September 2014 marks the 160th anniversary of the start of the legendary defense of Sevastopol in the years Crimean War. On September 25 (September 13, old style), 1854, the siege of the city of Russian naval glory began by enemy forces superior in numbers and weapons. As you know, in the Crimean War the Russian Empire faced a coalition of the leading Western powers of that time - England and France, as well as the Ottoman Empire and the Sardinian Kingdom, which joined the coalition.

Back in June 1854, the naval forces of England, France, the Ottoman Empire and the Kingdom of Sardinia, consisting of 34 battleships and 55 frigates, blocked the Russian military navy in the Sevastopol Bay. The forces of the Russian fleet were significantly inferior to the enemy - 14 battleships, 6 frigates and 6 steam frigates were blocked in the Bay of Sevastopol. By the way, the vast majority of Russian warships were sailing, while the Allied fleet had a clear advantage in modern steam ships.

Military-technical backwardness of the Russian fleet

Here we should dwell in more detail on what the Russian navy was like by the middle of the 19th century. The naval forces of the empire included two fleets - the Black Sea and the Baltic, as well as several smaller flotillas - the Kamchatka, Caspian, White Sea and Aral, which did not play a significant role in the defense of the country's maritime borders. Black Sea and Baltic Fleet had a number of significant differences from each other. The Baltic Fleet was always in sight and therefore its command was aimed at developing, first of all, the external side of the fleet. The ships of the Baltic Fleet with their appearance were supposed to give the impression of the elite of the Russian naval forces and, indeed, the fleet looked great at reviews and parades. However, his combat training raised many questions - the Baltic seamen rarely went sailing, the officers sought more to build a career than to master naval science and the ability to manage the crews under their command.

The Black Sea Fleet, which also lagged behind the British or French fleets in military-technical terms, in terms of personnel training, it presented a completely different picture than the Baltic Fleet. Firstly, the Black Sea Fleet has been continuously at war for almost the entire existence of the Russian naval forces - primarily with Ottoman Turkey. Secondly, the ships of the fleet more often went on long voyages and had a wealth of experience interacting with ground forces during the blockade of the Caucasian coast. It had a fleet and a strategic goal - to capture the Bosporus and Dardanelles straits in the event of a naval conflict with Ottoman Empire.

It was the Crimean War and, in particular, the defense of Sevastopol, about which so many books have been written in Russian military-historical literature that it makes no sense to retell the course of events in the heroic months of September 1854 - August 1855, became a turning point in the development of the Russian military. navy. The raid of the enemy fleet to the Sevastopol Bay showed the backwardness of the then Russian fleet, which consisted in the predominance of the sailing fleet over the steam one. If England and France had a significant part of their warships represented by steamships, then the Russian navy at the start of the Crimean War consisted mainly of sailing ships, which, naturally, were inferior to the more modern steam fleet. In this article we will dwell on several key points in the transition of the Russian fleet from sailing ships to steam-powered ones, without claiming to be comprehensive and complete in covering the topic, but offering to remember the people and events with which the development of the Russian navy is associated.

The first Russian steam ships began to be developed at the beginning of the 19th century. In 1815, the first passenger barge “Elizabeth” began sailing on the route “St. Petersburg - Kronstadt”. In 1820, the steamship Vesuvius sailed from Nikolaev to Kherson. However, the navy of the Russian Empire was in no hurry to acquire steam warships. Only at the end of the 1830s. The construction of the first steam-powered warships begins: in 1838, the steam frigate Bogatyr was launched; in the period from 1836 to 1850. – seven wheeled steam frigates and one screw frigate. As a result, by the time the Crimean War began, Russia was significantly inferior to both England and France in terms of the development of the steam navy. In many ways, this military-technical backwardness was responsible for Russia’s obviously losing position in the Crimean War, since the tasks of the fleet included suppressing the enemy’s attempts to approach the Crimean coast. As is known, despite the heroism Russian sailors- admirals, officers and sailors - this task was never completed due to the technical backwardness of the Russian fleet.

The world's first battle involving rare military ships at that time was the battle between the steam frigate "Vladimir" and the Turkish-Egyptian steam frigate "Pervaz Bahri", which took place even before the siege of Sevastopol - on November 5, 1853. The steam frigate Vladimir was launched in March 1848, five years before the events described. Its displacement reached 1713 tons, length - 61 m, width - 11 m. By the time the Crimean War began, it was considered the best steam frigate Black Sea Fleet.

In those years, Russia had only 16 steam frigates on the Black Sea, while the naval command was distrustful of these ships, adhering to conservative views on the development of the fleet. Indeed, from an aesthetic point of view, sailing battleships looked much more impressive compared to small steam frigates, on top of that sailing fleet Over the past century, Russia has proven itself in many naval battles, primarily with the ships of Ottoman Turkey. Therefore, at first the fleet command refrained from active combat use steam frigates. They were used to support ground forces, transport damaged sailing ships, and carry out assignments for the delivery of correspondence and supplies. They did not take part directly in the hostilities.

The technical lag of the Russian navy was determined not only by the backwardness of the Russian engineering (including shipbuilding) industry in comparison with the English or French, but also by the conviction of many admirals and, especially, the tsarist ministers that the sailing fleet remained combat-ready, then how colossal changes took place in global military shipbuilding during this period.

The first battle of steamships: the capture of Pervaz-Bahri

By the morning of November 5, the steam frigate “Vladimir” was in the Black Sea waters near the mouth of the Danube River, where it carried out tasks to monitor the movements of the Turkish military fleet. On board the frigate was the Chief of Staff of the Black Sea Fleet, Vice Admiral V.A. Kornilov (1806-1854), and the Vladimir was directly commanded by Lieutenant Commander G.I. Butakov (1820-1882).

At the time of the events described, Grigory Ivanovich Butakov was 33 years old. The hereditary sailor, whose father Ivan Butakov once commanded the battleship Tsar Konstantin, already had more than twenty years of naval service behind him. In 1831, Grigory Butakov entered the Naval Cadet Corps and graduated five years later. Then there was a two-year internship in the Baltic Fleet, appointment in 1838 as a flag officer on the battleship Silistria with the rank of midshipman, assignment of lieutenant shoulder straps in 1843 for excellent service, including off the coast of the North Caucasus, five-year command of the tender Pospeshny , assignment in 1850 to the rank of captain-lieutenant and appointment in 1852 as commander of the steamship frigate "Vladimir".

On the morning of November 5, Vice Admiral Kornilov himself was on the captain’s bridge of the Vladimir, along with the ship’s flag officer. Vladimir Alekseevich was watching the sea with binoculars when he saw in the distance the smoke of a steamship heading towards Sevastopol. Without seeing the ship, the vice admiral mistook it for the Russian steam frigate Bessarabia and thought that the latter was heading to Sevastopol Bay. Kornilov gave the command to catch up with the steamer, to which the commander of the Vladimir Butakov noted that it might not be the Bessarabia.

As it turned out, the vice admiral was also satisfied with another situation - if the ship turned out to be enemy, then it would be a sin not to engage in battle with it. Within an hour, the steam frigate Vladimir managed to significantly reduce the distance separating it from the suspicious ship. The latter, in turn, turned towards the shore, hoping to break away from the unwanted pursuer. “Vladimir” went to meet him - the red banner with a crescent fluttering over the unknown ship spoke for itself. The Russian steamship frigate met not with its “colleague” “Bessarabia”, but with the Turkish steamship frigate “Pervaz-Bahri” (“Sea Loach”), commanded by an experienced officer Seyid Pasha.

At 10 o'clock in the morning the first shot of the Vladimir cannon was heard. The fired cannonball fell in front of the bow of the Turkish frigate, which meant only one thing - the Russian ship was inviting the Turks to surrender immediately. In response, the Turkish steam frigate responded with cannon salvoes. The battle between the Russian and Turkish ships began. Captain-Lieutenant Butakov got his bearings instantly. Noticing that the Turkish warship lacked bow and stern cannons, Butakov skillfully controlled the Vladimir, not allowing the latter to approach the sides of the Pervaz-Bahri.

A Russian cannon shot shot down the Turkish flag on the steamer's mast, but the Ottomans immediately replaced it and tried to break away from the Russian ship. In response, "Vladimir" fired from its bow guns - 214 mm cannons. It is difficult to deny the courage of the Turks, primarily commander Seyid Pasha, who stood on the site throughout the battle until he was killed by another salvo from a Russian steamer. Approaching a hundred meters from the Pervaz-Bahri, the Russian steamer opened fire with grapeshot from all onboard guns. After the death of the captain, the Turks wavered and soon the flag with a crescent crept down the mast. This meant that the frigate Pervaz-Bahri was surrendering to the mercy of the winner. For the Turkish sailors, the battle ended with the loss of 58 officers and sailors killed; two people died on the Vladimir. The captured steam frigate "Pervaz-Bahri" was repaired and, under the new name "Kornilov", was enlisted in the Black Sea Fleet.

For the victory and capture of Pervaz-Bahri, Grigory Ivanovich Butakov was awarded the order St. George of the 4th degree and promoted to captain of the 2nd rank. Subsequently, for almost thirty years, he continued to serve in the Russian Navy, rising to the rank of full admiral. During the defense of Sevastopol, Butakov commanded a detachment of steam frigates, was promoted to captain of the 1st rank and appointed chief of staff of the Black Sea Fleet. Butakov was highly valued by the famous Russian admirals Nakhimov and Kornilov, and Nakhimov even forbade sending Butakov on dangerous missions, arguing that the Russian fleet needed this officer alive - as a storehouse of knowledge, experience and initiatives. After the Crimean War, he served as the military governor of Nikolaev and Sevastopol, commanded a detachment of screw ships in the Baltic Fleet, was a naval agent in England, France and Italy, and commanded the Practical Squadron of armored ships in the Baltic Sea. In 1878-1881. Butakov was the head of the coastal and sea defense of the Sveaborg fortress, and from January 1, 1881, the chief commander of the St. Petersburg fleet.

In addition to his feats of arms, Grigory Ivanovich Butakov went down in history as one of the first Russian heralds of the development of the steam navy. His pen belongs treatise"New foundations of steamship tactics." It was Butakov, based on personal experience and analysis of existing scientific theories, who introduced methods of combat training for the fleet: prepare the fleet not for reviews and parades, but for combat operations; pay more attention to maritime practice, especially sailing; develop initiative, courage and ingenuity of naval officers and sailors; train the fleet in the basics of interaction with ground forces. Butakov also drew attention to the need to increase the technical preparedness of officers, non-commissioned officers and sailors in the context of the transition from a sailing to a steam fleet and, accordingly, increasing requirements for the engineering and technical literacy of sailors.

Modernization of shipbuilding

After the defeat in the Crimean War, the Russian Empire was prohibited from having a full-fledged combat fleet in the Black Sea. Nevertheless, realizing that without a fleet Russia sooner or later will not be able to exist, at least as great country, the government of the country switched to a program for the development of a steam and armored fleet. Thus, the Crimean War became a kind of impetus for the ossified Russian officials, prompting them to pay attention to the need to modernize naval shipping and shipbuilding and move on to the construction of modern warships.

Already in 1857, a shipbuilding program was approved, according to which the Baltic Fleet, which in fact remained the only full-fledged fleet of the Russian Empire following the Crimean War, was to receive 18 screw battleships, 12 screw frigates, 14 screw corvettes, 100 screw gunboats, 9 wheeled steam frigates. In addition, it was planned to develop the navy on Pacific Ocean. It was decided to concentrate 9 screw corvettes, 6 screw clippers, 9 screw transporters and 4 paddle steamers there. According to the results of the war, on the Black Sea the Russian Empire could have only insignificant naval forces consisting of 6 screw corvettes, 9 screw transporters and 4 paddle steamers.

However, the development of the steam fleet in post-war Russia required significant efforts - first of all, the creation of a powerful shipbuilding industry focused on steam ships. Not only talented inventors were required, but also engineers, technicians, skilled workers capable of working in shipbuilding industry. The corresponding reforms were also expected organizational structure navy. Military reforms D.A. Milyutin made it possible to transform the Russian army and navy into modern armed forces, not inferior to the armed forces of the Western powers, not only in numbers, but also in the specifics of recruitment and training of military personnel.

On January 1, 1874, the transition to a system of universal conscription. The number of naval personnel was reduced by 58 thousand people - from 85 thousand people in 1857 to 27 thousand people in 1878. The period of conscription service on naval ships was reduced from 25 to 7 years of active service and three years of service in the reserve. At the same time, the approach to personnel issues recruitment of the navy. Emphasis began to be placed on recruiting skilled workers into the navy who possessed certain technical knowledge and skills. The last one played very important role in strengthening the training of recruits called up for the navy, since the workers, unlike illiterate or semi-literate peasants, had technical specialties and could, if they had a short-term military training perform professional duties on board the ship.

The construction of screw wooden ships began, proceeding at a fairly rapid pace. Over the course of six years, from 1857 to 1863, 26 screw ships were built and launched from the St. Petersburg shipyard. Contemporaries noted the high maneuverability and seaworthiness of screw ships, but noted that the lack of armor makes wooden screw ships an easy target for enemy artillery and allows the enemy to quickly disable them. The need to improve the security of propeller-driven ships led to the transition to the construction of an armored fleet.

In 1860, the Navy Ministry began drawing up a second development program domestic shipbuilding oriented towards the construction of an armored fleet. According to the program developers, the naval fleet of the Russian Empire should prevail over the fleets of potential rivals, which will allow Russia, regardless of its financial and economic resources, worthy of positioning itself on the international stage.

However, solving the task of building an armored fleet also required appropriate preparation for its implementation for the Russian shipbuilding industry. First of all, it was necessary to re-equip shipyards, which had previously focused on the production of wooden ships. Since St. Petersburg remained the main center of shipbuilding, the main attention was paid to the modernization of St. Petersburg shipbuilding enterprises. The key ones were the shipyard on Galerny Island, the New Admiralty, the Byrd, Carr and McPherson, Semyaninkov and Poletiki factories. It was decided to reassign all private factories to the Maritime Ministry of the Russian Empire. In the south of the Russian Empire, Nikolaev played a key role in the shipbuilding industry, where from the 1870s - 1880s. The construction of battleships for the Black Sea Fleet began. There were also shipbuilding enterprises in Sevastopol and Odessa, where small warships were built. In addition to shipbuilding factories, the metallurgical industry was important for the development of the steam armored fleet. Rapid development domestic metallurgy began in the last quarter of the 19th century.

However, the beginning of the production of armor dates back to an earlier time. The main part of the armor plates for domestic fleet supplied from the Izhora and Obukhov plants. It should also be noted that, in addition to domestic factories, battleships and individual components of their equipment were purchased by the Russian Empire abroad, since domestic industry in the second half of the 19th century was not yet able to fully cover the need of the Russian naval department for warships. The first domestic armored ship - gunboat“Experience” - was built in 1861 at the St. Petersburg shipyard, under the leadership of engineer H.V. Prokhorova. Made entirely of metal, the boat was equipped with a single gun located at the bow of the vessel.

"Popovki"

The most important role in the process of transition from sailing ships to steam ones, in the development of the Russian armored fleet, was played by Admiral Andrei Aleksandrovich Popov (1821-1898). A graduate of the Naval Cadet Corps, Popov also came from the Black Sea Fleet, where he began his service and commanded the steamships Meteor, Elbrus, Andia, Turok, and Taman.

Like Butakov, Popov was a participant in the Crimean War. As the commander of the Taman, Popov broke through from blockaded Sevastopol to Odessa and returned back with cargo to supply the blockaded defenders of the city. After the end of the Crimean War, Popov continued to serve in the Baltic Fleet as chief of staff of the Kronstadt port, then commanded a detachment of ships in the Pacific Ocean, and in 1861 he was appointed responsible for converting sailing ships into screw ships. The name of Popov is associated with the direct transition of the Russian Navy to steam and armored ships. Popov supervised the construction of such famous ships such as the battleship "Peter the Great", the imperial yacht "Livadia", the armored frigates "Admiral General" and "Duke of Edinburgh".

The battleship "Peter the Great", built under the leadership of Popov, at one time became one of the strongest warships in the world, not inferior to the English and French battleships. Launched in 1877, it was a powerful ship with a displacement of 10 thousand tons, armed with four 85-mm guns in two turrets. The ship's speed reached 12.5 knots. The famous English shipbuilder E. Reed spoke of Peter the Great as an extremely powerful ship, a much stronger vessel than any English battleship. Also under the leadership and, among other things, projects of A.A. Popov, in the period after 1856, 14 screw corvettes and 12 clippers were built.

In order to strengthen coastal defense in the area Kerch Strait and the Dnieper-Bug estuary, the naval command decided to build several armored ships specifically designed for security service coastline. The military and naval ministries were tasked with creating batteries whose armor thickness and artillery caliber would surpass the battleships of all foreign powers. At the same time, since, as a result of the Crimean War, Russia was not allowed to have ships with a certain displacement on the Black Sea, the created batteries had to meet the prescribed requirements - that is, at the same time not be among the prohibited ships in terms of their characteristics, and have high combat capabilities. qualities that allow them to fully cope with the tasks of defending the straits and the coast.

A.A. Popov proposed his own design of battleships with a large displacement and shallow draft. Popov's round floating battery was supposed to be equipped with powerful artillery pieces capable of resisting battleships. Although the ship turned out to be slow-moving, this did not bother Popov, since the participation of floating batteries in the long hikes. The armament of such a battery should have consisted of 11-inch or 20-inch smooth guns. The smaller area of ​​the floating battery made it possible to significantly save on armor, which was of no small importance for economically weakened Russia, which had just emerged from the Crimean War as a losing side. These ships received the colloquial name “popovki” - after the name of their designer and initiator of production. It was planned to build 4 “popovkas”, two of which were to be launched by the St. Petersburg shipyard and two by the Nikolaevskaya shipyard. In 1871, construction began on the first “popovka”, which received the name “Novgorod”. Two years later, in May 1873, the Novgorod ship delivered from the St. Petersburg shipyard was launched.

What was the ship "Novgorod"? It was equipped with two 280 mm rifled guns. During testing, the “popovka” developed a speed of six knots. The downside of the popovka was its slow rate of fire: the gun rotated 180 degrees in three minutes. It took ten minutes to load the cannon with shells. A serious setback of the project was that the ship was susceptible to going off course in windy conditions, and in strong winds it was practically unable to move. The characteristics of the battleship "Novgorod" were as follows: displacement - 2491 tons, length - 30.8 m, width - 30.8 m, side height - 4.6 m, power plant - 4 steam engines of 120 horsepower, 8 boilers The battleship could survive autonomously for three days. The battleship's crew consisted of 151 people, including 15 officers.

The second “Popovka” was supposed to be launched in 1873 under the name “Kyiv”, but then Popov began to modernize it and as a result the battleship “Vice Admiral Popov” appeared, named after the designer. Its launch took place in 1876. In terms of its characteristics, “Vice Admiral Popov” was somewhat superior to its predecessor, the battleship “Novgorod”. In particular, its data were as follows: displacement - 3550 tons, maximum length - 36.57 m, width - 36.57 m, side height - 4.6 m, power plant - 8 steam engines of 120 hp each ., 12 boilers, 6 screws. The full speed of the reinforced “popovka” model reached 8 knots. It was armed with two 305 mm cannons, six 87 mm Krupp cannons, eight 47 mm Hotchkiss cannons, and five 37 mm Hotchkiss revolver cannons. The crew of the battleship "Vice Admiral Popov" consisted of 206 people, including 19 officers.

Many experts argue that the “popovka” project, due to its round body, was largely an erroneous decision. After all, having built a round ship with thick armor and heavy artillery, Popov did not foresee that the ship would rock strongly on the waves, thereby reducing the accuracy of artillery fire. The Popovkas did not hold their course well and could periodically be overwhelmed by waves. Despite the fact that the shortcomings of the project in the launched ships were overcome, rumors spread widely in the country about the unsuitability of these battleships in real combat operations. In particular, uninformed people claimed that the “butt” rotates when firing due to the round body.

Nevertheless, the “priests” participated in Russian-Turkish War 1877-1878, having made a trip to the mouth of the Danube River, in 1892 they were enrolled in the number of coastal defense battleships. The popovkas were decommissioned from naval service only in 1903, five years after the death of their designer in 1898. It should be noted that it is precisely thanks to the “priests” in such difficult period for the Russian presence in the Black Sea, like three decades after the Crimean War, coastal defense of the most important strategic points Black Sea coast of the Russian Empire. However, in general, the Russian Naval Ministry failed to create a full-fledged line of defense of the Black Sea coast, since it relied exclusively on “popovkas”, and then, under the influence of public opinion, stopped their production after the launch of the first two battleships and did not propose new original projects.

Popov's merit was also the development of the idea of ​​​​building armored cruisers, also called first-rank cruisers. Subsequently, shipbuilders and the naval command of almost all of them were guided by Popov’s ideas in the field of cruiser construction. sea ​​powers of that time - thus, the Russian admiral became not only the founder of the domestic steam fleet, but also gave a creative impetus to the development and modernization of shipbuilding on a global scale.

Ultimately, the Russian government thought about the prospects and ways to modernize the domestic fleet and over several post-war decades, relying on the selfless work of specialists - naval officers, design engineers, technicians, as well as an unknown mass of skilled workers, it was able to create a full-fledged navy, equipped with modern warships and not inferior in its combat qualities to the fleets of Western maritime powers.

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Novgorod land.

Novgorod land.

Grand Duchy of Lithuania.

In addition to Muscovite Rus', during the Middle Ages there were two more alternative development options: Novgorod Rus' and Rus Lithuanian. Novgorod and Pskov, city-republics - this is the evolution of cities that took place in the West, and which could well have been repeated in Russia if not for the Mongol invasion.

Novgorod land.

Already in the 12th century, as one of the alternatives to strong princely power, Novgorod Republic, where after 1136 the princes were not rulers, but performed the functions of a military leader. In 1136 Monomakh's grandson Vsevolod Mstislavich was expelled from the city, after which until the end of the 15th century. Novgorod was ruled by an elected mayor, who exercised supreme power in the intervals between veche meetings.

Back at the end of the 11th century. The boyars of Novgorod achieved the approval of posadnichestvo and control over the movement of land property, and in 1126. - organizing a joint court of the prince and the mayor with the latter having real priority in it. This is a natural result of the development of a rich trading boyar republic, where the traditions of the veche - a people's assembly that led foreign policy, invited or drove away the prince, elected the head of the Novgorod Republic - the mayor (for life) and his assistant - the thousand.

The veche institution is the people's parliament of the early Middle Ages, especially developed in those territories that were away from strong states that pursued a policy of unification. In Rus', the veche lasted the longest in Novgorod and Pskov, remote from Kyiv, and then Moscow.

Princely power in the Novgorod land was established as a result of an agreement between the local inter-tribal elite and the invited prince (Rurik). The treaty appears to have limited the scope of government revenue organization from the very beginning. This is the fundamental difference between Novgorod statehood and the monarchical Smolensk and Kyiv, where the princely power of the Rurikovichs was asserted not by treaty, but by conquest. It was the initial condition for limiting princely power in Novgorod that laid the foundations for its unique structure. The rest is a matter of time and the success of the boyars in their quest for power.

On the charters of Yaroslav the Wise of 1018-1019, confirming the effectiveness existing standards relations between Novgorod and the Kyiv princes, the princes invited to Novgorod took an oath. Princes were invited from the allied principalities. Most often - from Suzdal, because bread was purchased here, because... there wasn't enough of mine. From the end of the 13th century. Novgorod is firmly included in the political system of the Grand Duchy of Vladimir: the Vladimir and then Moscow princes were princes in Novgorod. Their relationship was built on a contractual basis.

The verdict of the veche on this or that issue received legal force according to the majority of cries. Participants - about 500 people, usually rich and noble people, as well as representatives of the districts (ends) and suburbs.

All R. 12th century An administrative system was finally organized in which the outer belt of Novgorod volosts, located on the border of neighboring principalities and therefore most susceptible to princely desires, was specifically stipulated in treaties as a territory under the exclusive sovereignty of the Novgorod boyars.

Novgorod is a republic of artisans and traders. The Russian population paid taxes, and the non-Russian population (Karelians, Lithuania, Chud) paid tribute. Those. Novgorod is a multinational state.

Since 1156 Novgorodians elected their archbishop, with approval by the Kyiv metropolitan.

The prince and his retinue were not stationed in Novgorod, but in a special courtyard - a fortified settlement.

Decisive factor in the formation of Novgorod as the richest city of Kievan Rus was the Baltic trade, carried out from all over Northern Europe. The remoteness from the ruinous Steppe and the Varangian dynasty of Rus', which made it possible to get along peacefully with the warlike Scandinavians, became the reason for the constant and uninterrupted process of growth in the welfare of Novgorod.

Another key factor in the economic recovery of Novgorod was the exploitation of the fishing resources of the North. Now the trades of furs and “fish tooth” (walrus bone) seem exotic, but for medieval Rus', with its low-productive agriculture and the lack of its own sources of non-ferrous and noble metals, these sectors of the economy have become a significant source of wealth accumulation. Centuries of fishing and agricultural colonization of the Novgorodians shaped the North as a special historical region Rus', vital for the metropolis.

The formation of the boyar class had a significant impact on political structure society. In North-Eastern Rus', the grand-ducal power prevailed over the aristocracy, which led to the strengthening of the monarchical system. Novgorod nobility by the 13th century. reached such power that she broke the princely power and founded the boyar-veche “republic”. To the highest government positions Only members of influential (aristocratic) boyar families were elected. For example, the Mishinich-Ontsiforovich clan from the middle. 13 to the beginning of the 15th century. occupied the highest positions in the Novgorod Republic, including the post of mayor. The voivode was responsible for maintaining law and order in the city.

The princely domain was expropriated, and the princes invited to Novgorod under the “row” (agreement) were prohibited from owning lands within the Novgorod borders. The approval of new orders allowed the Novgorod land to avoid fragmentation.

The highest official of the veche republic was the archbishop, who had his own army and kept the Novgorod treasury. The veche system can function only under a strong government that does not allow anarchy. At the same time, the right to elect an archbishop belonged to the veche, and not to the Moscow metropolis. The Moscow Metropolitan, in turn, was elected by the Holy Council, where the final word belonged to the Moscow Sovereign. Thus, the system for electing the head of the church was also determined by differences in the political system.

Novgorod officials could only be judged by the Council of Gentlemen and the Veche. The Grand Duke did not have the right to judge the Novgorodians “at the bottom,” i.e. within the Vladimir and then Moscow principalities.

All affairs of Novgorod were managed by the elected mayor and the boyars, who made up the Council of Gentlemen.

The most important decisions of the Council were approved by the veche.

In the middle of the 15th century. Moscow increased pressure on Novgorod, seeking its subordination to the grand ducal power. Lacking sufficient forces for defense, the Novgorodians tried to rely on outside help, in particular, on Lithuania, which was still the lion's share of the Russian state. However, an appeal to the Catholic king of the Polish-Lithuanian state united on the basis of a personal union, which the pro-Lithuanian party of the Boretsky boyars insisted on, could be interpreted as a defection from Orthodox faith, as a result of which the veche rejected the mayor’s proposal.

In Moscow, Novgorod's decision to defend its independence was presented as a conspiracy of the Boretsky boyars, because for Moscow, only the monarchical system was natural and legal. After the death of Archbishop Jonah, who was anti-Moscow, and the election of his successor, Theophilus, a supporter of subordination to Moscow, in the spring of 1471. Ivan III declared war on Novgorod, and Pskov and Tver were Moscow's allies. The Novgorod militia came out to meet the Moscow army, which was defeated on the Shelon River, because. the archbishop's regiment refused to participate in the battle.

To end the republican system, Ivan III it was necessary to expropriate and evict all the boyars from the Novgorod land, and then the merchants and middle landowners. For centuries, the historically established agricultural class provided political leadership and economic prosperity in the unfavorable conditions of the Russian North. But the expropriation showed that this was not a simple unification of Novgorod with Moscow under the supremacy of Moscow, but in fact a conquest, accompanied by the destruction of the traditional structure of Novgorod society.

The confiscated lands became the property of the Moscow state, and the formation of a huge fund of state land property had a decisive influence on the formation of the Russian noble class, whose most characteristic feature was dependence on the central state. authorities. Power passed into the hands of the grand ducal governors, who had full power and “fed” at the expense of the controlled population.

The conquest of Novgorod laid the foundation for the future autocratic empire, becoming a turning point in the development of Russian political culture. The pogrom of Novgorod in 1569, organized by Ivan the Terrible, superimposed on the oprichnina terror that reigned in the country and the unsuccessful Livonian War, finally excluded the Novgorod experience as an alternative to the Moscow-type state-legal system existing in Russia.

During the Middle Ages, there were 15 principalities on the territory of Rus', but their number, as a result of feudal fragmentation, increased to 50. However, 3 of them, the largest, played a special role. These were Galicia-Volynskoe, Vladimirsko-Suzdalskoe and Novgorodskoe. Something can be more or less reliably learned about the latter only from the 9th century. The date of the official founding of Novgorod is considered to be 859, but historians note that the city itself appeared much earlier; it is simply not possible to establish the exact time.

The fact is that all the buildings at that time were completely wooden. Consequently, they easily burned and rotted, and little remained of them. And the activities of people who lived on the same land in later centuries almost completely buried the hopes of archaeologists to reliably establish something about those times. In addition, many written references about the Principality of Novgorod disappeared due to the Tatar-Mongol invasion. A huge number of documents simply perished in the fire.

However, from what we have been able to establish, it becomes clear that the Novgorod principality became acquainted with statehood quite early. And local historians even suggest that Rurik was here. But no confirmation has yet been found, only assumptions.

The most early recordings concern the sons of Svyatoslav, Oleg and Yaropolk. A power struggle broke out between them. As a result of fierce battles, Yaropolk defeated his brother and became the Grand Duke, capturing Kyiv. He chose mayors to govern Novgorod. Whom he killed younger brother, Vladimir, who fled to the Varangians, from where he returned with mercenary army, received power first in Novgorod, and then in Kyiv. And it was his son, Yaroslav the Wise, who refused to pay tribute to Kyiv. Vladimir, who was gathering a squad to deal with this problem, suddenly died. Power was seized by Svyatopolk the Accursed, who fought rather brutally for power without choosing any methods. But in the end, Yaroslav won, largely with the help of the support of the people, who feared a more cruel prince. Now Yaroslav became the Grand Duke, and he began to send his sons to Novgorod.

Even a brief retelling of a relatively short period of time concerning events from the 9th to the 11th centuries clearly shows that the Novgorod principality had time to get used to both the frequent change of princes and the constant struggle for power between them. It is noticeable that the majority sought to seize the throne, ultimately in Kyiv. Staying in Novgorod was often considered as an intermediate option. What affected a certain perception of princely power by the people: firstly, as temporary, and secondly, inextricably linked with war, squads and campaigns.

At the same time, Novgorod was a fairly large city, where a kind of democracy with elements of oligarchy gradually began to form. This became especially noticeable during the period of feudal fragmentation, when the prince was forced to sign a charter (agreement), on the basis of which he could legally stay in the city. At the same time, his powers were greatly limited. In particular, the prince could not declare war or make peace, independently trade, distribute lands, or grant privileges to anyone. He did not even have the right to hunt in the wrong place or keep a squad in the city itself: the latter was due to the fear that power would be seized by force.

In fact, the figure of the prince was reduced to the role of a military leader, a commander who was obliged to defend the city and received certain privileges in this regard. But his position often remained precarious. In order to gather people other than his own squad, for example, for a military campaign, the prince could address the residents at a people's meeting, which remained the highest authority. But he had no right to order.

Any free man could take part in the meeting. The meeting was convened by the mayor or the thousand, whom the veche appointed, taking away this right over time from the prince. The assembly was also considered the highest judicial body. The posadnik was the highest official who received ambassadors in the absence of the prince and led the armed forces in the same conditions. Tysyatsky was his right hand and assistant. The exact duration of their powers was not specified, but each could lose their position by losing the trust of the people. The Veche had the right to remove anyone it appointed from the relevant position. In general, the breadth of powers is clearly demonstrated by the fact that in Novgorod even a bishop was elected at a people's meeting.

As for the Boyar Council, it, in fact, dealt with trade issues. It also served as an advisory body. United all influential people, headed by the prince. I was preparing questions that were worth bringing up at the meeting.

Times of feudal fragmentation

The uniqueness of the Novgorod principality was fully manifested during the period of feudal fragmentation. Historically, such a division is usually assessed negatively, and it really had an extremely negative impact on the Slavs, making them vulnerable to the Tatar-Mongol yoke. But for individual lands this had its advantages. In particular, geographical location The Novgorod principality gave him some protection: it turned out to be quite far away even for nomads, and as a result, less than all other lands suffered from the actions of the Mongols. Protect western borders the Russian princes did much better. And thanks to fragmentation, Novgorodians did not get involved in the problems of their neighbors.

Also, do not forget that the Novgorod land itself was quite large. It was comparable in size to European states of the same period. And profitable geographical position allowed her to establish trade with the Hansa and some other neighbors. In addition to Novgorod itself, the principality included Pskov, Yuryev, Ladoga, Torzhok and other territories, including even part of the Urals. Through Novgorod it was possible to gain access to the Neva and the Baltic Sea. But it was not only the geographical location that made the principality so unique, but a combination of various factors, political, economic and cultural. And religious ones, too.

Life, religion and culture

With regard to such a state phenomenon as the Principality of Novgorod, the description will not be complete if attention is not paid to issues of religion, culture and life. The baptism of Novgorod took place shortly after Kyiv, from where the Byzantine priest Joachim Korsunanin was sent for this purpose. But, like many Slavs, the Novgorodians did not immediately abandon pagan beliefs. It's gotten to the point where christian religion, not wanting to constantly face resistance from the flock, absorbed some traditions, combining them with Christmas (fortune telling and other rituals).

As for culture, a careful study of the chronicles shows that here, until the capture of the Novgorod principality in the 15th century by Ivan III, a fairly good level of writing and education was maintained. It also affected that these lands suffered less than others from the invasion of the Tatar-Mongol yoke. Much knowledge was passed on from parents to children and was preserved. Which, in turn, affected everyday life. Thus, Novgorodians were ardent adherents of wooden housing construction, cleanliness, and certain rituals associated with nature. The identified cultural layer is so powerful that it is still being studied.

Reasons for fragmentation

According to the generally accepted point of view, from the middle of the 11th to the beginning of the 12th century. The Old Russian state entered a new stage in its history - the era of political and feudal fragmentation.

Kievan Rus was vast but unstable public education. The tribes that were part of it maintained their isolation for a long time. Individual lands under the dominance of subsistence farming could not form a single economic space. In addition, in the XI - XII centuries. new ones arise factors, contributing to the fragmentation of this unstable state.

1. The main force The process of separation was initiated by the boyars. Relying on his power, local princes were able to establish their power in each land. However, subsequently, inevitable contradictions and a struggle for influence and power arose between the strengthened boyars and the local princes.

2. The growth of population and, accordingly, the military potential of various regions of Rus' became the basis for the formation of a number of sovereign principalities. Civil strife among the princes arose.

3. The gradual growth of cities, trade and economic development of individual lands led to the loss of Kiev historical role in connection with the movement of trade routes and the emergence of new centers of craft and trade, increasingly independent from the capital of the Russian state.

4. There was a complication of the social structure of society, the emergence of the nobility.

5. Finally, the collapse of a unified state was facilitated by the lack of serious external threat for the entire East Slavic community. Later, this threat appeared from the Mongols, but the process of separating the principalities had already gone too far by that time.

These processes actually manifested themselves in the middle of the second half of the 11th century. Prince Yaroslav the Wise, shortly before his death (1054), divided the lands between his five sons. But he did this in such a way that the sons' possessions mutually divided each other; it was almost impossible to manage them independently. Yaroslav tried to solve two problems at once in this way:

On the one hand, he sought to avoid bloody strife between the heirs, which usually began after the death of the Kyiv prince: each of the sons received lands that were supposed to ensure his existence as a sovereign prince;

On the other hand, Yaroslav hoped that his children would jointly defend all-Russian interests, related primarily to the defense of borders. The Grand Duke did not intend to divide the united Rus' into independent ones, independent states; he only hoped that now it, as a single whole, would be ruled not by one person, but by the entire princely family.

It is not entirely clear how exactly the subordination of various lands to Kyiv was ensured, or how these lands were distributed among the princes. Described by historians of the 19th century. the principle of gradual (alternate) movement of princes from one throne to another was more of an ideal scheme than a practically functioning mechanism (A. Golovatenko).

CM. Solovyov, analyzing the political structure of Rus' after Yaroslav the Wise (1019–1054), came to the conclusion that the lands subject to the Grand Duke were not divided into separate possessions, but were considered as common property the entire Yaroslavich family. The princes received for temporary control any part of this common possession - the better, the “older” this or that prince was considered. Seniority, according to Yaroslav's plan, was to be determined in the following way: all his brothers followed the ruling Grand Duke of Kyiv; after their death, their eldest sons succeeded their fathers in the line of princes, gradually moving from less prestigious thrones to more important ones. At the same time, only those princes whose fathers managed to reign in the capital could claim the title of Grand Duke. If some prince died before it was his turn to take the throne in Kyiv, then his descendants were deprived of the right to this throne and reigned somewhere in the province.

Such a system "ladder ascent" » - « next order“inheritance (V.O. Klyuchevsky), was very far from perfect and gave rise to constant strife between brothers and children of princes (the eldest son of the Grand Duke could take his father’s throne only after the death of all his uncles). Disputes about seniority between uncles and nephews were a frequent occurrence in Rus' (already Moscow) and more late period until in the 15th century. there was no established procedure for transferring power from father to son.

At every opportunity, the Yaroslavichs tried to break the order - of course, for the benefit of themselves or their closest relatives and allies. The “ladder scheme” turned out to be unviable; the confusing order of inheritance was the reason for frequent strife, and the discontent of the princes, excluded from the queue for power, led to the fact that they turned to the Hungarians, Poles, and Cumans for help.

Thus, since the 50s. XI century The process of determining the boundaries of future independent lands was underway. Kyiv became the first among the principality-states. Soon other lands caught up with it and even outstripped it in their development. A dozen independent principalities and lands emerged, the boundaries of which were formed within the framework of the Kyiv state as the boundaries of appanages, volosts, where local dynasties ruled.

As a result of fragmentation, principalities emerged as independent principalities, the names of which were given capital cities: Kiev, Chernigov, Pereyaslav, Murmansk, Ryazan, Rostov-Suzdal, Smolensk, Galician, Vladimir-Volyn, Polotsk, Turovo-Pinsk, Tmutarakan, Novgorod and Pskov lands. Each of the lands was ruled by its own dynasty - one of the branches of the Rurikovichs. The new form of state-political organization was politicalfragmentation, which replaced the early feudal monarchy.

In 1097, on the initiative of Yaroslav’s grandson, Prince Vladimir Vsevolodovich Monomakh of Pereyaslavl, a congress of princes met in the city of Lyubech. It was installed new principle organization of power in Rus' - “let everyone keep his fatherland.” Thus, the Russian land ceased to be the combined possession of an entire clan. The possessions of each branch of this family are patrimony (became her hereditary property). This decision consolidated feudal fragmentation. Only later, when Vladimir Monomakh (1113–1125) became the Grand Duke of Kyiv, and also under his son Mstislav (1126–1132), the state unity of Rus' was temporarily restored. Rus' maintained relative political unity.

The beginning of the period of fragmentation (both political and feudal) should be considered from 1132. However, Rus' was ready for collapse long ago (it is no coincidence that V.O. Klyuchevsky defines the beginning of “ specific period", i.e. the period of independence of Russian principalities, not from 1132, but from 1054, when, according to the will of Yaroslav the Wise, Rus' was divided among his children). Since 1132, the princes stopped reckoning with the Grand Duke of Kyiv as the head of all Rus' (T.V. Chernikova).

Some modern historians do not use the term “feudal fragmentation” to characterize the processes that took place in the Russian lands at the end of the 11th – beginning of the 12th centuries. They see the main reason for the fragmentation of Rus' in the formation of city-states. The super union led by Kiev broke up into a number of city-states, which, in turn, became centers of land-volosts that arose on the territory of the former tribal unions. According to these views, Rus' from the beginning of the 12th century. entered the period of existence of autonomous communal unions, which took the form of city-states (I.Ya. Froyanov).

Novgorod land in the XII-XV centuries.

Novgorod land

By the 13th century. The Novgorod land turned out to be the most prosperous and cultural region of all that was previously included in Kievan Rus. After the defeat of Byzantium by the Crusaders in 1204, the remnants of Russian foreign trade moved to the Baltic Sea, and Novgorod, with its dependent Pskov, took the place of Kyiv as the business center of the country.

Novgorod land is located in the north-west of Rus'. It is characterized by poor and marshy soils, and therefore the conditions for agriculture here are unfavorable. Vast forest areas provided the opportunity to hunt fur-bearing animal, and along the shores of the White Sea and on the sea. Novgorod is located on the Volkhov River, directly on the route “from the Varangians to the Greeks” (Gulf of Finland - Neva - Lake Ladoga - Volkhov). Its geographical location created favorable conditions for trade with Russia and abroad.

Because of his northern position Novgorod could not always provide itself with food and was forced to buy grain in Germany and between the Oka and Volga rivers. The prosperity of Novgorod was based on close cooperation with the Hanseatic League of Free Trade Cities, of which he became an active member. German merchants founded permanent colonies in Novgorod, Pskov, Sol Vychegda and other cities. They obliged the Novgorod authorities to contact producers of goods only through Russian intermediaries, in return for which they received full control over the entire overseas part of the business, including transportation and sales. It was the interests of foreign trade, according to most historians, that forced the Novgorodians to expand the borders of their state right up to the Urals, exploring and colonizing most north of the country.

The order of government that emerged in Novgorod in all its main features resembled the form known from the history of the medieval city-states of Western Europe.

Novgorod consisted of two sides (Sofia and Trade), divided into ends. Initially there were three ends (Slavensky, Nerevsky, Lyudin), later - five (Prussky and Plotnitsky stood out). Initially, the ends were independent settlements of different tribes, which later merged into a single city. They were inhabited by Ilmen Slovenes, Krivichi, Merya and, possibly, Chud. “Novgorod” itself was originally called not the entire city, but the Kremlin, where the secular administration and priesthood common to all villages were located.

Most of the wealth was in the hands not of princes, but of powerful trading and landowning families. The Novgorodians invited princes to conduct military campaigns. In the 13th century these were often the sons of the Grand Dukes of Vladimir. The prince was elected by the veche, and it also established the rules that he was obliged to adhere to. After 1200, the veche became the focus of Novgorod sovereignty. The oldest surviving contract between Novgorod and the prince dates back to 1265. The rules were strict, especially in financial matters. The prince owned some property, but he and his warriors were expressly forbidden to acquire estates and servants (slaves) on the territory of Novgorod and to exploit industries without the permission of the veche. The prince could not increase or decrease taxes, declare war or make peace, and in any way interfere with the activities of government agencies and the politics of the city. Sometimes the prince was forbidden to enter into direct relations with German merchants. These restrictions were in no way an empty formality, as evidenced by the expulsion from Novgorod of princes accused of going beyond the limits of their powers. During one particularly turbulent period, 38 princes visited Novgorod one after another over 102 years.

The veche also controlled the civil administration of the city and adjacent volosts, electing the mayor, the mayor and appointing the church ruler - the archbishop (in the early period of the republic - the bishop). All free Novgorodians, including those from remote cities and villages of the land, were allowed to attend the meeting. Novgorod was divided into 10 tax-paying “hundreds,” which were governed by the sotskys, subordinate to the thousand. Some historians express the opinion that Tysyatsky led the Novgorod militia - the “thousand”. After Novgorod separated from Kyiv, the mayor was no longer the eldest of the sons of the Grand Duke of Kyiv, but always one of the boyars. Tysyatsky initially elected a representative of the merchants, but in the 13th–14th centuries. and this position passed into the hands of the boyars. The Novgorod archbishop (“Vladyka”), who was elected at the assembly, was then confirmed Metropolitan of Kyiv. The archbishop, together with the mayor, affixed his seal to the international treaties of Novgorod and represented the Novgorodians in negotiations with the Russian princes. He even had his own regiment. The ordinary population of Novgorod took part only in the “Konchansky” and “Ulichansky” veche, electing the elders of the ends and streets. However, the boyars also often used the Konchan and Ulichsky veches for their own purposes, pitting the residents of “their” end against rivals from other ends.

The decisive word at the meeting belonged to the Novgorod boyars, who traced their origins to the old squad, which was dominated by people from the Slavs and Varangians. The boyars consisted of several dozen prominent families, each of which was organized into a corporation around the personality of a saint - the patron saint of a temple. Often the temple was built at the expense of the boyar family. The independence of the boyars had no parallel in any Russian city, either then or since. Boyar families filled all high positions in the city. The Novgorod boyars were focused more on maintaining close ties with the Lithuanian state rather than with Vladimir (later Moscow) Russia. This was especially evident in the 15th century.

The Mongol-Tatars did not plunder Novgorod in 1238. They did not reach it by about 100 kilometers. But Novgorod paid tribute to them at the request of its prince Alexander Yaroslavich (after 1240 - Nevsky). The Mongol-Tatars did not interfere in the political system of the Novgorod land; they visited these places infrequently and ethnocultural processes actually had no impact.

Novgorod's relations with its northwestern neighbors were much more tense. At the beginning of the 13th century. German crusaders captured the lands of Western Lithuanians (Zemaitians), Curonians, Semigallians, Latgalians and southern Estonians. Northern Estonia was captured by the Danes at the same time. The Order of the Swordsmen, having captured the Eastern Baltic, deprived the weakened Principality of Polotsk political influence in the lower reaches of the Western Dvina. In 1237, the Order of the Swordsmen united with the Teutonic Order, which settled in East Prussia. Formed Livonian Order. The forces that resisted the order's aggression for decades were Lithuania and the Novgorod land. Military conflicts between Novgorod and Lithuania were also frequent.

In 1239 Grand Duke Vladimirsky Yaroslav Vsevolodovich restored his supreme power over Smolensk, having won it from Lithuania. In 1239–1240 his son Alexander defeated the Swedes on the Neva. In 1241–1242, having enlisted the support of the Horde Tatars, he expelled the Germans from Koporye and their supporters from Pskov, and on April 5, 1242, he inflicted a crushing defeat on the Germans in the battle of Lake Peipsi(Battle on the Ice). After him, the Livonian Order for 10 years did not dare to undertake offensive actions against Rus'.