Radical transformation of the system international relations, the adoption of a new military doctrine, a reduction in the size of the Armed Forces, a focus on quality parameters in defense construction - these and many other factors dictate the need for military reform in Russia. Therefore, military reform became an imperative of socio-political practice in Russia after the end of "cold war". The need for military reform in the Russian Federation is due to geopolitical changes. It is geopolitical features that predetermine the significant scale of transformation that must be carried out in the context of large-scale socio-economic reforms.
The armed forces inherited by the Russian Federation from the USSR were created as a means of confrontation in "cold war" and in many respects do not meet the requirements for modern armed forces. The Russian army is not sufficiently prepared for local and ethnic conflicts; technical equipment Russian army, insufficient professionalism of soldiers and officers. One of the main problems of the Russian army has been insufficient funding « human resource» , as well as ineffective mechanisms for social protection of military personnel. All of these problems and many others cannot be solved by gradually correcting the shortcomings inherent in the Russian army - to solve the numerous problems of the Russian armed forces, it is necessary to implement military reform as a comprehensive series of measures aimed at radically transforming the RF Armed Forces.
Military reform should not be identified with the reform of the Armed Forces, since the reform of the Armed Forces is considered as an integral part of the reform of the entire military development in the country. In this context, it is also worth noting some other problems accompanying the implementation of the military reform process in modern Russia, which, one way or another, require close study.
The crisis in the Russian army worsened in the late 1980s. By the end of the 80s. expenses for the military-industrial complex and the maintenance of a multimillion-dollar army aggravated the economic crisis. Underestimation of the factor of the Russian army's unpreparedness to repel threats to global, regional and national security has led to miscalculations in the military reform carried out in Russia. It should also be noted that all these factors create the prerequisites for the implementation of military reform in order to strengthen the combat capability of the Russian army.
As main negative factors, which predetermined the decline in combat readiness of the Soviet and then Russian army, K. Tsirulis and V. Bazhanov indicate:
1. The irreconcilable contradiction of the corrupt caste with the rest of the officer mass;
2. Alienation between the generals, officers, sergeants and soldiers;
3. "Hazing", which created a tendency to criminalize the army and a system of ugly informal relationships;
4. Intensive development of equipment and weapons, which has exacerbated the contradiction between the need to increase the professionalism of personnel and outdated methods of combat training and its organization;
5. The decline in the prestige of military service in the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation due to the involvement of military personnel of military specialties in economic work, which led to a decrease in combat readiness.
Unsatisfactory combat readiness is associated with a transition from the form of army organization inherent in the command-administrative system Soviet type to the form of army organization democratic state. However, events in the early 1990s prevented the rapid implementation of military reforms. In the 1990s. military reform was not implemented. The state policy of reducing military spending without reforming the Armed Forces led to the collapse of the army. The shortage of funding for the Armed Forces has led to the use of emergency reserves.
The military reform programs being developed had political significance, and military reform in practice meant a theoretical, methodological, organizational and legal framework. However, the successful implementation of military reform in the late 1990s. were hampered by insufficient funding, shortage of funds and lack of political will to implement the planned measures. During the military reform from 1992 to 2001, which can be called, in the words of L. Pevenya "a decade of missed opportunities", its main tasks were not completed:
- high combat readiness of troops is not ensured;
- not developed effective measures By social security military personnel.
The aspect of the gradual transition of the Russian army to a contract basis for staffing positions deserves special attention. In the context of military reform in Russia, this process can be seen as affecting not only the organization of the Russian army, but also influencing Russian society. This makes it possible for contract soldiers to effectively use the latest equipment and improve the professionalism of military personnel and the Russian army as a whole. However, the initial cost of maintaining contract soldiers significantly exceeds the cost of conscript soldiers. The first experiments on the formation of military units from contract soldiers were carried out in the early 1990s. The first unsuccessful experiment to transfer the army to a contract system of recruiting privates and non-commissioned officers in Russia began in 1992. The peak of the unsuccessful experiment occurred in the summer - autumn of 1993 - the experiment failed due to insufficient funding and the lack of a social benefits package for contract workers.
However, even now material remuneration and social benefits for contract workers are minimal. It can be assumed that, provided favorable socio-economic conditions are provided for a significant part of conscripts, this type of service in the Armed Forces can become an attractive and prestigious type civil service. Important role Positive advertising in the media can play a role in increasing motivation to serve under a contract. Support for the transition to a professional army is significantly higher among groups with higher social resources and the potential for their implementation.
The introduction of the alternative civil service (ACS) became important event in the socio-political life of the Russian Federation. Perhaps in the future the AGS Institute will be replenished with a large number of potential participants, the number of which can be measured in tens and hundreds of thousands. Jobs for those mobilized within the framework of the alternative civil service can be found in orphanages and homes, homes for the elderly, and people with disabilities. These jobs, as a rule, are characterized by relatively difficult working conditions and are not prestigious and unattractive for the majority of traditional workers, but the public demand for such work is increasing. Military reforms meet with support in Russian society, especially among those categories of conscripts and other social groups that receive social benefits or benefits as a result of the introduction of alternative civilian service. The problem of assessing the socio-economic consequences of staffing the alternative civil service is difficult to predict long-term. It should be assumed that many social groups will benefit from these innovations. However, in existing form These transformations cannot solve the main problem of the Russian army - the plight of soldiers (called up for military service) and officers.
Social aspects of military reform of the Russian Armed Forces
IN post-reform Russia complex, contradictory and often unpredictable social processes have a significant impact not only on certain social groups of Russian society, but also on military personnel and their families. Indeed, one of the main problems of the Russian army has been insufficient funding "human resource", ineffective mechanisms for social protection of soldiers and officers. All of these and many other problems cannot be solved by gradually correcting the shortcomings inherent in the Russian army. Therefore, in order to solve numerous social problems of the Russian army, it is necessary to implement comprehensive measures, the purpose of which is to take targeted actions aimed at radically transforming the social protection system of Russian military personnel.
Low pay for military personnel and insufficient funding for the maintenance of the army have become one of the important problems requiring immediate solution. In this regard, economic measures of the Government have been adopted or planned to be adopted, the purpose of which is to replace the benefits of military personnel with monetary compensation. Calculated for 2002-2010. the State Housing Certificates program partially contributed to solving this problem. The functioning of the mortgage system for officers will solve the housing problem for many military personnel.
Having considered the main aspects of military reform and its impact social aspects on Russian society, we can come to the following conclusions:
1. Russia as great country, on which international security depends, must have a combat-ready army that meets the most modern requirements. The need to counter terrorist threats and repel the threats of potential aggressors obliges military personnel to constantly improve the military-technical equipment of the army.
2. In the modern Russian army there is a very negative social climate, very common cases "hazing". To increase public confidence in the army, hazing must be curbed. Frequent cases of violation of fundamental human rights in the army determine the negative attitude of many conscripts towards military service. Numerous illegal methods of evading military conscription are widespread.
3. Military reform, carried out in Russia for more than a century and a half, has become one of key events Russian socio-political life. It has a great influence on Russian society and affects the interests of many social groups and lobbies.
4. The most pressing problem of military reform has a rational, feasible solution for the Russian economy and society. Since 2001, it has entered the accelerated implementation process. The successful implementation of the military reform of the RF Armed Forces will make it possible to move to a new system of recruiting troops without compromising the combat capabilities of military units, to ensure the necessary number of trained reserves, to eliminate many aspects of social tension in society, which is typical for current system appeal and ensure Russian society's support for reforms.
Work with personnel
Referring to authoritative studies of domestic experts in the field of military construction and military management, B.L. Belyakov highlights the problems of educating personnel of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation, and also focuses his research interest on the substantive characteristics of their influence. He points out that the problems of modern military education are determined by such a factor as the disintegration of the relatively effective system that previously functioned in the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation and has been established for decades educational work, including strengthening military discipline, with military personnel of various ethnic groups and nations, along with introducing a confessional factor into the army environment.
The slow and protracted phased creation of a new system of educational work, which does not meet the main goals and objectives of the concept of transition to a unitary system of educational work in military collectives of various branches of the Armed Forces. This slow process of transition to a unitary education system, in his opinion, also makes it difficult for more effective and coordinated work command and commanders of military formations, as well as the system of bureaucratic departments of educational work to unite and carry out educational work in multinational or multi-ethnic military collectives of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation. Moreover, the absence in the Armed Forces of a scientifically and conceptually based system and training program for humanities specialists (philologists, ethnologists and historians) specially trained to conduct socially oriented work (information, educational, etc.) with military personnel of various ethnic groups has a negative impact and nationalities inhabiting the Russian Federation.
In the 70s of the last century in Soviet army There were no serious interethnic or interethnic conflicts, and the grandfather structure prevailed in the system of social relations in army collectives. Later, when solidarity in army collectives on a national, ethnic or compatriotic basis acquired a large-scale character, the compatriot-status system of social relations in many cases prevailed in army collectives over the traditional "grandfather's" and even destroy the latter. With the collapse of the USSR and the increased national homogeneity of the Russian army, the criminal system came to the fore.
In the modern Russian army, many commanders and their assistants in educational work need to work and act, mainly in extraordinary conditions and with some elements of innovation and even, under certain conditions, risk, to solve current problems and tasks of increased pedagogical complexity. At the same time, it is also necessary to take into account that some commanders have lost the previous ideological and moral-value guidelines of the traditional system of educational work that developed in the Russian and Soviet armies, and new spiritual values in educational activities never formed. Failed search experiments national idea, ostentatious appeal to national and ethno-confessional sources, the decline in the standard of living of a significant number of the country's population led to social and legal vulnerability and uncertainty about the future among a significant number of military personnel. All these factors in a negative way influence the pedagogical activities of officers in the army to strengthen military discipline in military teams. It should also be noted that the solution to many of the above problems and challenges is possible by turning to theoretical, conceptual and practical methods sociological science and the involvement of professional sociologists in eliminating the consequences of these dysfunctional phenomena in the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation.
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The Decree of the President of the Russian Federation of July 16, 1997 “On priority measures to reform the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation and improve their structure” substantiates the need for military reform and defines the stages, content and timing of military reforms. Military reform is being carried out in two stages.
At the first stage(until 2000) there was a noticeable reduction in the number of armed forces. By the end of 1998 it amounted to 1.2 million military personnel. At the same time, the process of optimizing the structure of the combat personnel of the Armed Forces was underway. In the second half of 1997, the unification of the Strategic Missile Forces (RVSN), Military Space Forces (VKS) and Rocket and Space Defense Forces (RKO) was carried out. Qualitatively new ones have been created Strategic Missile Forces. Further - in 1998, the Air Force (Air Force) and the Troops were merged air defense(air defense). Qualitatively new ones have been created Air Force. During the reform, serious changes took place in Navy, although its structure is generally preserved. Major changes took place in Ground forces.On the basis of formations and units of reduced strength and personnel, storage bases for weapons and military equipment (ACVT) have been created. What is important from a mobilization point of view. The military-industrial complex is being reformed. Conditions are being created for the military-technical re-equipment of the army and navy. Through the merger of educational institutions and their transformation, a radical reorganization of the military education system.
However, after the completion of the first stage of military reform, improvement military organization countries has slowed down noticeably.
The year 2000 was a turning point in terms of reform. Twice - in August and November - the Security Council considered issues of military development. The system of functioning of the Armed Forces was recognized not only as unbalanced, but as ineffective. Thorough, serious work has been done, taking into account forecasts for the development of the Armed Forces and the country's economy. The volumes of financing up to 2010 were determined, broken down by year and item of expenditure. Aircraft construction plan until 2005 ., which is a complex of more than 30 interrelated documents, was signed by the President of the Russian Federation.
In the next three to four years, the size of the army and navy will decrease by 365 thousand military personnel and 120 thousand civilian specialists. However, the reduction of the army and navy will in no way affect the quality of the permanent readiness units. The main task of the reforms is the ability to localize the armed conflict in strategic directions. Since we now have six such directions, and seven military districts, the PriVO and Ural Military Districts are planned to be combined into one military district.
The largest structural change will be the transition of the Armed Forces to a three-service basis: Ground troops, Air Force and Navy - according to the principle of “three elements”. And on the basis of the strategic missile forces, two branches of the Armed Forces will be created: the Strategic Missile Forces and the one formed by merging the Military Space Forces with the Rocket and Space Defense forces.
A decision was also made to reduce the so-called military formations of other ministries and departments (including the reduction of military departments under state educational institutions higher vocational education).
It is clear that the reform process will not be limited to these measures. Much will still have to change - be it the social sphere, military education or science. However, the first decisive step in the right direction has been taken.
Reference: if in the 90s the Russian Armed Forces did not emerge from a protracted crisis, then many times more difficult situation turned out to be the national armies of the states parties to the Collective Security Treaty and the Union of Independent States (CIS). Almost everywhere there is a sharp decline in combat training and the level of combat readiness of troops. Despite the presence of often a significant amount of weapons, only a very small proportion of them are suitable for combat use (with the exception of the Armed Forces of Belarus).
A significant part of the equipment is in storage, and in disassembled form. Thus, only a few of the army aviation helicopters are capable of taking to the air. Air Force units have less than 30% serviceable aircraft. Many types of weapons (90%) are morally outdated, while modern types of military equipment are national armies Hardly ever. The entire fleet of combat vehicles and vehicles does not have batteries. Combat training has become conditional, since military equipment is allocated best case scenario 5-15% of fuels and lubricants from requirements.
One of the main reasons for this state of affairs is considered to be the weakness and incompetence of the national military elite, senior command personnel at the strategic and operational-tactical level.
Many officers and generals of titular nationalities, hastily promoted to the highest leadership positions in their armies, do not have the necessary service experience and military education, even at the operational-tactical level.
Finally, new states simply do not have enough funds. If, for example, the entire annual Ukrainian military budget as a whole is sufficient to maintain only one combat-ready division according to NATO standards, then in the other republics former USSR the situation is even worse.
conclusions:
The heirs of centuries-old military glory - the Armed Forces of Russia - have a clearly justified structure - they consist of types and branches of the military, each of which performs tasks according to its intended purpose. The RF Armed Forces are equipped with modern, effective weapons, most of which are superior to those of foreign armies.
Changes in the military-political situation, tasks and conditions of the country's military security dictate the need for comprehensive military reform.
| III. FINAL PART ………….. 5 min. 1.Remind the topic, what issues were discussed, the goals of the lesson, how they were achieved. 2. Answer students’ questions 3. Announce final grades to students who were surveyed during class, note those who distinguished themselves, and indicate general shortcomings. 4. Announce the topic of the next lesson and its location. 5. Announcement of the task for self-study with reference to the literature: a) Study from the notes: - the purpose, composition and tasks of the main branches of the Armed Forces and branches of the Ground Forces; - the concept of association, connection, part, division; - content of the stages of military reform of the Armed Forces. b) Write down in your workbook: - from the overhead projector slide and know by heart the diagram of the composition of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation; - from the Military Manual of the SV, part 2 and know by heart the abbreviations of motorized rifle, tank and artillery units. | If students have no questions, ask 1-2 questions on the topic covered. Please note that the completion of the task will be checked by a control test at the next lesson. |
Seven years have passed since the beginning of the Serdyukov-Makarov military reform: this year the second stage of reforms ends. There are still five years ahead. Sankt-Peterburg.ru talks about what has already been done to reform the Armed Forces, what remains to be done and what the army of the future is like.
In short: the essence of the reform
Russia has experienced many military reforms. Highest value for us today are those that were adopted under Peter the Great and after him: actually Petrovskaya, Potemkinskaya, Milyutinskaya, Frunzenskaya and others. The current transformations in the military sphere are called the “reform of Anatoly Serdyukov,” who was the country’s Minister of Defense from 2007 to 2012, but the changes that have already happened and are coming are associated not only with his name. Serdyukov’s authorship actually belongs to the ideas about a new look at military spending, about the humanization of military service, and about outsourcing consumer services for military personnel. However, changes in the structure of the Armed Forces were initiated by the ex-chiefs of the General Staff of the Russian Armed Forces: Nikolai Makarov and Yuri Baluevsky. Simply put, if Serdyukov was involved in the socio-economic side of the matter, then the “military” section of the reform was developed by Makarov, and before him by Baluevsky.
Nikolai Makarov (left) replaced Yuri Baluevsky in the General Staff
photo: svoboda.org
Serdyukov announced the start of a new military reform on October 14, 2008 at a meeting of the board of his department. 19.2 trillion rubles were allocated for the implementation of the new State Armament Program. The reform affects all functional bases of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation: the number of personnel, the officer training system, the structure central control, and also provides for the gradual equipping of the army with modern military equipment. Conventionally, the reform was divided into three stages. The first (2008-2011) announced the optimization of the number of personnel and management personnel, as well as the reform of military education. In the second (2012-2015) - increasing wages, providing housing, professional retraining and advanced training of military personnel. The third (2016-2020), the most expensive, involves rearmament.
The conceptual basis of the reform is research and development work, for the active development of which about 2 trillion rubles were allocated. Fundamental Goal reform is to move from the Soviet system to a more modern structure of the Armed Forces. That is, a mass and mobilization army adapted for a global war (for example, with NATO) should be replaced by a more compact one, adequate to the current economic, social and territorial capabilities of the country and adapted to local regional conflicts army of constant readiness.
Of course, the matter will not be limited to scientific research. An equally priority area was the improvement of strategic nuclear weapons. In particular, the development of a ground-based missile force and the modernization of strategic aviation - Tu-95 and Tu-160 (the same amount of funds were allocated for these purposes as for scientific research - 2 trillion rubles) and the introduction of a heavy liquid-fueled intercontinental ballistic missile to replace outdated ICBMs RS-18 and RS-20 and a promising long-range aviation complex.
"First Swallows"
The first stage plan (2008-2011), announced by Serdyukov in October 2008, implied a reduction in the size of the Russian Armed Forces to one million military personnel by 2012. At the same time, the officer corps should be optimized to 150 thousand people, which entailed a significant reduction: in 2008 it amounted to 355 thousand officer positions. In the Russian Air Force, from 2009 to 2012, it was planned to eliminate all aviation divisions and regiments, forming 55 air bases on their basis, and also to reduce over 50 thousand officer positions. The number of units of the Russian Navy was to be reduced from 240 to 123. The officer corps of the fleet was planned to be reduced by 2-2.5 times. And finally, the reorganization of the military education system involved the creation of 10 systemically important universities - three military educational and scientific center, six academies and one university - on the basis of the already existing 65 military educational institutions. What of the plans was implemented and how qualitative were the changes?
Introduction of operational-strategic commands
Before Serdyukov and Makarov, as discussed above, the foundations for reform had already been laid by Baluevsky. Thus, he came up with the idea of creating operational-strategic commands. USCs are useful in that they unite power groups in a particular territory (the exception is Strategic nuclear forces) and make it possible to create a unified troop command and control system, the same in conditions of both peace and war. In other words, if hostilities begin, there will be no need to waste time rebuilding the system: it will already be ready for use.
In the 1970-80s, the USC also existed in the USSR: then they were formed to control troops in foreign theaters of military operations and were liquidated after the collapse of the organization Warsaw Pact and the collapse of the USSR. From that moment on, troops on the territory of the Russian Federation began to be controlled through a system of military districts, founded by Dmitry Milyutin, Minister of Defense of the Russian Empire in 1861-1881. General Baluevsky began the introduction of the USC, Makarov continued his work and eliminated the system of districts. Today there are four USCs: “West” (general headquarters in St. Petersburg), “East” (Khabarovsk), “Center” (Ekaterinburg) and “South” (Rostov-on-Don). Today, all forces are subordinate to the USC general purpose, including air force/air defense and navy units. At the same time, the military districts became not six, but four.
Transfer of the Ground Forces to a brigade structure
Another change initiated by Baluev and brought to fruition by Makarov was the liquidation of divisions and the transfer of the Ground Forces to the structure of brigades, which became mobile components of groupings under the control of the operational command - army headquarters. The existing divisions were transformed into three types of brigades numbering 5-6.5 thousand people: “heavy”, “medium”, “light”. The “heavy” ones include tanks and most motorized rifle brigades. They are distinguished by increased impact force and survivability. “Medium” brigades are equipped with armored personnel carriers and are designed to conduct combat operations in specific conditions, both urban and natural, for example, in mountainous or wooded areas. “Light” brigades are distinguished by high maneuverability: they are equipped with appropriate vehicles.
"Unloading" of managers
The changes also affected the management corps. Firstly, the commanders of military units and formations of permanent readiness no longer resolve economic issues, which allowed them to concentrate on their immediate work, and the responsibilities for providing logistics fell on the heads of educational centers and universities.
Secondly, the General Staff has become a full-fledged strategic planning body, which organizes and manages the Armed Forces together with the Ministry of Defense.
Thirdly, within the Ministry of Defense, which for a long time remained the main command authority, two emerged individual directions. The “military” branch of the Ministry of Defense, headed by the General Staff, deals exclusively with issues of combat training of the Armed Forces and command and control of troops. The “civilian” branch, which employs the relevant specialized departments, resolves all financial, housing, medical, and economic issues that arise in the rear, including the purchase of military equipment. Many experts believe that this measure helps reduce corruption in arms procurement and improve governance in cash The Ministry of Defense is transparent.
New troop basing system
It involves the formation of 184 military camps, which will be able to accommodate personnel of the Armed Forces total number more than 700 thousand people. To optimize the aviation basing system of the Armed Forces, 31 air bases Air Force was reduced to 8. To increase the mobility and fire capabilities of the troops, army aviation bases were created.
photo: arms-expo.ru
Formation of officer and sergeant corps
The reduction of the army and its recruitment is the most painful point in the entire reform. In particular, the reduction of the officer corps. If in 2008 the number of officers (these are generals, colonels, lieutenant colonels, majors, captains, senior lieutenants and lieutenants) was 365 thousand people, then in 2012 there were only 142 thousand left. The positions of warrant officer and midshipman were abolished. However, in the process of changes, the approach had to be adjusted: the Ministry of Defense decided to “rewind” and leave 220 thousand officers in the Armed Forces. The formal explanation for this change was the creation of the Aerospace Defense Forces as a separate structure, however, according to a number of experts, main reason is that the 142,000-strong officer corps was ultimately considered insufficient to control the Armed Forces. As a result, by decree of Dmitry Medvedev, the missing 80 thousand were returned to the Armed Forces.
Similar “throwing” accompanied the decision of the Ministry of Defense regarding the transfer of the army to a completely contract service. At first, the department increased the share of contract soldiers and rapidly reduced the number of conscripts. Then it again reduced the number of contract soldiers, explaining its actions by difficulties caused by the economic crisis. Finally, in 2011, the emphasis was again placed on “personnel officers” - they should now form the basis of the army.
This uncertainty, in turn, jeopardized the sergeant corps. After reforming the officer corps and eliminating the positions of warrant officers and midshipmen, it was decided that they should be replaced by sergeants and foremen. But in practice, it turned out that there is no place to train sergeants yet, and a sergeant’s salary is so low that it is almost impossible to collect the required number of employees. As a result, at the beginning of 2013, the positions of warrant officers were returned. Today, with an increase in pay and the gradual improvement of sergeant schools, the question of the formation sergeant corps It’s no longer so acute.
Reorganization of the military education system
In order to new system worked without interruption, there was a need for a promotion vocational training military personnel, new programs for their training and the creation of a modern network of military educational institutions. On September 1, 2011, military educational institutions of the Ministry of Defense began training officers with higher military operational-tactical training and higher military operational-strategic training under additional professional education programs.
photo: unn.ru
The Ministry of Defense began to apply unified approaches to training in military and civilian schools: primary-level officers began to be trained under specialist training programs, and at branch academies and the Military Academy of the General Staff of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation - under additional professional education programs. Professional sergeants are now trained in training connections And military units, in sergeant schools and in higher educational institutions of the Ministry of Defense under secondary vocational education programs. In 2009, such training was launched in six universities of the Russian Ministry of Defense, including the Sergeant Training Center (Ryazan), in 2010 - in 19 universities, in 2011 - in 24.
Second stage: humanization of the army
Changes in the army's infrastructure became the main task of the second stage of reforms (2011-2015). In recent years, it has been carried out under the auspices of the “Effective Army” program - a set of solutions in all areas of the Armed Forces. It made it possible to increase the pay of military personnel and launch targeted provision of housing for them. In addition, the program involves the construction of standard headquarters, barracks, gyms and canteens. This means that by the end of the reform, all military units will be equipped with the same infrastructure that works efficiently and smoothly.
Thus, by the beginning of the new decade, a unified system of logistics support for troops had been formed - unified logistics centers, managing all types of supplies and transportation throughout the military district. At the same time, a transition began to servicing technical parks at enterprises that repair weapons and military equipment. Most importantly, many functions to provide infrastructure for the troops were taken over by civilian enterprises. On an outsourcing basis, maintenance and repair of equipment, catering for personnel, bath and laundry services, cargo transportation, refueling of naval ships with fuel and motor oils, comprehensive airfield maintenance of aircraft, refueling of automotive equipment through the network are now carried out. gas stations, operation of communal infrastructure.
Apartments
Due to dramatic changes in the size of the officer corps, the problem of housing shortages has worsened. The fact is that every officer who has served for more than 10 years and left service (not for discreditable reasons) has the right to an apartment at his chosen place of residence. Almost 170 thousand officers were laid off, and most of them needed housing for their families. A queue formed, but by the end of 2010 it had decreased to 120 thousand people, and in 2011 - to 63.8 thousand people. If we consider that in 2013, 21 thousand military personnel received official housing, and in 2014 - 47 thousand, then we can safely say that all officers who left the service received apartments. Most importantly, sq. meters began to provide those who are still in the service: at the beginning of 2015, almost 4 thousand Russian military personnel received housing. Housing issue for the military turned out to be completely solvable, and the current situation is noticeably different from what it was in the late 2000s.
Nutrition
Until 2010, the food system rested on the shoulders of the servicemen themselves, and in the literal sense: hot meals were prepared by the soldiers themselves, conscripts went through cook school, soldiers peeled potatoes in the kitchen. Another achievement of the military reform is that food was transferred to civilian companies, after which, according to reviews from servicemen, the quality of food increased sharply, and the soldiers were finally able to engage in their immediate duties - military service. Outsourcing companies provide the process from start to finish: delivery, delivery, storage, preparation, distribution, service according to standards. Civil services also began to maintain military camps, clean barracks and surrounding areas, sew uniforms, organize military transportation and repair of equipment and weapons.
photo: voenternet.ru
The outsourcing system was adopted from the armies of NATO countries. Since the 1990s, it has operated in the armies of the USA, Canada, Great Britain, France, Italy, and Bulgaria. Its introduction was associated with a sharp reduction in military budgets. The pioneers in outsourcing were countries where the private sector of the economy predominated - the USA, England, Australia. Outsourcing abroad has a very wide range organizational forms, as a rule, this is a public-private partnership. Outsourcing came to Russia suddenly, and it should be introduced gradually: from simple projects (cleaning services and food supplies) to large and complex ones (technical support for military equipment).
Monetary allowance
The increase in pay is also associated with the intensification of the “Effective Army” program. This program has implemented automated system material accounting, development is envisaged military medicine, creation of a system for recording personal data of military personnel and civilian personnel. In particular, the amount of payments to military personnel is increasing: several years ago the average size monetary allowance was 57.8 thousand rubles, and in 2014 it was already 62.1 thousand rubles. The pension of military personnel was indexed by 7.5% from October 1: now its average level is 21.5 thousand rubles.
In April 2015 it was fully agreed total budget Russian Ministry of Defense: it will amount to 3.6 trillion rubles. Expenditures on the army are primarily related to its re-equipment, which in turn guarantees investments in the military-industrial complex: guaranteed orders to military, metallurgical, chemical, electronic, textile and agricultural enterprises.
Elimination of hazing
The conditions for completing military service have changed dramatically over the past five years: in addition to shortening the term, the very essence has changed. Firstly, classic “hazing” has become a thing of the past as a format of hazing based on the “senior-junior” principle, which is reproduced with each call. The army still has problems with hazing, based on physical superiority combined with insufficient moral principles of individual soldiers, in fraternities, but there are prerequisites for them in civil life, the old “hazing” no longer exists in the army.
The principle of responding to soldiers' complaints has changed. If earlier cases of hazing and their consequences were tried to be hidden, now such a concealment can cost the commander who committed it more than the fact of hazing in the unit itself. Soldiers, having received the right to use a mobile phone, and often the Internet (sometimes from the same phone), began to inform their relatives in much more detail about how they live and serve.
Mobilization and humanization as the basis of the army of the future
The main and tangible achievement of the first stage of the reform is increasing the combat readiness and mobility of the Armed Forces. High combat readiness presupposes a more advanced army structure, which allows you to act immediately after receiving an order, spending up to several hours on preparation. Moreover, complete units are ready for independent active actions and combat missions. It was the transfer of the army to the system of battalions and brigades that made it possible to increase mobility and combat readiness Armed forces. If we add to this the results of the second stage—fundamental changes in the army’s infrastructure—then the picture emerges more than encouraging. During the reforms, firstly, the conservatism of the system was broken, and secondly, the mobilization and humanization of troops was introduced - there are strongholds of the new army, and it is thanks to them that the rearmament that is yet to come is possible.
Browser -Observer 2003 № 6 (1 6 1 )
MILITARY REFORM IN RUSSIA
Oleg Lisov,
head of the VIMI sector
The first attempts at serious and systematic reform of the Armed Forces of our state in recent decades were made in the 70s, when, on the instructions of the USSR Minister of Defense D. Ustinov, an entire army was transferred to new organizational and personnel staff and new equipment (the 28th, stationed in Belarus). After knocking together and fully equipped new technology She took part in the Zapad-81 maneuvers, showing excellent results for those times. Unfortunately, this experience was not used, and the subsequent period of stagnation and the so-called “perestroika” did not allow the country’s leadership to further engage in reforming the army.
Over the past 10 years, in all layers of Russian society and, first of all, Russian politicians The debate about the need to reduce the army and reform the Russian Armed Forces continues. The country's leadership is hesitantly (either out of ignorance or out of fear?) making attempts to do something in this direction, but significant and, most importantly, positive results there are still no results from these attempts. At the same time, the Armed Forces are finally losing their combat readiness and combat effectiveness, the best, young and promising officers are leaving the army, equipment is aging, the number of accidents is growing sharply, and the prestige of the Armed Forces has fallen to its lowest level. Military service has become not an honorable duty and duty (as it is written in the Constitution of the Russian Federation and as it should be), but almost a shame.
The military reform carried out in Russia since mid-1997 was designed to adapt the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation to the new military needs of the state and its changed economic capabilities. However, the financial and economic collapse of August 1998 interrupted the program of civilized military reform and delayed its implementation for many years.
Regulatory framework for reform
Until 1998 guiding document to determine the strategy for reforming the Armed Forces, the “Plan for the reform and construction of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation” was approved by the President, which was then replaced by the “Fundamentals (concept) of state policy for the military development of Russia for the period until 2005”, approved by the Decree of the President of the Russian Federation in July 1998. In accordance With this document, unfortunately, each law enforcement department developed its own internal plans for reforming the forces, which then had to be coordinated with the General Staff of the Armed Forces and combined into a common document in order to ensure a systematic process of reforming, building and strengthening Russia’s military security according to a single plan. In accordance with this plan, some organizational and staffing measures were carried out, but over time it turned out that the measures taken did not achieve the objectives, and many transformations did not improve, but, on the contrary, worsened the country’s security organization system and required cancellation or replacement with new ones (Table 1). 1).
The main measures of the military reform of the Russian Federation, carried out until 2005.
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Stages and main activities on reforming the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation |
Goals and tasks to be solved and possible consequences |
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Stage 1 - until 2000 |
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(Significant reductions in troop personnel, reduction (enlargement) of military districts, changes in the structure of troops and the organization of military command). |
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Reduction in the number of personnel of the Russian Ground Forces from 420 thousand people. up to 348 thousand people |
Increasing the efficiency of troop control |
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Reform of the Main Command of the Ground Forces. |
Significant reduction in numbers. |
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Inclusion of the military space forces (VKS) and missile and space defense forces (RKO) into the Strategic Missile Forces (Strategic Missile Forces). |
Reduction in the number of administrative staff. |
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The formation of a new independent branch of the military from the Aerospace Forces and the Russian Defense Forces - the space one - and its transfer to the Russian Air Force. |
Reducing the cost of maintaining management staff. |
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Strategic Missile Forces - reorganization from a type of troops into a branch of troops. |
Reducing costs for R&D and scientific development. |
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Completion of the formation of the structure of the Russian Armed Forces, consisting of four services - the Ground Forces, Navy, Air Force and Strategic Forces. |
Elimination of parallelism in the work of military headquarters and leadership. |
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Merger of the country's Air Force and Air Defense into one branch of the Russian Armed Forces - the Air Force. |
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Establishment unified system military-administrative division of the territory of the Russian Federation into strategic directions: North-Western - within the borders of the Leningrad Military District; Western - within the boundaries of the Moscow Military District; Southwestern - within the borders of the North Caucasus Military District; Siberian Military District and Far Eastern Military District - within the borders of the Far Eastern Military District (5 military districts). |
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Stage 2 - until 2002 |
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(Reducing numbers, increasing funding, increasing combat readiness, transferring some units to contract service). |
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Reconstruction of the High Command of the Ground Forces (2001). |
Increasing the combat readiness and combat effectiveness of units and formations. |
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Increasing combat readiness, modernization and development of new types and types of weapons. |
Reforming and strengthening the military-industrial complex of the Russian Federation. |
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Creation of parts and connections of “constant readiness”: |
Preservation of the officer corps. |
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three divisions and four brigades of “constant readiness” have been formed in the Leningrad, Moscow, North Caucasus and Siberian military districts, which are at least 80% staffed with l/s, 100% armed, trained and constantly subject to increased requirements). |
Raising the social and moral status of military personnel. |
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Steps to increase the number of contract soldiers in the Armed Forces. |
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Increasing the social status and rights of military personnel. |
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Experimental transfer of an airborne division to a contract basis, with subsequent study of experience and its implementation in other troops. |
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Development and adoption of the Law “On Alternative Civil Service in the Russian Federation (AGS)”. |
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Stage 3 - until 2005 |
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(Increase in units and formations of “constant readiness”, increase in purchases of military equipment. Transfer of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation and the entire state defense system to the principle of “effective sufficiency”). |
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Concentration of efforts and funds to gradually increase the number of formations and units of “constant readiness” (such units and formations should be created in all types of the Armed Forces. It was planned to have up to 10 full-fledged divisions in the Ground Forces). |
Increasing the efficiency of troops and military equipment. |
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Improving the structure of command and control of troops. |
Strengthening the role and place of the military-industrial complex in the country's defense system. |
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Transfer of the Armed Forces proper to a three-service organizational structure (land, air-space, sea). |
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Modernization and improvement of weapons and military equipment. |
Increasing the combat power of the Armed Forces, strengthening the process of re-equipping the army, introducing new types and models of weapons and military equipment. |
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Increased purchases of weapons and military equipment, enhanced and effective implementation of them among the troops. |
Implementation of the constitutional right of a citizen to alternative service. |
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Preparation of a regulatory, legal, organizational, staffing and socio-economic justification for the introduction of an alternative civil service (ACS) in the Russian Federation, along with compulsory military service (the ACS law has been put into effect in the Russian Federation only since 2004). |
Fulfillment of assumed international obligations. |
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Creation of a unified rear of the Armed Forces for the army, navy, aviation, troops of the Russian Ministry of Emergency Situations, border, internal and railway troops. |
Reducing the number of conscripts. |
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Reaching 100% provision of the Armed Forces with all resources (combat, financial, etc.). |
Scientific and technical development of new types of equipment and mastery of this technology. |
In addition, over time, it became clear that reforms in the law enforcement agencies were and are being carried out by certain groups of certain officials who were not interested in them, and their actions are often based not on scientifically developed and well-verified calculations, but on their purely personal feelings and accumulated experience and knowledge. The results of such work are an annual reduction in numbers, the merger and division of branches and branches of the armed forces, the consolidation of districts, the reorganization of the administrative apparatus, the reform of combat formations, the liquidation of scientific schools and the entire system of training scientific personnel, the reduction of military schools and academies. But where is the expected result - a positive effect? Such implementation of organizational and staffing measures does not solve the main task - strengthening the military security of the state, but, on the contrary, weakens it and aggravates the situation of the Russian Armed Forces. The results of each reform are extremely painful not only on personnel, their moral and psychological state and financial situation, but on the most important thing - the combat effectiveness and combat readiness of forces and means to protect the state. An analysis of the measures taken as part of the reform of the Russian military machine shows that the effectiveness (effectiveness) of many of the measures carried out until recently, frankly speaking, does not correspond to the initial calculations - no extra financial resources appear, numbers are not reduced, and expenses are not reduced. As a result, combat readiness does not increase, and some activities remain experiments and previously made decisions are canceled or replaced by others (for example, the liquidation and re-establishment of the Main Command of the Ground Forces). This kind of event first sharply reduces the efficiency of the functioning of the entire military body, then there is a loss of the best, experienced part of the troop personnel and, finally, a partial or complete loss of combat readiness of units and formations. So, if by the beginning of the 90s the ground forces had 80 combat-ready formations, then in 2002 - 20 formations of the ground forces and 15 in other types of armed forces eke out a miserable existence, of which only one 42nd division in Chechnya is responsible these increased requirements.
The composition of the contingent of conscripts called up for military service is also interesting - 89% of young men of conscription age either evade service or are released from it in various ways - they get sick, give birth to more than 2 children, go on the run, go abroad, etc.
Of the 11% of conscripts, mainly from remote areas and remote areas, 7% have elementary education, 30% are secondary, and 40% have never studied or worked anywhere, and only about 20% meet the requirements.
An analysis of the first stage of military reform in Russia allowed "attentive" researchers from the London Institute for Strategic Studies in their report "Military Balance 1999-2000." draw very pessimistic and rather amateurish conclusions. Their meaning is as follows: " general state The combat readiness of all the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation, with the exception of nuclear forces, remains low due to a lack of funds for the training, maintenance and purchase of weapons. However, despite the difficulties in 1999, the Russian Armed Forces demonstrated a higher than it would seem ability to deploy large combined forces." At what expense and with what efforts?
Main directions of reform implementation
As experience and practice show, the main thing in solving the most complex and enormous problem of our state - reforming its Armed Forces - should be a systematic approach. This primarily includes:
Correct formulation of political tasks facing the state and the Armed Forces;
Scientific determination of the future appearance of the Armed Forces (what the Armed Forces should be);
Optimal reform of those parts and formations that exist at the time of reform;
The gradual construction and creation of new units and formations for the successful defense of the country and the possible conduct of war for the next 10, 20, 30 or more years.
Reforms in the Armed Forces, as a rule, are carried out in four main directions - changing the command and control system of the Armed Forces, changing the recruitment system, changing the training and education system, changing the system of equipping troops with weapons, military equipment, various types of allowances and maintenance. This has not been implemented in our Armed Forces until recently. Military science states that there are three states of the level of combat readiness of any military unit or formation - combat-ready, partially combat-ready and not combat-ready. The Chief of the General Staff of the Armed Forces introduced the fourth category - the supercritical level of combat readiness of all the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation - this is current state our aircraft.
It is well known that all the above tasks must be determined and formulated in the main government documents- “Military Doctrine of the Russian Federation” - a political document that defines the main directions of state policy in the field of ensuring the security of the individual, society, state and the country’s security from external and internal threats; "The Concept of National Security of the Russian Federation" is a political document that defines the military-political, military-strategic and military-economic foundations for ensuring the military security of the Russian Federation and a number of other fundamental legal planning and executive acts. Unfortunately, these legal documents began to appear only in 2000. It can be considered that from that moment, on the basis of a whole package of such normative and legal acts, systematic work began to continue in our country to implement the reform of its Armed Forces.
Economic aspects of military reform
With the collapse Soviet Union, with the formation of the Russian Federation and its entry into the perestroika era, military expenditures of the state began to decline sharply, and if in 1992 they amounted to 5.56% of GDP, then in 2002 - approximately 2.5% of gross domestic product, and in 2003 - 2.65%. Moreover, the reduction in expenses occurred simultaneously and was accompanied by an indiscriminate reduction in the size of the Russian Armed Forces, the squandering and destruction of weapons and military equipment (Table 2). In practice, real spending on national defense, taking into account inflation, the war in Chechnya and a number of other economic and environmental consequences and other negative aspects of our history, according to experts, in last years decreased by 70-75%.
Recognizing the importance and need for clear and mandatory implementation of military reforms in security forces ah, the Russian Federation, the Government of the Russian Federation has finally designated the allocations for its implementation as a separate line in the budget. Moreover, if in 2001 only 4.5 billion rubles were allocated for these purposes, then in 2002 it was already 16.544 billion rubles, i.e., practically, the amount increased almost 4 times, and in 2003 - 15.8 billion rubles. Next year this amount should be more significant, and the country's leadership stipulates that it is possible to increase allocations for these purposes.
Allocations for the national defense of the Russian Federation in 1992-2003.
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Indicators |
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GDP, billion rubles |
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Actual expenditures on national defense, billion rubles. |
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Actual allocations, % of GDP |
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The main element of reforming the Armed Forces, unfortunately, in accordance with the decisions made, was and remains a radical reduction in the number of troops. Of the total number of personnel of law enforcement agencies, 2 million 360 thousand people. military and 960 thousand people. About 600 thousand civilian personnel should be fired. From the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation proper, whose number is 1 million 200 thousand people. (Table 3), 365 thousand people should be dismissed, and about 140 thousand people from other law enforcement agencies. In fact, during 2001, the staffing level of the RF Armed Forces was reduced by 91 thousand people. and 14.5 thousand people. civilian personnel. As of January 1, 2002, the strength of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation was 1.274 million military personnel. Subsequently, some politicians propose to increase the strength of the Russian Armed Forces to 600-800 thousand people, however, it is scientifically substantiated that for the reliable organization of military security of the state, the strength of the Armed Forces of any country should be 1% of the population. According to calculations of the General Staff of the RF Armed Forces, Russia should have an Armed Forces of 1 million 200 thousand people, which will make it possible to reliably protect borders and military security state and fully fit within the framework of its financial capabilities.
According to the adopted “Concept of National Security of the Russian Federation,” the level of spending on national security (this includes defense) should be approximately 5.1% of GDP, and in the opinion of our President, this figure should not exceed 3.5% of gross domestic product. The main task for the Armed Forces in at this stage- creation of units and formations of “constant readiness” in all types and branches of troops. This task was set by the President of the Russian Federation at a meeting with the high military command in July 2002. In the near future, the Ground Forces will have 10 full-blooded divisions of “constant readiness”, and in other types of armed forces the number of such formations is planned to be increased
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Indicators |
Number |
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Composition of the RF Armed Forces |
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Total number |
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Officers and warrant officers (midshipmen) |
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Soldiers and sergeants (sailors and foremen); (conscription service) |
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Warrant officers (midshipmen), sergeants and soldiers (foremen and sailors); (contract service) |
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Another, no less important area of reform is the creation of combat-ready units and formations with the involvement of a larger number of contract soldiers. According to many experts, with the current level of technology development, this can only be achieved by transferring the Armed Forces to a contract basis. Such experiments are already being carried out. Such an experiment is being carried out in the Pskov Airborne Division. According to conservative estimates, the transfer of just one division to a contract basis is estimated at 3-3.5 billion rubles, and for the entire Armed Forces at 150-200 billion rubles. This is only a translation.
No one has yet calculated how much it will cost to maintain such troops. It is clear, as world experience shows, that it is impossible to solve all the problems of the army with the help of contract soldiers. According to the experience of most European countries, the Armed Forces in these countries are staffed in two ways - by contract and by conscription. Foreign experts clearly consider this model of army recruitment to be the best and have long abandoned a completely hired Armed Forces. And this is the right decision.
The third important area of reforming the Armed Forces is the development and adoption of a completely new legal act for our country, which allows young people called up for military service to undergo non-military, as well as civilian - alternative service. The adoption of such a document will entail the creation of a whole state system setting up such a service and would likely be costly. On July 24, 2002, the President of the Russian Federation signed a new Federal Law “On Alternative Civil Service in the Russian Federation (AGS),” which will come into force in our country in January 2004.
The appearance of such an unusual document for our country is dictated by the provision of Russian citizens with the right to alternative service, which is written down in Article 59 of the Constitution of the Russian Federation, the federal laws “On Military Duty and Military Service” and “On Defense”. After the adoption of the Law “On Alternative Civil Service”, it will be necessary to develop and adopt a regulation on alternative civil service (ACS), adapt it to the conditions individual regions, determine the executive body that will exercise this control and be responsible for the person’s performance of this service. This will certainly require new expenses.
Some calculation data
1998-1999 on behalf of the President of the Russian Federation and the government of the country General base The Armed Forces, together with a number of research institutes, conducted a comprehensive scientific study "Forecast of financial and economic support for the construction of the RF Armed Forces for the period up to 2010." All work was based on the scientifically proven number of armed forces of 1 million 200 thousand people, the existing volumes of monetary allowances, standards for the supply of clothing and food, the established level of medical and other types of allowances, services and support.
In table 3, 4 and 5 show the results of these studies. Despite the considerable time that has passed since the publication of these data, with minor amendments, they could be used for further developments.
The results of the forecast of financial and economic support for the construction of the RF Armed Forces for the period up to 2010 indicate that even if the most successful option for the development of the Russian economy is implemented, the country's Ministry of Defense will be able to receive financial resources in the required volumes only starting from 2005. This circumstance will clearly require a revision of some deadlines for the implementation of the most important measures of military reform of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation.
billion rubles (in 1998 prices)
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Preparation |
Procurement of arms and military equipment |
Builder- |
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Table 5
Required distribution of total expenses of the RF Ministry of Defense
for the intended purpose in 1988-2005.
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Preparation |
Procurement of arms and military equipment |
Builder- |
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Some conclusions
1. Despite a number of negative aspects (sometimes weak theoretical validity of the event, lack of sufficient and real funding, reluctance of some senior managers carry out unpopular reforms, improperly organized and not fully carried out measures, etc.), a number of organizational, staffing, structural, financial and social reforms continue to be carried out in the Russian Federation in line with the military reform of its Armed Forces.
2. The annual increase in funding for military reform (from 4.5 billion rubles in 2001 to 16.5 billion rubles in 2002) gives new impetus to its continuation and expansion.
3. In the course of the ongoing reform in the RF Armed Forces, three new divisions and four new brigades of “permanent readiness” have already been created and are functioning in the Leningrad, Moscow, North Caucasus and Siberian military districts. They are at least 80% manned, 100% equipped with equipment and weapons, and are constantly subject to increased demands. It is planned to have such units and formations in all types of aircraft.
4. The President of the Russian Federation assigned to the leadership of the Armed Forces the main task- create units and formations of “constant readiness” in all types of aircraft. In particular, it is planned to have 10 such formations in the Ground Forces, and the construction of the Armed Forces and the entire defense of the country should be carried out according to the principle of “effective sufficiency.”
5. Practical steps to create units and formations staffed on a contract basis (transfer of the Pskov Airborne Division) should give practical results in further expanding this experiment to all types and branches of the Armed Forces.
6. When reforming units and formations, it is necessary to use the experience and miscalculations identified during the anti-terrorist operation in Chechnya, NATO combat operations in Yugoslavia and the US Armed Forces in Afghanistan, and possibly future battles in Iraq.
7. Adoption by the leadership of the Russian Federation in 2002 Federal Law"On alternative civil service in the Russian Federation (ATS)" and its entry into force in January 2004 continues the process of consolidation in the state legislative norms for implementation Russian citizens their rights and responsibilities (only 11% of the conscript contingent is currently serving in the military, 89% of young men of conscription age avoid serving in the Armed Forces).
8. As the experience and practice of building and reforming the Armed Forces of other states shows, such negative decisions and mistakes are always present when implementing such grandiose transformations as military reform. To reduce them you need:
Participation in the transformation process large number disinterested participants (experts);
Competent approach and scientifically based development of the creature, move and final results any event carried out;
Practical consolidation of the results obtained directly in the troops;
Evaluate and use the experience gained to take further steps in the reform process.
9. The purposeful nature of military construction in new, changed conditions requires a rather complex and well-developed system of planning and implementation of the entire process of this construction. To do this, it is necessary to have a package of specially developed regulatory legal acts that define the goals, objectives and functional responsibilities of various government agencies in managing military development and generally strengthening the combat power of the state. For further, targeted and legitimized work to implement practical life For the planned measures to reform the Armed Forces of Russia, it would be advisable to adopt the Law of the Russian Federation “On Military Reform” - defining the basic principles, stages, boundaries, norms and rules of military development.
stages and main content of the reform
All reforms in the Russian Army took place as a result of the country's major military defeats in the struggle for freedom and independence. Ivan the Terrible's military reforms late XVII- early 18th century were caused by the need to strengthen the Russian army in connection with the creation single state and protection from attacks by neighbors. Peter the Great creates regular army and a navy based on conscription. After powerful defeats from its northern neighbors, after Russia’s defeat from the Anglo-French-Turkish coalition in Crimean War 1853–1856 There is an urgent need for another military reform in the country. After military defeat in the Russo-Japanese War of 1904–1905. the government of Nicholas II attempted to carry out another military reform (1905–1912), etc.
The main goal of the latest military reforms is the creation of highly equipped Armed Forces with the necessary military deterrence potential.
When planning the reform, the country's leadership took into account the difficult socio-economic situation in Russia, limited opportunities financing reform activities.
The entire reform was planned to be carried out over a period of 8–10 years, which is divided into 2 stages.
At the first stage (1997–2000), it was planned to move from five branches of the Armed Forces to four branches.
The implementation of this stage of reforms was met with strong approval Western states, who saw their interests in this, NATO member countries, which allocated money for the disposal (destruction) of Soviet defense and attack systems. In the period 1997–1998, the air force and air defense forces were combined. The ground forces were reformed, and the structures of the Navy were optimized. All this boiled down to the creation of a limited number of combat-ready formations and units, expanding the functions and sphere of influence of the remaining ones, staffed by people and equipped with modern equipment.
The first stage of military reform ended with the optimization of the entire structure of the Russian Armed Forces.
The second stage of the reform should bring the following results:
– transition to a three-type aircraft structure;
– creation of multifunctional new types of weapons for strategic, operational and tactical purposes;
– creation of scientific, technical and technological basis for the rearmament of the Russian Army;
– transformation of the Military Space Forces into an independent branch of the military.
As a result of the reform, the capabilities of the Armed Forces should increase to carry out the tasks of strategic deterrence, prevent and repel aggression against Russia and its allies, localize and neutralize local conflicts and wars, as well as implement Russia’s international obligations.
To solve these problems, the Russian Armed Forces must include:
– nuclear deterrence forces (SNF) – to deter nuclear powers from possible deployment nuclear war, as well as other states with powerful conventional weapons, from non-nuclear wars;
– non-nuclear deterrent forces to deter possible aggressor states from starting non-nuclear wars;
– mobile forces – for the speedy resolution of military conflicts;
– information forces – to counter a possible enemy in an information war.
These tasks must be solved by the already reformed branches of the Russian Armed Forces.