Soviet-Japanese war Khalkhin goal. Battles at Khalkhin Gol

1939)
G. K. Zhukov (after June 6, 1939)
Khorlogin Choibalsan

The conflict began with the demands of the Japanese side to recognize the Khalkhin Gol River as the border between Manchukuo and Mongolia (the old border ran 20-25 km to the east). One of the reasons for this requirement was the desire to ensure the safety of the Halun-Arshan-Ganchzhur railway being built by the Japanese in this area.

May 1939 First battles

On May 11, 1939, a detachment of Japanese cavalry numbering up to 300 people attacked the Mongolian border outpost at the height of Nomon-Khan-Burd-Obo. On May 14, as a result of a similar attack with air support, the Dungur-Obo heights were occupied.

On May 17, the commander of the 57th Special Rifle Corps, Divisional Commander N.V. Feklenko, sent a group of Soviet troops to Khalkhin Gol, consisting of three motorized rifle companies, a company of armored vehicles, a sapper company and an artillery battery. On May 22, Soviet troops crossed Khalkhin Gol and drove the Japanese back to the border.

During the period from May 22 to 28, significant forces are concentrated in the conflict area. The Soviet-Mongolian forces included 668 bayonets, 260 sabers, 58 machine guns, 20 guns and 39 armored vehicles. Japanese forces consisted of 1,680 bayonets, 900 cavalry, 75 machine guns, 18 guns, 6 armored vehicles and 1 tank.

On May 28, Japanese troops, having numerical superiority, went on the offensive, with the goal of encircling the enemy and cutting them off from the crossing to the western bank of Khalkhin Gol. The Soviet-Mongolian troops retreated, but the encirclement plan failed, largely thanks to the actions of the battery under the command of Senior Lieutenant Bakhtin.

The next day, Soviet-Mongolian troops carried out a counter-offensive, pushing the Japanese back to their original positions.

June. The fight for air supremacy

Although there was no collision on the ground in June, there was an air war in the skies. Already the first clashes at the end of May showed the advantage of Japanese aviators. Thus, in two days of fighting, the Soviet fighter regiment lost 15 fighters, while the Japanese side lost only one aircraft.

The Soviet command had to take radical measures: on May 29, a group of ace pilots headed by Deputy Chief of the Red Army Air Force Yakov Smushkevich flew from Moscow to the combat area. Many of them were Heroes of the Soviet Union, and also had combat experience in the skies of Spain and China. After this, the forces of the parties in the air became approximately equal.

At the beginning of June, N.V. Feklenko was recalled to Moscow, and G.K. Zhukov was appointed in his place, at the suggestion of the head of the operational department of the General Staff, M.V. Zakharov. Soon after G.K. Zhukov arrived in the area of ​​military conflict in June 1939, he proposed his plan of military operations: conducting active defense on the bridgehead beyond Khalkhin Gol and preparing a strong counterattack against the opposing group of the Japanese Kwantung Army. The People's Commissariat of Defense and the General Staff of the Red Army agreed with the proposals put forward by G. K. Zhukov. The necessary forces began to converge on the conflict area. Brigade commander M.A. Bogdanov, who arrived with Zhukov, became the chief of staff of the corps. Corps Commissar J. Lkhagvasuren became Zhukov’s assistant in command of the Mongolian cavalry.

To coordinate the actions of Soviet troops in the Far East and units of the Mongolian People's Revolutionary Army, Army Commander G. M. Stern arrived from Chita to the area of ​​the Khalkhin Gol River.

Air battles resumed with renewed vigor in the twentieth of June. As a result of the battles on June 22, 24 and 26, the Japanese lost more than 50 aircraft.

In the early morning of June 27, Japanese aircraft managed to launch a surprise attack on Soviet airfields, which led to the destruction of 19 aircraft.

Throughout June, the Soviet side was busy organizing defenses on the eastern bank of Khalkhin Gol and planning a decisive counteroffensive. To ensure air supremacy, new Soviet modernized I-16 and Chaika fighters were transferred here. So, as a result of the battle on June 22, which became widely known in Japan, the superiority of Soviet aviation over Japanese aviation was ensured and it was possible to seize air supremacy.

At the same time, on June 26, 1939, the first official statement of the Soviet government was made regarding the events at Khalkhin Gol.

July. Japanese attack

Fierce fighting broke out around Mount Bayan-Tsagan. On both sides, up to 400 tanks and armored vehicles, more than 800 artillery pieces and hundreds of aircraft took part in them. Soviet artillerymen fired direct fire at the enemy, and at some points there were up to 300 aircraft on both sides in the sky above the mountain. The 149th Rifle Regiment of Major I.M. Remizov and the 24th Motorized Rifle Regiment of I.I. Fedyuninsky especially distinguished themselves in these battles.

On the eastern bank of Khalkhin Gol, by the night of July 3, Soviet troops, due to the numerical superiority of the enemy, retreated to the river, reducing the size of their eastern bridgehead on its bank, but the Japanese strike force under the command of Lieutenant General Yasuoka did not complete its task.

The group of Japanese troops on Mount Bayan-Tsagan found themselves semi-surrounded. By the evening of July 4, Japanese troops held only the top of Bayan-Tsagan - a narrow strip of terrain five kilometers long and two kilometers wide. On July 5, Japanese troops began to retreat towards the river. In order to force their soldiers to fight to the last, by order of the Japanese command, the only pontoon bridge across Khalkhin Gol at their disposal was blown up. In the end, Japanese troops at Mount Bayan-Tsagan began a wholesale retreat from their positions by the morning of July 5. More than 10 thousand Japanese soldiers and officers died on the slopes of Mount Bayan-Tsagan. Almost all tanks and most of the artillery were lost.

The result of these battles was that in the future, as G.K. Zhukov later noted in his memoirs, Japanese troops “no longer dared to cross to the western bank of the Khalkhin Gol River.” All further events took place on the eastern bank of the river.

However, Japanese troops continued to remain on the territory of Mongolia and the Japanese military leadership planned new offensive operations. Thus, the source of conflict in the Khalkhin Gol region remained. The situation dictated the need to restore the state border of Mongolia and radically resolve this border conflict. Therefore, G.K. Zhukov began to plan an offensive operation with the goal of completely defeating the entire Japanese group located on the territory of Mongolia.

The 57th Special Corps was deployed to the 1st Army (Front) Group under the command of G.K. Zhukov. In accordance with the resolution of the Main Military Council of the Red Army, for the leadership of the troops, the Military Council of the Army Group was established, consisting of the commander - corps commander G. K. Zhukov, division commissar M. S. Nikishev and chief of staff of the brigade commander M. A. Bogdanov.

New troops, including the 82nd Infantry Division, urgently began to be transferred to the site of the conflict. The 37th Tank Brigade, armed with BT-7 and BT-5 tanks, was transferred from the Moscow Military District to the territory of the Trans-Baikal Military District, partial mobilization was carried out and the 114th and 93rd Rifle Divisions were formed.

On July 8, the Japanese side again began active hostilities. At night, they launched an offensive with large forces on the eastern bank of Khalkhin Gol against the position of the 149th Infantry Regiment and a battalion of a rifle-machine-gun brigade, which were completely unprepared for this Japanese attack. As a result of this Japanese attack, the 149th Regiment had to retreat to the river, maintaining a bridgehead of only 3-4 kilometers. At the same time, one artillery battery, a platoon of anti-tank guns and several machine guns were abandoned.

Despite the fact that the Japanese carried out this kind of sudden night attacks several more times in the future, and on July 11 they managed to capture the heights, they were the result of a counterattack by Soviet tanks and infantry, led by the commander of the 11th Tank Brigade, brigade commander M.P. Yakovlev, were knocked out from above and thrown back to their original positions. The defense line on the eastern bank of Khalkhin Gol was completely restored.

From July 13 to July 22, there was a lull in the fighting, which both sides used to build up their forces. The Soviet side took vigorous measures to strengthen the bridgehead on the eastern bank of the river, which was required to carry out the offensive operation planned by G.K. Zhukov against the Japanese group. The 24th motorized rifle regiment of I. I. Fedyuninsky and the 5th rifle and machine gun brigade were transferred to this bridgehead.

On July 23, the Japanese, after artillery preparation, began an attack on the right-bank bridgehead of the Soviet-Mongolian troops. However, after two days of fighting, having suffered significant losses, the Japanese had to retreat to their original positions. At the same time, intense air battles took place, so from July 21 to 26, the Japanese side lost 67 aircraft, the Soviet side only 20.

Significant efforts fell on the shoulders of the border guards. To cover the border of Mongolia and guard crossings across Khalkhin Gol, a combined battalion of Soviet border guards under the command of Major A. Bulyga was transferred from the Transbaikal Military District. In the second half of July alone, border guards detained 160 suspicious persons, among whom dozens of Japanese intelligence officers were identified.

During the development of the offensive operation against Japanese troops, proposals were put forward both at the headquarters of the army group and at the General Staff of the Red Army to transfer combat operations from Mongolia to Manchurian territory, but these proposals were categorically rejected by the country's political leadership.

As a result of the work carried out by both sides of the conflict, by the beginning of the Soviet counter-offensive, Zhukov’s 1st army group consisted of about 57 thousand people, 542 guns and mortars, 498 tanks, 385 armored vehicles and 515 combat aircraft, the Japanese group opposing it was specially formed by imperial decree The Japanese 6th Separate Army, under the command of General Ogisu Rippo, consisted of the 7th and 23rd infantry divisions, a separate infantry brigade, seven artillery regiments, two tank regiments, a Manchu brigade, three regiments of the Bargut cavalry, two engineering regiments and other units, which in total amounted to more than 75 thousand people, 500 artillery pieces, 182 tanks, 700 aircraft. It should also be noted that the Japanese group included many soldiers who gained combat experience during the war in China.

General Rippo and his staff also planned an offensive, which was scheduled for 24 August. Moreover, taking into account the sad experience of the battles on Mount Bayan-Tsagan for the Japanese, this time an enveloping strike was planned on the right flank of the Soviet group. Crossing the river was not planned.

During G.K. Zhukov’s preparation for the offensive operation of the Soviet and Mongolian troops, a plan for operational-tactical deception of the enemy was carefully developed and strictly followed. To mislead the enemy in the early period of preparation for the offensive, the Soviet side at night, using sound installations, imitated the noise of the movement of tanks and armored vehicles, aircraft and engineering work. Soon the Japanese got tired of reacting to noise sources, so during the actual regrouping of Soviet troops, their opposition was minimal. Also, throughout the preparation for the offensive, the Soviet side carried out active electronic warfare with the enemy. Despite the overall superiority in forces of the Japanese side, by the beginning of the offensive Zhukov managed to achieve almost three times superiority in tanks and 1.7 times in aircraft. To carry out the offensive operation, two-week reserves of ammunition, food and fuel and lubricants were created.

During the offensive operation, G.K. Zhukov planned, using maneuverable mechanized and tank units, to encircle and destroy the enemy in the area between the state border of the MPR and the Khalkhin Gol River with unexpected strong flank attacks.

The advancing troops were divided into three groups - Southern, Northern and Central. The main blow was delivered by the Southern group under the command of Colonel M. I. Potapov, the auxiliary blow was carried out by the Northern group, commanded by Colonel I. P. Alekseenko. The central group under the command of brigade commander D.E. Petrov was supposed to pin down enemy forces in the center, on the front line, thereby depriving them of the ability to maneuver. The reserve, concentrated in the center, included the 212th airborne and 9th motorized armored brigades and a tank battalion. Mongolian troops also took part in the operation - the 6th and 8th cavalry divisions under the overall command of Marshal X. Choibalsan.

The offensive of the Soviet-Mongolian troops began on August 20, thereby preempting the offensive of the Japanese troops, scheduled for August 24.

The offensive of the Soviet-Mongolian troops, which began on August 20, turned out to be a complete surprise for the Japanese command. At 6:15 a.m., a powerful artillery barrage and air raid on enemy positions began. At 9 o'clock the offensive of the ground forces began. On the first day of the offensive, the attacking troops acted in full accordance with plans, with the exception of a hitch that occurred when crossing tanks of the 6th Tank Brigade, since when crossing Khalkhin Gol, the pontoon bridge built by sappers could not withstand the weight of the tanks.

The enemy offered the most stubborn resistance on the central sector of the front, where the Japanese had well-equipped engineering fortifications - here the attackers managed to advance only 500-1000 meters in a day. Already on August 21 and 22, the Japanese troops, having come to their senses, fought stubborn defensive battles, so G.K. Zhukov had to bring the reserve 9th motorized armored brigade into the battle.

Soviet aviation also performed well at this time. On August 24 and 25 alone, SB bombers made 218 combat group sorties and dropped about 96 tons of bombs on the enemy. During these two days, fighters shot down about 70 Japanese aircraft in air battles.

In general, it should be noted that the command of the Japanese 6th Army on the first day of the offensive was unable to determine the direction of the main attack of the advancing troops and did not attempt to provide support to its troops defending on the flanks. By the end of August 26, the armored and mechanized troops of the Southern and Northern groups of Soviet-Mongolian forces united and completed the complete encirclement of the Japanese 6th Army. After this, it began to be crushed by cutting blows and destroyed in parts.

In general, Japanese soldiers, mostly infantrymen, as G.K. Zhukov later noted in his memoirs, fought extremely fiercely and extremely stubbornly, to the last man. Often Japanese dugouts and bunkers were captured only when there was no longer a single living Japanese soldier there. As a result of the stubborn resistance of the Japanese, on August 23, on the Central sector of the front, G. K. Zhukov even had to bring his last reserve into battle: the 212th airborne brigade and two companies of border guards, although in doing so he took considerable risks.

Repeated attempts by the Japanese command to carry out counterattacks and release the group encircled in the Khalkhin Gol area ended in failure. After the battles of August 24-26, the command of the Kwantung Army, until the very end of the operation on Khalkhin Gol, no longer attempted to relieve its encircled troops, having accepted the inevitability of their death.

The last battles continued on August 29 and 30 in the area north of the Khaylastyn-Gol River. By the morning of August 31, the territory of the Mongolian People's Republic was completely cleared of Japanese troops. However, this was not yet the complete end of the border conflict (in fact, the undeclared war of Japan against the USSR and its ally Mongolia). So, on September 4 and 8, Japanese troops made new attempts to penetrate the territory of Mongolia, but they were driven back beyond the state border by strong counterattacks. Air battles also continued, which stopped only with the conclusion of an official truce.

On September 15, 1939, an agreement was signed between the Soviet Union, the Mongolian People's Republic and Japan on the cessation of hostilities in the Khalkhin Gol River area, which came into force the next day.

Results

The USSR's victory at Khalkhin Gol played a decisive role in Japan's non-aggression against the USSR. A remarkable fact is that when German troops stood near Moscow in December 1941, Hitler furiously demanded that Japan attack the USSR in the Far East. It was the defeat at Khalkhin Gol, as many historians believe, that played a major role in the abandonment of plans to attack the USSR in favor of an attack on the United States.

In the fall of 1941, the USSR leadership received a message from intelligence officer Sorge that Japan was not going to attack the USSR. This information made it possible, during the most critical days of the defense of Moscow in late October - early November 1941, to transfer from the Far East up to twenty fresh, fully staffed and well-equipped rifle divisions and several tank formations, which played a key role in the defense of Moscow, and also allowed Subsequently, Soviet troops launched a counteroffensive near Moscow in December 1941.

Literature

• Zhukov G.K. Memories and reflections. Chapter seven. Undeclared war on Khalkhin Gol. - M.: OLMA-PRESS, 2002.

• Shishov A.V. Russia and Japan. History of military conflicts. - M.: Veche, 2001.
• Fedyuninsky I.I. In the East. - M.: Military Publishing House, 1985.
• Novikov M.V. Victory at Khalkhin Gol. - M.: Politizdat, 1971.
• Kondratyev V. Khalkhin Gol: War in the Air. - M.: Techniki - Youth, 2002.
• Kondratyev V. Battle over the steppe. Aviation in the Soviet-Japanese armed conflict on the Khalkhin Gol River. - M.: Aviation Promotion Foundation "Russian Knights", 2008. - 144 p. - (Series: Air Wars of the 20th Century). - 2000 copies. - ISBN 978-5-903389-11-7

Cinema

The Soviet-Mongolian feature film “Listen on the Other Side” directed by Boris Ermolaev and Badrakhyn Sumkhu (1971) is dedicated to the battles on the Khalkhin Gol River.

The television film “On the Roads of the Fathers” by Irkutsk television journalist Natalya Volina (2004) is dedicated to the 65th anniversary of the end of the battles on the Khalkhin Gol River and the Soviet-Mongolian expedition to places of military glory.

Notes

Footnotes

1. incl. 6,472 were killed and died during the sanitary evacuation stages, 1,152 died from wounds in hospitals, 8 died from illnesses, 43 died in disasters and as a result of accidents
2. data is incomplete
3. In “Western” historiography, in particular in American and Japanese, the term “Khalkin Gol” is used only to name the river, and the military conflict itself is called the local “Incident at Nomon Khan”. "Nomon Khan" is the name of one of the mountains in this area of ​​the Manchu-Mongolian border.
4. Translated into Russian “Khalkin-Gol” - Khalkha River
5. The troops were transported along the Trans-Siberian Railway to Ulan-Ude, and then through the territory of Mongolia they followed marching order
6. During this battle, the famous Japanese ace pilot Takeo Fukuda, who became famous during the war in China, was shot down and captured.
7. In total, Japanese air forces lost 90 aircraft in air battles from June 22 to 28. The losses of Soviet aviation turned out to be much smaller - 38 aircraft.
8. : On June 26, 1939, the words “TASS is authorized to declare...” were heard on Soviet radio. News from the shores of Khalkhin Gol appeared on the pages of Soviet newspapers.
9. : Zhukov, without waiting for the approach of the accompanying rifle regiment, threw into battle directly from the march the 11th tank brigade of brigade commander M.P. Yakovlev, which was in reserve, which was supported by a Mongolian armored division armed with 45-mm cannons. It should be noted that Zhukov in this situation, violating the requirements of the combat regulations of the Red Army, acted at his own peril and risk, and contrary to the opinion of Army Commander G. M. Stern. In fairness, it is worth noting that Stern subsequently admitted that in that situation the decision made turned out to be the only possible one. However, this act of Zhukov had other consequences. Through the special department of the corps, a report was transmitted to Moscow, which fell on the desk of I.V. Stalin, that division commander Zhukov “deliberately” threw a tank brigade into battle without reconnaissance and infantry escort. An investigative commission was sent from Moscow, headed by Deputy People's Commissar of Defense, Army Commander 1st Rank G.I. Kulik. However, after conflicts between the commander of the 1st Army Group G.K. Zhukov and Kulik, who began to interfere in the operational control of the troops, the People's Commissar of Defense of the USSR reprimanded him in a telegram dated July 15 and recalled him to Moscow. After this, the head of the Main Political Directorate of the Red Army, Commissar 1st Rank Mekhlis, was sent from Moscow to Khalkhin Gol with instructions from L.P. Beria to “check” Zhukov.
10. : The division was formed hastily in the Urals; many soldiers of this division had never held a weapon in their hands, so it was necessary to urgently organize on-site training for its personnel.

The fighting at Khalkhin Gol was an armed conflict that lasted from spring to autumn 1939 near the Khalkhin Gol River in Mongolia near the border with Manchuria (Manchukuo), between the USSR and Japan. The final battle took place at the end of August and ended with the complete defeat of the Japanese 6th Army. On September 15, a truce was concluded between the USSR and Japan.

In Fig. map of the fighting near the Galkhin-Gol River on August 20-31, 1939.

Let us turn to one of the key, and perhaps the decisive moment of the battles at Khalkhin Gol - the offensive of Japanese troops with the aim of encircling and defeating the combined Soviet-Mongolian forces. In early July, the Japanese command brought all 3 regiments of the 23rd Infantry Division (ID), two regiments of the 7th Infantry Division, a cavalry division of the Manchukuo Army, two tank and one artillery regiments to the conflict site. According to the Japanese plan, it was planned to deliver two strikes - the main one and the restraining one. The first involved crossing the Khalkhin Gol River and reaching the crossings behind Soviet troops on the eastern bank of the river. The group of Japanese troops for this attack was led by Major General Kobayashi. The second strike (Yasuoka group) was to be delivered directly to the positions of Soviet troops on the bridgehead.

The Yasuoka group was the first to attack. It was a kind of mousetrap: the Japanese wanted to draw parts of the Red Army into positional battles, force G.K. Zhukov to reinforce troops on the eastern bank of Khalkhin Gol, and then slam the mousetrap with a strike from Kobayashi’s group on the crossings on the western bank of the river. Thus, the Soviet troops would have been forced to either evacuate the bridgehead and suffer a moral defeat, or be under the threat of complete defeat.

The Yasuoka group's offensive began on July 2 at 10:00. The Japanese offensive was seriously countered by Soviet artillery. On the evening of July 3, the Japanese launched several attacks. Zhukov, faced with a Japanese advance on the bridgehead, decided to launch a flank attack on the attackers. On the night of July 2-3, the concentration of units intended for a counterattack began: the 11th Light Tank Brigade (separate light tank brigade) and the 7th motorized armored brigade, as well as the Mongolian cavalry. It was this decision that saved the Soviet troops from defeat. At 3:15, Kobayashi’s group began crossing to the western bank of the Khalkhin Gol River near Mount Bain-Tsagan. The Japanese knocked down the Mongol cavalry guarding the crossing from their positions and dispersed their counterattack with air strikes. By 6:00 in the morning, two battalions had already crossed and immediately moved south, towards the crossings. At 7:00, units of a motorized armored brigade moving towards their initial positions for a counterattack encountered Japanese units. So the direction of the attack of the Japanese forces became completely clear to the Soviet command.

In the photo: Soviet tanks cross Khalkhin Gol.

The commander of the 1st Army Group, G.K. Zhukov reacted with lightning speed. He decided to immediately counterattack the bridgehead formed by the Japanese. For this purpose, the 11th Tank Brigade under the command of M. Yakovlev was used. According to the original plan, she was supposed to cross to the eastern bank of the river in the “ruins” area, that is, north of the point where the Japanese began crossing. The brigade was urgently redirected to attack the bridgehead. All three tank battalions attacked the Japanese infantry that had crossed from different directions.

At 9:00, the lead company of the 2nd battalion - 15 BT tanks and 9 armored vehicles - in an oncoming battle, using a flank maneuver, completely defeated the marching column of the Japanese infantry battalion with a horse-drawn anti-tank battery, moving in a southerly direction. The 2nd battalion could not advance further, since the 71st Infantry Regiment (IR) of the Japanese had already deployed on the southern slopes of Mount Bain-Tsagan.

With the arrival of the main forces of the 11th LTBr, a simultaneous attack began from three directions: northern (1st battalion together with the Mongolian motorized armored division), southern (2nd battalion) and western (3rd battalion together with the 24th motorized rifle regiment). The attack was scheduled for 10:45, but the motorized rifle regiment (MSR) lost its orientation during the march, lost its way and did not reach its original positions by the appointed time. Under these conditions, it was decided to attack the enemy with tanks without infantry support. At the appointed time, the attack began.

In the photo: Soviet tanks support an infantry attack.

The battle lasted 4 hours. Advancing from the south, tank companies of the 2nd battalion (53 BT-5 tanks) encountered Japanese suicide bombers armed with Molotov cocktails and anti-tank mines on bamboo poles. As a result, 3 tanks and two armored vehicles were lost, of which 1 tank and both armored vehicles were evacuated.

On the morning of July 4, Japanese troops attempted a counterattack. After a 3-hour artillery barrage and a raid by a large group of bombers, the Japanese infantry went on the attack. During the day, the enemy attacked unsuccessfully 5 times, suffering heavy losses.

At 19:00, Soviet and Mongolian units launched an assault. The Japanese could not stand it and began to retreat to the crossing at night. At dawn, tanks of the 1st and 2nd battalions of the 11th LTBr broke through to the crossing and began shelling it. In order to avoid the capture of the crossing, the Japanese command gave the order to blow it up, thereby cutting off the retreat routes for their group on the western bank of the river, which was attacked and defeated. The Japanese were scattered, abandoning all their weapons. Soviet troops captured all the equipment and heavy weapons; only the steep slopes of the mountain and the floodplain of the Khalkhin Gol River, impassable for tanks, did not allow them to pursue and completely destroy the enemy.

On the morning of July 5, the commander of a tank company of the 11th Leningrad Brigade Art. Lieutenant A.F. Vasiliev led the attack of four BT tanks against 11 Japanese tanks. Using maneuver and constantly firing, Soviet tank crews knocked out 4 Japanese tanks without losing a single vehicle. For this battle, Vasiliev was awarded the title of Hero of the Soviet Union.

In the photo: an attack by Soviet tanks on Japanese positions in the area of ​​Mount Bayin-Tsagan.

Of the 133 tanks that took part in the attack at Mount Bayin-Tsagan, 77 vehicles were lost, of which 51 BT-5 and BT-7 were irretrievably lost. Losses in the personnel of the tank battalions of the 11th brigade were moderate: the 2nd battalion lost 12 people killed and 9 wounded, the 3rd battalion - 10 killed and 23 missing. The battlefield remained with the Soviet troops and many tanks were restored. Already on July 20, the 11th LTBr had 125 tanks.

In the reporting documents of the 1st Army Group compiled after the battles, the losses of BT tanks are classified as follows:

From anti-tank fire - 75-80%;
from bottlers - 5-10%;
from field artillery fire - 15-20%;
from aviation - 2-3%;
from hand grenades, min 2-3%.

The tanks suffered the greatest losses from anti-tank missiles and from “bottle bottlers” - approximately 80-90% of all losses. From throwing bottles, tanks and armored cars burn; from hits from anti-tank artillery, almost all tanks and armored cars also burn and cannot be restored. The cars become completely unusable, and a fire breaks out within 15–20 seconds. The crew always jumps out with their clothes on fire. The fire produces intense flames and black smoke, visible from a distance of 5–6 km. After 15 minutes, the ammunition begins to explode, after which the tank can only be used as scrap metal." (The style and spelling of the original have been preserved). As one Japanese officer figuratively put it, “the funeral pyres of burning Russian tanks were like the smoke of the steel mills in Osaka.”

The Japanese faced the same problem of the superiority of weapons over the protection of armored vehicles. For example, out of 73 tanks that took part in the Yasuoka group’s attack on the Soviet bridgehead on July 3, 41 tanks were lost, of which 18 were irretrievably lost. Already on July 5, the tank regiments were withdrawn from the battle, “due to loss of combat capability,” and on the 9th they returned to their permanent location. dislocations.

Delay in eliminating the Japanese bridgehead could undoubtedly have fatal consequences. The lack of forces would lead to the impossibility of containing the breakthrough of the Japanese infantry to the crossings in the rear of the Soviet troops. If the Japanese had been left alone, they could have easily walked the 15 km that separated them from the crossings. Moreover, they had already covered half of this distance by the time the marching column was discovered by the advanced units of the 7th Motorized Armored Brigade. Waiting for the lost infantry of a motorized rifle regiment to approach, in a situation of acute time pressure, was suicide. In just 4 months, commanders less decisive than Zhukov will find themselves surrounded by “motties” in Karelia in much less dramatic situations. Because they will not attack the Finns who have infiltrated to the rear with the forces at hand. With his determination, Georgy Konstantinovich managed to avoid encirclement, albeit at the cost of several dozen burnt tanks.

In the photo: a damaged Japanese Ha-Go tank captured by the Red Army.

As a result of the battles for the bridgehead on the western bank of the Khalkhin Gol River and the withdrawal from it that dragged on for almost a day under attacks from tanks of the 11th Light Brigade, Soviet artillery and aviation, the Japanese lost 800 people killed and wounded from Kobayashi’s 8,000-strong group. The losses of the tank crews of the 11th Brigade in a decisive attack on the bridgehead without infantry support were more than justified. Their sacrifices were recognized and appreciated: 33 tankmen, based on the results of the battles at Khalkhin Gol, were awarded the title of Hero of the Soviet Union, of which 27 were from the 11th Brigade.

- a river on the territory of Mongolia and China, in the lower reaches of which in May-September 1939, Soviet and Mongolian troops repelled the aggression of Japanese invaders who invaded the territory of the then Mongolian People's Republic (MPR).

The pretext for the invasion was the so-called “unresolved territorial dispute” between Mongolia and Manchuria. The purpose of the Japanese attack was an attempt to establish military control over the region bordering Transbaikalia, which would pose a direct threat to the Trans-Siberian Railway, the main transport artery connecting the European and Far Eastern parts of the USSR.

In accordance with the Mutual Assistance Agreement concluded in 1936 between the USSR and the Mongolian People's Republic, Soviet troops took part in repelling Japanese aggression together with Mongolian troops.

Losses of Soviet troops: irrecoverable - about 8 thousand people, sanitary - about 16 thousand people, 207 aircraft.

For courage and heroism in the battles at Khalkhin Gol, more than 17 thousand people were awarded government awards, 70 people were awarded the title of Hero of the Soviet Union, and pilots Sergei Gritsevets, Grigory Kravchenko, Yakov Smushkevich became the first twice Heroes of the Soviet Union in the country. Orders of the USSR were awarded to 24 formations and units.

In memory of the events at Khalkhin Gol in August 1940, the badge “Khalkin Gol. August 1939” appeared. It was approved by the Great People's Khural of Mongolia. All persons who were directly involved in the conflict were nominated for the award.

In 2004, Japan received permission from Mongolia to collect and remove the remains of Japanese soldiers killed in the 1939 battles near the Khalkhin Gol River.

(Additional

Khalkhin Gol (May - September 1939)

KHASAN PROLOGUE

August 1938. Far East, border area between the Tumen-Ula River and Lake Khasan. Soviet troops over and over again stormed the Bezymyannaya, Zaozernaya, Chernaya, and Machine Gun Hills captured by the Japanese. After the most difficult three-day battles, the enemy was driven out of our territory, the heights were cleared of “samurai”, and the red flag was again raised over Zaozernaya.
However, the victory turned out to be inconclusive - the battles unexpectedly dragged on, our losses were more than twice as high as the Japanese.
And there is no longer any doubt that the Khasan events are only the first round of the battle, that it will continue. At the end of the 30s, the whole country knew that in the East “the clouds are gloomy”, and the samurai are ready to “cross the border by the river” again.
And indeed, less than a year had passed after the Khasan battles, when a new border conflict broke out - this time in Mongolia, on the Khalkhin Gol River.

BACKGROUND OF THE CONFLICT

Since the early 1930s, the Japanese government had aggressive plans towards the Mongolian People's Republic. Back in 1933, the Japanese Minister of War, General Araki, demanded the occupation of Outer Mongolia, which “must necessarily be the Mongolia of the East.” Beginning in 1935, on Japanese official maps, the state border line in the area of ​​the Khalkhin Gol River began to be moved into the interior of the Mongolian People's Republic at a distance of up to 20 km.
At the end of January, Japanese-Manchu troops attacked the Khalkhin-Sume and Mongolryba border outposts, which were abandoned by the Mongolian border guards without a fight. To prevent conflict, negotiations began in June 1935 on the demarcation of the state border between Mongolia and Manchukuo. But the positions of the parties immediately diverged. The representative of Japan, on behalf of the government of Manchukuo, demanded that its authorized representatives be allowed into the appropriate points on the territory of the MPR (including Ulaanbaatar) for permanent residence, who will enjoy the right of free movement.” Mongolia rejected these demands “as a direct attack on the sovereignty and independence of the MPR.” As a result, the negotiations were interrupted. At the same time, the representative of Manchukuo said: “In the future, we are going to resolve all issues at our own discretion.”

In March 1936, several minor skirmishes occurred on the Mongol-Manchu border. In response to this, on March 12, a protocol on mutual assistance was signed between the USSR and the MPR, and Stalin, in an interview with an American journalist, warned: “If Japan decides to attack the Mongolian People’s Republic, encroaching on its independence, we will have to help the Mongolian People’s Republic.” On May 31, speaking at a session of the Supreme Council, Molotov, Chairman of the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR and People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs, confirmed "that we will defend the border of the Mongolian People's Republic as decisively as our own border."
In accordance with the mutual assistance agreement, in September 1937, a “limited contingent” of Soviet troops consisting of 30 thousand people, 265 tanks, 280 armored vehicles, 5,000 cars and 107 aircraft was introduced into Mongolia. The headquarters of the corps of Soviet troops, which received the name 57th Special, settled in Ulaanbaatar. The corps was commanded by N.V. Feklenko. However, the Japanese continued to prepare for an attack on the Mongolia. It was no coincidence that the Japanese command chose the area near the Khalkhin Gol River for the invasion - two railways led here from Manchuria, the nearest station was only 60 km from the intended combat area. But from the Soviet railway station Borza to Khalkhin Gol there were more than 750 km, and the stretch of communications made it very difficult to concentrate the Soviet-Mongolian troops and supply them with ammunition and food.

We have to admit that on the eve of the conflict, both the command of the Mongolian border corps and the commander Feklenko showed unforgivable carelessness. The state border across the Khalkhin Gol River was actually not guarded, and there were no stationary observation posts on the western bank - only sometimes Mongolian horse patrols passed through here. The command staff of the 57th Special Corps of the threatened area was not studied. There was no reconnaissance on the ground. The soldiers were distracted by wood harvesting for long periods of time.

The Japanese acted differently. Long before the attack, they carried out reconnaissance of the future combat area, published excellent maps, and made many reconnaissance flights not only in the border zone, but also over Mongolian territory. Field trips were conducted with the command staff of units and formations intended for the operation. The troops were trained taking into account the conditions of the given area.
Since January 1939, the Japanese have resumed provocations in the Khalkhin Gol region - they raid Mongolian territory, fire at border guards, and attack guard posts. And in mid-May they begin to deploy full-scale military operations.

START OF BATTLES

On May 11, about two hundred Japanese-Manchus, accompanied by a truck and a Pickup, armed with light machine guns and 50-mm mortars, violated the border, attacked a Mongol outpost of twenty people and pursued them to the Khalkhin Gol River. Here reinforcements approached the border guards; a battle ensued that lasted about 12 hours. The intruders were repulsed.
On May 14, three hundred Japanese-Manchu horsemen again invaded the territory of the MPR, occupied Dungur-Obo and reached the Khalkhin Gol River.
On May 15, border guards observed up to seven hundred enemy horsemen, seven armored vehicles, one tank and vehicles with infantry in the Dungur-Obo area.
Japanese aircraft repeatedly violate the border, shelling and bombing Mongolian border posts. So, on May 15, five Japanese bombers raided the location of the 7th outpost (west of Dungur-Obo) and dropped 52 bombs. As a result, 2 cyriks were killed and 19 wounded.
All these events clearly indicated that the Japanese were launching a serious operation, but the command of the 57th Special Corps continued to regard them as “petty border trifles.” Although fighting had been going on at Khalkhin Gol for the fifth day with regular Japanese-Manchu troops supported by aviation, on May 15 the command of the special corps went to logging 130 km from Ulaanbaatar. And only the order of the People's Commissar of Defense Voroshilov on the 16th forced Feklenko to finally take measures to bring the troops into combat readiness.

The 6th Cavalry Division of the MPR was sent to the Khalkhin Gol River, as well as the operational group of the 11th Tank Brigade - consisting of a rifle and machine-gun battalion, a company of armored vehicles and a 76-mm battery - under the command of Senior Lieutenant Bykov. On May 20, he sent reconnaissance to the eastern shore of Khalkhin Gol, which was met with heavy rifle and machine gun fire and, after a 4-hour battle, retreated back. However, the next day, the vanguard of Bykov’s detachment, together with the Mongolian cavalry, managed to push the enemy into the territory of Manchuria, reach the border and take up defense.
Meanwhile, the Japanese ambassador in Moscow was summoned to the Kuznetsky Most to the People's Commissariat for Foreign Affairs, where Molotov, on behalf of the Soviet government, made an official statement to him: “We have received information about the violation of the border of the Mongolian People's Republic by Japanese-Manchu troops who attacked Mongolian units in the area Nomon-Kan-Burd-Obo, as well as in the Dongur-Obo area. There are wounded and killed in the military units of the Mongolian People's Republic. Japanese-Manchurian aircraft also took part in this invasion of the Mongolian People's Republic. I must warn that there is a limit to all patience, and I ask the ambassador to tell the Japanese government that this will not happen again. This will be better in the interests of the Japanese government itself.” The Japanese ambassador immediately transmitted the text of this statement to Tokyo. However, there was no answer.

On May 25, the Japanese began to concentrate large forces from the 23rd Infantry Division and Manchu cavalry in the Nomonhan-Burd-Obo area. At dawn on May 28, the Japanese-Manchus launched a surprise attack and, having pushed back the Mongolian cavalry regiment and the left-flank company of Bykov's detachment, deeply enveloped our left flank, threatening the crossing. Bykov himself, who was trying to organize a counterattack, came under heavy machine-gun fire and barely escaped capture by abandoning an armored car stuck in the mud. The Mongol-Soviet units retreated in disarray to the Sandy Hills, 2-3 km from the crossing, where they detained the enemy.
At this time, the 149th Infantry Regiment of Major Remizov, which arrived in vehicles from Tamtsak-Bulak, without waiting for the concentration of all forces, entered the battle on the move. The regiment's units acted uncoordinated, without interaction with artillery. Control of the battle was poorly organized, and with the onset of darkness it was completely lost.

The firefight continued throughout the night. The next morning the battle resumed and continued with varying degrees of success. On the right flank, Bykov's company could not hold on to the occupied heights and retreated, mistakenly fired upon by their own artillery. But on the left flank, our flamethrower tanks, supported by infantry, defeated the Japanese reconnaissance detachment of Lieutenant Colonel Azuma, who was killed.
By evening the battle finally died down. One gets the impression that both sides considered themselves losers - exhausted by continuous two-day battles, having suffered significant losses, the Japanese hastily withdrew their troops beyond the border line, but the Soviet units also retreated to the western bank of Khalkhin Gol (the commander of the 57th Special Corps, Feklenko, reported to Moscow that that he had to withdraw “under enemy pressure,” and explained the defeat by complete air supremacy of enemy aircraft). Moreover, our intelligence discovered the very fact of the Japanese retreat only 4 days later. Following the results of the May battles, which can hardly be called successful, Feklenko was removed from his post; G.K. Zhukov was appointed to replace him.

THE STRUGGLE FOR AIR DOMINANCE

The war at Khalkhin Gol started unsuccessfully for Soviet pilots as well. The May battles revealed the overwhelming superiority of enemy aircraft. On May 21, the Japanese shot down a P-5 communications plane with impunity. The first air battle, which took place the next day, also ended in favor of the Japanese aces - at 12:20 a flight of I-16s and a pair of I-15s patrolling over Khalkhin Gol collided with five Japanese fighters. Noticing them, the pilot Lysenkov single-handedly rushed at the enemy and was shot down; the rest of the Soviet planes did not enter the battle.

Having information about the strengthening of enemy aviation in the conflict zone and increasing its activity, the Soviet command also increased its air forces: at the end of May, the 22nd Fighter Aviation Regiment and the 38th Air Force arrived from Transbaikalia to help the 100th mixed air brigade stationed on the territory of the Mongolian People's Republic. bomber, but it was not possible to immediately turn the situation around.

On May 27, an I-16 squadron consisting of eight aircraft was in an ambush at a forward airfield in the area of ​​Mount Khamar-Daba with the task of taking off and destroying an enemy air force when an airborne enemy appeared. In total, during this day the squadron made four alert sorties. There were no encounters with the enemy in the first three, but two pilots burned out the engines of their cars. During the fourth flight, the squadron commander's engine did not start. He ordered the pilots who started the engines to take off before him. The pilots took off and headed for the front line. The squadron commander, having started the engine, was the last to take off. Six I-16 fighters followed the border one at a time, gaining altitude along the route. Over Khalkhin Gol, these single planes, being at an altitude of 2000-2200 m, met with two flights of enemy fighters that were in formation. The forces were too unequal, our pilots found themselves in a deliberately losing position, so after the first attack, they turned around and began to leave for their territory, and the enemy, being higher up, pursued them to the airfield and even shot them after landing. As a result, two of the six pilots died (including the squadron commander), one was wounded, and two more burned out their engines.
That same evening, the command of the 57th Special Corps had an unpleasant conversation over a direct line with the People's Commissar of Defense Voroshilov, who expressed Moscow's dissatisfaction with the losses of Soviet aviation.

But the next day, May 28, was truly “black” for our pilots. In the morning, an order was received for twenty I-15bis fighters to fly “to the area of ​​operation of ground forces,” but only the first flight managed to take off when the order was given to “stop the flight.” Since there was no radio contact with the trio that had already taken off, the pilots did not receive warning that they were left alone, they continued to carry out their mission and were attacked by superior enemy forces over Khalkhin Gol - none of them returned from this unequal battle.

Three hours later, another I-15 squadron was taken by surprise by an attack from behind the clouds and lost seven out of ten fighters in the short-lived battle, shooting down only one enemy aircraft.
Thus, the score of the May battles was 17:1 in favor of Japanese aviation. After such a defeat, Soviet fighters did not appear over Khalkhin Gol for more than two weeks, and “Japanese bombers bombed our troops with impunity.”

Moscow responded immediately, taking emergency measures to strengthen our aviation in the conflict zone. Already on May 29, a group of the best Soviet aces, led by Deputy Chief of the Red Army Air Force Smushkevich, flew to Mongolia. In just three weeks, they managed to do an incredible amount - combat training for flight personnel was established, supplies were radically improved, a whole network of new takeoff and landing sites was created, and the size of the air group was increased to 300 aircraft (versus 239 Japanese). And when the next round of air battles began over Khalkhin Gol, the Japanese met a completely different enemy.
Our pilots took revenge for the May defeats already on June 22: after a fierce two-hour battle, the Japanese were forced to flee, missing 30 aircraft (they themselves, however, admitted the loss of only seven aircraft, but experts who worked with documents claim that, as a rule, The Japanese side in official reports underestimated the figures of their own losses by about half). And although our losses that day were also high - 17 aircraft - it was an undoubted victory, the first since the beginning of the war in the air.

On June 24, there were three more clashes with the enemy, and twice the Japanese did not accept the battle, scattering and retreating to their territory after the first attack. Their attempt to intercept a group of Soviet bombers returning from a mission also ended in vain - the airborne gunners were able to fight off the fighters. On the same day, a Japanese pilot was captured for the first time after jumping with a parachute from a downed plane over our territory. Another “samurai” in a similar situation chose to shoot himself in the temple.
But Major Zabaluev, commander of the 70th Fighter Aviation Regiment, was luckier. On June 26, during another air battle, he had to make an emergency landing behind Japanese lines. Bargut horsemen were already rushing to the downed plane when Captain Sergei Gritsevets landed his I-16 next to the commander’s vehicle, literally dragged it into his cockpit, squeezing it into the narrow space between the armored back and the side, and took off in front of the confused enemies 1 .

Convinced that they would not be able to cope with Russian aviation in air battles, the Japanese decided to destroy it on the ground by launching a surprise attack on our airfields. Early in the morning of June 27, 30 Japanese bombers, covered by 74 fighters, attacked the airfields in Tamtsak-Bulak and Bayin-Burdu-Nur. In the first case, the approach of enemy bombers was detected in time, and the fighters of the 22nd Air Regiment managed to take off to intercept - after the battle, the Japanese were missing five aircraft, having shot down only three of ours. But during a raid on the airfield of the 70th Fighter Regiment, they managed to achieve tactical surprise, since the telephone line connecting the airfield with air observation posts was cut by Japanese saboteurs. As a result, 16 Soviet aircraft were destroyed on the ground and during takeoff, but the Japanese had no losses. On the same day, they also raided the rear airfield in Bain-Tumen, shooting down one fighter on takeoff.

The Japanese command tried to inflate their tactical success and pass it off as the complete defeat of Soviet aviation, announcing the destruction of one and a half hundred aircraft - but it seems that even the Japanese themselves did not really believe these victorious reports. Despite some successes, they lost their previous air supremacy - the “unpunished bombing” of ground troops stopped, air battles from now until the end of July continued with varying success, and the scales gradually tipped in our favor.

BAIN-TSAGAN BATTLE

By the end of June, the Japanese concentrated in the combat area the entire 23rd Infantry Division and half of the 7th, two tank regiments, an artillery regiment, an engineering regiment and three Manchurian cavalry regiments.

According to the plan of the Japanese command, in the “second period of the Nomonkhan incident” it was supposed to strike the western bank of Khalkhin Gol, to the rear of the Soviet-Mongolian troops.
The strike group under the command of Major General Kobayashi, consisting of the 71st and 72nd infantry regiments, reinforced with artillery, had the task of crossing the river in the area of ​​Mount Bain-Dagan and moving south, cutting off our units’ escape route from the eastern bank. The 26th Infantry Regiment, mounted on vehicles, was supposed to operate on the approaching flank of the strike group and prevent the approach of Soviet reserves, and if our units retreated, pursue them. The crossing and advancement of the strike group was ensured by the 23rd Engineer Regiment.
The pinning group under the command of Lieutenant General Yasuoka, which, in addition to infantry and cavalry, included both tank regiments, was supposed to act against Soviet units on the eastern bank of Khalkhin Gol in order to prevent their breakthrough from the “cauldron”, and then completely destroy .

Fighting on July 2-3, 1939 (until 10.00 am)

The Japanese launched their offensive on the night of July 2–3. At 9 o'clock in the evening, Soviet units, which were in combat guard, were attacked by tanks and infantry. In a stubborn battle, Lieutenant Aleshkin's battery knocked out up to ten Japanese tanks, but the rest broke through to the firing position and began to crush the guns and iron the cracks with the soldiers hiding in them. However, light Japanese tanks were unable to inflict significant damage. Having broken the rules of the guns and plowed the trenches, they began to leave. Then the artillerymen jumped out of cover and opened fire on the retreating tanks, knocking out several more vehicles. Turning around, the tanks again attacked the battery. This was repeated three times. Finally, the attack was repulsed.
The next day, the first duel took place between Soviet and Japanese tank crews. Despite their numerical superiority, the Japanese were never able to advance a single step, losing seven tanks against three Soviet ones. The enemy suffered even heavier losses in a collision with the reconnaissance battalion of the 9th motorized armored brigade - our BA-10 cannon armored cars acted exemplarily, shooting the advancing enemy formations from cover, destroying 9 tanks and not losing a single armored vehicle. These events cannot be called anything other than a defeat - on July 3 alone, during unsuccessful attacks, the Japanese lost more than half of their armored vehicles on the eastern bank of Khalkhin Gol (44 tanks out of 73). Soon both of their tank regiments were withdrawn to the rear.

At first, the offensive of Kobayashi’s strike group developed much more successfully. Having crossed the river at dawn on July 3 and broken the weak resistance of the 15th Mongolian Cavalry Regiment, the Japanese quickly moved south, getting behind the main Soviet-Mongolian forces, which were fighting defensive battles on the eastern bank of Khalkhin Gol. The situation was becoming threatening. Scattered counterattacks by armored cars and tankers, at the cost of heavy losses, made it possible to stop the enemy’s advance towards the crossings and gain time until the main reserves arrived.

At about 11.30, the 11th Tank Brigade launched a counteroffensive - on the move, without preliminary reconnaissance, without information about the enemy, without infantry support. Having suffered terrible losses - more than half of the tanks and personnel - the brigade broke through the Japanese defenses, only a short distance from reaching their crossing. Together with the tankers, the 24th motorized rifle regiment and a detachment of Mongolian cavalry were supposed to advance, but the motorized riflemen lost their way during the march and attacked an hour and a half late, and the cavalry was scattered by enemy artillery and aircraft. At 15.00, the armored battalion of the 7th motorized armored brigade arrived and was thrown into battle from the march, however, met with concentrated fire from anti-tank guns shooting at the armored cars at point-blank range, it was forced to retreat, having lost 33 armored vehicles out of 50. In the evening, another, now general, was organized. attack, but the Japanese, surrounded on three sides, pressed against the river, were able to fortify themselves on Mount Bain-Tsagan, created a layered defense and put up stubborn resistance, repelling all attacks. We have to admit that the control of the battle that day left much to be desired - the arriving Soviet reserves rushed to the offensive one by one, interaction between them was organized only in the evening, when all units had already suffered heavy losses and were bled to death as a result of uncoordinated attacks.

Fighting during the day on July 3, 1939

The firefight continued until the morning. The next day, the Japanese began to withdraw their troops back to the right bank of Khalkhin Gol. Huge crowds gathered near the only bridge, filled with infantry and equipment, along which our aviation and artillery were working. According to Soviet sources, “the only pontoon bridge built by the Japanese for the crossing turned out to be blown up prematurely by them. Panicked, Japanese soldiers and officers rushed into the water and drowned in front of our tank crews. In the area of ​​Mount Bayin-Tsagan, the enemy lost thousands of soldiers and officers, as well as a huge amount of weapons and military equipment abandoned here.” However, the Japanese themselves admit the loss of only 800 people (10% of the strike force), claiming that they allegedly managed to evacuate all the heavy equipment and blew up the bridge only after completely completing the crossing.
After the defeat at Bayin-Tsagan, the Japanese command tried to take revenge on the eastern bank of Khalkhin Gol. On the night of July 7-8, the enemy managed to push back our right-flank battalions, which were able to regain a foothold only 3-4 km from the river. On July 11, the Japanese captured the Remizov height, but their further advance was stopped by artillery fire and tank counterattacks. On the night of July 12, taking advantage of a command mistake, a Japanese detachment managed to penetrate deeply into our defenses, taking the crossing under machine-gun fire, but by the morning it was surrounded in one of the pits and destroyed after a fierce battle. This pit was later nicknamed the “samurai grave.”
In the second half of July - early August, the calm was interrupted three more times by short-term battles, in which the opponents suffered significant losses, but did not achieve any significant results. Meanwhile, both sides continued to build up their forces, transferring fresh reinforcements to the combat area.

The struggle for air supremacy continued, during which the initiative finally passed to Soviet aviation. In July, our pilots attacked enemy airfields on the territory of Manchukuo several times. So, on July 27, two I-16 squadrons carried out an attack on the Ukhtyn-Obo airfield, taking the enemy by surprise and shooting down 4 Japanese fighters and 2 gas tankers on the ground with impunity. On July 29, the baptism of fire of the I-16 cannons, which took part in a raid on an enemy airfield in the area of ​​Lake Uzur-Nur, took place. And again the enemy was taken by surprise. The attack aircraft destroyed 2 enemy aircraft in the parking lots and damaged nine more. On the same day, a second strike was carried out - with even more impressive results: this time they were lucky to “catch” the Japanese during landing, when they were completely helpless, and shoot down three fighters at once, another one was burned on the ground. And again our pilots returned from a combat mission without losses. On August 2, during another attack on a Japanese airfield in the Jinjin-Sume area, Colonel Katsumi Abe’s plane was shot up on takeoff, and six aircraft on the ground were destroyed at once, not counting the damaged ones.
In the air battles of early August, our pilots also acted more and more confidently, inflicting irreparable losses on the enemy - several more Japanese aces were killed during these days. And given the double numerical superiority over the enemy achieved by this time, it is quite possible to talk about the conquest of air superiority by Soviet aviation, which will be confirmed by its actions during the general offensive.

GENERAL OFFENSIVE

In mid-August, an operation plan was approved to defeat the Japanese troops, according to which it was necessary to pin down the enemy in the center, break through his defenses with two flank attacks, encircle the Japanese group between the Khalkhin-Gol River and the state border and completely destroy it. For this purpose, three groups were created - Southern, Central and Northern - which were assigned the following tasks:
1) Southern group under the command of Colonel Potapov (57th rifle division, 8th motorized armored brigade, 6th tank brigade (without 1st battalion), 8th cavalry division, 185th artillery regiment, SU-12 division, two tank battalion and rifle-machine-gun battalion of the 11th Tank Brigade, 37th Anti-Tank Gun Battalion, tank company XV-26): advance in the direction of Nomon-Kan-Burd-Obo and, in cooperation with the Central and Northern groups, encircle and completely destroy the Japanese group south and north of the Khaylastyn-Gol River; the immediate task is to destroy the enemy on the southern bank of the Khaylastyn-Gol river, and subsequently on the northern bank of the Khaylastyn-Gol river; when reserves appear, destroy them first; The 8th Mongol Cavalry Division will secure the right flank.
2) Central group (82nd and 36th motorized rifle divisions): attack from the front, pinning down the enemy with fire throughout the entire depth and depriving him of the ability to maneuver to the flanks.
3) Northern group under the command of Colonel Olekseenko (7th motorized armored brigade, 601st rifle regiment, 82nd howitzer regiment, two battalions of the 11th tank brigade, 87th anti-tank division, 6th Mongolian cavalry division): advance in the direction of the lakes 6 km northwest of Nomon-Kan-Burd-Obo and, in cooperation with the 36th Motorized Rifle Division and the Southern Group, encircle and destroy the enemy north of the Khaylastyn-Gol River; The 6th Cavalry Division of the Mongol Army provides the left flank.
4) Reserve (212th Airborne Brigade, 9th Motorized Armored Brigade, 1st Battalion of the 6th Tank Brigade): by the morning of August 20, concentrate in the area 6 km southwest of Sumbur-Obo and be ready to build on the success of the Southern or Northern Group .
5) Air Force: strike before artillery preparation on the nearest reserves and on the main line of enemy defense. Fighters must cover the actions of SB bombers and ground forces, and if enemy reserves approach, attack them with all their might. The duration of artillery preparation is 2 hours 45 minutes.

Particular attention was paid to disinformation to the enemy in order to create the impression that our units were going on the defensive. For this purpose, the “Memo to a Soldier in Defense” was sent to the troops. False reports about the construction of defensive structures and requests for engineering equipment were transmitted. A powerful sound broadcasting station that arrived at the front imitated the driving of stakes, creating the full impression of large defensive works. All troop movements took place only at night. To accustom the Japanese to the noise of tanks, 10-12 days before the offensive, several vehicles with their silencers removed were constantly running along the front. All these measures turned out to be very effective, allowing them to mislead the enemy and take them by surprise.

On the eve of the offensive, thorough reconnaissance of the front line of the Japanese defense was carried out, during which the command staff dressed in Red Army uniforms for camouflage purposes, and the tank crews dressed in combined arms uniforms. Data on the enemy's battle formations and defensive structures was clarified by aerial reconnaissance with photographing of the area and night searches, accompanied by the capture of "tongues".
Although Soviet propaganda inflated the importance of party-political work at the front so much that over time this phrase began to evoke only a smile, nevertheless, the ideological factor should not be underestimated: party-political work undoubtedly strengthened the offensive impulse of the Soviet troops. Many famous writers who visited Khalkhin Gol took part in the ideological campaign, including Konstantin Simonov, who did not mince words:
“We will forget all pity in battle, We will find these snakes in holes, They will pay for your grave with an endless Japanese cemetery!” “Here you go, get it! Once it’s war, it’s war: We won’t leave a single Japanese for seed!”

At dawn on August 20, 150 SB bombers, covered by 144 fighters, dealt a crushing blow to the Japanese front line, troop concentrations and artillery positions. Bombing was carried out from a height of 2000 m at maximum speeds, leaving the target with a left turn. The successful actions of the Soviet bombers forced the enemy to open anti-aircraft fire, which made it possible to detect the location of its firing points and launch a massive assault strike on them. As a result, Japanese anti-aircraft artillery was temporarily suppressed, and the second echelon of bombers attacked enemy positions from medium altitudes without interference, without encountering serious opposition: Japanese fighters did not appear over the battlefield.

At 6.15, Soviet artillery opened fire. Artillery preparation lasted 2 hours 45 minutes. 15 minutes before its end, a second air raid was carried out. This time, the Japanese interceptors arrived in time and, breaking through the fighter cover, attacked our bombers over the target, damaged three vehicles (all of them returned safely to the airfield), but were unable to prevent targeted bombing.

Fighting August 20, 1939

At 9 o'clock in the morning, Soviet troops went on the offensive along the entire front. The greatest successes on this day were achieved by the Southern Group, which captured the Big Sands despite the fact that it acted without tank support: the 6th Tank Brigade, delayed at the crossing due to poorly prepared exits and entrances, was 4 hours late and did not participate in the offensive. The central group also basically completed the task of the day, not only engaging the enemy in battle, but also moving forward 0.5-1 km. The most serious difficulties faced the Northern Group, which was never able to break through the Japanese defenses, underestimating the enemy’s strength. The command assumed that no more than two Japanese companies were defending at the “Finger” height and expected to take it on the move - but unexpectedly ran into desperate resistance: only during the battles did it become clear that the Japanese had created a powerful stronghold here, which lasted four days.
All day on August 20, Soviet bomber aircraft worked on the enemy's front line and artillery positions, ensuring the advancement of ground troops. And our fighters not only successfully covered the bombers over the battlefield, but also repeatedly stormed Japanese airfields, which forced the enemy to evacuate their aircraft further from the front line. We can say that on this day our pilots for the first time completely dominated the air.

The next morning, the Japanese tried to turn the situation around by launching massive attacks on Soviet airfields, but they were unable to repeat their June success - the enemy bombers were promptly detected by VNOS posts and met by Soviet fighters. Only the first of three waves was able to break through to the target, but it bombed hastily and ineffectively; the other two were scattered by fighters while still approaching.
Having failed to suppress our aviation, the Japanese command tried to redirect their bombers to attack the advancing ground forces, but both strike groups were intercepted by fighters above the front line and, having dropped bombs anywhere, hastily left the battle.

Combat operations August 21-22, 1939

These days became a turning point not only in the air, but also on the ground. As early as August 21, the troops of the Southern Group, reinforced by the 6th Tank Brigade, which finally entered the battle, completely captured the Big and Small Sands and cut off access to the east for the Japanese-Manchurian units operating south of the Khaylastyn-Gol River. In the northern direction, the 9th Motorized Armored Brigade, bypassing the “Finger” height blocked by our troops, reached the spurs of Mount Nomonkhan-Burd-Obo, threatening to close the encirclement ring.
On August 22, units of the Southern Group defeated Japanese reserves in the Small Sands area and began to eliminate individual resistance centers. We had to storm every trench, every firing point: the guns hit point blank, flamethrower tanks burned out dugouts and trenches, and then the infantry moved forward.

By the evening of August 23, the “Finger” height finally fell. This strong point was a well-fortified area with a diameter of up to one and a half kilometers with all-round defense, reinforced with anti-tank artillery, wire barriers and dugouts with concrete floors. The “samurai” had to be knocked out with bayonets and grenades; no one surrendered. At the end of the fighting, more than six hundred enemy corpses were removed from the trenches and dugouts. The encirclement of the Japanese group was completed.

The next day, the Japanese tried to break through the ring from the outside, large forces attacked the positions of the 80th Infantry Regiment in the Big Sands area, but were repulsed. The attack was repeated on August 25 - with the same result. The surrounded units also made attempts to escape from the “cauldron”. At dawn on August 27, a large Japanese detachment (up to a battalion) tried to retreat east along the valley of the Khaylastyn-Gol River, but was met by artillery fire, partly destroyed, and partly retreated back. On the same day, another group tried to leave the encirclement the same way, but history repeated itself: having come under heavy fire, the Japanese fled to the northern bank of Khaylastyn-Gol, where they were finished off by the 9th Motorized Armored Brigade.
Japanese pilots tried unsuccessfully to help their doomed troops. The August aviation losses were so great that the enemy had to bring all available reserves into battle - even units flying hopelessly outdated biplanes were transferred to Khalkhin Gol. But the war in the air was already hopelessly lost - as, indeed, on the ground.

By the morning of August 28, all pockets of resistance south of Khaylastyn-Gel were eliminated. On the northern shore, the Japanese had the last, most fortified defense node - Remizov Hill. Blocked on all sides, after a powerful artillery bombardment, the height was taken by Soviet troops. However, the fighting here dragged on for another day - holed up in “fox holes” and dugouts, the Japanese fought to the last man. On August 30, the liquidation of individuals and small groups who tried to escape from encirclement or infiltrate the formations of Soviet troops continued. And only by the morning of August 31, the operation was completed and the territory of Mongolia was completely cleared of the Japanese-Manchu invaders.

SEPTEMBER - LATEST CLAIMS

According to the official Soviet version, the fighting on the Khalkhin Gol River ended by September 1, 1939. But in reality, clashes on the border continued for another half a month. In addition to daily skirmishes, the Japanese attacked our positions three times - on September 4, 8 and 13. The most intense battle was on the 8th, when in the area of ​​the Eris-Ulin-Obo heights, two Japanese battalions managed to encircle our company. However, help arrived on time, and the enemy was first driven back by Soviet tanks and infantry, and then surrounded and destroyed (the Japanese lost 450 people killed that day alone).
Even more intense fighting took place in the air. Soviet fighters patrolling the border repeatedly engaged in battles with the enemy.

In the first days of September alone, five air battles took place, in which the Japanese again suffered serious losses. Then it began to rain for a week, but on September 14, as soon as the weather improved, the enemy tried to bomb advanced Soviet airfields, but was unsuccessful. The next day the Japanese repeated the raid with a larger force. Despite the fact that they managed to take our pilots by surprise - the VNOS posts warned of the approach of the enemy late, so the fighters had to take off under fire, immediately losing four - the operation again ended in failure for the Japanese: their bombers bombed inaccurately, without hitting them on the ground not a single plane, and meanwhile reinforcements were already rushing from neighboring airfields, attacking the hesitant enemy from all sides and not allowing them to leave the battle with impunity. As a result, even according to their own data (usually underestimated), the Japanese lost ten aircraft, and our pilots only six.
This air battle was the last. On the same day - August 15 - a ceasefire agreement was signed.
According to the agreement reached, on September 23, Soviet troops opened access to the Japanese funeral teams on the battlefield. According to the terms of the agreement, Japanese officers carried sabers, and soldiers carried bayonets, but without firearms. The exhumation and removal of corpses continued for a whole week. Black smoke hung over the Japanese positions on the other side of the border from morning until late at night - the “samurai” were burning the remains of their warriors.

LOSSES OF PARTIES

At the end of the fighting, the Soviet side announced that the enemy had lost 52-55 thousand people at Khalkhin Gol, of which at least 22 thousand were killed. Japanese figures are much more modest - 8,632 killed and 9,087 wounded (however, this very ratio of sanitary and irretrievable losses raises serious suspicions of falsification).
According to statistical studies, Soviet troops suffered the following personnel losses on the Khalkhin Gol River:

Of the military personnel admitted to hospitals, according to incomplete data, 3,964 people were returned to duty, 355 people were dismissed from the Red Army and 720 died.
There were relatively few prisoners on both sides. At the end of hostilities, the USSR returned 88 people to Japan, and the Japanese freed 116 Soviet citizens.

Our losses in armored vehicles turned out to be very high - 253 tanks and 133 armored vehicles, not counting those recovered during the battles. Which is not surprising - after all, it was the tank units that bore the brunt of the fighting (it is no coincidence that among the Heroes of the Soviet Union awarded this title based on the results of the battles at Khalkhin Gol, there were most tankers). In this category, comparison with Japanese losses seems incorrect, since, unlike the Red Army, the enemy used its tanks very limitedly, and after the catastrophic losses suffered in early July, he completely withdrew both tank regiments to the rear.

As for aviation, Soviet sources cited the following figures.

Enemy losses:

Period	Fighters	Scouts	Bombers	Transport aircraft	Total aircraft
16.05-3.06	1	-	-	-	1
17.06-27.06	53	-	-	-	55
28.06-12.07	103	-	-	-	105
21.07-8.08	161	6	-	-	173
9.08-20.08	32	-	-	1	33
21.08-31.08	146	22	35	5	208
1.09-15.09	68	2	1	-	71
Total	564	32	44	6	646

Soviet losses (from 22.05 to 16.09)

	Combat	Non-combat	Total
I-16	83	22	105
I-16P	4	-	4
I-15bis	60	5	65
I-153	16	6	22
SB	44	8	52
TB-3	-	1	1
Total	207	42	249

The Soviet figures for losses of enemy aircraft are clearly overestimated, which, however, is completely natural - at all times and in all wars, enemy losses are calculated according to the principle: “why should we feel sorry for him, the adversary?” In this sense, Soviet pilots are still surprising with their modesty - the Germans or the same Americans lie much more shamelessly, and the Japanese postscripts cannot even be called fantastic - they are simply anecdotal. Thus, the “samurai” claim that, having lost 162 aircraft at Khalkhin Gol, they themselves shot down 1,340 Soviet aircraft and destroyed another 30 on the ground (that is, twice as many as we actually had there). In a word, everything is like in that old joke: “Out of forty tanks that broke through to our shore, eighty were destroyed.”

1 In fairness, it must be said that Japanese pilots several times risked their lives to land in the depths of Mongolian territory to pick up their downed pilots.

Bayin-Tsagan

Perhaps none of the events at Khalkhin Gol in May-September 1939 causes as much controversy as the battle for Mount Bayin-Tsagan on July 3-5. Then the 10,000-strong Japanese group managed to secretly cross Khalkhin Gol and begin moving towards the Soviet crossing, threatening to cut off Soviet troops on the eastern bank of the river from the main forces.

The enemy was accidentally discovered and, before reaching the Soviet crossing, was forced to take a defensive position on Mount Bayin-Tsagan. Having learned about what had happened, the commander of the 1st Army Group G.K. Zhukov ordered the 11th brigade of brigade commander Yakovlev and a number of other armored units immediately and without infantry support (Fedyuninsky’s motorized rifles got lost in the steppe and reached the battlefield later) to attack the Japanese positions.

Soviet tanks and armored vehicles launched several attacks, but, having suffered significant losses, were forced to retreat. The second day of the battle came down to constant shelling of Japanese positions by Soviet armored vehicles, and the failure of the Japanese offensive on the east bank forced the Japanese command to begin a retreat.

Historians still argue how justified the introduction of Yakovlev’s brigade into battle from the march was. Zhukov himself wrote that he deliberately went for it... on the other hand, did the Soviet military leader have a different path? Then the Japanese could have continued moving towards the crossing and a disaster would have occurred.

The Japanese retreat is still a controversial point for Bain-Tsagan - whether it was a general flight or a systematic, organized retreat. The Soviet version depicted the defeat and death of Japanese troops who did not have time to complete the crossing. The Japanese side creates a picture of an organized retreat, pointing out that the bridge was blown up even when Soviet tanks burst onto it. By some miracle, under artillery fire and air strikes, the Japanese managed to cross to the opposite bank. But the regiment that remained in the cover was almost completely destroyed.

Bayin-Tsagan can hardly be called a decisive tactical victory for one of the sides. But in strategic terms, this is, of course, a victory for the Soviet-Mongolian troops.

Firstly, the Japanese were forced to begin a retreat, suffering losses and failing to complete their main task - the destruction of the Soviet crossing. Moreover, not once during the conflict did the enemy again try to force Khalkhin Gol, and this was no longer physically possible. The only set of bridge equipment in the entire Kwantung Army was destroyed by the Japanese themselves during the withdrawal of troops from Bain Tsagan.

Next, Japanese troops could only conduct operations against Soviet troops on the eastern bank of Khalkhin Gol, or wait for a political solution to the conflict. True, as you know, the enemy expected something completely different...