One of the undeclared wars in which the Soviet Union fought was the battles at Khalkhin Gol (May 11 - September 16, 1939). It was during this war that Marshal Zhukov's star rose, and he became a hero of the Mongolian Republic. The fighting took place on the territory of Mongolia near the border with the puppet state of Manchukuo (created by the Japanese Empire) in the area of the Khalkhin Gol River.
The first photo shows a tank attack of the Red Army. Khalkhin Gol, August 1939.
Beginning of the conflict
Since January 1939, on the border of Mongolia, the Japanese staged provocations, fired at the border guards of the Mongolian People's Republic (MPR), and attacked their troops.
On the night of May 8, a detachment of Japanese tried to capture an island on the Khalkin-Gol River, but the Mongolian border guards repelled the attack. On May 11, a detachment of Japanese cavalry penetrated 15 km deep into the territory of the MPR and attacked the border outpost; after reinforcements arrived, the Mongols pushed the enemy back to the border. On the 14th, a Japanese detachment, supported by aviation, attacked the 7th border outpost of Mongolia, the Japanese occupied the height of Dungur-Obo, and on the 15th, the Japanese transferred 2 companies and 8 units of armored vehicles to the occupied height.
The Soviet Union was connected with the Mongolian People's Republic by the “Protocol on Mutual Assistance,” our army responded immediately: on the morning of May 17, units of the 57th Special Rifle Corps N.V. Feklenko were sent to the conflict area, and on the 22nd, Soviet units pushed the enemy back to the border. On May 22-28, the parties concentrated their forces in the conflict area: the USSR and Mongolian People's Republic had about 1,000 people, the Japanese concentrated more than 1,600 people. On May 28, the Japanese attacked with the goal of encircling the Soviet-Mongolian forces and cutting them off from crossing to the west bank of the river. Our forces retreated, the encirclement plan was thwarted. On the 29th our forces counterattacked and restored the situation.
Moscow stated that it would defend Mongolia’s borders “as if it were our own,” and the transfer of armored and aviation units began. So, on May 1 there were 84 aircraft, on May 23 – 147, on June 17 – 267 aircraft.
Japanese infantry crossing the river. Khalkhin Gol.
Air war
In June there were no battles on land, but there was a fierce battle for air superiority. The USSR lost its first aircraft, an R-5 type aircraft, on May 22. The very first clashes of the USSR Air Force with the Japanese caused concern in Moscow: on May 27, the 1st squadron of the 22 IAP (fighter aviation regiment) was defeated, Major T.F. Kutsevalov’s fighter did not take off due to engine malfunction, 4 more fighters left battle and landed for the same reason; of the four remaining pilots, two died. One was wounded.
On May 28, the 4th squadron of the 22nd IAP was almost completely destroyed: out of 10 pilots, 5 were killed or missing, three were wounded. At the beginning of June, pilots who had experience fighting in Spain and China began to arrive as instructors and organizers. It can be noted that pilots who had no combat experience quickly adopted their experience, which indicates their generally good training. A group of pilots and technical specialists of 48 people, led by Deputy Chief of the Red Army Air Force Y.V. Smushkevich, besides him, 16 more pilots had the title Hero of the Soviet Union, they were distributed into units and began training personnel.
Japanese fighter Ki 27.
I-153 squadron commander of the 56th IAP, Major Cherkasov. Reconstruction by Vladimir Zagorodnev.
At the beginning of the war in Manchuria and Korea, the Japanese Air Force had 274 aircraft, that is, they did not have numerical superiority. In June, the Japanese in the conflict area had 77 fighters, 24 twin-engine bombers, 28 single-engine aircraft (reconnaissance aircraft, light bombers).
Another reason that caused large losses of the Soviet Air Force (in total during this war the USSR lost 207, and Japan - 162-164 aircraft) was the massive use of biplane fighters. Thus, already on June 22, 13 out of 49 participating I-15 fighters (27%) and only one out of 13 I-16s were lost in a battle with the Japanese. The commander of the 4th squadron of the 22nd IAP, pilot Evgeny Stepanov (who went through the “school” of Spain), had difficulty getting out of the battle and landed the I-15 with a broken engine control rod. Biplanes performed well in Spain and in 1939 they became the most popular fighter aircraft of the USSR, although alarming information was already received from China. There our pilots encountered high-speed Japanese monoplanes.
On June 22-28 there were fierce air battles, on the morning of the 27th the Japanese Air Force managed to launch a surprise attack on Soviet airfields, they lost 5 aircraft, we lost 19. During these days, the Japanese Air Force lost approximately 90 aircraft, we lost 38.
The main and most modern monoplane of the Soviet Air Force in these battles was the I-16 monoplane, which in many ways made it possible to turn the situation in favor of the Red Army Air Force.
Strategic planning in relation to the aviation industry and the Air Force was also successful: Soviet military doctrine assumed a readiness to fight two wars simultaneously - in the west and the east. And for this, a material base was created; the Soviet aviation industry not only created two aviation groups, but was also able to make up for losses in a timely manner. This allowed the Air Force to support our troops during the conflict in Khasan in 1938 and at the same time keep 2000 aircraft ready to support Czechoslovakia in the Western strategic direction. In 1939, in the East, the Air Force fought at Khalkin Gol and at the same time supported the operation to annex Western Belarus and Western Ukraine.
The USSR created a quantitative advantage on the front with Japan; in the first half of August, new reinforcements arrived - about 200 aircraft. By mid-August, together with the Mongolian P-5s, the Soviet Air Force had up to 558 combat aircraft, twice as many as the Japanese. Of these, 181 aircraft are SB bombers, which became the main striking force of the Air Force when breaking through the Japanese front line during the offensive on August 20. Japan, due to a weak industrial base and the simultaneous war in China (which absorbed most of the air force), was unable to increase its forces. Only at the end of the conflict, in September, were they able to transfer 60 obsolete biplane fighters, bringing their forces to 295 aircraft. In addition, the Japanese did not have a significant number of trained pilots, their losses were irreplaceable.
In the first half of September, 7 air battles took place, the largest on September 15, 1939 (the day before the armistice) - 120 Japanese aircraft against 207 Soviet ones.
The air battles at Khalkin Gol are unique in that significant forces of the parties collided in a small space. They showed the importance of good equipment and the need to quickly replenish pilots and equipment.
Khalkin-Gol, summer 1939. Preparing the I-15 fighter for a combat mission.
Khalkin-Gol. Red star against the Rising Sun. I-16 against Nakajima Ki.27.
Kutsevalov Timofey Fedorovich (1904-1975), Hero of the Soviet Union.
Fighting on land
Zhukov was sent to Khalkin-Gol as an inspector; it is believed that Budyonny contributed to his dispatch; the old marshal respected Zhukov as a tough and demanding division commander. On May 30, Zhukov sent a critical report to Moscow, in which he said that the corps commander was “poorly organized and insufficiently purposeful.” At the beginning of June N.V. Feklenko was recalled to Moscow, and Zhukov was appointed in his place, brigade commander M.A. Bogdanov became his chief of staff. This was an example of the Stalinist personnel principle: if you criticize, show yourself what you can do. Zhukov got a chance to stand out.
Soon the new headquarters proposed a plan: active defense on the bridgehead beyond Khalkhin Gol and preparation of a counterattack against the Japanese group. The God of War gave Zhukov time to prepare; air battles continued throughout June; there were no major clashes on land.
The Japanese also did not sit idly by and at the end of the month they prepared their operation, its goal was to encircle and destroy the forces of the Red Army on the eastern bank of the river, cross the river and break through the Soviet front. On July 2, the Japanese attacked, crossed the river and captured Mount Bayan-Tsagan, 40 km from the border; the situation was difficult. Japanese forces, while building on their success, hastily strengthened the bridgehead. Zhukov, acting at his own peril and risk, in order to save the situation, was forced to ask for a mobile reserve into battle - the 11th tank brigade of brigade commander M.P. Yakovlev with a Mongolian armored division, without the support of a rifle regiment. The brigade completed the task, the Japanese were defeated, although at the cost of losing more than half of the armored vehicles, but the situation was saved. Other units arrived, the Japanese began to retreat to stop them, the Japanese command blew up the only pontoon bridge, but on the morning of the 5th it was already a flight. The Japanese lost only several thousand people killed, almost all their armored vehicles and artillery.
Yakovlev, Mikhail Pavlovich (November 18, 1903 - July 12, 1939), Hero of the Soviet Union posthumously.
Broken Soviet armored car BA-10.
On the eastern bank, Soviet forces retreated to the river, reducing their bridgehead, but were not defeated. In order to completely eliminate the threat of the Mongolian People's Republic, it was necessary to defeat the Japanese on the eastern bank and restore the border. Zhukov began planning an offensive operation. The Japanese also planned an offensive operation, but taking into account the sad experience, without crossing the river. We decided to limit ourselves to the destruction of the Soviet bridgehead.
Additional forces were assembled: the 82nd Infantry Division, the 37th Tank Brigade, in the Trans-Baikal Military District carried out partial mobilization and two new divisions were formed. A combined battalion of border guards was transferred from the Trans-Baikal District to strengthen the border of the Mongolian People's Republic; they detained dozens of Japanese intelligence officers. The 57th Corps was reorganized into the 1st Army (Front) Group.
The number of Soviet forces increased to 57 thousand soldiers, the army group had 542 guns and mortars, about 500 tanks, 385 armored vehicles and 515 combat aircraft. The Japanese, in the specially created 6th Army, had more than 75 thousand people, 500 guns, 182 tanks.
On July 8-11, fighting took place on the eastern bank of the river; Soviet positions were held. On July 13-22 there was a lull, the Soviet side strengthened the bridgehead, the 24th motorized rifle regiment of I.I. Fedyuninsky and the 5th rifle and machine-gun brigade were transferred to it. On July 23-24, the Japanese attacked, but were unable to dislodge our forces from the bridgehead.
M. A. Bogdanov.
Komkor Zhukov and Marshal Choibalsan.
Defeat the enemy
Soviet preparations took place in the strictest secrecy, all movements took place only at night, radio conversations were conducted about defense preparations and plans for the autumn-winter campaign, at night sound installations broadcast the sounds of the movement of tanks and planes so that the Japanese would get used to night movement, and other events were carried out in order to introduce the enemy misleading.
As a result, the offensive, launched on August 20, came as a surprise to the Japanese army; the Japanese themselves planned to strike on August 24. It was a classic operation with flank attacks by mechanized and tank units, with the goal of encircling and defeating the enemy in the area between the Khalkin-Gol River and the state border of the Mongolian People's Republic. The Red Army, under the command of Zhukov, carried out this experience before the famous Wehrmacht attacks in Poland, France, and the USSR. The attack was carried out by three groups: the Southern group delivered the main blow (Colonel M. I. Potapova), the Northern group delivered an auxiliary blow (Colonel I. P. Alekseenko), and the Central group pinned down the enemy in battle (brigade commander D. E. Petrov).
At 6.15 a.m. artillery preparation and an air strike began, and at 9 a.m. the ground forces launched an attack. The most brutal battles took place in the Central direction; here the enemy had powerful fortifications. On the 21st-22nd, Zhukov brought a reserve into battle - the 9th motorized armored brigade; on the 23rd, in the Central direction, the last reserve had to be introduced - the 212th airborne brigade and two companies of border guards. The Air Force actively helped; on August 24-25 alone, bombers made 218 sorties. The Japanese command was unable to determine the direction of the main attack and provide timely assistance to its flanks. By August 26, the encirclement was completed and significant forces of the Japanese 6th Army fell into the “cauldron”.
The Japanese soldiers showed their best side, fought to the last, did not surrender, attempts to release the encircled forces were repulsed. By August 31, the territory of the MPR was cleared of the Japanese.
On September 4 and 8, Japanese forces attempted to occupy the Mongolian border territories, but were repulsed, suffering heavy losses (about 500 killed alone).
On September 15, 1939, an agreement was signed between the Soviet Union, Mongolia and Japan on cessation in the area of the Khalkhin Gol River, which came into force on September 16. The conflict was finally resolved in May 1942, a final agreement was signed to resolve the problem: it was a compromise, largely in favor of Japan, a settlement of borders based on old maps. The USSR was in a difficult situation and it was diplomatically wrong to insist on its own. True, the agreement lasted only until 1945, then the MPR returned the areas ceded in 1942.
Results:
The demonstration of the military power of the USSR at Khasan and Khalkin-Gol showed Tokyo the full danger of war with the Red Army and became the main reason for the Japanese elite choosing the main direction of expansion - the South. And this, on the eve of Germany’s attack on the USSR, was of enormous military-strategic importance; we received a relatively safe rear in the East.
Khalkin-Gol was the beginning of Zhukov’s magnificent career, before one of the many commanders became the commander of one of the most important military districts of the country - Kyiv, and the chief of the General Staff.
Michitaro Komatsubara, who led the military operation of the Imperial Japanese Army near the Khalkhin Gol River, committed suicide in the fall of 1940.
Memorial "Zaisan", Ulaanbaatar.
Khalkhin Gol (Mongolian Khalkhyn Gol - “Khalkha River”, Chinese) is a river in Mongolia and China.
The river is famous for the battles of the Red Army against Japan in April-September 1939
In 1932, the occupation of Manchuria by Japanese troops ended. The puppet state of Manchukuo was created in the occupied territory. The conflict began with the demands of the Japanese side to recognize the Khalkhin Gol River as the border between Manchukuo and Mongolia (the old border ran 20-25 km to the east). One of the reasons for this requirement was the desire to ensure the safety of the Halun-Arshan-Ganchzhur railway being built by the Japanese in this area. In 1935, clashes began on the Mongol-Manchurian border. In the summer of the same year, negotiations began between representatives of Mongolia and Manchukuo on border demarcation. By the fall, negotiations had reached a dead end. On March 12, 1936, the “Protocol on Mutual Assistance” was signed between the USSR and the MPR. Since 1937, in accordance with this protocol, units of the Red Army were deployed on the territory of Mongolia. In 1938, a two-week conflict had already occurred between Soviet and Japanese troops near Lake Khasan, which ended with the victory of the USSR. In 1939, tensions on the border increased. On May 11, 1939, a detachment of Japanese cavalry numbering up to 300 people attacked the Mongolian border outpost at the height of Nomon-Khan-Burd-Obo. On May 14, as a result of a similar attack with air support, the Dungur-Obo heights were occupied. On May 17, the commander of the 57th Special Rifle Corps, Divisional Commander N.V. Feklenko sent a group of Soviet troops to Khalkhin Gol, consisting of three motorized rifle companies, a company of armored vehicles, a sapper company and an artillery battery. On May 22, Soviet troops crossed Khalkhin Gol and drove the Japanese back to the border. During the period from May 22 to 28, significant forces are concentrated in the conflict area. The Soviet-Mongolian forces included 668 bayonets, 260 sabers, 58 machine guns, 20 guns and 39 armored vehicles. Japanese forces consisted of 1,680 bayonets, 900 cavalry, 75 machine guns, 18 guns, 6 armored vehicles and 1 tank. On May 28, Japanese troops, having numerical superiority, went on the offensive, with the goal of encircling the enemy and cutting them off from the crossing to the western bank of Khalkhin Gol.
The Soviet-Mongolian troops retreated, but the encirclement plan failed, largely thanks to the actions of the battery under the command of Senior Lieutenant Bakhtin. The next day, Soviet-Mongolian troops carried out a counter-offensive, pushing the Japanese back to their original positions. Although there were no clashes on the ground in June, an air war broke out in the skies. Already the first clashes at the end of May showed the advantage of Japanese aviators. So, in two days of fighting, the Soviet fighter regiment lost 15 fighters, while the Japanese side lost only one aircraft. The Soviet command had to take radical measures: on May 29, a group of ace pilots headed by Deputy Chief of the Red Army Air Force Yakov Smushkevich flew from Moscow to the combat area. Many of them were Heroes of the Soviet Union who had combat experience in the skies of Spain and China. After this, the forces of the parties in the air became approximately equal. At the beginning of June N.V. Feklenko was recalled to Moscow, and in his place, at the suggestion of the head of the operational department of the General Staff, M.V. Zakharov was appointed G.K. Zhukov . Soon after arriving in June 1939 in the area of military conflict, G.K. Zhukov, he proposed his plan of combat operations: conducting an active defense on the bridgehead beyond Khalkhin Gol and preparing a strong counterattack against the opposing group of the Japanese Kwantung Army. The People's Commissariat of Defense and the General Staff of the Red Army agreed with the proposals put forward by G.K. Zhukov. The necessary forces began to gather in the conflict area - the troops were transported along the Trans-Siberian Railway to Ulan-Ude, and then through the territory of Mongolia they followed in marching order. Brigade commander M.A., who arrived with Zhukov, became the chief of staff of the corps. Bogdanov. Corps Commissar J. Lkhagvasuren became Zhukov’s assistant in command of the Mongolian cavalry. To coordinate the actions of Soviet troops in the Far East and units of the Mongolian People's Revolutionary Army, the commander of the Far Eastern Army, Commander G.M., arrived from Chita to the area of the Khalkhin Gol River. Stern. Air battles resumed with renewed vigor in the twentieth of June. As a result of the battles on June 22, 24 and 26, the Japanese lost more than 50 aircraft. In the early morning of June 27, Japanese aircraft managed to launch a surprise attack on Soviet airfields, which led to the destruction of 19 aircraft. In total, during the conflict, the USSR lost 207, Japan - 162 aircraft. Throughout June, the Soviet side was busy organizing defenses on the eastern bank of Khalkhin Gol and planning a decisive counter-offensive. To ensure air supremacy, new Soviet modernized I-16 and Chaika fighters were deployed here. So as a result of the battle on June 22
, which became widely known in Japan (During this battle, the famous Japanese ace pilot Takeo Fukuda, who became famous during the war in China, was shot down and captured), the superiority of Soviet aviation over Japanese aviation was ensured and it was possible to seize air supremacy. In total, Japanese air forces lost 90 aircraft in air battles from June 22 to 28. The losses of Soviet aviation turned out to be much smaller - 38 aircraft. At the same time - on June 26, 1939, the first official statement of the Soviet government was made regarding the events at Khalkhin Gol - on June 26, 1939, the words “TASS is authorized to declare...” were heard on Soviet radio. News from the shores of Khalkhin Gol appeared on the pages of Soviet newspapers . July. The offensive of the Japanese group By the end of June 1939, the headquarters of the Kwantung Army developed a plan for a new border operation called the “Second Period of the Nomonhan Incident.” In general terms, it was identical to the May operation of Japanese troops, but this time, in addition to the task of encircling and destroying Soviet troops on the eastern bank of the Khalkhin Gol River, Japanese troops were tasked with crossing the Khalkhin Gol River and breaking through the Red Army’s defenses on the operational sector of the front. On July 2, the Japanese group went on the offensive. On the night of July 2-3, the troops of Major General Kobasi crossed the Khalkhin Gol River and, after a fierce battle, captured Mount Ban Tsagan on its western bank, located 40 kilometers from the Manchurian border. Immediately after this, the Japanese concentrated their main forces here and began to extremely intensively build fortifications and build layered defenses. In the future, it was planned, relying on Mount Ban-Tsagan, which dominated the area, to strike in the rear of the Soviet troops defending on the eastern bank of the Khalkhin-Gol River, cut off and subsequently destroy them. Fierce fighting also began on the eastern bank of Khalkhin Gol. The Japanese, advancing with two infantry and two tank regiments (130 tanks) against one and a half thousand Red Army soldiers and two Mongolian cavalry divisions, numbering 3.5 thousand cavalry, initially achieved success. The defending Soviet troops were rescued from a difficult situation by a mobile reserve created in advance by Zhukov, which was promptly put into action. Zhukov, without waiting for the escort rifle regiment to approach, threw the 11th tank brigade of brigade commander M.P. Yakovlev, which was in reserve, into battle from the march, which was supported by a Mongolian armored division armed with 45-mm cannons. It should be noted that Zhukov in this situation, violating the requirements of the combat regulations of the Red Army, acted at his own peril and risk, and contrary to the opinion of Army Commander G. M. Stern. To be fair, it is worth noting that Stern subsequently admitted that in that situation the decision made turned out to be the only possible one. However, this act of Zhukov had other consequences. Through the special department of the corps, a report was transmitted to Moscow, which fell on the desk of I.V. Stalin, that division commander Zhukov “deliberately” threw a tank brigade into battle without reconnaissance and infantry escort. An investigative commission was sent from Moscow, headed by Deputy People's Commissar of Defense, Army Commander 1st Rank G.I. Kulik. However, after conflicts between the commander of the 1st Army Group G.K. Zhukov and Kulik, who began to interfere in the operational control of the troops, the People's Commissar of Defense of the USSR reprimanded him in a telegram dated July 15 and recalled him to Moscow. After this, the head of the Main Political Directorate of the Red Army, Commissar 1st Rank Mekhlis, was sent from Moscow to Khalkhin Gol with instructions from L.P. Beria to “check” Zhukov. Fierce fighting broke out around Mount Ban Tsagan. On both sides, up to 400 tanks and armored vehicles, more than 800 artillery pieces and hundreds of aircraft took part in them. Soviet artillerymen fired at the enemy with direct fire, and at certain moments there were up to 300 aircraft on both sides in the sky above the mountain. The 149th Rifle Regiment of Major I.M. Remizov and the 24th Motorized Rifle Regiment of I.I. Fedyuninsky especially distinguished themselves in these battles. On the eastern bank of Khalkhin Gol, by the night of July 3, Soviet troops, due to the numerical superiority of the enemy, retreated to the river, reducing the size of their eastern bridgehead on its bank, but the Japanese strike group under the command of Lieutenant General Masaomi Yasuoki did not complete the task assigned to it. The group of Japanese troops on Mount Ban Tsagan found themselves semi-surrounded. By the evening of July 4, Japanese troops held only the top of Ban Tsagan - a narrow strip of terrain five kilometers long and two kilometers wide. On July 5, Japanese troops began to retreat towards the river. In order to force their soldiers to fight to the last, by order of the Japanese command, the only pontoon bridge across Khalkhin Gol at their disposal was blown up. In the end, Japanese troops at Mount Ban Tsagan began a general retreat from their positions by the morning of July 5. According to some Russian historians, more than 10 thousand Japanese soldiers and officers died on the slopes of Mount Ban Tsagan. Almost all tanks and most of the artillery were lost. These events became known as the “Ban-Tsagan Massacre.” The result of these battles was that in the future, as G.K. Zhukov later noted in his memoirs, Japanese troops “no longer dared to cross to the western bank of the Khalkhin Gol River.” All further events took place on the eastern bank of the river. However, Japanese troops continued to remain on Mongolia, and the Japanese military leadership planned new offensive operations. Thus, the source of the conflict in the Khalkhin Gol region remained. The situation dictated the need to restore the state border of Mongolia and radically resolve this border conflict. Therefore, G.K. Zhukov began to plan an offensive operation with the goal of completely defeating the entire Japanese group located on the territory of Mongolia.
July August. Preparation for the counter-offensive of the Soviet troops The 57th Special Corps was deployed into the 1st Army (Front) Group under the command of G.K. Zhukov. In accordance with the resolution of the Main Military Council of the Red Army, for the leadership of the troops, the Military Council of the Army Group was established, consisting of the commander - corps commander G. K. Zhukov, division commissar M. S. Nikishev and chief of staff of the brigade commander M. A. Bogdanov. New troops, including the 82nd Infantry Division, urgently began to be transferred to the site of the conflict. The 37th tank brigade, armed with BT-7 and BT-5 tanks, was transferred from the Moscow Military District; partial mobilization was carried out on the territory of the Trans-Baikal Military District and the 114th and 93rd rifle divisions were formed. On July 8, the Japanese side again began active hostilities. At night, they launched an offensive with large forces on the eastern bank of Khalkhin Gol against the position of the 149th Infantry Regiment and a battalion of a rifle-machine-gun brigade, which were completely unprepared for this Japanese attack. As a result of this Japanese attack, the 149th Regiment had to retreat to the river, maintaining a bridgehead of only 3-4 kilometers. At the same time, one artillery battery, a platoon of anti-tank guns and several machine guns were abandoned. Despite the fact that the Japanese carried out this kind of sudden night attacks several more times in the future, and on July 11 they managed to capture the heights, as a result of a counterattack by Soviet tanks and infantry, led by the commander of the 11th Tank Brigade, brigade commander M.P. Yakovlev, were knocked out from above and thrown back to their original positions. The defense line on the eastern bank of Khalkhin Gol was completely restored. From July 13 to July 22, there was a lull in the fighting, which both sides used to build up their forces. The Soviet side took vigorous measures to strengthen the bridgehead on the eastern bank of the river, which was required for the offensive operation planned by G.K. Zhukov against the Japanese group. The 24th motorized rifle regiment of I. I. Fedyuninsky and the 5th rifle and machine gun brigade were transferred to this bridgehead. On July 23, the Japanese, after artillery preparation, began an attack on the right-bank bridgehead of the Soviet-Mongolian troops. However, after two days of fighting, having suffered significant losses, the Japanese had to retreat to their original positions. At the same time, intense air battles took place, so from July 21 to 26, the Japanese side lost 67 aircraft, the Soviet side only 20. Significant efforts fell on the shoulders of the border guards. To cover the border of Mongolia and guard the crossings across Khalkhin Gol, a combined battalion of Soviet border guards was transferred from the Trans-Baikal Military District under the command of the chief of staff of the Kyakhta border detachment, Major A. Bulyga. In the second half of July alone, border guards detained 160 suspicious persons, among whom children of Japanese intelligence officers were identified. During the development of the offensive operation against Japanese troops, proposals were put forward both at the headquarters of the army group and at the General Staff of the Red Army to transfer combat operations from Mongolia to Manchurian territory, but these proposals were categorically rejected by the country's political leadership. Marshal of the Soviet Union M.V. Zakharov later recalled one of Stalin’s statements on this matter: “You want to start a big war in Mongolia. The enemy will respond to your detours with additional forces. The focus of the struggle will inevitably expand and become protracted, and we will be drawn into a long war.” As a result of the work carried out by both sides of the conflict, by the beginning of the Soviet counter-offensive, Zhukov’s 1st army group consisted of about 57 thousand people, 542 guns and mortars, 498 tanks, 385 armored vehicles and 515 combat aircraft, opposing it was a Japanese group - specially formed by imperial decree The Japanese 6th Separate Army under the command of General Ryuhe Ogisu (n.), consisted of the 7th and 23rd infantry divisions, a separate infantry brigade, seven artillery regiments, two tank regiments of the Manchu brigade, three regiments of the Bargut cavalry, two engineering regiments and other units, which in total amounted to more than 75 thousand people, 500 artillery pieces, 182 tanks, 700 aircraft. It should also be noted that the Japanese group included many soldiers who gained combat experience during the war in China. General Ogisu and his staff also planned an offensive, which was scheduled for 24 August. Moreover, taking into account the sad experience of the battles on Mount Ban Tsagan for the Japanese, this time an enveloping attack was planned on the right flank of the Soviet group. Crossing the river was not planned. During Zhukov’s preparation for the offensive operation of the Soviet and Mongolian troops, an operational plan was carefully developed and strictly followed.
tactical deception of the enemy. All troop movements in the front-line zone were carried out only in the dark, it was strictly forbidden to send troops into the initial areas for the offensive, reconnaissance on the ground by command personnel was carried out only in trucks and in the uniform of ordinary Red Army soldiers. To mislead the enemy in the early period of preparation for the offensive, the Soviet side at night, using sound installations, imitated the noise of the movement of tanks and armored vehicles, aircraft and engineering work. Soon the Japanese got tired of reacting to sources of noise, so during the actual regrouping of Soviet troops, their opposition was minimal. Also, throughout the preparation for the offensive, the Soviet side carried out active electronic warfare with the enemy. Knowing that the Japanese were conducting active radio reconnaissance and listening to telephone conversations, a program of false radio and telephone messages was developed to disinform the enemy. Negotiations were conducted only on the construction of defensive structures and preparations for the autumn-winter campaign. Radio traffic in these cases was based on an easily decipherable code. Despite the overall superiority in forces of the Japanese side, by the beginning of the offensive Zhukov managed to achieve almost three times superiority in tanks and 1.7 times in aircraft. To carry out the offensive operation, two-week reserves of ammunition, food and fuel and lubricants were created. More than 4 thousand trucks and 375 tank trucks were used to transport goods over a distance of 1300-1400 kilometers. It should be noted that one road trip with cargo and back lasted five days. During the offensive operation, G.K. Zhukov planned, using maneuverable mechanized and tank units, to encircle and destroy the enemy in the area between the state border of the MPR and the Khalkhin Gol River with unexpected strong flank attacks. At Khalkhin Gol, for the first time in world military practice, tank and mechanized units were used to solve operational problems as the main striking force of flank groups maneuvering to encircle. The advancing troops were divided into three groups - Southern, Northern and Central. The main blow was delivered by the Southern group under the command of Colonel M. I. Potapov, the auxiliary blow was carried out by the Northern group, commanded by Colonel I. P. Alekseenko. The central group under the command of brigade commander D.E. Petrov was supposed to pin down enemy forces in the center, on the front line, thereby depriving them of the ability to maneuver. The reserve, concentrated in the center, included the 212th airborne and 9th motorized armored brigades and a tank battalion. Mongolian troops also took part in the operation - the 6th and 8th cavalry divisions under the overall command of Marshal X. Choibalsan. The offensive of the Soviet-Mongolian troops began on August 20, thereby preempting the offensive of the Japanese troops, scheduled for August 24.
August. Strike by Soviet troops. Defeat the enemy
The offensive of the Soviet-Mongolian troops, which began on August 20, turned out to be a complete surprise for the Japanese command. At 6:15 a.m., a powerful artillery barrage and air raid on enemy positions began. At 9 o'clock the offensive of the ground forces began. On the first day of the offensive, the attacking troops acted in full accordance with plans, with the exception of a hitch that occurred when crossing tanks of the 6th Tank Brigade, since when crossing Khalkhin Gol, the pontoon bridge built by sappers could not withstand the weight of the tanks. The enemy offered the most stubborn resistance on the central sector of the front, where the Japanese had well-equipped engineering fortifications - here the attackers managed to advance only 500-1000 meters in a day. Already on August 21 and 22, the Japanese troops, having come to their senses, fought stubborn defensive battles, so G. K. Zhukov had to bring the reserve 9th motorized armored brigade into the battle.
Soviet aviation also performed well at this time. On August 24 and 25 alone, SB bombers made 218 combat group sorties and dropped about 96 tons of bombs on the enemy. During these two days, fighter jets shot down about 70 Japanese aircraft. In general, it should be noted that the command of the Japanese 6th Army on the first day of the offensive was unable to determine the direction of the main attack of the advancing troops and did not attempt to provide support to its troops defending on the flanks. By the end of August 26, the armored and mechanized troops of the Southern and Northern groups of Soviet-Mongolian forces had united and completed the complete encirclement of the Japanese 6th Army. After this, it began to be crushed by cutting blows and destroyed piece by piece.
In general, Japanese soldiers, mostly infantrymen, as G.K. Zhukov later noted in his memoirs, fought extremely fiercely and extremely stubbornly, to the last man. Often Japanese dugouts and bunkers were captured only when there was no longer a single living Japanese soldier there. As a result of the stubborn resistance of the Japanese, on August 23 on the Central sector of the front, G. K. Zhukov even had to bring his last reserve into battle: the 212th airborne brigade and two companies of border guards, although in doing so he took considerable risks (the commander’s closest reserve was the Mongolian armored brigade - located in Tamtsak-
Bulak 120 kilometers from the front). Repeated attempts by the Japanese command to carry out counterattacks and release the group encircled in the Khalkhin Gol area ended in failure. On August 24, the regiments of the 14th Infantry Brigade of the Kwantung Army, which approached the Mongolian border from Hailar, entered into battle with the 80th Infantry Regiment covering the border, but neither that day nor the next day they were able to break through and retreated to the territory of Manchukuo. Go. After the battles of August 24-26, the command of the Kwantung Army, until the very end of the operation on Khalkhin Gol, no longer attempted to relieve its encircled troops, having accepted the inevitability of their death. The Red Army captured about 200 guns, 100 vehicles, 400 machine guns and 12 thousand rifles as trophies. The last battles continued on August 29 and 30 in the area north of the Khaylastyn-Gol River. By the morning of August 31, the territory of the Mongolian People's Republic was completely cleared of Japanese troops. However, this was not yet the complete end of the border conflict (in fact, the undeclared war of Japan against the USSR and its ally Mongolia). So, on September 4 and 8, Japanese troops made new attempts to penetrate the territory of Mongolia, but they were driven back beyond the state border by strong counterattacks. Air battles also continued, which stopped only with the conclusion of an official truce. Through its ambassador in Moscow, Shigenori Togo, the Japanese government appealed to the USSR government with a request to cease hostilities on the Mongolian-Manchurian border. On September 15, 1939, an agreement was signed between the Soviet Union, the Mongolian People's Republic and Japan on the cessation of hostilities in the Khalkhin Gol River area, which came into force the next day. The conflict ended in 1942, in May, with the signing of a final settlement agreement. Moreover, it was a compromise settlement, largely in favor of the Japanese - based on the old map. For the Red Army, which suffered defeats in the Soviet-
on the German front, then a rather difficult situation arose. Therefore, the settlement was pro-Ponese. But it only lasted until 1945.
It is generally accepted that the Soviet victory at Khalkhin Gol played a decisive role in Japan’s non-aggression against the USSR. A remarkable fact is that when German troops stood near Moscow in December 1941, Hitler furiously demanded that Japan attack the USSR in the Far East. It was the defeat at Khalkhin Gol, as many historians believe, that played a major role in the abandonment of plans to attack the USSR in favor of an attack on the United States. In Japan, the defeat, and the simultaneous signing of the Soviet-German Non-Aggression Pact, led to a government crisis and the resignation of the cabinet of Hiranuma Kiichiro, and subsequently to the triumph of the so-called “maritime party”, which defended the idea of expansion towards Southeast Asia and the Pacific Islands, which inevitably led to a clash with America. The new Japanese government signed an armistice agreement with the USSR on September 15, 1939, and on April 13, 1941, concluded a Soviet-
Japanese Neutrality Pact. On December 7, 1941, Japan attacked Pearl Harbor, which triggered the United States' entry into World War II. "Golden Star"
At the height of the conflict, on August 1, 1939, the highest award of the USSR was established - the Gold Star of the Hero of the Soviet Union (the title existed since 1934, but heroes did not receive insignia). The fate of the winners
Khalkhin Gol became the beginning of the military career of G.K. Zhukov. The previously unknown corps commander, after the victory over the Japanese, headed the country's largest Kiev Military District. The commander of the aviation of the 1st Army Group, Ya. V. Smushkevich, and the commander of the Far Eastern Army, G. M. Stern, were awarded the Gold Star medals for the battles at Khalkhin Gol. " After the end of the conflict, Ya. V. Smushkevich was appointed head of the Red Army Air Force, G. M. Stern commanded the 8th Army during the Soviet-Finnish War. In June 1941, both military leaders were arrested and executed a few months later. Rehabilitated in 1954. The chief of staff of the 1st Army Group, brigade commander M.A. Bogdanov, did not receive any awards for Khalkhin Gol, and ended the Great Patriotic War as a division commander and the rank of major general. According to researchers who consider the military abilities of G.K. Zhukov to be overrated (B.V. Sokolov, Viktor Suvorov, etc.), it was he who played a key role in developing the operation plan, but there is no evidence of this version. Feklenko N.V. .
Bayin-Tsagan
Perhaps none of the events at Khalkhin Gol in May-September 1939 causes as much controversy as the battle for Mount Bayin-Tsagan on July 3-5. Then the 10,000-strong Japanese group managed to secretly cross Khalkhin Gol and begin moving towards the Soviet crossing, threatening to cut off Soviet troops on the eastern bank of the river from the main forces.
The enemy was accidentally discovered and, before reaching the Soviet crossing, was forced to take a defensive position on Mount Bayin-Tsagan. Having learned about what had happened, the commander of the 1st Army Group G.K. Zhukov ordered the 11th brigade of brigade commander Yakovlev and a number of other armored units immediately and without infantry support (Fedyuninsky’s motorized rifles got lost in the steppe and reached the battlefield later) to attack the Japanese positions.
Soviet tanks and armored vehicles launched several attacks, but, having suffered significant losses, were forced to retreat. The second day of the battle came down to constant shelling of Japanese positions by Soviet armored vehicles, and the failure of the Japanese offensive on the east bank forced the Japanese command to begin a retreat.
Historians still argue how justified the introduction of Yakovlev’s brigade into battle from the march was. Zhukov himself wrote that he deliberately went for it... on the other hand, did the Soviet military leader have a different path? Then the Japanese could have continued moving towards the crossing and a disaster would have occurred.
The Japanese retreat is still a controversial point for Bain-Tsagan - whether it was a general flight or a systematic, organized retreat. The Soviet version depicted the defeat and death of Japanese troops who did not have time to complete the crossing. The Japanese side creates a picture of an organized retreat, pointing out that the bridge was blown up even when Soviet tanks burst onto it. By some miracle, under artillery fire and air strikes, the Japanese managed to cross to the opposite bank. But the regiment that remained in the cover was almost completely destroyed.
Bayin-Tsagan can hardly be called a decisive tactical victory for one of the sides. But in strategic terms, this is, of course, a victory for the Soviet-Mongolian troops.
Firstly, the Japanese were forced to begin a retreat, suffering losses and failing to complete their main task - the destruction of the Soviet crossing. Moreover, not once during the conflict did the enemy again try to force Khalkhin Gol, and this was no longer physically possible. The only set of bridge equipment in the entire Kwantung Army was destroyed by the Japanese themselves during the withdrawal of troops from Bain Tsagan.
Next, Japanese troops could only conduct operations against Soviet troops on the eastern bank of Khalkhin Gol, or wait for a political solution to the conflict. True, as you know, the enemy expected something completely different...
In the summer of 1939, Soviet and Japanese troops converged on the Khalkhin Gol River on the territory of the Mongolian People's Republic (MPR). The battlefield was the endless steppe; near the riverbed itself, small sandy hills alternated with deep basins. With the help of Soviet and Japanese documents, we will try to figure out how the fighting at Khalkhin Gol was organized, and how the opponents - the armies of the USSR and the Japanese Empire - assessed each other.
Start
The first battles were characterized by extreme confusion. For several days, reports of clashes on the border did not even reach Moscow. When it became known about Japanese provocations on the borders of the Mongolian People's Republic, the command of the Red Army had to hastily search the maps for the battle area and try to understand what the Japanese wanted to achieve in the bare steppe, which had almost no water. For the Red Army, Khalkhin Gol became the first major battle after the end of the civil and Soviet-Polish wars, in which literally everything was tested in battle: from medical services and supply organization to infantry tactics.
At the end of May, after a series of skirmishes, Soviet and Japanese troops left the right bank of Khalkhin Gol. On the left, western bank of the river, the flywheel of war was only gaining momentum. Tank and aviation units were transferred from the USSR to Mongolia thousands of kilometers away.
The summer battles were characterized by extreme tension - no one wanted to give in. Soviet troops managed to hold back the Japanese offensive in July at Mount Bain-Tsagan and push the enemy back to the eastern bank of the river. By August 20, the time of the start of the decisive offensive, Soviet troops brought 574 guns to the battlefield - against 348 in July.
Invisible Enemy
The enemy did not sit idly by. The Japanese defense was built on individual resistance nodes and consisted of several lines of trenches. Separate trenches were equipped for snipers and tank fighters, who used bottles of gasoline and mines on poles. Each node was adapted for long-term all-round defense and had fire communications with its neighbors. Soviet reports after the battles noted that “even with a large presence of mounds and pits, there was no dead and undefeated space in front of the front edge”.
In front of their trenches, the Japanese set up marks for shooting - turf poles, sheets of white paper, shell casings and white flags. They were used not only by artillerymen and machine gunners, but also by individual riflemen with rifles. Firing points were carefully camouflaged, and the soldiers in positions moved exclusively by crawling or crouching.
Soviet experts highly appreciated the Japanese tray-shaped shovel, as well as the presence in the troops... of scythes that easily cut off the thick Mongolian grass. This made it easier to camouflage the structures. Often, in order to mislead observers, the Japanese exhibited models of tanks and guns, and stuffed soldiers.
From left to right: Army Commander 2nd Rank Grigory Stern, Marshal of the MPR Khorlogin Choibalsan and Corps Commander Georgy Zhukov, 1939
Field fortification floors made of small concrete slabs made it possible to withstand shelling even from 152-mm shells. But the Japanese had almost no minefields, nor barbed wire. Only in front of some defense nodes were there sections of barriers 100–150 m wide. Another drawback of the Japanese defense, according to Soviet assessments, was the crowded arrangement of shelters for infantry.
The Soviet side also had weaknesses. For example, there was an acute shortage of well-trained infantry, as well as special equipment for it. Even after the first battles, excessive losses in command personnel were noted:
“The reason for the large loss of command personnel was the lack of proper camouflage (clothing uniform, walking tall) and the desire to personally destroy O.T.(firing points) enemy".
Unlike the Japanese army, in Soviet units many military personnel, and especially officers, almost universally ignored self-entrenchment and camouflage. And the units either had no camouflage equipment at all, or they did not match the color of the area.
It turned out that the Soviet small sapper shovel was not very suitable for working in sandy soil. Since in company and battalion defensive areas they did not bother with digging communication passages, they had to move from unit to unit in open areas. This also led to additional commander losses. It is significant that even at the command post of the army group near Mount Khamar-Daba, until August only corps commander Georgy Zhukov and the operations department had dugouts with light overlap. The remaining departments were located in cars near dug holes - shelters from bombing.
The leadership of the 36th Infantry Division called the Achilles heel of the Red Army the weak interaction between all branches of the military, as well as insufficient use of the terrain, unsatisfactory observation, and lack of communications equipment for the artillery. The units that were recently deployed for mobilization were especially poorly trained. The strengths were a good supply of automatic weapons and “dedication to the Socialist Motherland, to the cause of the Lenin-Stalin party”.
The Japanese noted the “intrusiveness” of the Soviet attacks, but easily guessed their preparation from the loud noise when moving. The night attacks of the Red Army took place stubbornly, but randomly, in all directions. That is why, as the Japanese believed, they ended unsuccessfully for the Red Army every time. At the same time, according to Soviet data, at night the Red Army soldiers succumbed to panic more easily: “at night we are afraid of the enemy”. More than once there are references to White Guards giving false commands at night. Perhaps it was the ease of such small victories that aroused contempt for the enemy on the part of the Japanese, for which they soon had to pay.
“The nature of the battles is a real meat grinder”
At the beginning of August, units of the Red Army at Khalkhin Gol received many instructions from the command. The soldiers needed to learn close combat and marksmanship, crawling over distances of up to 400 m, terrain orientation and self-digging. They should have had camouflage nets for their helmets and torsos: a single soldier or even a group should not have been visible from 50 m away. The soldiers should have been able to crawl close to the curtain of their artillery fire during the attack. Intelligence was instructed to cope with the recognition of enemy fire systems. At night, their troops were required to be marked with white armbands and to open fire on the enemy only at point-blank range.
On August 20, 1939, having concentrated forces and accumulated fuel and ammunition, Soviet troops suddenly went on the offensive with the aim of encircling and destroying the Japanese group. The attack was preceded by a massive artillery and air raid; 2nd Rank Army Commander Grigory Mikhailovich Stern, who led the actions of the 1st Army Group, personally observed the work of one and a half hundred SB bombers. The fighters made 5–8 sorties per day. The Japanese heavy artillery, which did not change positions during the lull, was largely disabled by the first blow. The dominance of Soviet aviation and artillery is repeatedly confirmed by Japanese sources.
The Japanese infantry resisted desperately. There were battles for every height. According to Stern, “the nature of the battles is a real meat grinder, since they do not surrender except for single individuals, as long as they only go to death”.
The Soviet troops were rescued by equipment, the infantry went on the attack with the support of tanks and armored vehicles. As noted in the documents following the battles, “each firing point delayed the attack, the attackers lay low until a tank or armored vehicle destroyed it”. The tanks broke through the Japanese defenses, moved forward, and if the infantry was delayed, they returned and destroyed the surviving enemy firing points. Chemical (that is, flamethrower) T-26 tanks proved to be indispensable in this matter. In the July battles, 13 rifle battalions accounted for 8–9 tank battalions. In August, the density of tanks reached 20 vehicles per 1 km of front or two companies of tanks per rifle regiment (not counting artillery and flamethrower tanks).
On the other hand, such a saturation of armored vehicles led to a shortage of accompanying infantry. It happened that after the defeat of another defense center, tanks without infantry went to refuel and replenish their ammunition, which was enough for only 3 - 4 hours of battle. And when the infantry marched forward, the seemingly destroyed Japanese firing points came to life again. Therefore, Stern demanded that we first crush the surrounded pockets of resistance with field guns, “forty-fives” and flamethrowers, and then launch tank and infantry units on the offensive.
Zhukov ordered that the soldiers be fed hot food and provided with hot tea no later than dawn "with biscuits and sugar". When conducting encirclement battles, he indicated: “The main means of combat are the hand grenade, point-blank fire and the bayonet.”, since the artillery could hit its own.
In August, infantry commanders often threw their last reserve - scouts - into the attack. They were sent to the most difficult points, so reconnaissance losses were very high - up to 70% of personnel. Already in the first days of the August offensive, many reconnaissance units of companies and battalions simply ceased to exist.
By the end of the fourth day of the offensive, only, according to Stern, remained on the territory of the MPR. "a group of isolated pockets of desperate and frenzied Japanese". But the surrounded enemy also had to be destroyed before fresh Japanese units arrived. Japanese prisoners often “did not know” (and in fact did not want to say) even basic things, for example, the number of their own unit. Stubborn fighting continued until August 30, and in September 1939, Soviet troops repulsed Japanese attempts to cross the border again.
Characteristic is the instruction of the head of the Main Political Directorate of the Red Army, Lev Mehlis, who saw a newspaper article “The Japanese fled like frightened hares” and noted its incorrect tone:
“It is true that in terms of the tenacity and heroism of its soldiers, no other army in the world can compare with the Red Army. But one could not turn a blind eye to the fact that the illiterate, downtrodden and deceived Japanese soldier, terrorized by the officers, showed great tenacity, especially in defense: even the wounded were shot back, but did not surrender. That is why it was impossible to print this note under such a loud title. It orients incorrectly and demagnetizes the fighters. On the other hand, when talking about the successes and victories of the Red Army soldiers and units, no exaggerations should be allowed. You need to check the material carefully. We have a sufficient number of truly miraculous feats, heroic episodes, so as not to invent or exaggerate.”
Indeed, at Khalkhin Gol in 1939, the Red Army won a difficult, difficult, but deserved victory over a strong and skillful enemy.
Sources and literature:
- RGVA, f. 32113.
- Battles at Khalkhin Gol. M.: Voenizdat, 1940.
- Armed conflict in the area of the Khalkhin Gol River. M.: Novalis, 2014.
- Svoysky Yu. M. Prisoners of war of Khalkhin Gol. M.: Dmitry Pozharsky University, 2014.