Legal assessments of the parties' actions. South Ossetia: Official data

This is one of the best texts about the Russian-Georgian war of 2008.

Seven years ago, the Russian-Georgian war broke out. It certainly created a new reality - in Georgia, Russia, the post-Soviet space and in the world in relation to Russia. But most of us know about it from myths created by massive Russian propaganda. Here are the most common ones

Myth No. 1: Saakashvili started the war

War is started by those who prepare for it in advance.

Who prepared for it and who tried to prevent it?

In June-July 2008, various information sources reported that a political decision on an imminent (presumably in August) war with Georgia had already been made in Moscow, with Putin personally overseeing the preparations. The official news agency Osinform will publish the formula for a future war: “a peacekeeping operation to force the aggressor to peace.”

On July 5, large-scale maneuvers of the North Caucasus Military District (NCMD) "Caucasus-2008" begin. 8,000 military personnel, 700 armored vehicles, and ships of the Black Sea Fleet are taking part in them. The official purpose of the exercise is to prepare for a “peace enforcement operation.” The troops are distributing the leaflet “Warrior, know your probable enemy!” - with a description of the armed forces of Georgia.

The best airborne units of the Russian army from different regions of the country are being transferred to the border with Georgia. They replace the motorized rifle units previously stationed there. At the Terskoye training ground of the 58th Army in the south of North Ossetia, a field military hospital is being set up, capable of treating 300 wounded per day.
After the end of the maneuvers, the field hospital is not dismantled. The troops participating in them do not return to their places of permanent deployment. Some of them seep into South Ossetia. Fortunately, just these days (coincidentally) the construction of a military base in Java was completed.

By the beginning of the war (that is, before 08/08/08 - the official date of the entry of Russian troops into hostilities), about 200 units of armored vehicles and advanced units of the 135th and 693rd regiments of the 58th Army - over 1,200 people - were concentrated in Java. Russia still does not recognize this (how can one admit that Russian troops were stationed in South Ossetia before the start of the aggression to repel Georgian aggression?), but the testimony of the soldiers and officers of the 58th Army themselves, which appeared in the media, does not leave this doubts (see, for example, selection).

Simultaneously with military training, information training took place. On July 20, hacker attacks began on Georgian government and information sites. This was the second known case of cyber warfare against a state in history. (The first was recorded in 2007, when, after the aggravation of relations between Russia and Estonia due to the relocation of a monument to Soviet soldiers in the center of Tallinn, the websites of Estonian government agencies were destroyed.) The final attack occurred on the morning of August 8 - against Russian-language information websites of Georgia.

But from August 1, Russian journalists began to arrive from Vladikavkaz to Tskhinvali in an organized manner. Soon their number increased to 50 people, but not a single foreigner (with the exception of a correspondent for the Ukrainian TV channel Inter) was among them. The Russian authorities established a strict access system: accreditation had to be obtained from both the Ministry of Defense and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Only the most trusted and trusted could pass through this double sieve.

This ensured that the conditions were not only for a massive invasion, but also that only what needed to be reported about it was ensured.

The most significant thing in this multi-step combination is that the war has actually begun
July 29, 2008.

It was on this day that hostilities began. And they were started, in accordance with plans from Moscow, by South Ossetian armed formations completely controlled by Russia.

They began a massive and systematic shelling of villages in South Ossetia under Georgian jurisdiction and the positions of the Georgian peacekeeping contingent. The fire came from mortars and 120-mm guns, which are generally prohibited in the conflict zone. People died.

This is not a separate escalation in the long-standing confrontation between the separatists and the central government. This is a blatant prelude to war. Deliberate provocation with the aim of causing a response. So the city punks send a youngster to pick on a passer-by, only to then jump out from around the corner and pile on him shouting: “Don’t touch the kid!”

The Tbilisi authorities understood perfectly well what was expected of them. But it is impossible to bear the blows for long. By the evening of August 1, the Georgians begin returning artillery fire on militant positions in the vicinity of Tskhinvali. The Ossetians are responding by expanding the shelling zone of Georgian villages and increasing the intensity of fire. Large-caliber mortars and 122-mm guns are already in use.

Mass evacuation of the population to Russia begins from Tskhinvali. Over the course of several days, more than 20 thousand people were taken out. This is estimated to be half the actual population of the self-proclaimed republic. Tskhinvali becomes an almost deserted city.

And through the Roki tunnel - the only way for heavy equipment to pass from North Ossetia to South Ossetia - Russian armored vehicles and troops are moving.

The Georgian authorities are trying to the last to resolve the matter peacefully. Saakashvili's personal representative T. Yakobashvili arranges a meeting with the South Ossetian leadership in Tskhinvali on August 7 through the mediation of the Russian Ambassador-at-Large Yu. Popov.

He's coming. Popov is not there. It turns out that the tire got flat on the way. "So put on the spare tire!" - the Georgian minister advises the Russian ambassador. “And the spare tire is punctured,” the ambassador replies. Such a disaster. The representative of South Ossetia refuses to negotiate without a Russian mediator.

Yakobashvili is negotiating with whoever he has - the commander of the peacekeeping forces, General Kulakhmetov. He admits that he is “no longer able to control the Ossetian units.” What to do? “Announce a unilateral ceasefire,” Kulakhmetov advises.

Within an hour, Yakobashvili resolved the issue. At 17:00 he announces to Kulakhmetov that the Georgian government has agreed to a unilateral ceasefire. At 17:10 the Georgian guns fell silent. At 19:10 Saakashvili announces this in a live television address in Georgian and Ossetian and calls for negotiations.

The response is to intensify shelling of Georgian villages. By 23:00 they reached their peak. And at the same time, a column of Russian troops with 100 units of armored vehicles emerges from the Roki tunnel. The invasion has begun.
In half an hour, Saakashvili will give the order to start a military operation.

Could he have done anything differently? Of course he could.

But to do this, you had to forget that you are the president of a sovereign country, that you are a man and that you are Georgian. And if he had done this, he would not have been one, or the other, or the third.

It was a Zugzwang situation: the rulers of Russia skillfully brought him into the war, leaving no other way out.
The one who wants war, the one who starts the war is the one who prepares for it, the one who does not give the enemy a chance to avoid it. It was Russia.

Myth No. 2: Russia started the war to stop the genocide of Ossetians

Where did this come from?

Already on August 8, the President of South Ossetia E. Kokoity reported that as a result of shelling and military operations in Tskhinvali alone, 1,400 people were killed - the figure is not final. The next day, August 9, the official representative of the Ministry of Internal Affairs of the republic announced that 2,100 civilians had died in Tskhinvali.
This figure - more than 2,000 dead - appeared everywhere later: in reports, in media reports, and in online forums.

The number of victims was supplemented by examples of the atrocities of the Georgian military: direct fire from tanks at houses where civilians were hiding, targeted fire from machine guns at children and the elderly, burning of houses along with living people, decapitated corpses of girls...

But when they began to count, it turned out that everything was not quite like that. During the entire fighting in the city, the Tskhinvali hospital, where all the wounded and dead Ossetians were admitted, received 273 wounded and 44 killed, 90% of the victims were South Ossetian militias. The head of the Investigative Committee under the Russian Prosecutor's Office, A. Bastrykin, announced that 134 civilians of South Ossetia had died during the entire war, according to Yulia Latynina, “resurrecting 1,866 people in one fell swoop.”

But even after the official count, the number “2000” remained in the public consciousness, and even in speeches and interviews with officials, including Putin.

Although it is initially unrealistic. The official number of residents of Tskhinvali before the war was 42 thousand. After the evacuation in early August, half of them should have remained. The usual ratio of killed to wounded in military conflict zones is 1:3. This means, statistically, for every 2,000 killed there should have been another 6,000 wounded. That is, almost every second Tskhinvali resident would have been wounded or killed after the Georgian assault. And if it were so, would such a brave arithmetician as Kokoity be able to keep silent about it? But he didn't say.

How did 2,000 dead appear on the second day? And so - what genocide without thousands of victims! "Thousands" is at least two. So it turned out to be 2000. Modestly - to the minimum.

As for the Georgian atrocities, not a single fact was confirmed even after verification by such a demanding organization as Human Rights Watch. Not a single eyewitness account - only retellings of what was told. That's how rumors spread. Judging by their abundance and drama, these were deliberately spread rumors. Professional disinformation.

But ethnic cleansing of Georgians by South Ossetian armed forces is not a rumor. The Georgian population in South Ossetia, where Georgian villages interspersed with Ossetian ones almost in a checkerboard pattern, no longer exists. Robbed, expelled, killed - some Georgian villages were simply razed to the ground. This was done by the hands of the brave warriors of Kokoity. They did not distinguish themselves in battles and almost did not participate (and the warlike president himself, at the first reports of the advance of Georgian troops to Tskhinvali, fled from the capital under the shadow of Russian tanks to Java, and returned with them), but they took their souls in reprisals against civilians and looting.

Thanks to their efforts, there are no more Georgians in South Ossetia. But on the territory of Georgia, outside of South Ossetia, more than 60 thousand Ossetians lived and continue to live peacefully. What would happen to them if the Georgians really started genocide? Remember the Armenians in Baku during the Karabakh crisis.

But the fact is that there was no genocide of Ossetians in Georgia or by Georgians either before the war, during it, or after it. There was no reason.

Myth No. 3: Russia went to war to protect its peacekeepers

The last thing the Georgians wanted was to fight with Russian peacekeepers.

The first thing they did when starting hostilities was to warn the Russian peacekeeping contingent.
At 23.35, President Saakashvili gives the order to begin the operation, and at 23.40, the commander of the Georgian peacekeeping forces, Brigadier General Mamuka Kurashvili, reports the advance of the troops to the commander of the Russian peacekeepers, General Kulakhmetov, and asks not to interfere.

“It’s not that simple,” the Russian general answered the Georgian.

Even before this, at the initial stage of hostilities, Ossetian artillerymen and mortarmen fired at Georgian villages near the peacekeepers’ deployment sites, using them as cover, or even using direct assistance to direct fire. Kulakhmetov did not consider it necessary to deny this in conversations with Georgian officials. During the offensive of the Georgian troops, key figures of the South Ossetian command hid in the main headquarters. According to international standards, this made it a legitimate target.

However, in the target map issued to Georgian artillerymen during artillery preparation, the peacekeepers' targets were marked as prohibited for fire.

In order to protect its peacekeepers, the Russian leadership did not have to send troops and spend money on the war. It was enough to prohibit Kokoity from using them as cover - and everyone would have remained safe. But the goal was different.

Myth #4: Russia started the war to protect its citizens

The Russian authorities themselves created their own artificial diaspora in South Ossetia, issuing Russian citizenship and Russian passports to thousands of residents of the self-proclaimed republic on Georgian territory. Legally, this is regarded as interference in the internal affairs of another state. As it turned out - and in fact. The artificial diaspora created an artificial reason for intervention: protecting our citizens is nothing like the newly minted ones, everyone is dear to us.
Ingenious, of course: this can provide justification for an invasion of any country.
But not original: in the same way, Hitler created a pretext for the annexation of Czechoslovakia in 1938 under the pretext of protecting the rights of the Sudeten Germans and for making territorial claims to Poland. Milosevic tried to do the same thing in the 90s in dismembered Yugoslavia.
First of all, good company. Secondly, we know how this defense of their “oppressed compatriots” ultimately turned out.
Who really benefited from the virtually uncontrolled issuance of Russian passports to residents of South Ossetia is the corrupt elite of the republic. The Georgians found hundreds of Russian passports without the signatures of the owners in captured Tskhinvali - pensions and benefits from the Russian treasury were probably accrued to these “dead souls”.

Myth 5: Georgia bombed Tskhinvali

When Georgian troops approached Tskhinvali on the night of August 8, they only conducted barrage fire and shelled administrative buildings. There was no need for anything else. The Georgians entered an intact and half-empty city, which was abandoned not only by the majority of residents, but also by the main forces of the militia. Kokoity with the color of his army fled to the Russian military base in Java. The Georgian troops were opposed by a few scattered groups of partisans with small arms. They could only run away from the tanks.

Bombing and shelling of the city from "Grads" were needed in the next two days, when the Georgians were driven out of the city by Russian troops who arrived to help their Ossetian brothers. These were their bombs and shells. It is on their conscience that most of the dead civilians (see Myth No. 2) and the destroyed city are responsible.

Myth No. 6: Georgians fled shamefully

Most of us get an idea of ​​the course of modern wars from television pictures. From the picture of the August war, the viewer could remember how “timid Georgians fled,” leaving equipment and barracks with their beds made. And I couldn’t see what wasn’t shown.
For example, the defeat of a Russian column of armored vehicles by Georgian special forces on August 8. Then, out of 120 tanks and armored personnel carriers, more than half were destroyed, and the commander of the 58th Army, General Khrulev, was seriously wounded. According to Saakashvili, this episode delayed the advance of Russian troops for two days. And then the Russian command brought up such forces that in the event of a direct confrontation, the Georgian army would have been completely destroyed. And he gave the order to retreat so that there would be something to defend Tbilisi. You can't break the butt with a whip.
It is clear that the balance of forces between the Russian and Georgian armies is so disproportionate that there can be no talk of any real confrontation. But this rather relates to Myth No. 1 - about whether the Georgians wanted war.

Myth No. 7: The war ended in peace

Georgia lost 20% of its territory - lands that most Georgians consider theirs. Not a single Georgian president will dare to abandon them forever. And no one can guarantee that any of them will not dare to return what was lost - including by force.

Russia acquired two formally independent quasi-states as satellites, which, besides itself, were recognized only by such influential powers as Nicaragua, Venezuela and Nauru - for 50 million dollars, and Vanuatu is still bargaining, and Hamas, which itself is not a state. In fact, these are two forever subsidized regions of Russia, doomed to be black holes of the Russian budget, oases of wild corruption and crime. There will never be prosperity or even peace there, but there will always be the possibility of criminal and national conflicts.

Russia has regained its Soviet image of a brutal aggressor, which, of course, pleases national pride, but only harms business, diplomacy and, ultimately, the security of the country.

Russia and Georgia have become and will remain irreconcilable enemies. This will last a long time. After the war, a real “cold war” began between the two states, and as recent past experience shows, in a “cold war” the one who has more weapons and a stronger army does not always win.

Myth No. 8: South Ossetia is the land of Ossetia, not Georgia

The territory of South Ossetia is the original part of Georgia, as even the geographical names indicate. The same Tskhinvali, after the war in the Russian press and official documents was renamed Tskhinvali, did not become less Georgian because its root is from the ancient Georgian word meaning “hornbeam”. Ossetians in the capital of South Ossetia became the national majority only in 1990. Before the interethnic conflicts of the decline of the USSR and the wars of sovereignty caused by it, there was practically no antagonism between Georgians and Ossetians. This is not even the situation of Kosovo, where an overwhelming Albanian majority was formed on primordially Serbian soil. The ethnic cleansing carried out by Kokoity with the support of Putin in 2008 is too deep and too fresh a wound for it to heal and for Georgians to come to terms with it.

And finally, a lot of photos of destroyed Georgian villages

At the beginning of the 21st century, Russia took part in a number of wars. These military actions influenced the subsequent development of the Russian army, military equipment and military doctrine. One of the most striking examples of this is the reflection of Georgian aggression in South Ossetia by Russia and its allies, on the one hand, back in August 2008. Another name for this conflict is the “five-day war.”

Historical background

The border that arbitrarily divided Ossetians between the RSFSR and the Georgian SSR was established back in Soviet times. Back then they could not even imagine that it would become the border between two unfriendly blocs.

While Georgia was part of the USSR, things were peaceful here, and there was no talk of a possible ethnic conflict. But everything changed after perestroika, when the Georgian authorities began to slowly but surely move towards gaining independence. It was when it became clear that the exit of the Georgian SSR from the Union was quite real that the South Ossetian leadership, mostly gravitating toward Russia, began to think about its own sovereignty. And as a result, already in 1989, the autonomy of South Ossetia was declared, and in 1990 - its full sovereignty.

However, the Georgian government was against it. At the same time, in 1990, the Supreme Council of Georgia declared the decree granting autonomy to South Ossetia invalid.

War 1991-1992

On January 5, 1991, Georgia sent a three-thousand-strong police force into the capital of South Ossetia, the city of Tskhinvali. However, just a few hours later, street fighting broke out in the city, often with the use of grenade launchers. During these battles, the futility of the decision of the Supreme Council of Georgia became obvious, and the Georgian detachment itself was gradually pushed back to the city center. As a result, the Georgian contingent was withdrawn to positions in the center of Tskhinvali, where they began to prepare for long-term defense.

On January 25, 1991, an agreement was reached on the withdrawal of the Georgian contingent from Tskhinvali and their abandonment of the city, thanks to which the fire ceased for several days. However, new provocations from the Georgian side made the truce short-lived.

What also added fuel to the fire was the fact that, according to the Soviet constitution, autonomous entities within the Soviet socialist republics leaving the Union could independently make decisions about their stay within the USSR. Therefore, when Georgia seceded from the Soviet Union on April 9, 1991, the South Ossetian leadership hastened to announce its continued stay in the USSR.

However, the conflict flared up. The Georgian police and army controlled the territory and heights near Tskhinvali, thanks to which they could launch artillery strikes on the city. The situation there became truly catastrophic: destruction, loss of life and appalling conditions did not add sympathy to the Georgian side.

On December 21, 1991, the Supreme Council of South Ossetia adopted a declaration of independence of the republic, and a month later a corresponding referendum was held. It should be noted that this referendum was mainly boycotted by the Georgian population of the republic, so the absolute majority of votes (about 99%) were cast for independence. Naturally, the Georgian government did not recognize either the independence of the region or the referendum.

The conflict ended quite quickly, and the cause was political instability in Georgia. At the end of 1991, a civil war broke out in this country, which significantly weakened Georgia’s position in the region. In addition, Russia, which was not happy with the smoldering hotbed of tension on the southern border, also intervened in the situation. Pressure was put on the Georgian government (even to the point of the possibility of an airstrike against Georgian forces in the Tskhinvali area), and in mid-July 1992 the shelling of the city stopped.

The result of this war was that the people and government of South Ossetia finally turned away from Georgia and continued to strive with all their might for recognition of their independence in the international arena. Total casualties during the conflict were approximately 1,000 killed and 2,500 wounded.

Period 1992-2008 Rising tensions

The period after the Georgian-South Ossetian war became a time of undulating tension in the region.

As a result of the conflict of 1991-1992. An agreement was reached between the Russian, Georgian and South Ossetian sides on the deployment of a joint peacekeeping contingent to the territory of South Ossetia. This contingent consisted of three battalions (one from each side).

The first half of the nineties was characterized by a big diplomatic game played by all parties. On the one hand, South Ossetia sought to finally separate from Georgia in the eyes of the international community and become part of the Russian Federation. Georgia, in turn, methodically “squeezed out” South Ossetian independence and autonomy. The Russian side was interested in peace in South Ossetia, but soon focused its attention on Chechnya, another far from peaceful region.

However, negotiations continued throughout the first half of the nineties, and in October 1995, the first meeting between the Georgian and Ossetian sides took place in Tskhinvali. Representatives of Russia and the OSCE were present at the meeting. During the meeting, an agreement was reached to cancel the decree of the Georgian Supreme Council on the liquidation of the autonomy of South Ossetia, as well as the republic’s non-secession from Georgia. It is worth noting that, perhaps, the Russian leadership took such a step in exchange for Georgian President E. Shevardnadze’s non-recognition of the Chechen Republic of Ichkeria and his support for the actions of Russian troops in Chechnya.

In the spring of 1996, a memorandum on the non-use of force in South Ossetia was signed in Moscow. It became a real step forward in Georgian-Ossetian relations. And on August 27 of the same year, the first meeting between Georgian President E. Shevardnadze and the Chairman of the Parliament (and in fact the head of state) of South Ossetia L. Chibirov took place. During this meeting, the parties outlined further ways to normalize the situation, however, after the meeting, E. Shevardnadze said that “it is too early to talk about the autonomy of South Ossetia.”

However, the situation by 2000 contributed to further peace in the region, the return of refugees and economic recovery. However, all the cards were confused by the coming to power in Georgia in January 2004 as a result of the “Rose Revolution” by M. Saakashvili. It was he who represented the young, nationalist-minded generation of Georgia, which, in pursuit of immediate success, did not disdain populist ideas, even if at times very absurd.

Even before his official election as President of Georgia, Mikheil Saakashvili visited South Ossetia, and this visit was not coordinated with the South Ossetian authorities. At the same time, he allowed himself the remark that “2004 will be the last year when South Ossetia and Abkhazia do not participate in elections in Georgia.” This statement contributed to the destabilization of the situation.

In 2004-2008 The situation around South Ossetia and the Russian peacekeeping battalion on its territory continued to heat up. In the spring of 2006, the Georgian leadership declared Russian peacekeeping troops in South Ossetia criminals. The reason for such a loud statement was that the servicemen from Russia did not have visas issued by the Georgian side and were allegedly staying on Georgian territory illegally. At the same time, the Georgian side demanded either the withdrawal of Russian peacekeepers or their “legalization.”

Meanwhile, fighting flared up in a number of regions of South Ossetia. Skirmishes, provocations and shelling, including mortar attacks, are no longer rare. At the same time, the overwhelming number of provocations were carried out by the Georgian side. It is also worth mentioning the May 2006 statement by then Georgian Defense Minister Irakli Okruashvili, who stated that by May 1, 2007, South Ossetia would become part of Georgia. In response to this clearly provocative statement, Russian Defense Minister Sergei Ivanov guaranteed assistance to Abkhazia and South Ossetia in the event of Georgian aggression against them.

It was in 2006 that the process of confrontation between Georgia and South Ossetia took final shape. The Georgian leadership, in its nationalist hysteria, continued to declare that Georgian territory must be inviolable and restored by any means, even military means. It is in this regard that Georgia has set a course for rapprochement with the United States and NATO. American military equipment and instructors arrived in the Georgian army and became frequent guests.

At the same time, South Ossetia from the very beginning of its existence adhered to an exclusively pro-Russian course, so its “peaceful” unification with Georgia after Saakashvili came to power could not happen in principle. In November 2006, a referendum on support for independence was held in South Ossetia. As a result, approximately 99% of the residents of South Ossetia who voted were in favor of maintaining the independence of the republic and continuing its foreign policy course.

Thus, by August 2008, the situation in the region had deteriorated to the limit and a peaceful resolution of the issue was practically impossible. The Georgian “hawks” led by Saakashvili could no longer retreat - otherwise they would have lost their prestige and weight in the eyes of the United States.

Start of hostilities on August 8

On August 8, 2008, approximately 15 minutes after midnight, the Georgian army suddenly opened fire on Tskhinvali with Grad multiple rocket launchers. Three hours later, Georgian troops moved forward.

Thus, the truce was violated by the Georgian side, and the Georgian army, already in the first hours of the offensive, managed to capture a number of settlements on the territory of South Ossetia (Mugut, Didmukha), and also break into the outskirts of Tskhinvali. However, the South Ossetian militia units were able to inflict significant losses on the aggressor at the very beginning of the conflict and slow down the pace of the Georgian “blitzkrieg” with stubborn defense.

At this time, in Tskhinvali itself, as a result of the Georgian artillery attack, casualties appeared among the civilian population. The city was taken by surprise, but the residents bravely greeted the news of the Georgian invasion. Another tragic episode of the initial period of the war was the death of Russian peacekeepers from the fire of Georgian salvo launchers. This fact finally convinced the Russian leadership that there was no prospect of a peaceful resolution of the conflict. President of the Russian Federation Dmitry Medvedev announced the start of an operation to force the Georgian side to peace.

In the morning, Russian aircraft began carrying out air strikes on Georgian troops, thereby sharply reducing the pace of their advance. Russian columns of the 58th Army, which formed the main reserve and main defense forces in the South Ossetian direction, moved through the Roki tunnel to help the peacekeepers and South Ossetian militia units.

During the day, Georgian troops managed to significantly push back the Russian-South Ossetian troops and surround the barracks of the Russian peacekeepers, but they failed to decisively turn the situation in their favor. In fact, by the evening of August 8, it became clear that the Georgian “blitzkrieg” had failed and it would not be possible to immediately capture Tskhinvali. However, a victorious mood reigned in the Georgian media; It was announced that the assault on Tskhinvali was successful.

Further development of the conflict (August 9-11)

By the morning of August 9, fighting in Tskhinvali continued, but the Georgian troops no longer had significant superiority. Having gotten bogged down in street fighting, they now sought to seize as much territory as possible so that during subsequent peace negotiations (which no one doubted on August 9) they would have at least some trump cards in their hands. However, militia units and Russian peacekeepers continued to stubbornly defend the city's neighborhoods.

At the same time, a group consisting of units of the 58th Russian Army arrived in Tskhinvali; in addition, the 76th Airborne Division was transferred to the scene of events. A battalion group was also created, separated from the 135th Motorized Rifle Regiment. The task of the group was to release Russian peacekeepers and establish contact with them.

However, due to the fact that the offensive impulse of the Georgian troops had not yet been exhausted, and the troops themselves had a sufficient amount of manpower and equipment, as a result of the oncoming battle, the Russian battalion group suffered significant losses and was withdrawn from the city by the end of the day. However, this counter-strike contributed to the speedy stop of the Georgian offensive and the transition of Georgian forces to defense.

Throughout the day on August 9, there were Russian airstrikes against Georgian troops, as well as mutual artillery shelling. A group of ships of the Russian Black Sea Fleet entered the territorial waters of Georgia in order to carry out patrols and prevent aggressive actions by Georgia at sea. Moreover, the very next day, August 10, 2008, an attempt by the Georgian naval forces to penetrate the conflict zone was repelled.

On August 10, Russian troops launched a counter-offensive and began to oust Georgian forces from Tskhinvali, and Russian-Abkhaz forces began moving out of the regions bordering Georgia. Thus, on the third day of the conflict, the Georgian offensive completely fizzled out, and the front line began to move in the opposite direction. The result of the defensive battles was, first of all, a complete stop of the Georgian troops, their losses and complete disorganization. It was at this point that the Georgian leadership began to panic, caused by the threat of complete military defeat. Saakashvili asked NATO countries to intervene in the conflict and “save Georgia from the clutches of the Russian aggressor.”

On August 11, Russian troops completed the liberation of the territories of South Ossetia seized by the aggressor and entered the territory of Georgia. Nevertheless, this event was covered in every possible way as the need to “force Georgia to peace.” On the same day, Russian troops occupied the city of Zugdidi in western Georgia without a fight, and the city of Gori was abandoned by Georgian troops.

Truce and end of the conflict

On August 12, Russian President D. Medvedev announced that there was no longer a danger to the civilian population of South Ossetia and Russian military personnel, which is why it makes sense to stop the operation to force the aggressor to peace. After this, through the mediation of the President of France and the President of the European Union, Nicolas Sarkozy, negotiations began between Russia and Georgia. The general meaning of the future peace agreement was based on the non-use of force to resolve controversial issues, the end of hostilities, the withdrawal of troops to the positions they occupied before the conflict, access for humanitarian aid to the region, as well as the beginning of an international discussion on the status of South Ossetia and Abkhazia. The Georgian leadership agreed with all points of the agreement, except for the point on the status of Abkhazia and South Ossetia. This paragraph has been reformulated.

Over the next days, the process of withdrawing Russian troops from Georgian territory continued. On August 16, the peace agreement was signed by the heads of the Russian Federation, Abkhazia, South Ossetia and Georgia. Thus, although this conflict is called a five-day war (due to the fact that the phase of active hostilities lasted from August 8 to 12, 2008), it actually ended on August 16.

Results and consequences of the five-day war

The results of the August conflict in South Ossetia are interpreted differently by each side of the conflict. The Russian leadership announced the victory of Russian and South Ossetian troops, curbing the aggressor, inflicting a serious defeat on him and excluding new large-scale military conflicts in the near future. However, isolated battles and artillery attacks, ambushes and firefights continued until the end of 2008.

The Georgian leadership announced the victory of the Georgian troops, and Georgian President M. Saakashvili stated that one Georgian brigade, equipped with the latest American weapons, managed to defeat the entire 58th Army. However, if we objectively evaluate the results of the conflict, it should be noted: the statement of the Georgian leadership was made solely for propaganda purposes and had nothing to do with reality.

As for the losses suffered by the parties to the conflict, their estimates also differ. According to Russian data, the losses of the troops of Russia, South Ossetia and Abkhazia in total amount to about 510 people killed and wounded, while the losses of Georgia are approximately 3000. The Georgian side claims that the losses of Georgian troops during the conflict amounted to about 410 killed and 1750 wounded, and the losses of Russian troops and their allies were approximately 1,500 killed and wounded. Thus, there was no such thing as “the defeat of an entire Russian army by a Georgian brigade.”

The objectively recognized result of the war in South Ossetia was the victory of Russia and its allies, as well as the heavy defeat of the Georgian army. At the same time, as a result of investigations conducted by the International Commission of the European Union, it was proven that it was Georgia that was the aggressor in the conflict, but at the same time it was pointed out that “Russia’s provocative behavior prompted Georgia to resolve the issue by force.” However, how this “provocative behavior” was linked to Russia’s refusal to accept South Ossetia and Abkhazia, as well as the non-recognition of the independence of the republics, the Commission was unable to give an answer.

The consequences of the five-day war were Russia's recognition of the independence of South Ossetia and Abkhazia and the beginning of confrontation between the Russian Federation and Georgia (diplomatic relations were severed between the states in September 2008). The United States, despite the Commission's conclusions about Georgia's responsibility for starting the war, accused Russia of aggressively seeking to expand its borders. Thus, the conflict in South Ossetia can be called a new era in relations between Russia and the Western world.

If you have any questions, leave them in the comments below the article. We or our visitors will be happy to answer them

Russia has completed a significant part of the operation to force Georgia to peace in South Ossetia, Tskhinvali has been taken under the control of peacekeepers, Russian President Dmitry Medvedev said.

00:06 Shortly before midnight Moscow time, shelling from large-caliber guns of the South Ossetian capital Tskhinvali, as well as South Ossetian villages, began from the Georgian villages of Nikozi and Ergneti. Representatives of the unrecognized republic stated that Georgian troops had actually started a war and were storming Tskhinvali.

00:42 Georgia promised to restore constitutional order in South Ossetia. The commander of the Georgian peacekeepers, Mamuka Kurashvili, called the military operation in the zone of the Georgian-Ossetian conflict “restoring constitutional order in South Ossetia.” He also called on Russian peacekeepers stationed in the conflict zone not to interfere in the situation.

01:38 The assault on Tskhinvali is being carried out in all directions. The South Ossetian authorities stated that the Georgian side was shelling Tskhinvali from Grad launchers, howitzers and large-caliber mortars.

02:08 Georgia announced the start of war with South Ossetia. Georgia notified peacekeepers stationed in the conflict zone about the outbreak of war in South Ossetia.

02:37 Abkhazia is sending a thousand volunteers to South Ossetia. President of Abkhazia Sergei Bagapsh convened an emergency meeting of the Security Council on Friday night; According to media reports, Abkhazia will send about a thousand volunteers to help South Ossetia.

03:46 Georgia launched a tank attack on the southern outskirts of Tskhinvali. The Georgian army has launched a tank attack on the southern outskirts of Tskhinvali, said South Ossetian President Eduard Kokoity. South Ossetian forces, he emphasized, are resisting. Georgian State Minister Temur Yakobashvili, in turn, announced that Tskhinvali is surrounded by Georgian troops.

04:20 Infantry went to storm Tskhinvali.

04:33 Russia demanded the convening of a UN Security Council meeting on the situation in South Ossetia.

04:48 Reinforcements from North Ossetia arrived in Tskhinvali.

06:49 Abkhazia is moving troops to the border with Georgia.

07:12 Georgian media reported the call for reservists.

07:23 Georgian aviation struck South Ossetia.

08:56 Georgian troops began shelling Russian peacekeepers.

09:23 Georgian media announced the capture of Tskhinvali.

11:10 The President of Georgia, during his address to the nation, spoke about his vision of the situation in the conflict zone and announced the general mobilization of reservists.

11:19 “Rustavi-2”: Georgia shot down a plane arriving from Russia.

12:37 The Parliament of North Ossetia called on Russia to help the South.

13:45 A gas pipeline was blown up in Tskhinvali. Earlier it was reported that fighting was taking place in the center of the capital of South Ossetia, a hospital was destroyed, and a university was on fire.

16:14 A column of Russian armored vehicles entered Tskhinvali. Earlier, Georgia threatened Russia with war if information about the introduction of Russian armored vehicles into the territory of South Ossetia was confirmed.

18:23 Units of the 58th Army occupy the northern outskirts of Tskhinvali.

19:32 During an air raid on a Georgian air base, several military aircraft were destroyed.

21:23 200 volunteers from Russia crossed the border of South Ossetia. According to one of the volunteers, a column of 20 Gazelles arrived from North Ossetia to South Ossetia.

23:16 20 trucks with Georgian military departed from Batumi towards Tskhinvali. According to eyewitnesses, at least 200 military personnel were sent from Batumi to South Ossetia.

02:14 The shelling of Tskhinvali from all types of weapons continues.

09:17 One of the tactical groups of the 58th Army of the North Caucasus Military District broke into the base camp of Russian peacekeepers in Tskhinvali.

11:38 Units of the 76th Airborne Division from Pskov enter Tskhinvali. Units of the 98th Airborne Division from Ivanovo, as well as special forces from the 45th Separate Reconnaissance Regiment, are being transferred to South Ossetia.

12:28 The General Staff of the Russian Armed Forces confirms information about two downed Russian military aircraft Su-25 and Tu-22 in the zone of the Georgian-Ossetian conflict. One pilot was killed, three were captured.

12:59 Georgian military surrenders and leaves positions in the South Ossetian capital.

14:59 Abkhazia began an armed operation in the upper part of the Kodori Gorge.

15:52 Ossetian militias destroyed 4 Georgian tanks.

19:02 The Abkhaz army launched a missile attack on some military facilities in western Georgia.

20:39 Ships of the Russian Black Sea Fleet are regrouping in the Black Sea, adjacent to the maritime border of Georgia.

21:00 Units of the 58th Army are conducting an operation to oust Georgian formations from the southern outskirts of Tskhinvali.

23:50 After a five-hour battle, the artillery shelling of Tskhinvali stopped. Tank assault prevented. On the southern outskirts of the city, 12 Georgian tanks were destroyed.

08:45 Abkhaz troops resumed massive shelling in the upper part of the Kodori Gorge, controlled by the Georgian military, using aircraft and Grad multiple rocket launchers.

10:20 Russia has strengthened its naval group in the zone of the Georgian-Abkhaz conflict. Black Sea Fleet warships entered the waters near the city of Ochamchira.

10:25 The Georgian Ministry of Internal Affairs announced the withdrawal of troops from South Ossetia.

14:02 The Russian Ministry of Defense confirmed information about the withdrawal of Georgian troops from Tskhinvali.

14:40 An air raid was carried out on Zugdidi.

17:13 Abkhaz troops continue to launch air and artillery strikes on Georgian positions in the upper part of the Kodori Gorge.

17:33 The Abkhaz army took up positions on the Inguri River along the border with Georgia.

18:39 The first column with the wounded left Tskhinvali for Vladikavkaz. 50 people were evacuated.

18:56 Georgia announced a ceasefire. The Russian consul was handed a note, which states the corresponding order of Mikheil Saakashvili. The Georgian Ministry of Foreign Affairs claims that Georgian troops have withdrawn from South Ossetia.

20:20 Georgian media reported a new bombing of the territory of the Tbilaviastroi plant. According to journalists, the bombs were dropped by a Russian plane. No casualties or damage were reported.

21:05 Sergei Lavrov stated the need for the unconditional withdrawal of Georgian troops. In a telephone conversation with Georgian Foreign Minister Eka Tkeshelashvili, Lavrov pointed out that Georgian troops did not leave the conflict zone, contrary to the statement of the Georgian authorities.

21:40 Tskhinvali has completely come under the control of Russian peacekeepers. This was reported by assistant commander of the JPKF Vladimir Ivanov. According to him, Georgian troops are retreating to the administrative border with South Ossetia.

22:16 Georgia agreed to allow Russian peacekeepers into the Zugdidi region

The governor of the Zugdidi region, Zaza Morokhia, agreed to the presence of the Russian military on the condition that the bombing of Georgia stops

23:40 Igor Dygalo confirmed the destruction of the Georgian missile boat. According to the Assistant Commander-in-Chief of the Navy, four ships violated the boundaries of the “declared security zone” in the patrol area of ​​the Russian fleet. After the destruction of the boat, three other Georgian ships left in the direction of Poti.

00:17 Russian paratroopers arrived in Abkhazia. According to Alexander Novitsky, assistant commander of the KSPM for information support, the soldiers were brought in with the goal of “preventing Georgia’s military aggression against Abkhazia.”

00:23 Tskhinvali was again subjected to artillery shelling.

1:10 19 Georgian saboteurs were captured in South Ossetia. The prisoners were placed under tight security due to fears that residents of the unrecognized republic would stage lynching.

1:22 Georgian Ministry of Internal Affairs: Russian artillery began intensive shelling of the city of Gori.

1:57 Russia and Georgia agreed not to use aviation in the conflict zone. This was reported by Novosti-Georgia news agency. The commander of the Russian peacekeeping forces, Sergei Chaban, noted that the agreement does not apply to the Tskhinvali region.

2:37 Assistant commander of the JPKF: the shooting in Tskhinvali has stopped.

3:28 North Ossetia will send 2,500 volunteers to South Ossetia. According to Novaya Gazeta, help is arriving in the conflict zone from Kabardino-Balkaria, Chechnya and other regions of the Caucasus.

4:16 Abkhazia resumed shelling of the Kodori Gorge.

4:24 France presented a plan for resolving the Georgian-South Ossetian conflict. The main provisions of the plan are an immediate ceasefire, provision of medical care to the wounded, and the withdrawal of Georgian and Russian troops from the conflict zone.

5:24 According to the Georgian Ministry of Internal Affairs, the Russian Air Force attacked the suburbs of Tbilisi.

7:26 Georgia continues shelling Russian peacekeepers in South Ossetia

According to JPKF commander Marat Kulakhmetov, clashes between Russian peacekeepers and Georgian military continued in the southern part of the Tskhinvali region on Monday night. One of the peacekeepers' posts was bombed by the Georgian Air Force

8:24 A convoy of the Ministry of Emergency Situations with humanitarian aid entered South Ossetia. 52.5 tons of food, two hospitals and a tent camp for 500 people will be delivered to Tskhinvali.

8:51 According to South Ossetian government representative Irina Gagloeva, Georgia opened an irrigation canal to deprive people of the opportunity to hide from bombing.

10:10 The Georgian Ministry of Foreign Affairs stated that 50 Russian bombers appeared in the skies over Tbilisi. According to the Georgian side, bombs were dropped on the village of Kojori near the capital.

10:20 Abkhaz forces have completely blocked the upper part of Kodori and are ready to begin an operation to destroy Georgian troops.

10:50 Russian peacekeepers demanded that Georgian troops in Kodori surrender their weapons. Sergei Chaban announced the demilitarization of the Georgian-Abkhaz conflict zone.

12:24 Sea communications between Russia and Georgia have been stopped. The Georgian port of Batumi is closed.

12:43 The shelling on the road from Tskhinvali to the Roki tunnel on the border with Russia has stopped, the situation has stabilized. The evacuation of local residents from surrounding settlements continues, and military equipment, including tanks and self-propelled artillery units, is heading towards Tskhinvali.

13:02 Georgia Online found Russian submarines off the coast of Abkhazia.

13:05 The “peace enforcement operation” in the zone of the Georgian-Ossetian conflict has been largely completed, said Russian President Dmitry Medvedev. According to him, the city of Tskhinvali has been taken under control by a reinforced Russian peacekeeping contingent.

13:07 Georgia refused to lay down arms in Kodori. Georgian troops rejected the ultimatum of the Russian peacekeepers.

13:07 The General Staff of the Russian Federation admitted the loss of two more Su-25 aircraft, said Deputy Head of the General Staff of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation Anatoly Nogovitsyn. He also stated that the total loss of personnel on Georgian territory was 18 people killed, including one officer and another 17 sergeants and soldiers.

13:10 Russian General Staff: Georgian military were transferred from Iraq by American planes.

13:31 Western airlines are canceling flights to Georgia.

13:35 Saakashvili signed a ceasefire document prepared by the foreign ministers of France and Finland, the Novosti-Georgia agency reports.

13:52 Deputy Chief of the General Staff of the Russian Armed Forces, Colonel General Anatoly Nogovitsyn, called the statements of Georgian President Mikheil Saakashvili about a ceasefire a deception.

During the three days of the war in Georgia, 92 people died. Losses among the population of South Ossetia, according to the Russian Ministry of Defense, exceed two thousand people, more than 30 thousand became refugees.

00:31 Georgian television reported that Russian troops entered the territory of Poti.

00:51 The Russian Ministry of Defense denied this message.

04:34 Two Russian journalists missing in Georgia have been found. It turned out that the photographer of the Expert magazine Vyacheslav Kochetkov and the correspondent of the Russian Reporter magazine Igor Naydenov are in the camp of Russian peacekeepers in Tskhinvali.

10:15 Russian troops began fighting 20 kilometers south of Tskhinvali. Agencies reported this with reference to Ossetian militias.

11:21 Reuters reported that Russian planes began bombing Gori. It was also reported that several people were injured as a result of the bombing.

11:35 The FSB detained the deputy head of the Georgian Foreign Intelligence Service. Russian intelligence services claimed that the detainee was collecting information about the military and the president of South Ossetia. It was also reported that a number of Georgian agents are suspected of attempting to form a gangster underground in southern Russia.

13:00 Russian President Dmitry Medvedev announced the completion of the operation to enforce peace in the zone of the Georgian-Ossetian conflict. The goal of the operation, Medvedev said, had been achieved, the safety of peacekeepers and civilians had been ensured, and possible centers of aggression would be destroyed.

13:01 Georgia accused Russia of bombing the oil pipeline. According to Georgian media reports, Russian planes bombed the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan (BDT) oil pipeline, which is necessary for transporting oil from Azerbaijan to Turkey and is partially laid through Georgian territory. This was stated by Secretary of the National Security Council of Georgia Alexander (Kakha) Lomaia. Previously, Russian representatives have repeatedly stated that they do not intend to interfere with the operation of the oil pipeline.

13:21 Explosions occurred on the outskirts of Tbilisi, media reported. According to preliminary information, this happened in the area where the airport and aircraft factory are located.

13:40 Russian troops control Senaki airport and settlements in the security zone of Abkhazia.

13:50 The Russian General Staff denied reports of bombing of the oil pipeline.

14:00 The Russian General Staff demanded the presence of international observers in the zone of the Georgian-Ossetian conflict.


The material was prepared based on information from open sources

The Russian military operation, taking place from 08/08/2008 to 08/12/2008, was called the “Five-Day War”. This operation was of a peacekeeping nature and was a response to Georgian aggression towards South Ossetia. This military operation was the first in the history of the Russian Federation to take place outside its territory.

The war in South Ossetia began on the night of August 7–8. That night, Georgian artillery struck Tskhinvali with a powerful blow, marking the beginning of the Russian-Georgian conflict. Immediately after the unprovoked artillery strike by Georgia, Russian troops located on the border and territory of South Ossetia began active operations that lasted for 5 days.

Increasing conflict in early 2008

The conflict between Georgia and South Ossetia has been escalating since the late 1980s. The first bloody battles between Georgia and the self-proclaimed republic of South Ossetia took place back in 1991-1992. Then Georgia imposed a complete economic blockade of South Ossetia, which led to the mass death of children and elderly people in the winter months. As a result of this conflict, a huge number of refugees tried to get into Russian territory, often being attacked by the Georgian military along the way.

In 2004, the conflict between Georgia and South Ossetia escalated again. The Georgian side began a large-scale campaign to restore the integrity of the country, considering the territory of South Ossetia to be its original territory. In 2004, Georgian troops were introduced into the territory of South Ossetia, and subsequently the systematic bombing of Ossetian cities and villages began. Only Russian intervention saved the young republic from the seizure of its territory by Georgia. At the same time, this strained Russian-Georgian relations.

In 2008, when tensions in the South Ossetian region reached the limit, Russia lifted the flank quota restrictions on the deployment of military forces in the North Caucasus. Already in April 2008, some units of the 7th Airborne Division were introduced into the territory of Abkhazia and located near the Georgian border.

At the end of May 2008, Russian railway troops, totaling about 400 people, entered Abkhaz territory. This deployment of troops caused real hysteria among the Georgian authorities, who declared to the whole world that Russia was preparing for a full-scale invasion of Georgian territory, under the guise of providing assistance to South Ossetia.

The second half of July was marked by joint exercises between the United States and Georgia, at which, according to military experts, the attack and seizure of the territory of South Ossetia was practiced. At the same time, Russia conducted the Caucasus-2008 exercises, in which units of various military and security forces took part. In addition to the exercises, Russian railway troops completely restored the railway tracks on the territory of Abkhazia.

Exacerbation of the military conflict in the Georgian-Ossetian region at the end of the summer of 2008

Starting from the end of July, various shootouts and raids began to systematically occur on the territory of South Ossetia, which the Georgian government diligently denied. As a result of instability, civilians quickly began to leave the region. Since the final target of all the raids was the city of Tskhinvali, the Prime Minister of South Ossetia Yuri Morozov signed documents on the mass evacuation of residents of this city.

In early August 2008, the concentration of military forces of the Georgian army on the border with South Ossetia reached a critical limit. Although both Georgia and Russia deny the presence of their regular troops on the territory of South Ossetia before the conflict began, some events indicate that both Georgian and Russian special forces military units were already in South Ossetia. The death of some contract soldiers from both sides on the first day of the conflict (August 8) indirectly testifies to this.

Who started this conflict, the opinions of the warring parties

To this day, the conflicting parties blame each other for starting this conflict. To figure out who is really to blame, you need to hear all sides of the conflict and draw conclusions from this:

  • The opinion of the Georgian government is unequivocal and unshakable. They claim that this conflict was started by the South Ossetian side, which entered into a conspiracy with Russia and carried out a series of provocations. According to Georgia, their invasion of the territory of South Ossetia was due to the fact that the Georgian military managed to intercept a secret telephone conversation in which information “came up” that Russian troops had already invaded the territory of South Ossetia on August 7;
  • Russia's position on this issue was clearly voiced by Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov. He stated that the only reason for the entry of Russian troops into the territory of South Ossetia was Georgia's military aggression against South Ossetia. The consequences of Georgian aggression were 30 thousand refugees, the death of civilians in South Ossetia, and the death of Russian peacekeepers. All actions of the Georgian army on the territory of South Ossetia were qualified by the Russian side as full-scale genocide. According to Russia, not a single country in the world will remain indifferent after an attack on its peacekeepers and civilians who find themselves on the territory of South Ossetia, therefore the entry of Russian troops into the territory of South Ossetia is natural and justified;
  • Since Europe was also interested in finding out who is to blame for the Russian-Georgian conflict, an International Independent Commission was created, headed by Swiss diplomat Heidi Tagliavini. This commission found Georgia guilty of starting the conflict in South Ossetia, since it was Georgia that began the bombing of Tskhinvali. It was noted that the Georgian attack was launched after multiple acts of provocation on the part of South Ossetia. The Russian side has also been accused of numerous violations of international rights.

Progress of hostilities from August 7 to 10, 2008

In order to trace the entire chronology of the military conflict, called the “five-day war,” it must be studied starting one day before the official start and ending a day later, after the end of the conflict.

On August 7, all Georgian media published information that the leader of South Ossetia Eduard Kokoity had prepared to conduct massive military operations to seize Georgian territories. Since the attack of a small South Ossetian army on Georgia sounded absurd, the media reported that, together with the South Ossetian army, numerous detachments of Russian volunteers, who are in fact regular units of the Russian army, would march against Georgia. The leader of South Ossetia himself is in Java, from where he will lead the military operation.

The afternoon of August 7 was devoted to a televised address by Georgian President Mikheil Saakashvili, who called on the Georgian military to cease fire unilaterally, and called on Russia to become a guarantor of negotiations between Georgia and South Ossetia, in which he guaranteed to give South Ossetia the widest possible autonomy within Georgia.

At the same time, Saakashvili guaranteed a complete amnesty to all armed forces of South Ossetia, to which he included the army. As a result of these negotiations, both sides agreed to cease fire until negotiations were scheduled for August 8.

At 23.30 Georgia opened massive fire on Tskhinvali. The Georgian government stated that it was forced to open fire because South Ossetia did not stop shelling Georgian villages during the truce.

On the night of August 8, Tskhinvali was subjected to massive shelling from Grad multiple launch rocket launchers. At 3.30 am, Georgian troops began to storm Tskhinvali with the help of tanks. As a result of this assault, the capital of South Ossetia was surrounded, and 6 South Ossetian villages were captured by Georgian troops.

On the same day, a meeting of the UN Security Council was held in New York at the request of Russia. The representative of Georgia said that the blame for the shelling lies entirely with South Ossetia. Although the UN Security Council expressed extreme concern about the situation in South Ossetia, it was not satisfied with the solution proposed by Russia.

By 21.00, according to official information from the Georgian media, the entire territory of South Ossetia, except for the settlement of Java, was under the control of Georgian troops. By this time, 7 thousand volunteers from North Ossetia were sent to help South Ossetia. Another 3 thousand volunteers, gathered at the headquarters of Vladikavkaz, were waiting to be sent. By the end of the day, Russian troops reached the western outskirts of the city of Tskhinvali.

On the night of August 9, the UN Security Council did not make any decisions regarding the situation in South Ossetia. While the UN was trying to come up with a solution to this conflict, Russian troops took active action. While the Georgian army was bombing and shelling Russian and Ossetian positions, Russian aircraft carried out targeted bombing of various military and strategic targets in Georgia. Russian artillery fired at Georgian firing points in the Tskhinvali area.

At the same time, Russian ships began patrolling Georgian territorial waters.

On August 10, the fighting in South Ossetia was in full swing. The Georgian army systematically bombed the populated areas of South Ossetia and the positions of Russian and Ossetian troops. Russian aviation, in turn, continued air strikes on the following targets in Georgia:

  • All known locations of Georgian anti-aircraft missile systems;
  • Military radars;
  • Various military bases throughout Georgia;
  • Sea ports;
  • Aerodromes;
  • Bridges throughout the country, in order to limit the mobility of military units of the Georgian army.

Although the Georgian side still insists that Russia carried out numerous attacks on populated areas of Georgia. In fact, all the losses that occurred among the civilian population of Georgia were accidental, since such losses are always inevitable during military operations. The Russian side completely refutes all talk that its air strikes were directed against the civilian population of Georgia.

In the evening of that day, Russian aviation launched a powerful air strike on a military airport, which was located on the outskirts of Tbilisi.

The Russian side increased the number of its troops in South Ossetia to 4 regiments, in addition, significant aviation and artillery forces were involved. The total number of Russian troops officially participating in this conflict has approached the 10 thousand mark. In response to this, the Georgian side urgently began transferring its infantry brigade, which was in Iraq.

On the same day, Abkhazian troops decided to take advantage of this situation and moved into the Kodori Gorge. By mid-day, Abkhaz troops took up positions on the Ingur River. Concerned by the latest events, the Georgian government handed the Russian consul a note informing the Georgian side that all military operations in South Ossetia had ceased. Despite this, firefights from the Georgian side continued throughout the next night.

Progress of hostilities from August 11 to 13

On the night of August 11, the Russian Air Force launched a powerful air strike on a military base that was located near Tbilisi. This was reported by the Ministry of Internal Affairs of Georgia. In addition, according to the Georgian Ministry of Internal Affairs, on the same night the Russian Air Force carried out a massive raid on a number of Georgian cities:

  • Batumi;
  • Tbilisi;
  • Poti;
  • Zugdidi.

According to the Georgian Foreign Ministry, Russia carried out a massive attack on peaceful Georgian cities on the night of August 11, using at least 50 bombers in this operation. Russia, in turn, denies the fact of air strikes on civilians, stating that all attacks were aimed at destroying Georgian military facilities.

The Russian Ministry of Defense stated that as a result of ongoing military operations, the number of Russian military deaths continues to increase, reaching 18 people. In addition, Russia officially announced that it had lost 4 combat aircraft. According to the Georgian side, their military shot down 19 military aircraft belonging to Russia. Given the tendency towards exaggeration that characterizes official sources, it can be assumed that in reality Russia lost 8-10 aircraft, although this information cannot be verified.

On the same day, Georgian President Saakashvili signed an official ceasefire document. However, throughout South Ossetia, fighting continued with detachments of the Georgian military, who were cut off from the main forces of Georgia and did not hear anything (or did not want to hear) about the signing of such an important document.

On August 11, the capital of South Ossetia was completely cleared of the presence of Georgian military forces. Fighting continued with the use of heavy artillery and aircraft by both sides. Georgian troops continued to fire at Tskhinvali from a distance with long-range artillery and mortars.

During these same days, Ukrainian nationalists became seriously active and announced a gathering of volunteers in support of the Georgian army. Official authorities in Kyiv stated that they do not support this movement. In addition, the nationalists do not even have enough funds to buy tickets to Georgia for those who want to fight there.

All communications between Russia and Georgia were interrupted. In the evening, fighting between the Russian and Georgian sides took place within a radius of 25 km from Tbilisi. Russian President Dmitry Medvedev said that the main part of the operation to force Georgia to a peaceful settlement of the South Ossetian conflict has been completed.

On the morning of August 12, the armed forces of Abkhazia went on the offensive. Their goal was to completely oust the Georgian armed forces from the Condor Gorge. Prior to this, for 2 days, Abkhaz artillery and the Air Force attacked Georgian military installations located in the upper part of the Kodori Gorge. This offensive involved not only Abkhaz regular troops, but also reservists of the Abkhaz Armed Forces.

At the same time, the Russian Air Force launched a powerful bomb attack on Gori. Georgian television managed to film this blow and show it on television.

On the afternoon of August 12, Russian President Dmitry Medvedev announced that he had decided to complete the military operation to force Georgia to peace. On the same day, a rally was held in Tbilisi, at which President Saakashvili announced that Georgia was leaving the CIS, and South Ossetia and Abkhazia were being declared occupied territories.

On August 13, Russian ships that were in the Poti area were suddenly attacked by boats belonging to Georgia. This act provoked the entry of Russian warships into the port, which destroyed 3 Georgian coast guard ships. At the same time, no one offered any resistance to the Russian military.

On the same day, Russia and Georgia declared mourning for those killed during this military operation.

Throughout the day, Georgian media and officials repeatedly reported that the Russian army continued to bomb Georgian settlements, captured Gori, and Russian tanks were moving at an accelerated pace towards Tbilisi. In response to these statements, the Russian Ministry of Defense stated that all movements of Russian troops across the territory of Georgia are connected only with the withdrawal of Russian troops from South Ossetia and Abkhazia.

In addition, the head of the Foreign Ministry said that a number of Russian army troops remain on Georgian territory in the Gori and Senaki regions. This is due to the fact that the Georgian military abandoned warehouses of military equipment and ammunition to the mercy of fate, which could be plundered by looters or various gangs of separatists. In addition, Russian troops are providing all possible humanitarian assistance to the local population.

War crimes committed during the conflict in South Ossetia

Since the Russian and Georgian authorities accuse each other of various crimes and ethnic cleansing, one should listen to the opinions of independent experts, since each side will protect itself while denigrating the actions of the enemy.

The human rights organization Amnesty International became seriously interested in this conflict; in 2008, while all the consequences of the military conflict were still visible and fresh in the memory of the local population. Already in November 2008, this association published an official report, which detailed a large part of the war crimes. Here are the main findings from this report:

  • When the Georgian army stormed Tskhinvali, its soldiers carried out numerous attacks on civilians, leaving dozens of them dead and hundreds seriously injured. In addition, the city's infrastructure was significantly damaged, which was not a military facility (schools, hospitals, etc.);
  • Tskhinvali suffered the most extensive destruction from the use of Georgian Grad multiple launch rocket systems, which have an extremely low accuracy parameter;
  • During the military conflict, Russian aviation carried out about 75 combat missions. It is these sorties that the Georgian side accuses of causing enormous harm to the civilian population. According to the results of the inspection, villages and towns suffered little damage as a result of air strikes; several streets and some individual houses were destroyed. Naturally, the people who were in them also suffered;
  • Sometimes the Russian military, attacking Georgian settlements, caused harm to civilians. To this, the Russian side responds that all attacks on civilians are provoked by their aggressive behavior;
  • The report noted that the discipline of Russian military personnel differed significantly from the behavior of Ossetian fighters and militias, who often behaved like looters. Georgian civilians interviewed confirm that the Russian military rarely behaved undisciplinedly;
  • South Ossetian soldiers were seen committing serious war crimes on Georgian territory. These are illegal killings, arson, beatings, threats, rape and robberies that were committed by units and militias of South Ossetia.

Amnesty International calls on parties to investigate every war crime and punish those responsible.

The military campaign in Georgia in 2008 showed that the Russian army is in urgent need of reform, since many branches of the military were unable to act coherently within the framework of a separate combat operation. Russia's combat losses were incomparable with the scale of this military conflict.

Little victorious war (tm)
About the Russian-Georgian war of August 8-12, 2008.
This war is just an echo of the confrontation between two powers - the Empire of Good (USA) and the Empire of Evil (Russia).
The United States pursued largely political goals, namely, the implementation of the previous administration’s program to “promote democracy” in the East. If we consider the military component, the Pentagon was interested in assessing the effectiveness of the GSSOP II training program for puppet armies in the post-Soviet space. Well, a real assessment of the combat effectiveness of the Russian (as it sounds in all documents from American sources) army.

For our FSB and GRU, the task was set differently - to contribute to the defeat of the Georgian army and to seize objects of interest. Our GRU was interested in three modern electrical installations built by the Americans in Georgia. Radar station in Anaklia, air defense center near Gori, air defense radar on a mountain near Tbilisi. The first two were captured and taken away.

The plan for the American operation in Georgia was revealed in the spring, a few months before the war. It is known that Bush personally gave “permission” to the war, that US Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice, who arrived in Tbilisi a month before the war, discussed the details of the operation there, assuring that the Russians would not dare to attack Georgia.

Back in 2006, there was a plan in Georgia code-named “Throw the Tiger,” which envisaged, by May 1, 2006, with the support of the United States and the OSCE, forcing Russia to withdraw its peacekeepers from South Ossetia. Following this, in order to destabilize the situation in the region, several high-profile provocations were to be organized within a week against the population of Georgian enclaves in South Ossetia. At the same time, under the pretext of localizing the conflict area and ensuring the safety of the Georgian population living in close proximity to it, it was planned to create groups of Georgian troops on the border with South Ossetia. On May 6, formations, military units and units of Georgian law enforcement agencies from different directions were to capture all major settlements in South Ossetia while simultaneously completely blocking the border with the Russian Federation. Next, according to the plan, was the arrest of the actual leadership of South Ossetia and their bringing to trial. Then martial law was to be introduced in the republic, a provisional government was appointed and a curfew was established. In total, the Georgian military was given 7 days for this operation. The existence of such a plan was confirmed in an interview with Reuters by former Georgian Defense Minister Irakli Okruashvili.

In 2007, President Saakashvili demanded the withdrawal of Russian troops from Georgia. The largest base was Akhalkalaki. The troops were withdrawn ahead of schedule - on November 15, 2007, although the withdrawal was planned during 2008. Only Russian peacekeepers remained, acting under the CIS mandate in Abkhazia and under the Dagomys agreements in South Ossetia.

During Saakashvili's presidency, Georgia set a world record for military budget growth, increasing it more than 33 times from 2003 to 2008. The Georgian leadership sharply increased its military budget, trying to bring its armed forces to NATO standards. The Georgian budget for 2008 planned expenditures for the Ministry of Defense equivalent to $0.99 billion, which amounted to more than 25% of all Georgian budget revenues for 2008.

Georgia's arms suppliers included the United States, England, France, Greece, Turkey, Israel, Lithuania, Estonia, Ukraine, Serbia and others, although the Serbian plant that produces Kalashnikov assault rifles denies direct deliveries and suggests that the assault rifles came to Georgia through Croatia and Bosnia . Ukraine supplied the following types of weapons to Georgia: Osa and Buk air defense systems, Mi-8 and Mi-24 helicopters, L-39 training aircraft, self-propelled guns (including heavy 2S7 "Pion" 203 mm caliber) as well as tanks, BMP and small arms. Georgian special forces were trained by American specialists according to a program that was tested in Croatia in 1995 as part of the operation of the Croatian armed forces to capture the Serbska Krajina region, the majority of whose population were ethnic Serbs

The war, which began on the night of August 7-8, was preceded by a five-day escalation of the situation on the border of the then unrecognized South Ossetia. Starting on August 3, shootings broke out at night. Observers from the OSCE and Russian military observers worked to identify the instigators and tried to resolve the situation; tripartite negotiations were held.

Actually, from the very beginning it was clear that all the provocations were carefully planned and carried out precisely by the Georgian side. Involve the Ossetians in a shootout, and then make sad faces and shout to the whole world that the bandit Ossetians are not allowing peaceful Georgians to live. Control over the actions of Georgian saboteurs and their training was carried out by specialists from the CIA.

The words of Mikheil Saakashvili before the war testify to this. “I will add that the purpose of this attack was not only to liberate South Ossetia for Georgia, but also to “drive,” as Saakashvili put it in a conversation with Burjanadze, Russian troops “on rusty tanks” and demonstrate Russian “impotence” to the whole world. In other conversations, he said that he personally wanted to put Putin in his place..." Some may find it funny, but the Georgian generals and their commander-in-chief were going to drive our army all the way to Rostov.

At 23.45 on August 7, the Georgian side began massive shelling by the forces of the artillery brigade, and in the morning the Georgian offensive began: hourly arrangement and video.

Strengths of the parties

What was the Georgian army like by the night of August 8? The main force of the group consisted of special forces units of the Ministry of Internal Affairs of Tbilisi and the regions:
1. Elite special forces unit of Shavnabad;
2. "Anti-terrorist" special squad;
3. Department for the protection of pipelines (under the jurisdiction of the Ministry of Internal Affairs);
4. Divisions of the first and third departments of the Main Directorate for Special Affairs;
5. Parts of the Kakheti, Mtskheta-Mtianeti, Kvemo-Kartli, Gori and other regional departments of the same Main Directorate;
6. Batumi Marine Battalion;
7. Special forces brigade of the joint headquarters of the Ministry of Defense.

Total - up to 15 thousand military personnel of the Ministry of Defense, 5 thousand employees of the Ministry of Internal Affairs and 30 thousand reservists. According to other sources, the strength of all Georgian armed forces during the conflict was 29 thousand people, including reservists. Of these, 2 thousand were at that time in Iraq, and 17 thousand in South Ossetia, plus an unspecified number of employees of the Ministry of Internal Affairs and other law enforcement agencies.

Infantry - 1st, 2nd, 3rd and 4th Infantry Brigades, trained under the American GSSOP II program. The 2nd brigade was in reserve, the 4th (armed with M4, suffered the greatest losses) and the 3rd covered Tskhinvali with pincers through the Znaur region and the Prissky heights with the goal of reaching Java. The 1st Brigade was in Iraq. Only one battalion of the 1st brigade was the same Georgian peacekeeping battalion that opened fire on our peacekeepers at the beginning of the war.

A full-fledged Georgian brigade has at least 1,500 people on staff.

BTT - 120 T-72 tanks, modernized by Israeli specialists.

Artillery - 80 guns, 120 mortars, 27 MLRS "Larm" and "Grad" (according to other sources, LARM are unguided projectiles for the Israeli MLRS "Linx", produced by IMI under the designation "Pounder").

Aviation - 33 airplanes and 42 helicopters.

They were opposed by about 2 thousand Ossetian militias and 340 Russian military observers. Both did not have heavy weapons in the front zone. The Ossetians kept 4 T-55 tanks in the green area on the Zar road.

According to other sources, the armored forces of the Republic of South Ossetia consisted of 20 tanks and 25 self-propelled guns, and according to Novaya Gazeta, about 80 T-72 and T-55 tanks remained after the Russian exercises “Caucasus-2008”. Ambassador at Large of the Russian Foreign Ministry Valery Kenyakin argued back in January 2006 that all the weapons that are now in Tskhinvali are the equipment that was equipped with the armed forces of the USSR and that remained there from the times of the Soviet Union. According to him, they were talking about four T-55 tanks, several howitzers and armored vehicles.

After the arrival of units of the 58th Army of the North Caucasus Military District, the 76th “Pskov” Airborne Division, the “Vostok” battalion of the 291st Motorized Rifle Regiment of the 42nd Guards Motorized Rifle Division and the Black Sea Fleet, the composition of the Russian Army group increased to 15 thousand people. From the Abkhaz side (Kodori Gorge), up to 5 thousand Abkhaz militia personnel could be involved.

"Yamadayevites" on the march:

Georgian and South Ossetian troops have been engaged in skirmishes and fire attacks of varying intensity since late July 2008. On the evening of August 7, the parties agreed on a ceasefire, which, however, was not actually done.

Ground operation

On August 7, the Georgian army tried to occupy the Pris Heights around Tskhinvali, but this attack was repulsed. On the same day, the American Ambassador to Georgia, John Teft, reported to Washington that Georgian troops, including units with Grad-type launchers, were moving towards South Ossetia.

On the afternoon of August 7, Secretary of the Security Council of South Ossetia Anatoly Barankevich said: “Georgian troops are active along the entire border with South Ossetia. All this suggests that Georgia is beginning large-scale aggression against our republic.” Barankevich also suggested that the Georgian military has plans to carry out an assault on Tskhinvali in the near future.

According to some reports, on the evening of August 7, part of the units of the 58th Army of the North Caucasus Military District was alerted and received an order to advance to Tskhinvali. After the war, the Georgian side began to declare this, publishing its intelligence information in September 2008.

At 7 pm on August 7, Georgian President Mikheil Saakashvili made a special address on television: “... a few hours ago I issued an order, a very painful order, as commander in chief, so that not a single Georgian unit, not a single police and other unit subject to our control , did not return fire... I propose a ceasefire, I propose to immediately hold negotiations... I propose that the Russian Federation be the guarantor of South Ossetian autonomy on the territory of Georgia." “I am ready to take this step for the sake of peace, and I am ready for the Georgian state to forgive all the crimes that were committed over the past years, so that we achieve peace, and so that the peace process and negotiations move forward... for the sake of peace, we are ready to take to any compromise, to any agreement."

Half an hour before midnight, the artillery brigade begins a hurricane shelling of the positions of the Ossetians and our peacekeepers.

At 3.00 Spetsnaz, 1st, 3rd and 4th Infantry Brigades go on the offensive.

A traffic jam of advancing troops formed at the crossing and was hit by an Ossetian mortar battery. Unimaginable chaos began, some of the reservists, throwing down their weapons, began to retreat and came under fire from the special forces of the Georgian Ministry of Internal Affairs. Many of the reservists were from the region bordering Armenia, ethnic Armenians, and they all fled.

Only Maxim Akopyan died, there were several wounded. This stalled the advance for an hour.

First day video:

All that is visible in the footage is the center of the city around the headquarters of the peacekeeping forces.

The heaviest fighting took place in the “upper town” of military observers. There, 140 Russian soldiers under the command of Lieutenant Colonel Konstantin Timerman held the defense for almost two days. After the artillery attack, their communications failed, Georgian tanks went on the attack twice.

The car park is on fire:



Here they are bombed by aircraft:

By evening, a reconnaissance platoon made its way to the “upper town” to help, providing communications. It was Captain Ukhvatov’s reconnaissance platoon; in a night battle they destroyed the servants of the Grad installation and captured a spotter.

Two tanks broke through. The one standing near the barracks was burned by their own during the retreat (the ammunition was shot, the chassis was damaged), the retreat of the main forces was covered by the captain and 4 soldiers, by lunchtime the paratroopers of the 54th Airborne Battalion came out to them).

According to the recollections of Georgian soldiers, “artillery support was only available if you knew the numbers of the mobile artillery officers.” Often the gunner was an ordinary infantryman, who gave commands on his mobile phone like “a little further and to the right... no, no, I made a mistake a little to the left.”

In total, under different commands, at different times of 3 days, up to 2 thousand Ossetians fought in Tskhinvali (according to other estimates - no less than three thousand).

The battle for Tskhinvali continued until 16.00, then the Georgian units retreated to their original positions, losing 7 tanks (3 on the square in front of the parliament, 1 “upper town”, 3 “oak grove”), 2 “Cobra” armored cars (Turkish wheeled armored personnel carrier based on the American armored car HMMWV). In one of them they found a body with a Ukrainian passport with the surname Borisenko.

In 15-20 minutes this Cobra will be shot down, trophy video:


12.00 Russia entered the war.

Russian aviation is bombing Georgian troops throughout the entire depth of the front line and rear bases. They bombed the roads to Tskhinvali, in one of these bombings, in the “oak grove” they burned 3 tanks, a truck, a Chevrolet of the medical service and 22 Georgian soldiers of the 42nd battalion of the 4th infantry brigade.

"Oak Grove" number 3:

The 42nd battalion fled in panic, the commanders and Americans jumped into their cars and rushed off. Those who did not have time to get into the cars fled at a run. All this army rushed past the 43rd battalion, which followed its comrades. The commander of the 42nd battalion died in battle the next day.

2 reinforced battalions (800 people) of the 58th Army under the command of General Khrulev begin to make their way to Tskhinvali. By the end of the day, they managed to recapture the village of Tbet and break the encirclement of the city.

On August 9, the Georgian parliament unanimously approved the decree of President Mikheil Saakashvili declaring martial law and full mobilization for a period of 15 days. In the text of the decree, the introduction of martial law was justified by the need to “prevent destabilization in the region, armed attacks on civilians and acts of violence, in order to protect human rights and freedoms.”

The first loss of the Russian Air Force in the August War. An SU-25BM aircraft of Colonel Oleg Terebunsky from the 368th Assault Aviation Regiment (Budennovsk airfield), shot down over the territory of South Ossetia in the Zarsky Pass area, between Java and Tskhinvali. He was hit by a MANPADS missile from South Ossetian militias at about 6 p.m. on August 8. The crash of the burning plane and its wreckage were recorded on video by a film crew from the Russian state TV channel Vesti and shown on television as the downing of a Georgian plane. The misidentification of the aircraft, which caused "friendly fire" and led to the first combat loss, likely occurred due to the fact that this was one of the first Russian aircraft sorties in the conflict, and the South Ossetian side was not yet aware of the participation of Russian aircraft in it.
In addition, just a few hours earlier, four Georgian Su-25 bombed a nearby area, after which the Ossetians had reason to assume that Georgian air raids would continue. Lieutenant Colonel Terebunsky successfully ejected and was quickly discovered and evacuated by the Russian side.
Anton Lavrov Torzhok

And here is what we managed to dig up from our colleagues from “Russia”. Consider the "source", with all the replicas.


The following video was made by the political officer of the battalion of the 135th regiment. Column of the 135th regiment on the march. Refugees. The footage is taken from the amateur film "South Ossetia. Chronicle of the War", the author of which is the political officer. Therefore, the first video, excuse me, has “music”...


The same political officer films the consequences of shelling of the column by Georgian mortars. An infantry fighting vehicle in which ammunition is exploding is on fire. This is the Zar road at the entrance to Tskhinvali, 4 kilometers away, just above the cemetery. Approximately from 11 to 13 Moscow time. Now no music.


Well, our shooting is the same day, but a little later. Exactly 20 minutes before this, Sasha Sladkov (correspondent of TV channel "Russia") and General Khrulev drove past us towards Tskhinvali.


The battalion tactical group (BTG) in the area of ​​the village of Khetagurovo came under mortar fire. A Georgian spotter directed artillery fire at the column and the group retreated, losing one infantry fighting vehicle and two mortar trucks, two more trucks were damaged and taken out the next day.

Battle or “ambush of Khrulev’s column”:

At about 15.00, the BTG went on the offensive, the task was to reach the southern outskirts of Tskhinvali to the “upper town”. The BTG column passed what was a Georgian post, and the reservists and tank crew left the position without a fight. Moving through the city in the direction of the “Upper Town”, in the “Shanghai” microdistrict, the column literally “ran into” soldiers of the 2nd Georgian Infantry Brigade. In the ensuing oncoming battle, General Khrulev was wounded in the shin.

All 8 Georgian intelligence officers were killed, they were literally mowed down at point-blank range. The battle distances were almost 8-10 meters. But one of the Georgian soldiers managed to throw a grenade, a fragment of which wounded General Khrulev. Part of the column with the wounded retreated to the height of Sarabuk, 5 km away, the other went further, occupying the outskirts of the city at the foot of the "Upper Town" high-rise building.

The battle in the city lasted about seven hours.

The video clearly shows how the BTG enters the city, Major Denis Vetchinov blows up an abandoned Georgian tank in the “oak grove” area. Then the BTG walks through the city and on the very outskirts, a concrete fence on the left, enters into battle with the forward company of the 2nd Georgian Infantry Battalion entering the city.

Captain Semiletov's group in eight infantry fighting vehicles, having defeated the leading company of the Georgian 2nd Infantry Brigade at the brewery, walked another two blocks, reaching the outskirts. Here, in the area of ​​kindergarten 14, ours began a battle with the main forces of the 2nd Georgian Infantry Brigade, immediately losing 2 infantry fighting vehicles.

During a 7-hour battle in the Shanghai microdistrict, Russian soldiers destroyed a Georgian tank and armored personnel carrier. At the intersection, a Georgian jeep with a machine gun crawled under the tracks, and they were shot at point-blank range. By nightfall, having used up ammunition on all six infantry fighting vehicles, the group retreated. The scouts put about 30 civilians from nearby houses in the BMP, who had come running for help.

After the battle, the bodies of dead Georgians remained in the place of the notorious “ambush”.

By the end of August 9, the Georgians retreat to their strongholds and fortified positions. Behind them remain 4 mountains hanging over Tskhinvali, and fortified areas in Nikozi and surrounding Georgian villages.

At night, a powerful artillery attack on Tskhinvali followed again, and early in the morning, Georgian units repeated the assault attempt. This time they met more organized resistance, falling into the “fire bags” of the Ossetians, they were unable to advance to the center. The battle continued until the evening.

200 aircraft of the Transcaucasian Military District destroyed all airfields in Georgia, even bombed two fields of flying clubs.

August 8, 2008
(1) 9:45 2 Russian military fighters dropped about 3-5 bombs near the village of Shavshvebi, on the highway between Poti and Tbilisi and 300-500 meters from Georgian military radars (they bombed the radar, damaged antennas and a warehouse).
(2) 10:30 Russian Su-24s bombed the village of Variani in the Kareli region, 75 kilometers west of Tbilisi. Seven civilians were wounded (the rear base of the 4th brigade was bombed, the fuel depot and the ammunition depot were destroyed).
(3) 10:57 Two of the six Russian planes dropped three bombs in Gori. One of them fell near the stadium, the second near the Gorijvari slope and the third near the artillery brigade (reservists were bombed, the losses were listed as civilian).
(4) 15:05 Russian warplanes drop two bombs on the Vaziani military airport (reservists were bombed).
(5) (6) 16:30 30 Russian air bombs fell in Marneuli and Bolnisi, on the territory of military air bases, 20 km and 35 km south of Tbilisi, respectively. Two planes were destroyed on the ground. In addition, several buildings were destroyed and there were casualties.
(7) 17:00 Second bombing of the military air base in Marneuli (the runway was destroyed, 2 Su-25s were damaged, there were no more cars in the parking lot).
(8) 17:35 The military air base in Marneuli, 20 km south of Tbilisi, was bombed for the third time, resulting in 1 person killed and 4 injured. As a result of three explosions, three aircraft were destroyed (fuel tankers burned out).
(9) 18:45 The Georgian artillery brigade in Gori was bombed by five Russian aircraft.

August 9, 2008
(10) 00:12 The military port of Poti came under rocket fire, killing 4 civilians, one policeman, wounding 33 reservists, and killing Navy Corporal Pichhaya.
(11) 00:17 Bombing of the Senaki military base, 1 soldier and 5 reservists were killed. The railway station at Senaki was also bombed, killing eight.
(12) 00:20 Vaziani airfield, which is 2-3 kilometers from Tbilisi International Airport, was bombed again.
(13) 01:00 Poti, the port was hit by a Tochka-U tactical missile.
(14) 1:20 Bombing of Gatchiani in the Gardabani areas (not a clear fact, most likely a “free hunt”).
(15) 10:00 The Russian Air Force bombed the Kopitnari airfield a few kilometers from Kutaisi (a very successful bombing, half of the Georgian aircraft were destroyed).
(16) 10:22 The Russian Air Force continues to bomb Gori.
(17) 12:40 Kopitnari airfield was bombed again (finished off).
(18) 14:00 The Russian Air Force bombed the positions of the 5th brigade, including the airfield in the village of Omarishara
(19) 16:35 They bombed (no data).
(20) 22:30 The Russian Air Force bombed Chkhalta, the administrative center of Upper Abkhazia. No casualties have been reported.

August 10, 2008
(21) 5:45 A Russian bomber entered Georgian airspace from Dagestan and dropped 3 bombs on the Tbilisi aircraft plant (they bombed the plant’s runway).
(22) 7:40 Russian bombs fell in the village of Urta in the Zugdidi region (preparing for an offensive, bombing the police and reservists).
(23) 8:45 Ten Russian planes attacked Upper Abkhazia.
(24) 11:15 In the village of Shavshvebi, between Gori and Kareli, a field airfield of attack helicopters was bombed, 3 MI-24s burned down.
(25) 15:00 The Russians bombed the village of Knolevi in ​​the northern region of Kareli (3rd brigade of the Georgian Armed Forces).
(26) 15:10 Russian troops and Abkhaz militias shell the Kodori Gorge.
(27) 16:05 Burn, military bases were bombed.
(28) 16:10 Russian aircraft fired at the only remaining bridge on the highway connecting the eastern and western parts of the country.
(29) 19:05 Tbilisi civil airport, radar destroyed by X-59 missile.
(30) 19:10 "Tbilaviamsheni" aviation plant, the runway was bombed.
(31) 19:35 Two bombers bombed Senaki (Western Georgia).
(32) 20:25 Two bombers bombed the Kodori Gorge (Upper Abkhazia).

August 11, 2008
(33) 00:30 A radar station in the village of Shavshvebi, west of Gori, was hit by an airstrike.
(34) 00:31 Bombed the Kodori Gorge (Upper Abkhazia).
(35) 3:05 Villages of Sharabidzhebi, Kapandichi and Makkhov near Batumi (Georgian-Turkish border). Batumi airport was bombed.
(36) 3:12 The territory of the military base in Khelvachauri (near the Georgian-Turkish border) was bombed.
(37) 3:26 Kodori Gorge (Upper Abkhazia). Artillery fire from ships.
(38) 4:30 Central command center of the Georgian Air Force, bomb attack.
(39) 4:37 A civilian radar station in the village of Yeninisi, 5 kilometers from the center of Tbilisi, was partially destroyed by Russian bombing.
(40) 5:00 Russian planes bombed the Shiraki airfield in the Dedoplistskaro region in the east of the country.
(41) 6:10 The Gori tank battalion was bombed again (36 killed).
(42) 7:15 Senaki airport, runway and Senaki military base were bombed by Russian planes (3 helicopters were destroyed).

August 12, 2008
(43) 09:30 - 10:55 The central square and market in Gori (the collection point for Georgian reservists) were bombed.

Animated map of air bombing strikes of the Russian Air Force with a point-by-point layout:

There were 4 reconnaissance groups of the fleet operating on the shore - they did not suffer any losses, they completed their combat missions. An air defense radar damaged by aviation, an S-125 air defense division, 6 ships and a coastal radar station were blown up.

Currently, the Georgian Navy has been disbanded, the surviving 2 “Vultures” have been handed over to the coast guard, and two landing ships have been decommissioned.

Ground operation

On the morning of August 10, advanced Russian units entered the city, the same BTGs of the 135th and 693rd motorized rifle regiments, a company of the Vostok battalion and paratroopers of the 76th division.

Junior Lieutenant V.V. Neff, the commander of the T-62 platoon, strategically positioned his tanks at the intersection of Moskovskaya and Chochiev streets and organized surveillance.

In the battle near school No. 12, tankers of junior lieutenant Neff burned a Georgian T-72 tank at point-blank range and shot the servants of a mortar battery in the school yard; in the battle on August 10, the tank was hit by two shots from an RPG (Vitaly Neff was posthumously awarded the title of Hero of the Russian Federation).

By mid-day on August 10, the city and immediate surroundings were completely cleared of Georgian troops, the Georgians fled, leaving the corpses of their killed comrades on the streets

A network of battalion tactical groups began an operation to encircle the enemy. The air assault battalions of the Pskov division bypassed Tskhinvali along the “Likhvan corridor”, capturing Georgian villages.

On the night of August 11, the BTG broke through the front and reached Gori, capturing a height with a television tower and a Georgian battery of D-30 howitzers. The crews simply fled, coming under fire.





On the same day, in the central square of Gori, where reservists walked in herds, and the hotel housed the operational headquarters of the Georgians and American “advisers,” in the former home of the pioneers, a Georgian reservist accidentally fired a grenade launcher into a fuel tank in the boiler room. The explosion was mistaken for a bombing, and panic began.

A rumor spread that the Russians were already in Gori, our aircraft were constantly flying over the city, the Georgians had no communications, the command had disappeared.

In the evening and at night, the Georgian army, huddled in a huge herd, ran along the Georgian Military Road to Tbilisi. The commander was the first to do this, “moved due to shell shock,” as he now explains. The others began to follow him.

Russian armored formations captured the 3rd and 4th brigades near Tskhinvali. The troops who found themselves surrounded abandoned their equipment and weapons and fled, dressed in civilian clothes.


The last battle took place in Zemo-Khviti. During the offensive, the column came under fire from an artillery battery, losing a tank and 2 infantry fighting vehicles.

Video of the fight.


During the attack on Gori, perhaps the most amazing battle took place here. The BMD-1, which was traveling as part of an air assault battalion, had an engine failure, and the crew and paratroopers were left on the road to wait for a repair vehicle. At that moment, the headquarters column of the 2nd Infantry Brigade was leaving the encirclement. During the battle, 11 fighters burned two Urals and damaged 5 Land Rovers.



The story of the soldiers of the 104th airborne assault rifle ("tank" is what the paratroopers call the BMD; there were about 200 Georgian soldiers):

On the morning of August 12, everything was over, President Medvedev announced the end of the “peace enforcement operation.”

Losses of the parties.

Aviation (4th Air Force and Air Defense Army) lost 4 aircraft: 1 Tu-22, 2 Su 25 and 1 Su-24 (according to some sources, another Su-24, although most likely the dispute is about the wreckage of a Georgian plane shot down over Gufta ).

Infantry
67 fighters (mostly those who were hit by artillery on August 8-9). Name list. Other sources call 71 dead and 340 wounded. According to Georgia - up to 400 killed.

Georgia

Aviation - 25 airplanes and 37 helicopters (see above).

Shot down and captured
68 T-72
25 BMP-1/2 (including Ukrainian BMP-1U Shkval)
14 BTR-70/80

65 tanks of the Georgian army and 15 BMP-2 infantry fighting vehicles were captured (21 captured tanks were destroyed).

The number of armored vehicles damaged and burned in battles is 19 T-72 tanks.

Air defense
5 Osa missile launchers (division), 4 Buk missile launchers (Ukraine), 2 Israeli-made Spider missile launchers were captured.

The S-125 division was destroyed near Poti.

11 trucks, 4 armored personnel carriers, 2 German mine clearance vehicles, 37 guns and 96 mortars were captured.

Infantry
Killed: 180 - army, 29 - Ministry of Internal Affairs, 111 - reservists, national guard (all on the list of civilians).

Sanitary losses: 1964 wounded.

According to Georgia: 412 dead (including 170 military personnel and employees of the Ministry of Internal Affairs, 228 civilians), 1,747 wounded and 24 missing. According to other sources, the total losses are up to 3,000 people among the army and law enforcement officers.

South Ossetia

According to various estimates, from 162 to 1692 dead.

Abkhazia - 1 dead and two wounded.

US losses

2 killed instructors who were in Georgian combat formations in Tskhinvali (data closed). According to other sources, they were captured in the village. Kekhvi.

2 prisoners.
One was captured near Tskhinvali (data closed).

The second, Winston Fraserley, was wounded and left by the Georgians on the street of Tskhinvali, introducing himself as a journalist.

A year later, it became no clearer about American losses.

And here are the most curious revelations of Israeli military advisers.

08.08 morning, the 4th Infantry enters Tskhinvali in a slender crowd, walking along Heroes Street

www.youtube.com/v/6Cme25yYBcg?version=3
there's no time for fun here

The first day of the war in Tskhinvali
www.youtube.com/v/fUQ4DHvPGnQ?version=3
the assault was repulsed, the Georgians had already retreated, around 17.00

Hit "Dots"
www.youtube.com/v/F8XN0lPmg-A?version=3

This is Gori 10.08. at the end, you can see an explosion at a tank base http://mreporter.ru/reports/2108

Morning 08.08 Ossetian filming of the city http://mreporter.ru/reports/2559

Strike on 09.08 at 14.00 by our artillery brigade on Georgian batteries on the Prissky Heights http://mreporter.ru/reports/2522

Video of the “upper town” of MS, a broken barracks in which they held the defense.
www.youtube.com/v/85nD_kevQ-0?version=3
And
www.youtube.com/v/F8hZyjZtwBg?version=3
bombing of the "Upper Town" filmed from Eredvi.

Here, fighters from a position remove the burning car park of the upper town.
www.youtube.com/v/E8tMXQJIC1o?version=3

Amateur video, driving along Heroev Street
www.youtube.com/v/iEFDrXTcR38?version=3

The corpses of killed Georgian tank crews and soldiers of the 4th Infantry Brigade.

The first day of the war, the 42nd battalion is in the “oak grove”, the 41st is bombed, then everyone runs away.
www.youtube.com/v/uXASj0U_xPA?version=3

Those who have not yet managed to escape
www.youtube.com/v/N5lUELciC0o?version=3

Video, "oak grove", corpses.
www.youtube.com/v/I8LG5aiL2Mc?version=3
All 22 were killed after attack by attack aircraft 08/08/08

This one was luckier, he was captured by the Ossetians
www.youtube.com/watch?v=DhZberA3o6A

These, too, sit in the Ossetian KGB
www.youtube.com/v/wBE54oks2AU?version=3

After the attack on Gori
www.youtube.com/v/iP8utJiO80k?version=3

Wounded Sladkov and Khrulev
www.youtube.com/v/T5r1BBBsnjU?version=3

Marneuli airfield, rocket debris
www.youtube.com/v/OI5F8A3eDAA?version=3


A little more video:



The data is taken mainly from here, partly from Wikipedia and the rest of the Internet.