After the occupation of part of Georgia by Russian troops and ethnic cleansing of Georgian villages around South Ossetia, a ceasefire was reached with the participation of international mediators. According to the agreements reached, the conclusion Russian troops from Georgian territory was to end by October 1, 2008.
1. Background to the conflict
Ethnolinguistic map of the Caucasus.
Map of Georgia, 1993
2. Military actions
2.1. Beginning of the conflict
Protests in front of the Russian Embassy in Tbilisi.
The aggravation of the situation on the border between the autonomy and Georgia began at the end of July and beginning of August of this year. Each side blamed the other for the outbreak of hostilities. A significant deterioration occurred on August 1, when six Georgian police officers were wounded in a terrorist attack. In response to this, shelling of Tskhinvali began from the Georgian side, which caused an escalation of the conflict and shelling of enemy positions from both sides. On August 3, South Ossetia began evacuating the civilian population from Tskhinvali - about 2.5 thousand people were evacuated.
2.2. Russian intervention
Georgia unilaterally stopped the offensive to allow civilians to leave the war zone. In turn, the South Ossetian government announced the death of 1,400 people, mostly civilians in the region. Meanwhile, regular troops of the Russian Federation were introduced into South Ossetia total number about 150 tanks and other equipment. By the end of August 8, Russian troops and Ossetian detachments controlled large parts of Tskhinvali, and Russian aviation continued to bomb military bases near Tbilisi and destroy Georgian aircraft. There were also direct clashes between Russian and Georgian troops in the military area around Tskhinvali.
2.3. Conflict escalation
On the night of August 8-9 and into the morning, fighting continued between Georgian and Russian troops around the capital Tskhinvali. At the same time, information was received about Russian aircraft bombing the Georgian port of Poti on the country’s Black Sea coast. Military bases in different cities In Georgia, in particular in the city of Gori, residential buildings were bombed, killing about 60 civilians. Also, airborne units and special forces units began to arrive to reinforce Russian troops in South Ossetia, in particular the formation of the Seventy-sixth and 98th Airborne Divisions. Already at about 8 o'clock in the morning, the Russian side announced the capture of Tskhinvali - this information was denied by the Georgian side, which insisted that Georgian troops still controlled parts of the capital of the autonomy. Georgia also reported 10 Russian aircraft shot down, but Russia admitted the loss of only two. After the fact, Russia admitted the loss of six aircraft, three of which were hit by Russian air defense forces: three Su-25 attack aircraft, a Tu-22M3 bomber and two Su-24M front-line bombers.
The main battle in the first days took place in the air of Georgia. The Georgian air defense system offered fierce resistance to Russian aircraft - and it also served main goal air strikes. After Russian aviation managed to destroy the main radars and air defense systems of the Georgians, and it completely took over the skies over Georgia, organized armed resistance to the invasion virtually ceased. Russian military units advanced without resistance to their designated positions. The Georgian command withdrew its units and began to prepare for the defense of Tbilisi.
The escalation of the conflict spread to another separatist region, Abkhazia, where units of the unrecognized republic and Russian mercenaries(in the Russian press - “volunteers”) began attacks on Georgian positions in the Kodori Gorge. On the same day, on the proposal of President Saakashvili, the Georgian parliament adopted a resolution on a “state of war” in Georgia for a period of 15 days. The Georgian President also proposed a ceasefire between the parties and the withdrawal of troops, but this proposal was rejected by Russia, which insisted on the withdrawal of Georgian troops from South Ossetia as a precondition for the ceasefire. The UN Security Council also failed to make a decision on a solution to this conflict, and Russia stated that it was conducting an “operation to force Georgia to peace.”
The situation deteriorated significantly on August 11, when Russia expanded the range of its attacks not only against targets in the immediate vicinity of the theater of operations, but also launched an offensive against the town of Gore on the way to Tbilisi and captured the Georgian cities of Zugdidi and Senaki in the west of the country. Russian troops also captured the central highway that connects eastern and western Georgia. As the front approached Tbilisi, panic began in the city and residents began to flee the combat area. Mikheil Saakashvili tried to reassure the population and assured that Georgian troops were ready to defend the capital. Meanwhile, Russia reported that it does not intend to attack Tbilisi.
2.4. Participation of the Russian Black Sea Fleet
A group of ships took direct part in the conflict Russian fleet Led by the flagship missile cruiser Moskva, the detachment included large landing ships Yamal and Saratov and others. Marines Black Sea Fleet occupied main port Georgia's Poti and destroyed all Georgian boats and ships in the roadstead that had military markings, including border ones, by planting explosives in them.
Back on August 10, Ukraine warned the Russian side against the participation of ships of the Russian Black Sea Fleet in the conflict around South Ossetia. The statement of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Ukraine noted “In order to prevent the emergence of circumstances in which Ukraine could be drawn into an armed conflict and hostilities due to the participation in them of military formations of the Russian Black Sea Fleet, which is temporarily based on the territory of Ukraine, Ukrainian side reserves the right according to the regulations international law and the legislation of Ukraine, prohibit the return to the territory of Ukraine until the conflict is resolved of ships and vessels that may take part in the above actions." However, the Ukrainian side subsequently admitted that interstate agreements regulating the presence of the Russian fleet in Ukraine do not contain restrictions on the military use of the fleet.
3. Sarkozy's plan
Press conference between Medvedev and Sarkozy after negotiations on the six-point truce plan
On August 10, Georgian troops announced the withdrawal of troops from Tskhinvali and a unilateral ceasefire. Mikheil Saakashvili signed the truce plan proposed by the European Union, the initiative was taken by France, which presides over the EU. The agreement was achieved in Tbilisi by the French Foreign Minister Bernard Kouchner, who later visited Moscow and had negotiations with Russian President Medvedev.
On August 12, French President Nicolas Sarkozy also joined the peace process and proposed a six-point plan for a peaceful settlement. He also secured the support of the Georgian and Russian presidents for this plan, according to which each side pledged to:
In the previous plan there was a clause on international discussion of the future status of the unrecognized republics, however, at the request of Georgia it was slightly changed. This deal was called the “Sarkozy plan”; in Russia they called it the “Medvedev-Sarkozy plan”. Moscow did not enter into a direct negotiation process with Tbilisi; they chose the path of ignoring Mikheil Saakashvili. All negotiations were actually carried out through the mediation of the French side.
3.1. Occupation of Georgian territories
On August 11, President Medvedev said “A significant part of the operation to force Georgia to peace has been completed.” In Russian propaganda terminology, the invasion of Georgia was called “peace enforcement.” The next day, Prime Minister Putin corrected the president’s statement, noting that “Russia will bring its peacekeeping mission to its logical conclusion.”
Despite the agreement signed on August 12, Russian troops began to actively advance deeper into Georgian territory. In particular, the cities of Gori, Senaki, Poti were occupied, the road connecting the western and eastern Georgia. Roadblocks were set up on the roads. Russia used serious strategic weapons in the conflict, in particular, military missions were carried out by the Tu-22 bomber, and the Tochka-U missile system was delivered through the Roki tunnel. On a hundred-kilometer section of the road between Tbilisi and Gori on August 16-17, a column of heavy equipment was observed moving towards the Georgian capital: “Urals” with infantry and “Grad” installations, self-propelled guns, tanks and infantry fighting vehicles. Deputy Chief of the General Staff of the Russian Federation, General Nogovitsyn, said at a press conference on September 17 that the Russians are observing how Georgian troops are concentrating around Tbilisi.
In turn, Georgia also accused Russia of targeted attacks on civilian targets, bombing residential buildings in Gori and Poti and Tbilisi International Airport. With the threat of Russian troops attacking the capital, refugees appeared who tried to leave Tbilisi. Ossetian units, according to the Georgian side, shelled Georgian villages around Tskhinvali, which led to the emergence of refugees from these regions. Due to the offensive of Russian troops, the city of Gori was almost deserted - most of the residents became refugees. Eyewitnesses blamed South Ossetian rebels for a campaign of terror against Gori residents. There were also accusations of ethnic cleansing on both sides. The President of South Ossetia, Eduard Kokoity, generally openly spoke about ethnic cleansing and boasted about the destruction of Georgian villages in the autonomy; the fact of ethnic cleansing in South Ossetia was confirmed by international human rights organizations.
6. Information war
From the first day of the confrontation, mass information dissemination channels, television channels in Russia and Georgia, were mobilized to provide information support for military operations. So in Russia, where the main television channels are controlled by the state, a continuous telethon was actually organized, the main slogans of which were repeated by voice hundreds of times a day and were displayed all the time in capital letters on the screens. These slogans were “Genocide in South Ossetia” and “Forcing Georgia to peace.” Russian society, in agreement with the country's authorities, supported the introduction of troops into South Ossetia and military operations on Georgian territory; more than 70% of Russians approved such decisive actions.
In Georgia, having presented itself as a victim of aggression from its northern neighbor, support for President Mikheil Saakashvili has grown.
6.1. Cyberwar
During the war big role objective information coming from the scene of events played. Russian, Georgian and foreign media covered information coming from the scene in different ways. The real information war unfolded on the Internet, long before the start of hostilities. Russian channels were switched off on Georgian territory, which Georgia accused of operating information war. Internet connections to sites with the “ru” domain were also blocked. As with the Bronze Soldier controversy in Estonia, Georgia and its institutions have also received hacker attacks. In particular, the website of the Georgian Foreign Ministry, where photographs of Hitler were posted, was attacked. Due to hacker attacks, other government websites of the republic also did not work. The attacks from Russia on the websites of the parliament, government and the Ministry of Defense turned out to be very organized and massive; even the websites of Georgian news agencies were blocked. Russian hackers spread the call: “Hackers and bloggers of all countries unite,” “Sites will be blocked completely! No one will be able to read the nonsense that Russia attacked Georgia.” At the same time, Estonia, which suffered similar attacks, sent a team of experts to help Georgia.
The government of the self-proclaimed Republic of South Ossetia also reported attacks on its websites government agencies and news agencies of the republic. Reporters Without Borders condemned these actions.
6.2. Mass media
Attitudes to the conflict were polarized both in Ukraine and abroad. Georgia unconditionally condemned the aggression; its position was supported by a number of Ukrainian politicians and international organizations, who called Russia’s actions aggression against sovereign Georgia. Military aggression named Russia's actions numerous Western politicians, in particular US Vice President Dick Cheney and Lithuanian President Adamkus and others. At the same time, some international and Ukrainian politicians supported Russia’s actions. In particular, the Chairman of the Communist Party of Ukraine Simonenko called these events Georgian aggression against South Ossetia. The Supreme Council of the Crimean Autonomy expressed the same attitude towards the conflict in its appeal and called on Kyiv to recognize Abkhazia and Pv. Ossetia. The Chairman of the UN General Assembly, Miguel Brockmann, also condemned Georgia’s actions in the conflict.
In turn, Russia accused Western news agencies of biased coverage of events in Georgia. It was indicated that in news releases Western media the events in Tskhinvali and the destruction of the city were almost completely ignored, and in return a lot of attention was paid to the comments of the Georgian side, in particular Mikheil Saakashvili.
Russian media have also been criticized for censoring their coverage of events in Georgia. In particular, British journalist William Dunbar resigned in protest from the English-language channel Russia Today, where, according to him, there is censorship. According to the journalist, he was not allowed to go on air after reporting on the bombing of Russian aircraft in Georgia.
7. Diplomatic relations
8. Statements by parties to the conflict
9. Reaction of the world community
9.1. PACE Commission
The Commission of the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe (PACE) believes that Moscow and Tbilisi bear equal responsibility for the August military actions. This conclusion is contained in the report of the head of the PACE special commission, Luc van der Brande, released on September 29. During the period from September 21 to 26, Luc van der Brande visited South Ossetia, buffer zones in Georgia, Tbilisi and Moscow in order to clarify the causes and consequences of the August armed conflict. According to the report, the delegation is “extremely concerned” that two members of the Council of Europe have violated their commitments within the organization to peacefully resolve all differences, including old conflicts. This behavior is unacceptable and both countries "are responsible for the escalation of this conflict in full scale war", the statement says.
The report also notes that the completely opposite points of view and versions of the parties, as well as the short duration of the commission’s visit to the conflict zone, make it very difficult to determine the sequence of events on August 7 and 8 and the circumstances that led to them.
However, "it is quite clear that both sides did not make sufficient efforts to prevent war," and since then numerous human rights violations have been - and still are - committed in the region. PACE called for the investigation of all such cases and punishment of the perpetrators in court, while especially emphasizing that the Russian Federation bears responsibility for those crimes that are committed in the territory currently under its control.
The report also noted that the Council of Europe is surprised that Russia and the United States do not have satellite images, which could clarify the situation about the beginning of the conflict in Georgia. The parliamentarians noted that Moscow and Tbilisi adhere to diametrically opposed versions of the start of full-scale military operations. Thus, the Russian side insists that it brought in tanks and armored vehicles after Georgian troops invaded the Tskhinvali region and began fighting there. The Georgian side, in turn, claims that its intelligence reported a concentration of Russian troops and armored vehicles entering South Ossetia through the Roki tunnel, and a military operation was launched to repel the attack of the Russian army that had invaded Georgian territory.
9.2. international Court
According to international affairs lawyer Akhmat Glashev, “the court made a purely political decision, which, first of all, is beneficial to Russia. The court actually refused to satisfy the complaint of the Georgian side, and at the same time refrained from making any clear decision. The court ruling does not say Russia violated the international convention on the elimination of racial discrimination."
9.3. European Parliament
The war in Georgia had significant economic consequences: with the outbreak of hostilities, shares of Russian companies fell sharply and affected not only the Russian, but also the world market. There was also some correction in the ruble exchange rate against the US dollar when foreign investors began to sell rubles on the domestic market. Trading on the main Russian stock exchanges MICEX and RTS was stopped several times during August due to falling indices to prevent panic among traders: the overall drop in the PCT and MICEX indices for a month and a half after the war was more than 40%. The continuous growth of Russia's foreign exchange reserves against the backdrop of the oil boom gave way to a fall: in 30 working days the volume gold and foreign exchange reserves Bank of Russia decreased by $38 billion, or 6.8%.
Notes
- Comparison of the combat potential of the ARMED forces of Georgia, South Ossetia and Russia in the conflict zone - lenta.ru/articles/2008/08/08/forces /
- General Staff: The Russian Armed Forces lost 64 servicemen in South Ossetia - gazeta.ru/news/lenta/2008/08/20/n_1260079.shtml
- UPC clarified Russian losses during the war in South Ossetia - lenta.ru/news/2009/08/07/losses /
- Russian General Staff: Russian troops lost 74 dead - ua.korrespondent.net/world/552715
- Georgia confirms the withdrawal of Russian troops - www.polit.ru/news/2008/09/13/151.html
- South Ossetia chose independence and Kokoity (Russian)- Newsru.com/world/13nov2006/osetia1.html
- S.Ik: Russia has double standards regarding the conflict in the Caucasus. - www.bbc.co.uk/ukrainian/indepth/story/2008/08/080808_eke_ie_om.shtml
- Kulik about the Caucasus: Ukraine needs to draw conclusions. - www.bbc.co.uk/ukrainian/indepth/story/2008/08/080809_kulyk_is_is.shtml
- Terrorist attack in South Ossetia: six Georgian police officers were wounded. - novynar.com.ua/world/33571
- More than 2.5 thousand people left the Georgian-Ossetian conflict zone - novynar.com.ua/world/33715
- Georgia announced the start of war with South Ossetia - novynar.com.ua/world/34135
- Saakashvili did not give a reason to start hostilities - maidan.org.ua/static/news/2007/1218543889.html
- Russia left Georgia no choice - maidan.org.ua/static/news/2007/1219242475.html
- Vladimir Gorbach. Provocation - Prostration - Occupation - pravda.com.ua/news/2008/8/20/80141.htm
- Kokoity: The assault on Tskhinvali has begun - ua.korrespondent.net/world/547055
- BBC Ukrainian: Georgia offers rebels a truce - www.bbc.co.uk/ukrainian/news/story/2008/08/080807_georgia_ob.shtml
- Saakashvili gave the order for the full mobilization of reservists - novynar.com.ua/world/34153
- ... We've been there since August 7th. Well, our entire 58th Army... - www.permnews.ru/story.asp?kt=2912&n=453
- Russian tanks entered Tskhinvali: Georgia threatens Russia with war - ua.korrespondent.net/world/547700
- Russian aircraft attacked a military base near Tbilisi - ua.korrespondent.net/world/547722
This is one of best texts about the Russian-Georgian war of 2008.
Seven years ago, the Russian-Georgian war broke out. She certainly created a new reality - in Georgia, Russia, post-Soviet space and in the world in relation to Russia. But most of us know about it from myths created by massive Russian propaganda. Here are the most common ones
Myth No. 1: Saakashvili started the war
War is started by those who prepare for it in advance.
Who prepared for it and who tried to prevent it?
In June-July 2008, various information sources reported that a political decision on an imminent (presumably in August) war with Georgia had already been made in Moscow, with Putin personally overseeing the preparations. Official information Agency"Osinform" will publish the formula for a future war: "a peacekeeping operation to force the aggressor to peace."
On July 5, large-scale maneuvers of the North Caucasus Military District (NCMD) "Caucasus-2008" begin. 8,000 military personnel, 700 armored vehicles, and ships of the Black Sea Fleet are taking part in them. The official purpose of the exercise is to prepare for a “peace enforcement operation.” The troops are distributing the leaflet “Warrior, know your probable enemy!” - with a description of the armed forces of Georgia.
The best airborne units of the Russian army from different regions of the country are being transferred to the border with Georgia. They replace the motorized rifle units previously stationed there. At the Terskoye training ground of the 58th Army in the south of North Ossetia, a field military hospital is being set up, capable of treating 300 wounded per day.
After finishing the maneuvers field hospital not dismantled. The troops participating in them do not return to their places of permanent deployment. Some of them seep into South Ossetia. Fortunately, just these days (coincidentally) the construction was completed military base in Java.
By the beginning of the war (that is, before 08/08/08 - the official date of the entry of Russian troops into hostilities), about 200 units of armored vehicles and advanced units of the 135th and 693rd regiments of the 58th Army - over 1,200 people - were concentrated in Java. Russia still does not recognize this (how can one admit that Russian troops were stationed in South Ossetia before the start of the aggression to repel Georgian aggression?), but the testimony of the soldiers and officers of the 58th Army themselves, which appeared in the media, does not leave this doubts (see, for example, selection).
Simultaneously with military training, information training took place. On July 20, hacker attacks began on Georgian government and information sites. This was the second known case of cyber warfare against a state in history. (The first was recorded in 2007, when, after the aggravation of relations between Russia and Estonia due to the relocation of a monument to Soviet soldiers in the center of Tallinn, the websites of Estonian government agencies were destroyed.) The final attack occurred on the morning of August 8 - against Russian-language information websites of Georgia.
But from August 1, from Vladikavkaz to Tskhinvali began to in an organized manner arrive Russian journalists. Soon their number increased to 50 people, but not a single foreigner (with the exception of a correspondent for the Ukrainian TV channel Inter) was among them. Russian authorities They established a strict access system: accreditation had to be obtained from both the Ministry of Defense and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Only the most trusted and trusted could pass through this double sieve.
This ensured that the conditions were not only for a massive invasion, but also that only what needed to be reported about it was ensured.
The most significant thing in this multi-step combination is that the war has actually begun
July 29, 2008.
It was on this day that hostilities began. And they were started, in accordance with plans from Moscow, by South Ossetian armed formations completely controlled by Russia.
They began a massive and systematic shelling of villages in South Ossetia under Georgian jurisdiction and the positions of the Georgian peacekeeping contingent. The fire came from mortars and 120-mm guns, which are generally prohibited in the conflict zone. People died.
This is not a separate escalation in the long-standing confrontation between the separatists and central government. This is a blatant prelude to war. Deliberate provocation with the aim of causing a response. So the city punks send a youngster to pick on a passer-by, only to then jump out from around the corner and pile on him shouting: “Don’t touch the kid!”
The Tbilisi authorities understood perfectly well what was expected of them. But it is impossible to bear the blows for long. By the evening of August 1, the Georgians begin returning artillery fire on militant positions in the vicinity of Tskhinvali. The Ossetians are responding by expanding the shelling zone of Georgian villages and increasing the intensity of fire. Large-caliber mortars and 122-mm guns are already in use.
Mass evacuation of the population to Russia begins from Tskhinvali. Over the course of several days, more than 20 thousand people were taken out. This is estimated to be half the actual population of the self-proclaimed republic. Tskhinvali becomes an almost deserted city.
And through the Roki tunnel - the only way Russian armored vehicles and troops are moving to allow heavy equipment to pass from North Ossetia to South Ossetia.
The Georgian authorities are trying to the last to resolve the matter peacefully. Saakashvili's personal representative T. Yakobashvili arranges a meeting with the South Ossetian leadership in Tskhinvali on August 7 through the mediation of the Russian Ambassador-at-Large Yu. Popov.
He's coming. Popov is not there. It turns out that the tire got flat on the way. "So put on the spare tire!" - advises the Georgian minister Russian Ambassador. “And the spare tire is punctured,” the ambassador replies. Such a disaster. The representative of South Ossetia refuses to negotiate without a Russian mediator.
Yakobashvili is negotiating with whoever he has - the commander of the peacekeeping forces, General Kulakhmetov. He admits that he is “no longer able to control the Ossetian units.” What to do? “Announce a unilateral ceasefire,” Kulakhmetov advises.
Within an hour, Yakobashvili resolved the issue. At 17:00 he announces to Kulakhmetov that the Georgian government has agreed to a unilateral ceasefire. At 17:10 the Georgian guns fell silent. At 19:10 Saakashvili announces this in a live television address in Georgian and Ossetian and calls for negotiations.
The response is to intensify shelling of Georgian villages. By 23:00 they reached their peak. And at the same time, a column of Russian troops with 100 units of armored vehicles emerges from the Roki tunnel. The invasion has begun.
In half an hour, Saakashvili will give the order to start a military operation.
Could he have done anything differently? Of course he could.
But to do this, you had to forget that you are the president of a sovereign country, that you are a man and that you are Georgian. And if he had done this, he would not have been one, or the other, or the third.
It was a Zugzwang situation: the rulers of Russia skillfully brought him into the war, leaving no other way out.
The one who wants war, the one who starts the war is the one who prepares for it, the one who does not give the enemy a chance to avoid it. It was Russia.
Myth No. 2: Russia started the war to stop the genocide of Ossetians
Where did this come from?
Already on August 8, the President of South Ossetia E. Kokoity reported that as a result of shelling and military operations in Tskhinvali alone, 1,400 people were killed - the figure is not final. The next day, August 9, the official representative of the Ministry of Internal Affairs of the republic announced that 2,100 civilians had died in Tskhinvali.
This figure - more than 2,000 dead - appeared everywhere later: in reports, in media reports, and in online forums.
The number of victims was supplemented by examples of the atrocities of the Georgian military: direct fire from tanks at houses where civilians were hiding, targeted fire from machine guns at children and the elderly, burning of houses along with living people, decapitated corpses of girls...
But when they began to count, it turned out that everything was not quite like that. During the entire fighting in the city, the Tskhinvali hospital, where all the wounded and dead Ossetians were admitted, received 273 wounded and 44 killed, 90% of the victims were South Ossetian militias. The head of the Investigative Committee under the Russian Prosecutor's Office, A. Bastrykin, announced that 134 civilians of South Ossetia had died during the entire war, according to Yulia Latynina, “resurrecting 1,866 people in one fell swoop.”
But even after the official count, the number “2000” remained in the public consciousness, and even in speeches and interviews with officials, including Putin.
Although it is initially unrealistic. The official number of residents of Tskhinvali before the war was 42 thousand. After the evacuation in early August, half of them should have remained. The usual ratio of killed to wounded in military conflict zones is 1:3. This means, statistically, for every 2,000 killed there should have been another 6,000 wounded. That is, almost every second Tskhinvali resident would have been wounded or killed after the Georgian assault. And if it were so, would such a brave arithmetician as Kokoity be able to keep silent about it? But he didn't say.
How did 2,000 dead appear on the second day? And so - what genocide without thousands of victims! "Thousands" is at least two. So it turned out to be 2000. Modestly - to the minimum.
As for the Georgian atrocities, not a single fact was confirmed even after verification by such a demanding organization as Human Rights Watch. Not a single eyewitness account - only retellings of what was told. That's how rumors spread. Judging by their abundance and drama, these were deliberately spread rumors. Professional disinformation.
But ethnic cleansing of Georgians by South Ossetian armed forces is not a rumor. The Georgian population in South Ossetia, where Georgian villages interspersed with Ossetian ones almost in a checkerboard pattern, no longer exists. Robbed, expelled, killed - some Georgian villages were simply razed to the ground. This was done by the hands of the brave warriors of Kokoity. They did not distinguish themselves in battles and almost did not participate (and the warlike president himself, at the first reports of the advance of Georgian troops to Tskhinvali, fled from the capital under the shadow of Russian tanks to Java, and returned with them), but in reprisals against civilians and lost their souls to looting.
Thanks to their efforts, there are no more Georgians in South Ossetia. But on the territory of Georgia, outside of South Ossetia, more than 60 thousand Ossetians lived and continue to live peacefully. What would happen to them if the Georgians really started genocide? Remember the Armenians in Baku during the Karabakh crisis.
But the fact is that there was no genocide of Ossetians in Georgia or by Georgians either before the war, during it, or after it. There was no reason.
Myth No. 3: Russia went to war to protect its peacekeepers
The last thing the Georgians wanted was to fight with Russian peacekeepers.
The first thing they did when starting hostilities was to warn the Russian peacekeeping contingent.
At 23.35, President Saakashvili gives the order to begin the operation, and at 23.40, the commander of the Georgian peacekeeping forces, Brigadier General Mamuka Kurashvili, reports the advance of the troops to the commander of the Russian peacekeepers, General Kulakhmetov, and asks not to interfere.
“It’s not that simple,” the Russian general answered the Georgian.
Even before this, on initial stage military operations, Ossetian artillerymen and mortarmen fired at Georgian villages near the peacekeepers' deployment sites, using them as cover, or even using direct assistance to direct fire. Kulakhmetov did not consider it necessary to deny this in conversations with Georgian officials. During the offensive of Georgian troops key figures The South Ossetian command was hiding in the main headquarters. According to international standards, this made it a legitimate target.
However, in the target map issued to Georgian artillerymen during artillery preparation, the peacekeepers' targets were marked as prohibited for fire.
In order to protect its peacekeepers, the Russian leadership did not have to send troops and spend money on the war. It was enough to prohibit Kokoity from using them as cover - and everyone would have remained safe. But the goal was different.
Myth #4: Russia started the war to protect its citizens
The Russian authorities themselves created their own artificial diaspora in South Ossetia, issuing Russian citizenship and Russian passports to thousands of residents of the self-proclaimed republic on Georgian territory. Legally, this is regarded as interference in the internal affairs of another state. As it turned out - and in fact. The artificial diaspora created an artificial reason for intervention: protecting our citizens is nothing like the newly minted ones, everyone is dear to us.
Ingenious, of course: this can provide justification for an invasion of any country.
But not original: in the same way, Hitler created a pretext for the annexation of Czechoslovakia in 1938 under the pretext of protecting the rights of the Sudeten Germans and for making territorial claims to Poland. Milosevic tried to do the same thing in the 90s in dismembered Yugoslavia.
First of all, good company. Secondly, we know how this defense of their “oppressed compatriots” ultimately turned out.
Who really benefited from the virtually uncontrolled issuance of Russian passports to residents of South Ossetia is the corrupt elite of the republic. Georgians discovered hundreds of Russian passports without the owners' signatures in captured Tskhinvali - these " dead Souls“Pensions and benefits were probably accrued from the Russian treasury.
Myth 5: Georgia bombed Tskhinvali
When Georgian troops approached Tskhinvali on the night of August 8, they only conducted barrage fire and shelling administrative buildings. There was no need for anything else. The Georgians entered an intact and half-empty city, which was abandoned not only by the majority of residents, but also by the main forces of the militia. Kokoity with the color of his army fled to the Russian military base in Java. The Georgian troops were opposed by a few scattered groups of partisans with small arms. They could only run away from the tanks.
Bombing and shelling of the city from "Grads" were needed in the next two days, when the Georgians were driven out of the city by Russian troops who arrived to help their Ossetian brothers. These were their bombs and shells. It is on their conscience that most of the dead civilians (see Myth No. 2) and the destroyed city are responsible.
Myth No. 6: Georgians fled shamefully
About the progress modern wars Most of us get our ideas from television pictures. From the picture of the August war, the viewer could remember how “timid Georgians fled,” leaving equipment and barracks with their beds made. And I couldn’t see what wasn’t shown.
For example, the defeat of a Russian column of armored vehicles by Georgian special forces on August 8. Then, out of 120 tanks and armored personnel carriers, more than half were destroyed, and the commander of the 58th Army, General Khrulev, was seriously wounded. According to Saakashvili, this episode delayed the advance of Russian troops for two days. And then the Russian command brought up such forces that in the event direct confrontation the Georgian army would have been completely destroyed. And he gave the order to retreat so that there would be something to defend Tbilisi. You can't break the butt with a whip.
It is clear that the balance of forces between the Russian and Georgian armies is so disproportionate that there can be no talk of any real confrontation. But this rather relates to Myth No. 1 - about whether the Georgians wanted war.
Myth No. 7: The war ended in peace
Georgia lost 20% of its territory - lands that most Georgians consider theirs. Not a single Georgian president will dare to abandon them forever. And no one can guarantee that any of them will not dare to return what was lost - including by force.
Russia acquired two formally independent quasi-states as satellites, which, besides itself, were recognized only by such influential powers as Nicaragua, Venezuela and Nauru - for 50 million dollars, and Vanuatu is still bargaining, and Hamas, which itself is not a state. In fact, these are two forever subsidized regions of Russia, doomed to be black holes of the Russian budget, oases of wild corruption and crime. There will never be prosperity or even peace there, and the possibility of criminal and national conflicts- Always.
Russia has regained its Soviet image of a brutal aggressor, which, of course, pleases national pride, but only harms business, diplomacy and, ultimately, the security of the country.
Russia and Georgia have become and will remain irreconcilable enemies. This will last a long time. After the war, a real “cold war” began between the two states, and as recent past experience shows, in “ cold war“The one who has more weapons and a stronger army does not always win.
Myth No. 8: South Ossetia is the land of Ossetia, not Georgia
The territory of South Ossetia is the original part of Georgia, as even the geographical names indicate. The same Tskhinvali, after the war in the Russian press and official documents was renamed Tskhinvali, did not become less Georgian because its root is from the ancient Georgian word meaning “hornbeam”. Ossetians in the capital of South Ossetia became the national majority only in 1990. Before interethnic conflicts After the decline of the USSR and the sovereignty wars it caused, there was practically no antagonism between Georgians and Ossetians. This is not even the situation of Kosovo, where an overwhelming Albanian majority was formed on primordially Serbian soil. The ethnic cleansing carried out by Kokoity with the support of Putin in 2008 is too deep and too fresh a wound for it to heal and for Georgians to come to terms with it.
And finally, a lot of photos of destroyed Georgian villages
On the night of August 8, 2008, the Georgian army entered the territory of South Ossetia and partially destroyed its capital, Tskhinvali. The Russian Federation, protecting the residents of South Ossetia, most of them have Russian citizenship, sent its troops into the region and, within 5 days of fighting, ousted the Georgians from the conflict zone. Later, at the end of August, Russia recognized the independence of Abkhazia and South Ossetia, in response to which Georgia called these two republics occupied territories. Let's figure out what losses in people and equipment the parties suffered during this fleeting conflict.
Losses in people, Russia
According to the Center for Analysis of Strategy and Technology, the Russian army lost 67 people killed during the conflict. This is exactly the figure that the Investigative Committee of the Russian Federation Prosecutor’s Office named, analyzing past military operations. This figure also includes those killed after the period of active hostilities, that is, until the withdrawal of troops. The situation is somewhat blurred by the fact that neither the UPC nor the RF Ministry of Defense have ever published an official list of dead servicemen, which introduces some confusion into this issue and the appearance different numbers deaths ranged from 48 to 74.
Of the 67 military personnel killed, 48 died directly from enemy fire, the remaining 19 were victims of road accidents, “friendly fire” and careless handling. TsAST classified them as “non-combat losses” of the Russian army in this conflict. The role of road accidents was especially great; they accounted for 9 deaths. Such high losses are explained by the objective difficulty of transporting a large group of troops, carried out at high speed along a narrow mountain serpentine, in some cases at night. So out of 30 wounded 429th motorized rifle regiment Only two were injured by enemy fire, the rest were injured on the march (severe bruises, fractures, traumatic brain injuries). Of the 9 wounded of the 292nd mixed artillery regiment, 8 were injured as a result of an accident. At the same time, the 70th, 71st, 135th and 693rd motorized rifle regiments, well prepared for operations in mountainous terrain, reached their positions without suffering significant non-combat losses. The total number of Russian army soldiers wounded as a result of the conflict ranges from 170 to 340 people; it is difficult to determine more precisely.
Casualties in people, Georgia
As the head of TsAST, Ruslan Pukhov, noted, unlike us, the Georgian Defense Ministry published a list of dead and missing people by name less than a month after the conflict. Subsequently, it was regularly updated and clarified as the fate of the missing was clarified and the remains were identified. In addition to first and last names, this list contains military ranks and belonging to military units. According to the director of CAST, the data presented in it is quite complete and accurate.
The Georgian military lost 170 people killed and missing during the conflict, and 14 Georgian police officers also died. The number of wounded reached 1,964 people, including reservists and police. This large ratio of wounded to dead, more than 10 to 1, is explained by widespread use in the Georgian army, personal protective equipment (helmets, body armor) of modern models. The majority of the wounded received shrapnel wounds from Russian aviation and artillery fire. In these conditions individual means The defenses turned out to be quite effective. According to the Georgians, the sanitary evacuation services worked well, and in the immediate vicinity of the conflict zone there were stationary, well-prepared hospitals and clinics, which made it possible to reduce the mortality rate among the delivered wounded to 2%.
Losses in technology, Russia
Most full list losses Russian technology also cited by the Center for Analysis of Strategies and Technologies. From August 8 to 12, our units on the territory of South Ossetia lost 3 tanks, up to 20 light armored vehicles and 6 aircraft, this information is based on the study of photo and video materials from the conflict zone, media materials, and memories of combatants.
So during the conflict, Russia lost three tanks: T72B(M), T-72B and one T-62. All of them were destroyed by enemy fire. Light tracked and wheeled armored vehicles suffered more significant losses - about 20 units. Among them are nine BMP-1, three BMP-2, two BTR-80, one BMD-2, three BRDM-2 and one MT-LB6 tractor. No artillery, MLRS or air defense systems were lost.
Losses in vehicles were high. Only in the peacekeepers’ camp, as a result of artillery shelling and tank fire, all the equipment located there, which was about 20 units, was destroyed. 10 GAZ-66 trucks of mortar batteries of the 693rd and 135th regiments were destroyed by enemy artillery fire. Two Ural-4320 trucks were destroyed on August 11 in daytime as a result of an attack by a Georgian Mi-24 helicopter. A number of other trucks were lost as a result of serious accidents.
During the fighting, three Su-25, two Su-24 and one Tu-22M3 were lost; after the end of the conflict, two Mi-24 and Mi-8 MTKO helicopters crashed as a result of accidents. Of these aircraft, 2 were reliably shot down by enemy air defense systems, 3 became victims of “friendly fire”, and it was not possible to determine who shot down the last one. In addition, 4 more Russian Su-25 attack aircraft were seriously damaged, but were able to return to their bases.
Losses in equipment, Georgia
During active phase During the fighting, the Georgian combat fleet was completely destroyed, losses amounted to 2 missile boats, 5 patrol boats and a number of smaller ships. Aviation lost three An-2 transport helicopters, three Mi-24 helicopters and one Mi-14, while Mi-24 helicopters were occasionally used by the Georgian army until the end of the conflict. Georgia has not lost a single combat or training aircraft, and there is an explanation for this. Georgian aviation appeared over the battlefield only once on the morning of August 8, after which the planes did not take off and were dispersed and camouflaged at airfields.
15 Georgian tanks were destroyed in the battles, about 20 more were burned after being captured on the battlefield, the Russian army kept about 30 tanks as trophies, most of them T-72s. In addition to tanks, the Georgians lost four BMP-2s, four Turkish-made Cobra armored vehicles and three BTR-80s. Russia captured fifteen BMP-1U and two BMP-2 as trophies. The Georgian artillery lost four self-propelled 203 mm. howitzers "Pion" and two "Dana" of Czech production. One "Pion", two "Dana" and about 20 non-self-propelled guns of various calibers were captured by the Russian army as trophies.
Four years ago, on the night of August 8, 2008, Georgian troops attacked South Ossetia and destroyed part of its capital Tskhinvali.
After an armed conflict that lasted until the summer of 1992, Georgia lost control over South Ossetia. Since then, Tskhinvali has sought recognition of the independent status of South Ossetia, while Tbilisi continued to consider this territory integral part Georgia, offering only autonomy to the Ossetians.
The situation in the zone of the Georgian-Ossetian conflict evening of August 1. The city of Tskhinvali and a number of other settlements were subjected to massive shelling from the Georgian side. In the conflict zone, a battle raged for several hours using small arms, grenade launchers and mortars. The first casualties and significant destruction appeared. South Ossetia began evacuating its residents to North Ossetia, in the first two days after the shelling, 2.5 thousand residents left their homes.
August 2 Georgian State Minister for Reintegration Temur Yakobashvili, who visited South Ossetia, after meetings with representatives of the OSCE observer mission, with the Chief of Staff of Peacekeeping Operations of the Georgian Ministry of Defense, General Mamuka Kurashvili, and the Commander of the Joint Peacekeeping Forces (JPKF), General Marat Kulakhmetov, said that the Georgian authorities do not see an alternative to direct negotiations between Tbilisi and Tskhinvali and express their readiness to conduct negotiations without preconditions. The Georgian authorities, Yakobashvili said, will accept all situations.
August 3rd Georgian side to the borders of South Ossetia. From the military base in Gori, an artillery column consisting of one division of D-30 artillery mounts and two mortar batteries, which are part of the fourth motorized infantry brigade of the Georgian Ministry of Defense, advanced towards Tskhinvali.
August 16 Russian President Dmitry Medvedev signed a plan to resolve the conflict in Georgia.
August 17 was introduced in the unrecognized republic state of emergency for a period of one month. A curfew was introduced on the territory of Tskhinvali, that is, a ban on citizens being on the streets and in other public places without specially issued passes and identification documents, from 21:00 to 6:00.
August 20 from 21:00 there is a state of emergency throughout South Ossetia and a curfew in Tskhinvali “in connection with the stabilization of the situation in South Ossetia.”
August 21 Abkhazia and South Ossetia based on the results of “nationwide gatherings” of the presidents and parliaments of the republics with a request to recognize the independence of the self-proclaimed states.
The material was prepared based on information from RIA Novosti and open sources
IN beginning of XXI century, Russia took part in a number of wars. These military actions influenced the subsequent development of the Russian army, military equipment and military doctrine. One of the most bright ones examples include the reflection of Georgian aggression in South Ossetia by Russia and its allies, on the one hand, back in August 2008. Another name for this conflict is the “five-day war.”
Historical background
The border that arbitrarily divided the Ossetians between the RSFSR and the Georgian SSR was established back in Soviet time. Back then they could not even imagine that it would become the border between two unfriendly blocs.
While Georgia was part of the USSR, things were peaceful here, and there was no talk of a possible ethnic conflict. But everything changed after perestroika, when the Georgian authorities began to slowly but surely move towards gaining independence. It was when it became clear that the exit of the Georgian SSR from the Union was quite real that the South Ossetian leadership, mostly gravitating toward Russia, began to think about its own sovereignty. And as a result, already in 1989, the autonomy of South Ossetia was declared, and in 1990 - its full sovereignty.
However, the Georgian government was against it. At the same time, in 1990, the Supreme Council of Georgia declared the decree granting autonomy to South Ossetia invalid.
War 1991-1992
On January 5, 1991, Georgia sent a three-thousand-strong police force into the capital of South Ossetia, the city of Tskhinvali. However, just a few hours later, street fighting broke out in the city, often with the use of grenade launchers. During these battles, the futility of the solution became obvious Supreme Council Georgia, and the Georgian detachment itself was gradually pushed back to the city center. As a result, the Georgian contingent was withdrawn to positions in the center of Tskhinvali, where they began to prepare for long-term defense.
On January 25, 1991, an agreement was reached on the withdrawal of the Georgian contingent from Tskhinvali and their abandonment of the city, thanks to which the fire ceased for several days. However, new provocations from the Georgian side made the truce short-lived.
What also added fuel to the fire was that according to the Soviet constitution autonomous entities as part of the Soviet socialist republics leaving the Union, they could independently make decisions about their stay within the USSR. Therefore, when Georgia left the Soviet Union On April 9, 1991, the South Ossetian leadership hastened to announce its further stay in the USSR.
However, the conflict flared up. The Georgian police and army controlled the territory and heights near Tskhinvali, thanks to which they could launch artillery strikes on the city. The situation there became truly catastrophic: destruction, loss of life and appalling conditions did not add sympathy to the Georgian side.
On December 21, 1991, the Supreme Council of South Ossetia adopted a declaration of independence of the republic, and a month later a corresponding referendum was held. It should be noted that this referendum was mainly boycotted by the Georgian population of the republic, so the absolute majority of votes (about 99%) were cast for independence. Naturally, the Georgian government did not recognize either the independence of the region or the referendum.
The conflict ended quite quickly, and the cause was political instability in Georgia. At the end of 1991, an outbreak broke out in this country Civil War, which significantly weakened Georgia’s position in the region. In addition, Russia, which was not happy with the smoldering hotbed of tension on the southern border, also intervened in the situation. Pressure was put on the Georgian government (even to the point of the possibility of an airstrike against Georgian forces in the Tskhinvali area), and in mid-July 1992 the shelling of the city stopped.
The result of this war was that the people and government of South Ossetia finally turned away from Georgia and continued to strive with all their might for recognition of their independence in the international arena. Total losses During the conflict, approximately 1,000 people were killed and 2,500 wounded.
Period 1992-2008 Rising tensions
The period after the Georgian-South Ossetian war became a time of undulating tension in the region.
As a result of the conflict of 1991-1992. An agreement was reached between the Russian, Georgian and South Ossetian sides on the deployment of a joint peacekeeping contingent to the territory of South Ossetia. This contingent consisted of three battalions (one from each side).
The first half of the nineties was characterized by a big diplomatic game played by all parties. On the one hand, South Ossetia sought to finally separate from Georgia in the eyes of the international community and become part of Russian Federation. Georgia, in turn, methodically “squeezed out” South Ossetian independence and autonomy. Russian side was interested in peace in South Ossetia, but soon focused her attention on Chechnya, another far from peaceful region.
However, negotiations continued throughout the first half of the nineties, and in October 1995, the first meeting between the Georgian and Ossetian sides took place in Tskhinvali. Representatives of Russia and the OSCE were present at the meeting. During the meeting, an agreement was reached to cancel the decree of the Georgian Supreme Council on the liquidation of the autonomy of South Ossetia, as well as the republic’s non-secession from Georgia. It is worth noting that, perhaps, the Russian leadership took such a step in exchange for non-recognition by the President of Georgia E. Shevardnadze Chechen Republic Ichkeria and its support for the actions of Russian troops in Chechnya.
In the spring of 1996, a memorandum on the non-use of force in South Ossetia was signed in Moscow. It became a real step forward in Georgian-Ossetian relations. And on August 27 of the same year, the first meeting between Georgian President E. Shevardnadze and the Chairman of the Parliament (and in fact the head of state) of South Ossetia L. Chibirov took place. During this meeting, the parties outlined further paths to normalize the situation, however, after the meeting, E. Shevardnadze said that “it is too early to talk about the autonomy of South Ossetia.”
However, the situation by 2000 contributed to further peace in the region, the return of refugees and economic recovery. However, all the cards were confused by the coming to power in Georgia in January 2004 as a result of the “Rose Revolution” by M. Saakashvili. It was he who represented the young, nationalist-minded generation of Georgia, which, in pursuit of immediate success, did not disdain populist ideas, even if at times very absurd.
Even before his official election as President of Georgia, Mikheil Saakashvili visited South Ossetia, and this visit was not coordinated with the South Ossetian authorities. At the same time, he allowed himself the remark that “2004 will be last year when South Ossetia and Abkhazia do not participate in elections in Georgia.” This statement contributed to the destabilization of the situation.
In 2004-2008 The situation around South Ossetia and the Russian peacekeeping battalion on its territory continued to heat up. In the spring of 2006, the Georgian leadership declared Russian peacekeeping troops in South Ossetia criminals. The reason for such a loud statement was that the servicemen from Russia did not have visas issued by the Georgian side and were allegedly staying on Georgian territory illegally. At the same time, the Georgian side demanded either the withdrawal of Russian peacekeepers or their “legalization.”
Meanwhile, fighting flared up in a number of regions of South Ossetia. Skirmishes, provocations and shelling, including mortar attacks, are no longer rare. At the same time, the overwhelming number of provocations were carried out by the Georgian side. It is also worth mentioning the May 2006 statement by then Georgian Defense Minister Irakli Okruashvili, who stated that by May 1, 2007, South Ossetia would become part of Georgia. In response to this clearly provocative statement, Russian Defense Minister Sergei Ivanov guaranteed assistance to Abkhazia and South Ossetia in the event of Georgian aggression against them.
It was in 2006 that the process of confrontation between Georgia and South Ossetia took final shape. The Georgian leadership, in its nationalist hysteria, continued to declare that Georgian territory must be inviolable and restored by any means, even military means. It is in this regard that Georgia has set a course for rapprochement with the United States and NATO. The American army arrived in the Georgian army military equipment and instructors who became frequent guests.
At the same time, South Ossetia from the very beginning of its existence adhered to an exclusively pro-Russian course, so its “peaceful” unification with Georgia after Saakashvili came to power could not happen in principle. In November 2006, a referendum on support for independence was held in South Ossetia. As a result, approximately 99% of the residents of South Ossetia who voted were in favor of maintaining the independence of the republic and continuing its foreign policy course.
Thus, by August 2008, the situation in the region had deteriorated to the limit and a peaceful resolution of the issue was practically impossible. The Georgian “hawks” led by Saakashvili could no longer retreat - otherwise they would have lost their prestige and weight in the eyes of the United States.
Start of hostilities on August 8
On August 8, 2008, approximately 15 minutes after midnight, the Georgian army suddenly opened fire on Tskhinvali with Grad multiple rocket launchers. Three hours later, Georgian troops moved forward.
Thus, the truce was violated by the Georgian side, and the Georgian army already in the first hours of the offensive managed to capture a number of settlements on the territory of South Ossetia (Mugut, Didmukha), and also break into the outskirts of Tskhinvali. However, the South Ossetian militia units were able to inflict significant losses on the aggressor at the very beginning of the conflict and slow down the pace of the Georgian “blitzkrieg” with stubborn defense.
At this time, in Tskhinvali itself, as a result of the Georgian artillery attack, casualties appeared among the civilian population. The city was taken by surprise, but the residents bravely greeted the news of the Georgian invasion. Another tragic episode initial period war was the death of Russian peacekeepers from the fire of Georgian salvo launchers. This fact finally convinced the Russian leadership that there was no prospect of a peaceful resolution of the conflict. President of the Russian Federation Dmitry Medvedev announced the start of an operation to force the Georgian side to peace.
In the morning, Russian aircraft began carrying out air strikes on Georgian troops, thereby sharply reducing the pace of their advance. Russian columns of the 58th Army, which formed the main reserve and main defense forces in the South Ossetian direction, moved through the Roki tunnel to help the peacekeepers and South Ossetian militia units.
During the day, Georgian troops managed to significantly push back the Russian-South Ossetian troops and surround the barracks of the Russian peacekeepers, but they failed to decisively turn the situation in their favor. In fact, by the evening of August 8, it became clear that the Georgian “blitzkrieg” had failed and it would not be possible to immediately capture Tskhinvali. However, a victorious mood reigned in the Georgian media; It was announced that the assault on Tskhinvali was successful.
Further development of the conflict (August 9-11)
By the morning of August 9, fighting in Tskhinvali continued, but the Georgian troops no longer had significant superiority. Having become bogged down in street fighting, they now sought to seize as much territory as possible, so that in the course of subsequent peace talks(which no one doubted on August 9) to have at least some trump cards in their hands. However, militia units and Russian peacekeepers continued to stubbornly defend the city's neighborhoods.
At the same time, a group consisting of units of the 58th Russian Army arrived in Tskhinvali; in addition, the 76th Airborne Division was transferred to the scene of events. A battalion group was also created, separated from the 135th Motorized Rifle Regiment. The task of the group was to release Russian peacekeepers and establish contact with them.
However, due to the fact that the offensive impulse of the Georgian troops had not yet been exhausted, and the troops themselves had a sufficient amount of manpower and equipment, as a result of the oncoming battle, the Russian battalion group suffered significant losses and was withdrawn from the city by the end of the day. However, this counter-strike contributed to the speedy stop of the Georgian offensive and the transition of Georgian forces to defense.
Throughout the day on August 9, there were Russian airstrikes against Georgian troops, as well as mutual artillery shelling. A group of ships of the Russian Black Sea Fleet entered the territorial waters of Georgia for the purpose of patrolling and excluding aggressive actions Georgia at sea. Moreover, the very next day, August 10, 2008, an attempt by the Georgian naval forces penetrate the conflict zone.
On August 10, Russian troops launched a counter-offensive and began to oust Georgian forces from Tskhinvali, and Russian-Abkhaz forces began moving out of the regions bordering Georgia. Thus, on the third day of the conflict, the Georgian offensive completely fizzled out, and the front line began to move into reverse direction. The result defensive battles was, first of all, a complete stop of the Georgian troops, their losses and complete disorganization. It was at this point that the Georgian leadership began to panic, caused by the threat of complete military defeat. Saakashvili asked NATO countries to intervene in the conflict and “save Georgia from the clutches of the Russian aggressor.”
On August 11, Russian troops completed the liberation of the territories of South Ossetia seized by the aggressor and entered the territory of Georgia. Nevertheless, this event was covered in every possible way as the need to “force Georgia to peace.” On the same day, Russian troops occupied the city of Zugdidi in western Georgia without a fight, and the city of Gori was abandoned by Georgian troops.
Truce and end of the conflict
On August 12, Russian President D. Medvedev announced that there was no longer a danger to the civilian population of South Ossetia and Russian military personnel, which is why it makes sense to stop the operation to force the aggressor to peace. After this, through the mediation of the President of France and the Chairman European Union Nicolas Sarkozy negotiations began between Russia and Georgia. The general meaning of the future peace agreement was based on the non-use of force to resolve controversial issues, the end of hostilities, the withdrawal of troops to the positions they occupied before the conflict, access for humanitarian aid to the region, as well as the beginning of an international discussion on the status of South Ossetia and Abkhazia. The Georgian leadership agreed with all points of the agreement, except for the point on the status of Abkhazia and South Ossetia. This paragraph has been reformulated.
Over the next days, the process of withdrawing Russian troops from Georgian territory continued. On August 16, the peace agreement was signed by the heads of the Russian Federation, Abkhazia, South Ossetia and Georgia. Thus, at least this conflict and is called a five-day war (due to the fact that the phase of active hostilities lasted from August 8 to 12, 2008), but in fact it ended on August 16.
Results and consequences of the five-day war
The results of the August conflict in South Ossetia are interpreted differently by each side of the conflict. The Russian leadership announced the victory of Russian and South Ossetian troops, curbing the aggressor, inflicting a serious defeat on him and excluding new large-scale military conflicts in the near future. However, isolated battles and artillery attacks, ambushes and firefights continued until the end of 2008.
The Georgian leadership announced the victory of the Georgian troops, and Georgian President M. Saakashvili stated that one Georgian brigade, equipped with the latest American weapons, managed to defeat the entire 58th Army. However, if we objectively evaluate the results of the conflict, it should be noted: the statement of the Georgian leadership was made solely for propaganda purposes and had nothing to do with reality.
As for the losses suffered by the parties to the conflict, their estimates also differ. According to Russian data, the losses of the troops of Russia, South Ossetia and Abkhazia in total amount to about 510 people killed and wounded, while the losses of Georgia are approximately 3000. The Georgian side claims that the losses of Georgian troops during the conflict amounted to about 410 killed and 1750 wounded, and the losses of Russian troops and their allies were approximately 1,500 killed and wounded. Thus, there was no such thing as “the defeat of an entire Russian army by a Georgian brigade.”
The objectively recognized result of the war in South Ossetia was the victory of Russia and its allies, as well as the heavy defeat of the Georgian army. However, as a result of investigations carried out International Commission European Union, it was proved that it was Georgia that was the aggressor in the conflict, but at the same time it was pointed out that “Russia’s provocative behavior prompted Georgia to resolve the issue by force.” However, how this “provocative behavior” was linked to Russia’s refusal to accept South Ossetia and Abkhazia, as well as the non-recognition of the independence of the republics, the Commission was unable to give an answer.
The consequences of the five-day war were Russia's recognition of the independence of South Ossetia and Abkhazia and the beginning of confrontation between the Russian Federation and Georgia (diplomatic relations were severed between the states in September 2008). The United States, despite the Commission's conclusions about Georgia's responsibility for starting the war, accused Russia of aggressively seeking to expand its borders. Thus, the conflict in South Ossetia can be called a new era in relations between Russia and the Western world.
If you have any questions, leave them in the comments below the article. We or our visitors will be happy to answer them