Afghan war 1979-1989: the entire chronicle of events from beginning to end

For more than 30 years after World War II, the Soviet Union was at peace without taking part in any major military conflicts. Thus, Soviet military advisers and soldiers participated in wars and conflicts, but they did not take place on the territory of the USSR and in terms of the scope of participation of Soviet citizens in them they were essentially insignificant. Thus, the Afghan War became the largest armed conflict since 1945 in which Soviet soldiers and officers took part.

Historical background

Since the 19th century, there has been a peaceful struggle between the Russian and British empires, aimed at expanding the sphere of influence in the Central Asian region. At the same time, Russia's efforts were aimed at annexing the lands lying along its southern outskirts (Turkestan, Khiva, Bukhara), and Great Britain - at the colonization of India. It was here that already in 1885 the interests of both powers collided for the first time. However, things did not come to war, and the parties continued to colonize the lands that were in their spheres of influence. Afghanistan was at the same time a cornerstone in relations between Russia and Britain, a very advantageous position that would allow decisive control over the region. At the same time, the country remained neutral, extracting its own benefits from this situation.

The first attempt by the British crown to subjugate Afghanistan was made back in 1838-1842. Then the British expeditionary force encountered stubborn resistance from the troops of the Afghan emirate, as well as guerrilla warfare. The result was the victory of Afghanistan, the preservation of its independence and the withdrawal of British troops from the country. However, Britain's presence in the Central Asian region has increased.

The next attempt by the British to take control of Afghanistan was a war that lasted from 1878 to 1880. During this war, British troops again suffered a series of defeats from the Afghan army, but the Afghan army, in turn, was defeated. As a result, Afghanistan became a British protectorate, and the southern part of the country was annexed to British India.

However, this state of affairs was temporary. The freedom-loving Afghans did not want to remain under the control of the British, and discontent quickly and massively matured in the country. However, Afghanistan had a real chance to free itself from British protectorate only after the First World War. In February 1919, Amanullah Khan ascended the throne in Afghanistan. He was supported by representatives of the “Young Afghans” and the army, who finally wanted to get rid of the oppression of the British. Already upon his accession to the throne, Amanullah Khan declared the country's independence from Britain, which caused the invasion of British troops. The 50,000-strong Afghan army was quickly defeated, but a powerful national movement practically nullified the military victories of the British. Already in August 1919, a peace treaty was concluded between Afghanistan and Great Britain, according to which Afghanistan became a completely independent state, and its border ran along the Durand Line (the modern Afghan-Pakistani border).

In foreign policy, the orientation towards the young Soviet state became most obvious. So, Soviet military instructors arrived here, who made it possible to create a fairly combat-ready air force, and also participated in combat operations against Afghan rebels.

However, the north of Afghanistan became a refuge for mass migration of residents of Soviet Central Asia who did not want to accept the new government. Basmachi detachments were also formed here, which then carried out partisan attacks on the territory of the USSR. At the same time, the financing of armed groups was carried out by Great Britain. In this regard, the Soviet government sent a note of protest to Amanullah Khan, after which the channels of English assistance to the Basmachis were significantly suppressed.

However, things were far from calm in Afghanistan itself. Already in the fall of 1928, an uprising of a new contender for the throne, Habibullah, who also received support from Great Britain, broke out in the east of the country. As a result, Amanullah Khan was forced to flee to Kandahar, and Habibullah seized power. The result of this was the complete immersion of Afghanistan into the abyss of anarchy, when absolutely everything was subjected to pogroms: schools, hospitals, villages.

Thus, by April 1929, a difficult situation had developed: the legitimate ruler of Afghanistan, Amanullah Khan, was in Kandahar, forming an army of people loyal to him. Habibullah was in Kabul, continuing to enforce the cruel laws of Islamic fundamentalism. In this situation, the Soviet leadership decided to help the legitimate leader of Afghanistan regain power in the country. On April 15, Soviet troops under the command of the Soviet military attache V. Primakov crossed the border of Afghanistan and began active military operations against Habibullah’s supporters. From the very first days, events developed clearly in favor of the Red Army, and the number of losses was approximately 1:200 in its favor. However, the successes of the operation, achieved in a month and a half, were negated by the flight of Amanullah Khan to India and the end of his struggle for power. After this, the Soviet contingent was withdrawn from the country.

In 1930, the Red Army again launched a campaign into Afghanistan with the goal of defeating the Basmachi gangs based there and destroying their economic and supply bases. However, the Basmachi did not accept the battle and retreated to the central regions of the country, which is why the further presence of Soviet troops in Afghanistan became not only impractical, but also diplomatically dangerous. In this regard, the Red Army left the country.

In Afghanistan itself, the civil war subsided only at the end of 1929, when Habibullah was overthrown by Nadir Shah (the latter became the king of Afghanistan). After this, the country continued to develop, albeit extremely slowly. Relations with the Soviet Union were quite close, thanks to which the country had many benefits, mainly of an economic nature.

At the turn of the 1950s-1960s, people's democratic movements, including Marxist ones, began to emerge in Afghanistan. Thus, the ideological inspirer and leader of the Marxist movement was Nur Mohammed Taraki, a journal poet. It was he who, on January 1, 1965, announced the creation of the PDPA - the People's Democratic Party of Afghanistan. However, the composition of the party was heterogeneous - it included people from the lower strata of society, as well as from the middle and even the upper. This inevitably led to a conflict within the party and caused its split already in 1967, when two branches were formed at once: “Khalq” (“People”, the most radical faction) and “Parcham” (“Banner”, a moderate faction, represented mainly representatives of the intelligentsia).

Afghanistan remained a monarchy until 1973, when the king's cousin Mohammed Daoud led an anti-monarchy coup and ultimately came to power as prime minister. The change in the form of government had virtually no effect on Soviet-Afghan relations, since Muhammad Daoud continued to maintain close relations with the USSR. The name of the country changed to the Republic of Afghanistan.

Over the next five years, Mohammed Daoud took steps to modernize Afghan industry and the state as a whole, but his steps actually did not have any results. By 1978, the situation in the country was such that almost all sections of the population were opposed to the vain prime minister. The severity of the political situation can be indicated by the fact that already in 1976, both factions of the PDPA - Khalq and Parcham - agreed to cooperate against the dictatorship of Daoud.

The revolution and the assassination of Muhammad Daoud, which occurred on April 28, 1978 under the leadership of the PDPA and the army, became a milestone in the history of the country. Now a regime has been established in Afghanistan, very similar and akin to the Soviet one, which could not but cause further rapprochement between the two countries. As in the USSR, the head of state was the General Secretary of the Central Committee of the PDPA, Nur Muhammad Taraki, who was the leader of the Khalq faction. The name of the state changed to "Democratic Republic of Afghanistan".

Beginning of the Civil War

However, things were still not calm in Afghanistan. First of all, after the April (or Saur) revolution, the struggle between the PDPA factions intensified. Since it was the Khalq wing that received a dominant position in the government, the gradual removal of the Parchamists from the levers of power began. Another process was the departure from Islamic traditions in the country, the opening of schools, hospitals and factories. Also an important decree was the provision of land to peasants free of charge.

However, all these measures, which were intended to improve life and thus gain the support of the people, led mainly to diametrically opposed results. The formation of armed opposition groups began, consisting mainly of peasants, which, in principle, is not surprising. People who had lived Islamic traditions for hundreds of years and suddenly lost them, simply could not accept it. Also dissatisfied were the actions of the Afghan government army, which often, in the fight against the rebels, struck peaceful villages whose residents were not associated with the opposition.

In 1978, the civil war began, which essentially continues in Afghanistan to this day. In its early stages, this war was fought between the Afghan government and armed rebels - the so-called "dushmans". However, in 1978, the rebels’ actions were still not sufficiently coordinated and consisted mainly of attacks on Afghan military units and shelling of convoys. Blows were also struck against party functionaries, but this mainly concerned lower-level party representatives.

However, the main signal that the armed opposition had matured and was ready for decisive measures was the uprising in the large city of Herat, which broke out in March 1979. At the same time, there was a real danger of the city being captured, since the Afghan government army was very reluctant to fight against its compatriots, and there were frequent cases of government soldiers going over to the side of the rebels.

It was in this regard that real panic began among the Afghan leadership. It became clear that with the loss of such a large administrative center as Herat, the government’s position would be seriously shaken. A long series of negotiations began between the Afghan and Soviet leadership. In these negotiations, the Afghan government asked to send Soviet troops to help suppress the rebellion. However, the Soviet leadership clearly understood that the intervention of the Soviet Armed Forces in the conflict would only lead to a worsening of the situation, including the international one.

Ultimately, the Afghan government army was able to cope with the Herat rebellion, but the situation in the country continued to deteriorate. It became clear that a civil war was already in full swing in the country. Thus, the Afghan government army was drawn into battles with rebel gangs that controlled mainly rural and mountainous areas. The “people's” Afghan government managed to control only a number of large cities (and not always completely).

In the same regard, the popularity of Noor Mohammad Taraki in Afghanistan began to decline, while his prime minister, Hafizullah Amin, was rapidly gaining political weight. Amin was a rather tough politician who believed that order could be restored in the country only through military means.

Undercover intrigues in the Afghan government led to the fact that in mid-September 1979, Nur Mohammad Taraki was removed from all his posts and expelled from the PDPA. The reason for this was the unsuccessful assassination attempt on Prime Minister Amin when he arrived at Taraki’s residence for negotiations. This assassination attempt (or provocation, since there is still no sufficient evidence that Mohammad Taraki himself was involved in the assassination attempt) made him an obvious enemy of Amin, which resulted in the former receiving a death sentence. Taraki was killed in October 1979, and his family and friends were taken to Puli-Charkhi prison.

Having become the ruler of Afghanistan, Hafizullah Amin set about purging both the ranks of the clergy and the rival faction, Parcham.

At the same time, Amin realized that he could no longer cope with the rebels on his own. Increasingly, there were cases of soldiers and officers transferring from the government Afghan army to the ranks of the Mujahideen. The only restraining factor in the Afghan units were Soviet military advisers, who sometimes suppressed such incidents by the force of their authority and character. During numerous negotiations between the Soviet and Afghan leadership, the Politburo of the CPSU Central Committee, after weighing all the pros and cons, at its meeting on December 12, 1979, decided to send a limited contingent of troops to Afghanistan.

Soviet troops had been in Afghanistan since July 1979, when a battalion of the 111th Guards Parachute Regiment of the 105th Airborne Division was transferred to Bagram (a city about 60 km from Kabul, also a large air base in the country). The battalion’s responsibilities included monitoring and guarding the Bagram airfield, where Soviet planes with supplies for the Afghan leadership landed and took off from. On December 14, 1979, a battalion from the 345th separate parachute regiment arrived here as reinforcements. Also on December 20, the Soviet “Muslim Battalion” was transferred to Kabul, which received this name because it was staffed exclusively by Soviet military personnel from the Central Asian republics. This battalion was included in the Amin palace security brigade, supposedly to strengthen the security of the Afghan leader. But few people knew that the Soviet party leadership decided to “remove” the too impulsive and obstinate leader of Afghanistan.

There are many versions of why it was decided to remove Hafizula Amin and put Babrak Karmal in his place, but there is no consensus on this matter. It is likely that after establishing order in Afghanistan with the help of Soviet troops, Amin would become too independent, which, given his close contacts with the United States, jeopardized the Soviet presence in the country. If the United States of America had received an ally in Amin, the threat to the southern borders of the USSR would have become obvious. Also, we should not forget that Amin, with his widespread repressions and the murder of Nur Mohammad Taraki, managed in a very short period of time to turn against himself not only the lower strata of Afghan society (who, however, were already in the majority in opposition to the regime), but also and the Afghan elite. Having concentrated great power in his hands, he had no intention of sharing it with anyone. It would be, to put it mildly, unreasonable for the Soviet leadership to rely on such a leader.

By December 25, 1979, two motorized rifle and one airborne divisions, two motorized rifle regiments, 2 fighter-bomber aviation regiments, 2 helicopter regiments, one airborne fighter regiment, and airborne troops were prepared for entry into Afghanistan from the Central Asian, Turkestan and Belarusian military districts. -assault brigade and logistics support units. Additionally, three more divisions were formed and staffed according to wartime standards as a reserve. All these troops were part of the 40th Combined Arms Army, which was destined to enter Afghanistan.

The troops were staffed mainly by reservists - residents of the Central Asian republics called up for military training. For example, in the 201st Motorized Rifle Division, whose task was to march and take positions in the area of ​​the city of Kunduz, about half of the personnel were reservists. All this, of course, had a negative impact on the combat training of the units, but given that the participation of Soviet troops in hostilities was not planned, then such a “show of force” had its meaning.

Already on December 25, the introduction of a limited contingent of Soviet troops into Afghanistan began. The first to enter Afghanistan were units of the 108th Motorized Rifle Division, as well as units of the 103rd Guards Airborne Division, which were landed in Kabul. Also on this day, the 4th Airborne Assault Battalion of the 56th Separate Airborne Assault Brigade entered the country, whose task was to secure the strategically important tunnel on the Salang Pass.

In the period from December 25 to December 31, 1979, almost all units of the 40th Army that were intended for this entered the territory of Afghanistan.

As of March 1980, the deployment of units of the 40th Army was as follows:

• Kabul - 103rd Guards Airborne Division and 108th Motorized Rifle Division.
• Bagram - 345th separate parachute regiment.
• Herat - 101st motorized rifle regiment of the 5th motorized rifle division.
• Shindand - 5th motorized rifle division.
• Kunduz - 201st motorized rifle division and 56th separate air assault brigade.
• Kandahar - 70th separate motorized rifle brigade.
• Jalalabad - 66th separate motorized rifle brigade.
• Ghazni - 191st separate motorized rifle regiment.
• Puli-Khumri - 395th motorized rifle regiment of the 201st motorized rifle division.
• Khanabad - 122nd motorized rifle regiment of the 201st motorized rifle division.
• Fayzabad - 860th separate motorized rifle regiment.
• Jabal Ussaraj - 177th motorized rifle regiment of the 108th motorized rifle division.
• Aviation units were based at the airfields: Bagram, Kunduz, Shindand, Kandahar, Jalalabad, Faizabad, Ghazni and Gardez.

On December 27, 1979, the Alpha group carried out an operation at Amin’s residence to eliminate the obstinate leader. As a result, Hafizula Amin was eliminated, and on the night of December 28, the new ruler of Afghanistan, Babrak Karmal, arrived in Kabul. On the same night (from December 27 to 28), Soviet troops, mainly from the 103rd Airborne Division, occupied a number of important buildings in the Afghan capital and established complete control over them.

Beginning of the war (1979-1982)

OKSV began suffering its first losses in Afghanistan back in December 1979. So, on December 25, while landing at Kabul airfield, an Il-76 carrying paratroopers of the 103rd Airborne Division crashed into a mountain. As a result, dozens of soldiers and officers died.

From the very first days of the presence of a limited contingent of Soviet troops in Afghanistan, our units began to be drawn into hostilities, which at first were of an exclusively episodic nature. So, on January 11, 1980, units of the 186th motorized rifle regiment of the 108th motorized rifle division stormed the village of Nahrin not far from Baghlan, suppressing the rebellion of the Afghan artillery regiment. At the same time, losses during the operation were extremely low (two wounded and two killed, with about 100 Afghans killed).

It is noteworthy that the nature of the first military operations of the Soviet troops in Afghanistan was more likely to suppress uprisings of Afghan units than to fight with dushmans, whose units were essentially still being created and formed. Also, the tasks of the Soviet units at this time included maintaining control over a number of large settlements in the country, disarming deserters and improving everyday life.

The first clash between Soviet troops and dushmans was the Kunar operation, which took place from late February to mid-March 1980. During this operation, three Soviet battalions carried out a raid against gangs in the province of the same name. As a result, having inflicted significant losses on the enemy, our troops lost 52 people killed.

Since the beginning of the spring of 1980, the war in Afghanistan has unfolded in full. To ensure control over a number of areas, as well as to reduce the effectiveness of the rebels’ actions, Soviet military units began to be regularly involved in combat operations, often in cooperation with the Afghan army (“greens”) or Afghan units of the Ministry of Internal Affairs (“tsaranda”). The combat effectiveness of the Afghan government army (unlike the Mujahideen) was at a very low level, which was explained by the reluctance of ordinary Afghans to fight for something that they themselves did not really know.

Although the effectiveness of OKSVA’s actions was quite high, losses increased sharply with the increase in the intensity of hostilities. Naturally, this was kept silent in the official Soviet press, which stated that “Soviet troops are in Afghanistan for maneuvers, as well as to provide international assistance to the fraternal people, consisting in the construction of hospitals, houses and schools.”

By mid-1980, the Politburo of the CPSU Central Committee decided to withdraw from the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan a number of tank and anti-aircraft units, which were not needed in the conditions of the guerrilla war. However, at the same time, the question of the complete withdrawal of Soviet troops from the country was postponed. It became clear that the Soviet Army was “bogged down” in Afghanistan, and this fact simply could not go unnoticed by the CIA. It was 1980 that was characterized by the beginning of cooperation between American intelligence services and the Afghan Mujahideen.

The year 1981 for OKSVA is characterized by a further intensification of hostilities. During the first half of the year, Soviet troops fought with rebels mainly in the northern and eastern provinces of Afghanistan, but already in May the situation in the central region of the country, near Kabul, worsened. Here, actions on the part of the group of Ahmad Shah Masud, whose patrimony was the Panjshir Gorge, intensified, thanks to which he received the title “Lion of Panjshir”. The purpose of his group’s actions was to expand the area of ​​control, as well as to pin down Soviet troops in order to prevent their penetration into Panjshir.

However, by August 1981, Soviet troops had already carried out four combined arms operations in the Panjshir Gorge. However, as in previous times, Soviet troops occupied the territory of the gorge, destroyed part of the enemy’s manpower and their ammunition depots, but could not stay here for long - the difficulties in supplying them far from the places of permanent deployment of units affected them, as well as the fact that the dushmans in such a “dead” area they acted exceptionally boldly. The effectiveness of the Panjshir operations was seriously reduced by the fact that the rebels left the gorge ahead of time, leaving only barriers from small detachments and mining the paths.

By the end of 1981, it became clear that the dushmans, having an inexhaustible flow of volunteers and supplies from Pakistan, could fight for as long as they wanted. It was for this purpose, to block mountain paths in the southeast, that the 56th separate air assault brigade was transferred from Kunduz to the city of Gardez, the capital of Paktia province. Additionally, the actions of other Soviet units near the southern border of Afghanistan intensified. Indeed, already in the first months of 1982, it was possible to significantly reduce the flow of reinforcements and supplies for the Mujahideen from Pakistan. However, in the following months, due to the intensification of the actions of the dushman in other parts of the country, the situation practically returned to its initial state. The most striking episode, testifying to the increased combat capabilities of the rebels, was their encirclement of an entire battalion (4th Airborne Assault) of the 56th Airborne Assault Brigade in the Alikhail area. Only thanks to the energetic actions of the brigade leadership, as well as the competent interaction of the military branches (aviation, landing and artillery), the battalion was released with relatively small losses.

The war continues (1982-1987)

The year 1982 was also marked by a major tragedy at the tunnel through the Salang Pass, which was strategically important for the whole of Afghanistan. In November, a sabotage act by dushmans was committed there, which consisted in the fact that the exit from one side of the tunnel was blocked by their cars.

As a result of this action, 64 Soviet soldiers died, as well as more than 100 Afghans, including civilians. The rebels, in pursuit of immediate success, did not even stop at killing their compatriots, Afghan women and children.

At the end of the same 1982, a meeting was held in Moscow between Pakistani President Zia ul-Haq and the head of the USSR Yuri Andropov. During the meeting, the conditions for ending Pakistan's assistance to the Afghan rebels, as well as the conditions for the withdrawal of Soviet troops from the country, were discussed.

During 1983, Soviet troops in Afghanistan continued to carry out operations against armed opposition groups. However, this period is characterized by an increased intensity of hostilities in the area of ​​the Soviet-Afghan border (Marmol operation), as well as the end of the fighting in the Panjshir Gorge by signing a truce with the armed forces of Ahmad Shah Massoud. The 177th special forces detachment located in the gorge was eventually withdrawn from it after 8 months of intense combat operations.

In April, in the province of Nimroz, a large fortified area of ​​​​Rabati-Jali militants was defeated. This fortified area also had the functions of a transshipment base for transporting drugs. After its destruction, the economic base of the rebels was significantly damaged, not to mention the fact that they lost a powerful base capable of admitting a large number of militants from Iran and Pakistan.

Another “hot” spot in a far from calm Afghanistan in the summer of 1983 was the city of Khost, located in the southeast of the country, almost close to the border of Pakistan. It was on him that the dushmans began their attack in July. Their plan was simple: to capture the city and make it the capital of the “rebellious” areas. Taking the Host would allow them to gain recognition in the world.

However, the stubborn defense of Khost made adjustments to the plans of the leadership of the Afghan opposition. Having failed to take the city right away, it was decided to take it into the blockade ring. But this plan also failed. Soviet troops, with massive air and artillery support, managed to thwart the attempted blockade of the city.

The winter of 1983-1984 in the Afghan War is notable for the fact that for the first time during it, armed opposition groups did not leave the territory of Afghanistan, as was the case previously. This caused an aggravated situation in the area of ​​Kabul and Jalalabad, where the Mujahideen began setting up bases and fortified areas for a long-term guerrilla war.

It was in this regard that, already at the beginning of 1984, the decision was made to carry out Operation Veil by Soviet troops. Its essence was to create a barrier line along the Afghan-Pakistani and partially Afghan-Iranian borders with the aim of stopping the supply of Mujahideen detachments and intercepting caravans going to the territory of Afghanistan. For these purposes, quite large forces with a total number of 6 to 10 thousand people and a large number of aviation and artillery were allocated.

But the operation ultimately did not achieve its goal, since it was almost impossible to completely close the border with Pakistan, especially with such limited, albeit mobile, forces. Only 15-20% of the total number of caravans coming from Pakistan were intercepted.

1984 was characterized mainly by military operations against the newly created transit points and fortified areas of the dushmans with the aim of depriving them of long-term bases and ultimately reducing the intensity of their operations. At the same time, the Mujahideen not only carried out military operations, but also carried out a number of terrorist attacks in the cities of the country, such as the explosion of a bus with passengers in Kabul in June of the same year.

In the second half of 1984, the rebels became more active in the area of ​​​​the city of Khost, and therefore, in November-December, a large army operation was carried out here to accompany the columns and break through the orders of dushmans who were trying to take the city. As a result, the Mujahideen suffered heavy losses. It is worth noting, however, that the losses of Soviet troops were very noticeable. Constant mine explosions, of which by 1984 there were almost 10 times more on Afghan roads compared to the initial period of the war, unexpected shelling of convoys and Soviet units, already exceeded the level of casualties from ordinary fire contacts with dushmans.

However, the situation in January 1985 remained stable. The Afghan government, with strong support from the Soviet Army, held Kabul and a number of provincial centers. The Mujahideen were in full control of the rural and mountainous areas, having serious support among dehkans - Afghan peasants and receiving supplies from Pakistan.

It was with the aim of increasing the number of intercepted caravans coming from Pakistan and Iran that in the spring of 1985, the 15th and 22nd separate GRU special forces brigades were introduced into Afghanistan. Being divided into several detachments, they were dispersed throughout the country, from Kandahar to Jalalabad. Thanks to their mobility and exceptional combat effectiveness, the special forces of the GRU General Staff were able to significantly reduce the number of caravans carried out from Pakistan, and, as a result, seriously hit the supply of dushmans in a number of areas.

However, 1985 was marked primarily by large and bloody operations in the Panjshir Gorge, as well as in the Khost region and in the so-called “green zone” of a number of provinces. These operations ensured the defeat of a number of gangs, as well as the seizure of large quantities of weapons and ammunition. For example, in the province of Baghlan, serious losses were inflicted on the troops of the field commander Said Mansur (he himself remained alive).

The year 1985 is also notable for the fact that the Politburo of the CPSU Central Committee took a course towards a political solution to the Afghan problem. The new trends caused by the young General Secretary M. Gorbachev came in handy on the Afghan issue, and already in February of the following year, 1986, the development of a plan for the phased withdrawal of Soviet troops from Afghanistan began.

In 1986, there was an increased effectiveness of the actions of Soviet troops against the bases and fortified areas of the Mujahideen, as a result of which the following points were defeated: “Karera” (March, Kunar province), “Jawara” (April, Khost province), “Kokari-Sharshari” ( August, Herat province). At the same time, a number of large operations were carried out (for example, in the north of the country, in the provinces of Kunduz and Balkh).

On May 4, 1986, at the XVIII plenum of the PDPA Central Committee, the former head of the Afghan Security Service (KHAD), M. Najibullah, was elected to the post of Secretary General instead of Babrak Karmal. The new head of state announced a new – exclusively political – course for solving intra-Afghan problems.

At the same time, M. Gorbachev announced the imminent withdrawal from Afghanistan of a number of military units numbering up to 7 thousand people. However, the withdrawal of six regiments from Afghanistan took place only 4 months later, in October. This move was rather psychological, aimed at showing the Western powers the readiness of the Soviet Union to resolve the Afghan issue peacefully. The fact that a number of withdrawn units practically did not participate in hostilities, and the personnel of a number of newly formed regiments consisted exclusively of soldiers who had served 2 years and were being demobilized, did not bother anyone. That is why this step by the Soviet leadership was a very serious victory with minimal sacrifices.

Another important event that opened the page for the new, final period of the USSR war in Afghanistan was the proclamation by the Afghan government of a course towards national reconciliation. This course provided for a unilateral ceasefire starting January 15, 1987. However, the plans of the new Afghan leadership remained plans. The Afghan armed opposition viewed this policy as a cause of weakness and intensified efforts to fight government forces throughout the country.

The final stage of the war (1987-1989)

The year 1987 is characterized by the complete failure of the policy of national reconciliation put forward by M. Najibullah. The rebels were not going to follow the example of the government troops, and the fighting continued throughout the country. However, it was since 1987 that Soviet troops operated mainly through large army operations, which achieved success thanks to the competent interaction of all branches of the military. The largest operations during this period were: “Strike” (Kunduz province), “Thunderstorm” (Ghazni province), “Circle” (Logar and Kabul provinces), “South-87” (Kandahar province).

Separately, it is also worth mentioning Operation Magistral to unblock the city of Khost. It was this city that was stubbornly defended by both Afghan and Soviet forces for more than 5 years and, as a result, was surrounded. However, supplies to the Khost garrison were carried out by air. The result of Operation Magistral was the complete unblocking of the Gardez-Khost highway in January 1988 and the defeat of a number of rebel gangs.

On April 14, 1988 in Geneva, the ministers of Afghanistan and Pakistan signed agreements on a political settlement of the Afghan conflict. The USSR and the USA acted as guarantors of these agreements. In addition, the USSR pledged to withdraw troops from Afghanistan within 9 months. The United States and Pakistan pledged to stop supporting the Mujahideen.

The first period of the OKSV withdrawal from Afghanistan began on May 15, 1988. During it, Soviet units were withdrawn from the Panjshir Gorge, Kunduz, Kandahar, Gardez and other points of the country. As a result, a kind of “vacuum” was initially formed, which was very quickly filled by rebels. Already in August-October, the dushmans occupied a number of large settlements in Afghanistan, including Kunduz and Khanabad. The number of limited Soviet troops was approximately half of what it was as of January 1, 1988 - 50 thousand people.

By November, the Afghan government army, with the support of Soviet troops, controlled only approximately 30% of the country's territory, while after the departure of Soviet units, entire provinces came under the control of the rebels.

On November 15, the second and final stage of the withdrawal of Soviet troops from the country began. This period is characterized by a significantly reduced intensity of hostilities. The last operation for the Soviet Army in Afghanistan was Operation Typhoon in the provinces of Baghlan, Parwan and Kapisa. It was carried out at the request of the General Secretary of the PDPA Central Committee M. Najibullah, who thus wanted to seriously weaken the forces of the rebels at last before facing them one on one. However, although the dushman’s losses were quite large, they were not critical, but the withdrawal of the last Soviet units from Afghanistan made this operation somewhat more complicated.

Tactics of the parties

During the Afghan War, both sides widely used tactics that originated during World War II in Yugoslavia, and were also developed in the wars for freedom of Algeria and Vietnam. At the same time, the USSR, which previously supported the rebels who fought against the armies of capitalist countries, was now itself faced with a serious partisan struggle.

At the beginning of the war, the Soviet army had virtually no experience in fighting modern partisan movements, which caused a number of command errors and serious losses in the first operations. However, the Soviet troops had good combat training and were seriously superior to the Afghan rebels technically, materially and morally.

A striking example of the initial period of hostilities of the Soviet army in Afghanistan was the capture of the bridge over the Kokcha River. This bridge was captured at the end of 1979 - beginning of 1980 and was held by large forces of dushmans (up to 1,500 people). Soviet forces numbered up to 70 people (1st parachute company of the 1st infantry battalion of the 56th air assault brigade, reinforced by AGS-17 crews).

As a result of the battle, Soviet troops drove the rebels out of their positions and occupied the bridge, suffering losses of 7 dead and 10 wounded. The dushman's losses turned out to be much greater. This operation was considered successful, and the company commander, Senior Lieutenant S.P. Kozlov, was awarded the title of Hero of the Soviet Union.

Subsequently, Soviet tactics were significantly developed and became more flexible. To destroy the Mujahideen bases, Soviet units (usually at first no more than a battalion, divided into combat groups for ease of control) went on foot through the mountains or were delivered by helicopter. The firepower of combat groups almost always made it possible to suppress the firing points of the dushmans, as well as destroy their ambushes. In addition to small arms, combat groups were often reinforced by mortar crews and AGS crews. In rare cases, combat groups were even assigned crews of SPTG (mounted anti-tank grenade launchers), which usually did not usually participate in combat operations.
In cases where the enemy was hiding in villages or green zones, the Soviet units themselves or interacting with the “greens” (Afghan government army) carried out a “combing” (search for dushmans in the territory) of a given area.

GRU special forces units, used to intercept caravans, interacted more closely with aviation. Helicopters delivered them to ambush sites, from where they already operated, intercepting, inspecting caravans, or eliminating them if necessary.

The supply of Soviet troops was carried out through columns traveling along Afghan roads with everything they needed. These columns were mandatorily equipped, in addition to trucks, with military equipment (armored personnel carriers, infantry fighting vehicles, infantry fighting vehicles, tanks and self-propelled guns). However, despite all the precautions, attacks by dushmans on columns were a very frequent occurrence, and the number of broken and burned equipment became more and more numerous. The road in the area of ​​the village of Mukhamed-Aga in Logar province (the so-called “Mukhamedka”) was notorious throughout Afghanistan - almost every column here was fired upon. It is noteworthy that the drivers of the vehicles in the convoys had instructions - during shelling, increase their speed and try to get out of the fire as quickly as possible.

The Soviet army also made massive use of aviation and artillery. If Vietnam became the “finest” hour for American helicopters, then for Soviet army aviation it was the Afghan War that became such a time. The Mi-8 and Mi-24 helicopters were not only mobile and reliable means of delivering personnel to the required areas, but also excellent means of supporting ground troops, as well as suppressing enemy firing points. In total, during the years of the Afghan war, the USSR lost 333 helicopters.

The dushman's tactics consisted mainly of inflicting as much damage as possible on Soviet troops and acting on their communications, as well as (for example, near Khost in 1983-1988 or in general at the final stage of the war) in capturing populated areas. Ambushes, attacks on convoys, mining of mountain paths and even terrorist attacks in Kabul and other large cities - these measures had their results, although sometimes very dubious. There were also frequent cases of mujahideen extermination of families, and even entire villages, that in any way collaborated with the “infidels.”

If the dushman group was in danger, it easily disappeared into the mountains that were native to the Afghans. However, the dushmans’ retreat was not always successful, and in such cases the group died or was captured.

At the beginning of the war (1979-1983), the Mujahideen, as a rule, went to spend the winter in Pakistan, where they had equipped field camps and bases. However, starting from 1983, they began to establish similar bases on the territory of Afghanistan, and often these bases were discovered and destroyed by Soviet troops. Reinforcement into the ranks of the Mujahideen came mainly from destroyed villages or from deserted soldiers of the Afghan government army.

Results of the Afghan War and its significance

The result of the Afghan War was that the pro-Soviet regime in Afghanistan, with the support of Soviet troops, was able to hold out much longer than it would have lasted without it (the regime finally fell in 1992). However, at the same time, the trust of the Afghan people in the PDPA was completely undermined, and therefore no political solution to intra-Afghan problems could be found.

The USSR, which was created at the southern border, somewhat fettered the Soviet forces, preventing them from effectively solving other foreign policy problems in the 80s, such as, for example, the crisis in Poland. Ultimately, this circumstance seriously influenced the balance of power in Eastern Europe and, as a consequence, the collapse of the Warsaw Pact Organization.

The American leadership, having barely recovered from the Vietnam War, was interested in bogging down the USSR in Afghanistan, and therefore provided serious support to the Afghan rebels. However, in reality, the Afghan insurgent movement was poorly controlled, as a result of which already in the mid-90s it was completely discredited in the eyes of almost the entire world.

In military terms, the Soviet Army gained very extensive experience in fighting partisans in mountainous areas, which, however, was little taken into account 6 years later - during the war in Chechnya. Nevertheless, OKSVA honorably fulfilled all the military tasks set for itself, in the words of General B. Gromov, “returned to their homeland in an organized manner.”

The losses of Soviet troops in Afghanistan amounted, according to various sources, from 13,835 to 14,427 people. The KGB losses amounted to 576 people, and the Ministry of Internal Affairs - 28 people. 53,750 people were wounded and shell-shocked, 415,930 fell ill (mainly with diseases such as malaria, typhus and hepatitis). 417 military personnel were captured, of which 130 were released.

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Introduction

Afghan war 1979-1989 -- an armed conflict between the Afghan government and allied forces of the USSR, who sought to maintain the pro-communist regime in Afghanistan, on the one hand, and the Muslim Afghan resistance, on the other.

Of course, this period is not the most positive in the history of the USSR, but I wanted to open a small curtain in this war, namely, the reasons and main tasks for the USSR to eliminate the military conflict in Afghanistan.

Cause of hostilities

The main reason for the war was foreign interference in the Afghan internal political crisis, which was a consequence of the struggle for power between the Afghan government and numerous armed groups of the Afghan Mujahideen (“dushmans”), who enjoy political and financial support from leading NATO states and the Islamic world, on the other hand.

The internal political crisis in Afghanistan was the “April Revolution” - the events in Afghanistan on April 27, 1978, which resulted in the establishment of a Marxist pro-Soviet government in the country.

As a result of the April Revolution, the People's Democratic Party of Afghanistan (PDPA), whose leader was in 1978, came to power. Nur Mohammad Taraki (killed by order of Hafizullah Amin), and then Hafizullah Amin until December 1979, who proclaimed the country the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan (DRA).

Attempts by the country's leadership to carry out new reforms that would overcome Afghanistan's lagging behind have encountered resistance from the Islamic opposition. In 1978, even before the introduction of Soviet troops, a civil war began in Afghanistan.

Lacking strong popular support, the new government brutally suppressed internal opposition. Unrest in the country and infighting between supporters of the Khalq and Parcham (the PDPA was divided into these two parts), taking into account geopolitical considerations (preventing the strengthening of US influence in Central Asia and protecting the Central Asian republics) pushed the Soviet leadership to introduce .troops to Afghanistan under the pretext of providing international assistance. The entry of Soviet troops into Afghanistan began on the basis of a resolution of the Politburo of the CPSU Central Committee, without a formal decision regarding this by the Supreme Soviet of the USSR.

In March 1979, during the uprising in the city of Herat, the Afghan leadership made its first request for direct Soviet military intervention. But the CPSU Central Committee Commission on Afghanistan reported to the Politburo of the CPSU Central Committee about the obvious negative consequences of direct Soviet intervention, and the request was rejected.

However, the Herat rebellion forced the reinforcement of Soviet troops at the Soviet-Afghan border and, by order of Defense Minister D.F. Ustinov, preparations began for a possible landing of the 105th Guards Airborne Division into Afghanistan. The number of Soviet advisers (including military) in Afghanistan was sharply increased: from 409 people in January to 4,500 by the end of June 1979.

The impetus for the USSR's intervention was US assistance to the Mujahideen. According to the official version of history, CIA assistance to the mujahideen began during 1980, that is, after the Soviet army invaded Afghanistan on December 24, 1979. But the reality, kept secret until today, is different: in fact, President Carter signed the first directive on secret assistance to opponents of the pro-Soviet regime in Kabul on July 3, 1979.

On December 25, 1979, the entry of Soviet troops into Afghanistan began in three directions: Kushka - Shindand - Kandahar, Termez - Kunduz - Kabul, Khorog - Faizabad.

The directive did not provide for the participation of Soviet troops in hostilities on the territory of Afghanistan; the procedure for the use of weapons, even for the purposes of self-defense, was not determined. True, already on December 27, D. F. Ustinov’s order appeared to suppress the resistance of the rebels in cases of attack. It was assumed that Soviet troops would become garrisons and take protection of important industrial and other facilities, thereby freeing up parts of the Afghan army for active action against opposition forces, as well as against possible external interference. The border with Afghanistan was ordered to be crossed at 15:00 Moscow time (17:00 Kabul time) on December 27, 1979. But on the morning of December 25, the 4th battalion of the 56th Guards Air Assault Brigade crossed the pontoon bridge across the border river Amu Darya, which was tasked with capturing the high-mountainous Salang pass on the Termez-Kabul road in order to ensure the unhindered passage of Soviet troops. On the same day, the transfer of units of the 103rd Guards Airborne Division to the airfields of Kabul and Bagram began. The first to land at the Kabul airfield were the paratroopers of the 350th Guards Parachute Regiment under the command of Lieutenant Colonel G.I. Shpaka.

The troops landed at the airfields of Kabul, Bagram, and Kandahar. Sending in troops is not easy; Afghan President Hafizullah Amin was killed during the capture of the presidential palace in Kabul. The Muslim population did not accept the Soviet presence, and an uprising broke out in the northeastern provinces, spreading throughout the country.

Afghanistan has traditionally been a fairly calm country, as calm as a Muslim state can be with its inherent constant internecine struggle. By 1973-1974, intra-clan confrontations began to intensify, and in 1978 this resulted in the so-called “April” or “Saur revolution” (which translated means “bull revolution”).

As a result of this revolution, the People's Democratic Party of Afghanistan (PDPA) came to power. Afghanistan was declared a Democratic Republic. Nur Muhammad Taraki, who belonged to the Khalq group, became president of the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan. Babrak Karmal from the Parcham faction became vice-president and vice-premier, and Hafizullah Amin from Khalq received the posts of second vice-president and foreign minister. They were convinced that the development of the country along the path of socialism, relying on the support of the USSR, would create the best opportunities for modernization and overcoming economic and social backwardness. However, most tribal leaders and Muslim clergy rejected the idea of ​​reform. In the context of the interethnic and religious war that began on July 19, Taraki and Amin raised the question of bringing in two Soviet divisions in case of emergency.

On October 10, Taraki's death from a long, serious illness was officially announced. Although it later became known that officers of the presidential guard had strangled him two days earlier on the orders of Amin. There was a hunt for Taraki's supporters. By November 1979, civil war had effectively broken out in Afghanistan. Unfortunately, under H. Amin, this little Afghan Pol Pot, the authority of the new government was undermined by mass arrests, executions of undesirables, hasty reforms that did not meet national traditions, and executions of Muslim theologians. The number of many units of the Afghan army in 1979 was reduced by three to four times, the number of officers - even by 10 times. Gradually, the idea emerged to create conditions for replacing Amin with a more progressive figure. In December 1979, Amin died during the storming of the presidential palace by Soviet special forces. Soviet military units entered Afghanistan. Babrak Karmal became the head of the party and state. The course towards “building socialism” continued.

Opposition forces began an open struggle against the authorities. Armed detachments of Mujahideen began to be created. Finding itself unable to deal with the opposition, the government took a number of steps towards reconciliation. In 1987, Najibullah became the new president of the country. In 1988, a series of agreements on a political settlement in Afghanistan were concluded with the participation of Pakistan, the USSR and the USA. In accordance with them, all Soviet troops were withdrawn from Afghanistan.

Despite the agreements, the authorities' attempts to achieve national reconciliation failed. In 1992, armed mujahideen units captured Kabul. Power passed to the Jihad Council. The country was declared an Islamic state. The head of the Islamic Society of Afghanistan, B. Rabbani, began to serve as the country's president. At the same time, the struggle for power continued in the center and locally between commanders of military formations belonging to different parties and national groups.

In 1995, the Islamic movement Taliban joined the fight. Its Taliban organizers are former students of religious schools who were trained in opposition military camps.

In September 1996, the Taliban captured Kabul and then most of the country. In the fall of 2001, after the Taliban government refused to hand over Osama bin Laden to the United States, a military operation was carried out in Afghanistan to overthrow the government. Along with the Americans, armed anti-Taliban opposition forces took part in it. The Taliban left Kabul. In December 2001, a new interim administration of Afghanistan was formed. In 2004, a new president of the country was elected. Today the country's president is Hamid Karzai.

The Afghan war is a tragedy for our country

The fate of Afghanistan could not help but worry us. The USSR had a common border with it with a length of about 2,400 km. Since 1919, we have provided Afghanistan with the widest possible assistance. For example, by 1978, we ranked first among all countries in the world in terms of the volume of economic assistance provided. More than 3,000 Afghan officers were trained by us even before the April 1979 revolution. All this cannot be thrown off the scales of history.

The decision to send troops was made behind closed doors by several top leaders of the state. True, doubts were expressed. But the last word remained with L.I. Brezhnev. On December 25, 1979, at 15:00 Moscow time, the entry of Soviet troops into Afghanistan began.

Documentary information: “The losses of personnel of a limited contingent of Soviet troops in the Republic of Afghanistan in the period from December 25, 1979 to February 15, 1989 amounted to: 13,833 people from the 40th Army were killed or died from wounds. 49,985 people were injured, 6,759 became disabled, 330 are wanted, 312 of them are missing. In addition, there are 180 military advisers, 584 translators and specialists from other ministries and departments.

During the war years, more than 200 thousand people were awarded orders and medals. The title of Hero of the Soviet Union was awarded to 71 “Afghans” (Tajik, Russian, Ingush, Tatar, Ukrainian, etc.). Twenty-five of them received this title posthumously. A monument is dedicated to all of them in the ancient fortress of Balla Hissar. The faceted spire of a majestic arrow shot up into the blue sky. A five-pointed star and a laurel branch crown it. Below on the black granite is carved in Russian and Dargah: “To the internationalist warriors.” This monument was built in 1985 with funds from the youth of Afghanistan as a sign of deep gratitude to the Soviet soldier for his selfless help.

And all those who died were taken back to their native land from distant Afghanistan by planes called “Black Tulip”

For almost 10 years, from December 1979 to February 1989, military operations took place on the territory of the Republic of Afghanistan, called the Afghan War, but in fact it was one of the periods of civil war that has been shaking this state for more than a decade. On the one hand, pro-government forces (the Afghan army) fought, supported by a limited contingent of Soviet troops, and they were opposed by quite numerous formations of armed Afghan Muslims (Mujahideen), who received significant material support from NATO forces and most countries of the Muslim world. It turned out that on the territory of Afghanistan the interests of two opposing political systems once again collided: one sought to support the pro-communist regime in this country, while others preferred that Afghan society follow the Islamist path of development. Simply put, there was a struggle to establish absolute control over the territory of this Asian state.

Over the course of all 10 years, the permanent Soviet military contingent in Afghanistan numbered about 100 thousand soldiers and officers, and in total more than half a million Soviet military personnel passed through the Afghan war. And this war cost the Soviet Union about 75 billion dollars. In turn, the West provided the Mujahideen with financial assistance worth $8.5 billion.

Causes of the Afghan War

Central Asia, where the Republic of Afghanistan is located, has always been one of the key regions where the interests of many of the world's strongest powers have intersected for several centuries. So in the 80s of the last century the interests of the USSR and the USA collided there.

When Afghanistan gained independence back in 1919 and was freed from British colonization, the first country to recognize this independence was the young Soviet country. In all subsequent years, the USSR provided its southern neighbor with tangible material assistance and support, and Afghanistan, in turn, remained devoted to the most important political issues.

And when, as a result of the April Revolution of 1978, supporters of the ideas of socialism came to power in this Asian country and proclaimed Afghanistan a democratic republic, the opposition (radical Islamists) declared a holy war on the newly created government. Under the pretext of providing international assistance to the fraternal Afghan people and to protect their southern borders, the leadership of the USSR decided to introduce its military contingent into the territory of the neighboring country, especially since the Afghan government had repeatedly turned to the USSR with requests for military assistance. In fact, everything was a little different: the leadership of the Soviet Union could not allow this country to leave its sphere of influence, since the coming to power of the Afghan opposition could lead to a strengthening of the US position in this region, located very close to Soviet territory. That is, it was at this time that Afghanistan became the place where the interests of two “superpowers” ​​collided, and their interference in the country’s internal politics became the cause of the 10-year Afghan war.

Progress of the war

On December 12, 1979, members of the Politburo of the CPSU Central Committee, without the consent of the Supreme Council, finally made a decision to provide international assistance to the fraternal people of Afghanistan. And already on December 25, units of the 40th Army began to cross the Amu Darya River to the territory of a neighboring state.

During the Afghan war, four periods can be roughly distinguished:

• Period I – from December 1979 to February 1980. A limited contingent was introduced into Afghanistan and placed in garrisons. Their task was to control the situation in large cities, guard and defend the locations of military units. During this period, no military operations took place, but as a result of shelling and attacks by the Mujahideen, Soviet units suffered losses. So in 1980, 1,500 people died.
• Period II - from March 1980 to April 1985. Conducting active combat operations and major military operations together with the forces of the Afghan army throughout the state. It was during this period that the Soviet military contingent suffered significant losses: about 2,000 people died in 1982, and more than 2,300 in 1985. At this time, the Afghan opposition moved its main armed forces to mountainous areas, where it was difficult to use modern motorized equipment. The rebels switched to maneuverable actions in small detachments, which did not make it possible to use aviation and artillery to destroy them. To defeat the enemy, it was necessary to eliminate the base areas of concentration of the Mujahideen. In 1980, a major operation was carried out in Panjshir; in December 1981, a rebel base was destroyed in the province of Jowzjan; in June 1982, Panjshir was captured as a result of military operations with a massive landing. In April 1983, opposition forces were defeated in the Nijrab gorge.
• III period - from May 1985 to December 1986. Active military operations of the Soviet contingent are decreasing, military operations are more often carried out by the Afghan army, which received significant support from aviation and artillery. The delivery of weapons and ammunition from abroad to arm the Mujahideen was stopped. 6 tank, motorized rifle and anti-aircraft regiments were returned to the USSR.
• IV period – from January 1987 to February 1989.

The leadership of Afghanistan and Pakistan, with the support of the UN, began preparations for a peaceful resolution of the situation in the country. Some Soviet units, together with the Afghan army, are conducting operations to destroy militant bases in the provinces of Logar, Nangarhar, Kabul and Kandahar. This period ended on February 15, 1988 with the withdrawal of all Soviet military units from Afghanistan.

Results of the Afghan War

Over the 10 years of this war in Afghanistan, almost 15 thousand Soviet soldiers died, more than 6 thousand remained disabled, and about 200 people are still considered missing.

Three years after the departure of the Soviet military contingent, radical Islamists came to power in the country, and in 1992 Afghanistan was proclaimed an Islamic state. But peace and tranquility never came in the country.

In 1979, the USSR sent its troops into Afghanistan. Many people wonder why the leadership of the Soviet Union did this? The main reason is to stop the development of civil war in neighboring Afghanistan and support supporters of socialism. But did anyone push the USSR into armed conflict?

Let us recall that in 1979, the leadership of the USSR, in order to stop the development of civil war in neighboring Afghanistan, sent a limited contingent of troops there. This caused a violent reaction in the West: in particular, as a sign of protest, the United States and some other countries announced a boycott of the Moscow Olympics, which took place in 1980. The Soviet side lost about 15,000 soldiers in this war.

One of the US leaders of that time tells us the truth. It says that the USSR was lured to Afghanistan by the Americans.

The CIA appeared in Afghanistan before the Russians

Archived 1998 interview with President Carter adviser Zbigniew Brzezinski

about how the United States provoked the Soviet Union to intervene in Afghanistan.

Nouvelle Observer (French weekly magazine): Former CIA Director Robert Gates writes in his memoirs that American intelligence agencies began helping the mujahideen in Afghanistan six months before the entry of Soviet troops there. At that time you were US President Carter's national security adviser, you were in the know. Do you confirm what Gates said?

Brzezinski: Yes. According to the official version, the CIA began supporting the Mujahideen in 1980, that is, after the entry of the Soviet Army into Afghanistan on December 24, 1979. But in reality (this was kept secret until today) everything was different: in fact, President Carter signed the first directive to provide secret assistance to opponents of the pro-Soviet regime in Kabul on July 3, 1979. And on the same day I wrote him a memo in which I explained that, in my opinion, this assistance would entail military intervention by the Soviets.

Despite this risk, you were a supporter of this secret operation. But maybe you wanted this war for the Soviets and were looking for ways to provoke it?

Brzezinski:

We did not force the Russians to intervene, but we deliberately increased the likelihood that they would do so.

When the Soviets justified their actions by saying they intended to fight covert US involvement in Afghanistan, no one believed them. However, there was truth in their words... Do you have any regrets today?

Regret what? That secret operation was a brilliant idea. She let the Russians be lured into an Afghan trap, and you want me to be sorry? When the Soviets officially crossed the border, I wrote to President Carter, essentially: "We now have the opportunity to give the USSR its own Vietnam War." In fact, Moscow had to fight an unbearable war for almost ten years, a conflict that led to demoralization and ultimately the collapse of the Soviet Empire.

Do you regret that you promoted Islamic fundamentalism, armed and advised future terrorists?

What is more important for world history? Taliban or the fall of the Soviet Empire? A few excited Islamists or the liberation of central Europe and the end of the Cold War?

- “Somewhat excited”? But it has been said repeatedly: Islamic fundamentalism today poses a global threat...

Nonsense! It would be necessary, as they say, for the West to have a common policy towards Islamism. This is stupid: there is no global Islamism. Let's look at Islam rationally and without demagogy or emotion. It is a world religion with 1.5 billion adherents. But what do fundamentalist pro-Western Saudi Arabia, moderate Morocco, militaristic Pakistan, Egypt or secular Central Asia have in common? Nothing more than what unites Christian countries.

The United States supplied the Afghan Mujahideen with advanced weapons - Stinger MANPADS

US arms supplies to Afghanistan

Afghanistan, 1980s. Mujahid with Stinger

The USSR command promised the title of Hero of the Soviet Union to anyone who captured the Stinger MANPADS complex (Second Generation Man-portable Anti-Aircraft Missile Systems) in good condition. During the years of the Afghan War, Soviet special forces managed to obtain 8 serviceable Stinger MANPADS, but none of them became a Hero.
The Pentagon and the US CIA, arming Afghan rebels with Stinger anti-aircraft missiles, pursued a number of goals, one of which was the opportunity to test the new MANPADS in real combat conditions. By supplying modern MANPADS to the Afghan rebels, the Americans “tried” them to supplying Soviet weapons to Vietnam, where the United States lost hundreds of helicopters and planes shot down by Soviet missiles. But the Soviet Union provided legal assistance to the government of a sovereign country fighting the aggressor, and American politicians armed anti-government armed groups of the Mujahideen (“international terrorists” - according to the current American classification).

Despite the strictest secrecy, the first media reports about the supply of several hundred Stinger MANPADS to the Afghan opposition appeared in the summer of 1986. American anti-aircraft systems were delivered from the United States by sea to the Pakistani port of Karachi, and then transported by vehicles of the Pakistani Armed Forces to Mujahideen training camps. The US CIA supplied missiles and trained Afghan rebels in the vicinity of the Pakistani city of Rualpindi. After preparing the calculations at the training center, they, together with the MANPADS, were sent to Afghanistan in pack caravans and vehicles.