from Hezbe Islami, who were subsequently arrested (only for the fact that they wanted to smuggle to Pakistan Szpkowiak's camera) ... They are also believed to be involved in the deaths of two independent American filmmakers - Lee Shapiro from New York and James Lindelof from Los Angeles. Their guide from the Hezbe Islami group said that both of them were killed during a raid by Soviet attack helicopters. Most observers agree with this version, but some believe that the cameramen were killed during a clash between Hezbe Islami units and one of the rival factions.

The leaders of the Afghan emigration in Pakistan have recently been increasingly making trips to various Western countries to meet with their official representatives in order to extract new allocations and loans for the maintenance of refugees, the formation and creation of new combat units from them. In addition, these Islamic businessmen are increasingly involved in matters of personal commerce: they meet with the presidents of Western companies, through which they then carry out their personal, including illegal, business, from which Afghan refugees suffer. Calculations show that approximately one sixth of the financial and material assistance sent to them reaches refugees.

"Opposition leaders are unpopular among refugees," one Western diplomat in Islamabad told Newsweek's Rom Moro. “There is growing dissatisfaction among the refugees in the camps that opposition leaders are only enriching themselves by waging war from the comfort of Peshawar, far from the fighting and the refugee shacks.”

“...Commanders on the ground, the people directly fighting the Afghan government, resent the Peshawar-based resistance leaders for being corrupt opportunists who took political advantage of the war without even taking part in it.”

Afghan opposition forces in Iran

Afghan opposition Islamic organizations also operated in Iran. Their formation on the territory of Iran began in April 1979. The leadership of these organizations was selected from more or less authoritative Afghans who lived in Iran or fled there after the PDPA came to power. Ordinary members of the armed units were also recruited from Afghans who had previously worked in Iran (until April 1978, up to 600 thousand Afghans were constantly working in Iran). Since January 1980, the human resources base for opposition organizations has continually expanded to include refugees.

Afghan opposition parties in Iran were created quickly, in a short time. Disagreements also immediately arose between their leaders based on the desire to gain the patronage of one or another Shiite figure and receive more financial assistance, weapons and people.

The Shiite leadership of Iran has always considered Afghan organizations as a military-political force with the help of which it would be possible to destabilize the situation in the DRA, weaken the people's democratic system, contribute to its overthrow and, in the future, create the “Islamic Republic of Afghanistan” under the auspices of Imam Khomeini or his successor.

Organizationally, Soyuz-8 took shape in December 1987 with the direct participation of the ruling clergy of Iran. The newly formed association received the official name: “Coalition Council of the Islamic Revolution of Afghanistan.” Soyuz-8 included:

Victory (“Nasr”).

Party of Allah (“Hezbe Allah”).

Afghanistan's Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC).

United Front of the Islamic Revolution (UFIR).

Islamic Movement of Afghanistan (IMA).

Council of Islamic Harmony (SIS).

Islamic Revolution Movement (MIR).

Organization of Fighters for Islam of Afghanistan (OBI).

The main goal of creating “Union-8” was to unite the Afghan Shiite opposition under Iranian leadership to expand the scale of the anti-Afghan political and armed struggle, and to prevent the spread of the monopoly influence of the pro-Pakistan “Alliance-7” on the development of the situation in and around the Republic of Armenia. The ultimate political activity of Soyuz-8 was the transformation of Afghanistan into an “Islamic republic” similar to Iran.

In the Soyuz-8 program, Khomeini was declared the highest religious leader of the Afghan Shiites. It was announced that there would be a complete severance of ties with the United States, its allies, as well as with Arab regimes that deny the leading role of the Iranian clergy in the Islamic world. Iran was singled out as the only reliable guarantor of the protection of the vital interests of the Afghan Shiites. It rejected the expediency of the proposals of the RA leadership regarding the implementation of the policy of national reconciliation, including the formation of a coalition government. At the same time, Afghan-Pakistani negotiations in Geneva were declared illegal and unacceptable for Shiite organizations. The most staunch adherents of the ideas of exporting the “Islamic revolution” were the organizations of the Party of Allah, Victory, and the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps of Afghanistan.

Party of Allah (“Hazbe Allah”) - created by the Iranian leadership in 1982 in order to consolidate the counter-revolutionary forces of the rebels and export the “Islamic revolution” to Afghanistan. The leader is Qari Ahmad Yakdaste (“one-armed Qari”), a Shiite mullah who claims to be the “spiritual leader of the Shiites of Afghanistan.” Membership in this party requires the obligatory practice of Shiite Islam. The armed formations of Hezbe Allah are particularly cruel towards supporters of the ruling regime. It is most active in the western and southern provinces of the Republic of Armenia (Herat, Farah, Nimruz and Kandahar). The headquarters is located in Mashhad, the party has branches in Tehran, Nishapur, Zabol. The number of combat detachments is about 4 thousand people.

The Victory Party (Nasr) is a pro-Iranian Shia organization formed in 1980. The leaders are Sheikh Abdul Ali Mazari and Sheikh Shafaq. Both are in Iran and enjoy the support of the second person in the state, Ayatollah Montazeri. Combat detachments, numbering up to 4 thousand people, operate in the central provinces of the Republic of Armenia, in the Hazarajat region (Bamiyan, Ghazni, Wardak, Uruzgan, Baghlan, Samangan, Balkh, Parvan and Gur). The overall military leader is Mohammad Hussein Sadiqi. Nasr groups and detachments were distinguished by good military training and were fairly well equipped with weapons and ammunition. Recently, there has been a noticeable increase in China's influence on the leadership of the organization. A characteristic feature of the organization’s activities is the constant confrontation with rival groups, and especially those that are oriented towards Pakistan. Enjoys broad military and financial support from Iran, China, and the United States. The headquarters is located in Qom.

The Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps of Afghanistan (IRGC) is a pro-Iranian organization under the control of the Iranian IRGC. Maoist concepts are quite widespread among the group’s members, and therefore it enjoys the support of China. There are Chinese instructors in the squads and groups. Coordinates its activities with the Pobeda group. The areas where gangs are concentrated are the provinces of Gur and Bamiyan. The leader of the organization is Akbari. The number of combat detachments is up to 1.5 thousand people. The headquarters is located in Qom. The United Front of the Islamic Revolution (UFIR) includes 4 Shiite counter-revolutionary organizations (Young Clergy of Afghanistan, Islamic Society of the Towhid School, Fighters of the Islamic Society, Movement of the Dispossessed). He advocates the recognition of Khomeini as the leader of the world Islamic movement and the proclamation of Afghanistan as an “Islamic republic” like Iran. Headquarters in Qom. The number of combat detachments is about 2.5 thousand people. It has the greatest influence in the provinces of Balkh, Wardak, and Uruzgan.

The Islamic Movement of Afghanistan (IMA) is one of the largest Shiite counter-revolutionary groups. Works closely with the Hazara underground in the cities of Ghazni, Kandahar, Herat, Kabul. There are facts of coordination of activities with the pro-Pakistan organizations IOA and IPA. The group enjoys limited trust among the Iranian clergy. Detachments and groups operate in the provinces of Wardak, Bamiyan, Balkh, Helmand, and Nimruz. Leader - Mohammed Assef Mohseni (Kandahari). The headquarters is located in Mashhad, with representative offices in Qom, Mashhad, Shiraz, Zabol, Tayabad, and also in Quetta (Pakistan). The number of combat detachments is more than 3 thousand people. As a result of contradictions between the leaders of this party in 1981, it split into two wings: the Kandahari Islamic Movement and the Council of Islamic Accord.

The Council of Islamic Accord (CIC) is a nationalist Shia counter-revolutionary organization of the Hazaras. The leader is Ali Beheshti, the military leader is Said Jagran. The group has limited trust in Iran because Beheshti maintains ties to the Iraqi clergy. The political platform of the organization contains a demand for the withdrawal of Soviet troops from the territory of Afghanistan and the provision of autonomy to Hazarajat.

Detachments and groups, numbering more than 6 thousand people, are concentrated in the provinces of Ghazni and Bamiyan. Currently, they are not conducting active hostilities, but are mainly busy fighting with gangs of other groups for spheres of influence. The leaders of the organization are inclined to the need to negotiate with government officials.

The Islamic Revolution Movement (MRM) is a breakaway faction from the pro-Pakistan DIRA party. The leader is Nasrullah Mansour. The organization enjoys the confidence of the Iranian leadership. They intend to use it to expand Iran's influence on Afghan counter-revolutionary groups based in Pakistan. The number of combat detachments is about 800 people. Nasrullah coordinates his activities with the general leader of the IOA in the province of Herat, Turan Ismail.

The Organization of Fighters for Islam of Afghanistan (OBI) is a Shiite counter-revolutionary group of Hazaras. The leader is Mosbakhzadeh. The leadership of OBI maintains close ties with the Pobeda organization. For Iran, the presence of Afghans on its territory is an additional source of manpower. He needs disadvantaged people so that, at the cost of their misfortunes and suffering, he can implement Imam Khomeini’s plans to export the Islamic revolution to other countries.

The peculiarities of the Afghan insurgent movement (leadership was exercised from headquarters abroad, the leaders of the groups were in Pakistan and Iran, and the main armed struggle took place on the territory of Afghanistan) led to the emergence of a special category of military leaders from among the commanders of large armed formations within the country.

The most famous of them were: Ahmad Shah Masud (leader of the IOA forces in Panjshir), Turan Ismail (leader of the IOA forces in the province of Herat), Jalaluddin Hakani (leader of the IKH forces in the provinces of Paktia and Paktika), Said Mansur, Mohammad Bashir, Farid (all IPA), Said Ali Beheshti, Said Mohammad Hasan (Said Jagran), Mohammad Assef Mohseni-Kandahari (all SIS), Abdul Basir (major IOA leader in Badakhshan province), Khirodmand (IPA), Arienpur (IOI), “Dr.” Ismail (IPA), Sufi Payanda (IPA), Nikmamad (DIRA), Abdurahman (DIRA), Gulyammamad (ISOA), Mulla Nasim (DIRA), Zabibulo (IPA), Mulla Malang, Gafar (DIRA), Mahmud (IPA), Akbarali (IPA), Fateh (IPA) and others. These leaders, directly leading the armed struggle against the PDPA regime, acquired significant weight and influence both among the rebels and among the country's population and were even more popular than foreign leaders of opposition parties. I will give only small characteristics of some of them.

Food for thought

From the dossier on the field commanders of the internal armed opposition.

Turan Ismail son of Mohammad Aslam (Ismail Khan) was born in 1947 in the village of Nasrabad, Shindand district, Herat province. Tajik by nationality. He graduated from the Harbi Puhantong Military School. Until 1979, with the rank of captain (Turan), he commanded a battalion of the 17th Infantry Division. After the Herat rebellion (March 1979), he deserted and led the IOA armed formation in the vicinity of Herat.

Married. The family lives in Tayabad (Iran). Secretive and cautious, he often changes the location of his headquarters. Extremely cruel. Personally deals with prisoners. He is the general leader of the armed forces of the IOA in the province of Herat and is considered the second leader of the rebels in Afghanistan after Ahmad Shah. About 2 thousand rebels operate under his leadership. He enjoys authority among the local population, as he prohibits robberies.

Molawi Jalaluddin Khakani born in 1935 in the Jadran tribe, Mizi clan. He graduated from a religious school (madrassa) in Pakistan. He received a clergy title and upon returning to Afghanistan opened a madrasah in the village of Farah, Paktia province. During the reigns of Zahir Shah and M. Daoud, he took an active part in the anti-government activities of the Muslim Brotherhood organization in the province of Paktia.

After April 1978, he was one of the first in Paktia to start fighting against the PDPA. At first, he actively supported the political course of the IPA and was considered a representative of G. Hekmatyar in Paktia. Then he joined the IPH. Subsequently, he declared himself independent from other counter-revolutionary organizations and the military leader of the Jadran tribe. With full mobilization, the Jadran tribe is capable of fielding up to 10 thousand armed fighters. Jalaluddin regularly visits Saudi Arabia, where he directly negotiates with representatives of the government of this country. Jalaluddin receives weapons and ammunition for the tribe, as well as financial assistance, personally, bypassing the IKH headquarters in Peshawar.

By nature he is a cruel and uncompromising person. We are irreconcilable with the Najibullah regime in Afghanistan. It is waging an armed struggle under the slogan of establishing an “Islamic republic” on the orthodox principles of Islam. Jalaluddin's armed forces number up to 3 thousand people, located mainly in the area inhabited by the Jadran tribe in the provinces of Paktika and Paktia.

Said Mansur son of Said Marteza (pseudonym Said Pancho) was born in the province of Parvan in 1955. His nationality is Tajik. He graduated from 12 classes of the lyceum, was a small trader for some time, then entered Kabul University, but completed only two courses. He joined the Islamic Party of Afghanistan in his first year at university. In 1978, G. Hekmatyar was appointed leader of the IPA rebels in Baghlan province. The main area of ​​operation of his gangs is adjacent to the Doshi-Salang highway section.

Shows exceptional cruelty to people he suspects of loyalty to the ruling regime. Smart, cunning and resourceful. He repeatedly flirted with party and government bodies, pretending that he wanted to start negotiations on cooperation. However, he used the gained time to strengthen gangs and strengthen his authority among the leaders of detachments and groups.

He is careful, constantly changing his places of stay, fearing attacks from opponents. Practices disseminating misinformation through his agents regarding his movements. Has personal security of 20 people. The main base areas are located in the Valyan and Bajga gorges (Baghlan province, Khinzhan parish). Under his leadership, up to 1,500 armed rebels are actively operating.

Mohammad Bashir Zergul's son was born in 1951 in Baghlan province. Pashtun by nationality.

Married. The family lives in the village of Davlyazan (outskirts of Baghlan). Parents died in 1984. Previously, he worked as an official in the agriculture department in Baghlan province. Currently he is a major IPA bandit leader in Baghlan. The number of rebels operating under his leadership is about 500 people. Characterized by caution and cruelty. Personally participates in executions. Fanatically devoted to the leader of the IPA G. Hekmatyar.

The actions of his gangs are criminal in nature, the rebels rob and terrorize local residents. Ustad Farid was born in 1949. Tajik by nationality. He graduated from Kabul University, worked as a lyceum teacher, then as a school director. While still studying at the university, he became close to Hekmatyar and was a member of the Muslim Youth organization. By nature he is secretive and cunning. He is an implacable enemy of the PDPA and the Kabul authorities. Maintains contact with Hekmatyar and follows only his personal instructions. He is the general leader of the IPA gangs in the province of Kapisa, whose total number is about 1,500 people.

Abdul Khalid Basir the son of Moulavi Mamad Aslam was born in 1945 in the city of Fayzabad (Badakhshan province) in the family of a clergyman. Tajik by nationality. In 1965 he graduated from the Pamir Lyceum in Fayzabad. During the reign of M. Dauda he worked as a teacher in Faizabad and in the Korano-Munjan volost. After April 1978, he initiated the armed struggle in the province of Badakhshan. Basir personally participates in hostilities both against government and Soviet troops, and against gangs of other parties. He strives to expand his zone of influence and get to the lapis lazuli deposits in Jarm district (in this he competes even with Ahmad Shah). During the fighting, he showed himself to be an experienced leader, a cruel and treacherous opponent. His closest circle includes only relatives. Basir's authority rests on the feeling of fear even among his loved ones.

In its activities it relies on the support of local residents of villages located northeast of Fayzabad. The number of his armed detachments is about a thousand people, Basir pays great attention to the engineering equipment of the base sites in the gorges, the arrangement of firing positions, etc. Said Ali Beheshti was born in 1930 in the village of Chejchi, Varas district, Bamyan province, in the family of a clergyman. His nationality is Hazara, Shia Muslim. He graduated from a madrasah in Bamiyan, then continued his studies in Najaf (Iraq) under the guidance of Ayatollah Khoya. Upon returning from Iraq, he took up active religious activities among the Hazaras and in a short period of time, with the financial support of the major feudal lord Hazarajat, Vakil Sarwar Khan became one of the famous Shiite religious figures.

After the Saur Revolution, he openly took an anti-government position. In August 1978, the government of the so-called “Islamic Republic of the Hazara Shiites” was formed in the province of Bamiyan. The highest authority of this republic was declared to be the “central Islamic council” headed by Sheikh Said Ali Beheshti. In 1982, the “central council” ceased to exist, and S. A. Beheshti became the head of the Council of Islamic Accord (SIS) group.

Beheshti's political platform includes demands for the withdrawal of Soviet troops from Afghanistan, the creation of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan and the granting of autonomy to the Hazarajat. At the same time, he is more of a theorist, a gentle person and, in principle, does not take a hard line on the need to wage an armed struggle against state power. He has repeatedly spoken out for dialogue with the government in order to end the armed struggle in Hazarajat. But due to his indecisiveness, he puts forward the condition that other SIS leaders also participate in the negotiations. The number of armed formations is more than a thousand people.

Said Mohammed Hassan the son of Said Mubin (better known by the name Said Jagran) was born in 1925 in the village of Sporephawat, Nuwar district, Ghazni province, into the family of a middle feudal lord. Hazara by nationality. S. Jagran studied at a military lyceum for seven years, graduated from the Kharbi Pukhantun military school in Kabul, and then from the Higher Military Artillery School in the USSR. Last place of service - 14th Infantry Division in Ghazni, military rank of lieutenant colonel. Deserted during the reign of X. Amin in 1979. In 1980–1981. conducted active and relatively successful military operations against the DRA Armed Forces. In 1982, S. Jagran expressed a desire to negotiate with the government to end the armed struggle. However, as a result of provocative actions on the part of the DRA government (during the period of preliminary contacts, bomb attacks were carried out in the areas of its deployment by the DRA Air Force), S. Jagran refused this. Subsequently, he stopped active hostilities against the people's government, but did not disband the armed formations, but is fighting against the Nasr (Victory) and IRGC groups, which are trying to take a dominant position in the provinces of Ghazni, Bardak, Bamiyan, Gur and the northern part of Uruzgan. S. Jagran enjoys great influence among the Hazaras as a political and military leader. Its armed units number up to 6 thousand people.

Mohammed Assef Mohseni(Kandahari) was born in Kandahar in 1925. Hazara by nationality. Received theological education in Najaf. Close to Ayatollah Khomeini. In 1981, at the World Islamic Conference in Pakistan, he was declared the spiritual leader (pir) of the Shiites in Afghanistan. He adheres to a strong pro-Iranian orientation, at one time he had close contact with the former President of Iran A. Banisadr and now maintains close ties with the Iranian clergy, including with prominent Iranian religious figures Shariatmadari, Qumi, Shirazi. Works closely with the leaders of Hezbe Allah (Party of Allah).

He firmly stands on the position of the need to wage an armed struggle against the government of the republic, its overthrow, the withdrawal of Soviet troops and the establishment in Afghanistan of an “Islamic republic” regime modeled on Iran. Kandahari and Beheshti are waging a hidden struggle for sole leadership in the SIS organization (Beheshti is a follower of Ayatollah Khoya, and Kandahari is an ardent supporter of Ayatollah Khomeini). Of course, there were other field commanders, many of them came to the forefront after the withdrawal of Soviet troops. In addition to the opposition parties operating in Afghanistan, Pakistan and Iran, many different organizations were based in other countries and fought against the PDPA.

From the first days of the establishment of the new regime in Afghanistan, the governments of a number of Western and Arab countries made significant efforts to politically neutralize the PDPA that came to power. In addition to military and economic sanctions against the Republic of Armenia, the forces of international reaction began to legalize Muslim parties and organizations of the Afghan opposition, which made it possible to expand the scope of comprehensive assistance to the rebels on the completely official basis of “support for Afghan refugees.” The emergence of a significant number of unions, bureaus and other organizations of the “public concerned about the situation of the Afghan people” occurred in the 80s, when the US leadership intensified anti-Soviet propaganda in order to increase allocations for the development of the military-industrial complex.

The main tasks of such “societies”, officially existing on “voluntary donations”, were the transportation to Pakistan and distribution of arms, ammunition, medicines, and material and technical means among the detachments and groups of the Afghan opposition; conducting active propaganda work among Afghan refugees; recruiting new members of counter-revolutionary organizations. According to available data, the Afghan opposition had an extensive network of organizations in the United States, Western Europe and other countries.

Reference

In the United States, 8 “societies” of opposition Muslim parties in Afghanistan were officially registered, located mainly in New York. Members of the organizations, using the help of the American administration, carried out active recruitment work among Afghan refugees and provided financial and military assistance to the rebels.

The Association for Assistance to Afghan Refugees was created in 1979. The main goal of the organization is to provide comprehensive assistance to the Afghan opposition. With the assistance of the association, the Afghan Relief Fund was created in New York, whose board included millionaire John Train, several former American diplomats in Kabul, the director of the Peace Corps office in Afghanistan, the head of the Center for Research on Afghanistan (Nebraska), as well as Senators D. Javits, K. Pell and a number of other individuals widely known for their reactionary political views and connections with the intelligence services.

"National Liberation Front of Afghanistan" led by Zia Naseri and the Zakria brothers. Members of the front conduct propaganda and recruitment work among Afghans living in America, and also collect donations for the needs of the rebels.

The “Solidarity Council of Afghan Liberation Organizations of the USA” was created in May 1980. The main task of the council is to coordinate the actions of Afghan counter-revolutionary organizations in various countries of the world and provide military assistance to Afghan rebels. The council maintains close ties with Mojaddadi and Gilani and publishes the monthly magazine Voice of Afghanistan.

The Unity Council was created in June 1980 in Omaha to provide financial and political support to the Afghan rebels. The leader of the group is one of the representatives of the Mojaddadi family. In addition, the country has the Afghan Society of California, American Aid to the Afghans, the Afghan Rescue Committee, the Afghan Society of America, the Intelligentsia Committee Responsible for Afghanistan, etc.

In France. Organizations located in Paris:

"Movement in support of the resistance of the Afghan people." Created in July 1980 by the Frenchman M. Barry. The headquarters is located in Paris, branches are in Lyon, Nantes, Bordeaux. In October 1981, within the framework of the movement, the International Bureau for Afghanistan was formed, which plans to transfer separate groups of cultural figures to the Republic of Armenia through Pakistan in order to attract the attention of the world community to the so-called “Afghan issue”. In 1981, medical workers from the organization “International Medical Aid” (Paris, 100 rue Babillot) were already operating as part of the gangs.

"Paris Committee on Human Rights". One of the areas of his activity is the deployment of a network of underground radio stations in Afghanistan to conduct anti-Soviet and anti-government propaganda. Specific activities in this direction are carried out by the department of the Radio Free Kabul committee (75014, Paris, rue Chateau, 152).

"Afghan-French Friendship Society", "Doctors Without Borders", "Raid Association". The main goal of the societies is to provide assistance to the Afghan opposition.

The listed organizations maintain ties with the rebels through the following Afghan counter-revolutionary groups located in France:

The “Homayoun Shah Assef Group” is associated with the NIFA group, as well as Afghan pro-monarchist organizations in Italy. He is actively working to raise funds to help the rebels. The group size is several dozen people.

The Zakria Brothers Group is associated with the NFSA group. Mainly conducts propaganda work. Number of people - 30 people.

The “Homayoun Tandara Group” is associated with the IPA group. Conducts propaganda work among Afghan students in France.

The “Group of Progressive Students” was formed in 1980 and is mainly engaged in propaganda work among students.

In West Germany, members of 7 legal “representatives” of the Afghan resistance forces actively cooperate with the Bundeswehr. In addition to propaganda tasks, functionaries of these organizations, located in Bonn and Frankfurt am Main, are engaged in intermediary operations in the arms trade.

The population of the Afghan colony on the territory of Germany is about 15 thousand people.

“Pashtun and Baloch Committee” (6000, Frankfurt am Main, Marburger 3), “Society of Afghan Leaders in Frankfurt”, Committee of Solidarity with the Afghan People (Post Office 244, 2000, Hamburg 6), “Afghan Cultural center" (Bonn), Federation of Afghan Students Abroad (mail box 210920, 75, Karlsruhe, 21), "Fund for Assistance to Afghan Refugees" was created in early 1981. The fund was headed by Bundestag deputy Shumard. The main goal is to provide comprehensive assistance to the Afghan rebels.

In addition, there are representations of the following Afghan counter-revolutionary organizations:

The Islamic Party of Afghanistan is represented by Kokojan Niazi (PO Box 4425, 620 Wiesbaden).

The Social Democratic Party of Afghanistan is represented by Enayat Isakzai (Timmelberg 21-a, 2300 Kiel, telephone 0431/331584).

The Organization for the Liberation of the People of Afghanistan is represented by Abdul Qayum Rahber.

In Italy, the Afghan counter-revolution is represented by the “Pro-monarchist group” (Rome), which is trying to unite and lead the opposition forces in the fight against state power.

The “pro-monarchy group” unites former prominent political and military figures who held major government posts under the royal regime. One of the leaders of the group is former Afghan army colonel Abdul Wali. The group provides some assistance to the Afghan rebels and tries to unite and lead the entire Afghan counter-revolutionary movement.

The International Relief Committee is an Italian neo-fascist organization associated with Afghan insurgents in Pakistan. In Karachi there is a permanent representative of the committee, Mullah Rigia de Souza, through whom the rebels receive money and weapons.

"Committee of Solidarity with the Afghan Mujahideen." The committee is headed by members of the Italian parliament Gaetano Arfe, Carlo Ripa de Milan and the Czech dissident J. Peliean. The main goal of the committee is to provide comprehensive assistance to the Afghan rebels.

In Great Britain, the “Movement for Solidarity, Reconciliation and Resistance in Afghanistan” and the “Afghanistan Support Committee” were created in 1980.

In 1985, a representative office of Alliance-7 was opened in Europe.

In Egypt, the “Committee of Solidarity with the People of Afghanistan” was organized in April 1981. The committee is headed by S. Nofal, Secretary of the Arab and Muslim League. The committee's goal is to provide comprehensive assistance to the Afghan insurgents.

The “Afghan Bureau” unites representatives of various Afghan counter-revolutionary groups located in Egypt. The main task of the bureau is to organize financial, military and other assistance to the Afghan rebels.

There are about 20 thousand Afghan refugees in Turkey. They live mainly in camps located in the vicinity of Ankara, Istanbul and some cities in Eastern Anatolia.

The Afghan Refugee Fund was created mainly through donations coming from Saudi Arabia. The money collected is sent to Afghan counter-revolutionary organizations in Pakistan.

In Kuwait, the “Mahboob Sharif group” seeks to organize a regional center to direct all the activities of the Afghan reaction in the countries of the Persian Gulf. According to estimates, there are up to 10 thousand Afghans here.

In India, the number of Afghan refugees is 30 thousand people, of which 4 thousand are members of the following counter-revolutionary organizations.

The Social Democratic Party of Afghanistan is a bourgeois-nationalist organization based on Pashtuns. Leader - Amin Wakman. The headquarters is located in New Delhi.

“Branch of the international organization “Muslim Brotherhood”. Shows the greatest activity in counter-revolutionary propaganda and recruitment of refugees to join gangs on the territory of the Republic of Armenia. The groups' activities are supported by former Indian Foreign Minister Vajpayee.

“Shoale Javid” is a left-wing extremist group closely associated with the Chinese intelligence services and pro-Maoist groups in the Republic of Armenia. Representatives of the group conduct propaganda and recruitment work among Afghan refugees.

In other countries there are also organizations of the “struggling Afghan people”. Having significant financial resources and based in the capitals, the “committees” focus their activities on military assistance to the rebels...

Sources of information: MGB (DRA) RA, RU General Staff of the Armed Forces of RA,

headquarters of the 40th Army, KGB of the USSR,

GRU General Staff of the EU USSR,

Council of Ministers, 1987

In addition to armed groups controlled by opposition parties, armed gangs of feudal lords and drug dealers operated in Afghanistan. Such groups have existed from time immemorial. With their help, the feudal lords resolved all controversial issues (including robbery), and drug dealers transported raw opium purchased from Afghan peasants to Pakistan and Iran.

Methods and forms of rebel action

The main forms of subversive activities of the rebellious movement were armed struggle, sabotage and terrorist actions, sabotage and various events of an ideological nature. Particular importance was attached to propaganda activities, including using the platforms of the UN, OIC and other organizations, to attract the attention of the world community to the Afghan issue.

So, the leaders of the Afghan opposition initially set as their goal the overthrow of the PDPA regime by force and the creation of a theocratic state in the country. At the same time, the armed struggle has been given priority throughout the years. During 1980, the insurgency spread across 90% of Afghanistan. The main role in this was played by the patriotic factor, which united the entire population of the DRA to fight against foreign occupiers, against the “godless” Soviets. There were so many people willing to fight the invaders that at first it was impossible to arm them. Such a rise in the rebellious movement was never observed subsequently. At first (beginning of 1980), the opposition tried to resist the Soviet troops with fairly large forces, but after a few months, due to large losses in people, they switched mainly to actions in small groups, that is, they began to use guerrilla tactics.

At the same time, in the provinces of Kunar, Nangarhar, Paktia, Paktika, bordering with Pakistan, the Khost district and the Kandahar region, there was a concentration and use of large groups by the opposition (up to 4-6 thousand during all nine years of the war). Here the rebels, as a rule, did not have to fear encirclement and complete defeat, since in the event of such a threat they could easily leave for Pakistan. In the central, northern and western regions, the Mujahideen constantly operated in small groups, taking refuge, if necessary, among the civilian population or in highlands inaccessible to heavy equipment. The armed struggle itself was conventionally divided into three stages.

The first is organizational, with insignificant combat activity, holding individual points and areas, conducting extensive propaganda events among the population and attracting them to their side.

The second is an increase in the activity of military operations through acts of sabotage and terrorism, raids on garrison posts of government troops, attacks on convoys, the main goal is the seizure of weapons, ammunition and various material and technical means. The third is the complete and widespread destruction of the enemy.

The main principles of combat operations were: to avoid direct clashes with superior forces of regular troops; do not turn combat operations into positional warfare, refuse to hold occupied areas for a long time; attack suddenly, widely use the methods of the Basmachi movement, as well as terror and indoctrination of the personnel of the Afghan army and the population.

The general leadership of the rebel movement in Afghanistan and other countries was carried out by the headquarters of opposition organizations located in Pakistan and Iran. As a rule, they included several committees (departments): military, intelligence and counterintelligence, information, propaganda, administrative, economic, judicial, financial, medical, etc. For more flexible and prompt management of rebel actions in the border areas of Afghanistan, in In the cities of Pakistan (Quetta, Parachinar, Teri-Mangal, Miramshah, etc.) and Iran (Mashhad, Zabol, etc.), most opposition parties created their own representative offices, which were branches of their main headquarters. The main tasks solved by the headquarters and their representative offices included: control over the actions of armed formations on the territory of Afghanistan and the situation in their area of ​​​​responsibility; planning and carrying out armed actions; preparation and transportation of caravans with weapons, ammunition and logistics equipment (MTO) on the territory of the DRA; financing of armed groups; creation of bases, construction of fortifications, warehouses for various purposes; organization of interaction between formations of different party affiliations, etc.

Direct management of the activities of the opposition forces in Afghanistan was carried out by Islamic committees created in provinces, districts, volosts, areas under the control of the rebels, as well as the headquarters of large formations, uniting several detachments and called “fronts”. The functions of the Islamic committees and headquarters of the “fronts” as local government bodies included the leadership of armed detachments and coordination of their actions, the implementation of military and administrative control in areas of responsibility, the conduct of armed actions, as well as the organization of anti-government propaganda, the replenishment of rebel groups from the local population with subsequent sending them to training centers, tax collection, etc.

In order to organize a more harmonious system for managing the combat operations of the armed detachments that are part of the “fronts”, as well as to centralize logistics, in 1985 the leadership of the Afghan opposition decided to intensify activities to create paramilitary formations such as regiments on their basis. According to opposition leaders, the formation of such regiments streamlined the management of the rebels' actions and strengthened their combat power.

During the period of hostilities, military committees at headquarters supervised formations from forward command posts created in the areas of Pakistan bordering Afghanistan, as a rule, in the areas where regiments were located. They also organized the transfer of combat groups, weapons and ammunition, and carried out interaction.

The leadership of the Islamic committees and regiments of the opposition headquarters was carried out through their representatives, who on the spot solved the problems that arose among the rebels and specified their tasks in conducting combat operations.

In order to increase management flexibility, efficiency and exchange of information, and quickly communicate instructions to executors, technical means of communication were used. At the highest level (communication of headquarters with Islamic committees and the command of “fronts” and regiments) - radio communication in shortwave (HF), at the lowest level (communication of Islamic committees with “fronts” and regiments, as well as command of “fronts” and regiments with subordinate units) - in the ultrashort wave (VHF) ranges.

Infrastructure of resistance

The opposition leadership paid special attention to the creation of infrastructure to ensure the deployment and functioning of the rebel movement: base areas, bases, transit bases and strongholds.

A. The base areas were large areas in inaccessible mountain gorges, remote from communications and garrisons of Soviet and Afghan troops. The main elements of such areas were: headquarters (Islamic committee), training center, warehouses for various purposes, repair shops, hospital, residential buildings, shelters and shelters. Permanent garrisons were located here for their maintenance, security and defense. The base areas were well equipped in terms of engineering, had a developed network of defensive structures and barriers, and were covered by air defense systems.

The main base areas included: Agarsay (42 km south of Mazar-i-Sharif, IPA), Bayramshah (36 km south-west of Mazar-i-Sharif, DIRA), Shorcha (57 km south of Mazar-i-Sharif, NIFA), Hukumati-Dukhanai -Gori (22 km southwest of Puli-Khumri, IPH), Upper Panjshir (26 km north-east of Rukha, IOAP), Gurbategar (38 km west of Baraki, IPA and DIRA), Azrau (58 km south- eastern Kabul, IPA and ISOA), Iskapol (16 km west of Ghazni, DIRA), Zarkashan (70 km west of Ghazni, IPA, IPA and DIRA), Islamdara (48 km north - west Kandahar), Warsaj (province Badakhshan, IOA), Tagankhok (Herat province, IOA).

B. The bases were small facilities designed to accommodate an armed formation of one party affiliation and store its weapons and property.

The main rebel bases in Afghanistan: Almar, Kara-Darai-Zang, Shah, Darayi-Band, Darzab, Karamkul, Amrah, Tonj, Jarob, Bedak, Kashka, Dekhi, Zingird, Sher-Sher, Mushkhana, Buston, Yashul, Pumbuki -Bala, Kuhi-Sufi, Jigdalai, Melava, Kambakka, Shpalkai, Srana, Kunsaf, Surkhagan, Apushela, Chinartu, Gulinai, Mulla-Bostankalai, etc.

IN. Transshipment bases and points were (as their name suggests) intermediate supply bodies for the opposition. They were kept on caravan routes near the borders with Pakistan and Iran (and at points deep in the DRA territory). It was on them that weapons, ammunition, and materiel were reloaded from transports that came from Pakistan and Iran to the transport of opposition groups operating in Afghanistan itself. Here, if necessary, it was possible to store weapons and ammunition for a long time.

Transshipment bases: Marulgad, Rabati-Jali, Shinarai, Kokari-Shushari, Javara, Lmarhauza, Angurkot, Khojamulk, Mianpushta, Anandara, Shagali, Tangiseidan. Large transshipment bases (for example, Marulgad, Shinarai, Jawara, Rabati-Jali, etc.) were also base areas.

It is interesting to note that some bases (for example, Jawara) were created over many years, and construction began even before the PDPA came to power, to fight the Daoud regime. They were a complex of above-ground and underground (tunnel-type with a protective thickness of 15–20 m) structures. They housed everything necessary for life, everyday life and combat activities: a command post with a communications center, training and propaganda centers, several barracks, many warehouses for weapons, ammunition and materiel, auto repair and weapons workshops, a cartridge plant (for the assembly of BUR cartridges) , hospital, prison. There were administrative buildings and residential buildings to accommodate dignitaries and foreign representatives. The base had autonomous electricity and water supply.

The approaches to the base were covered by three lines of strong points equipped with fire installations and shelters at dominant heights. The entire area had exceptionally strong air defense - a large number of MANPADS, DShK, ZGU. Most of the bases appeared in 1983 and later. Why? Until the winter of this year, opposition formations conducted active military operations in the spring, summer and fall. With the onset of cold weather, they went to Pakistan and Iran, where they rested, were replenished with people and weapons, and underwent combat training under the guidance of foreign instructors.

With the onset of warm weather, they returned to Afghanistan again. In the winter of 1983, for the first time in the years of struggle, many opposition groups did not go on vacation - they were strictly forbidden to do so. The creation of base areas and bases directly in the DRA began (the base in Herat province, for example, was built in 1984–1985 in accordance with a plan developed by West German and Iranian military engineers).

G. Training centers. With the assistance of the Pakistani and Iranian authorities, the Afghan opposition created and operated a fairly coherent system of military training for the rebels, which was carried out in training centers located in Pakistan and Iran, as well as in training centers in the locations of base areas and large bases on the territory of the DRA. This allowed it to have a trained reserve to replace losses incurred during hostilities and maintain the number of active armed formations at a level exceeding 60 thousand people.

In total, there were 212 specialized centers and training points (178 in Pakistan and 34 in Iran), allowing for the training of over 75 thousand people. in year. Main rebel training centers:

in Pakistan: Chitral (IOA), Mirkhani (IPA), Karmarsar (united), Mamadgart (IOA), Mansehra (IOA), Tangi (IPA), Lowaramena (IPA, ISOA), Warsak (IPA, NIFA, NFSA), Ismailki (NIFA, NFSA), Kameni-Balu (IPA), Sadr (IPA), Tatarai (IPA), Uch-Nakhr (IPA), Umar-Miyana (IPA), Hapah (united), Shakai (united), Bartorbandi (IPA , IOA), Gwakai (IPA), Sadda (DIRA, IPA), Thal (NFSA, IOA), Tindoh (IPA), Shashi (united), Miramshah (united), Mir Ali (IPA, IOA), Mardargar, Yarukarez and etc.

in Iran: Mashhad (Party of Allah), Tehran (united), Birjand (united), Zabol (Party of Allah), Shiraz, Zahedan, Hatay, etc.

Most training centers provided general military training. It included studying the equipment of small arms and practical shooting, mastering the basics of combat tactics, practicing terrain orientation skills, and providing primary medical care. In addition, the training programs included religious and political indoctrination, a course of anti-government and anti-Soviet propaganda in Iran, a special propaganda faculty was created at the Qom Theological Center for the ideological indoctrination of students. Particular attention was paid to the training of terrorist saboteurs and leadership of armed formations. In a number of training centers, specialists in mine demolition were trained in the use of anti-aircraft machine guns (DShK, ZGU) and other types of weapons, and specialized centers were also created with separate training of specialists in the combat use of man-portable anti-aircraft missile systems (Mamadgart, Varsak, Sadda, Aravali and etc.) and missile launchers.

The rebels were trained by instructors from the Pakistani and Iranian armed forces, former Afghan army officers, as well as instructors from the United States, China, Egypt and Saudi Arabia. Special coordination centers have been established in both Pakistan and Iran to oversee training and education. In addition to control, these centers generalized the experience of combat and special operations in Afghanistan, developed recommendations for their conduct, drew up training programs, and also staffed training centers with teachers and instructors. The duration of training at the training centers ranged from two to three weeks to six months.

Most training centers were tent cities surrounded by barbed wire. The largest of them had capital administrative and barracks buildings. A strict access control regime and a uniform daily routine were established in the centers, and their security was organized.

An important role in the system of military training of the rebels was also played by training points and groups under large armed formations, where the rebels had the opportunity not only to master small arms, but also to study techniques and methods of combat use of rockets, methods of mining and mine clearance. Upon completion of their studies, the rebels were sent to armed forces in Afghanistan. They were usually seen off solemnly. I will give an excerpt from the speech of one of the leaders before sending the next group of rebels to the DRA:

“Dear Muslims! Before you enter into a holy war with the infidels, I would like to tell you what you should know about the holy war and what you should observe in this war.

Firstly, each of you, heading to the barricades of war, must remember that this is your duty to God. You are going to fight not for the sake of someone else’s pleasure, not because the current state forces you to serve at home, but so that you can unite with the fighters for the faith. You must be guided by the fact that this is your duty to God and you are going to fulfill this duty.

This is equivalent to your prayers. Every day you go to read a prayer, remembering that this is your duty to God. So your actions are also a duty to be in this war. And if you fail to fulfill this duty, you are responsible to God and will go to hell.

Secondly, none of you should pursue wealth. Do not leave your positions for property and weapons located in open areas. If it itself turns out to be under your feet, this is your luck, sent by God. If it is not there, then it should not attract you to follow it. Your first priority should remain serving Allah. You must remember that if you turn your face to wealth, it will run away from you. If you turn your back to it, it itself will follow you. This is the essence of nature and the law of life.

Thirdly, do not harbor greed for fame in your soul. If one of the fighters pursues glory, his fight is not considered a fight for God. Always be balanced, modest, and efficient. This is the law. God's law. God will exalt everyone who was submissive and modest in this world.

Fourthly, you must refrain from shedding the blood of a Muslim fighter for the faith. God commands that if two Muslims crossed their swords and intended to shed each other’s blood, then their place is hell. You've probably been told what the torments of hell are. May Allah save you from hell!

…One of my important pieces of advice to you is don’t torture civilians. Do not forget that you yourself rebelled against evil. You rebelled against the infidels, against injustice. If the people see evil and injustice from you, then to whom should they go? The people, the innocent ones, will remain between two fires.

I think that you should become exactly the people who should heal the wounds of a long-suffering people. Having heard about your arrival in their region, the people should rejoice, they should think that their saviors and liberators from evil forces have arrived.

...We have repeatedly told your commanders and now I am telling you - we allocate money to each group going to Afghanistan, and we say - do not take bread from innocent residents for free. Be sure to pay them for food, don’t offend people. If you are hungry, go to the residents, pay them and eat. If you hear that someone is sick, help him. If you hear that someone does not have funds, give him 100 Afghanis from our budget.

The common people already have nothing left. The Russians ate the meat, Taraki, Amin, and Babrak stole the bones. The people had only their skin left. I swear that some residents give you bread upon your arrival, but they have fear in their souls, because they will feed you, but they know that their children will remain hungry. If they don’t feed you, they are afraid that tomorrow they will be killed under any pretext.

I ask you to always keep this in mind. If you have no money, sell your things that we give you here, but under no circumstances take the things and bread of the common people. If we were unable to deliver money and food to you on time from here, I allow you to sell the weapons and ammunition issued to you here to my friend, but I ask you not to rob the people. Do not take anything from the people by force.

Remember that our common enemy - yours and the poor people's - has come to our country. Let us first eliminate our common enemy, and, God willing, we can build an Islamic republic in Afghanistan, then we will also deal with our internal enemies...

If any of you kills even one infidel, the gates to heaven will be open to you. You kill him not because he is your enemy, but because he is the enemy of God...

May Allah help you! Let's liberate Afghanistan from the infidels!”

Opposition detachments and groups were armed with small and heavy weapons, the weight characteristics of which made it possible to transport them with pack animals and carry them disassembled. Most of the weapons were Soviet-made. The main type of small arms were Kalashnikov assault rifles made in China and Egypt, as well as Soviet ones obtained through third countries or obtained in battle. One could also find American M16A1 rifles and machine guns made in West Germany, Israel, England and Sweden.

Chinese-made 12.7-mm heavy machine guns DShK, hand-held anti-tank grenade launchers (RPG-2, RPG-7, Swiss Falconet, German Lanze-2, American M72A2, French Sarpak, Israeli Picket) were widely used. , 75- and 82-mm Chinese, Pakistani and American recoilless rifles. The main weapon of fire was 60- and 82-mm mortars, which each armed group of rebels had. Since the beginning of 1984, Chinese launchers for firing rockets have appeared in large numbers in the arsenal of the Mujahideen. They began to be used against Soviet outposts and garrisons, as well as for shelling administrative centers under government control.

As air defense systems, large-caliber machine guns, anti-aircraft mountain installations (ZGU), small-caliber Oerlikon anti-aircraft guns were used, and since 1981, man-portable anti-aircraft missile systems (MANPADS) Strela-2 of Soviet, Chinese and Egyptian production, "Red Ai", "Jevelin", later the English "Blowpipe" and American "Stinger" appeared.

The rebels were armed with various types of mines, including anti-tank and anti-personnel mines, as well as landmines. Most of them were in the detachments operating near communications. These were Italian mines (TS-2, 5; TS-1, 6; TS-50 and SH-55), American (M-19, M-18A1, RSME-S and Claymore), Swedish M-102 and English MK-7, Czechoslovakian. The most widely used were mines in a plastic case, which were triggered after several clicks on the lid and were difficult to detect by mine detectors, as well as remote-controlled landmines and radio-controlled mines. Improvised explosive devices and surprise mines in the form of various household items were often used.

The control of detachments and groups was carried out using HF and VHF radio communications of Japanese, West German, Chinese and Soviet (R-105M, R-118BM, R-118BMZ) production. Early in the Afghan War, the United States created a system where Saudi Arabian funds were used to purchase Soviet-made weapons from Egypt, Israel and China and ship them to Pakistan. From there, weapons and ammunition intended for shipment to Afghanistan were delivered by vehicle to the state border or directly to transshipment bases and base areas in the border zone of Afghanistan. Then caravans were formed, which delivered various goods to their destination. In those areas where Soviet and government troops showed increased activity, caravans were formed on the adjacent side.

It should be noted that the delivery of weapons and ammunition to the territory of the DRA was a very difficult and dangerous task for the rebels, so it was well paid.

The caravans varied in composition and purpose. Some delivered large quantities of weapons to transshipment bases and warehouses and included from 25 to 100 pack animals or vehicles and up to 80 people. security Depending on the importance of the cargo, security increased. Others were sent with rebel groups trained at training centers in Pakistan and Iran. They were, as a rule, smaller in composition. When a small amount of weapons was transported, the caravan was correspondingly small. Usually, a few days before the caravan left, rebels disguised as refugees or small traders checked the routes and checked the passability of rivers, gorges and individual areas. By interviewing local residents, the presence of mining sites and ambushes by government and Soviet units, as well as the intensity of aviation flights, were revealed. Drivers of vehicles transporting contraband, nomads and scouts on motorcycles were also involved in checking the routes. To reveal possible ambush sites and the presence of mining areas, the Mujahideen first drove the cattle in the direction of the route.

When making the transition in large caravans, movement through the territory controlled by government and Soviet troops was carried out at night. Days were held in populated areas with reinforced security or at transshipment bases. Upon arrival at specially equipped bases, the head of the caravan handed over the delivered weapons and ammunition to representatives of the Islamic committees.

In total, to transport weapons and ammunition from Pakistan and Iran to Afghan territory, the rebels used about 100 routes, which were divided into directions: Badakhshan, Kunar-Nangarhar, Ghazni-Gardez, Kandahar, Helmand, Farah, Herat, etc. Without blocking these caravan marches it is impossible It was possible to establish normal life in Afghanistan, since, receiving comprehensive assistance exclusively from abroad, the armed opposition groups could continue subversive and sabotage actions against the PDPA regime for a very long time. The Soviet military command understood this well and took appropriate measures. They constantly fought with the caravans.

How were the military operations to destroy the caravans organized? This issue was resolved comprehensively. At the beginning of 1984, the Soviet military command developed a plan, code-named “Curtain,” according to which it was planned to block all these routes and thereby deprive the Mujahideen of constant sources of weapons and ammunition. In the “Veil” system, combat operations were carried out by 11 motorized rifle battalions, 3 reconnaissance battalions, 8 special forces battalions, a special forces company, 11 reconnaissance companies and 60 reconnaissance platoons, which could simultaneously set up 180 ambushes. In reality, 30–40 ambushes were set up every day.

Summing up the results of the fight against caravans in 1984, Major General A. Luchinsky reported: “Since April 15, 1984, in pursuance of the plan approved by the commander of the 40th Army, the allocated units and subunits began combat operations in the “Curtain” zone.

The purpose of creating this zone is to prevent the penetration, advancement and supply of gangs with people, weapons, ammunition, material and technical means along the caravan routes from Pakistan to the territory of the DRA (with the consistent destruction of caravans to the line of the main highway Asadabad, Jalalabad, Kabul, Ghazni, Kandahar, Girishk, Herat).

The width of combat operations reaches from 100 to 300 km and the length - up to 1000 km. The basis of the allocated forces and assets are special forces battalions and a separate “special forces” company. The entire combat zone, in accordance with the deployment of special forces units, is divided into areas of responsibility. Each battalion is assigned 4 Mi-8 transport and combat helicopters and 4 Mi-24 fire support helicopters. When conducting combat operations within a radius of 15 km, artillery units are allocated. To set up mine-explosive barriers on the routes of caravans, the battalions were assigned one special mine platoon, as well as one squad of a company of signal equipment for installing Realia-V lines. To conduct reconnaissance, groups use the following methods of combat operations - ambush, search, raid, observation. Special forces battalions also widely use this method of combat operations, such as helicopter aerial reconnaissance flights with inspection teams on board (then the obtained aerial reconnaissance data is implemented without additional time, according to the decision of the group commander). The group usually consists of 15–20 people on two Mi-8 helicopters covered by a pair of Mi-24s. If the caravan resists inspection, it is attacked by helicopters and the inspection team completes its destruction.

They practically do not fight the caravans of the DRA Armed Forces or we do not receive data from them, although 24 border battalions are guarding the state border with Pakistan. The duty forces of infantry divisions, commando brigades, and division artillery entering the “Curtain” zone are inactive, although in most cases, according to the data we have, caravans pass in close proximity to PPD (permanent deployment points. - Author’s note) units and security posts. An example of this is the 25th Infantry Division, 59th Regiment, which is located on the caravan route, and the caravans pass from it at a distance of 10 to 30 km, and the information is via the line of the operational duty officer "Almaz" (the call sign of the communications center of the office of the chief military adviser in the DRA. - Author's note) at least about their composition and direction of movement.”

In the spring of 1985, the number of special forces battalions was increased and deployed along the Afghan-Pakistani border in the most dangerous directions. Organizationally, they were consolidated into two brigades. Their headquarters were located in Jalalabad and Lashkar Gah. Perhaps these were the most combat-ready units of the 40th Army, since they included the most militarily and physically trained soldiers and officers. They were better equipped and armed. Each brigade and battalion was assigned an area of ​​responsibility where they conducted reconnaissance and destroyed caravans. As a rule, special forces units operated successfully in ambushes against caravans in Afghanistan, but here, too, much depended on their endurance and luck. There were many successful operations to intercept caravans using ambushes. Some special forces battalions killed one or two caravans almost every month. However, according to the servicemen of these units themselves and human intelligence data, only 12–15% of all caravans sent to Afghanistan were intercepted.

Typically, ambush operations against caravans were carried out according to the following scheme. Having received intelligence information about the time and route of the caravan's advance, the special forces prepared for the operation, trying to take into account all the details. At first, special forces groups moved to the site of operations in vehicles. Having arrived at the scene, the special forces dismounted. The equipment was immediately sent to the nearest Soviet outpost or outpost in readiness for immediate action upon a signal from the group commander, and the landing party made a quick march on foot to the ambush site. To ensure secrecy, the transition was made at night. The length of the transition ranged from 10 to 30 km (sometimes up to 100 km). While making the transition from the landing site, the special forces misled the intelligence and volunteer assistants of the Mujahideen, since they always closely monitored all the movements of armored vehicles and helicopter flights. But we had to abandon this, since the cumbersome and time-drawn-out landing did not ensure surprise and the effectiveness of such actions was, as a rule, zero.

Subsequently, separate helicopter squadrons were created for each brigade and the landing or airlifting of special forces groups was more often carried out by helicopter. Here, too, appropriate tactics were developed (constantly changing helicopter flight routes, false landings in several areas, etc.). The equipment intended to support special forces operations left a little later and stopped in a nearby area (at a distance of 30–50 km).

Having chosen a place for an ambush, the special forces “sat on the path” and waited for “prey.” The main thing is “not to get exposed.” At best, the ambush had no result, and at worst, it was attacked by superior forces of the rebels, because they conducted constant reconnaissance and for special forces groups, which they knew in advance, they themselves prepared ambushes. Moreover, the Mujahideen attacked at a time when the helicopters had already flown away and the equipment had not yet arrived. Then the special forces suffered the heaviest losses.

The most dangerous (but also effective) method was patrolling by helicopters with groups of inspection and destruction of caravans on board. Having noticed the moving caravan, the helicopter crew, having made several circles, landed the helicopter nearby and the group began the inspection. If the caravan was carrying weapons and ammunition, the caravan riders immediately scattered in different directions. Caravans with peaceful cargo continued on their way after inspection. Often the Mujahideen “caught” these inspection groups using “bait” (they deliberately set up several vehicles or pack animals) in an ambush and inflicted losses on them.

At the end of 1985, motorized rifle units and subunits began to be brought in to close the border. Since the spring of 1987, Soviet troops began to use the Barrier system, blocking certain areas of the country in the east and southeast of the country with a continuous chain of ambushes and units that defended the main road junctions and controlled the gorge from the heights. The main task was to prevent the movement of caravans to the center of Afghanistan. As a result of this, weapons and ammunition were accumulated at rebel transshipment bases and then destroyed by air strikes.

Thanks to the actions of the special forces, most of the caravan routes were reliably controlled. However, despite the measures taken, it was not possible to completely solve the problem of blocking the state border during the entire period of the presence of Soviet troops in Afghanistan, although this was one of the key tasks in the entire war.

Methods of "holy war"

Most of the rebel detachments and groups were located in villages among civilians. Those who were constantly at the bases, constituting their guard, lived in separate adobe courtyards-fortresses, in caves, dugouts or tents.

According to the leadership of the Afghan opposition, the need to select and use methods of guerrilla warfare was determined by the fact that the rebels did not have a sufficient number of organized, well-trained and equipped armed formations capable of successfully conducting open battle against government and, especially, Soviet troops. In accordance with the goals and objectives, the organizational structure of the armed formations was determined. The lowest level was a group consisting of 15 to 50 people. The groups united into detachments numbering up to 200 rebels. Several such detachments constituted a large formation, the number of which reached 100–600 or more people. Such detachments were usually located in several areas.

Fearing artillery fire from Soviet and government troops and air strikes, the Mujahideen avoided concentrating their forces. True, there were several fairly large rebel groups (Ahmad Shah in Panjshir and the northeastern regions of the DRA, Turan Ismail in the western regions of Afghanistan, Jalaluddin in the provinces of Paktia and Paktika, Said Jagran in Hazarajat, etc.), which operated in the zones of their control in for a number of years.

And yet, when conducting combat operations, the rebels sought to carry out subversive actions in small groups in a short time using the factor of surprise, create superiority in forces and means for carrying out military actions in certain areas, avoid direct contact with superior forces of government troops and provide them with stubborn resistance only in the defense of base areas, large transshipment bases and other important facilities. The Mujahideen tried to avoid fighting while surrounded, withdrawing their forces in a timely manner even before the complete blocking of a particular area, since they knew the area well and all the secret paths and passages in the mountains. The rebels defended themselves only in exceptional cases (when escape routes were cut off, while protecting large base areas).

In all cases, the main attention was paid to the initiative and independence of the commanders of detachments and groups, well-organized reconnaissance and notification of the activities of Soviet or government troops. The report of the deputy commander of the 40th Army, Major General P. S. Semenov, in December 1984 emphasized: “To achieve their goals, the rebels resort to various methods of armed struggle with regular troops and order maintenance forces, and also carry out sabotage and terrorist actions and propaganda events. The armed struggle is carried out mainly by small and lightly armed groups (20–50 people), which operate throughout the country.” If necessary, when solving complex problems, several groups can unite into squads of 150–200 or more people. The composition and organizational structure of groups and detachments in different provinces of the country are not the same.

As an option, the following organization of a group of rebels can be given: a commander (leader) with 3–4 bodyguards; deputy commander (leader) of the group; 3–4 scouts (observers); 2–3 battle groups (6–8 people each); one or two mortar crews; one or two DShK calculations; two or three RPG crews; mining group (4–5 people)… The individual training of the rebels was quite high and improved from year to year. They also operated quite successfully in small groups, especially when carrying out sabotage and terrorist actions. As for carrying out operations to capture large populated areas in the presence of military garrisons in them, even consisting of units of government armed forces, here the rebels were helpless to do anything. And they showed their complete incompetence. I will give an interesting document showing how Soviet military experts assessed the actions of the rebels in the mid-80s.

Analytical note of the Main Directorate of Combat Training of the Ground Forces

(Secret)

...The tactics of the rebels are becoming more flexible and competent every year. Techniques and methods of conducting armed struggle are constantly modified taking into account the specifics of the military-political situation in the country and the tactics of action used by Afghan and Soviet troops, which they constantly study and skillfully adapt to.

At the same time, in different regions of Afghanistan, the Mujahideen use different methods and forms of struggle. If, for example, in the central and northern provinces they operated mainly in small groups (10–15 people each)… in the southeastern provinces adjacent to Pakistan, large gangs remain and attempts are being made to seize administrative centers and entire regions.

...Guerrilla actions became more decisive and varied. Dushmans began to pay more attention to the factor of surprise, secrecy, mobility and efficiency. Combat operations are active, especially at dusk and after dark (18:00–24:00), as well as in conditions when it is impossible to use aviation. Bandit formations never operate without thorough reconnaissance of Soviet and Afghan troops; they skillfully use stereotypes, the slightest mistakes and mistakes of our commanders in organizing combat operations or combat support. Monitoring of security posts, garrisons and movement routes of Soviet and Afghan troops is being successfully carried out, and human intelligence is well established. Notification is carried out by sound and light signals (flashlights, fires, mirrors, etc.). For these purposes, the local population, shepherds and even children are widely involved. All this allows the rebels, when blocking their bases and concentration areas, to withdraw their main forces in advance from the attacks of troops, and with the remaining forces (the most trained and hardy fighters) to set up ambushes and mine the area.

If, as a result of sudden actions of government troops, the Mujahideen did not have time to withdraw their gangs in advance and remove stocks of materiel and ammunition from the combat areas, then they will fire long-range weapons and small arms (BUR rifle, DShK) from a long range (about 1000 m) or sudden with fire from all means from a range of 200–300 m, they strive to defeat the advancing troops, especially if they are left without fire support from armored groups, artillery and aviation, delay them until dark, and then retreat. The withdrawal is usually carried out in small groups (10–15 people) in different directions under the cover of pre-installed mines, sniper fire and heavy machine guns (using karizs, systems of ditches, mountain paths and crevices). But the most successful withdrawal is carried out at night through gaps and breaks in the battle formations of the Soviet and Afghan troops.

Often, upon receiving relevant information about the approach of troops, the rebels leave the village zone for the mountains or hide their weapons and disappear among the civilian population, leaving observers and small groups of 2-3 people. to cover the retreat. Base areas with weapons and materiel depots (for example, Javara, Iskapol, Melawa, Marulgad, Tura-Bura, Shpalkai, Lmarhauza, Sran, Shinaray, Islamdara, etc.), as well as vital areas (for example, the Panjshir and Andarab valleys , Black Mountains north-west Jalalabad) the rebels are preparing for a stubborn defense in engineering terms. Trenches, underground communication passages, trenches and other structures are equipped. The defense of these areas is carried out, as a rule, by all the forces of the gangs located there until the complete evacuation of weapons, ammunition and supplies from them to new base areas. If this cannot be done, then stubborn resistance is shown until the main gangs completely leave the area of ​​​​combat operations...

The rebels organize the defense of the heights in 2-3 tiers. Heavy machine guns and mortars are usually located in the second and third tiers. All-round defense is carried out in populated areas and green areas. The supply of gangs with weapons and ammunition has improved. If previously they were supplied mainly with small arms, as well as DShK and RPGs, now the rebels are receiving mortars, recoilless rifles, MANPADS, and rocket launchers in ever-increasing quantities, which are already widely used against our and Afghan troops.

It has been established that only at the beginning of August this year. 20 thousand machine guns, 20 thousand boxes of ammunition and shells, 70 thousand bulletproof vests, 50 thousand pairs of shoes, binoculars and other weapons arrived from China. In addition, on August 4, 2 thousand light machine guns, 1 thousand anti-tank shells, and 400 thousand cartridges were delivered to bases in Pakistan. A large number of weapons come from Iran and Saudi Arabia. Weapons and ammunition delivered from abroad are placed as follows:

small arms, RPGs and ammunition for them are distributed immediately among detachments and groups, with reserve ammunition (“IZ”) kept by the leaders;

heavy weapons (mountain guns, mortars, DShK) and ammunition for them are supplied to bases, to stationary warehouses equipped in caves, basements of mosques and houses of leaders.

Currently, the following standards for arming rebels have been established, regardless of their party affiliation: a group of 10 people. receives one RPG and 9 AKM; consisting of 20 people. - 2 RPGs and 18 AKMs; consisting of 25 people. - one DShK, one recoilless rifle, one mortar, 2–3 RPGs, 16 AKM; for a squad of 100 people. one anti-aircraft gun or MANPADS, 4 DShK, 5 recoilless rifles, 4 mortars, 10 RPGs and a corresponding number of small arms are allocated.

...In the autumn-winter period of 1984–1985. tactical techniques and methods of action of the rebels against our troops, apparently, will not undergo any special changes and will boil down to the following:

widespread conduct of hostilities using guerrilla methods (ambushes, shelling, raids, mining, sabotage, terror);

creation of a centralized system for controlling gangs based on the unification of disparate forces;

the concentration of significant forces in the southeastern and eastern provinces with the aim of conducting large-scale operations aimed at capturing the areas bordering Pakistan and creating there the so-called “liberated territories of Afghanistan” under the control of the “interim government”;

concentration of forces, accumulation of weapons to restore the situation in the Panjshir and Andarab valleys (Ahmad Shah Masud);

constantly maintaining a large rebel group in the center of the country in order to destabilize the situation in the capital and surrounding areas, as well as divert forces from Panjshir and Andarab;

strengthening forces and means to combat our aviation both in the air and at airfields; possible widespread use of MANPADS;

an increase in the number of caravans with weapons, ammunition and the transfer of new groups of rebels from abroad;

build-up of weapons in gangs. At the same time, special attention will be paid to providing them with new modern weapons (MANPADS such as “Stinger”, “Blowpipe”, extended-range PURS, etc.), which will allow them to successfully conduct combat operations against the regular army;

conducting broad and targeted propaganda among the population, as well as among the military personnel of the DRA Armed Forces.

(October 1984)

The main methods of action of the rebels were shelling the location of troops and populated areas with heavy weapons (rocket shells), attacks on posts and small garrisons of government troops, setting up ambushes, mining, carrying out sabotage at national economic facilities and sabotage and terrorist acts against representatives of the party and state apparatus and military personnel, subversive actions to disrupt transportation on the country's main communications.

1. Shelling garrisons, outposts and outposts. This method was most often used in order to maintain constant tension in various areas, inflicting maximum material and moral damage to the enemy, while avoiding the loss of one’s forces and means.

Populated areas, troop locations and security posts, industrial and other facilities were shelled. Periodically, border outposts, military garrisons and Tsarandoy units in the areas of the main caravan routes with the aim of blocking them, exhausting them and morally oppressing the personnel. When shelling populated areas and military garrisons, the rebels paid great attention to the concentration of various fire weapons to organize a massive fire attack. In these cases, fire was fired simultaneously from several directions from various types of weapons.

Shelling of security posts on highways occupied one of the main places in the commission of sabotage. This was facilitated by the fact that, as a rule, posts were stationary objects that were well known to the rebels and over which they were constantly monitoring. For a diversionary maneuver, the post was sometimes fired upon from a secondary direction with small arms, and then carried out from the main direction - with heavy weapons. In some areas, the rebels, after several intense shelling of posts, stopped active operations and created for a long time the appearance of a calm situation in the area, thereby dulling vigilance at security posts, after which they suddenly carried out massive shelling or captured and destroyed them.

When organizing and conducting shelling, mobile vehicles with weapons installed on them (mortars, DShK, PURS, etc.) were widely used, which allowed the rebels to change firing positions during the shelling and quickly hide after they were carried out.

This most often happened at night, when it was difficult to pinpoint firing positions and the use of DRA aircraft was complicated. Rocket artillery, recoilless rifles, mortars, PGIs, DShK, RPGs and small arms were used for shelling. There were frequent cases of using artillery pieces for shelling.

With the advent of launchers for launching extended-range rockets into service with the Mujahideen, their ability to fire at various objects has increased significantly. The rebels, as a rule, arrived at the launch areas in a car on which the launcher was installed. After the shelling, which took a very short time, the car left the area even before return fire opened. This method was also used when the rebels installed rockets at night, connected a launch device to them with a fixed launch time, and left the area. At the appointed time the shelling was carried out. The return fire of government troops in the area from which the rockets were launched did not produce anything in such cases. It should be noted that the use of rockets by rebels has been constantly increasing from year to year, sometimes several times in relation to the previous year.

2. Raids were carried out (almost always) in combination with shelling and pursued the goal of seizing weapons, ammunition, food, and destroying military and other equipment. To carry out such actions, various forces were involved depending on the nature of the object. For example, to capture a DRA Armed Forces guard post, small groups (20–30 people) were involved, and during raids on the administrative centers of counties and volosts, large groups and detachments of up to several hundred people acted. When attacking a populated area, the rebels usually did not try to take it over immediately, but first captured nearby commanding heights, blocked it and created difficulties in supplying it with ammunition and food.

Then, through systematic shelling from various types of weapons and active propaganda to disintegrate government troops, they tried to force them to surrender. The Mujahideen did not stay in populated areas. After reprisals against party activists, robbery, collecting taxes from the population and forcibly recruiting young people into their units, they went to their base areas.

Attacks on military garrisons were usually preceded by massive shelling from heavy weapons. In some cases, if there was evidence that the garrison was demoralized and would not be able to resist, the rebels resorted to carrying out demonstrative attacks in large forces (up to several hundred people). Snipers were often used, who, approaching at close range, fired aimed fire at personnel and heavy weapons crews. The rebels did not dare to attack the Soviet garrisons.

3. Ambush actions Mujahideen usually carried out attacks on the roads with the aim of destroying military equipment, vehicles, as well as capturing prisoners, weapons and materiel. The tactics of waging a “road” war depended on the terrain conditions and the nature of the object, the availability of forces and means. During the ambush operations, the rebels fired at road communications security posts, mined certain sections of roads, and created rubble. The battle formation of the Mujahideen in an ambush, as a rule, included capture, cover and diversion groups.

As the column approached the ambush site, specially designated snipers opened fire on the drivers and senior officers of the vehicles. To stop the column, the lead vehicles were detonated by controlled charges. To combat armored vehicles located in the columns, large-caliber machine guns and grenade launchers were used. To temporarily stop traffic on the roads, especially in areas of military operations, the rebels created rubble in places where it was difficult to overcome and clear them. The rebels mined the rubble, and at commanding heights they set up positions of DShK and other fire weapons to cover them. When attacking a large convoy, it was first crushed into pieces, followed by the destruction of a cluster of vehicles with cargo. To do this, guided mines were detonated at the beginning, middle and end of the column, or they were shot from an RPG. Sometimes the bulk of the vehicles were allowed through, and only the lagging vehicles were attacked. But other methods were also used: “The rebels provide the main resistance to the troops when the wiring of the columns is completed and the units begin to remove the blocks.

By this time, the enemy has concentrated his forces in advance in the gorges facing the road. At the same time, on command, the rebels begin to move towards the road, firing at the posts. From the front, along the road, the troops are pursued by a cavalry group, constantly maneuvering through gorges and firing at retreating units. Thus, in October 1986, in the area of ​​the village of Aram, at the end of hostilities to conduct columns along the Gardez-Chamkani route, the rebels surrounded the 2nd infantry battalion of the 72nd infantry regiment of the 8th infantry division, which was removing units from the block. The battalion escaped the encirclement, but 60 people were captured..."

From the speech of the Chief of Staff of the GVS in the DRA, Kabul, June 1987.

Often, in ambushes, the rebels used special mobile groups with MANPADS near airfields, which penetrated into restricted areas and fired at aircraft as they took off and landed. According to the views of the rebel leadership, the most effective ambushes were those organized when Soviet and Afghan units returned from combat operations, when the fatigue of the personnel affected them and their vigilance was dulled. The report of the commander of the 40th Army in November 1984 cited a case that received wide resonance: “In the Panjshir operation on April 30, 1984, as a result of a criminally negligent attitude to the performance of his official duty by the commander of the 682nd infantry regiment, the 108th medical regiment, Lieutenant Colonel Suman The first battalion of this regiment was ambushed and suffered heavy losses as a result of the battle - 53 people. killed, including 12 officers and 58 people. wounded.

In the rear of this battalion there were Afghan units that could have supported the combat operations of the 1st MSB, but the uninitiative actions of the Afghan commander contributed, so to speak, to the execution of the 1st MSB by the rebels ... "

4. Mining, as a rule, it was carried out in the so-called bottlenecks of road communications, bridges, tunnels, galleries, difficult sections of the road (turns, serpentines, descents, ascents), that is, where visibility was limited and maneuver and detour were difficult. At the same time, mines were installed to the right and next to the road in case of dispersal of transport when it was attacked from an ambush.

Mining methods and techniques were very diverse. On paved roads, for example, mines were installed on ramps and roadsides, under asphalt and concrete - by digging under them from the side and in places where the road surface was damaged. To increase the power of the explosion, land mines were used, which were made by the rebels from improvised means (unexploded aerial bombs, artillery shells, etc.). Directional explosion land mines were used, intended to destroy manpower and vehicles. Usually these were shell casings filled with various pieces of metal, and when they exploded, personnel were hit by shrapnel. In addition, landmines filled with gasoline, kerosene or diesel fuel were used. Saltpeter was used to increase the power of the explosion. The detonation of objects was often carried out with the help of mines and explosive devices, made in the form of various cargoes transported by transport (barrels, boxes), with a large amount of explosives. Plasticite was often used.

5. Sabotage and terrorist actions occupied a special place in the activities of opposition forces in Afghanistan and were considered by the Islamic leadership as an important factor in the serious weakening of state power. A detailed manual on the tactics of guerrilla warfare in Afghanistan, developed by one of the ideologists of the Islamic movement, Abu Tarok Musafer, directly stated that terror is “a particularly important aspect of the struggle.” Throughout the “Afghan war,” the rebels carried out terrorist acts and sabotage. Why did they succeed? “Well-armed and trained sabotage groups and extremist elements commit terrorist acts and provocations in Kabul, Kandahar, Jalalabad, Herat, Mazar-i-Sharif and a number of other cities, including against Soviet citizens abroad. Threats and repressions, flexible and targeted propaganda, skillful use of religious feelings, nationalist and anti-Soviet sentiments, as well as mistakes and excesses made and being tolerated by the new government, all this together allows the Afghan reaction to put pressure on fairly wide sections of the population ... "

Afghan security agencies waged a constant struggle to curb the terrorist activities of the Mujahideen, but terrorism was not so easy to eradicate. This required the involvement of large forces and resources, as well as the establishment and maintenance of an emergency regime.

Document (Secret)

In the vicinity of Kabul, in the territory controlled by the rebels, “guerrilla groups” (IPA) are deployed, which are engaged in sabotage and terrorist activities both in Kabul itself and in its environs. Structurally, these groups are included in three zones:

“Bodr” zone - Dahisabz, Karabag, Mirbachakot districts;

"Khaibar" zone - Surubi, Bagrami, Chakhorasiab districts;

Tabuk zone - Shakardara, Paghman, Chakhordegi districts...

In 1981, the Afghan Security Service (SSIS) arrested over 400 members of the “Central Zone”. Among those arrested were: 125 military personnel, including senior officers - 17, junior officers - 47, military school cadets - 24, soldiers - 37, SGI employees - 4, Tsarandoy (police) employees - 28, employees of the Supreme Court - 5, one employee of the prosecutor's office of the Kabul province, 11 teachers of lyceums and universities, 10 students, etc. The leaders of a number of committees were arrested: the people's committee - Bismello, the employees - Modir Nasrat, the cultural - Abdul Hai. In 1982, 24 members of the IPA terrorist groups belonging to the “Central Zone” were arrested. At the end of 1983 - beginning of 1984, the head of the “Central Zone” Ismati and the leaders of the committees Samad and Khalid were arrested. In total, over 60 people were arrested.

From sources of “Kasym”, “Jalil” and others, information is received that after the arrest of the leaders of the zone, its structural links have not been restored...

In addition to the underground, which is organizationally part of the “Central Zone of the IPA in Kabul,” there are a number of underground groups in the capital that are associated with large gangs such as Ahmad Shah Massoud...

(Source of information: GRU General Staff of the USSR Armed Forces, Intelligence Department of the 40th Army Headquarters, Kabul 1984)

The main objects of sabotage were power lines, government and cultural institutions, industrial and agricultural facilities, etc. For example, on June 13, 1985, sabotage was committed at the Shindand airbase, as a result of which 19 combat units from the Afghan Air Force were blown up on the ground aircraft (13 Mig-21 and 6 Su-17) and 13 aircraft damaged.

Based on an investigation conducted by MGB specialists, it was established that some of the Afghan servicemen serving as security guards at the air base, having entered into a conspiracy with representatives of the counter-revolutionary organization IPA, allowed them onto the planes to lay mines. One such mine was found unexploded. The opposition underground in Shindand was identified and neutralized: 31 people were arrested, including 13 officers and 8 soldiers.

The physical destruction of party and government workers, activists, commanders of the armed forces, police and security agencies is one of the main objectives of the terrorist activities of the rebels. This was carried out by groups of up to 10–15 people specially trained in Pakistan, Iran and in some countries of Europe and the Middle East.

The rebels used the following methods of terror: killing or capturing officials; arson and robbery; mining buses with magnetic mines; the use of cars filled with explosives (a car explosion in Kabul near the Indian Embassy in the spring of 1987); the use of children and teenagers to place mines on government officials' cars; undermining power line supports; the use of domestic animals to deliver explosives to bazaar areas; the use of various surprise mines (children's toys, fountain pens, lighters, etc.) in bazaars and other crowded places; ban on trade in cities. The most typical way of carrying out sabotage was the detonation of various explosive devices in public places, in the buildings of institutions and departments, hotels, cinemas, educational institutions, etc. This was especially often practiced during various holidays and other public events (for example, at the funeral of a leader Pakistani Pashtuns Ghafar Khan in January 1988 in Jalalabad).

Using terror and sabotage on a large scale, the opposition tried to create a climate of fear and uncertainty among civilians in the country, raise distrust in government power, and show the government’s inability to restore order and ensure the safety of the population. In addition, this did not make it possible to establish normal economic activity, as a result of which the living standards of the population deteriorated, which also caused their dissatisfaction with the ruling regime. Moreover, the scale of terrorist acts was constantly expanding.

The training of terrorists and the supply of small-sized, modern weapons created the preconditions for the spread of sabotage to other countries, including the United States. As reported in the fall of 1987, Iran took possession of a shipment of Stinger anti-aircraft missiles that the CIA had funneled to Afghan guerrillas. The Iranians were preparing to use them against ships sailing under the protection of the US Navy in the Persian Gulf. Confused US officials claimed that the deadly Stinger surface-to-air missile systems had been "stolen" from innocent Afghan mujahideen. However, in reality, as Saira Shah, a journalist for the London Observer newspaper, found out, American and Pakistani officials transferred the missile systems to one fundamentalist leader, who, as is known, had previously resold shipments of weapons twice for profit.

After the Mujahideen came to power in Afghanistan, the Americans also began to show concern about the intensification of Islamists and expressed interest in finding an opportunity to buy back and destroy the Stinger MANPADS previously delivered to the Afghan rebels in order to prevent their use for terrorist purposes. In particular, the First Secretary of the US Embassy, ​​Robert Bayer, in a conversation in Dushanbe with a representative of the Russian troops in January 1993, asked for information about the places of purchase and sale of Stingers in Tajikistan.

6. Some commanders of opposition groups also used such a technique as entering into negotiations (in the event of a threat of defeat) with government agencies and concluding ceasefire agreements. The goal is to gain time, save forces and resources, and receive appropriate assistance from the state. At the same time, the so-called “treaty leaders” remained associated with the rebellious movement. Such actions were also noted at a high level. For example, during the operation to unblock the road to Khost (“Magistral”) in December 1987, when, as a result of the successful actions of Soviet troops, there was a threat of capturing the main base area of ​​Sran. At this time, a Loya Jirga was held in Kabul, to which Jalaluddin’s envoys arrived with a proposal for a truce, and it was immediately accepted at the proposal of the President of the Republic of Armenia. The troops received a command to stop further advance and gain a foothold in their positions. The pause lasted fifteen days. During this time, the rebels urgently removed ammunition and other materiel from warehouses located in Srana to inaccessible mountainous areas. Despite repeated reports to Najibullah about this, he prohibited the resumption of hostilities. And only when the base was empty, an order was received to continue the operation, allegedly because the opposition leadership refused the truce. But even in the “remnant”, Soviet troops captured and destroyed more than 100 thousand rockets alone. It is difficult for me to judge the motives that prompted President Najibullah to take such a step, but one cannot fail to take into account that his family roots are from these places and he was not indifferent to how they would fighting will develop here. Obviously, he wanted to demonstrate... his loyalty to his fellow countrymen, and maybe... he hoped to establish cooperation with the Mujahideen. This is the situation in which the Soviet troops had to fight.

7. Opposition units persistently fought against the OKSV aviation and the DRA Armed Forces. In order to destroy airplanes and helicopters, they carried out constant intensive shelling of airfields with rockets, and sometimes, if the situation allowed, with mortars. And although the effectiveness of these shellings was low, as a rule, civilians in nearby houses suffered, but since the shelling was carried out almost every day, the damage was done.

There was a case of mining by rebel agents from among the service personnel in 1984 at the Shindand airfield of several Afghan aircraft, as a result of which they were destroyed. Planes and helicopters were fired at from MANPADS along their flight routes. Special groups with MANPADS were sent to airfield areas to destroy aircraft during takeoff and landing. It is typical that up to 50% of aviation losses occurred in protected areas of airfields.

Information

The rebel group operating in the DRA is armed with 341 MANPADS, including 47 Stinger MANPADS. Compared to the same period in 1986, the number of MANPADS has doubled. The number of MANPADS launches against Soviet and Afghan aircraft and helicopters has increased sharply. So, if in 1984 there were 62 launches of MANPADS, in 1985 - 141, then in 1986 - 847 (26 planes and helicopters were shot down). Over three and a half months of this year, 86 MANPADS launches were carried out (18 air targets were shot down). At the same time, the effectiveness of the use of MANPADS by the rebels has increased significantly: at the end of last year, the probability of hitting air targets was 3%, this year - 20%...

8. Defensive and offensive actions the rebels did not act on their own initiative. Defense in their tactics was a forced type of combat and was used in cases of surprise attack, when all escape routes were cut off and it was impossible to avoid open battle, as well as in the defense of large base areas. In general, the offensive was often used in the form of a psychic attack, with religious slogans and shouts. It was more an act of desperation and hopelessness than a type of military action among the rebels.

9. Subversive propaganda activities was aimed primarily at creating a situation of political instability in the country, discrediting the activities of the government of the republic, disintegrating party and state bodies, units and subunits of the Afghan army, inclining tribal leaders and elders to the side of the opposition, and attracting the population into the ranks of the rebels. The propaganda, which had a pronounced anti-Soviet orientation, was based on lies, manipulation of facts, distortion of the goals of the reforms carried out in Afghanistan and the role of the OKSV.

Methods and forms of agitation and propaganda work among various categories of Afghans were constantly changing and adapting to the conditions of the situation. The opposition actively used radio propaganda, distribution of printed publications and tape cassettes with recordings of Islamic, anti-government content, oral group and individual propaganda and campaigning in bazaars and mosques, holding rallies and meetings. Particular emphasis in propaganda was placed on the use of religion as the main ideological weapon in the fight against the ruling regime in Afghanistan, and the actions of the authorities to suppress such actions were ineffective.

From the resolution of the CPSU Central Committee No. 147 of July 8, 1983.

...The rebels are taking feverish measures to expand anti-government propaganda and agitation, resorting to intimidation, repression and psychological influence on the population. One of their leaflets states that for the initial listening to the broadcasts of Radio Kabul and the Voice of Rodish radio station, the perpetrators will be fined in the amount of 10 thousand Afghanis, and in the next case they will be punished by death. Unfortunately, their words do not match their deeds. In the past week alone, rebels have killed three jirga elders convened in Kabul province to elect local governments; seven more elders received bandit warnings. Mullahs who speak out in support of people's power are dealt with mercilessly by bandits...

A case in point is the case of Mullah Nasrula, who was killed by rebels. The Supreme Council of Ulema of the DRA proclaimed him a “saint”, at the same time his family was not provided with a pension and the children were left with virtually no means of subsistence. This fact was immediately used by counter-revolutionary propaganda...

One of the effective forms of anti-Soviet propaganda was the commission of terrorist acts by rebels dressed in Soviet military uniforms. In a number of cases, after carrying out terrorist attacks, robberies and murders, the rebels left at the scene of the crime individual items of Soviet military uniform, as well as scraps of Soviet newspapers, notes in Russian, shell casings from Soviet small arms, etc.

In order to win over the Afghan army to their side and involve the wavering part of the population in anti-government activities, manipulation of facts, bribery, blackmail and provocations were also widely used.

The opposition attached great importance to working with refugees. At the same time, its leaders sought in no case to allow them to return to their homeland. In particular, after the Afghan government announced a new political course for reconciliation, when many Afghan refugees increasingly began to express a desire to return to their native villages, according to eyewitnesses, the Pakistani and Iranian authorities, in close contact with the leaders of the Alliance-7, prevented their return until to the physical elimination of those who no longer wished to remain in the camps. For example, authorities prevented the return to Afghanistan of 890 families from Zabol (Iran), 610 families from the Nasar Bagh camp, and 280 families from the Sawabi camp (Pakistan). During the shootout that arose between refugees and barriers from the armed formations of Alliance-7, army and police units of Pakistan and Iran, 213 people were killed, among whom were mainly women, old people and children.

The leaders of Alliance-7 saw the problem of Afghan refugees as a great benefit for personal enrichment and satisfaction of their ambitions. The governments of Islamabad and Tehran were also interested in this. Pakistan, in particular, has used aid flowing to Afghan refugees to increase its own treasury and weapons stockpiles for its armed forces.

View from the outside

It will probably be interesting for the reader to look at the actions of the Mujahideen through the eyes of Western journalists and analysts who have made forays into their camps more than once and are well versed in the tactics of the “sacred struggle.” Olivier Roy, whose publications in the West are valued for their competence and depth, will help us with this. Here are some of his observations and conclusions:

One of the first characteristics of the Afghan “resistance” is its strategic immobility. However, the space of solidarity is not only a homogeneous territory, closed within its borders; it is, first of all, a whole complex of networks: networks of “cadm”, brotherhoods, ethnic groups and political parties. Thus, in one space there may be several political parties with their own fronts, embedded in the fronts of competitors, with their own administration and inflated general staffs. In most of the territory, resistance groups are not a mosaic, but an intricacy of networks of their own and others, where each of them ultimately functions around a political party.

...At first the Mujahideen were located among the population, in villages. But bombing and repression forced them to retreat to the mountains and gorges. "Markaz" is a Mujahideen camp that has air defense and heavy guns. Families do not live here, and the Mujahideen organize their lives themselves: someone is a baker, someone is a gardener, someone is a groom, someone is a delivery boy, etc. “Markaz” did not exist in the traditional inter-tribal war, since in between Between the two battles the warrior lived at home. But the traditions of the “markaz” can be found in Muslim history: the refuge of the famous bandit and the “ribat” of brotherhoods fighting on the borders of the “house of war”. "Ribat" is similar to some "markazs" of the tribal zones of the south or northeastern provinces, uniting warriors from different tribes, but members of the same brotherhood ("Naqshbandi"); "Markaz" is a fortified "madras". “Amir” is at the same time “evil” or “pir”, or the beloved disciple of the “pir”; provision of troops is carried out by the “mudarris” of the schools, and many warriors are “murids”. The famous base at Zhawar (Paktia) is the subject of fierce battles of the same type. Its commander is Jalaluddin. There are several "markazs" that resemble bandit dens, such as Amir Rasul's markaz in Baghlan, where the gorge is controlled primarily for the purpose of collecting tolls. Only in the “markazs”, whose commanders are religious leaders, do people from different “kadmas” live; otherwise, such heterogeneity may be viewed negatively. If you do not maintain ties with the “cadm”, then what should you remain loyal to?

…Once the decision to attack is made (usually in the morning), the group leaves the “markaz” after a midday meal and tea. There was no order in the advance, no reconnaissance, no advance detachment. At dusk, the group stops at such a distance from the target that the object can be seen through binoculars. As darkness falls, the group begins to move forward. Advancement, again, does not depend on the specialization or training of people, but on their desire to more or less sincerely play the role of Mujahideen, future “martyrs” (martyrs) or future “ghazis” (victors of the infidels). The most focused ones reach enemy positions without receiving any order. Others are located where they see fit. The one who drags in the tail will not be punished: everything is the will of Allah. And suddenly the silence explodes: they shoot from everything and everywhere; in a very short time all ammunition is used up. Anyone who wants to improvise gets closer and tries to throw grenades or kill soldiers. The feat consists of bringing weapons taken from the enemy: this is booty and an act pleasing to God. Then, when the heavy guns of a distant base or the formidable mortars of the enemy come into play, a retreat begins, fast, but not panicky. Every man for himself, no orders, no advanced detachments. The wounded and dead are taken away with them. They usually stop in a house or mosque, out of reach of mortars, and after all members of the group return, tea begins. The summary is rather meager. There was a battle (“jang”) - even a special expression for this appeared: “takotuk cardan” (“tak-tak-tak” - the sound of a machine gun). There is no boasting or cowardice here (sometimes they still kill in war, and the next day the battle can resume). War as a way of life, as a performance, as an auto-da-fe.

There is one type of weapon that the Mujahideen really like. This is an individual weapon that produces a lot of noise and smoke. Afghans are real aces in handling the RPG-7 (hand-held anti-tank weapon) and DShK (12.7 mm machine gun); they love various rocket launchers and recoilless rifles, but less often use mortars, which require the coordinated actions of three or four people and precise aiming to fire, although the mortar is often the only effective weapon for shelling strong defensive structures. This indifference of the attacking Afghans is transmitted to the attacked Afghans, who are poorly dug in in shallow trenches. In general, the Mujahideen do not take very good aim: the height of the sight is always jammed for the shortest distance, and the ingenious optical sights are dismantled.

Among the warriors who became mujahideen, an argument has emerged with which they justify their inability to defeat the enemy: the technical backwardness of weapons. In the 19th century a breech-loading rifle appeared; Today the fear of minefields reigns supreme. The inventors of “jihad” apparently believed that tactics would lose their importance in the world of technology. Thus, the Afghans almost never undertake assault attacks under the pretext of fear of minefields. However, some studies have shown that mines do not play such an important role at all. In fact, Afghans do not know how to effectively conduct targeted fire. Most official posts are very poorly protected. The argument regarding possible threatening losses completely loses its meaning, especially since the Mujahideen sometimes engage in the most risky battles or start internal wars, which can turn them simply into “koshta” (killed), and not into “martyrs”.

Any shift to more sophisticated siege tactics implies a change in the perception of war; specialization, that is, the difference between fighters, coordination, that is, a sense of precise timing, and especially the desire to create a gap between fights.

The lack of tactical ingenuity, so strange among people whom all world literature presents as born warriors, is a consequence of the lack of strategy.

The definition of the target (a Soviet-Afghan post located on the borders of solidarity space) as well as the concept of attack (a show of force without sufficient desire to capture and destroy the target) are inherited from tribal warfare, which is defensive rather than offensive because it devalues ​​the single point, the capture which would put an end to aggression. The capture of Soviet bases is beyond the comprehension of most Afghans, as is the capture of the capital; a participant in an intertribal war could take power only after it had fallen.

Attacking the base means completely changing the concept of strategy. Then the Afghans simply try to live next to these bases, which are like land-based aircraft carriers, closed in on themselves and, paradoxically, completely out of contact with the environment after their security perimeter has been cleared with bombs and bulldozers. Repeating the famous words, a warrior does not take power, he selects it (capture of Kabul in 1929). The state in itself is not the goal; empty space attracts a warrior more than filled space; the bazaar is looted when the ruler leaves the palace. In the same way, the tactical ideal for most mujahideen is the return of official post after negotiation or betrayal. This is a reward for a holy cause, and not the result of a measured and precise strategy. Time doesn't match history.

From the narrative of a Western journalist, the image of the Mujahid is drawn as a romantic warrior of the holy jihad, a kind of “free artist,” a somewhat limited and insufficiently trained fighter for the faith, who fights very easily, as if playfully, almost for his own pleasure. This is not entirely true, although there is some truth in his reasoning.

As you can see, a somewhat simplified, primitive view of the rebellious movement in Afghanistan prevails, although many of the features and specifics of the organization and conduct of armed struggle by the Mujahideen have undoubtedly been revealed.

If we generally evaluate the rebellious movement and the actions of the Mujahideen during this period, we can state that the individual training of the rebels was quite high and improved from year to year. They also operated quite successfully in small groups, especially when carrying out sabotage and terrorist actions. As for carrying out operations to capture large populated areas in the presence of military garrisons in them, even consisting of units of government armed forces, here the rebels were helpless to do anything and showed their complete incompetence. They were unable to win a general victory over Soviet and government forces, since they failed to create a unified organization, did not adhere to any specific tactics and strategy, and did not fight actively enough. However, by inflicting their “pin” pricks, they did not allow the government to carry out planned reforms, diverted significant resources (human and material) to ensure the country’s security, maintained the tension in the internal political situation in Afghanistan, gradually corroding state power like rust. However, in modern conditions, when small-sized weapons are quite powerful, if comprehensive support is provided by developed countries, such tactics often make it possible to achieve a global goal, as evidenced by the experience of many countries.

It should be noted that after the opposition parties came to power in Afghanistan, their leaders clearly demonstrated their true intentions. Islam did not become the basis for national reconciliation for them. They showed that they were not much different from the party functionaries of the PDPA and had nothing in common with either Islam or the Mujahideen, although they continued to call themselves that and supposedly rely on Islamic values. The Mujahideen of one Islamic party began to kill the Mujahideen of another. It became obvious to everyone that they needed the Islamic factor only to achieve their goal - to seize power in the country. Thus, by exploiting Islam for their own selfish interests, they burdened their souls with betrayal of true Islamic values ​​- tolerance, a penchant for compromise, risk avoidance, and the desire not to harm the cult of knowledge, justice and law.

The “Mujahideen commanders” began to sort things out among themselves, proving which of them was stronger, staging a real massacre in Kabul. The actions of self-proclaimed Islamic leaders caused serious damage to Afghanistan and its people, especially the capital of the country, which was destroyed by two-thirds. And no matter what arguments they gave to justify their actions, their essence was clearly revealed. But that was much later, and then, in the mid-80s, they fought against the PDPA regime and Soviet troops under the banner of Islam.

Afghan Mujahideen(Arabic: مجاهد‎‎ mujāhid, mujahiddin) - members irregular armed forces, motivated by radical Islamic ideology, organized into a single insurgent force during the Afghan Civil War from 1979-1992. They were recruited from the local population since 1979 with the aim of waging an armed struggle against the military presence of the USSR and the Afghan governments of Babrak Karmal and Najibullah. Some of the Afghan Mujahideen, after the end of the war in the mid-1990s, joined the ranks of the radical Taliban movement, while others joined the " Northern Alliance».

The word "mujahid" is of Arabic origin ("mujahid", plural "mujahiddin"), literally meaning "fighter for the faith", at the same time being the name of a participant in jihad or rebel (rebel). The Soviet army and Afghan authorities called them spooks(Dari دشمان - dušman, dushmon, Pashto دښمان - duxman,dušman- “enemy”), and the Afghans called Soviet soldiers shuravi (Dari شوروی - šuravî, šuravi- “Soviet”) Soviet soldiers often, in everyday life, used the slang word “spirits” - a derivative of “dushmans” - to designate them.
Dushmans wore the same traditional Afghan clothes as the local population, without outwardly standing out from them (shirts, black vests, turban or pakol).

Ideology and strategy of the Afghan dushmans (Mujahideen)

• The main line and basis of the political platform in the propaganda of the Mujahideen ideology was the declaration of the basic principle: “The duty of every Afghan is to protect his homeland - Afghanistan and his faith - holy Islam from the infidels.”

• Uniting under the banner of sacred Islam all devout Muslims: “...In the name of Allah, the duty of every devout Muslim is a holy war - Jihad, for this he must go and kill the infidels, only then his soul can enter the gates of heaven.”

• The spiritual and political leaders of the dushmans (Mujahideen) paid special attention to conducting political propaganda and agitation within the ranks of armed groups and among the local population. Mujahideen political parties and foreign sponsors spent significant amounts of money for these purposes.

• In the propaganda struggle for the support of the local population, the Mujahideen won an unconditional victory.

• The Mujahideen, as part of solving immediate combat missions, acted as part of groups of various sizes: small mobile detachments, large groups and large formations.

• Sometimes, armed formations varying in size, combat capability, equipment and degree of organization, in addition to the main goal of expelling the “shuravi” and overthrowing the current government, pursued their own private and financial interests.

• Often, internal contradictions between political parties, their leaders and leaders (field commanders), associated with the division of spheres of influence and advantages in the distribution of foreign sponsorship, led to armed clashes between the Mujahideen (dushmans) themselves.

• However, despite various contradictions related to a common goal, the Mujahideen were able to quickly mobilize significant forces and resources, organizing a unified interaction of formations to conduct large-scale combat operations on a wide front, as a single paramilitary association.

• Every year, the number of members of the armed formations of the Mujahideen since the end of 1979, the moment the OKSVA was introduced, has grown exponentially. By the time OKSVA was withdrawn in 1989, it exceeded 250 thousand people.

• Throughout the war of 1979-1989, in government circles, in the ranks of the army command, the Ministry of State Security, the Ministry of Internal Affairs of the DRA, and among the local population, the Mujahideen had a widely ramified and well-organized intelligence network.

• Mujahideen detachments were created along geographic, party, national, confessional, and tribal lines; their actions were coordinated and controlled by the authoritative command of local field commanders and local leaders, which made it possible to act coherently and effectively.

• The purpose of the armed struggle of the Mujahideen against OKSVA, the state authorities and the armed forces of the DRA was the withdrawal of Soviet troops and the overthrow of the pro-Soviet government regime in Afghanistan.

Mujahideen (dushmans) cross the Afghan-Pakistani border, 1985.

Tactics

Combat tactics are guerrilla. The main principles of managing the combat operations of the Mujahideen were:

• avoidance of direct clashes with superior forces of regular troops;

• not turning hostilities into positional warfare,

• refusal to consolidate and retain occupied areas for a long time;

• surprise attacks with extensive use of tactics Basmachi movement

The armed confrontation was conventionally divided into three stages:

• Organized resistance with an inactive form of hostilities, holding individual points and areas, conducting extensive propaganda events among the population and attracting them to their side.

• Increasing combat activity through sabotage and terrorist attacks, raids on garrisons and posts of government troops, and attacks on convoys. The main goal is to capture weapons, ammunition and various logistics.

• Complete and widespread destruction of the enemy.

Armament

Mujahideen of the IOA, armed with DShK, AKMS and RPG-7, 1987

Most of the Mujahideen's weapons were made in China and the USSR.

• BUR rifles (Lee-Metford and Lee-Enfield (Lee-Metford.Mk.I,II, Lee-Enfield Mk I, I*)) - ten-shot rifles of caliber 303 inches (7.71x56 mm) made in England 1890-1905 .;

• Kalashnikov assault rifles 7.62 mm made in China, Egypt, USSR;

• automatic rifles M-16A1 made in the USA;

• automatic machines produced in Germany, Israel, England, Sweden;

• heavy machine guns DShK 12.7 mm caliber made in China;

• hand-held anti-tank grenade launchers RPG-2, RPG-7 made in the USSR, China, Volsknet - Switzerland, Lanze-2 - Germany, M72 LAW - USA, Sarpak - France, Picket - Israel;

• recoilless rifles caliber 75 mm and 82 mm made in China, Pakistan and the USA;

• mortars - 60 and 82 mm;

• Chinese PURS;

Air defense systems:

• Anti-aircraft mining installations ZGU, ZU-25-2, ZU-23-4 made in China, USSR, Czechoslovakia;

• Small caliber anti-aircraft guns "Oerlikon";

• Man-portable anti-aircraft missile systems "Strela-2" - USSR, China, Egypt, "Jevelin", "Blowpipe" - England, "Stinger", "Redeye" - USA;

Different types of mines, including anti-tank (ATM) And anti-personnel (AP) and landmines;

• Italian mines (TS −1, TS-2.5, TS-1.6, TS-50, SH-55);

• American - M-19, M 18A-1, DSME-S, Claymore;

• Swedish - M-102, English MAK-7, as well as Czechoslovak and Soviet production.

Mujahideen leaders

• Abdul Ali Mazari

• Ahmad Shah Masood

• Ismail Khan

• Said Mansour

• Mojaddedi, Sebgatullah

• Rabbani, Burhanuddin

• Sayyaf, Abdul Rasul

• Haqqani, Jalaluddin

• Hekmatyar, Gulbuddin

Allies of the Mujahideen

• USA represented by the CIA.

• Great Britain represented by MI6

• UAE, as well as some organizations and individuals in other Arab countries.

• Pakistan was a kind of channel for the transfer of American aid; its own support was expressed mainly in the provision of space for training camps and camps for Soviet prisoners of war on its territory, as well as in the participation of Pakistani instructors in the training of the Mujahideen.

• Iran (provided support to the Shia part of the Afghan Mujahideen based in the west of the country along the border with Iran, as well as to detachments of Afghan Mujahideen consisting of Shia Hazaras and Ismaili Hazaras living in the central part of Afghanistan in the provinces of Bamyan and Daikundi, in Baghlan Province In the north of the country).

• The PRC supplied the Mujahideen with weapons, supplying them through Pakistan.

• Egypt - supplies of weapons to the Mujahideen, financial assistance.

Sources of supply and financing

After the entry of Soviet troops into Afghanistan, the CIA formed a network of training camps and supply bases for the Mujahideen in Pakistan. Subsequently, the main sources of funding for the Mujahideen were:

• drug trafficking (thanks to the dushmans who later formed the Northern Alliance, Afghanistan became the world's largest producer of opium and heroin, giving the name to the drug trafficking area - Golden Crescent);

• artisanal gold mining and sale of gold sand;

• sponsorship from the USA, UAE, Pakistan, China, Arab countries, Muslim organizations.

The most famous party leaders

• The Mujahideen were not homogeneous; the units consisted of a large number of small formations, whose commanders often fought not only with Soviet troops, but also with each other. The reason is different national composition (Pashtuns, Tajiks, Uzbeks, Hazaras, Charaimaks, Nuristanis, etc.) and religious (Sunnis, Shiites, Ismailis), different sources of sponsorship.

• Their largest coalition was the Sunni Islamic Unity of the Afghan Mujahideen, or the Peshawar Seven, created in May 1985, which included six Pashtun and one Tajik group (the leader of the Tajik Jamiat-e Islami party, Burhanuddin Rabbani, became the president of Afghanistan after the withdrawal of Soviet troops ). There was also a military-political organization of Shiite Mujahideen - the Shiite Eight, based in Iran.

Peshawar Seven- "Alliance of Seven"

"Alliance of Seven", or "Peshawar Seven" - a military-political alliance of the leaders of the Afghan Mujahideen. Established in 1982, headquartered in Peshawar, Pakistan. He was represented by the leaders of various fundamental Islamic parties, predominantly the Pashtun majority of the Sunni branch of Islam. The alliance included four fundamentalist parties, which declared their main goal to be the creation of an Islamic state in Afghanistan. Afghan society, which represents a large number of different social groups, differing from each other in ethnic, religious and other characteristics, living autonomously or in close proximity to other groups, was characterized as very heterogeneous. Therefore, the forces of the Afghan rebels were ra-zob-ny et-no-che-ski, geo-gra-fi-che-ski, con-fessional-sio-nal- But. Numerous attempts by various groups to unite into a single organized force could not be achieved. thread of dividing them into two main groups: Islamic fun-da-men-ta-lists and moderate na-tsio-na- sheets These are:

• « Islamic Party of Afghanistan"(IPA). It was headed Gulbuddin Hekmatyar. He enjoyed special favor from the US CIA and received up to 40 percent of all American aid to the opposition.

• « Islamic Society of Afghanistan" (IOA) under the leadership Burhanuddin Rabbani.

• "Islamic Union for the Liberation of Afghanistan" (ILU). The head of this party was Abdul Rasool Sayyaf. ISOA focused mainly on Saudi Arabia and received most of its assistance from it.

• "Islamic Party of Afghanistan" Yunus Khales (IPA). One name with the Islamic Party of Afghanistan of Gulbuddin Hetmatyar. Party leader Yunus Khales is the only one of all the G7 leaders who directly participated in the hostilities.

The other three parties of the “seven” were called traditionalist. They advocated the return of Afghanistan to pre-revolutionary forms of government. This:

• National Islamic Front of Afghanistan (NIFA). The leader was Syed Ahmad Geilani. He enjoyed the greatest influence among Afghan refugees in Pakistan.

• National Front for the Salvation of Afghanistan (NFSA). The party, led by Sebghatullah Mojaddedi, was small. She took a monarchist position and advocated the return of the former king Zahir Shah to Afghanistan.

• "Islamic Revolution Movement of Afghanistan" (DIRA). The leader of this group is Muhammad Nabi Muhammadi, religious figure. Among the traditionalist parties he was closest to the fundamentalists.

Shia Eight- "Alliance of Eight"

The “Shiite Eight,” more often called the “Alliance of Eight,” included eight parties focused on the Shiite and Ismaili part of the population of Afghan society. All of them enjoyed financial and other support from the Islamic Republic of Iran and its spiritual leaders. Those living in the provinces bordering Iran - Herat, Farah, partially Helmand, Shia Tajiks, Charaimaks, as well as Shia Hazaras and Ismaili Hazaras living in the central part of Afghanistan in the provinces of Bamiyan, Daykundi, Ghor, Uruzgan, Ghazni, Baghlan, Balkh and Samangan. Shiites and Ismailis, not being the majority of the Afghan population, throughout the history of the Afghan state experienced religious and national discrimination by the majority - Pashtuns and Tajiks. The formation of the “Alliance of Eight” was expedient not only from the point of view of the financial independence of the Shiite part of society from the influence of Sunni Pakistan, that is, the Pashtuns who manage the financial flows of the CIA within the framework of Operation Cyclone, but also attempts to independently participate in the political division of power in the country. The “Shiite Eight” are eight Shiite parties of the Afghan Mujahideen:

• “Hezbe Allah” (Party of Allah), leader Karim Ahmadi “Karim - yak daste” (“Karim is one-armed”), an authoritative Shiite mullah, the party headquarters was located in Mashhad, Iran, party branches - Tehran, Nishapur, Iranian Zabul . Represented in the western and southern provinces of RA Farah, Nimruz and Kandahar)

• Nasr (Victory Party) leaders: Sheikh Mohammad Hussein Sadiqi, Sheikh Abdul Ali Mazari, Sheikh Shafaq - the areas of influence of these leaders extend to the traditional places of residence of the Hazaras in the Hazards - Bamiyan, Daykundi, Ghazni, Uruzgan, Ghor, Baghlan, etc. The headquarters of Nasr were located in Mashhad and Qom, Iran. Represented in the Central Province of the Republic of Armenia, in the Hazarajat region (Bamiyan, Ghazni, Wardak, Uruzgan, Baghlan, Samangan, Balkh, Parwan and Ghor).

• Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps Afghanistan (IRGC) - leader Sheikh Akbari, headquarters were also located in Mashhad and Qom, Iran. Present in the provinces of Ghor and Bamiyan, Balkh, Wardak, Uruzgan.

• "Islamic Movement of Afghanistan" (IMA) - leader Sheikh Mohammad Assef Mohseni (Assef Kandahari) headquarters in Qom, Iran. Present in the provinces of Wardak, Bamiyan, Balkh, Helmand, Nimruz.

• “Council of Islamic Accord” (SIS) - leaders Sheikh Said Ali Beheshti, Said Mohammad Hasan (Said Jargan). The headquarters was located in Mashhad, Iran. Present in the provinces of Ghazni and Bamiyan.

• The Islamic Revolution Movement (MIR) is led by Sheikh Nasrullah Mansour. The headquarters was located in Mashhad, Iran. Presented in Herat province.

• "Organization of Fighters for Islam" (OBI) - leader Sheikh Mosbah Zadeh, leader of the Hazaras of Bamiyan. Headquarters Mashhad, Iran.

• “RAAD Party - “Thunder”” - leaders Sheikh Seyyid Abdul Jaffar Nadiri, Mohammad Khazai, Seyd Ismail Balkhi. Headquarters in Mashhad, Iran. Present in the provinces of Balkh and Herat.

The most famous Mujahideen field commanders

Field commanders- commanders of armed opposition formations of various sizes, permanently based directly on the territory of Afghanistan. They carried out armed opposition to the current official government of the DRA, government troops and the presence of OKSVA. In case of tactical necessity, they came into contact with representatives of the DRA government and concluded temporary agreements on various issues. There are known cases when field commanders and their troops went over to the side of the people's power. The bulk fought fiercely, under the banners of the “Alliance of Seven” or the “Shiite Eight”. There were also commanders independent of political parties.

The most famous and influential were:

• Ahmad Shah Massoud is the leader of the IOA, his troops operated in Panjshir Gorge and the Charikar Valley, near the strategic Hairatan-Kabul highway, in the Salang Pass area

• Ismail Khan (Turan Ismail) - controlled the entire west, partly the north-west and south-west of the country

• Yunus Khales, Jalaluddin Haqqani"IPA" - east, southeast of the country

• Said Mansur "IPA", Ustad Farid "IPA", Abdul Sayyaf, Abdul Haq, Said Mohammad Hasan (Said Jargan) "SIS", Said Ali Beheshti "SIS" - the center of the country

• Mulla Malang, Mulla Naqib, Mulla Nasim “DIRA”, Mohammad Assef Mohseni (Assef Kandahari) “SIS” - south of the country

• Mohammad Bashir (IPA), Abdul Basir "IPA", Kazi Kabir Marzbon "IPA", Saeed Mansoor, Abdul Wahob, Mohammad Wadud, Sufi Payand "IPA", Arienpour "IPA", Khirodmand "IPA", "Dr. Ismail" "IPA" ", Zabiullo "IPA" - northeast of the country

• others: Nikmamad “DIRA”, Abdurahman “DIRA”, Gulyammamad “ISOA”, Gafar “DIRA”, Mahmud “IPH”, Akbarali “IPA”, Fateh “IPA” and others

These leaders, directly leading the armed struggle against the PDPA regime, acquired significant weight and influence both among the rebels and among the country's population and were even more popular than foreign leaders of opposition parties.

People from other countries of the world also joined the ranks of the Mujahideen, especially from Saudi Arabia, contingents from Algeria, Jordan, Egypt, Bangladesh, Philippines, small groups from Morocco, France, England.

Zones of military activity in Afghanistan

The main zones of military activity were areas of cities and towns:

• Kandahar, Musa Qala, Argandab, Kajaki-Sufla, Islamdara, Kishkinakhud, Spinbuldak, Kalat, Lashkargah, Girishk - in the south

• Alikheil, Khost, Urgun, Narai, Gardez, Shahjoy - in the southeast

• Jalalabad, Asadabad, Asmar, Birkot, Mehterlam, Surubi - in the east

• Baghlan, Kunduz, Khanabad, Talukan, Kishim, Faizabad - in the northeast

• Herat, Farah in the west

• Panjshir Gorge, Charikar Valley, Wardak, Paghman, Ghazni in Central Afghanistan

Large fortified areas of the Afghan Mujahideen

Along the border with Pakistan and Iran there were several large bases and fortified areas of the Mujahideen, repeatedly occupied by Soviet troops during military operations during the Afghan War of 1979-1989. The most famous of these are:

• Jawara - Paktia province (southeast, border with Pakistan)

• Tora Bora - Nangarhar province (east, border with Pakistan)

• Kokari-Sharshari - Herat province (west, border with Iran)

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Mujahideen of Afghanistan
Ahmad Shah Masood

The Afghan Mujahideen (Arabic: مجاهد‎ mujāhid, mujahiddin) are members of irregular armed forces motivated by radical Islamic ideology, organized into a single insurgent force during the Afghan Civil War from 1979 to 1992. They were recruited from the local population since 1979 with the aim of waging an armed struggle against the military presence of the USSR and the Afghan governments of Babrak Karmal and Najibullah. After the end of the war in the mid-1990s, some of the Afghan Mujahideen joined the ranks of the radical Taliban movement, while others joined the Northern Alliance units.
The word "mujahid" is of Arabic origin ("mujahid", plural "mujahiddin"), literally meaning "fighter for the faith", at the same time being the name of a participant in jihad or rebel (rebel). The Soviet army and the Afghan authorities called them dushmans (Dari دشمان - dušman, dushmon, Pashto دښمان - duxman, dušman - “enemy”), and the Afghans called the Soviet soldiers shuravi (Dari شوروی - šuravî, šuravi - “Soviet”). Soviet soldiers often, in everyday life, used the slang word “spirits” - a derivative of “dushmans” - to designate them.
The Dushmans wore the same traditional Afghan clothes as the local population, without outwardly standing out from them (shirts, black vests, turbans or pakol).

The main line and basis of the political platform in the propaganda of the Mujahideen ideology was the declaration of the basic principle: “The duty of every Afghan is to protect his homeland - Afghanistan and his faith - holy Islam from the infidels.”
Uniting under the banner of sacred Islam all devout Muslims: “...In the name of Allah, the duty of every devout Muslim is a holy war - Jihad, for this he must go and kill the infidels, only then his soul can enter the gates of heaven.”
The spiritual and political leaders of the dushmans (Mujahideen) paid special attention to conducting political propaganda and agitation in the ranks of armed groups and among the local population. Mujahideen political parties and foreign sponsors spent significant amounts of money for these purposes.
In the propaganda struggle for the support of the local population, the Mujahideen won an unconditional victory.
The Mujahideen, as part of solving immediate combat missions, acted as part of groups of various sizes: small mobile detachments, large groups and large formations.
Sometimes, armed formations varying in size, combat capability, equipment and degree of organization, in addition to the main goal of expelling the “shuravi” and overthrowing the current government, pursued their own private and financial interests.
Often, internal contradictions between political parties, their leaders and leaders (field commanders), associated with the division of spheres of influence and advantages in the distribution of foreign sponsorship, led to armed clashes between the Mujahideen (dushmans) themselves.
However, despite various contradictions related to a common goal, the Mujahideen were able to quickly mobilize significant forces and resources, organizing a unified interaction of formations to conduct large-scale combat operations on a wide front, as a single paramilitary association.
Every year, the number of members of the Mujahideen armed forces since the end of 1979, the moment the OKSVA was introduced, has grown exponentially. By the time OKSVA was withdrawn in 1989, it exceeded 250 thousand people.
Throughout the war of 1979-1989, in government circles, in the ranks of the army command, the Ministry of State Security, the Ministry of Internal Affairs of the DRA, and among the local population, the Mujahideen had a widely ramified and well-organized intelligence network.
Mujahideen detachments were created along geographic, party, national, confessional, and tribal lines; their actions were coordinated and controlled by the authoritative command of local field commanders and local leaders, which made it possible to act coherently and effectively.
The purpose of the armed struggle of the Mujahideen against OKSVA, the state authorities and the armed forces of the DRA was the withdrawal of Soviet troops and the overthrow of the pro-Soviet government regime in Afghanistan.

Combat tactics are guerrilla. The main principles of managing the combat operations of the Mujahideen were:

Avoidance of direct clashes with superior forces of regular troops;
not turning hostilities into positional warfare,
refusal to consolidate and retain occupied areas for a long time;
surprise attacks with extensive use of Basmachi movement tactics

The armed confrontation was conventionally divided into three stages:

Organized resistance with an inactive form of hostilities, holding individual points and areas, conducting extensive propaganda events among the population and attracting them to their side.
Increasing combat activity through sabotage and terrorist attacks, raids on garrisons and posts of government troops, and attacks on convoys. The main goal is to capture weapons, ammunition and various logistics.
Complete and widespread destruction of the enemy.

The most influential Mujahideen

Ahmad Shah Mosud
Son Dust Muhammadzhan was born in 1953 in the village of Dzhangalak (Bazarak volost, Panjshir district) into the family of a large feudal lord, a career military man (his father, with the rank of colonel, retired in 1976). Tajik by nationality, Sunni Muslim. He graduated from the capital’s theological lyceum “Abu Hanifiya”, studied at Kabul University at the Faculty of Engineering, where he joined the “Muslim Youth” organization, the origins of which were B. Rabbani, G. Hekmatyar, R. Sayaf and others.
In 1973, after a coup d'état, supporters of the Muslim Youth organized a conspiracy in the army to overthrow the Daoud regime and proclaim the Islamic Republic. The plot was discovered and the participants were executed. A. Shah managed to escape.
In 1974-1975 he takes an active part in the preparation and conduct of the uprising in the village of Bazarak, Panjshir district, which occurred on July 21, 1975, but due to lack of support from the population it was quickly suppressed. Ahmad Shah went into exile (Egypt, Lebanon), where he actively participated in hostilities and terrorist attacks as part of Palestinian combat groups. He studied the experience of guerrilla warfare in the countries of the Middle East, Latin America and Southeast Asia. The regime of M. Daoud declared him a war criminal.
In 1978, after the April Revolution, Ahmad Shah returned to Afghanistan and began creating armed units in the Panjshir Gorge. Possessing good organizational and propaganda skills, having theological training (an important factor in a Muslim country), combat experience, skillfully using the nationalist sentiments of the Tajiks and the dogmas of Islam, as well as taking advantage of the personal patronage of B. Rabbani, Ahmad Shah managed to create and lead by the end of 1979 IOA rebel group in Panjshir. At first, according to his own testimony, he had only 20 fighters, but the experience of carrying out terrorist attacks allowed him to quickly destroy the leaders claiming leadership in the area and establish his dominance here. It is no coincidence that Ahmad Shah received the pseudonym Masood, which means “happy.” In addition, he immediately proved to everyone that he is a strong-willed and energetic person who shows persistence and determination in achieving his goals.
By 1981, the number of Masud’s group had reached 2,200 people, and it began to pose a serious danger, mainly on the Kabul-Hairatan communication line in the Jabal-Ussaraj section and in the southern part of the Salang pass. They were supported by local residents.

Turan Ismail
The son of Mohammad Aslam (Ismail Khan) was born in 1947 in the village of Nasrabad, Shindand district, Herat province. Tajik by nationality. He graduated from the Harbi Puhantong Military School. Until 1979, with the rank of captain (Turan), he commanded a battalion of the 17th Infantry Division. After the Herat rebellion (March 1979), he deserted and led the IOA armed formation in the vicinity of Herat.
He was the general leader of the armed forces of the IOA in the province of Herat and was considered the second leader of the rebels in Afghanistan after Ahmad Shah.
Married. The family lives in Tayabad (Iran). Secretive and cautious, he often changes the location of his headquarters. Extremely cruel. Personally deals with prisoners. He enjoys authority among the local population, as he prohibits robberies.

Molawi Jalaluddin Khakani
Born in 1935 into the Jadran tribe, Mizi clan. He graduated from a religious school (madrassa) in Pakistan. He received a clergy title and upon returning to Afghanistan opened a madrasah in the village of Farah, Paktia province. During the reigns of Zahir Shah and M. Daoud, he took an active part in the anti-government activities of the Muslim Brotherhood organization in the province of Paktia.
By nature he is a cruel and uncompromising person. Jalaluddin's armed forces number up to 3 thousand people, located mainly in the area inhabited by the Jadran tribe in the provinces of Paktika and Paktia.

Said Mansour
The son of Said Martez (pseudonym Said Pancho) was born in the province of Parvan in 1955. His nationality is Tajik. He graduated from 12 classes of the lyceum, was a small trader for some time, then entered Kabul University, but completed only two courses. He joined the Islamic Party of Afghanistan in his first year at university. In 1978, G. Hekmatyar was appointed leader of the IPA rebels in Baghlan province. The main area of ​​operation of his gangs is adjacent to the Doshi-Salang highway section.
Shows exceptional cruelty to people he suspects of loyalty to the ruling regime. Smart, cunning and resourceful. He repeatedly flirted with party and government bodies, pretending that he wanted to start negotiations on cooperation. However, he used the gained time to strengthen gangs and strengthen his authority among the leaders of detachments and groups.
He is careful, constantly changing his places of stay, fearing attacks from opponents. Practices disseminating misinformation through his agents regarding his movements. Has personal security of 20 people. The main base areas are located in the Valyan and Bajga gorges (Baghlan province, Khinzhan parish).

Mohammad Bashir
Zergul's son was born in 1951 in Baghlan province. Pashtun by nationality.
Parents died in 1984. Previously, he worked as an official in the agriculture department in Baghlan province. He was a major bandit leader of the IPA in Baghlan. Characterized by caution and cruelty. Personally participates in executions. The actions of his gangs are criminal in nature, the rebels rob and terrorize local residents.

Ustad Farid
Born in 1949. Tajik by nationality. He graduated from Kabul University, worked as a lyceum teacher, then as a school director. While still studying at the university, he became close to Hekmatyar and was a member of the Muslim Youth organization. By nature he is secretive and cunning. He is an implacable enemy of the PDPA and the Kabul authorities. Maintains contact with Hekmatyar and follows only his personal instructions. He is the general leader of the IPA gangs in Kapisa province.

Abdul Khalid Basir
The son of Moulavi Mamad Aslam was born in 1945 in the city of Fayzabad (Badakhshan province) into the family of a clergyman. Tajik by nationality. In 1965 he graduated from the Pamir Lyceum in Fayzabad. During the reign of M. Dauda he worked as a teacher in Faizabad and in the Korano-Munjan volost. After April 1978, he initiated the armed struggle in the province of Badakhshan. Basir personally participates in hostilities both against government and Soviet troops, and against gangs of other parties. He strives to expand his zone of influence and get to the lapis lazuli deposits in Jarm district (in this he competes even with Ahmad Shah). During the fighting, he showed himself to be an experienced leader, a cruel and treacherous opponent. His closest circle includes only relatives. Basir's authority rests on the feeling of fear even among his loved ones.
In its activities it relies on the support of local residents of villages located northeast of Fayzabad. The number of his armed detachments is about a thousand people; Basir pays great attention to the engineering equipment of the base sites in the gorges, the arrangement of firing positions, etc.

Said Ali Beheshti
Born in 1930 in the village of Chejchi, Varas district, Bamiyan province, in the family of a clergyman. His nationality is Hazara, Shia Muslim. He graduated from a madrasah in Bamiyan, then continued his studies in Najaf (Iraq) under the guidance of Ayatollah Khoya. Upon returning from Iraq, he took up active religious activities among the Hazaras and in a short period of time, with the financial support of the major feudal lord Hazarajat, Vakil Sarwar Khan became one of the famous Shiite religious figures.

Said Mohammed Hassan
The son of Said Mubin (better known by the name Said Jagran) was born in 1925 in the village of Sporephawat, Nuwar district, Ghazni province, into the family of a middle feudal lord. Hazara by nationality. S. Jagran studied at a military lyceum for seven years, graduated from the Kharbi Pukhantun military school in Kabul, and then from the Higher Military Artillery School in the USSR. Last place of service - 14th Infantry Division in Ghazni, military rank of lieutenant colonel. Deserted during the reign of X. Amin in 1979. In 1980-1981. conducted active and relatively successful military operations against the DRA Armed Forces.

Mohammed Assef Mohseni
Born in Kandahar in 1925. Hazara by nationality. Received theological education in Najaf. Close to Ayatollah Khomeini. In 1981, at the World Islamic Conference in Pakistan, he was declared the spiritual leader (pir) of the Shiites in Afghanistan. He adheres to a strong pro-Iranian orientation, at one time he had close contact with the former President of Iran A. Banisadr and now maintains close ties with the Iranian clergy, including with prominent Iranian religious figures Shariatmadari, Qumi, Shirazi. Works closely with the leaders of Hezbe Allah (Party of Allah).
He firmly stands on the position of the need to wage an armed struggle against the government of the republic, its overthrow, the withdrawal of Soviet troops and the establishment in Afghanistan of an “Islamic republic” regime modeled on Iran. Kandahari and Beheshti are waging a hidden struggle for sole leadership in the SIS organization (Beheshti is a follower of Ayatollah Khoya, and Kandahari is an ardent supporter of Ayatollah Khomeini).

Of course, there were other field commanders, many of them came to the forefront after the withdrawal of Soviet troops. In addition to the opposition parties operating in Afghanistan, Pakistan and Iran, many different organizations were based in other countries and fought against the PDPA.

| USSR participation in Cold War conflicts. War in Afghanistan (1979-1989)

Background material on the war in Afghanistan
(1979-1989)

Fortified areas of the Afghan Mujahideen
(1979-1989)

Fortified areas of the Afghan Mujahideen (1979-1989) - “fortified areas”, “base areas”, “fortifications”, “strong points” of the Afghan Mujahideen during the Afghan war (1979-1989) - a key link in the system of organizing the armed struggle of the Afghan opposition formations with the Limited contingent of Soviet troops in Afghanistan and government forces of the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan.

Long-term fortifications that are significant over the territory, fundamental complexes with powerful defensive communications, fortifications and other protective structures, organized according to a unified plan for the interaction (control) of the fire system.

They were called upon to conduct prolonged combat operations in a stable defense on a wide front, in complete isolation with relatively small forces and means to inflict maximum damage on the superior besieging and assault forces of the Soviet troops, using heavy artillery and attack aircraft.

Erected and equipped with funds from the “Unions of Islamic Parties” of Afghanistan: “Peshawar Seven” and “Shiite Eight”, attracted within the framework of international financial and military assistance to the Afghan opposition formations.

They were located throughout the territory of the DRA, equipped in the border areas in the zone of the Afghan-Pakistani or Afghan-Iranian borders, and simultaneously served as strongholds and large transshipment bases.

The largest during the Afghan war (1979-1989) were the “Basic areas”: “Javara”, “Tora-Bora”, “Kokari-Sharshari”.

Afghan opposition base areas

In 1981 in Afghanistan, equipping combat areas with enemy air defense systems reached large scales. “There were up to several dozen anti-aircraft firing points around the fortified areas and Mujahideen bases. Risk reduction was achieved by skillful use of the terrain, ensuring stealth of the approach and surprise of reaching the target, as well as the choice of escape routes after the attack. On the enemy’s side were good knowledge of the area, support from the population, and the ability to use natural cover and camouflage. Opposition detachments moved quickly and quickly dispersed in case of danger. It was not easy to detect them from the air even with guidance due to the lack of characteristic landmarks in the monotonous terrain. In addition, planes and helicopters increasingly encountered anti-aircraft fire.”

"Jawara"

Jawara (Pashto: “Wolf Pit”) is a fortified area of ​​the Afghan Mujahideen during the Afghan War (1979-1989). (“Fortified area”, “base area”, “strong point and transshipment base”) - a long-term defensive structure of significant size, a “strong point and transshipment base” of a large armed formation as part of the “south-eastern united group” of a major field commander, one of the leaders of the Peshawar Seven - Jalaluddin Haqqani in the Afghan-Pakistani border zone of the Khost province, Republic of Afghanistan.

The Javara fortification is a complex with powerful defensive communications from defensive structures and fortifications, organized according to a single control plan (interaction) of the “fire system” for the purpose of conducting long-term defensive actions with superior enemy forces. About 20% of the total volume of foreign aid material resources coming from neighboring Pakistan passed through the Javara transshipment base: food, equipment, weapons and ammunition.

“Javara” was a major object of propaganda significance - a broadcasting platform for journalists and politicians sympathetic to the Mujahideen. It consisted of many galleries and shelters, storage and living quarters - a hospital, barracks, headquarters bunker, etc.

A fortified area in the southeastern province of Khost is a fortification structure with powerful defensive communications, protective structures and fortifications, with a unified plan for the interaction (control) of the fire system in a sustainable defense, in conditions of complete isolation, it is capable of effectively resisting significantly superior forces and means (ground forces, artillery and aviation), attacking the enemy on a wide front, causing maximum damage with insignificant forces.

The construction of the Jawara base began even before the PDPA came to power to fight the Daoud regime and continued for a long time. The fortification was a complex of above-ground and underground (tunnel-type with a protective thickness of 15–20 m) structures, which housed everything necessary for life, everyday life and combat activities: a command post with a communications center, training and propaganda centers, several barracks, many weapons depots, ammunition and materiel, auto repair and weapons workshops, a cartridge loading shop (for assembling BUR cartridges), a hospital, a prison, many warehouses for weapons, ammunition and materiel. Specialists in mine demolition, the use of anti-aircraft machine guns (DShK, ZGU) and other types of weapons were trained, and specialized centers were also created with separate training for specialists in the combat use of man-portable anti-aircraft missile systems (Mamadgart, Varsak, Sadda, Aravali, etc.) and missile launchers." (From the book “We attack from heaven” by Sergei Sergeev)

The vital activity of the fortified area was supported by backup and alternative energy sources. It was equipped with an autonomous water supply system with an artesian well. Availability of an inpatient medical facility. The base was guarded by a detachment of field commander Jalaluddin Haqqani, and Pashtuns living in the region were used as auxiliary forces.

Excerpt from the memoirs of Army General V.I. Varennikov about the Javara base:

“...It seems that everyone knows about the assault on Ishmael. We also heard something about the Maginot Line. These fortifications were considered impregnable. Is it acceptable to compare them with the JAWARA base? But the fact that the base itself and the defenses around it were built according to the latest science and technology and were considered impregnable by Western and Eastern specialists is an indisputable fact...” - V.I. Varennikov “Unique” (book 5 chapter 4)

There were administrative buildings and residential buildings to accommodate dignitaries and foreign representatives. The base had autonomous electricity and water supply. The approaches to the base were covered by three lines of strong points equipped with fire installations and shelters at dominant heights. The entire area had exceptionally strong air defense - a large number of MANPADS, DShK, ZGU.

"Tora Bora"

Tora Bora ("Tora Bora" or "Tura Bura") - a fortified area of ​​the Afghan Mujahideen during the Afghan War (1979-1989), the radical Islamic movement "Taliban" and the international terrorist organization "Alqaeda" during the reign of the "Taliban regime" and the entry of troops of the Western anti-Taliban coalition "ISAF".

The fortified area "Tora Bora" - "Fortified area", a strategic "base area", "strong point and transshipment base" - a long-term defensive structure of significant size, a key link in the rear system of the "eastern united group" under the command of a major field commander, one of the leaders of the Peshawar Seven - Yunus Khales.

It is a labyrinth of tunnels, going to a depth of 400 m, with many galleries, storage facilities, living quarters and shelters, bunkers, weapons and ammunition depots. The total length of communications is more than 25 km. Located in a remote mountain range at an altitude of 4000 m (above sea level), 85 km south of Jalalabad, Nangarhar province.

Used by the Afghan mujahideen and international terrorists led by Osama bin Laden, Mullah Omar, Yunus Khales and other field commanders of the Pashtun tribes during the Afghan war of 1979-1989. and later, with the aim of conducting combat operations in a stable defense with the superior forces of the “Northern Alliance” and “troops of the Western anti-Taliban coalition.”

"Kokari-Sharshari"

Kokari-Sharshari is a fortified area of ​​the Afghan Mujahideen during the Afghan War (1979-1989). “Fortified area”, “base area”, “fortification structure”, “strong point”, “transshipment base” - a long-term defensive structure of significant size, a stronghold and transshipment point of a large armed formation as part of the “Western united group” of a major field commander Ismail Khan (Turan Ismail), in the Kuhe-Senge-Surakh mountain range - “White Mountains” in the Afghan-Iranian border area, Herat province.

The base area “Kokari-Sharshari”, also known as “Kokari-Shershari”, “Kakari-Shashari”, “Kakari-Shushari”, “Sharshar”, “Sher-Sher” - a fortification complex of defensive structures and fortifications with powerful defensive communications organized according to a unified control (interaction) plan for the fire system, it was called upon to conduct prolonged combat operations in a stable defense on a wide front in complete isolation, with relatively small forces and means inflicting maximum damage on the superior besieging and assault forces of the Soviet troops, using heavy artillery and attack aircraft.

The base in Herat province was built in 1984–1985. according to a plan developed by West German and Iranian military engineers. In neighboring Iran, the rebels underwent general military training in 34 centers (camps): studying the material of small arms; practical shooting; mastering the basics of combat tactics; practicing terrain orientation skills; provision of primary health care; religious and political training, a course of anti-government and anti-Soviet propaganda. For the ideological indoctrination of students, a special propaganda faculty was created at the Qom Theological Center. The dushmans immediately understood that propaganda is one of the foundations of guerrilla warfare. Leaflets to the local population and appeals to our soldiers came across often.

“Kokari-Sharshari. Among the “Afghans” this place was considered bad and was “famous” for its solid defense fortifications and communications. We had to destroy them, as well as seize the warehouses of weapons and ammunition of the Mujahideen gang under the command of the field commander Turan Ismail Khan. About thirty minutes later we were approaching the landing site. Scorched earth, low mountains by Afghan standards, the dry bed of the Harirud River - the place where, according to the topographic map, the border of Afghanistan with Iran passes.”

The strategic transit and strong point is a key link in the partisan activities of the Afghan Mujahideen in the region bordering Iran, the west of the Republic of Afghanistan in the area of ​​​​responsibility of the commander of the “Western united group” of the Mujahideen - Ismail Khan (Turan Ismail) Infrastructure “Kokari-Sharshari” - “headquarters bunker” command", "communications center", "repeater", "barracks", "bomb shelter", "hospital" with modern medical equipment and medicines, "warehouses" with supplies of food, drinking water, weapons and ammunition were located in a multi-level complex - a powerful reinforced concrete structure capable of withstanding bomb attacks from aircraft and heavy artillery. Despite fierce resistance, on August 25, 1986, the Kokari group was defeated. The defenders who survived the defense, realizing the doom of the citadel, using communication passages in the underground communications system, leaving the defended positions, and the commander of the formations, Ismail Khan, retired to the territory of Iran.

“... We still took the fortified area of ​​Ismail Khan in Kokari-Sharshari. His gang was defeated. And only a very small part of the surviving dushmans, abandoning their weapons and ammunition, went to Iran together with Ismail Khan...”

- Commander of the 149th Guards Motorized Rifle Regiment A.I. Skorodumov

"Alburz, Agarsay, Shorcha, Bayramshah"

Fortified areas (strong points and transshipment bases) of field commanders: Zabiullo, Mohammad Alim, Atta Mohammad Nur - “Alburs”, “Agarsai”, “Bayramshah”, “Shorcha” and others were located in the zone: Marmolsky, Tangimarmolsky, Shadiansky, Ak Dara, Gor Dara, Tashkurgan gorges of the Red Rocks mountain range in the provinces of Balkh and Samangan 80-100 km. to the south, southwest of the city of Mazar-i-Sharif - the north of the Republic of Afghanistan. - the north of the Republic of Afghanistan. The largest combined arms operations to capture these base areas during the Afghan War (1979-1989) were: in 1980, August 1981, 1982, March 1983, January-February 1984, etc.

The Marmol gorge, with a total length of 110 kilometers, included four mountain sections following each other - starting from Chimtal, Balkh, Dideidi, Nakhri Shahi, Marmol and ending with the Khulm section.

The Marmol region was a difficult-to-reach area, well prepared by the Mujahideen in engineering terms. A plateau surrounded by mountains, the excess of which above the plateau was about 800 meters. There was a hill in the center of the plateau. There was a road to the area along the narrow Tangimarmol pass in the mountains. To protect themselves from the actions of Soviet troops, the Mujahideen mined this passage.

The rebel minefields blew up the tanks of the 40th Army, and they planted large charges in the form of aerial bombs into the mountain slopes. All the charges were combined into a single network, which, when detonated, was supposed to bring down mountains on the heads of the armored group that entered the passage. However, engineering reconnaissance was able to identify these charges and disrupt the network, and then clear the passage.

Powerful air strikes were carried out on the heights where the rebel positions were located, and then SA and Border Troops units were landed along the entire circumference of the plateau. Following them, the main forces entered the area and completed the defeat of the base area. In this area, a large number of warehouses with weapons and ammunition were discovered located in caves, which were also mined. A prison was also discovered in the area.

Mention of operations in the Balkh province in the Red Rocks area, 70 km. southwest of Mazar-i-Sharif: “...At the same time, there are cases when, during hostilities, rebels launch direct attacks on areas where our units are entrenched (BALKH province, landing area of ​​4 MSR 149 MSP, 8 MSR 122 SMEs in Operation MARMOL), and also provide fierce resistance and persistence in the areas. The rebels put up fierce resistance and only after repeated air strikes and artillery fire can their morale be broken.”

Subsequently, one of the units of the USSR border troops was stationed in the “Marmol Gorge” on one of the heights in the center of the plateau.

Operations to capture the SD in the Marmol area

Elimination of the rear system, capture of powerful fortified areas (UR) of fortification complexes - strong points and transshipment bases of the Afghan Mujahideen: “Alburs”, “Agarsai”, “Bayramshah”, “Shorcha” in the zone of Marmolsky, Tangimarmolsky, Shadian and Tashkurgan gorges of the “Red” mountain range rocks" in the province of Balkh during the Afghan War (1979-1989) were carried out during the combined arms "Marmol operations" by units of the 201st Gatchina Double Red Banner Motorized Rifle Division, other units of OKSVA, units of the border troops (KSAPO) of the KGB of the USSR and government forces of the DRA against armed formations Afghan mujahideen of the Islamic Society of Afghanistan Burhanuddin Rabbani (field commanders: Zabiullo, Mohammad Alim, Atta Mohammad Nur, etc.) with the involvement of significant forces and means - “Marmol operations”.

Combined arms operations: 1980, August 1981, 1982, March 1983, January-February 1984, September 1985, 1986, 1987, etc. were carried out with the aim of paralyzing the activities of anti-government forces: the defeat of armed formations , capture of fortified (base) areas: “Agarsai”, “Alburs”, “Bayramshah”, “Shorcha”, capture of strongholds and transit bases of the opposition, weapons and ammunition depots in the zone of the “Marmolsky, Tangimarmolsky, Shadian and Tashkurgan gorges” of the mountain range “Red Rocks” Balkh province, blocking the supply of material resources from the Balkh transshipment bases to other northern provinces of Afghanistan: Samangan, Jawzjan, Sari-Pul, Faryab, etc. The result of the operations was the capture of strong points, a significant amount of captured weapons and ammunition.

"Darzab"

Darzab is a fortified area (UR) (base area) a stronghold and transit point of the Afghan Mujahideen (1979-1989) of the Islamic Society of Afghanistan party of Burhanuddin Rabbani at the junction of the provinces of Faryab and Jawzjan in the north of the Republic of Afghanistan. The village of Darzab and the stronghold of the same name lay in the foothills, in a three hundred meter canyon of a mountain area.

The defeat of a large base area of ​​the opposition in the Darzab region on the border of the provinces of Jawzjan and Faryab, carried out from February 15 to 19, 1982, was preceded by thorough reconnaissance preparations. The territory (zone) of the planned military operation to defeat the “large base area” of the Darzab rebels in the northern region of the DRA included the area of ​​​​contact between the provinces of Faryab and Jowzjan.

Operation to capture the Darzab missile launcher

In January 1982, Chief of Staff of the 40th Army, Major General Ter-Grigoryants N.G. was appointed head of the “Darzab Operation” to block and destroy the enemy group in the province of Faryab (Meymen).

According to intelligence data, an underground Afghan government supported by the United States, Pakistan and other countries has been created in this area. Their further plans included separating part of the country’s territory from the center and creating a powerful center of resistance on it. Naturally, this could not be allowed to happen. In a short time, under the leadership of Major General Ter-Grigoryants, an “air-ground operation” was planned and carried out. About 1,000 military personnel of the Soviet Army and the DRA Armed Forces, about 15 aircraft and more than two dozen transport and fire support helicopters were involved.

“Planes with paratroopers on board from Kabul landed at the Mazar-i-Sharif airfield. There, having linked up with Afghan units according to a pre-planned pattern, the paratroopers with weapons and ammunition boarded MI-8MT helicopters. Fighter-bomber aircraft began to strike at previously identified targets. The movement of ground special forces units to the planned area began for joint actions with the landing force after its landing. 4 battalions of the Airborne Forces, 2 battalions of the Special Operations Forces of the GRU (OKSVA) and 4 battalions of the DRA Armed Forces, with the support of artillery and aviation, entered into prolonged hostilities in the mountains with the rebels in the Darzab region. The operation was commanded by the Chief of Staff of the 40th Army, General N.G. Ter-Grigoryants.”

The first stage of the operation on January 29, 1982 provided for the landing of a tactical airborne assault of units of the 103rd Guards Airborne Division on commanding heights, straddling the spurs and launching units of the DRA Armed Forces into the Darzab village.

However, the weather made its own adjustments to the course of the operation: “...Contrary to the optimistic forecasts of meteorologists, the helicopters with the landing force found themselves above a continuous veil of thick clouds. The capabilities of navigation equipment on military transport helicopters of that time left much to be desired. The crew navigators were only approximately able to determine the location of the helicopters relative to the landing area.”

When approaching the landing site, heavy machine-gun fire was opened on the helicopters. In this regard, the arriving units reached the landing site only the second time. The landing was carried out at a minimum altitude and speed. The rest of the helicopters failed to fly up to their designated targets on the spurs. Despite the low clouds, the helicopters landed troops, who occupied the commanding heights and did not allow the armed opposition units to escape from the Darzab area.

Helicopter aviation, using a narrow space in the sky, where the cloud had not yet reunited with the mountains, chose the tactic: “Moving in a spiral, one after another entered this gap, under which, like in a bowl, between the mountains the rebellious “Darzab” was located. Having barely completed this maneuver, the crews saw the settlement itself, but the rapidly settling cloud to the ground left no room for further maneuvering. However, the helicopters were discovered by the enemy, and heavy fire was opened on them.”

The advance detachment of units of the 350th Guards Parachute Regiment (350th Guards Airborne Regiment) of the 103rd Guards Airborne Division (103rd Airborne Division) was landed on the spurs of two ridges in the Darzab gorge area. Under the veil of clouds stretched the mountains and the area occupied by the enemy. The rebels, using knowledge of the terrain and current natural anomalies - with weapons, in front of the paratroopers, disappeared into the fog beyond shooting range.

The immediate task of the troops was to land and consolidate at the landing sites. Further: capture the adjacent dominant heights and provide fire cover for the landing of the main landing forces and the headquarters of the 40th Army.

The landing of units was accompanied by entry into battle. In a fierce two-hour battle, the paratroopers managed to capture a number of strategic heights. The landing force with subunits of the main forces continued to arrive in the area of ​​operation. “The ensuing battle was already in a continuous cloud, and the shooting became more and more chaotic and disorderly. In such conditions, there was a real danger of shooting at friendly units. Major General Ter-Grigoryants gave the command to cease fire and gain a foothold in the landing area. Soon the shooting died down from the opposite side. A new battle began a few hours later, when the cloud covering the mountains finally dissipated.”

During continuous battles, throughout the day and night, two dominant heights above the gorge were captured. As a result, by morning the landing site for the main forces was covered. The rebels, realizing that they were unable to drop the ground forces from the heights, no longer attacked.

Air force aviation and artillery worked on the indicated targets for more than four hours. During the day, the landing of the main forces was dropped onto the held heights - two regiments of the 103rd Guards Airborne Division: the 350th and 357th ODDP (both, two battalions).

At the end of the landing, the units were given the task of “moving to the specified line to block the area from where the combined units were to move out to comb the village of Darzab...”.

According to intelligence data, in this village there was a “training school for junior rebel commanders.” The second stage of the operation began on the morning of January 31 and lasted almost two days. In addition to the paratroopers of the 103rd Guards Airborne Division, two detachments (battalions) of GRU special forces (154th and 177th Special Forces Special Forces) took part in the operation.

For three days, the paratroopers did not leave the battle. We collected all the remaining provisions from the personnel and distributed them over two days. “The paratroopers ate almost all the snow in the area of ​​the strong point.” It was also important to keep people from the cold and prevent the wounded from dying. TNT was burned to heat them. Even in a critical situation, “the paratroopers did not wait until they were killed.” Having formed a reconnaissance group, they carried out sorties and carried out raids every night.

In order to evade mortar fire, the units dug in using improvised means; bayonet-knives and helmets. By the morning of the first day, we managed to dig three dugouts in the frozen ground: large two-meter holes - one per platoon, with communication passages. This saved the paratroopers' lives.

During the protracted confrontation, the helicopter pilots used unguided rocket launchers (NURS) from disabled helicopters. Having deployed the skeletons of the rotorcraft in the desired direction, the landing force had at its disposal a kind of multiple launch rocket system. These NURS salvoes from the ground turned out to be a complete surprise for the enemy and made it possible to significantly increase the firepower of the ground forces units. With air support from Mi-24 attack helicopters, the paratroopers defeated the enemy in the mountainous area. After this, they successfully linked up with special forces units, which by that time had already blocked and destroyed the rebels on the outskirts of Darzab. The goals and objectives of the first stage of the operation were completed.

The second stage of the operation During the combing of the bottom of the gorge, the forces of the paratroopers and special forces were reunited. On February 2, units of the 103rd Airborne Division carried out tasks to provide cover for the site, from where all forces and assets involved in the operation departed to the Maimane airfield, and were later transferred by military transport aircraft to Kabul.

However, the final stage of the operation went according to an unplanned scenario. After the departure of the main forces, units of the 103rd Guards Airborne Division expected evacuation by helicopter. But the weather interfered with the plans. It snowed sharply. When the helicopters entered the operation area to gather troops, they were unable to land.

Since the units closest to the sites were located 80 km away, in the current situation it was urgent to regain control over the dominant heights and wait for the weather to evacuate. As night approached, the snow piled up to a meter deep. The temperature dropped to minus 20 degrees. Meanwhile, the rebels, mistakenly assuming the departure of the Army, began to return to the “area”, which made a fatal mistake.

Having run into an ambush by paratroopers, the rebels attempted a counterattack with the goal of breaking through, but they failed. The first few rebel attacks were repulsed. Having assessed the situation, the rebels brought up mortars, and with a regularity of 20-30 minutes they began to fire continuously for three to five minutes. “In an ambush”, the rebels lost more than 10 more people. About 50 weapons were collected at the battle site.

During the operation, the “Base” was completely destroyed. “The defeat of the “impregnable Darzab” contributed to some stabilization of the situation in the northern provinces of the DRA and reduced the activity of the opposition in the region.”

"Krer" (Karera)

Krer - base area (Soviet military personnel called it “Karera”) - base area (fortification structure - strong point and transshipment base) of the Afghan Mujahideen of the Islamic Union for the Liberation of Afghanistan in the east of the Republic of Afghanistan. Under the leadership of the leader of the Mujahideen "Islamic Union for the Liberation of Afghanistan" Abdul Rasul Sayaf. Located east of the district capital of Sarkani in Kunar province, on the border with Pakistan. In the mountainous region of the Gulprai pass (Gulprey) near the village of Mamunda, two bases, “Shahid Abdul Latif” and “Fatha”, were equipped. Both had access to Pakistan in the Bajar region. These bases were both strongholds and served as large transshipment bases in Kunar province. The proximity to Pakistan contributed to the rapid build-up of base forces from adjacent territory.

It was equipped by the Afghan armed opposition in the early 1980s, twenty kilometers south of the administrative center of Kunar province, Asadabad, at the junction of the borders of Afghanistan and Pakistan. According to available intelligence data, the garrison of the fortified area consisted of 80–100 militants belonging to the Islamic Union for the Liberation of Afghanistan (ISOA), one of the seven most irreconcilable opposition parties to the Kabul government. The fortified area was located in highlands (altitude about 2000 meters), the northern slopes and gorges of which were covered with evergreen bushes and forests, occupying the territory of Afghanistan and Pakistan. The main battle formations of the fortified area were strongholds, sentry warning posts, equipped in engineering terms, located on the tops and ridges of mountain ranges, connected by a single fire system, radio and telephone communications.

The garrison of the fortified area in the Afghan mountainous region of "Krer" was represented by a regiment with commander Asadullah, a native of the village of Charkala, Kunar province. In 1978, he emigrated to Pakistan, where he studied at the ISOA military academy. Assadullah's formation was part of the group of Osama bin Zeid, a major warlord and an ardent follower of Islam. The regiment was in the ISOA society, leader Rasul Sayaf (Abdul Rab Rasul Sayaf (Ustad)), (one of the seven parties of the Peshawar Seven alliance.

Operation to capture the Krer missile launcher

At the end of March 1986, Soviet and Afghan troops attempted to capture the fortified Krer area. The number of the regiment in the garrison increased to 400 people due to reinforcements arriving from neighboring Pakistan. “As a result of a ground-air operation in the Krer fortified area on March 28, 1986, Soviet troops during a fifteen-hour battle destroyed 26 Mujahideen, destroyed military structures, but lost 42 people. On March 29-30, during the release of the base, the Mujahideen killed 70 Afghan and 50 Soviet troops. On March 29-31, during a two-day battle in the Krer gorge, the Mujahideen inflicted heavy damage on the Soviet troops, losing 42 people, but drove them out of the fortified area and captured three prisoners.”

The Mujahideen “base” of the Karera fortified area was located in a hard-to-reach area of ​​the Kunar region - mountains covered with forest hampered the landing of helicopters, and the proximity of the Pakistani border helped to perfectly equip the base. It became a powerful fortified area with a developed network of underground communications, an ammunition factory and layered air defense. The sites of possible landings were well targeted from the nearby mountains. Two detachments (1st and 5th battalions) of GRU special forces from Asadabad (334th Special Forces) and Jalalabad (154th Special Forces) took part in the March 1986 operation.

“When the Karera fortified area was captured at the end of March 1986, the target itself was located in an extremely difficult high-altitude forested region of the Kunar Gorge, directly near the Pakistani border. It was well protected by engineering structures, equipped with cave shelters and numerous firing points, which required the concentration of forces of both special forces detachments from Jalalabad and Asadabad. On the spot, it turned out that the approaches to the fortified area are protected by strongholds on neighboring heights, which also have considerable firepower.”

During the fierce battle, reinforcements from neighboring units (camps) arrived to help the Krera Mujahideen. While waiting for air support, the landing party used captured weapons in battle. The proximity of the border constrained the approval of the command authorities to carry out an air strike - by order of the aviation command it was forbidden to enter the ten-kilometer border zone. As a result, having suffered losses, the special forces units were removed by helicopters from the mountain peaks. Conditions for evacuation were unsatisfactory. The helicopters were unable to land to load the wounded and bodies of the dead.

Goshta is a base area (strong point and transit base) of the Afghan Mujahideen (1979-1989) in the east of the Republic of Afghanistan in Nangarhar province on the border with Pakistan. From the fortified (base) areas in the north-west of Nangahar province, Goshta was captured and completely destroyed by GRU special forces units in January 1986.

“Goshta” was taken along with large trophies, including: three ZGU-1 anti-aircraft mountain guns, seven DShK, three mortars and over 70 “barrels”, including sniper weapons. It took two days to remove the weapons and ammunition; the rest was blown up and mined. The GRU special forces did not suffer any losses in the operation.

Operation to capture the Goshta missile launcher

“The operation of the 15th BRSPN to capture a powerful fortified area near the village in January 1986. Goshta village, passed near the Pakistani border. The area had layered air defense, the riflemen were experienced and competently planned an attack on helicopters. A formation of 6 Mi-8MTs was attacked by dense small arms fire and multiple grenade launchers, which fired to detonate grenades to self-destruct and created a front of fire and fragments. Then the DShK opened fire on individual vehicles, and two helicopters were damaged, so the operation had to be curtailed and its implementation postponed to a later period. New forces were involved in the operation, aviation was reinforced by helicopters from the Bagram 335th Airborne Regiment and Su-25 from the 378th Oshap. On the morning of January 18, 18 Mi-24Ps launched a massive strike; From the infantry, the head of the attack formation was the chief of staff of the 154th OSPN, Mr. D. Lyuty, who was on board one of the helicopters.” From the Book “We Attack from Heaven” by Sergey Sergeev.

The operation to capture Gosht was carried out with minimal losses. We managed to destroy about 60 rebels, all warehouses with ammunition and equipment, capture as trophies three 14.5-mm ZPU-1 anti-aircraft machine guns, seven 12.7-mm DShK machine guns, one 82-mm BO-82 recoilless rifle, three 82-mm mortar (all weapons made in China) and over thirty small arms, including the American 7.62-mm M-21 sniper rifle, very rare in Afghanistan, as well as one Strela-2 MANPADS.

"Lurkokh"

Lurkoh is the base area of ​​the Afghan Mujahideen (1979-1989) in the Farah province in the southwestern part of the Republic of Afghanistan. It was located south of the city of Shindand in the mountain range of the same name, in an unusual mountain relief formation in a predominantly desert area, “rising in the middle of the plain as an impassable pile of rocks and gorges, occupying several tens of kilometers. The fortress created by nature itself was chosen by local gangs, creating a base camp there, from where they raided nearby roads and attacked military posts. The approaches to Lurkokh were protected by minefields, rock fortifications, and literally every bend in the gorges and trails was covered by firing points. Taking advantage of its invulnerability, the enemy began to use Lurkokh as a command post where the leaders of the surrounding gangs gathered.”

The “base,” which had been haunted for more than a year and a half, “was made, as they say, according to the latest word in engineering technology.” Huge storage facilities, concrete structures and shelters were built among the rocks. Tens of thousands of tons of fuel, food and ammunition could be hidden there. Everything that the dushmans got as a result of raids on roads - and not only Soviet columns were attacked, but also ordinary Afghans - was transported there. The dushmans were not particularly picky in their choice of prey - we found French glassware, containers with chemical fertilizers, and much more.

The armed formations used the geographical location of the area, at a distance from populated areas, on the outskirts of populated areas, garrisons, where troops were limited to episodic military operations, and with their completion, the rebels returned to the “area” again. The military operations carried out against the “Dushman base” did not bring success. At the cost of significant losses, it was possible to enter the mountain valleys, but the enemy was not at all going to “fight to the death” to hold positions; under the pressure of the army, he disappeared into the adjacent mountains and again returned to the abandoned caves as soon as the troops retreated. It made no sense for the army to hold an object where, in fact, there were no villages, and leaving outposts and outposts there was too expensive.

From the memoirs of the 5th MRD division commander Boris Gromov: “This massif was an interesting and unusual place. On a completely bare plain, within a radius of six kilometers, there were boulders of stone. The largest peak was located at an altitude of more than three kilometers above sea level. According to our and Afghan intelligence, in the center of the massif there was a large base with weapons, ammunition and food. The rebels there “set up an impregnable camp, from where they raided the road along which our and Afghan columns continuously marched to Kandahar, as well as the location of the 70th separate infantry brigade. All approaches and radial gorges leading to the center of the mountain range were mined."

Operations to capture the Lurkoh missile launcher

The command for the capture of the base area "Lurkokh" - at the initial stage, was carried out by Major General Yu. Shatalin, division commander of the 5th MSD, at the second stage - by the newly arrived division commander of the 5th MSD (former deputy division commander of the 108th MSD) Colonel B .V.Gromov. The operation lasted more than four weeks.

Divisional Commander Gromov B.V. accepted reports from officers who had a thorough knowledge of the situation around Lurkoh. Their position was that it was inappropriate to move deeper into the mountain range in order to avoid a frontal clash. It was proposed to mine all the entrances and exits to the gorges, enclosing the rebels in a bag and constantly keeping them under the influence of artillery and aviation. The command of the DRA Armed Forces had a different opinion: they proposed making a powerful breakthrough in depth, destroying the “base”, and sending the ground force forward.

The stronghold and transshipment point at Lurkokh had to be eliminated. However, during the next attempt to advance deeper into the mountain range, the units encountered stubborn, desperate resistance from the rebels. Apparently. The base, apparently, had been established long ago, and with perspective: huge reserves of ammunition and food allowed the rebels to hold out for a long time. To capture Lurkokh, it was necessary to clear all the prudently targeted points in the gorge. It was extremely difficult to do this without losses. Movement along the mountain ranges to capture the dominant heights was stopped by oncoming heavy fire.

Landing troops at Lurkokh, due to the numerical and positional advantage in favor of the rebels, was inappropriate. The artillery force, called upon to carry out preliminary attacks on the slopes in order to eliminate the loss of foot groups, was not enough. At the current stage, the ground forces did not have the necessary number of helicopters and front-line aviation for landing, as well as forces (aviation) to cover the helicopters. One of the main problems was also the lack of proper communication to control the landing force in the mountains, especially when descending into the gorge. Losing contact with the foot groups was tantamount to their death.

At the current stage, the ground forces were not yet equipped with aviation complexes with radio repeaters, those that later hung in the air during each of the hostilities. If the ground forces units had forced battle on the rebels, it would have led to heavy casualties.” Based on this, it was decided not to carry out the operation inside Lurkokh, but to limit ourselves to only selected measures: the approaches to the mountain range were mined, the gorges were treated with artillery. Reinforced barriers were set up between the Lurkokh rocks and the road to intercept the rebels. It all took five days, after which the division's units returned to their barracks. A few months later, the base in Lurkokh began to remind itself again.

Death of General Khakhalov

General Khakhalov arrived in the DRA, arrived in the area of ​​​​the military operation on the orders of the Air Force Commander-in-Chief, Air Marshal P.S. Kugakhov, in order to test the effectiveness of the use of Su-25 attack aircraft in the mountain range. “There was a serious struggle for non-compliance with this order, since, according to Kutakhov’s plan, after each bombing attack from the air, motorized rifle units had to go to the center of Lurkokh in order to make sure that yes, the aviation had achieved its goal.”

For several days General Khakhalov was in the vicinity of Lurkokh. The command of the operation in every possible way prevented his initiative to fly around the mountain range. Taking advantage of the temporary absence of the division commander, General B. Gromov, when the leadership of the military operations was carried out by his deputy, despite persistent advice not to do this, he flew in two helicopters over the mountain gorges into the depths of “Lurkokh”.

“Khakhalov never returned from there. The helicopter was shot down by rebels and crashed near their base.” After the emergency, the command of the 5th Motorized Rifle Division was forced “to fight through fierce battles through the mountains and ridges, along the bottom of two gorges to the center of the mountain range.” The rapid operation was carried out with the aim of taking the bodies of the general and crew members, so as not to leave them for desecration. When we reached the center of Lurkokh and finally captured this fortified area, not far from the base we found the wreckage of a damaged helicopter and the remains of officers. “It was scary to look at them...”

“The dushmans cruelly mocked the bodies of the general, and he was in uniform, and the helicopter pilots - their eyes were gouged out, their ears were cut off...” It took a week to complete the operation. Eight people died during the fighting. “The base was destroyed, especially strong structures were blown up, the entire “area” was once again mined, and they left it. This concluded the operation." Much later, Lurkokh again came to the attention of the command of the 40th Army. “The gangs operating there made themselves known at the end of 1985. In response to the rebel attacks, a series of massive bombing and air strikes were carried out, after which Lurkoh no longer caused much concern.”

"Vasatichignai"

Wasatichignai fortified area of ​​the Urals is a base area (stronghold and transit point) of the Afghan Mujahideen (1979-1989) in the south of the Republic of Afghanistan in Kandahar province on the border with Pakistan. Equipped in a mountain range seventy kilometers east of Kandahar, in spurs stretching “along the Kandahar-Kabul highway” for fifteen kilometers. to the south from the concrete road in the depths of one of the gorges of the ridge. The base area "Wasatichignai" is a key stronghold and transshipment base "in the system of conducting caravans on the routes of the central direction in the provinces of Kandahar and Zabul." The base area was under the control of warlord Abdul Rezak.

Brief description of the base area: “The entrance to the gorge was covered by two hills - strongholds of the defense system. On the tops there were firing positions for heavy machine guns. Trenches were cut into the rocky ground, stones were laid along the parapet in several rows, and concrete was poured on top for reinforcement. Between the hills is the entrance to the base area "Vasatichignai". The gorge is long, winding, in some places it narrows to tens of meters. The road is well-rolled along a high embankment. A steep slope stretched along the left side of the road; on the right, under a steep bank, a mountain stream shimmered.”

Operation to capture the "Vasatichignai" missile launcher

To capture the Vasaticichignai base area, units were involved: the 70th Separate Guards Motorized Rifle Brigade of the 70th Guards Motorized Rifle Brigade (Kandahar), “including a reconnaissance company of the 70th Motorized Rifle Brigade, an air assault battalion, a tank battalion and units of cannon and rocket artillery.” ; GRU special forces units: 173rd OoSpn (Kandahar) and 370th OoSpn (Lashkar Gah)); attack aircraft and heavy artillery. The operation was carried out under the overall command of Lieutenant General Gusev.

After carefully collecting information and studying aerial photography data, an operation plan was developed and the route of movement of forces and assets of the 70th Motorized Rifle Brigade to the “object” was outlined. Officers of the DRA Armed Forces found in their ranks a serviceman who had previously lived in the village of “Vasatichignai”, who clarified the location of important infrastructure facilities in the base area: the organization of security and defense; air defense system; notification scheme; also the likely course of action in the event of an attack by the Army. It was possible to establish: the number of rebel detachments permanently located at the base is one hundred and fifty people; The name of the gang leader is Abdul Rezak.

“The area is very rugged, there is no road. Dust raised by equipment makes observation difficult. The surrounding hills are dissected by deep ravines. The route is extremely difficult. Cars, winding between the hills, make their way forward. Suddenly, a cannonade of explosions is heard ahead in the direction of travel. A bombing attack began, preceding the landing of assault groups. Within half an hour, aviation operates on the slopes of the ridge in which the base area is located.”

The base area was captured and destroyed. During the operation, the parties suffered losses in manpower and equipment.

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Amine

A year after the April revolution (1978) in Afghanistan, a fierce struggle for power began between the first General Secretary of the PDPA Central Committee, Nur Mohammad Taraki, and the Prime Minister of Afghanistan, Hafizullah Amin. The point of no return was Taraki's conspiracy against Amin, which almost cost the Prime Minister his life. This happened in September 1979. Having lured a political opponent into his residence under guarantees of the safety of the Soviet Ambassador Puzanov, the guards of the PDPA Secretary General opened heavy fire on the arriving delegation of Taraki, killing almost all of his bodyguards. The head of government managed to escape, after which, on his orders, the Kabul garrison of General Yaqub took control of the residence of the Secretary General. Despite protests from the Kremlin, on October 9 of the same year, Mohammad Taraki was finished. He was strangled by Captain Abdul Hadud, a man from Amin’s secret police. Moscow clearly did not like this state of affairs, and yet the main argument in favor of eliminating the new Afghan leader was total repressions against Taraki’s supporters and the enemies of “April 1978.” The fact is that Amin was a Maoist to the core and, moreover, a Pashtun nationalist. The mass executions and burying alive of opponents of the revolution, which took place in Afghanistan in the fall and early winter of 1979, clearly harmed the image of socialism.

Islamic guerrillas

Operation Storm, as a result of which Amin was killed, was brilliantly carried out by Soviet special forces. However, the civil strife did not stop, since the confrontation between Amin and Taraki was only part of the civil war that broke out after the April Revolution. The introduction of a limited military contingent of the Soviet Army only added fuel to the fire. According to historians, the Afghans saw in this action a continuation of the Anglo-Afghan wars of the 19th-20th centuries. At first, the Mujahideen fought mainly with outdated Lee-Enfield rifles, but two years later modern Western weapons began to arrive in the partisan units. Soon, the most combat-ready forces of the Mujahideen concentrated in the two-hundred-kilometer Panjshir valley, in which, since 1980, the Islamic Society of Afghanistan, the field commander Ahmad Shah Massoud, an intelligent and cruel man, had been located. It was he who organized numerous attacks on transport convoys plying along the Hairatan-Kabul road. Afghan partisans managed to inflict significant damage to the supply of units of the 40th Soviet Army and the capital itself. In addition, the Mujahideen were active in the Bagram Valley, regularly shelling the Soviet aviation airfield located there.

Special forces go into battle

Large military operations against militants had only a temporary effect. Two special forces battalions were sent to Afghanistan for targeted combat against partisans. One is from the Central Asian, the second from the Turkestan military districts. In the spring of 1982, special forces were stationed in the village of Rukh and began fighting the Mujahideen. Significant losses from the troops of Ahmad Shah forced the field commander to agree to a truce with the GRU officers of the Soviet Army. It is interesting that the Mujahideen agreed not to touch only Soviet soldiers, reserving the right to attack government troops. However, Ahmad Shah told his subordinates that he was acting according to the laws of jihad, according to which the kafir must be deceived in order to then be killed.

Afghan counter-ambush

After agreements with Dr. Masud, the special forces were sent to another place - to Gulbahar, where they were assigned a wide area of ​​​​responsibility, which included Kabul, Kapisa, Parwan, Wardak. It was a difficult time for our soldiers, since the Afghan partisans, with the help of American military specialists, mastered the tactics of counter-ambush operations. Receiving information about where Soviet special forces were planning to ambush the caravans, the militants worked proactively. Thus, on January 14, 1984, in Sorubi district, militants of the field commander Abdul Haq killed and wounded several dozen soldiers from the Jalalabad GRU battalion.

Mujahideen fighters

Soon conclusions were drawn from bitter experience and the GRU group was strengthened. Between 1984 and 1985, six more special forces battalions arrived in Afghanistan and were stationed along the borders with Iran and Pakistan. The training of fighters has also increased. The command staff mainly consisted of graduates of the Ryazan Airborne School, as well as intelligence faculties of other schools. The GRU leadership chose the only correct practice - it gave officers the right to hunt without unnecessary approval. The result was not long in coming. For example, at the end of 1984, fighters from the Jalalabad battalion ambushed Pashtunistan, which had never been visited by Europeans. As a result, the column of 220 militants was completely destroyed. After 1985, about 20% of all caravans never reached the Mujahideen bases. The partisans had to take every precaution, which reduced the intensity of supplies. Sometimes Soviet special operations led to unexpected results. On September 18, 1985, in one of these battles, soldiers of Senior Lieutenant Krivenko near the village of Tahsildar killed an armed American, Thornton, who ended up in a Mujahideen caravan. Thus, the world learned about the active participation of US citizens on the side of the Islamists.

mission Impossible

Following the results of the Afghan war, the European publication Militarishe Rundschau wrote that “operations carried out by special forces units in many border areas, combined with bombing and mining, destroyed the ability of the Mujahideen to supply weapons by caravans deep into the country with the impunity that they reveled in the first period of the war " At the same time, the level of losses of the Soviet army during the almost ten-year war is considered the highest achievement, taking into account the vast territory and mountainous terrain. According to official data, we are talking about 15 thousand soldiers and officers who died in that military mission. However, there are also experts who are confident that the Soviet Union could have solved all the tasks set if not for the active assistance to the Islamists from Western powers, primarily the United States.