From the description of the battle: “The combined detachment of the 81st Motorized Rifle Regiment, formed from units remaining outside the “station” ring, managed to gain a foothold at the intersection of Bogdan Khmelnitsky and Mayakovsky streets. Command of the detachment was taken over by the deputy regiment commander for work with personnel, Lieutenant Colonel Igor Stankevich ."1
- tank commander
– driver mechanic [?] private TB 6th Guards. TP Evgeniy Germanovich Efimov (military unit 71432)2
– gunner
From the memoirs of E. G. Efimov’s mother: “According to the colleagues who accompanied my son Evgeniy Germanovich Efimov to the burial place, my son died in Grozny on Mayakovsky Street on the night of January 31-1, 1995. His tank was hit by "3
I believe that the tank was at a checkpoint and was hit, and according to version 4 of Vladislav Belogrud, the tank was part of the column.
Column Formation
The commander of the RS Obs 90 TD, Captain S. Spiridonov: “On the morning of January 1, a new column was formed. It was led by the political officer, Lieutenant Colonel Stankevich. This column included vehicles with ammunition and fuel to remove the surviving equipment.<...>And on the first of the month, when we went, we were met at the very beginning. True, the Chechens did not burn the fuel tankers; they wanted to seize them. They shot at armored vehicles. The killed fuel tanker drivers were replaced by warrant officers and removed from the fire."5
A not entirely clear point: 81 infantry regiments were assigned 200 paratroopers6, presumably from the 104th Airborne Division. There is information that on January 1 they were transferred from the airport to the city,7 but there is no information yet about their participation in hostilities.
According to version 8 of Vladislav Belogrud, the column consisted of “70 soldiers and four officers.”
BMP No. 435
- BMP commander, senior lieutenant Igor Vladimirovich Bodnya
– gunner-operator private Igor Sergeevich Komissarkin (from military unit 738749)
Guards Major A. Fomin: “On January 1, the combined detachment of the regiment entered Grozny to support units entrenched in the city center. The convoy included vehicles with ammunition, fuel, as well as vehicles for transporting the wounded. The crew of BMP-2 No. 435 was faced with the task of providing passage of the column, covering it with his fire.<...>As soon as the lead vehicle entered Ordzhonikidze Square, the column of the regiment's combined detachment was fired upon. They took her into the “fire bag”, knocking out the vehicles at the “head” and “tail” of the column. The decision was made to move back. BMP-2 No. 435 took up an advantageous firing position and began to cover the column’s retreat with its fire. Having unleashed all their firepower on the militants, the crew waited for the last vehicle in the convoy to pass. The ammunition was expended. The enemy immediately concentrated fire on the BMP. After several hits, the crew began to get out of the car. Private I.S. Komissarkin was seriously wounded and his comrades pulled him out. They continued to fight with personal weapons from the ground, but the forces were unequal...
Their bodies were found by colleagues not far from the burnt car. The crew of BMP-2 No. 435 fully fulfilled their military duty as befits real men, warriors."11
Return to the checkpoint
From the description of the battle: “For two days, his group, being semi-surrounded, remaining in a bare place - an open and wide intersection of two main city streets, held this strategically important area and constantly struck at the enemy. Stankevich wisely placed the fire weapons he had. He placed the infantry fighting vehicles. (he had 9 of them), organized the "attachment" of the fire of the attached mortars to the most threatening areas. When organizing the defense of the line, even non-standard measures were taken. So, in order to protect the infantry fighting vehicles from the fire of enemy grenade launchers, the lieutenant colonel ordered... to remove from the surrounding Grozny steel gates in the courtyards and cover the combat vehicles on the sides and front with them. Stankevich’s “know-how” turned out to be successful: an RPG shot “slipped” over a sheet of metal without hitting the vehicle. People gradually began to come to their senses after the bloody New Year’s Eve. In Stankevich’s detachment The fighters who had escaped from the encirclement gradually gathered together."12
+ + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + +
1 Semenov D. The 81st regiment completed its task in Grozny!
2 Unknown soldier of the Caucasian War. M., 1997. P. 82.
3 Remember and bow down. Ekaterinburg, 2000. P. 158.
4 Belogrud V. Tanks in the battles for Grozny. Part 1 // Front-line illustration. 2007. No. 9. P. 42.
5 Galaktionov V. How it was // Samara newspaper. 2000. January 11. (
THE MYSTERY OF THE DEATH OF THE MAIKOP BRIGADE
15 years ago the “New Year’s assault” on Grozny ended. And in these battles, the Russian army suffered the greatest losses since the end of the Great Patriotic War. One of the mysteries of these battles was the dramatic fate of the 131st motorized rifle brigade, stationed before this war in Maykop. In this article we will try to understand the myths that have developed around these events. We will try, based on the facts, to present our version of the actions of the North group and the 2 days of fighting: December 31, 1994-January 1, 1995, the most difficult two days in the modern history of the Russian army.
THE MAIN OBJECTIVE OF THE STORM- the capture of the “Presidential Palace of Dudayev” (formerly the Republican Committee of the Chechen Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic) went to the “North” group. The overall command of the "North" group was exercised by Major General K.B. Pulikovsky. The number of personnel in the units is not clear for certain; most likely, it differs from the official one to a lesser extent, but since There is no other data at the moment; we will take official data from the website “chechnya.genstab.ru” as a basis. In total, the group consisted of 4,097 people, 82 tanks, 211 infantry fighting vehicles (IFVs), 64 guns and mortars. The group included the 131st Separate Motorized Rifle Brigade (MSBR), 81st Guards Motorized Rifle Regiment (GvMSP) and 276 GvMSP, as well as attached and auxiliary units and units of the Internal Troops. The combined detachment of the 131st brigade under the command of Colonel I. Savin consisted of 1,469 personnel, 42 BMP-2, 26 T-72A tanks and 16 artillery pieces. The 81st regiment under the command of Colonel A. Yaroslavtsev consisted of 1331 people (including 157 officers, it is characteristic that 66 officers were in the platoon-company level and had only a military department of a civilian university behind them), 96 infantry fighting vehicles, 31 tanks (T-80BV and several T-80B) and 24 artillery pieces (self-propelled guns "Gvozdika"). The 276th regiment under the command of Colonel A. Bunin consisted of 1297 people, 73 BMP-1, 31 tanks (T-72B1) and 24 artillery pieces (it must be said that at one time the brigade was credited with as many as 120 BMPs, but the refutation of this is below).
Hero of Russia (posthumously) Colonel I.A.Savin.
131st brigade - 1 battalion on the southern slopes of the Tersky Range in the area 3 km north of Sadovoye, 2 battalions concentrated in the MTF area 5 km north of Alkhan-Churtsky;
81st Regiment - from 12/27/94 3 km south of the lane. Kolodezny with the main forces, from the morning of December 28, 1994, 1.5 km north of Grozny;
276th Regiment - on the northern slopes of the Tersky Range.
At least 400 people from the 276th regiment entered Grozny, 426 people from the 81st regiment entered the city, including a tank battalion. From the brigade - 446, including the "relief column".
On December 30, at a meeting, the units received orders. The brigade should move to the area of the old airfield on the morning of the 31st and take up defensive positions there. The 81st Regiment's primary task was to occupy the Mayakovsky-Khmelnitsky intersection by 16-00, the subsequent task was to block the Republican Committee building and occupy the station. The 276th regiment was supposed to take up positions on the approaches to Sadovoy on the 31st until further instructions.
The entry of troops into the city scheduled for the 31st was unexpected for everyone, because... Not all units have yet been replenished with people, not everyone has properly coordinated them.
Be that as it may, on the morning of the 31st the units began to move. The Khmelnitsky-Mayakovsky intersection was already occupied by 11 o’clock in the morning, the second battalion was unable to pass through the Rodina state farm due to heavy fire from the militants and was ordered by General Pulikovsky to turn back and proceed to carry out the subsequent task, which was done after the artillery had cleared the houses of the Ippodromny microdistrict, from where the fire was carried out. heavy fire from militants. At the same time
The 131st brigade completed the task and took up positions on the outskirts of the city, moving on to equip the defense area. But suddenly she took off and went with one battalion to the station, and the second to the market. The regiment reached the square. Ordzhonikidze, where a “traffic jam” formed, leaving one company for cover. But soon the regiment commander, Colonel Yaroslavtsev, ordered the regimental chief of staff, Burlakov, to take everything that could be pulled out to the station. While the regiment was walking towards Ordzhonikidze Square, the equipment of the 131st brigade began to overtake them. As a result, both the regiment and the brigade arrived at the station almost simultaneously, where the regiment occupied the freight station, and the first battalion of the brigade occupied the station, the second rolled back to the freight station after being attacked by militants. After occupying the defense, the brigade and regiment at the station were attacked. The attacks continued until the units left the station. Some of the equipment was burned, some was damaged, but they fought as long as they had ammunition. Losses at this point were small. But the situation worsened sharply because other units did not complete their tasks.
Lieutenant General L.Ya. Rokhlin, February 1995
The units of Lieutenant General Lev Rokhlin that reached the hospital were very small in number, because Some forces were forced to leave at checkpoints along the route; the Internal Troops did not approach. On New Year's Eve, one battalion of the 276th regiment began to replace the 33rd regiment at checkpoints. The assembled column has arrived. But having lost a lot of equipment, she was only able to get to the freight station. It became clear: the 131st brigade and the 81st regiment needed to leave the city, but the brigade’s exit was unsuccessful: the convoy was ambushed at the motor depot. Two infantry fighting vehicles were lost, most of the wounded died with them, the brigade commander was killed, and when the main part of the regiment left, battalion commander Perepelkin and the commander of the third company, Prokhorenko, were killed. Total losses at the end of January 2 were:
In the 131st brigade, 142 people were killed alone, how many were wounded or missing - there are no exact data (according to other sources, 167 people died, including brigade commander Colonel A. Savin, deputy brigade commanders for weapons and educational work, in addition, 60 soldiers and sergeants were killed, 72 people were missing). Those. of the 446 people who entered the city, 289, or 65%, remained in the ranks;
In the 81st regiment (possibly for the entire period of hostilities): 134 killed, 160 wounded, 56 people missing, according to the report of the regimental chief of staff Burlakov - 56 people were killed (of which 8 officers), 146 were wounded (of which 31 officer, 6 warrant officers), 28 people were missing (including 2 officers), 87 people were sick (including 8 officers and 3 warrant officers) - these data are more accurate. According to official data, as of January 10, the regiment lost 63 servicemen killed, 75 missing, 135 wounded;
In the 276th regiment: at least 42 people were killed, at least 2 of them were missing, there is no data on the wounded.
Equipment losses were:
The 131st brigade, according to A. Sapronov, lost 15 tanks and 47 infantry fighting vehicles; military journalist Viktor Litovkin gives other figures: “20 out of 26 tanks were lost, 18 out of 120 infantry fighting vehicles were evacuated from Grozny, all 6 Tunguskas were destroyed”;
81st Regiment - 23 tanks, 32 - BMP-2, 4 - armored personnel carriers, 2 tractors - 2, 1 "Tunguska" 1 MTLB;
276th Regiment - at least 15 BMP-1, at least 5 T-72B1 tanks.
SEVERAL VERSIONS HAVE BEEN PROMOTED what happened with the 131st brigade and the 81st regiment, there were both official and journalistic versions, but mostly with a negative connotation, discrediting the personnel of the units. Here are some of them: “The brigade missed the required turn and went to the station, where, without conducting reconnaissance, they formed columns along the streets,” “The columns stood along the streets and froze. The brigade commander did not organize security, did not take up defense, did not conduct reconnaissance. The brigade simply stood and seemed to be waiting for the Chechi to finally come to their senses and begin to burn it. Dudayev sent reconnaissance three times (!!!) to clarify the actions of the Russians, and three times reconnaissance reported that Russian columns were standing on Pervomaiskaya and Privokzalnaya without movement, without security, and that some soldiers and officers were wandering around the neighborhood in search of working shops (New Year is just around the corner!) And then Maskhadov ordered to gather all the grenade launchers who were in the city and pull them to the station, “the brigade entered the city under “vapors”, “Savin died in captivity, he was shot”, “everyone was drunk”, etc.
Let's try to sort out these myths and tell you how things really were.
Initially, the role of commander of the forces introduced into the city was assigned to General Lev Rokhlin. This is how Lev Yakovlevich himself describes it (quote from the book “The Life and Death of a General”): “Before the storming of the city,” says Rokhlin, “I decided to clarify my tasks. Based on the positions we took, I believed that the Eastern group, whose command It was suggested to me that another general should head it. And it would be advisable for me to be appointed to command the Northern group. I had a conversation with Kvashnin on this topic. He appointed General Staskov to command the Eastern group. “Who will command the Northern group?” I ask. Kvashnin replies: “I . We will deploy a forward command post in Tolstoy-Yurt. You know what a powerful group this is: T-80 tanks, BMP-3. (There were almost no such people in the troops then.)" - “What is my task?" - I ask. “Go to the palace, occupy it, and we will come up.” I say: “Did you watch the speech of the Minister of Defense on television? He said that they don’t attack the city with tanks.” This task was removed from me. But I insist: “What is my task anyway?” “You will be in reserve,” they answer. “You will cover the left flank of the main group.” And they assigned a route of movement.” After this conversation with Rokhlin, Kvashnin began to give orders to units directly. Thus, the 81st Regiment was given the task of blocking Reskom. Moreover, the tasks were given to the units at the very last moment.
Colonel General Anatoly Kvashnin had a separate line of secrecy, apparently, this was some kind of “know-how” of Kvashnin, everything was hidden, and the task was set directly as the units moved, the trouble is that in this case the units acted independently, separately, They were preparing for one thing, but were forced to do something completely different. Inconsistency and lack of interconnection is another distinctive feature of this operation. Apparently, the entire operation was based on the confidence that there would be no resistance. This only means that the leadership of the operation was divorced from reality.
Until December 30, unit and battalion commanders knew neither about their routes nor about their tasks in the city. No documents were processed. Until the last moment, the officers of the 81st regiment believed that the task of the day was the Mayakovsky-Khmelnitsky intersection. Before the regiment was brought into the city, its command asked how long it would take to bring it into combat-ready condition? The command reported: at least two weeks and replenishment of people, because The regiment is now “bare armor”. To solve the problem with the lack of people, the 81st regiment was promised 196 reinforcements for the landing of infantry fighting vehicles, as well as 2 regiments of the Internal Troops to clean up the quarters traversed by the regiment.
After a meeting on December 30, Colonel General Kvashnin ordered an officer to be sent for replacements, but due to bad weather the people could not be delivered on time. Then it was proposed to take two battalions of explosives as a landing party, the regimental commander Martynychev was sent after them, but the command of the Internal Troops did not give up the battalions. That is why it turned out that the 81st regiment went to the city of Grozny with “bare armor”, having at best 2 people in the landing force of infantry fighting vehicles, and often not having any at all!
At the same time, the regiment received a strange order: one battalion was supposed to go to the station, bypassing the Reskom, and then behind its back the second battalion was supposed to block the Reskom, that is, without ensuring the occupation of one line, it was necessary to go to the next, which is contrary to the regulations and methods . In fact, this separated the first battalion from the main forces of the regiment. What the station was needed for, one can only guess - apparently, this is also part of the “know-how”.
Colonel A. Yaroslavtsev, December 1994
Regiment commander Yaroslavtsev recalls these days: “I... worked with the battalion commanders, but we didn’t have time to outline, of course, not only to the company, you need to go down to the platoon to show where to get what. But due to the fact that like this - forward, come on, the first battalion... take the station and surround, take possession of it, and the second battalion move forward and surround Dudayev's palace... they didn't describe where and what, the battalion commander himself made the decision where to send, depending on the situation... The immediate task was get to the intersection... Mayakovsky-Khmelnitsky, then the next one is the station, the other is the Dudayev Palace... but this was not described in detail, because there was no time, nothing, and in theory each platoon needs to write down where it should approximately stand, where to leave, until what time and what should he do. As far as I understand, the commanders thought like this: surround him with bare armor, stand, point guns there, and partially, let’s say, if there is no one there, with infantry, report that he is surrounded... And then they will say - we will pull up some kind of negotiating group, or some scouts, and they will go forward!
We could still suppress a small center of resistance, but with organized mass resistance they began to crush us. Moreover, in the 81st Motorized Rifle Regiment, out of 56 platoon commanders, 49 were graduates of civilian universities, called up for two years. There is no need to talk about the level of their training. Many died in Grozny, sharing the fate of their soldiers."
Hero of Russia R.M. Klupov, 2014
Assistant Chief of Intelligence of the 131st Brigade, Major Rustem Klupov: “I didn’t know where we were going, I didn’t know our task. I found out that we were going to the station at the crossroads where we met with the 81st Regiment, Savin called me on the radio directed, maybe he was afraid that we were being bugged, since he had a closed channel, but I didn’t have a closed channel. Then the first battalion and the brigade headquarters on Rabochaya Street advanced to the railway station (approximately 13:00- 14:00). An incomplete battalion of the 81st regiment under the command of S. Burlakov is already stationed here."
Parts of the brigade definitely reached the train station and freight station, so G. Troshev’s conclusions are that “the combined detachment of the brigade missed the required intersection, got lost and eventually came to the railway station” (see G. Troshev, “My War” ) are unfounded. In fact, Colonel Savin carried out the command's task exactly. The 3rd MSR became the front to the railway, dispersed and took up defensive positions. There was only 1 infantry fighting vehicle on the platform. The rest are near the platform, but hidden either behind stalls or behind buildings. That is, there can be no talk about the fact that they went out somehow carelessly. They covered the equipment as best they could, but there was virtually nowhere to hide it.
I would like to say a special word about the instructions received in parts before leaving for the city. Units were forbidden to occupy buildings, excluding administrative buildings, to destroy benches, trash cans, etc., to check the documents of people they met with weapons, to confiscate weapons, and to shoot only as a last resort. What the command was counting on was clear, blind confidence in the absence of resistance from the militants. The opposition storming of Grozny on November 26 taught them nothing.
Station area. Photo taken January 20-26, 1995.
Station building. Photo taken January 20-26, 1995.
ALL PARTS MANAGEMENT It was carried out using the “go ahead” method. The commanders who controlled from afar did not know how the situation was developing in the city. To force the troops to move forward, they blamed the commanders: “everyone has already reached the city center and is about to take the palace, and you are marking time...”. As the commander of the 81st regiment, Colonel Alexander Yaroslavtsev, later testified, in response to his request regarding the position of his neighbor on the left, the 129th regiment of the Leningrad Military District, he received the answer that the regiment was already on Mayakovsky Street. “This is the pace,” the colonel thought then (“Red Star”, 01/25/1995). It could not have occurred to him that this was far from true... Moreover, the closest neighbor on the left of the 81st regiment was the combined detachment 8 corps, and not the 129th regiment, which was advancing from the Khankala area. Although it is on the left, it is very far away. Judging by the map, this regiment could have ended up on Mayakovsky Street only after passing the city center and passing the presidential palace. Therefore, it is unclear: either the group’s command did not look at the map at all and did not understand what Colonel Yaroslavtsev was asking, or the commander of the 81st regiment himself did not know who his closest neighbor was, or perhaps the journalists who interviewed Yaroslavtsev , got everything mixed up?
In any case, this suggests that no one really had a clear picture of what was happening, and the interaction was established in such a way that it misled not only the participants in the battles, but also those who later undertook to study their progress...”
Misunderstanding of the situation leads to the fact that on the morning of January 1, two mutually exclusive orders are issued one after another:
"7.15 - combat order O.G.V. No. ... 1.00h. 1.01.95 map. 50 thousand edition 1985.
The commander ordered:
3/276 SMEs by Z.00 today will be brought to the area where 1/33 SMEs are located (square on Kruglova Street), where they will be transferred to the operational subordination of the commander of the operational group 8 AK.
Units of the 131st Motorized Rifle Brigade and 1/81st Motorized Rifle Regiment from the occupied areas organize close fire and tactical cooperation between themselves and the units of the combined detachment of the 19th Motorized Rifle Division as they enter the area of the loading area of the Grozny station. Replenishment of material resources is carried out from imported supplies and a consolidated detachment.
By 6.00 today, take over the 74th Motorized Rifle Brigade of the 28th AK Siberian Military District in the area of the Grozny airfield and subsequently use it to carry out combat missions in the northern and northwestern directions.
This morning, after the transfer of the occupied lines of the 503rd Motorized Rifle Regiment to the 19th Motorized Rifle Division, the forces of the 131st Motorized Rifle Brigade, and part of the forces of the 81st Motorized Rifle Rifle, will carry out the disarmament or destruction of gangs in the area of the station, the Presidential Palace, the intersection of Griboedov Street and Pobeda Avenue. Then, by the end of the day, with the forces of the 131st Brigade. and 81 SMEs to capture the presidential palace.
"01/1/95, resolution (to the head of the operational department of the corps, room 81 MSP, 206 MSP; 131 OMSBR).
Execute the order.
81 SMEs blockade the area near the palace.
The 131st Motorized Rifle Brigade, after concentrating at the station, advance north to the palace area on the street. Komsomolskaya, 74 OMSBR go to the square. Friendship of Peoples on Mayakovsky Street and block the intersection of the street. Griboyedov - Pobeda Avenue with part of the forces, along Mayakovsky Street. Units of the 131st Motorized Rifle Brigade operate in a northerly direction along the street. Chernyshevsky to the palace.
Pulikovsky".
These documents very clearly demonstrate the dramatic conditions in which the command of the 131st brigade and the 81st regiment found themselves, how difficult it was to make decisions in these circumstances and under what psychological pressure they acted.
I would also like to talk about intelligence:
Regimental commander Yaroslavtsev: “When Kvashnin gave us the task, he sent us to the GRU colonel to get information about the enemy, but he didn’t say anything specific. Everything is general. There, north-west of Grozny, south-west of Grozny, there’s a group of so many. I I tell him, wait, what is the north-west, south-east, I’m drawing a route for you, Bogdan Khmelnitsky, so I’m walking along it, tell me what I can meet there. He answers me, here, according to our data, sandbags in windows, here there may be a stronghold, or maybe not. He didn’t even know whether the streets there were blocked or not, so they gave me these fools (UR-77 “Meteor”) so that I would blow up the barricades, but nothing was blocked there "There was none. In short, there was no intelligence information, either on the number or location of the militants."
Maps were rare; no one had seen city plans at all. For example, ensign Vadim Shibkov, a participant in the battles of the 131st brigade, recalls this: “There was a map, but it was on a scale of 1:50,000 and old, from the 70s, it was impossible to correct it and aim in the city, because of this the brigade’s artillery hit not very accurate." The company-platoon link did not have topographical plans of Grozny. The battalion commanders had maps at a scale of 1:50,000. The same thing happened in the 131st brigade and the 276th regiment.
Because of the maps, the 276th Regiment suffered losses in Sadovoye. On the map, the bridge where they were supposed to stop looked large, but in reality no one even noticed this bridge, it was so small, and the BRD moved on, stopping at the next one. Resembling the one on the map, the bridge came under fire.
While the regiment was marching to Reskoye and the station, the 131st brigade was supposed to take positions on the outskirts of the city, two kilometers east of Sadovaya, in order to provide passage to the city of Grozny for other troops, which was exactly done by 11 o’clock in the morning. There was practically no resistance, only reconnaissance destroyed the forward patrol of the militants. At 12 o'clock in the afternoon, Lieutenant General Pulikovsky K.B., who commanded the "North" group at that time, gave the order on the radio for the brigade to enter Grozny. The battalions received this order from Colonel Durnev, who arrived directly at the battalions’ location. At the same time, the brigade did not receive any written combat or graphic documents with an order to enter the city of Grozny. After passing along Mayakovsky Street, the corps headquarters unexpectedly gave the brigade the command to take the railway station, which was not initially planned at all.
Who gave the order for the brigade to go to the station?
Lev Rokhlin says (based on the book “The Life and Death of a General”): “Pulikovsky says that he did not give the command to the 131st brigade to seize the station. The forward command post of the Northern group was never deployed. They commanded directly from Mozdok. Therefore, find out who gave the command, it’s difficult... I know that, unlike me, Pulikovsky did not know until the last moment whether he would command anything at all in this operation. After all, Kvashnin himself declared himself the commander of everything. Pulikovsky could not draw up a detailed plan of action and give the necessary orders. Kvashnin decided everything."
Retired Lieutenant General K.B. Pulikovsky, 2014.
In the “Workbook of the operational group of the combat control center of the 8th Guards AK” the words of the corps commander are recorded: “General Shevtsov at 16:00 should have assigned them (the brigade and the regiment) a task so that they would give the position of the troops around the palace.” The general did not receive any information. Three years later, on December 28, 1997, the host of the “Actually” program of the TV Center channel, Mikhail Leontyev, will blame General Leonty Shevtsov for the death of the 131st brigade, who, according to the journalist, gave it that same ill-fated order - go to the railway station... So Pulikovsky’s words in the film “Untitled Operation” that “I don’t know how the brigade ended up at the station” are most likely true.
From the same book (“The Life and Death of a General”):
FROM "WORKBOOK OF THE OPERATIONAL GROUP OF THE 8th Guards AK COMBAT CONTROL CENTER":
2 MSB 81 MSB - around the palace.
1 MSB... (inaudible).
131st Omsbr - two battalions occupy defense near the railway. station".
This is the last record of the position of these units on the first day of the assault.
The 131st brigade had no mission,” says Rokhlin. - She was in reserve. One can only guess who ordered her to seize the railway station.
Stills shot by militants from A. Sladkov’s film “Operation Without a Title.”
So who set the tasks and directly developed this “operation”?
IN THE FILM "NEW YEAR'S NIGHT OF THE 81ST REGIMENT" Regiment commander Alexander Yaroslavtsev claimed that Kvashnin personally assigned him the task, “he drew and erased the arrows.” We find confirmation of this in the above excerpt from the book:
"Rokhlin: Who will command the "Northern" (grouping)?
Kvashnin: I..."
Later, Kvashnin and Shevtsov will retreat into the shadows, leaving Pulikovsky to deal with everything. Kvashnin will generally be called a “representative of the General Staff”; no written orders given by him were found and he did not bear any responsibility for these events. However, like all the other participants in this story.
FROM THE LETTER OF THE PROSECUTOR GENERAL OF THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION YU.I. SKURATOV TO THE CHAIRMAN OF THE STATE DUMA G.N. SELEZNEV No. 1-GP-7-97 DATED 01/15/1997:
"In accordance with State Duma Resolution No. 971-11 GD dated December 25, 1996 "On consideration of the circumstances and causes of mass deaths of military personnel of the Russian Federation on the territory of the Chechen Republic in the period from December 9, 1994 to September 1, 1996 and measures to strengthen defense country and state security" I inform you:... an investigation is underway into the circumstances of the death of personnel of the 131st separate motorized rifle brigade (military unit 09332), which stormed the city of Grozny on December 31, 1994 - January 1, 1995, during which 25 officers and warrant officers were killed , 60 soldiers and sergeants, and 72 servicemen of the brigade were missing.
From the explanations of the participants in these events, documents seized during the inspection, it follows that at the end of December 1994 in the city of Mozdok, the high command of the Russian Defense Ministry set the general task of liberating the city of Grozny. The specific task of sending troops into the city, movement routes and interaction was set by Colonel General A. V. Kvashnin (at that time a representative of the General Staff of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation).
The 131st brigade was tasked with concentrating two kilometers east of Sadovaya by December 27, 1994, in order to provide passage to the city of Grozny for other troops. Subsequently, the brigade occupied the line along the Neftyanka River and remained there until 11 o’clock on December 31, after which Lieutenant General Pulikovsky K.B., who commanded the “North” group at that time, gave the order by radio to enter Grozny. The brigade did not receive any written combat or graphic documents. After passing along Mayakovsky Street by the corps headquarters, the brigade was ordered to take the railway station, which was not originally planned.
Having captured the station, the brigade found itself in a dense ring of fire from illegal armed groups and suffered significant losses in manpower and equipment.
As can be seen from the inspection materials, the issues of thorough preparation of the operation should have been resolved by Pulikovsky, but this was not done in full, which was one of the reasons for the death of a large number of personnel of the 131st brigade.
Pulikovsky’s actions show signs of a crime under Art. 260-1 in paragraph “c” of the Criminal Code of the RSFSR, namely, the negligent attitude of an official towards the service, resulting in grave consequences.
However, a criminal case cannot be initiated, since the State Duma declared an amnesty on April 19, 1995 in connection with the 50th anniversary of Victory in the Great Patriotic War of 1941-1945, and the offense committed by Pulikovsky fell under its scope."
I would like to finish the article with an excerpt from that very book “The Life and Death of a General”:
“The operation plan developed by Grachev and Kvashnin actually became a plan for the death of the troops,” says General Rokhlin. “Today I can say with complete confidence that it was not justified by any operational-tactical calculations. Such a plan has a very specific name - an adventure. And Considering that hundreds of people died as a result of its implementation, this is a criminal adventure...”
Full version - on the website
Mikryakov brothers.
By the end of December 1994, according to intelligence data, Dudayev concentrated in Grozny up to 40 thousand militants, up to 60 guns and mortars, 50 tanks, about 100 infantry fighting vehicles and armored personnel carriers, about 150 anti-aircraft weapons.
Initially, the assault on Grozny was scheduled for January 5, but on December 30 at 19:00 an order was received to be ready to leave at 5:00 on December 31 according to the battle plan. Federal forces set out at dawn, around 7:00 am. The scouts went first. There was no resistance. But the closer to the center, the more often mines, obstacles and fire resistance were encountered. By 14-00 the railway station was taken, units of the 131st motorized rifle battalion were being brought up. At 15-00, the first and second battalions of the 81st motorized rifle regiment and the combined detachment of the 201st motorized rifle division blocked the presidential palace, Dudayev threw his best forces into restoring the situation. The shelling stopped only at 12 o'clock at night. The new year 1995 has arrived. For many 18- and 19-year-olds, it has never come.
Our fellow Togliatti residents also took part in these battles: guard junior sergeant, commander of the infantry fighting vehicle of the first battalion of the 81st Petrakovsky twice Red Banner Order of Suvorov, Kutuzov and Bogdan Khmelnitsky motorized rifle regiment Mikryakov Alexander Valerievich and guard private, gunner-operator of the infantry fighting vehicle of the first Petrakovsky battalion of the twice Red Banner Order of Suvorov, Kutuzov. and Bogdan Khmelnytsky motorized rifle regiment Mikryakov Alexey Valerievich.
It seemed to me that I had said everything
But never cry my heart out...
And the boys, tormented by death,
They leave someone else's war for the skies,
And I can’t reach them with a song...
O my inescapable memory!
Oh Lord, there are only crosses all around!
But how many new stars do you light?
Calling them by the names of the fallen
And you will never forget them,
Forgive them, God, my boys,
Without desecrating their souls with someone else’s sin...
(Marianna Zakharova)
Sasha and Alyosha were born on the same day, June 24, 1975. Sasha was born a little earlier and was almost a kilogram heavier than his brother. Doctors had long and seriously feared for the life of the weaker Alyoshka. But he survived, and from then on the boys were inseparable. They were not twins, but fraternal twins. They couldn't live without each other. We were always and everywhere together. Sasha was fair-haired, kind and silent by nature, almost a head taller than Alexei. The brother, on the other hand, has dark hair and a different character – “groovy” and cheerful. He was restless. His rich, beautiful laugh was constantly heard at home. Only Alyosha could laugh like that. His playful eyes always betrayed his kind and cheerful nature. He was a master of all sorts of tricks. The Mikryakov family had three children. The older brother Sergei is two years older than Alyosha and Sasha. Iraida Alekseevna herself was not spoiled by life. She, orphaned at the age of 10, was raised by her grandmother. She had to achieve everything in life herself. Therefore, they tried to raise the children like that. So that we can stand up for ourselves. So that we can be strong.
It used to be that my boys would fight with someone,” recalls Iraida Alekseevna, “they would come home scratched and covered in blood, and I would throw them out the door and say: “Go and be able to stand up for yourself.” I’ll cry myself, I feel sorry for them, but I don’t show them. In general, the guys were not spoiled and did not cause much trouble.
All household responsibilities were distributed in advance. Who should go for groceries, who should clean the house. At the family council, all financial issues were resolved - who and what to buy first. And Iraida Alekseevna also tried to ensure that her sons trusted her in everything. And they shared all their problems. It so happened that the boys had no secrets from her. The boys even told their mother about their first cigarette. True, at the same time, sixth-graders Sasha and Alyosha added that they did not like smoking very much. What the brothers had in common was that they could not live without each other. Starting from school, when they went to the same class, from the pioneer camp, where they certainly wanted to be in the same detachment get in.
“I remember,” says Iraida Alekseevna, “in the fifth grade the boys went to a pioneer camp. As luck would have it, they were separated. The difference in height was too great; no one took them for twins. The next day the counselors called and asked to take Alyosha because he had been crying all day. I went and figured it out. They were together again, and everything fell into place. In a word, it was impossible to separate them.
Their paths diverged only after the ninth grade. After graduating from the ninth grade of school No. 37, Alexey entered an auto-mechanical technical school, where he studied in the specialty “processing of materials on machines and automatic lines” with the qualification of a process technician. After technical school, he got a job at the VAZ CEC as a milling operator. And Alexander graduated from 11 classes of high school, and in September 1992 began to master the profession of a car repair mechanic at PTU-36. After PTU-36, he worked at the VAZ SME as an operator of automatic lines. He completed his studies at the lyceum earlier than Alexey , so Sasha was also drafted into the army earlier, but their mother Iraida Alekseevna, with difficulty, but still begged to wait with the conscription of one of the brothers and not separate them even in the army. Before the beginning of December 1994, Alexander and Alexey managed to serve 9 months near Samara, in Chernorechye, in the 81st regiment. Both brothers served on the same infantry fighting vehicle (IFV). True, Sasha was a vehicle commander and held the rank of sergeant, and Alexey was a gunner. On December 12, Iraida Alekseevna visited them in the unit. No one assumed that this was their last meeting. On the 13th they were sent to Mozdok. And on the 29th they were already near Grozny. A few days before that, a letter was sent home from the guys. As it turned out, it was the latter. Iraida Alekseevna was excited by Sasha’s strange words in the letter “... I don’t know, to be honest, we will have to see each other again or not, well, don’t worry, take care of yourself, don’t get sick...”, as well as footage from Grozny shown on television in the first days of the new year 1995 year. She called the information center in the Privo Military District, where she was informed that her children were not on the lists of those killed, and a few days later, they were informed that they were not on the lists of the living. She called all authorities, right up to Moscow, but no one could give her the exact information about her children. By hook or by crook, Iraida Alekseevna flew to Mozdok. During takeoff, they tried to remove her from the plane. The pilot helped, having already seen enough of the tearful mothers and hiding her in a safe place. Iraida Alekseevna did not have a pass, and this made the search very difficult. In Mozdoke we had to conduct a real investigation of our own. There was a rumor that one nurse was bandaging some guy, and he kept saying that he needed to go back, and not to the hospital. It was as if he still had a brother. According to the description, the guy looked like Sasha... They didn’t let her through in Mozdok. At the next checkpoint, kneeling in the sticky mud, she begged the colonel to let her pass further. The power of mother's love won - and the search for sons continued. Continued, despite the fact that the commandant of Mozdok wanted to force her out of the city. Iraida Alekseevna collected information about her sons bit by bit. Then a nurse was found who was bandaging the boy. But it turned out not to be Sasha. Iraida Alekseevna left with nothing. All that remained in my memory were the tents standing in the mud and the mutilated soldiers groaning in pain. Later, during the February truce, colleagues of the first company, who came to the Rostov hospital for identification, found first Sasha, then Alyosha. On February 12, it became known about Sasha’s death, and she immediately flew to Rostov. Alexander was buried on February 18. Soon Alyosha was brought from the Rostov hospital. The mother was informed about this on February 22. Aleshuna was buried the next day - February 23. Only God knows how Iraida Alekseevna was able to endure the death of her sons and not go crazy. Life had faded for her. The sun had stopped shining for her. She simply didn’t notice it. Yes, she didn’t notice anyone or anything. A deadly cold blew over her from everywhere. There are no sons of hers. They are not there at all. No, and there won't be. No one will ever laugh so loudly and beautifully in her house, as Alyosha did. No one will play the guitar and sing like Sasha loved to do. Your heart “sinks” and “takes your breath away” when you unravel this tangle of pain with a thin thread of narration, continuing the story about two brothers who died honestly fulfilling their military duty, defending the constitutional rights of Russia, and remaining faithful to the oath to the end.
Information about the last hours of Sasha and Alyosha’s life was collected by Iraida Alekseevna from eyewitnesses of those events, from witnesses of chance meetings and from fellow soldiers, from those who were shoulder to shoulder with her sons in those tragic events that unfolded on New Year’s Eve 1995 in the city of Grozny. One of them were Ivoshin Igor and Kuptsov Sergey from Tolyatti. And this is what she managed to find out. At the entrance to Grozny, the brothers were separated. Sasha with an infantry platoon went to capture the railway station and train station. And Alyosha, on his infantry fighting vehicle, as part of the assault group, advanced towards the presidential palace. Thrown by staff generals into an unprepared attack, 18-year-old boys found themselves in a real hell. Without maps, reconnaissance, combat training, or medical support, heavy tanks and infantry fighting vehicles drove into the streets and cramped quarters of a completely unfamiliar city. And the tanks in the city were completely deprived of the ability to maneuver. According to them They hit me point-blank - from basements, porches, and windows. Deadly fire seemed to “spew out” from everywhere. The heat began: tanks were burning, there were only explosions all around, cries for help, groans of the wounded, blood and more and more shooting at “targets” set up in the streets. Some were stunned, some were killed, some were burning in the car, some were taken prisoner by well-trained militants. BMP , in which Alyosha was, was hit and caught fire. One of the crew members died. Alexei himself, who was wounded in the thigh, was pulled out of the burning car by his fellow countryman Igor Ivoshin. He gave Alexei an injection and, having bandaged the wounded man, carried him to the fountain. Immediately after that, he was drowned out by an explosion. He woke up among the militants, having been captured. He was released from captivity only after 9 months. Meanwhile, Alexander fought a battle at the railway station. The guys stayed for a day surrounded by “Dudaevites”. When the militants started throwing grenades and mines at their vehicles, Captain D. Arkhangelov made a decision: using the three remaining “on the move” infantry fighting vehicles to break through the encirclement and remove the remaining soldiers, among whom there were many wounded. Standing under the cover of the wall of the building, with their backs pressed to each other, Sergeant Alexander Mikryakov and Captain Arkhangelov covered with their fire the loading of the wounded onto the armor. When breaking through the encirclement, one of the vehicles was hit. A group of soldiers and officers was ambushed, and this again resulted in the blood and death of their comrades. According to the testimony of those who were in those three cars, Sashi was not among them. Someone said that he was told over the radio that Alexei was wounded. Of course, Sasha could not leave his brother. He sent cars with the wounded and went to look for his brother. Most likely, he ran into an ambush and was killed at point blank range. According to Iraida Alekseevna’s assumptions, Alexei, who remained lying by the fountain, was most likely finished off by the militants, and possibly also blown up. Because there is information that the militants dragged the wounded soldiers into a pile and threw a grenade at them. Apparently this was the case, because Alexei’s body had many bullet and shrapnel wounds. And Sasha’s body was completely pierced by bullets. Apparently they had fired the entire clip at point-blank range. His military ID was also punched. Now this document is kept in the museum of the mechanical engineering college. And mother Iraida Alekseevna keeps two Orders of Courage, with which Sasha and Alyosha were awarded posthumously, their letters, tender letters that the brothers sent home, and the memory of two inseparable blood.
Letter-note from the Mikryakov brothers dated July 9, 1995 (transmitted by one of the Tolyatti residents who was demobilized on that day):
“Mom, come on July 9 for us. We're fine, we're not sick. We were transferred to the 90th division in the 81st regiment in the 1st battalion, 1st company. Come at 10 o'clock, on this day the new conscription will take the oath. You can come a little later, since we have to speak at this oath. Come see and pick us up."
Despite the fact that at one time the Chechen war did not leave the television screens and newspaper pages, the military operations of the Russian army, internal troops and special forces in the Caucasus still remain largely unknown, a “secret” war. Its main operations are still awaiting serious research, its analytical history has not been written to this day. By the end of 1994, Dzhokhar Dudayev, who fancied himself the president of a large Islamic state in the North Caucasus, managed to create his own sufficiently combat-ready armed forces of up to 40 thousand people, some of whose personnel underwent not only military training in specially created camps, but also fought in Afghanistan, Nagorno-Karabakh, Abkhazia, and Transnistria. Among the Chechen soldiers there were a large number of mercenaries and repeat offenders hiding from Russian justice. The republic was well-armed, only after the Soviet Army more than 40 thousand small arms were captured, in addition, there were many foreign-made weapons and hunting rifles. The production of the Boriz (Wolf) assault rifle was established in Grozny. There were 130 units of armored vehicles, about 200 artillery systems, including 18 Grad installations. These weapons could stop an army of up to 60 thousand people. Its formation took place not only in Grozny, but also in Shali, Argun, Gudermes, Petropavlovsky. In other populated areas there were local armed units that were created under the guise of self-defense units. Thus, the Chechen Republic was ready for resistance and a long guerrilla war, which the Russian command did not take into account in its plans. Therefore, first-hand information, unique photos and diagrams of military clashes are invaluable material for history.
From a letter from the captain of the 81st regiment D. Arkhangelov:
“Dear Iraida Alekseevna! The former deputy commander of the first company, Captain Arkhangelov, is writing to you. I personally knew and served with Alexei and Alexander. I would like to say a lot of warm words of gratitude to you for your sons.
I was in battle at the railway station in Grozny with Sasha on December 31, January 1 and 2, when we broke out of encirclement. You can be proud of your sons. They didn’t hide behind other people’s backs. Sasha and I personally bandaged the wounded in the station building.
We were the last two to leave the building, covering the landing of the soldiers, including the wounded, on the infantry fighting vehicles. These were the last minutes when I saw Sasha. We stood under the wall of the station premises - back to back. I covered his back, he covered mine. When all the wounded were boarded, Sasha ran to get on one BMP, and I on the other. Then we went for a breakthrough...
He was a great man. I wish there were more like him on earth! Of course, nothing can calm your aching mother’s heart. I understand all your pain. I deeply sympathize with the loss, the loss of your sons. Thank you for the wonderful guys and courageous soldiers. May they rest in peace!
Sorry if something is wrong. With great respect to you, Captain D. Arkhangelov, 81st Regiment.”
Russian Federation
City Hall of Tolyatti
Department of Education
07/08/2002 No. 1739
To the chairman of the committee
Togliatti city
public organization,
whose children died in
Chechen Republic
R.N. Shalyganova
Dear Raisa Nikolaevna!
In response to your appeal about naming vocational lyceum No. 36 after the brothers Alexander and Alexey Mikryakov, who died in the Chechen Republic, the Department of Education of the Tolyatti City Hall reports the following.
The joint work of the teaching staff of this lyceum and the Togliatti city public organization of parents whose children died in the Chechen Republic on the patriotic education of youth deserves attention.
Taking into account the opinion of the administration of vocational lyceum No. 36 and the consent of I.A. Mikryakova, the mother of the Mikryakov brothers, the Department of Education of the Tolyatti City Hall supports the initiative to name the Togliatti vocational lyceum No. 36 after Alexander and Alexey Mikryakov.
Deputy Director S.A. Punchenko
Samara Region
81st motorized rifle regiment, military unit 465349
The 81st Guards Motorized Rifle Regiment, the successor to the 210th Rifle Regiment, was formed in 1939. He began his combat career at Khalkin Gol. During the Great Patriotic War, he participated in the defense of Moscow, liberating Orel, Lviv, and cities in Eastern Europe. During the existence of the unit, 30 servicemen of the regiment became Heroes of the Soviet Union and 2 Heroes of Russia. On the battle banner of the unit there are 5 orders - two Red Banners, the Orders of Suvorov, Kutuzov and Bogdan Khmelnitsky. After the Great Patriotic War, the regiment was stationed on the territory of the GDR (GSVG), and in 1993, in connection with the liquidation of the GSVG, it was withdrawn to the territory of the Russian Federation and stationed in the village of Roshchinsky, Volzhsky district, Samara region, becoming part of the Second Guards Tank Army.
From December 14, 1994 to April 9, 1995, the 81st Guards Motorized Rifle Regiment took part in the fulfillment of the task of the Government of the Russian Federation to disarm illegal armed groups on the territory of the Chechen Republic. The regiment's personnel participated in the military operation to capture the city of Grozny from December 31, 1994. to January 20, 1995
Materials from the press based on the stories of Alexander Yaroslavtsev, commander of the 81st regiment, about the regiment’s military operations in Grozny from December 31, 1994 to January 1, 1995.
...Events unfolded like this. On December 8, the regiment was alerted and began to urgently recruit in order to complete the recruitment by December 15, and then begin combat training. Of the 1,300 people, about half came from training camps. The regiment arrived in Mozdok on December 20. On December 21, Colonel A. Yaroslavtsev began to lead the battalions out for firing. By December 24, everyone had shot. It turned out that some guns on armored personnel carriers and infantry fighting vehicles were faulty. From Mozdok the regiment moved to the area of Grozny airport. Here the regiment commander ordered to fire five or six shells again and not unload the guns, just put the safety on. “We thought that they wouldn’t send us further than the airport,” says the regiment commander. “We thought that we would stand behind the airport on defense... But things turned out completely differently.”
On December 30, 1994, the regiment was given the task of entering Grozny on the morning of December 31. The day before, the regiment commander, Colonel A. Yaroslavtsev, was asked how much time he needed to prepare the regiment for the assault. He replied that 10-15 days were needed. They did not give time for preparation. They did not give a written order for the assault (General Kvashnin gave the verbal order...).
The regiment was supposed to go to Grozny on the flank of the federal forces. They promised to give infantry, but they never did. Intelligence was very bad. However, with the tactics of the “Dudaevites” that they used then, no intelligence information would have helped.
At dawn on December 31, the regiment began moving from the airport towards Grozny. As 81 SMEs approached Mayakovsky Street, tanks appeared ahead. It turned out that these were “Rokhlintsy”. We agreed on cooperation - they went to the left of Pervomaiskaya, so as not to interfere with the advance of the regiment. The real battle began on Ordzhonikidze Square, but not immediately. The first battalion under the command of Semyon Burlakov passed to the station past the presidential palace without any problems. It turned out later that he had fallen into a “mousetrap”.
From A. Yaroslavtsev’s story: “Now, I think, I’ll move closer and pull out the second battalion. Well, and then I’ll surround the palace. They were already beating thoroughly... It was difficult to figure out where, how much, where they were hitting from?.. It was impossible to calculate the options, because there was no infantry. Either stand in a perimeter defense, or fire in all directions. So we began to fire, and that means - to fire until then until they burn you..."
At the corner of Pobeda and Ordzhonikidze avenues, the regiment commander, Colonel A. Yaroslavtsev, was seriously wounded... Next to him was a radio operator and communications chief. I asked the radio operator to bandage him, he was scared, but... they provided first aid to the commander. Yaroslavtsev told the fighter: “Let’s tell him that I’m wounded... Command to Burlakov.”
Burlakov will have to hand over command again, this time to Lieutenant Colonel Aidarov, the future commander of the 81st MRR. First, Semyon Burlakov is wounded in the leg at the station, and then, when evacuating the wounded to an infantry fighting vehicle, the Chechens will shoot everyone, but Burlakov will be mistaken for dead...
On the morning of January 1, 1995, regiment commander Alexander Yaroslavtsev was transferred to a hospital in Vladikavkaz...
Captain Arkhangelov's group. Little is known about this group, it is only clear that they covered the evacuation from the station until the last minute, after which they headed to the freight station, where they found 3 surviving infantry fighting vehicles of the 81st infantry regiment. Of the three cars, only one came out to its own. And one of the damaged ones could have been BMP No. 61822.
Naming the mechanical engineering college after the brothers Alexander and Alexey Mikryakov
February 18, 2004. Mechanical Engineering College. Time: 14-00. The assembly hall is full to capacity. There are chairs along the aisles. In the gallery are graduate students. There are many of them. They also came to the event, but there were not enough seats in the hall for them. Flashlights. Carnations. Tears of mothers whose children died in hot spots. On the stage are portraits of Alexander and Alexei Mikryakov. The ceremonial part of the event begins on the occasion of conferring the title of the Mikryakov brothers on the educational institution where Sasha studied. Twins Alexander and Alexey died in the New Year's assault on the city of Grozny in the first Chechen campaign. They were always together: both in life and in death. They were only buried at different times: on February 18, they buried Sasha, on February 23, Alyosha. Exactly 9 years have passed. The memory of the brother soldiers was immortalized by their “alma mater”.
Friends performed: some studied with their brothers at school, others at a technical school. The soul of the company, a good athlete, a person with a twist - this is how the brothers remained in the memory of their friends. Fellow soldiers said that on December 14, 1994, the 81st Regiment, where the brothers served, was sent to Chechnya. There were 1,300 military personnel on the train. All of them took part in the assault on Grozny. On the first day of the battle, more than 100 people died. There were 7 times more defending militants than Russian soldiers. This is contrary to any rules of military science. There were a lot of wounded, killed, and missing people. The hardest part was removing the bodies of Russian soldiers with signs of torture from the basements. But... there is such a profession - to defend the Motherland...
According to the military speakers, history will judge who became a hero in the Chechen company, and who – quite the opposite. The Russian state has always had two pillars - the army and the navy. Dmitry Chugunkov, commander of a reconnaissance platoon, a fellow soldier of the Mikryakov brothers, was taciturn. He said that the guys were in the most dangerous part of the New Year's assault on Grozny. Whatever trials the current recruits face, they must be worthy of the memory of their fellow countrymen.
Then they talked about the importance of patriotic education and the basic educational institution of AVTOVAZ. The brothers’ mother, Iraida Alekseevna, cried as she gave Sasha’s military ID to the museum of the educational institution for eternal storage. I read a poem of my own composition.
A criminal case has been brought to court against a group of natives of the Caucasus accused of attacking a military camp and military personnel of the 81st Motorized Rifle RegimentA criminal case has been transferred to the Kuibyshevsky District Court of Samara against a group of natives of the Caucasus accused of attacking a military camp and military personnel of the 81st motorized rifle regiment of the Volga-Ural Military District.
The emergency happened on January 20 last year in the village of Kryazh, where the regiment’s units were stationed. On that day, several Dagestanis living in Samara, unidentified by the investigation, decided to visit a fellow countryman who was undergoing military service. They tried to enter the territory of the military camp through checkpoint No. 2. The checkpoint duty officer, Private Sazhin, tried to block their path. A fight ensued. The reconnaissance platoon commander, Senior Lieutenant Zinoviev, who happened to be nearby, intervened. As a result, the uninvited guests were escorted out.
However, at about 19:00 on the same day, a crowd of approximately two dozen natives of Dagestan arrived at the checkpoint. The investigation was able to identify only the most active of them - Sadullaev, Shogenov and Abdurakhmanov. Moreover, as it turned out, Abdurakhmanov previously served first in a reconnaissance company, and then in the anti-aircraft missile division of the 81st regiment. For a military crime, a Dagestani man was sent to a disciplinary battalion by a military court. And only recently he was transferred to the reserve.
Judging by the shouts, the Caucasians intended to settle scores with Senior Lieutenant Zinoviev. The attackers blocked the squad on duty at the checkpoint, threatening them with knives. The telephone connection with the regiment duty officer, Captain Belov, was cut off. And the reconnaissance company burst into the barracks without hindrance.
From the testimony of the company duty officer, Sergeant Antsirov: “I heard orderly Sultanov shout: “Duty officer, get out!” I went out into the corridor and saw about 20 people of Caucasian nationality entering the company location, who pushed Senior Lieutenant Rakhmanin and the orderly away from the door. "There was an internal telephone on the bedside table, the receiver of which had been torn off. The Caucasians were looking for Senior Lieutenant Zinoviev, beating everyone they came across."
A group of raiders also raided the repair company. There, too, they beat soldiers, rummaged through their pockets, and took money, cell phones, and other valuables. A total of 18 servicemen were injured.
The raid lasted no more than half an hour. After this, the Dagestanis calmly left the regiment's location.
Sadullaev, Shogenov and Abdurakhmanov were charged under Articles 213 (hooliganism), 161 (robbery) and 116 (beatings) of the Criminal Code of the Russian Federation in the investigation, which lasted for about a year.
Opinions
Alexander Sharavin, reserve colonel, director of the Institute of Political and Military Analysis:
If in “hot spots” military units are seriously fortified and those on duty serve there in bulletproof vests, helmets and never leave their machine guns for a minute, then ordinary military camps, unfortunately, are poorly protected from attack. Of all the means of notification - the antediluvian telephone. I think that it is high time to equip all checkpoints of military units with alarm buttons, as is done in banks. And illegal entry into a military facility, especially with aggressive intentions, should be considered a particularly serious crime.
Alexander Samodelov, lieutenant colonel:
In principle, it is not difficult to get into many of our military units. Whether with good or evil intentions. Unless in Chechnya the 42nd Division reliably protects itself. At the end of the 90s I served in Dagestan. Thus, at night, even militants entered the 136th Motorized Rifle Brigade stationed in Buinaksk through breaks in the fence as if they were entering their own home. It also happened with weapons. Soldiers were kidnapped. I remember in 1998, straight from the military camp of the brigade, bandits in camouflage took away privates Stepanov, Erzhanov and Aleev. They were transported to Chechnya and then returned for ransom. Now there isn’t such a mess there either, it’s still a hot spot. But in the depths of Russia, military camps are not so carefully guarded.
“Grachev said that we are mercenaries, right? Why don’t we serve in the army?! Bastard! We were just following orders!” - Nikolai Potekhin from the Guards Kantemirovskaya Tank Division tried in vain to hide the tears on his burned face with bandaged hands. He, the mechanic-driver of the T-72 tank, was betrayed not only by his own Minister of Defense: when the tank was knocked out, he, wounded, was left there to burn alive by the officer - the commander of the vehicle. The Chechens pulled the ensign out of a burning tank on November 26, 1994. Formally, the military were sent on adventures by security officers: people were recruited by special departments. Then the names of Colonel General Alexei Molyakov - the head of the Military Counterintelligence Directorate of the Federal Counterintelligence Service of the Russian Federation (FSK, as the FSB was called from 1993 to 1995) - and a certain lieutenant colonel with the sonorous surname Dubin - the head of the special department of the 18th separate motorized rifle brigade. Ensign Potekhin was immediately given a million rubles - at the exchange rate of that month, approximately $300. They promised two or three more...
“We were told that we need to protect the Russian-speaking population,” said the ensign. - We were taken by plane from Chkalovsky to Mozdok, where we began preparing tanks. And on the morning of November 26 we received an order: to move to Grozny.” There was no clearly defined task: if you go in, Dudayev’s men will run away on their own. And the infantry escort was provided by Labazanov’s militants, who went over to the opposition to Dudayev. As the participants in that “operation” said, the militants did not know how to handle weapons, and in general they quickly dispersed to rob the surrounding stalls. And then grenade launchers suddenly hit the sides... Of about 80 Russian servicemen, about 50 were captured and six died.
On December 9, 1994, Nikolai Potekhin and Alexei Chikin, along with other prisoners, were returned to the Russian side. Then it seemed to many that these were the last prisoners of that war. The State Duma was talking about the coming pacification, and at the Vladikavkaz Beslan airport I watched as plane after plane of troops arrived, as airborne battalions deployed near the airfield, setting up squads, sentries, digging in and settling right in the snow. And this deployment - from the side into the field - said better than any words that the real war was just about to begin, and that it was about to begin, since the paratroopers could not and would not stand in a snowy field for a long time, no matter what the minister said. Then he will also say that his boy soldiers “died with a smile on their lips.” But this will happen after the “winter” assault.
“Mom, take me from captivity”
The very beginning of January 1995. The assault is in full swing, and a person who has wandered into Grozny on business or stupidity is greeted by dozens of gas torches: communications have been interrupted, and now almost every house in the battle area can boast of its own “eternal flame.” In the evenings, bluish-red flames give the sky an unprecedented crimson hue, but it is better to stay away from these places: they are well targeted by Russian artillery. And at night it is a reference point, if not a target, for a missile and bomb “precision” strike from the air. The closer to the center, the more residential areas look like a monument to a long-gone civilization: a dead city, what looks like life is underground, in basements. The square in front of Reskom (as Dudayev's palace is called) resembles a landfill: stone chips, broken glass, torn cars, heaps of shell casings, unexploded tank shells, tail fins of mines and aircraft missiles. From time to time, militants jump out of the shelters and ruins of the Council of Ministers building and dash, one at a time, weaving like hares, rushing across the square to the palace... And then a boy with empty cans is rushing back; there are three more behind him. And so all the time. This is how the combatants change, water and ammunition are delivered. The wounded are taken out by “stalkers” - these usually break through the bridge and square at full speed in their Zhiguli or Moskvich vehicles. Although more often they are evacuated at night by an armored personnel carrier, which federal troops shoot at with all possible guns. It was a phantasmagoric spectacle, I watched: an armored vehicle was rushing from the palace along Lenin Avenue, and behind its stern, about five meters, mines were exploding, accompanying it in a chain. One of the mines intended for the armored car hit the fence of the Orthodox Church...With my colleague Sasha Kolpakov, I make my way into the ruins of the Council of Ministers building, in the basement we come across a room: prisoners again,
19 guys. Mostly soldiers from the 131st separate Maykop motorized rifle brigade: blocked at the railway station on January 1, left without support and ammunition, they were forced to surrender. We peer into the grimy faces of the guys in army pea coats: Lord, these are children, not warriors! “Mom, come quickly, take me from captivity...” - this is how almost all the letters they sent to their parents through journalists began. To paraphrase the title of the famous film, “only boys go into battle.” In the barracks they were taught to scrub the toilet with a toothbrush, paint the lawns green and march on the parade ground. The guys honestly admitted: rarely did any of them fire a machine gun more than twice at the firing range. The guys are mostly from the Russian outback, many don’t have fathers, only single mothers. Ideal cannon fodder... But the militants did not allow us to really talk to them; they demanded permission from Dudayev himself.
Combat vehicle crew
The sites of the New Year's battles are marked by the skeletons of burnt-out armored vehicles, around which the bodies of Russian soldiers lie, although the time has already passed for Orthodox Christmas. Birds pecked out the eyes, dogs ate many corpses to the bones...
I came across this group of damaged armored vehicles in early January 1995, when I was making my way to the bridge over the Sunzha, behind which were the buildings of the Council of Ministers and the Reskom. A terrifying sight: sides pierced with cumulative grenades, torn tracks, red turrets, even rusty from fire. On the aft hatch of one infantry fighting vehicle, the tail number is clearly visible - 684, and from the upper hatch, hanging like a crooked mannequin, are the charred remains of what was recently a living person, a split skull... Lord, what a hellish flame it was that consumed a human life! In the rear of the vehicle you can see burnt ammunition: a pile of calcined machine gun belts, burst cartridges, charred cartridges, blackened bullets with leaked lead...
Near this damaged infantry fighting vehicle there is another one, through the open aft hatch I see a thick layer of gray ash, and in it there is something small and charred. I looked closer and it looked like a baby was curled up. Also a man! Not far away, near some garages, the bodies of three very young guys in oily army quilted jackets, and all of them had their hands behind their backs, as if they were tied. And on the walls of the garages there are traces of bullets. Surely these were soldiers who managed to jump out of the wrecked cars, and they were thrown against the wall... As in a dream, I lift the camera with cotton hands and take several pictures. A series of mines exploding nearby forces us to dive behind a damaged infantry fighting vehicle. Unable to protect her crew, she still shielded me from the fragments.
Who knew that fate would later again confront me with the victims of that drama - the crew of the damaged armored vehicle: alive, dead and missing. “Three tankers, three cheerful friends, the crew of a combat vehicle,” sang in a Soviet song of the 1930s. And this was not a tank - an infantry fighting vehicle: BMP-2, tail number 684 from the second motorized rifle battalion of the 81st motorized rifle regiment. The crew is four people: Major Artur Valentinovich Belov - chief of staff of the battalion, his deputy captain Viktor Vyacheslavovich Mychko, mechanic-driver private Dmitry Gennadievich Kazakov and signalman senior sergeant Andrei Anatolyevich Mikhailov. You can say, my fellow Samara residents: after the withdrawal from Germany, the 81st Guards Motorized Rifle Petrakuvsky twice Red Banner, Orders of Suvorov, Kutuzov and Bogdan Khmelnitsky regiment was stationed in the Samara region, in Chernorechye. Shortly before the Chechen war, according to the order of the Minister of Defense, the regiment began to be called the Volga Cossack Guards, but the new name never took root.
This infantry fighting vehicle was knocked out on the afternoon of December 31, 1994, and I learned about those who were in it only later, when after the first publication of the photographs, the parents of a soldier from Togliatti found me. Nadezhda and Anatoly Mikhailov were looking for their missing son Andrei: on December 31, 1994, he was in this car... What could I tell the soldier’s parents then, what hope could I give them? We called each other again and again, I tried to accurately describe everything that I saw with my own eyes, and only later, when we met, I handed over the photographs. I learned from Andrei’s parents that there were four people in the car, only one survived - Captain Mychko. I completely accidentally encountered the captain in the summer of 1995 in Samara at the district military hospital. I talked to the wounded man, started showing him pictures, and he literally stared at one of them: “This is my car! And this is Major Belov, there is no one else..."
15 years have passed since then, but I know for sure the fate of only two, Belov and Mychko. Major Arthur Belov is that charred man on the armor. He fought in Afghanistan and was awarded the order. Not so long ago I read the words of the commander of the 2nd battalion, Ivan Shilovsky, about him: Major Belov was an excellent shooter from any weapon, a neat guy - even in Mozdok on the eve of the campaign against Grozny, he always wore a white collar and with arrows on his trousers made with a coin, and there he released a neat a beard, which is why he ran into a remark from the commander of the 90th Tank Division, Major General Nikolai Suryadny, although the regulations allow wearing a beard during combat operations. The division commander was not too lazy to call Samara via satellite phone to give the order: to deprive Major Belov of his thirteenth salary...
How Arthur Belov died is not known for certain. It seems that when the car was hit, the major tried to jump out through the top hatch and was killed. Yes, it remained on the armor. At least, this is what Viktor Mychko claims: “No one gave us any combat mission, just an order over the radio: to enter the city. Kazakov sat at the levers, Mikhailov was in the stern, next to the radio station, providing communications. Well, I’m with Belov. At twelve o'clock in the afternoon... We didn't really understand anything, we didn't even have time to fire a single shot - neither from a cannon, nor from a machine gun, nor from machine guns. It was absolute hell. We saw nothing and no one; the side of the car was shaking from the hits. Everything was shooting from everywhere, we no longer had any other thoughts except one - to get out. The radio was disabled by the first hits. We were simply shot at like a range target. We didn’t even try to shoot back: where to shoot if you can’t see the enemy, but you’re in full view? Everything was like a nightmare, when it seems like it lasts forever, but only a few minutes have passed. We are hit, the car is on fire. Belov rushed into the top hatch, and blood immediately poured out on me - he was cut off by a bullet, and he hung on the tower. I rushed out of the car myself...”
However, some colleagues are not eyewitnesses! - later they began to claim that the major burned alive: he fired from a machine gun until he was wounded, tried to get out of the hatch, but the militants doused him with gasoline and set him on fire, and the BMP itself, they say, did not burn at all and its ammunition did not explode. Others agreed to the point that Captain Mychko abandoned Belov and the soldiers, even “surrendered” them to Afghan mercenaries. And the Afghans, they say, took revenge on the veteran of the Afghan war. But there were no Afghan mercenaries in Grozny - the origins of this legend, like the myth of “white tights,” must apparently be sought in the basements of the Lubyaninformburo. And investigators were able to examine BMP No. 684 no earlier than February 1995, when damaged equipment began to be evacuated from the streets of Grozny. Arthur Belov was identified first by the watch on his hand and the waist belt (it was some kind of special one, bought in Germany), then by his teeth and a plate in his spine. The Order of Courage, as Shilovsky claimed, was posthumously wrested from the bureaucrats only on the third attempt.
Tomb of the Unidentified Soldier
Captain Viktor Mychko was pierced by a shrapnel in the chest, damaging his lung; there were also wounds in the arm and leg: “I stuck out up to my waist - and suddenly there was pain, I fell back, I don’t remember anything else, I woke up in the bunker.” The unconscious captain was pulled out of the wrecked car, as many claim, by Ukrainians who fought on the side of the Chechens. Apparently, they knocked out this infantry fighting vehicle. Something is now known about one of the Ukrainians who captured the captain: Alexander Muzychko, nicknamed Sashko Bily, seemed to be from Kharkov, but lived in Rivne. In general, Viktor Mychko woke up in captivity - in the basement of Dudayev's palace. Then there was an operation in the same basement, liberation, hospitals and a lot of problems. But more on that below.
Soldiers Dmitry Kazakov and Andrei Mikhailov were not among the survivors, their names were not among the identified dead, and for a long time they were both listed as missing. They are now officially declared dead. However, in 1995, Andrei Mikhailov’s parents, in a conversation with me, said: yes, we received a coffin with a body, buried him, but it was not our son.
The story is like this. In February, when the fighting in the city subsided and the damaged cars were taken off the streets, the time came for identification. Of the entire crew, only Belov was officially identified. Although, as Nadezhda Mikhailova told me, he had a tag with the number of a completely different infantry fighting vehicle. And there were two more bodies with tags of the 684th BMP. More precisely, not even bodies - shapeless charred remains. The identification epic lasted four months, and on May 8, 1995, the one whom the examination identified as Andrei Mikhailov, guard senior sergeant of the signal company of the 81st regiment, found his peace in the cemetery. But for the soldier’s parents, the identification technology remained a mystery: the military refused to tell them about it then, and they certainly didn’t conduct genetic examinations. Maybe it would be worth sparing the reader’s nerves, but you still can’t do without details: the soldier was without a head, without arms, without legs, everything was burned. He had nothing with him - no documents, no personal belongings, no suicide medallion. Military doctors from a hospital in Rostov-on-Don told the parents that they allegedly conducted an examination based on a chest x-ray. But then they suddenly changed the version: they determined the blood type using the bone marrow and, using the method of exclusion, calculated that one was Kazakov. Different, that means Mikhailov... Blood type - and nothing more? But the soldiers could have been not only from another infantry fighting vehicle, but also from another unit! Blood type is another proof: four groups and two rhesus, eight variants for thousands of corpses...
It is clear that the parents did not believe it also because it is impossible for a mother’s heart to come to terms with the loss of her son. However, there were good reasons for their doubts. In Tolyatti, not only the Mikhailovs received a funeral and a zinc coffin; in January 1995, the messengers of death came knocking on many people’s doors. Then came the coffins. And one family, having mourned and buried their dead son, received a second coffin in the same May 1995! There was a mistake, they said at the military registration and enlistment office, the first time we sent the wrong one, but this time it’s definitely yours. Who was buried first? How could you believe after that?
Andrei Mikhailov's parents traveled to Chechnya several times in 1995, hoping for a miracle: what if they were captured? They ransacked the basements of Grozny. We were also in Rostov-on-Don - in the notorious 124th medical-forensic laboratory of the Ministry of Defense. They told how they were met there by boorish, drunken “body guardians.” Several times Andrei’s mother examined the remains of the dead stored in the carriages, but did not find her son. And she was amazed that for six months no one even tried to identify these several hundred killed: “Everyone was perfectly preserved, their facial features were clear, everyone could be identified. Why can’t the Ministry of Defense take photographs, send them to districts, and compare them with photographs from personal files? Why should we, mothers, have to travel thousands and thousands of kilometers ourselves, at our own expense, to find, identify and pick up our children - again on our own pennies? The state took them into the army, it threw them into the war, and then forgot them there - living and dead... Why can’t the army, in a humane way, at least pay its last respects to the fallen boys?”
“No one set the task”
Then I learned a lot about my fellow countryman. Andrei Mikhailov was drafted in March 1994. They were sent to serve nearby, in Chernorechye, where the 81st regiment withdrawn from Germany was based. It’s a stone’s throw from Togliatti to Chernorechye, so Andrey’s parents visited him often. Service was like service, and there was hazing. But the parents are firmly convinced that no one was involved in combat training in the regiment. Because from March to December 1994, Andrei held a machine gun in his hands only three times: at the oath and twice more at the shooting range - the father-commanders were generous with as many as nine rounds. And in sergeant training, he was essentially not taught anything, although he was given badges. The son honestly told his parents what he was doing in Chernorechye: from morning to night he built dachas and garages for gentlemen officers, nothing more. He described in detail how they set up some kind of dacha, a general’s or a colonel’s: they polished the boards with a plane to a mirror shine, adjusted one to another until they worked hard. Afterwards, I met with Andrei’s colleagues in Chernorechye: they confirmed that this was the case, all the “combat” training - the construction of dachas and serving the families of officers. A week before being sent to Chechnya, the radio in the barracks was turned off and the televisions were taken out. Parents who managed to attend the departure of their children claimed that the soldiers’ military IDs were taken away. The last time his parents saw Andrei was literally before the regiment was sent to Chechnya. Everyone already knew that they were going to war, but they drove away gloomy thoughts. The parents filmed their last evening with their son on a video camera. They convinced me that when they look at the film, they see that even then Andrei’s face bore the mark of tragedy: he was gloomy, didn’t eat anything, gave the pies to his colleagues...
By the beginning of the war in Chechnya, the once elite regiment was a pitiful sight. Of the career officers who served in Germany, there were almost none left, and 66 officers of the regiment were not career officers at all - “two-year students” from civilian universities with military departments! For example, Lieutenant Valery Gubarev, commander of a motorized rifle platoon, a graduate of the Novosibirsk Metallurgical Institute: he was drafted into the army in the spring of 1994. Already in the hospital, he told how they sent him grenade launchers and a sniper at the last moment before the battle. “The sniper says: “At least show me how to shoot.” And the grenade launchers are talking about the same thing... They’re already forming a column, and I’m training all the grenade launchers...” Commander
81st Regiment Alexander Yaroslavtsev later admitted: “The people, to be honest, were poorly trained, some drove little BMPs, some shot little. And the soldiers did not fire at all from such specific types of weapons as an under-barrel grenade launcher and a flamethrower.”
Lieutenant Sergei Terekhin, the commander of a tank platoon, wounded during the assault, claimed that only two weeks before the first (and last) battle his platoon was staffed with people. And in the 81st regiment itself, half of the personnel was missing. This was confirmed by the chief of staff of the regiment, Semyon Burlakov: “We concentrated in Mozdok. We were given two days to reorganize, after which we marched to Grozny. At all levels, we reported that the regiment in such a composition was not ready to conduct combat operations. We were considered a mobile unit, but we were staffed at peacetime levels: we had only 50 percent of our personnel. But the most important thing is that there were no infantry in the motorized rifle squads, only crews of combat vehicles. There were no direct shooters, those who should ensure the safety of combat vehicles. Therefore, we walked, as they say, “bare armor.” And, again, the overwhelming majority of the platoon members were two-year students who had no idea about conducting combat operations. The driver mechanics only knew how to start the car and drive away. The gunner-operators could not fire from combat vehicles at all.”
Neither the battalion commanders, nor the company and platoon commanders had maps of Grozny: they did not know how to navigate in a foreign city! The commander of the regiment's communications company (Andrei Mikhailov served in this company), Captain Stanislav Spiridonov, in an interview with Samara journalists said: “Maps? There were maps, but they were all different, from different years, they didn’t fit together, even the street names were different.” However, the two-year platoon soldiers couldn’t read maps at all. “Then the chief of staff of the division himself got in touch with us,” Gubarev recalled, “and personally set the task: the 5th company along Chekhov - to the left, and for us, the 6th company - to the right. That's what he said - to the right. Just right."
When the offensive began, the regiment's combat mission changed every three hours, so we can safely assume that it did not exist. Later, the regiment commander, giving numerous interviews in the hospital, was unable to clearly explain who assigned him the task and what it was. First they had to take the airport, they set out - a new order, turned around - again an order to go to the airport, then another introductory order. And on the morning of December 31, 1995, about 200 combat vehicles of the 81st regiment (according to other sources - about 150) moved towards Grozny: tanks, armored personnel carriers, infantry fighting vehicles...
They knew nothing about the enemy: no one provided the regiment with intelligence data, and they themselves did not conduct reconnaissance. The 1st battalion, marching in the first echelon, entered the city at 6 am, and the 2nd battalion entered the city with a gap of five hours - at 11 am! By this time, little was left of the first battalion; the second was heading to its death. BMP number 684 was in the second echelon.
They also claim that a day or two before the battle, many soldiers were given medals - so to speak, in advance, as an incentive. The same happened in other parts. At the beginning of January 1995, a Chechen militiaman showed me a certificate for the medal “For Distinction in Military Service”, 2nd degree, which was found on a dead soldier. The document stated: Private Asvan Zazatdinovich Ragiev was awarded by order of the Minister of Defense No. 603 of December 26, 1994. The medal was awarded to the soldier on December 29, and he died on December 31 - later I will find this name on the list of dead servicemen of the 131st Maykop Motorized Rifle Brigade.
The regiment commander later claimed that when setting up the combat mission, “particular attention was paid to the inadmissibility of the destruction of people, buildings, and objects. We only had the right to return fire." But the mechanic-driver of the T-80 tank, junior sergeant Andrei Yurin, when he was lying in a Samara hospital, recalled: “No, no one set a task, they just stood in a column and went. True, the company commander warned: “At the slightest chance, shoot! There’s a child on the road - push.” That's the whole task.
Control of the regiment was lost in the very first hours. Regimental commander Yaroslavtsev was wounded and dropped out of action; he was replaced by Burlakov, who was also wounded. Lieutenant Colonel Vladimir Aidarov took the reins next. The survivors almost unanimously spoke very unflatteringly about him. The softest of all is Lieutenant Colonel Ivan Shilovsky, commander of the 2nd battalion: “Aidarov showed obvious cowardice during the fighting.” According to the battalion commander, upon entering Grozny, this “regiment commander” placed his infantry fighting vehicle in the arch of a building near Ordzhonikidze Square, set up a guard and sat there the entire time of the battle, losing control of the people entrusted to him. And the divisional deputy commander, trying to regain control, shouted on the air: “Aidarov [pip-pip-pip]! And you, coward, where have you hidden?!” Lieutenant Colonel Shilovsky claimed: Aidarov “later ran away from the city at the first opportunity, abandoning his people.” And then, when the remnants of the regiment were taken out to rest and put in order, “the regiment was ordered to re-enter the city to support the units already entrenched there. Aidarov dissuaded the officers from continuing hostilities. He persuaded them not to enter the city: “You won’t get anything for this, motivate this by the fact that you don’t know the people, there aren’t enough soldiers. And I’ll be demoted for this, so you’d better...”
The regiment's losses were terrible; the number of dead was not made public and remains unknown to this day. According to the data of the former chief of staff of the regiment, posted on one of the sites, they died
56 people and 146 were injured. However, according to another authoritative, although far from complete, list of losses, the 81st Regiment then lost at least 87 people killed. There is also evidence that immediately after the New Year’s battles, about 150 units of “cargo 200” were delivered to the Kurumoch airfield in Samara. According to the commander of the communications company, out of 200 people of the 1st battalion of the 81st regiment, 18 survived! And out of 200 combat vehicles, 17 remained in service - the rest burned out on the streets of Grozny. (The regiment's chief of staff admitted the loss of 103 units of military equipment.) Moreover, the losses were suffered not only from the Chechens, but also from their own artillery, which since the evening of December 31 had been hammering around Grozny completely aimlessly, but did not spare shells.
When the wounded Colonel Yaroslavtsev was lying in the hospital, one of the Samara journalists asked him: how would the regiment commander act if he knew what he knows now about the enemy and the city? He replied: “I would report on command and act according to the order given.”