In 1979, the USSR sent its troops into Afghanistan. Many people wonder why the leadership of the Soviet Union did this? The main reason is to stop the development of civil war in neighboring Afghanistan and support supporters of socialism. But did anyone push the USSR into armed conflict?
Let us recall that in 1979, the leadership of the USSR, in order to stop the development of civil war in neighboring Afghanistan, sent a limited contingent of troops there. This caused a violent reaction in the West: in particular, as a sign of protest, the United States and some other countries announced a boycott of the Moscow Olympics, which took place in 1980. The Soviet side lost about 15,000 soldiers in this war.
One of the US leaders of that time tells us the truth. It says that the USSR was lured to Afghanistan by the Americans.
The CIA appeared in Afghanistan before the Russians
Archived 1998 interview with President Carter adviser Zbigniew Brzezinski
about how the United States provoked the Soviet Union to intervene in Afghanistan. 
Nouvelle Observer (French weekly magazine): Former CIA Director Robert Gates writes in his memoirs that American intelligence agencies began helping the mujahideen in Afghanistan six months before the entry of Soviet troops there. At that time you were US President Carter's national security adviser, you were in the know. Do you confirm what Gates said?
Brzezinski: Yes. According to the official version, the CIA began supporting the Mujahideen in 1980, that is, after the entry of the Soviet Army into Afghanistan on December 24, 1979. But in reality (this was kept secret until today) everything was different: in fact, President Carter signed the first directive to provide secret assistance to opponents of the pro-Soviet regime in Kabul on July 3, 1979. And on the same day I wrote him a memo in which I explained that, in my opinion, this assistance would entail military intervention by the Soviets.
Despite this risk, you were a supporter of this secret operation. But maybe you wanted this war for the Soviets and were looking for ways to provoke it?
Brzezinski:
We did not force the Russians to intervene, but we deliberately increased the likelihood that they would do so.
When the Soviets justified their actions by saying they intended to fight covert US involvement in Afghanistan, no one believed them. However, there was truth in their words... Do you have any regrets today?
Regret what? That secret operation was a brilliant idea. She let the Russians be lured into an Afghan trap, and you want me to be sorry? When the Soviets officially crossed the border, I wrote to President Carter, essentially: "We now have the opportunity to give the USSR its own Vietnam War." In fact, Moscow had to fight an unbearable war for almost ten years, a conflict that led to demoralization and ultimately the collapse of the Soviet Empire.
Do you regret that you promoted Islamic fundamentalism, armed and advised future terrorists?
What is more important for world history? Taliban or the fall of the Soviet Empire? A few excited Islamists or the liberation of central Europe and the end of the Cold War?
- “Somewhat excited”? But it has been said repeatedly: Islamic fundamentalism today poses a global threat...
Nonsense! It would be necessary, as they say, for the West to have a common policy towards Islamism. This is stupid: there is no global Islamism. Let's look at Islam rationally and without demagogy or emotion. It is a world religion with 1.5 billion adherents. But what do fundamentalist pro-Western Saudi Arabia, moderate Morocco, militaristic Pakistan, Egypt or secular Central Asia have in common? Nothing more than what unites Christian countries.
The United States supplied the Afghan Mujahideen with advanced weapons - Stinger MANPADS
US arms supplies to Afghanistan
Afghanistan, 1980s. Mujahid with Stinger The USSR command promised the title of Hero of the Soviet Union to anyone who captured the Stinger MANPADS complex (Second Generation Man-portable Anti-Aircraft Missile Systems) in good condition. During the years of the Afghan War, Soviet special forces managed to obtain 8 serviceable Stinger MANPADS, but none of them became a Hero.
The Pentagon and the US CIA, arming Afghan rebels with Stinger anti-aircraft missiles, pursued a number of goals, one of which was the opportunity to test the new MANPADS in real combat conditions. By supplying modern MANPADS to the Afghan rebels, the Americans “tried” them to supplying Soviet weapons to Vietnam, where the United States lost hundreds of helicopters and planes shot down by Soviet missiles. But the Soviet Union provided legal assistance to the government of a sovereign country fighting the aggressor, and American politicians armed anti-government armed groups of the Mujahideen (“international terrorists” - according to the current American classification). 
Despite the strictest secrecy, the first media reports about the supply of several hundred Stinger MANPADS to the Afghan opposition appeared in the summer of 1986. American anti-aircraft systems were delivered from the United States by sea to the Pakistani port of Karachi, and then transported by vehicles of the Pakistani Armed Forces to Mujahideen training camps. The US CIA supplied missiles and trained Afghan rebels in the vicinity of the Pakistani city of Rualpindi. After preparing the calculations at the training center, they, together with the MANPADS, were sent to Afghanistan in pack caravans and vehicles.
The last Soviet decade was marked by the Afghan War (1979-1989). The course of the war, in short, today is not known to every resident of Russia and other countries. In the 90s, due to rapid reforms and economic crises, the Afghan campaign was almost crowded out of public consciousness. But today, when a lot of work has been done by historians and researchers, all ideological clichés have disappeared, and a good opportunity has arisen to take an impartial look at the events of those years.
Prerequisites
In Russia and throughout the post-Soviet space, the Afghan War, briefly speaking, is associated with a ten-year period (1979-1989) when the armed forces of the USSR were present in this country. In fact, this was only one part of a long civil conflict. The prerequisites for its emergence appeared in 1973, when the monarchy was overthrown in Afghanistan. The short-lived regime of Muhammad Daoud came to power. It ceased to exist in 1978, when the Saur (April) revolution took place. After her, the People's Democratic Party of Afghanistan (PDPA) began to rule the country, which proclaimed the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan (DRA).
The organization was Marxist, which made it similar to the Soviet Union. Leftist ideology has become dominant in Afghanistan. Just like in the USSR, they began to build socialism there. However, by 1978 the country already existed in conditions of ongoing chaos. Two revolutions, a civil war - all this destroyed stability in the region.
The socialist government was opposed by various forces, but primarily by radical Islamists. They considered members of the PDPA to be enemies of the entire Afghan people and Islam. In essence, (jihad) was declared against the new political regime. Mujahideen detachments were created to fight the infidels. It was with them that the Soviet army fought, for which the Afghan War soon began. Briefly, the success of the Mujahideen can be explained by their skillful propaganda work in the country. For Islamist agitators, the task was made easier by the fact that the vast majority of the Afghan population (about 90%) was illiterate. In the state outside the big cities, tribal orders reigned with extremely patriarchal views of the world. Religion certainly played a significant role in such a society. These were the reasons for the Afghan War. They were briefly described in official Soviet newspapers as providing international assistance to the friendly people of a neighboring country.
No sooner had the PDPA come to power in Kabul than Islamist-fuelled attacks began in the rest of the country’s provinces. The Afghan leadership began to lose control of the situation. Under these conditions, in March 1979, it first turned to Moscow for help. Subsequently, such messages were repeated several more times. There was nowhere else to wait for help from the Marxist party, surrounded by nationalists and Islamists.
For the first time, the issue of providing assistance to Kabul “comrades” was considered in the Kremlin on March 19, 1979. Then Brezhnev spoke out against armed intervention. However, time passed, and the situation at the borders of the USSR became worse. Gradually, Politburo members and other senior government officials changed their minds. For example, the Minister of Defense believed that the Afghan war, in short, could cause danger to Soviet borders.
In September 1979, another coup took place in Afghanistan. This time the leadership in the ruling PDPA party has changed. He became the head of the party and state. Through the KGB, the Soviet Politburo began to receive reports that he was a CIA agent. These reports further influenced the Kremlin to intervene militarily. At the same time, preparations began for the overthrow of Amin. At the suggestion of Yuri Andropov, it was decided to replace Babrak Karmal, who was loyal to the Soviet Union, in his place. This member of the PDPA was at first an important person in the Revolutionary Council. During party purges, he was first sent as ambassador to Czechoslovakia, and then declared a traitor and conspirator. Karmal, who was in exile at that moment, remained abroad. At the same time, he moved to the USSR, becoming a figure on whom the Soviet leadership put their bets.
Making a decision to send troops
On December 12, 1979, it became finally clear that the USSR would begin its own Afghan war. After briefly discussing the latest reservations in the documents, the Kremlin approved the operation to overthrow Amin.
Of course, hardly anyone in Moscow then realized how long this military campaign would drag on. But from the very beginning, the decision to send troops had its opponents. Firstly, Chief of the General Staff Nikolai Ogarkov did not want this. Secondly, he did not support the decision of the Politburo. This position of his became an additional and decisive reason for the final break with Leonid Brezhnev and his supporters.
Direct preparations for the transfer of the Soviet army to Afghanistan began the next day, December 13. The Soviet special services tried to organize an assassination attempt on Hafizzulu Amin, but the first pancake came out lumpy. The operation hung in the balance. Nevertheless, preparations continued.
Storming of Amin's Palace
The deployment of troops began on December 25. Two days later, Amin, while in his palace, felt ill and lost consciousness. The same thing happened to some of his close associates. The reason for this was poisoning, which was organized by Soviet agents who worked as cooks at the residence. Amin was given medical assistance, but the guards sensed something was wrong.
At seven o'clock in the evening, not far from the palace, a Soviet sabotage group stalled in its car, which stopped near the hatch that led to the distribution center of all Kabul communications. The mine was safely lowered there, and a few minutes later there was an explosion. Kabul was left without electricity.
Thus began the Afghan War (1979-1989). Briefly assessing the situation, the commander of the operation, Colonel Boyarintsev, ordered the assault on Amin’s palace. The Afghan leader himself, having learned about the attack by unknown military personnel, demanded that his entourage ask for help from the Soviet Union (formally, the authorities of the two countries continued to remain friendly to each other). When Amin was informed that USSR special forces were at his gate, he did not believe it. It is not known exactly under what circumstances the head of the PDPA died. Most eyewitnesses later claimed that Amin committed suicide even before Soviet soldiers appeared in his apartment.
One way or another, the operation was successfully carried out. Not only the palace was captured, but the whole of Kabul. On the night of December 28, Karmal arrived in the capital and was declared head of state. The USSR forces lost 20 people (among them were paratroopers and special forces). The commander of the assault, Grigory Boyarintsev, also died. In 1980, he was posthumously awarded the title of Hero of the Soviet Union.
Chronology of the conflict
According to the nature of the fighting and strategic objectives, a brief history of the Afghan War (1979-1989) can be divided into four periods. In the winter of 1979-1980. Soviet troops entered the country. Military personnel were sent to garrisons and important infrastructure facilities.
The second period (1980-1985) was the most active. The fighting took place throughout the country. They were offensive in nature. The Mujahideen were destroyed and the army of the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan was improved.
The third period (1985-1987) is characterized by Soviet aviation and artillery operations. Activities using ground troops were carried out less and less, until they finally came to naught.
The fourth period (1987-1989) was the last. Soviet troops were preparing to withdraw. At the same time, the civil war in the country continued. The Islamists were never completely defeated. The withdrawal of troops was caused by the economic crisis in the USSR and a change in political course.
Continuation of the war
When the Soviet Union first sent its troops into Afghanistan, the country's leadership argued its decision by saying that it was only providing assistance, in accordance with numerous requests from the Afghan government. Following fresh developments, the UN Security Council was convened at the end of 1979. An anti-Soviet resolution prepared by the United States was presented at it. The document was not supported.
The American side, although it did not actually take part in the conflict, actively financed the Mujahideen. The Islamists had weapons purchased from the West. Thus, in fact, the cold confrontation between the two political systems received a new front, which became the Afghan war. The progress of the war was briefly covered in all world media.
The CIA organized several training and educational camps in neighboring Pakistan, in which Afghan Mujahideen (dushmans) were trained. The Islamists, in addition to American funding, received money from the drug trade. In the 80s, this country became the world leader in the production of heroin and opium. Often the goal of Soviet operations was precisely the destruction of these industries.
The causes of the Afghan War (1979-1989), in short, sent a huge mass of the population into confrontation, who had never before held a weapon in their hands. Recruitment into the ranks of dushmans was led by a wide network of agents throughout the country. The advantage of the Mujahideen was that they did not have a specific center. Throughout the armed conflict it was a collection of numerous heterogeneous groups. They were controlled by field commanders, but there was no “leader” among them.
The low effectiveness of guerrilla operations was fully demonstrated by the Afghan War (1979-1989). Brief summaries of many Soviet offensives were mentioned in the media. Many raids were nullified by the enemy’s effective propaganda work among the local population. For the Afghan majority (especially in deep provinces with a patriarchal structure), Soviet military personnel have always been occupiers. The common people did not feel any sympathy for the socialist ideology.
"Politics of National Reconciliation"
In 1987, the implementation of the “policy of national reconciliation” began. At its plenum, the PDPA renounced its monopoly on power. A law appeared that allowed opponents of the government to create their own parties. The country has a new Constitution and a new president, Mohammed Najibullah. All these measures were taken to end the war through compromise and concessions.
At the same time, the Soviet leadership, led by Mikhail Gorbachev, set a course to reduce its own weapons, which meant the withdrawal of troops from the neighboring country. The Afghan war (1979-1989), in short, could not be waged in the conditions of the economic crisis that began in the USSR. In addition, the Cold War was already on its last legs. The USSR and the USA began to agree among themselves by signing numerous documents on disarmament and ending the escalation of the conflict between the two political systems.
Mikhail Gorbachev first announced the upcoming withdrawal of Soviet troops in December 1987, while on an official visit to the United States. Soon after this, the Soviet, American and Afghan delegations sat down at the negotiating table in Geneva, Switzerland. On April 14, 1988, following the results of their work, program documents were signed. Thus the history of the Afghan War came to an end. Briefly, we can say that according to the Geneva agreements, the Soviet leadership promised to withdraw its troops, and the American leadership promised to stop funding opponents of the PDPA.
Half of the USSR military contingent left the country in August 1988. In the summer, important garrisons were left in Kandahar, Gradez, Faizabad, Kundduz and other cities and settlements. The last Soviet soldier to leave Afghanistan on February 15, 1989 was Lieutenant General Boris Gromov. The whole world saw footage of how the military crossed and crossed the Friendship Bridge across the border river Amu Darya.
Losses
Many events of the Soviet years were subject to a one-sided communist assessment. Among them was the history of the Afghan war. Dry reports briefly appeared in newspapers, and television talked about the continued successes of internationalist soldiers. However, until the start of Perestroika and the announcement of the policy of glasnost, the USSR authorities tried to keep silent about the true scale of their irretrievable losses. Zinc coffins containing conscripts and privates returned to the Soviet Union semi-secretly. The soldiers were buried without publicity, and for a long time there was no mention of the place and cause of death on the monuments. A stable image of “cargo 200” appeared among the people.
Only in 1989, the Pravda newspaper published real data on losses - 13,835 people. By the end of the 20th century, this figure reached 15 thousand, since many military personnel died in their homeland for several years due to injuries and illnesses. These were the real consequences of the Afghan war. Briefly mentioning her losses only further intensified her conflict with society. By the end of the 80s, the demand to withdraw troops from the neighboring country became one of the main slogans of Perestroika. Even earlier (under Brezhnev) dissidents advocated this. For example, in 1980, the famous academician Andrei Sakharov was sent into exile in Gorky for his criticism of the “solution to the Afghan issue.”
Results
What are the results of the Afghan war? In short, Soviet intervention extended the life of the PDPA exactly for the period for which USSR troops remained in the country. After their withdrawal, the regime suffered agony. Mujahideen groups quickly regained their own control over Afghanistan. Islamists even appeared at the borders of the USSR. Soviet border guards had to endure enemy shelling after the troops left the country.
The status quo was broken. In April 1992, the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan was finally liquidated by Islamists. Complete chaos began in the country. It was divided by numerous factions. The war of all against all continued there until the invasion of NATO troops at the beginning of the 21st century. In the 90s, the Taliban movement appeared in the country, which became one of the leading forces of modern world terrorism.
In the mass post-Soviet consciousness, the Afghan war became one of the most important symbols of the 80s. Briefly for school, today they talk about it in history textbooks for grades 9 and 11. Numerous works of art are dedicated to the war - songs, films, books. Assessments of its results vary, although at the end of the USSR the majority of the population, according to sociological surveys, were in favor of withdrawing troops and ending the senseless war.
Reasons for the invasion
Afghanistan - a country located on the borders of the Central Asian republics of the USSR - became a troubled point in the late 70s. In 1978, a coup d'état took place in the country, in which the government of the USSR played an important role. The result of this was the establishment of a pro-Soviet regime in Afghanistan. However, soon the new government in the country began to lose the threads of control. Amin, who tried to instill communist ideals in Islamic Afghanistan, was quickly losing authority in society, an internal conflict was brewing in the country, and the Kremlin itself was not happy with Amin, who increasingly began to look towards the United States. Under these conditions, the USSR government began to search for a person who would suit it at the head of Afghanistan. The choice fell on the opposition Amina Babrak Karmal, who was in Czechoslovakia at that time. The reasons for the entry of Soviet troops into Afghanistan, therefore, are largely related to a possible change in the country’s foreign policy vector. Having identified a new leader for the neighboring country, the USSR, after a series of consultations with Brezhnev, Marshal Ustinov and Foreign Minister Gromyko, began to intervene in the country. war propaganda Afghanistan
In less than a year, the position of the Soviet leadership on this issue changed from restraint to agreement to open military intervention in the intra-Afghan conflict. With all the reservations, it boiled down to the desire “not to lose Afghanistan under any circumstances” (the literal expression of KGB Chairman Yu.V. Andropov).
Minister of Foreign Affairs A.A. Gromyko initially opposed providing military assistance to the Taraki regime, but failed to defend his position. Supporters of sending troops into the neighboring country, first of all, Defense Minister D.F. Ustinov, had no less influence. L.I. Brezhnev began to lean towards a forceful solution to the issue. The reluctance of other members of the top leadership to challenge the opinion of the first person, together with a lack of understanding of the specifics of Islamic society, ultimately predetermined the adoption of a decision to send troops that was ill-considered in its consequences.
Documents show that the Soviet military leadership (except for Defense Minister D.F. Ustinov) thought quite sensibly. Chief of the General Staff of the USSR Armed Forces, Marshal of the Soviet Union N.V. Ogarkov recommended refraining from attempts to resolve political issues in the neighboring country by military force. But the top officials ignored the opinion of experts not only from the Ministry of Defense, but also the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. The political decision to send a limited contingent of Soviet troops (OCSV) to Afghanistan was made on December 12, 1979 in a narrow circle - at a meeting of L.I. Brezhnev with Yu.V. Andropov, D.F. Ustinov and A.A. Gromyko, as well as Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee K.U. Chernenko, i.e. five members of the Politburo out of 12. The goals of sending troops into a neighboring country and the methods of their actions were not determined.
The first Soviet units crossed the border on December 25, 1979 at 18.00 local time. Paratroopers were airlifted to the airfields of Kabul and Bagram. On the evening of December 27, special operations “Storm-333” were carried out by special groups of the KGB and a detachment of the Main Intelligence Directorate. As a result, the Taj Beg Palace, where the residence of the new head of Afghanistan, Kh. Amin, was located, was captured, and he himself was killed. By this time, Amin had lost the trust of Moscow due to his organized overthrow and murder of Taraki and information about cooperation with the CIA. The election of B. Karmal, who had arrived illegally from the USSR the day before, as General Secretary of the PDPA Central Committee, was hastily formalized.
The population of the Soviet Union was faced with the fact of sending troops into a neighboring country in order, as they said, to provide international assistance to the friendly Afghan people in defending the April Revolution. The official position of the Kremlin was stated in the responses of L.I. Brezhnev, in response to questions from a Pravda correspondent on January 13, 1980, Brezhnev pointed to the armed intervention unleashed against Afghanistan from the outside, the threat of turning the country into “an imperialist military bridgehead on the southern border of our country.” He also mentioned the Afghan leadership’s repeated requests for the entry of Soviet troops, which, according to him, will be withdrawn “as soon as the reasons that prompted the Afghan leadership to request their entry no longer exist.”
At that time, the USSR really feared interference in Afghan affairs by the United States, as well as China and Pakistan, a real threat to its borders from the south. For reasons of politics, morality, and the preservation of international authority, the Soviet Union could also no longer indifferently observe the development of civil strife in Afghanistan, during which innocent people were killed. Another thing is that it was decided to stop the escalation of violence by another force, ignoring the specifics of intra-Afghan events. The loss of control over the situation in Kabul could be regarded in the world as a defeat for the socialist camp. Personal as well as departmental assessments of the situation in Afghanistan played no small role in the events of December 1979. It is a fact that the United States was extremely interested in involving the Soviet Union in the Afghan events, believing that Afghanistan would become for the USSR what Vietnam was for the United States. Through third countries, Washington supported the Afghan opposition forces that fought against the Karmal regime and Soviet troops. The direct participation of the Soviet Armed Forces in the Afghan war is usually divided into four stages:
1) December 1979 - February 1980 - introduction of the main personnel of the 40th Army, deployment to garrisons; 2) March 1980 - April 1985 - participation in hostilities against the armed opposition, providing assistance in the reorganization and strengthening of the armed forces of the DRA; 3) May 1985 - December 1986 - a gradual transition from active participation in hostilities to support for operations carried out by Afghan troops; 4) January 1987 - February 1989 - participation in the policy of national reconciliation, support for the DRA forces, withdrawal of troops to the territory of the USSR.
The initial number of Soviet troops in Afghanistan was 50 thousand people. Then the number of OKSV exceeded 100 thousand people. Soviet soldiers entered the first battle on January 9, 1980, when they disarmed the rebel artillery regiment of the DRA. Subsequently, the Soviet troops, against their will, were drawn into active hostilities, the command moved to organize planned operations against the most powerful groups of Mujahideen.
Soviet soldiers and officers showed the highest fighting qualities, courage and heroism in Afghanistan, although they had to operate in the most difficult conditions, at an altitude of 2.5-4.5 km, at a temperature of plus 45-50 ° C and an acute shortage of water. With the acquisition of the necessary experience, the training of Soviet soldiers made it possible to successfully resist the professional cadres of the Mujahideen, trained with the help of the Americans in numerous training camps in Pakistan and other countries.
However, the involvement of OKSV in hostilities did not increase the chances of a forceful resolution of the intra-Afghan conflict. Many military leaders understood that it was necessary to withdraw troops. But such decisions were beyond their competence. The political leadership of the USSR believed that the condition for withdrawal should be a peace process in Afghanistan, guaranteed by the UN. However, Washington did its best to obstruct the UN mediation mission. On the contrary, American assistance to the Afghan opposition after the death of Brezhnev and the coming to power of Yu.V. Andropova has increased sharply. Only since 1985 have there been significant changes regarding the participation of the USSR in the civil war in the neighboring country. The need for OKSV to return to its homeland became completely obvious. The economic difficulties of the Soviet Union itself became more and more acute, for which large-scale assistance to its southern neighbor was becoming ruinous. By that time, several thousand Soviet troops had died in Afghanistan. Hidden dissatisfaction with the ongoing war was brewing in society, which was discussed in the press only in general official phrases.
Year after year passed, and the situation in Afghanistan did not improve; a number of brilliant operations of the Soviet army, such as, for example, the galaxy of Panjshir operations, could not bring the main thing - a change of mood in Afghan society. Residents of the country were categorically opposed to the ideology of the Soviets, and the Mujahideen were gaining more and more popularity. The losses of Soviet troops grew, the entry of Soviet troops into Afghanistan provoked a noticeable increase in military spending, growing discontent in society, by the way, the intervention also became the reason for the boycott of the 1980 Olympic Games held in Moscow by many countries. The unspoken defeat of the superpower was becoming obvious. As a result, the inglorious campaign of the Soviet army ended in February 1989: the last soldier left the country on February 15. Despite the fact that this war can be called a failure, the Soviet soldier confirmed his skills, stamina, heroism and courage. During the war, the USSR lost more than 13,000 people killed. The country's economic losses were also significant. Every year, about 800 million dollars were allocated to support the puppet government, and supplying the army cost 3 billion. Thus, this confirms the thesis that the entry of Soviet troops into Afghanistan worsened the situation in the country’s economy, and ultimately became one of the reasons for its systemic crisis.
USSR on the eve of the Afghan war
Several decades later, looking back into the past, we can name a number of reasons that ultimately led to the collapse of a huge and powerful country - the USSR. The attitude towards this country these days can be different, some have it negative, some have it positive, some talk about the fate of the Soviet empire from a scientific point of view, but, probably, there is not a single person indifferent to this grandiose formation . In this regard, consideration of the causes of the collapse of the USSR seems to be a particularly relevant topic. Yes, the collapse of the country is usually associated with reasons that lie on the surface, related to exorbitant expenses in the arms race, lower prices for energy resources, the unsuccessful restructuring that was launched, and the general rotting of the entire system. However, by and large, these processes, which, of course, became objective factors of the collapse, were just a consequence. A consequence of a deep systemic crisis and mistakes that took place back in the “golden” Brezhnev era. Speaking about Brezhnev’s policies, we can highlight two major miscalculations of the Secretary General. The first is the curtailment of the Kosygin reform, which revived the country's planned economy, and the rejection of which became one of the main reasons for the stagnation in the economy and its complete dependence on oil exports. The second grave miscalculation, which in the late 80s became literally a living symbol of the impending collapse of the USSR, was the decision to invade Afghanistan. The entry of Soviet troops into Afghanistan contributed to the deepening of the crisis in the economy, which ultimately became an important factor in the collapse of the country.
Reasons for the invasion
Afghanistan - a country located on the borders of the Central Asian republics of the USSR - became a troubled point in the late 70s. In 1978, a coup d'état took place in the country, in which the government of the USSR played an important role. The result of this was the establishment of a pro-Soviet regime in Afghanistan. However, soon the new government in the country began to lose the threads of control. Amin, who tried to instill communist ideals in Islamic Afghanistan, was quickly losing authority in society, an internal conflict was brewing in the country, and the Kremlin itself was not happy with Amin, who increasingly began to look towards the United States. Under these conditions, the USSR government began to search for a person who would suit it at the head of Afghanistan. The choice fell on the opposition Amina Babrak Karmal, who was in Czechoslovakia at that time. The reasons for the entry of Soviet troops into Afghanistan, therefore, are largely related to a possible change in the country’s foreign policy vector. Having identified a new leader for the neighboring country, the USSR, after a series of consultations with Brezhnev, Marshal Ustinov and Foreign Minister Gromyko, began to intervene in the country.
Invasion and progress of the war
The entry of Soviet troops into Afghanistan began on December 25, 1979. Just two days later, special forces groups organized an assault on the presidential palace, during which Amin was killed, after which power was transferred to Karmal. Initially, a small contingent was introduced into the country. However, the country soon became one of the hottest spots in the East. Having occupied the entire country, Soviet troops nevertheless could not establish constitutional order here. Mujahideen detachments opposed what was in fact an occupation. Soon the whole country began to fight against the presence of Soviet troops, and every village turned into a stronghold of resistance. In addition, the entry of Soviet troops into Afghanistan complicated the country's international position. The policy of détente in American-Soviet relations was thwarted; moreover, Afghan fighters began to receive weapons and funding from Washington, and Afghanistan itself turned into a typical testing ground of the Cold War.
End of hostilities
Year after year passed, and the situation in Afghanistan did not improve; a number of brilliant operations of the Soviet army, such as, for example, the galaxy of Panjshir operations, could not bring the main thing - a change of mood in Afghan society. Residents of the country were categorically opposed to the ideology of the Soviets, and the Mujahideen were gaining more and more popularity. The losses of Soviet troops grew, the entry of Soviet troops into Afghanistan provoked a noticeable increase in military spending, growing discontent in society, by the way, the intervention also became the reason for the boycott of the 1980 Olympic Games held in Moscow by many countries. The unspoken defeat of the superpower was becoming obvious. As a result, the inglorious campaign of the Soviet army ended in February 1989: the last soldier left the country on February 15. Despite the fact that this war can be called a failure, the Soviet soldier confirmed his skills, stamina, heroism and courage. During the war, the USSR lost more than 13,000 people killed. The country's economic losses were also significant. Every year, about 800 million dollars were allocated to support the puppet government, and supplying the army cost 3 billion. Thus, this confirms the thesis that the entry of Soviet troops into Afghanistan worsened the situation in the country’s economy, and ultimately became one of the reasons for its systemic crisis.
Twenty-six years have already passed since the last Soviet soldier left the territory of Afghanistan. But many participants in those long-ago events were left with a mental wound that still aches and hurts. How many of our Soviet children, just boys, died in the Afghan war! How many mothers shed tears at the zinc coffins! How much blood of innocent people has been shed! And all human grief lies in one small word - “war”...
How many people died in the Afghan war?
If you believe official data, about 15 thousand Soviet soldiers did not return home to the USSR from Afghanistan. There are still 273 people listed as missing. More than 53 thousand soldiers were wounded and shell-shocked. The losses in the Afghan war for our country are colossal. Many veterans believe that the Soviet leadership made a big mistake by getting involved in this conflict. How many lives could have been saved if their decision had been different?
There are still ongoing debates about how many people died in the Afghan war. After all, the official figure does not take into account the pilots who died in the sky while transporting cargo, the soldiers returning home who came under fire, and the nurses and aides caring for the wounded.
Afghan war 1979-1989
On December 12, 1979, a meeting of the Politburo of the CPSU Central Committee decided to send Russian troops to Afghanistan. They have been located in the country since December 25, 1979 and were supporters of the government of the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan. The troops were brought in to prevent the threat of military intervention from other states. The decision to help Afghanistan from the USSR was made after numerous requests from the republic’s leadership.
The conflict broke out between the opposition (Dushmans, or Mujahideen) and the armed forces of the Afghan government. The parties could not divide political control over the territory of the republic. A number of European countries, Pakistani intelligence services and the US military provided support to the Mujahideen during military operations. They also provided them with ammunition supplies.
The entry of Soviet troops was carried out in three directions: Khorog - Fayzabad, Kushka - Shindad - Kandahar and Termez - Kunduz - Kabul. The airfields of Kandahar, Bagram and Kabul received Russian troops.
Main stages of the war
On December 12, after coordinating his actions with the commission of the Politburo of the CPSU Central Committee, Brezhnev decided to provide military assistance to Afghanistan. On December 25, 1979, at 15.00 Moscow time, the entry of our troops into the republic began. It should be noted that the role of the USSR in the Afghan War was enormous, since Soviet units provided all possible support to the Afghan army.
The main reasons for the failures of the Russian army
At the beginning of the war, luck was on the side of the Soviet troops, proof of this is the operation in Panjshir. The main misfortune for our units was the moment when the Mujahideen were delivered Stinger missiles, which easily hit the target from a considerable distance. The Soviet military did not have equipment capable of hitting these missiles in flight. As a result of the use of the Stinger, several of our military and transport aircraft were shot down by the Mujahideen. The situation changed only when the Russian army managed to get its hands on several missiles.
Change of power
In March 1985, power in the USSR changed, the post of president passed to M. S. Gorbachev. His appointment significantly changed the situation in Afghanistan. The question immediately arose of Soviet troops leaving the country in the near future, and some steps were even taken to implement this.
There was also a change of power in Afghanistan: M. Najibullah took the place of B. Karmal. The gradual withdrawal of Soviet units began. But even after this, the struggle between Republicans and Islamists did not stop and continues to this day. However, for the USSR, the history of the Afghan war ended there.
The main reasons for the outbreak of hostilities in Afghanistan
The situation in Afghanistan has never been considered calm due to the location of the republic in the geopolitical region. The main rivals wishing to have influence in this country were at one time the Russian Empire and Great Britain. In 1919, the Afghan authorities declared independence from England. Russia, in turn, was one of the first to recognize the new country.
In 1978, Afghanistan received the status of a democratic republic, after which new reforms followed, but not everyone wanted to accept them. This is how the conflict between Islamists and Republicans developed, which ultimately led to civil war. When the leadership of the republic realized that they could not cope on their own, they began to ask for help from their ally, the USSR. After some hesitation, the Soviet Union decided to send its troops to Afghanistan.
Book of Memory
The day when the last units of the USSR left the lands of Afghanistan is moving further and further away from us. This war left a deep, indelible mark, stained with blood, in the history of our homeland. Thousands of young people who had not yet had time to see the life of the children did not return home. How scary and painful it is to remember. What were all these sacrifices for?
Hundreds of thousands of Afghan soldiers went through serious tests in this war, and not only did not break, but also showed such qualities as courage, heroism, devotion and love for the Motherland. Their fighting spirit was unshakable, and they went through this brutal war with dignity. Many were wounded and treated in military hospitals, but the main wounds that remained in the soul and are still bleeding cannot be cured by even the most experienced doctor. Before the eyes of these people, their comrades bled and died, dying a painful death from their wounds. Afghan soldiers have only the eternal memory of their fallen friends.
The Book of Memory of the Afghan War has been created in Russia. It immortalizes the names of heroes who fell on the territory of the republic. In each region there are separate Books of Memory of soldiers who served in Afghanistan, in which the names of the heroes who died in the Afghan War are written. The pictures from which young, handsome guys are looking at us make our hearts ache with pain. After all, none of these boys are alive anymore. “In vain the old woman waits for her son to come home...” - these words have been etched in the memory of every Russian since the Second World War and make the heart ache. So let the eternal memory of the heroes of the Afghan War remain, which will be refreshed by these truly sacred Books of Memory.
The results of the Afghan war for the people are not the result that the state achieved to resolve the conflict, but the number of human casualties, which number in the thousands.