War in Nagorno-Karabakh
The conflict in Nagorno-Karabakh was generated by the fact that this region, largely populated by Armenians, ended up being part of Azerbaijan for some historical reasons. It is not surprising that, as in many similar cases, the leadership of the Azerbaijan SSR took certain measures to change the ethnic map of this area
In the 1980s, the Armenian side began to increasingly accuse the Azerbaijani authorities of a “purposeful policy of discrimination and displacement,” arguing that Baku intended to completely oust the Armenians from Nagorno-Karabakh, following the model of what was done in the Nakhtevan Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic. Meanwhile, out of 162 thousand people living in the Nagorno-Karabakh region, there were 123,100 Armenians (75.9%), and only 37,300 Azerbaijanis (22.9%).
With the beginning of the so-called “perestroika”, the issue of Nagorno-Karabakh became even more acute. A wave of individual and collective letters from Armenians demanding the reunification of Karabakh with Armenia overwhelmed the Kremlin. In Karabakh itself, since the second half of 1981, a campaign was actively carried out to collect signatures for the annexation of the region to Armenia.
At the end of 1987, in the village of Chardakhly to the north-west of IKAO, the police, personally led by the first secretary of the Shamkhor district committee M. Asadov, carried out a mass beating of Armenians protesting against the replacement of the Armenian state farm director with an Azerbaijani. The news of this incident caused widespread outrage in Armenia.
At the same time (from November 1987 to January 1988), a number of Azerbaijani residents of the Kafan region of the Armenian SSR simultaneously left for Azerbaijan. According to Azerbaijani data, the reason for this was the pressure that Armenian extremists exerted on these residents in order to squeeze the Azerbaijani population out of the area. Other sources claim that the first ethnic clashes in Armenia occurred in November 1988, but in this case the flight was caused by rumors spread for provocative purposes. Indeed, in a number of cases, obvious provocateurs spoke at rallies under the guise of refugees from Kafan.
The situation was aggravated by the statement of Gorbachev’s economic adviser Abel Aganbegyan about the need to transfer Karabakh to Armenia. The Armenians took this as a signal that the idea was supported by the top leadership of the USSR. By the end of the year, an informal referendum on reunification with Armenia had already received 80 thousand signatures. In December - January, these petitions with signatures were presented to representatives of the CPSU Central Committee and the Supreme Soviet of the USSR.
On February 13, 1988, the first rally took place in Stepanakert demanding the transfer of the Nagorno-Karabakh Autonomous Region to Armenia. A week later, thousands of people were already demonstrating. On February 20, the People's Council of Deputies of the NKAO adopted a resolution (in the form of an appeal to the Supreme Councils of the USSR, Armenia and Azerbaijan) with a request to unite the region with Armenia. This caused indignation among Azerbaijanis. From this moment on, events clearly took on the character of an ethnopolitical conflict. The Azerbaijani population of Nagorno-Karabakh began to unite under the slogans of “restoring order.”
On February 22, near Askeran, on the Stepanakert-Agdam highway, a clash occurred between Armenians and a crowd of Azerbaijanis moving to Stepanakert. During this clash, which cost the Armenians approximately 50 wounded, two Azerbaijanis were killed. The first was killed by an Azerbaijani policeman, the second was killed by a shot from a hunting rifle from one of the Armenians. This sparked mass demonstrations in Yerevan. The number of protesters by the end of the day reached 45–50 thousand people. On the air of the Vremya program, the decision of the regional council of the NKAO was called inspired by “extremist and nationalist-minded individuals.” This reaction from the central media only increased the indignation of the Armenian side. On February 26, 1988, a rally in the capital of Armenia attracted almost 1 million people. On the same day, the first rallies begin in Sumgait (25 km north of Baku).
On February 27, 1988, speaking on Central Television of the USSR, Deputy Prosecutor General A.F. Katusev (who was then in Baku) mentioned the nationality of those killed in the clashes near Askeran. In the following hours, an Armenian pogrom began in Sumgait, lasting three days. The exact death toll is disputed. The official investigation reported 32 killed - 6 Azerbaijanis and 26 Armenians. Armenian sources indicate that these data were many times underestimated. Hundreds of people were injured, huge numbers were subjected to violence, torture and abuse, and many thousands became refugees. There was no timely investigation into the causes and circumstances of the pogroms, identification and punishment of provocateurs and direct participants in the crimes, which undoubtedly led to an escalation of the conflict. At trials, the murders were classified as murders with hooligan motives. State prosecutor V.D. Kozlovsky said that along with the Armenians, representatives of other nationalities also suffered in Sumgait. About eighty people were convicted in the case. One of the convicts, Akhmed Akhmedov, was sentenced to death.
The Sumgait pogrom caused a violent reaction from the Armenian public: rallies began in Armenia, at which there were demands to duly condemn the pogroms in Sumgait and publish a full list of victims, as well as to make a decision on the reunification of the Nagorno-Karabakh Autonomous Okrug and the Armenian SSR.
Moscow Armenians actively supported the decision of their compatriots to secede from Azerbaijan, and weekly organized rallies began to take place at the Armenian cemetery near the Surb Harutyun church demanding that the request of their Karabakh compatriots be satisfied and that the organizers of the Sumgayit tragedy be held accountable.
In the fall of 1988, attacks on Armenians in Azerbaijan resumed, accompanied by their expulsion to Armenia. The largest Armenian pogroms occurred in Baku, Kirovabad (Ganja), Shemakha, Shamkhor, Mingachevir, and the Nakhichevan Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic. Azerbaijanis living in Armenia were subjected to similar attacks and forced deportations (216 Azerbaijanis were killed, including 57 women, 5 infants and 18 children of different ages; according to Armenian sources, the number of Azerbaijanis killed did not exceed 25 people).
As a result of the pogroms, by the beginning of 1989, all Azerbaijanis and a significant part of the Kurds fled from Armenia, all Armenians fled from Azerbaijan, except those living in Nagorno-Karabakh and partly to Baku. There have been constant armed clashes in the NKAO since the summer, and the regional authorities refused to submit to Azerbaijan. An informal organization was created - the so-called “Krunk” committee, headed by the director of the Stepanakert construction materials plant, Arkady Manucharov. Its stated goals are to study the history of the region, its connections with Armenia, and restore ancient monuments. In fact, the committee took on the functions of organizing mass actions. In Stepanakert, almost all enterprises stopped working, and every day there were processions through the city streets and mass rallies. Hundreds of people came from Armenia to Karabakh every day. An air bridge was organized between Stepanakert and Yerevan, and the number of flights sometimes reached 4–8 per day.
On July 12, the regional Council adopted a resolution on secession from the Azerbaijan SSR. In January 1989, Moscow partially removed the NKAO from the control of Azerbaijan, introducing a state of emergency there and creating a Special Management Committee headed by A.I. Volsky. Members of the “Karabakh Committee” led by the future President of Armenia Levon Ter-Petrosyan were arrested in Yerevan.
On November 28, 1989, Karabakh was returned to the de facto authority of Azerbaijan: instead of the Special Administration Committee, an Organizing Committee was created, subordinate to the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Azerbaijan. The commandant's office of the region of emergency was subordinated to the organizing committee. For its part, on December 1, 1989, a joint session of the Armenian Supreme Council and the regional council of the NKAO proclaimed the unification of Nagorno-Karabakh with Armenia.
On January 15, 1990, a state of emergency was declared. Units of internal troops were introduced into Nagorno-Karabakh and the Shaumyan region. From that moment on, according to the Armenians, their situation worsened sharply, since the state of emergency was also implemented by Azerbaijani formations that deliberately sought to make the life of Armenians in the NKAO unbearable. However, the state of emergency did not interfere with military clashes: during this time, Armenian militants carried out over 200 operations.
Fighting actually began on the Armenian-Azerbaijani border. Thus, according to Armenian data, by June 1990 the number of “fidayeen” in Armenia was about 10 thousand people. They were armed with up to 20 armored vehicles (armored personnel carriers and armored vehicles), about 100 missile launchers, several dozen mortars, and more than 10 helicopters.
In addition, a special forces regiment of the Ministry of Internal Affairs was formed in Armenia (initially 400 soldiers, later expanded to 2,700). Azerbaijani formations, organized primarily by the so-called Popular Front of Azerbaijan (PFA), also had comparable forces.
In mid-January 1990, Azerbaijani extremists staged new pogroms in Baku against the remaining Armenians (by this time there were about 35 thousand of them left). Moscow did not react for several days until a threat to the authorities arose. Only after this did parts of the army and internal troops harshly suppress the Popular Front. This action led to numerous casualties among the civilian population of Baku, who tried to prevent the entry of troops.
In April - August 1991, units of the Soviet Army, together with the Azerbaijani riot police, carried out actions to disarm Karabakh villages and forcibly deport their residents to Armenia (Operation “Ring”). In this way, 24 villages were deported. However, after August 22, any influence of Moscow on the events in Karabakh ceased. The Karabakh Armenians, who created their own “self-defense units,” and Azerbaijan, which at that moment had only police and riot police at its disposal, found themselves face to face with each other. On September 2, 1991, Karabakh Armenians proclaimed the creation of the Nagorno-Karabakh Republic (as part of the USSR). In November 1991, the Supreme Council of Azerbaijan adopted a resolution on the liquidation of the autonomy of NKAO. For their part, the Armenians held a referendum on independence on December 10 and officially proclaimed the creation of an independent state. A war began, which subsequently escalated into a war between Azerbaijan and Armenia.
By the end of 1991, the Armenians in Karabakh had up to 6 thousand fighters (of which 3,500 were local, the rest were “fidayeen” from Armenia), united in the “NKR Self-Defense Forces” (later the “NKR Defense Army”) and subordinate to the Defense Committee. These forces significantly replenished their arsenals with the property of the withdrawn 88th Regiment of Internal Troops of the USSR Ministry of Internal Affairs and the 366th Motorized Rifle Regiment, which remained in Karabakh for some time.
On January 1, 1992, the Agdam battalion under the command of Yakub Rzayev, accompanied by six tanks and four armored personnel carriers, attacked the Armenian village of Khramort in the Askeran region. Subsequently, self-defense units operated in this direction from the Azerbaijani side. On January 13, when shelling the city of Shaumyanovsk, the Azerbaijanis used the Grad multiple launch rocket launcher for the first time.
On January 25, the Armenians went on the offensive and captured the riot police base in the Stepanakert suburb of Karkijahan, and then (in the first half of February) almost all ethnically Azerbaijani settlements on the territory of Nagorno-Karabakh. The only strongholds of the Azerbaijanis remained the urban-type settlement of Khojaly (where the only airfield was located) and Shusha, from where intensive shelling of Stepanakert was carried out (using Grad installations).
On the night of February 26, 1992, the Armenians captured Khojaly, after which they killed 485 Azerbaijanis (including more than a hundred women and children) who were leaving along the “humanitarian corridor” provided by the Karabakh leadership. An attempt by the Azerbaijani side in early March to go on the offensive (to Askeran) and recapture Khojaly was unsuccessful. On April 10, the Azerbaijani riot police (the Gurtulush battalion under the command of Shahin Tagiyev) burst into the Armenian village of Maraga and carried out a massacre there, as a result of which 57 residents were killed in various ways (including sawing them alive) and another 45 were taken hostage.
The successes of the Armenians caused a political crisis in Azerbaijan, which in turn contributed to further successes of the Armenians: after several attacks on May 8–9, Shusha was taken, and the entire territory of the NKR (former ICAO and the Shaumyan region) came under Armenian control. Armenian forces were rushed to Lachin, which separated the NKR from Armenia; by May 18, thanks to a double blow from the NKR and Goris (Armenia), Lachin was occupied, and direct communication was established between Armenia and NKR. The Armenians considered the war largely over. From their point of view, all that remained was to capture several Armenian villages of the Khanlar region (cleared during “Operation Ring”). For the planned offensive in the northern direction, minefields began to be removed.
However, the new government of Azerbaijan, headed by A. Elchibey, sought to return Karabakh at any cost. The division of property of the Soviet Army, which began at that moment, provided the Azerbaijani side with a large amount of weapons, ensuring military superiority over the Armenians. According to Armenian estimates, in Karabakh the Armenians had 8 thousand people (of which 4.5 thousand were Karabakh residents), 150 units of armored vehicles (including 30 tanks) and about 60 units of artillery and mortar systems. For its part, Azerbaijan concentrated 35 thousand people, about a thousand armored vehicles (including more than 300 tanks), 550 pieces of artillery, 53 aircraft and 37 helicopters in the Karabakh direction.
On June 12, the Azerbaijanis, unexpectedly for the Armenians, launched an offensive in the northern direction (towards the Shaumyan region). The area was occupied for two days. According to Armenian data, 18 thousand people became refugees, 405 people (mostly women, children and old people) went missing. After capturing the Shaumyan region, the Azerbaijani army, regrouping, attacked Mardakert and occupied it on July 4. Having occupied a significant part of the Mardakert region, the Azerbaijanis reached the Sarsang reservoir, where by July 9, after a month-long offensive, the front had stabilized. On July 15, the Armenians launched a counter-offensive and reached the outskirts of Mardakert, but were then again driven back by the Azerbaijanis, who reached the Khachen River in early September, taking control of up to a third of the territory of the Nagorno-Karabakh Republic.
On August 12, a state of emergency was declared in Karabakh and a general mobilization of citizens aged 18 to 45 was declared. Reinforcements from Armenia were quickly transferred to the republic.
On September 18, the Azerbaijanis launched a new offensive, launching three strikes at once: in the direction of Lachin, the regional center of Martuni (in the south) and Shusha (through the Karabakh ridge, using airborne forces and mountain riflemen). The Lachin direction was the main one, and the corridor was the main goal of the Azerbaijanis. The Azerbaijanis came close to Lachin (at a distance of 12 km) and Martuni, but did not achieve their goals. By September 21, their offensive ran out of steam, and the Armenians launched a counteroffensive and pushed them back to their original positions.
By this time, Armenia had completed arming and forming a national army, significant forces of which were transferred to Karabakh. By the end of the year, Armenian forces in Karabakh numbered 18 thousand people, of which 12 thousand were Karabakh residents. They had 100 tanks and 190 armored vehicles.
On January 15, 1993, Azerbaijan launched a new offensive on the northern front (in the direction of Chaldiran), trying to create a springboard for the attack on Stepanakert. The idea was to pin down the Armenian forces in the Mardakert direction and cut them off from Aghdam with a blow. However, the offensive ended in failure. This anticipated the spring-summer defeats of the Azerbaijani army.
On February 5, the Armenians, having exhausted the Azerbaijanis with defensive battles, went on the offensive and struck Chaldaran (Mardakert direction), which they occupied on the same day. By February 8, the Azerbaijanis were driven back 10 km. By February 25, the Armenians completely captured the Sarsang reservoir and took control of the Mardakert-Kelbajar road section, thus interrupting the connection of the Kelbajar region with the rest of Azerbaijan. Attempts to advance further and recapture Mardakert failed.
The Armenian offensive put the Kelbajar region in a hopeless situation, which found itself in a semi-blockade between Armenia, NKR and snow-covered mountain passes. On March 27, the Armenians began an operation to capture Kelbajar. The attacks were carried out from three sides: from the territory of Armenia, Karabakh and Lachin. Within 72 hours after the start of the offensive, the Armenians occupied the regional center. The population was evacuated by helicopters or fled through mountain passes, enduring a lot of hardships. Azerbaijani units also retreated through the passes, abandoning equipment stuck in the snow. The capture of Kelbajar significantly improved the strategic position of the Armenians, reducing the front line, eliminating the threat to Lachin from the north and establishing a strong connection between the NKR and Armenia instead of a “corridor”.
In Azerbaijan, the defeats caused a new political crisis, which in June led to the fall of Elchibey and the APF government and his replacement by Heydar Aliyev. The Armenians sought to develop their success. On June 12, the anniversary of the Azerbaijani offensive, they launched a massive offensive in the Agdam and Mardakert directions. In the Agdam direction they managed to achieve only minor success. But, having transferred the main forces to the northern front, on June 26 they returned Mardakert.
After this, the Armenian armed forces were again redeployed to the Agdam direction and, after 42 days of fighting, captured Agdam on the night of July 24. The further plan of the Armenians was to strike in a southern direction (to Fuzuli) and reach the Iranian border in the Horadiz region, which would automatically cut off and give the Zangelan and Kubatli regions into their hands. The offensive on the southern front began on August 11. By August 25, the regional centers of Jebrail and Fuzuli were occupied. After a short pause to regroup, the Armenians launched an attack on Kubatli and occupied it on August 31. On October 23, the Armenians occupied Horadiz (on the Iranian border), thus finally cutting off the Zangelan region and the part of the Kubatly and Jebrail regions that remained in the hands of the Azerbaijanis. The Azerbaijani military personnel stationed there, along with civilians, left through Arak to Iran. Thus, the southern front was practically eliminated, and the strategic position of Karabakh, which until recently was semi-encircled, improved significantly. During the eight months of their offensive, the Armenians managed to establish control over a territory of 14 thousand square meters. km.
On December 15, the Azerbaijanis, in a desperate attempt to restore their position, went on the offensive in all five directions (Fizuli, Martuni, Agdam, Mardakert, Kelbajar). The main blow was delivered in the south. On January 8, the Azerbaijanis returned Horadiz, and by January 26 they reached Fuzuli, where they were stopped
At the same time, in the Kelbajar direction, two of the three brigades involved there broke through the Murovdag ridge and occupied 14 settlements, reaching the Mardakert-Kelbajar highway. However, on February 12, the Armenians went on the offensive and captured the 701st Brigade in a pincer movement, from which it managed to escape with great difficulty and serious losses. The Azerbaijanis were again driven back beyond Murovdag.
On the night of April 10, 1994, the Armenians launched a massive offensive on the northeastern sector of the front, called the Terter operation. According to the plan, the Armenians were supposed to, having broken through the Azerbaijani defenses in the Terter region, develop an offensive on Barda-Yevlakh, reach the Kura River and the Mingachevir reservoir and thus cut off the entire north-west of Azerbaijan along with Ganja, just as the south-west had previously been cut off. It was assumed that after such a catastrophe, Azerbaijan would have no choice but to make peace on the terms prescribed by Armenia.
In the main sector of the offensive, about 1,500 military personnel and 30 armored vehicles (17 tanks) from the Stepanakert Mobile Regiment and other units of the NKR Defense Army were thrown into battle, supported by cannon and rocket artillery fire. Azerbaijani troops under the command of General Elbrus Orujov, relying on the fortified area of the city of Terter, put up stubborn resistance.
April 16 - May 6, 1994, the Armenian command, as a result of continuous attacks on the Tartar front, launched the forces of the 5th motorized rifle brigade and the separate motorized rifle battalion "Tigran Mets" on the offensive, forcing the Azerbaijani units to retreat. Sections of territory with several settlements north of Agdam and west of Tartar came under the control of Armenian formations. The losses of both sides in the final phase of hostilities were significant. Thus, in just one week (April 14–21), the losses of the Azerbaijani army in the Terter direction amounted to 2 thousand military personnel (600 killed). Armenian formations captured 28 armored vehicles - 8 tanks, 5 infantry fighting vehicles, 15 armored personnel carriers.
Both Armenians and Azerbaijanis were no longer able to continue fighting. On May 5, 1994, representatives of Azerbaijan, NKR and Armenia, through the mediation of Russia, signed a ceasefire agreement in Bishkek. On May 9, the agreement was signed by Azerbaijani Defense Minister Mammadrafi Mammadov in Baku. May 10 - Armenian Defense Minister Serge Sargsyan in Yerevan. May 11 - Commander of the Nagorno-Karabakh Army Samvel Babayan in Stepanakert. On May 12, this agreement came into force.
The Bishkek agreement put an end to the acute phase of the conflict.
The result of the military confrontation was the victory of the Armenian side. Despite the numerical advantage, superiority in military equipment and manpower, with incomparably greater resources, Azerbaijan was defeated.
The combat losses of the Armenian side amounted to 5856 people killed, of which 3291 were citizens of the unrecognized NKR, the rest were citizens of the Republic of Armenia and a few volunteers of the Armenian diaspora.
During the war between Azerbaijan and the unrecognized NKR, as a result of bombing and shelling by the Azerbaijani army of the civilian population of Nagorno-Karabakh, 1,264 civilians (of which more than 500 women and children) were killed. 596 people (179 women and children) were missing. In total, from 1988 to 1994, more than 2,000 civilians of Armenian nationality were killed in Azerbaijan and the unrecognized NKR.
It should be said about the weapons used by the parties. Both sides used weapons from Soviet Army stockpiles, ranging from small arms to tanks, helicopters, jets and multiple launch rocket systems. After the collapse of the USSR, Armenia and Azerbaijan replenished their arsenals not only with weapons captured and stolen from the collapsing Soviet Army, but also with weapons officially transferred to both countries.
At the beginning of 1992, Azerbaijan received a squadron of Mi-24 (14 helicopters) and a squadron of Mi-8 (9 helicopters) at the Sangachali airfield, and Armenia received a squadron of 13 Mi-24s, which was part of the 7th Guards Helicopter Regiment, based near Yerevan .
In the first four months of 1992, the Azerbaijanis captured 14 tanks, 96 infantry fighting vehicles, more than 40 armored personnel carriers and armored vehicles, 4 BM-21 Grad rocket launchers from the 4th Combined Arms Army, and these weapons immediately appeared at the front after the formation of crews and crews, creating a serious superiority in firepower. The Armenians also received certain trophies, but it was impossible to transport military equipment to Karabakh.
On April 8, 1992, Azerbaijani aviation received its first combat aircraft - the Su-25 attack aircraft, which was hijacked by senior lieutenant Vagif Bakhtiyar-ogly Kurbanov from the Sital-Chay airfield, where the 80th separate attack air regiment was based. The pilot prepared the attack aircraft for flight and flew to the civilian airfield of Yevlakh, from where a month later (May 8) he began regularly bombing Stepanakert and nearby villages. The residential sector and civilian population suffered from these air raids, while the Armenian units suffered virtually no losses. This use of combat aircraft was typical throughout the war and probably had the main goal not so much to break the morale and combat potential of the Karabakh defense forces, but to force the Armenian population to leave Karabakh. The Azerbaijani cannon and rocket artillery had the same, never completed, task, continuously striking civilian targets.
In May 1992, the official transfer of weapons to the 4th Combined Arms Army to Azerbaijan began. According to the directive of the Russian Ministry of Defense dated June 22, 1992, the following were transferred to Azerbaijan: 237 tanks, 325 armored combat vehicles, 204 infantry fighting vehicles and armored personnel carriers, 170 artillery mounts, including Grad mounts. In turn, by June 1, 1992, Armenia received 54 tanks, 40 infantry fighting vehicles and armored personnel carriers, as well as 50 guns.
The capture of the Lachin corridor made it possible to transfer this equipment to Karabakh, where previously the Armenians had only a few combat vehicles captured from the 366th regiment and the Azerbaijani riot police, as well as a couple of homemade armored cars.
Initially, Azerbaijani aviation was opposed by very weak Armenian air defense, which consisted of 6 ZU-23-2 anti-aircraft guns, 4 self-propelled ZSU-23-4 Shilka, 4 57-mm S-60 anti-aircraft guns and several dozen outdated Strela-2M MANPADS. Later, eight 57-mm S-60 anti-aircraft guns arrived, and the Azerbaijanis captured a ZU-23-2 in the Ural and one ZSU-23-4 Shilka. These low-altitude aircraft could not effectively counter enemy air raids, and Azerbaijani aviation launched strikes on Stepanakert almost daily. Losses among the population were very significant. Beginning in August 1992, Azerbaijani aircraft began dropping both RBK-250 and RBK-500 (disposable bomb container) containing fragmentation submunitions (known as “ball bombs”).
In 1994, the appearance of combat aircraft in Armenia was noted. It is known that 4 Su-25s were transferred by Russia as part of the CIS military cooperation.
The losses of the Azerbaijani side amounted to more than 25 thousand people killed, including military personnel of the National Army of Azerbaijan, internal troops, riot police, territorial battalions, militants from various organizations, as well as foreign mercenaries.
Armenian formations knocked out more than 400 armored vehicles (31% of those available to the Republic of Azerbaijan at that time), including 186 tanks (49%), shot down 20 military aircraft (37%), more than 20 combat helicopters of the National Army of Azerbaijan (more than half helicopter fleet of the Armed Forces of the Republic of Azerbaijan). Most of the damaged equipment (both Azerbaijani and Armenian) was captured by the NKR Defense Army, later repaired and returned to service.
The cruelty and scale of the war are also indicated by the following figures: from November 21, 1991 to May 1994, the Azerbaijani army fired over 21 thousand Grad MLRS shells, 2,700 Alazan missiles, more than 2 thousand artillery shells, 180 ball bombs, 150 half-ton aerial bombs (including 8 vacuum ones). On the territory of the unrecognized NKR, the Azerbaijani army installed more than 100 thousand anti-tank mines and an even larger number of anti-personnel mines.
As a result, the territory of 7 districts of the former Azerbaijan SSR came under the control of Armenian formations - Kelbajar, Lachin, Kubatly, Jabrail, Zangelan - completely and Agdam and Fizuli - partially. The total area of these territories is 7060 square meters. km, which is 8.15% of the territory of the former Azerbaijan SSR. The National Army of Azerbaijan controls 750 sq. km of the territory of the unrecognized NKR - Shaumyanovsky (630 sq km) and small parts of the Martuni and Mardakert regions, which constitutes 14.85% of the total area of the NKR. In addition, part of the territory of the Republic of Armenia - the Artsvashensky enclave - came under the control of Azerbaijan.
390 thousand Armenians became refugees (360 thousand Armenians from Azerbaijan and 30 thousand from NKR). In addition, as a result of the blockade and war, more than 635 thousand people left the Republic of Armenia.
The ceasefire agreement is still in effect. Currently, Nagorno-Karabakh is a de facto independent state, calling itself the Nagorno-Karabakh Republic. It maintains close ties with the Republic of Armenia and uses its national currency, the dram. The Armenian authorities are constantly under pressure from internal forces calling for the annexation of Nagorno-Karabakh. The Armenian leadership, however, does not agree to this, fearing the reaction of Azerbaijan and the international community, which still considers Nagorno-Karabakh part of Azerbaijan. The political life of Armenia and Nagorno-Karabakh is so closely interconnected that the former President of the Nagorno-Karabakh Republic Robert Kocharyan headed the government of Armenia in 1997, and from 1998 to April 2008 was its president.
At the peace negotiations, the Karabakh Armenians are formally represented by the Yerevan leadership, since Azerbaijan refuses to recognize them as one of the “parties to the conflict,” which continues to cause discontent in Karabakh itself.
Currently, the negotiation process has stalled, as Armenia and Azerbaijan are equally intransigent, and Nagorno-Karabakh is excluded from the negotiation process. Azerbaijan believes that Karabakh’s ownership is recognized by international law and is beyond discussion, and demands the return of all occupied areas of the “security zone” as a precondition for discussing the status of Karabakh. The Armenian side indicates that it cannot take such a step without security guarantees for the NKR, and demands preliminary recognition by Azerbaijan of the independent status of the NKR. Armenia, moreover, believes that since the NKR declared its independence simultaneously with the acquisition of independence by Azerbaijan, it was never part of the sovereign Azerbaijani state and both countries should be equally considered as successor states of the former USSR.
Representatives of Armenia, Azerbaijan, France, Russia and the United States met in Paris and Key West (Florida) in the spring of 2001. Details of the negotiations were not disclosed, but it was reported that the parties discussed relations between the central government of Azerbaijan and the Karabakh leadership. Despite rumors that the parties were again close to reaching an agreement, the Azerbaijani authorities, both during the reign of Heydar Aliyev and after his son Ilham Aliyev came to power after the elections in October 2003, stubbornly denied that in Paris or Ki -West any agreements have been reached.
Further negotiations between the President of Azerbaijan I. Aliyev and the President of Armenia R. Kocharyan were held in September 2004 in Astana (Kazakhstan) within the framework of the CIS summit. One of the proposals reportedly discussed was the withdrawal of occupation forces from Azerbaijani territories adjacent to Nagorno-Karabakh and holding a plebiscite in Nagorno-Karabakh and the rest of Azerbaijan on the future status of the region.
On February 10-11, 2006, negotiations were held in Rambouillet (France) between the Presidents of Armenia and Azerbaijan, R. Kocharyan and I. Aliyev, who arrived in France at the invitation of President Jacques Chirac. This meeting was the first round of negotiations to resolve the problem in 2006. The parties failed to reach an agreement on the future settlement of the Nagorno-Karabakh problem.
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From the book Anti-Crisis. Survive and win author Katasonov Valentin YurievichThe “Cold War” is, first of all, an “economic war.” Our country received a respite from the “economic war” only for the period 1941–1945, when an anti-Hitler coalition was created, the main participants of which were the USSR, the USA and Great Britain. Haven't had time to die down yet
From the book World War. Everyone against everyone author Larina Elena SergeevnaELECTRONIC WAR OF THE XXI CENTURY. A public review of the classified report "Electronic Warfare in the Information Age" prepared by the Old Crow Association. In the 21st century, the diplomatic, informational, military, economic and law enforcement components of national power
In the mountains that separate Armenia and Azerbaijan, a new European war is only a matter of time. This conflict is already a hundred years old. One of the parties is supported by Russia, the other by Türkiye.
“As a rule, they shoot in the evenings. Then we just go down to the basement and wait,” says Yenik, 57, from the Armenian border village of Nerkin Karmiraghbyur.
A couple of hundred meters from the crumbling house of Yenik and her husband are Azerbaijani positions.
In these valleys, picking apricots, grapes and pomegranates can be deadly. Every week, people are killed along the border between two blood enemies - with pistols, mortars, bombs and artillery.
“We mostly spend time in the garden on this side of the house. This is where we grow everything we need,” says Jenik.
The most dangerous situation in 23 years
If war breaks out, it may become more dangerous than one might imagine. Russia and NATO member Türkiye may find themselves on different sides.
“Armenia and Azerbaijan are closer to war than at any time since 1994,” the International Crisis Group stated in a recent report.
Both countries have modernized their militaries with large purchases from Russia, which has made billions from arms sales to both sides. All peace talks are on hold and both sides believe war is inevitable. The President of Azerbaijan has already promised to regain control of Nagorno-Karabakh by all possible means. The leaders of both countries enjoy support, causing a wave of patriotism and a thirst for revenge among the population.
"Muslims have been trying to destroy us for centuries"
As the Aftenposten team sets off along the winding roads along the border between Armenia and Azerbaijan to the village of Berd, our neighbors give us very clear advice - not to stop.
Even though we're 11 miles away (1 Norwegian mile is equal to 10 km - editor's note) From the self-proclaimed rebel republic of Nagorno-Karabakh, which is at the core of the conflict, the war smolders here, among these beautiful landscapes:
Empty ghost houses with bullet marks on both sides of the road show that war is just a few shots away from here. The mountains are Armenian, the plains are Azerbaijani.
© public domain, Nagorno-Karabakh
The exits are blocked by branches: this is a warning that due to snipers and mines, turning off the road means putting your life in danger.
Who's shooting?
We jump in surprise when, while in the city's market square, we hear the sound of gun shots.
"Do not be afraid. These are ours. We, everyone who lives here, have learned to distinguish by ear,” answers Anahit Badalyan.
“Then our people will know that we are friends,” says her husband David. He is a rescuer and firefighter.
Several months have passed since the last time the white cars of OSCE observers were here. Then the shooting always stopped.
Grandmother and grandson died
Last week, an Azerbaijani grandmother and grandson were killed by an Armenian grenade in a border village in Azerbaijan on the border with Nagorno-Karabakh.
The Armenians claim they were aiming at Azerbaijani artillery, but the Azeris accuse the rebel republic of provocation.
And on Friday morning—while world leaders were holding a G20 meeting—Azerbaijan put its army on high alert and began bombing Armenian positions.
Türkiye and Russia— on opposite sides
There are many indications that Azerbaijan will benefit more from a new war, with its army equipped with new weapons, a larger number of inhabitants and resources significantly superior to those of its rival. In recent years, Baku’s military spending has been greater than the entire state budget of Armenia.
Context
Karabakh: Iran and Russia are in no hurry, but the United States is “in a hurry”
Irates de facto 09/06/2016What in exchange for Karabakh?
Armtimes.com 01/24/2017Is a breakthrough possible in Karabakh?
Armworld 10/19/2016 “Armenia will be empty in 2100,” the Azerbaijani news agency AzerNews wrote last week. Both countries are waging a fierce information war.The longer the conflict remains frozen, the more the Armenians strengthen their position, the more likely it becomes that Azerbaijan will never regain the areas lost during the 1992-1994 war.
Russia benefits most from the continuation of the conflict in its current state.
The Russians have strengthened their military base in Armenia and are making enormous money by selling weapons to both sides.
However, the growing Russian presence poses a threat to NATO member Turkey, which describes Azerbaijan as “one nation, but two states.”
Conflict in Nagorno-Karabakh
The enclave of Nagorno-Karabakh was given to Azerbaijan by Stalin in 1923. In 1989, the majority of the population of this area (76.4%) were Armenians.
After the collapse of the USSR, ethnic contradictions intensified. In 1991, Azerbaijan declared independence and abolished the autonomy of the enclave. Armenians living in Nagorno-Karabakh demanded annexation to Armenia.
The 1992-1994 war claimed 20-35 thousand lives and made a million people refugees.
Today, Nagorno-Karabakh is economically and militarily ruled by Armenia, but is considered part of Azerbaijan by the international community.
For Azerbaijan, the area over which the conflict arose is equal to 20% of the country's territory, and for Armenia - one third.
That's why conflict is so dangerous
Therefore, a new war between Azerbaijan and Armenia could quickly drag both Russia and Turkey, a NATO member, into the conflict.
Russia has previously made it clear that if the Armenians lose, it will intervene militarily.
Turkey, for its part, will never allow the Armenians to advance and occupy new territories. She needs to have the best cards in her hands for negotiations.
Both sides have long-range missiles that can target civilians in large cities.
Young woman does not give in to fear
“War destroys everything. The last war still kills,” says Anahit Badalyan, a woman who decided to go against the tide.
Although Berd lost half of its population after the collapse of the USSR, Anahit, having completed her studies at Yerevan University, chose to return to her homeland.
Together with the Homeland Development Initiative Foundation and the Honorary Consul of Norway and Finland, Timothy Straight, Anait created a resource center for Berda women and provided employment for approximately 40 women. They gather every day to crochet little bear figurines, keychains and souvenirs.
Streit came to Armenia as a humanitarian aid worker 18 years ago, but chose to stay when his organization moved on to help in other conflicts.
“We can only admit that the world has forgotten about this conflict,” Streit says.
Four days of war
Last April, daily clashes led to a "four-day war" that made clear how little it would take to start things up again.
Azerbaijan took two important heights after both sides lost several hundred soldiers. Baku was intoxicated by victory, 65% of the population wanted the war to continue.
The popularity of the Aliyev family, which rules Azerbaijan, has increased, and criticism of corruption and human rights violations has subsided.
In Armenia and the rebel republic of Nagorno-Karabakh, enormous internal disputes began, leading to large-scale military reform and a powerful desire for revenge.
The Armenian diaspora abroad is also making its contribution - it sent $11 billion to the rebellious republic.
The war has made both Armenians and Azerbaijanis believe in the possibility of a “final solution” through weapons, says the International Crisis Group.
Women suffer the most
“Many Armenians are convinced that the ultimate goal of Turkey and Azerbaijan is to destroy us. Muslims have been attacking us for centuries. Therefore, we are afraid that they want to destroy us,” says Anait.
Armenians still remember the Armenian genocide in Turkey in 1915-1923, when between one and one and a half million Armenians died.
The current leadership of Turkey punishes the use of the word “genocide” and claims that at that time it was only about “deportations” in conditions of war.
“We have every reason to fear annihilation. But I am one of those who believe that the conflict cannot be resolved with weapons,” says Anahit.
InoSMI materials contain assessments exclusively of foreign media and do not reflect the position of the InoSMI editorial staff.
Last updated: 04/02/2016
Violent clashes broke out in Nagorno-Karabakh, a disputed region on the border between Armenia and Azerbaijan, on Saturday night. using “all types of weapons.” The Azerbaijani authorities, in turn, claim that the clashes began after shelling from Nagorno-Karabakh. Official Baku stated that the Armenian side had violated the ceasefire 127 times over the past 24 hours, including using mortars and heavy machine guns.
AiF.ru talks about the history and causes of the Karabakh conflict, which has long historical and cultural roots, and what led to its aggravation today.
History of the Karabakh conflict
The territory of modern Nagorno-Karabakh in the 2nd century. BC e. was annexed to Greater Armenia and for about six centuries formed part of the province of Artsakh. At the end of the 4th century. n. e., during the division of Armenia, this territory was included by Persia as part of its vassal state - Caucasian Albania. From the middle of the 7th century to the end of the 9th century, Karabakh fell under Arab rule, but in the 9th-16th centuries it became part of the Armenian feudal principality of Khachen. Until the middle of the 18th century, Nagorno-Karabakh was under the rule of the union of Armenian melikdoms of Khamsa. In the second half of the 18th century, Nagorno-Karabakh, with a predominant Armenian population, became part of the Karabakh Khanate, and in 1813, as part of the Karabakh Khanate, according to the Treaty of Gulistan, it became part of the Russian Empire.
Karabakh Armistice Commission, 1918. Photo: Commons.wikimedia.org
At the beginning of the 20th century, the region with a predominant Armenian population twice (in 1905-1907 and in 1918-1920) became the scene of bloody Armenian-Azerbaijani clashes.
In May 1918, in connection with the revolution and the collapse of Russian statehood, three independent states were proclaimed in Transcaucasia, including the Azerbaijan Democratic Republic (mainly on the lands of the Baku and Elizavetpol provinces, Zagatala district), which included the Karabakh region.
The Armenian population of Karabakh and Zangezur, however, refused to submit to the ADR authorities. Convened on July 22, 1918 in Shusha, the First Congress of Armenians of Karabakh proclaimed Nagorno-Karabakh an independent administrative and political unit and elected its own People's Government (from September 1918 - the Armenian National Council of Karabakh).
Ruins of the Armenian quarter of the city of Shusha, 1920. Photo: Commons.wikimedia.org / Pavel Shekhtman
The confrontation between Azerbaijani troops and Armenian armed forces continued in the region until the establishment of Soviet power in Azerbaijan. At the end of April 1920, Azerbaijani troops occupied the territory of Karabakh, Zangezur and Nakhichevan. By mid-June 1920, the resistance of the Armenian armed forces in Karabakh was suppressed with the help of Soviet troops.
On November 30, 1920, Azrevkom, by its declaration, granted Nagorno-Karabakh the right to self-determination. However, despite the autonomy, the territory continued to remain the Azerbaijan SSR, which led to intense conflict: in the 1960s, socio-economic tensions in the NKAO escalated into mass unrest several times.
What happened to Karabakh during perestroika?
In 1987 - early 1988, dissatisfaction of the Armenian population with their socio-economic situation intensified in the region, which was influenced by the ongoing USSR President Mikhail Gorbachev the policy of democratization of Soviet public life and the weakening of political restrictions.
Protest sentiments were fueled by Armenian nationalist organizations, and the actions of the nascent national movement were skillfully organized and directed.
The leadership of the Azerbaijan SSR and the Communist Party of Azerbaijan, for their part, tried to resolve the situation by using the usual command and bureaucratic levers, which turned out to be ineffective in the new situation.
In October 1987, student strikes took place in the region demanding the secession of Karabakh, and on February 20, 1988, a session of the regional Council of the NKAO addressed the Supreme Soviet of the USSR and the Supreme Council of the Azerbaijan SSR with a request to transfer the region to Armenia. In the regional center, Stepanakert, and Yerevan, rallies of many thousands with nationalist overtones took place.
Most of the Azerbaijanis living in Armenia were forced to flee. In February 1988, Armenian pogroms began in Sumgait, thousands of Armenian refugees appeared.
In June 1988, the Supreme Council of Armenia agreed to the entry of the NKAO into the Armenian SSR, and the Azerbaijani Supreme Council agreed to preserve the NKAO as part of Azerbaijan with the subsequent liquidation of autonomy.
On July 12, 1988, the regional council of Nagorno-Karabakh decided to secede from Azerbaijan. At a meeting on July 18, 1988, the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR came to the conclusion that it was impossible to transfer the NKAO to Armenia.
In September 1988, armed clashes began between Armenians and Azerbaijanis, which turned into a protracted armed conflict, which resulted in large casualties. As a result of the successful military actions of the Armenians of Nagorno-Karabakh (Artsakh in Armenian), this territory came out of the control of Azerbaijan. The decision on the official status of Nagorno-Karabakh was postponed indefinitely.
Speech in support of the separation of Nagorno-Karabakh from Azerbaijan. Yerevan, 1988. Photo: Commons.wikimedia.org / Gorzaim
What happened to Karabakh after the collapse of the USSR?
In 1991, full-fledged military operations began in Karabakh. Through a referendum (December 10, 1991), Nagorno-Karabakh tried to gain the right to full independence. The attempt failed, and this region became hostage to the antagonistic claims of Armenia and attempts by Azerbaijan to retain power.
The result of full-scale military operations in Nagorno-Karabakh in 1991 - early 1992 was the complete or partial capture of seven Azerbaijani regions by regular Armenian units. Following this, military operations using the most modern weapons systems spread to internal Azerbaijan and the Armenian-Azerbaijani border.
Thus, until 1994, Armenian troops occupied 20% of the territory of Azerbaijan, destroyed and plundered 877 settlements, while the death toll was about 18 thousand people, and the wounded and disabled were more than 50 thousand.
In 1994, with the help of Russia, Kyrgyzstan, as well as the CIS Interparliamentary Assembly in Bishkek, Armenia, Nagorno-Karabakh and Azerbaijan signed a protocol on the basis of which a ceasefire agreement was reached.
What happened in Karabakh in August 2014?
In the Karabakh conflict zone, at the end of July - in August 2014, there was a sharp escalation of tension, which led to casualties. On July 31 of this year, clashes occurred between the troops of the two states on the Armenian-Azerbaijani border, as a result of which military personnel on both sides were killed.
A stand at the entrance to NKR with the inscription “Welcome to Free Artsakh” in Armenian and Russian. 2010 Photo: Commons.wikimedia.org/lori-m
What is Azerbaijan's version of the conflict in Karabakh?
According to Azerbaijan, on the night of August 1, 2014, reconnaissance and sabotage groups of the Armenian army attempted to cross the line of contact between the troops of the two states in the Aghdam and Terter regions. As a result, four Azerbaijani servicemen were killed.
What is Armenia's version of the conflict in Karabakh?
According to official Yerevan, everything happened exactly the opposite. The official position of Armenia states that an Azerbaijani sabotage group entered the territory of the unrecognized republic and fired artillery and small arms at Armenian territory.
At the same time, Baku, according to the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Armenia Edward Nalbandian, does not agree to the proposal of the world community to investigate incidents in the border zone, which means, therefore, according to the Armenian side, it is Azerbaijan that is responsible for the violation of the truce.
According to the Armenian Ministry of Defense, during the period of August 4-5 of this year alone, Baku resumed shelling the enemy about 45 times, using artillery, including large-caliber weapons. There were no casualties on the Armenian side during this period.
What is the unrecognized Nagorno-Karabakh Republic (NKR) version of the conflict in Karabakh?
According to the defense army of the unrecognized Nagorno-Karabakh Republic (NKR), during the week from July 27 to August 2, Azerbaijan violated the ceasefire regime established since 1994 in the conflict zone in Nagorno-Karabakh 1.5 thousand times, as a result of actions on both sides, about 24 died Human.
Currently, firefights between the parties are being carried out, including the use of large-caliber small arms and artillery - mortars, anti-aircraft guns and even thermobaric grenades. Shelling of border settlements has also become more frequent.
What is Russia's reaction to the conflict in Karabakh?
The Russian Foreign Ministry assessed the escalation of the situation, “resulting in significant human casualties,” as a serious violation of the 1994 ceasefire agreements. The agency called on “to show restraint, renounce the use of force and take immediate measures aimed at.”
What is the US reaction to the conflict in Karabakh?
The US State Department, in turn, called on the ceasefire to be observed, and the presidents of Armenia and Azerbaijan to meet at the earliest opportunity and resume dialogue on key issues.
“We also urge the parties to accept the proposal of the OSCE Chairman-in-Office to begin negotiations that could lead to the signing of a peace agreement,” the State Department said.
It is noteworthy that on August 2 Prime Minister of Armenia Hovik Abrahamyan stated that the President of Armenia Serzh Sargsyan and the President of Azerbaijan Ilham Aliyev can meet in Sochi on August 8 or 9 this year.
The most serious clashes have occurred in the zone of the Armenian-Azerbaijani confrontation since 1994 - from the moment when the parties agreed on a truce, stopping the hot phase of the war over Nagorno-Karabakh.
On the night of April 2, the situation in the Karabakh conflict zone sharply worsened. “I ordered not to succumb to provocations, but the enemy has completely lost his belt,” Azerbaijani President Ilham Aliyev explained what was happening. The Armenian Ministry of Defense announced “offensive actions from the Azerbaijani side.”
Both sides announced significant losses in manpower and armored vehicles from the enemy and minimal losses on their part.
On April 5, the Ministry of Defense of the unrecognized Nagorno-Karabakh Republic announced that it had reached an agreement on a ceasefire in the conflict zone. However, Armenia and Azerbaijan have repeatedly accused each other of violating the truce.
History of the conflict
On February 20, 1988, the Council of Deputies of the Nagorno-Karabakh Autonomous Region (NKAO), predominantly populated by Armenians, addressed the leadership of the USSR, the Armenian SSR and the Azerbaijan SSR with a request to transfer Nagorno-Karabakh to Armenia. The Politburo of the CPSU Central Committee refused, which led to mass protests in Yerevan and Stepanakert, as well as pogroms among both the Armenian and Azerbaijani populations.
In December 1989, the authorities of the Armenian SSR and NKAO signed a joint resolution on the inclusion of the region into Armenia, to which Azerbaijan responded with artillery shelling of the Karabakh border. In January 1990, the Supreme Council of the USSR declared a state of emergency in the conflict zone.
At the end of April - beginning of May 1991, Operation “Ring” was carried out in the NKAO by the forces of the Azerbaijani riot police and the USSR Ministry of Internal Affairs troops. Over the course of three weeks, the Armenian population of 24 Karabakh villages was deported, and more than 100 people were killed. The forces of the USSR Ministry of Internal Affairs and the Soviet army carried out actions to disarm participants in the clashes until August 1991, when the putsch began in Moscow, which led to the collapse of the USSR.
On September 2, 1991, the Nagorno-Karabakh Republic was proclaimed in Stepanakert. Official Baku recognized this act as illegal. During the outbreak of the war between Azerbaijan, Nagorno-Karabakh and its supporting Armenia, the parties lost from 15 thousand to 25 thousand people killed, more than 25 thousand were injured, hundreds of thousands of civilians fled their places of residence. From April to November 1993, the UN Security Council adopted four resolutions demanding a ceasefire in the region.
On May 5, 1994, the three sides signed a truce agreement, as a result of which Azerbaijan effectively lost control of Nagorno-Karabakh. Official Baku still considers the region an occupied territory.
International legal status of the Nagorno-Karabakh Republic
According to the administrative-territorial division of Azerbaijan, the territory of the NKR is part of the Republic of Azerbaijan. In March 2008, the UN General Assembly adopted a resolution “The situation in the occupied territories of Azerbaijan”, which was supported by 39 member states (the co-chairs of the OSCE Minsk Group, the USA, Russia and France, voted against).
At the moment, the Nagorno-Karabakh Republic has not received recognition from the UN member states and is not its member; therefore, in the official documents of the UN member states and the organizations formed by them, some political categories are not used in relation to the NKR (president, prime minister -minister, elections, government, parliament, flag, coat of arms, capital).
The Nagorno-Karabakh Republic is recognized by the partially recognized states of Abkhazia and South Ossetia, as well as the unrecognized Transnistrian Moldavian Republic.
Escalation of the conflict
In November 2014, relations between Armenia and Azerbaijan sharply deteriorated after the Azerbaijani military shot down an Armenian Mi-24 helicopter in Nagorno-Karabakh. Regular shelling resumed on the line of contact; for the first time since 1994, the sides accused each other of using large-caliber artillery weapons. During the year, deaths and injuries were repeatedly reported in the conflict zone.
On the night of April 2, 2016, large-scale hostilities resumed in the conflict zone. The Armenian Ministry of Defense announced “offensive actions” by Azerbaijan using tanks, artillery and aviation; Baku reported that the use of force was a response to shelling from mortars and heavy machine guns.
On April 3, the Azerbaijani Ministry of Defense announced a decision to unilaterally suspend military operations. However, both Yerevan and Stepanakert reported that the fighting continued.
Press Secretary of the Armenian Ministry of Defense Artsrun Hovhannisyan reported on April 4 that “fierce fighting along the entire length of the line of contact between Karabakh and Azerbaijani forces continues.”
For three days, the parties to the conflict reported large losses to the enemy (from 100 to 200 killed), but this information was immediately refuted by the opposing side. According to independent estimates by the UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, 33 people were killed in the conflict zone and more than 200 were injured.
On April 5, the Ministry of Defense of the unrecognized Nagorno-Karabakh Republic announced that it had reached an agreement on a ceasefire in the conflict zone. Azerbaijan announced a stop to hostilities. Armenia announced the preparation of a bilateral ceasefire document.
How Russia armed Armenia and Azerbaijan
According to the UN Register of Conventional Arms, in 2013, Russia supplied heavy weapons to Armenia for the first time: 35 tanks, 110 armored combat vehicles, 50 launchers and 200 missiles for them. There were no deliveries in 2014.
In September 2015, Moscow and Yerevan agreed to provide a $200 million loan to Armenia for the purchase of Russian weapons in 2015–2017. This amount should supply Smerch multiple launch rocket system launchers, Igla-S anti-aircraft missile systems, TOS-1A heavy flamethrower systems, RPG-26 grenade launchers, Dragunov sniper rifles, Tiger armored vehicles, ground-based electronic reconnaissance systems "Avtobaza-M", engineering and communications equipment, as well as tank sights intended for the modernization of T-72 tanks and infantry fighting vehicles of the Armenian Armed Forces.
In the period 2010–2014, Azerbaijan concluded contracts with Moscow for the purchase of 2 divisions of S-300PMU-2 anti-aircraft missile systems, several batteries of Tor-2ME anti-aircraft missile systems, and about 100 combat and transport helicopters.
Agreements were also concluded for the purchase of at least 100 T-90S tanks and about 100 units of BMP-3 infantry fighting vehicles, 18 Msta-S self-propelled artillery mounts and the same number of TOS-1A heavy flamethrower systems, Smerch multiple launch rocket systems .
The total cost of the package was estimated at no less than $4 billion. Most of the contracts have already been completed. For example, in 2015, the Azerbaijani military received the last 6 of 40 Mi-17V1 helicopters and the last 25 of 100 T-90S tanks (under 2010 contracts), as well as 6 of 18 TOS-1A heavy flamethrower systems (under a 2011 agreement). In 2016, the Russian Federation will continue to supply BTR-82A armored personnel carriers and BMP-3 armored infantry vehicles (Azerbaijan received at least 30 of them in 2015).
Evgeny Kozichev, Elena Fedotova, Dmitry Shelkovnikov
https://www.site/2016-04-04/vse_versii_ob_armyano_azerbaydzhanskoy_voyne_komu_vygodno_i_budet_li_boynya
Who is the instigator - Caucasians, Turkey, USA, Russia?
All versions about the Armenian-Azerbaijani war: who benefits and will there be a massacre?
RIA Novosti/Asatur Yesayants
The Caucasus is again a real “hot spot”. Azerbaijan, Armenia and the Nagorno-Karabakh Republic, each for their part, report tens and hundreds of killed military personnel, civilian casualties, including the death of children. The head of the press service of the Azerbaijani Ministry of Defense, Vagif Dargahly, promises “a full-scale operation along the entire front line using all types of weapons” if Nagorno-Karabakh does not return to his country. Since 22 years of negotiations have not yielded any results, “the military path remains,” fears singer and ambassador Polad Bulbul Ogly. In turn, Armenian President Serzh Sargsyan intends to recognize the independence of the Nagorno-Karabakh Republic “if military operations continue and take on a wider scale.” Why did the escalation happen now? Who is to blame for it? Is a big war possible in the Caucasus? More about this in our review.
We brought this day closer as best we could
Nagorno-Karabakh has long been a territory populated mainly by Armenians. At the beginning of the 1920s, their share was close to 95%, by the end of Soviet rule - to 77%. Nevertheless, during the formation of the Soviet Union, Nagorno-Karabakh autonomy was included in Azerbaijan, and in the 1930s it was deprived of a common border with Armenia. In general, by the collapse of the USSR, all the conditions were present for the Nagorno-Karabakh Autonomous Republic to declare itself an independent (and unrecognized) republic through a referendum (the expelled Azerbaijani population did not participate in it) and a full-scale war to begin - with massive artillery shelling, tank strikes and air bombing , which lasted until the 1994 truce.
Despite the significant quantitative lag and thanks to the Russian military holding back Turkey, the combined military forces of Armenia and NKR at that time turned out to be more powerful than the Azerbaijani ones, as a result, not only Nagorno-Karabakh (with the exception of some of its northern territories), but also seven more regions came under the control of the Armenians Azerbaijan, including those that divided the NKR with Armenia. Thus, Azerbaijan lost approximately a fifth of its territory.
Since 2014, the situation has become tense. If in 2006-07, 700 ceasefire violations were recorded per year, then in 2012 - 3 thousand, and since 2013, border clashes and fire violations have increased at least 20 times more. In November 2014, when the Azerbaijanis shot down an NKR military helicopter, the war almost resumed. Last December, tanks were used for the first time in 20 years. This was facilitated by the fact that the united army of Armenians was one of the best in the post-Soviet space; experts compared its potential with the Belarusian one. Yes, add the Russian military base in Gyumri: Armenia, like Russia, is a member of the Collective Security Treaty Organization.
RIA Novosti/Sergey Titov
Azerbaijan is not one of those, but the strong increase in oil prices in the 2000s allowed it to strengthen strongly: in terms of the pace of rearmament of its army, Azerbaijan can be compared with the Russian Federation. Moreover, Baku was armed not only by Turkey, Ukraine and Belarus, Israel and South Africa, but also by Russia - first with large quantities of T-72 tanks, and then with the latest T-90, as well as infantry fighting vehicles and armored personnel carriers, artillery mounts, heavy flamethrower systems, military helicopters and fighter jets. President Ilham Aliyev was ready to spend billions of dollars on military purposes, but we had a desire to make money.
Today they say that in this way Moscow, being, along with the United States and France, one of the international “controllers” of the Armenian-Azerbaijani truce, restrained the potential for aggression on the part of Armenia. However, contracts for the supply of military equipment to Yerevan were much more modest (for example, we can mention the recent $200 million credit line opened by Moscow for the purchase of anti-tank and anti-aircraft missile systems and other advanced Russian weapons). And in general, experts say that Azerbaijan’s military budget is larger than the entire state budget of Armenia, which has recently experienced a lack of funds to modernize the army. So, Yerevan’s reproaches against Moscow, in the opinion of the Armenians, which pushed Azerbaijan to aggression, seem not unfounded.
It's my own fault
One way or another, neither the Armenians nor the Azerbaijanis actually hid the fact that they were strengthening their Armed Forces with an eye to a future war. Why did the exacerbation occur precisely in these days? And who provoked him? (After all, the parties accuse each other of resuming hostilities). There is a whole fan of expert opinions on this matter.
The most obvious version is that Azerbaijan “started first”: Armenia, quite satisfied with the results of the Bishkek ceasefire agreements 22 years ago, has no reason to attack. And in Azerbaijan, due to the collapse of oil prices and the reduction in economic growth in partner China, “there is a sharp drop in the cost of living, devaluation, and an increase in protest sentiments. All this forces the authorities to pay more attention to propaganda, says Vadim Mukhanov, a senior researcher at the Center for Caucasus Problems and Regional Security at MGIMO, in Moskovsky Komsomolets. - As you know, modern Azerbaijani society is consolidated on the idea of the return of Karabakh. This precondition is present during all escalations on the contact line. The political elites of Azerbaijan (to a greater extent) and Armenia always need to show their fellow citizens who is and will remain their enemy.”
RIA Novosti/Sergey Guneev
“For quite a long time, the parties were focused on solving their own problems. Apparently, such a number of them have accumulated in Azerbaijan that the authorities can no longer solve them using internal resources and therefore are using the escalation of the conflict in Karabakh as a steam valve,” Vladimir Novikov, a senior researcher at the Institute for Socio-Political Research of the Black Sea Region, joins in his opinion. - Ilham Aliyev cannot keep the manat from falling, and against this background the ruling clans are getting out of control. As the classics of Marxism said, the best way out of the crisis is war.”
Political scientist Ilgar Velizade in Novaya Gazeta draws attention to the fact that recently peace negotiations on the Nagorno-Karabakh issue have reached a dead end and, “no matter how paradoxical it may sound, the intensification of military operations can serve as an incentive to intensify the negotiation process.”
But the deputy director of the Institute of Political and Military Analysis, Alexander Khramchikhin, sees in current events a cunning game by the Armenians, since recently, due to economic difficulties, the military spending of the Azerbaijanis has decreased by as much as 40%. “As long as the forces of the parties are comparable, [the Armenians], having started the war first, can count on victory, that is, on a very significant weakening of Azerbaijan’s military potential. Which then would have to be restored for at least 15-20 years.” But in order not to look like aggressors in the eyes of the rest of the world, including the West, not to invite an invasion by Turkey (with which Baku forms a military alliance) and not to expose friendly Russia, the Armenians provoke their neighbors to attack first, and as soon as possible. “The second defeat will qualitatively worsen Baku’s political positions in the struggle for Karabakh. NKR will then go from being completely unrecognized to a partially recognized country: at least Armenia itself will recognize it,” comments Khramchikhin in “Russian Planet”.
“The persecuted Janissary has come”
Since Azerbaijan’s closest ally, both geographically and military-politically, is Turkey, it is next on the list of “suspects.” Moreover, in November last year, while in Baku, Turkish Minister of Internal Affairs Mevlüt Çavuşoğlu openly stated that “Turkey will do everything possible to ensure that the occupied territories of Azerbaijan are liberated,” joint military exercises took place in March, and these days Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan expressed support for the “Azerbaijani people.”
“Where others see blood and horror, he sees an opportunity to catch Russia in a trap and sharply strengthen Turkey’s position in the region,” indignant publicist Mikhail Rostovsky. - This is how I see Erdogan’s line of reasoning. Armenia is Moscow's military ally in the CSTO bloc. In the event of a war with Azerbaijan, Yerevan will certainly want Russian military assistance. If Moscow refuses such assistance, it will lose Armenia as its military, economic and political ally. If Moscow provides such assistance, it will finally lose its position in Azerbaijan. Baku will de facto become a satellite of Turkey. Erdogan “wins” in both cases.”
RIA Novosti/Nikolai Lazarenko
Political scientist Andrei Epifantsev, on the contrary, sees in Erdogan’s behavior a desire for peace: “Since the crisis with our plane, Turkey has tried, on the one hand, to attract Azerbaijan to its side, on the other hand, gradually, through the hands of Azerbaijan, tried to reach us, inviting us to a conversation . It cannot be ruled out that this is some kind of pressure on Russia in order to invite them to negotiations. That is: “I will create an unfavorable situation for you on the borders of your strategic ally if you do not negotiate with me.” At the same time, I don’t believe that Turkey really wants this war or will really help Azerbaijan in this war. Erdogan is a crazy person, but he is far from a fool. We see that Turkey today has absolutely no external allies, except Saudi Arabia, and this is a controversial ally. Having a war in Syria, starting a war in Karabakh is stupid.”
In the pincers of Moscow and Washington
Of course, there were statements among experts that Azerbaijan was acting in the interests of the United States (Ilham Aliyev just visited America). The logic of the reasoning is as follows: the United States is creating a strategic zone of instability around Russia in order to destabilize the domestic political situation on the eve of the parliamentary and presidential elections, and tactically inclining it to accommodation in the Syrian issue (as is known, the Kremlin continues to defend the political future of Bashar al-Assad) and in Ukraine. “Last week, for example, an incident on the border of Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan was inspired, and the conflict in Nagorno-Karabakh resumed,” Konstantin Sivkov, first vice-president of the Academy of Geopolitical Problems, emphasizes in the conservative newspaper Vzglyad.
Other observers who speak out in the liberal press, on the contrary, get it from the Kremlin. “One of the possible versions is that Moscow provoked military actions in Karabakh in order to once again emphasize that the United States is no good as a peacemaker. Although both Russia and the United States formally still remain co-chairs of the OSCE Minsk Group on the Karabakh settlement, British journalist Thomas de Waal suggests on the website of the Carnegie Moscow Center. “In such a scenario, Russian President Vladimir Putin must then act as a real peacemaker and achieve a new agreement under which Russian peacekeeping forces will be introduced into Karabakh.”
According to Heydar Jemal, in the Caucasus Russia is leading China into America’s “stall” RIA Novosti/Alexey Druzhinin
And military-political analyst Yuri Fedorov believes that the ultimate goal of Putin’s Caucasus policy is even more significant - NATO. “In recent months, additional Mi-24P attack helicopters, Mi-8 transport helicopters and five MiG-29 fighters have been deployed to the Russian Erebuni airbase in Armenia. This significantly increased the combat potential of the 102nd Russian military base in Armenia. Its personnel numbers about 5 thousand soldiers and officers, armed with 74 tanks, 17 infantry fighting vehicles, 148 armored personnel carriers, 84 artillery systems - this is a serious force. It is quite possible that the initial scenario was that Armenian troops, with Russian support, inflict a serious defeat on the Azerbaijani army. In this case, Ankara will either “lose face” when its closest ally, Baku, is defeated, or will be forced to intervene in the conflict, possibly facing Russian troops. As a result, Putin will gain politically, at the same time receiving a “legitimate” reason to attack Turkish troops. And NATO, of which Turkey is one of the leading members, will find itself in a political impasse, since Ankara will formally initiate an armed conflict with Moscow,” concludes Fedorov on Radio Liberty.
Finally, perhaps the most conspiratorial, twisted version is put forward by Heydar Jemal: they say that Washington, and in agreement with Moscow, is actually pushing Turkey to get bogged down in the Karabakh conflict. “After all, this is the real root of promising political Islam, which is already based on a legitimate base. This is not an initiative of outsiders, but a recognized state with a historical tradition, a member of NATO. This is scary: political Islam, relying on Turkey, can really acquire the contours of a world player and return to the historical stage. The stakes for the US are very high. As for Russia, its reasons for participating in the overthrow of Erdogan go much deeper than the downing of the SU-24. To put today's Turkey out of action is to deprive China of a window to the West. In this case, China will be forced into cooperation with the Russian Federation, which it wanted to avoid. And since Russia, as is obvious to everyone, is in tandem with the United States, China becomes completely geopolitically dependent on Washington.”
Face to face with ISIS
The Islamic State, banned in Russia, is literally a few hundred kilometers from the Armenian-Azerbaijani hotspot. If hostilities in the Caucasus are transferred from the territory of Nagorno-Karabakh to the soil of Armenia, Russia, as Yerevan’s partner in the CSTO, will be forced to enter into a military conflict. With little predictable consequences - up to a direct clash with Turkey and the militants of the Islamic State, which is banned in our country.
“Having lost many levers of influence over Georgia after recognizing Abkhazia and South Ossetia, Moscow cannot afford the luxury of being drawn into hostility with Azerbaijan, which, of course, Turkish politicians will not fail to take advantage of. And in this case, in the Dagestan direction, we risk getting additional pockets of instability in addition to the existing ones (only since December 2015, there have been four terrorist attacks on the territory of Dagestan under the banner of IS). Moreover, the transformation of Azerbaijan into an openly hostile state will complete the formation of the anti-Russian configuration Ankara - Baku - Tbilisi, in which there are still internal disagreements,” Forbes explains why Moscow is not interested in expanding the confrontation, always moderate in emotions, assessments and forecasts political scientist Sergei Markedonov.
RIA Novosti/Mikhail Voskresensky
In addition, Russia and Azerbaijan have quite acceptable relations. The Armenian diaspora is strong in the USA and France, but, on the other hand, joint pipeline projects with Azerbaijan are also important to them. Therefore, both Russia and the West are likely to make every effort to prevent escalation (at least officially) and remain neutral, many observers believe.
But will they be able to restrain and cool the elements of war with their authority? Experts aren't sure. “The resumption of war, in my opinion, is inevitable. I can’t say that the war will start right now, but someday it will start in any case,” believes Alexander Khramchikhin. “The war can be started either when Azerbaijan is completely confident that it will win, or if, in the context of a strong deterioration in the economic situation in Azerbaijan, in particular due to the fall in oil prices, social tension within the country increases and the authorities want to population's attention towards an external enemy. Then war will become very likely, and this moment is approaching,” predicts Andrei Epifantsev.
Thus, first the Russian-Georgian war of 2008 with the splitting off of Abkhazia and South Ossetia from Tbilisi, and then the annexation of Crimea to Russia and the subsequent war in the south-east of Ukraine, it is possible, opened a “Pandora’s box” throughout the entire post-Soviet space. The process of the collapse of the Russian-Soviet empire is far from complete, the final results have not arrived and are not formalized, the corpse is still rotting and stinking. What's next - Transnistria, Central Asia?
Website materials used: carnegie.ru, forbes.ru, mk.ru, novayagazeta.ru, poistine.org, rusplt.ru, svoboda.org, vz.ru