Russo-Japanese War: wiki: Facts about Russia. Russo-Japanese War: main facts

Today, February 9 (January 27), marks 112 years since legendary battle the cruiser "Varyag" and the gunboat "Koreets" with the Japanese squadron. From that moment on it flared up Russo-Japanese War, which lasted more than a year and a half - until September 5 (August 23), 1905. Our selection contains the most remarkable facts of this war.

The battle at Chemulpo and the feat of the cruiser "Varyag"

The armored cruiser "Varyag" and the gunboat "Koreets" under the overall command of Captain 1st Rank Vsevolod Rudnev in Chemulpo Bay - a Korean port in the Yellow Sea - were opposed by two Japanese armored ships, four armored cruisers and three destroyers. Despite the desperate resistance of the Russian sailors, the forces were incomparable. Only after the steering mechanisms and several guns were damaged, the Varyag was forced to return to Chemulpo, where it was scuttled and the gunboat Koreets was blown up.

The surviving sailors moved to ships of neutral countries, and after some time most of the team was able to return to their homeland. The feat of the cruiser sailors was not forgotten even after many years. In 1954, in honor of the 50th anniversary of the battle at Chemulpo, the Commander-in-Chief of the USSR Navy N.G. Kuznetsov personally awarded 15 veterans with medals “For Courage”.

Crew member of the cruiser "Varyag" Ivan Shutov with sailors Northern Fleet, 50s

The difficult fate of "Varyag"

But the Japanese were later able to lift the cruiser “Varyag” from the bottom and even put it into service in their Navy under the name “Soya”. In 1916, it was bought from Japan by Russia, which by that time was already an Entente ally. The cruiser made the transition from Vladivostok to Romanov-on-Murman (Murmansk). In February 1917, the ship went to Great Britain for repairs, where it was confiscated by the British. In 1925, while being towed, the cruiser was caught in a storm and sank off the coast in the Irish Sea. In 2003 the first Russian expedition with immersion in the area of the wreckage - then some small parts of the Varyag were recovered. By the way, the grandson of Vsevolod Rudnev, who lives in France, took part in the dive.

The cruiser "Varyag" after the battle on the Chemulpo roadstead, January 27, 1904

Death of Makarov and Vereshchagin

Mannerheim is responsible for the relief of the 3rd Infantry Division, which was caught in the “sack.” His dragoons, under the cover of fog, put the Japanese to flight. For his skillful leadership and personal courage, the baron was awarded the rank of colonel.

Also, with a detachment of “local police”, he conducted secret reconnaissance in Mongolia: “My detachment is simply Honghuzi, that is, local robbers with high road... These bandits... know nothing but a Russian repeating rifle and cartridges... There is no order or unity in it... although they cannot be blamed for lack of courage. They managed to escape from the encirclement where the Japanese cavalry had driven us... The army headquarters was very satisfied with our work - we managed to map about 400 miles and provide information about Japanese positions throughout the entire territory of our activities,” Mannerheim wrote.

Carl Gustav Mannerheim, 1904

Japan and Russia were incomparable neither in human potential - the difference was almost threefold, nor in the capabilities of the armed forces - the Japanese themselves feared that the angry “bear” could, if mobilized, field a three-million-strong army.

The thesis, familiar from Soviet times, that the conflict with the samurai was lost due to the rottenness of tsarism, the “general backwardness of Russia” completely coincides with the conclusions that are contained in many Western publications. Their essence boils down to a simple thing - they say, “corrupt tsarism could not effectively wage war.” Our views and Western historians coincide infrequently, what is the reason for such a unity of opinions?

Almost all researchers agree that the Japanese were helped to win by hard work, self-sacrifice, patriotism, high combat training of soldiers, skill of military leaders, exceptional discipline - the praise can be continued indefinitely. Let's try to figure it all out.

To what extent were the officers and soldiers of the Country ready? rising sun sacrifice oneself, as they like to say now? How much did their fighting spirit exceed the patriotism of our soldiers and sailors? After all, the Russians are credited with a tendency to revolt not only in the rear - this is about the battleship Potemkin, but even at the front - let us remember the description of a small riot on the battleship Orel before the Battle of Tsushima. How sharply this contrasts with the description of the life of Japanese sailors, which became public thanks to the pen of French journalists: crew members of a Japanese armored cruiser in free time weaved woolen socks for their army colleagues!

In order to dot all the i's, let's turn to Japanese sources. It's about O feature films created in the Land of the Rising Sun itself. And not for the purpose of instilling pacifist feelings among the emperor’s subjects, but, as they say, as an example for descendants.

Talking about the life of ordinary sailors on the flagship ship of the Japanese squadron "Mikasa", the filmmakers show all its ins and outs - mass fights, theft, disobedience to orders, hazing.

There is also an element unfamiliar to us: foremen lend money to sailors at a high interest rate. The Russian army and navy, thank God, have never known such a “bouquet” of violations. So it’s clear why, despite external discipline, the crew of the Mikasa rebelled immediately after arriving from England in 1902.

Now - about readiness for self-sacrifice. In our country, as indeed in the majority of the world, it is completely ingrained misrepresentation about all Japanese as kamikaze pilots. It is also necessary to take into account the following: the courage of the Japanese was blown away by the wind as soon as they began to suffer failures in battle. As historians recall, in 1904, after several unsuccessful attempts assault on Port Arthur, right on the front line, refused to obey the orders of the 8th infantry regiment, and many Japanese officers were going to desert, flee to Shanghai for fear of death.

Another argument in favor of the exceptionalism of the Japanese is as follows: they acted exceptionally competently in battle, due to which they won. Let us even remember the famous poem of those times: “In Manchuria, Kuroki in practice gives Kuropatkin lessons in tactics.” This quality supposedly allowed the Japanese to gain the upper hand. In fact, this is just a diligently fanned myth. What kind of literacy can we talk about when the Russian fortifications in Port Arthur were stormed head-on through well-targeted terrain several times? And the same Admiral Heihachiro Togo, proclaimed almost a military genius of that war, was never able to explain to his admirers why in August 1904 he did not attack the Russian squadron, which had huddled together after the failure of the flagship “Tsarevich”. Another question: why suddenly initial stage During the Battle of Tsushima, he exposed his flagship ship to the concentrated fire of the most powerful Russian ships, almost dying himself?

The actions of our enemies were not particularly distinguished by the coherence of the various units.

As testified by the Englishman, captain of the first rank William Pakinham, who was seconded to the squadron of Admiral Togo, after the end of the first day of Tsushima, when the Japanese gave the order to attack the remnants of the Second Pacific squadron with their destroyers, one of them, avoiding a collision with a ship of another formation that suddenly emerged from the darkness , made a sharp turn and overturned. Those who say that the root of all the fantastic victories of the Japanese is the exceptional luck of the admiral are probably right.

We were in some ways inferior to the Japanese in the design of artillery systems, but the Japanese were also not good at everything: their Arisaka rifle was noticeably inferior to the Russian rifle of Sergei Mosin in a number of important characteristics. Samurai simply cannot compete with the best Russian cavalry in the world, and, most importantly, our opponents could not compete in physical strength with our warriors.

Okay, but what helped the Japanese win? I think a whole complex of factors - both subjective and objective - made themselves felt. One of the main ones is the extremely careful handling of military secrets by the Japanese; our rivals were able to classify even the death of two of the six battleships they had. What can we say about smaller destroyers - they went to the bottom “in batches”, but the Japanese stubbornly denied everything, and after a while they commissioned a similar ship, that is, the same ship under the same name. The world and Russian public believed, and this is how the myth of the invincibility of enemies was born. Naturally, all this affected the mood among our military. The Japanese obtained all the information about our losses, troop movements and the appointment of new commanders from Russian newspapers.

Our gendarmerie, which was then entrusted with the function of counterintelligence, simply could not cope with the new conditions for it - many of its employees were simply unable to distinguish a Japanese from a Chinese.

Things got to the point that in the summer of 1904, as is clear from front-line reports from the Niva magazine, the strictest order was issued to shoot all Asians who appeared at the combat positions of our troops.

Let’s not discount the underestimation of the enemy: at first, the tsar did not want to transfer a single formation from the European part of Russia, and the second Pacific squadron began to be equipped for the journey only after the death of Admiral Stepan Makarov.

Another reason is the peculiarity of the Russian spirit. After all, we are accustomed to waging war with the expectation of gradually gathering forces for a subsequent crushing blow to the enemy. Example – Patriotic War 1812, when we retreated to Moscow, and the Great Patriotic War. As they say, Russians harness slowly, but drive quickly. So in those years, statements were heard like “The Japanese will inevitably be defeated, if not at Luoyang, then at Mukden, not at Mukden, then at Harbin, not at Harbin, then at Chita.” History has not given us this chance.

But there was also lack of will Russian diplomacy. The department at Pevchesky was unable to use the fact of the attack on Port Arthur without declaring war to isolate Tokyo internationally.

Diplomats were also unable to resolve the issue of allowing powerful battleships through the Turkish-controlled straits. Black Sea Fleet. Instead, the foreign policy department preferred to make up horror stories about a possible war with England, Afghanistan and Turkey if our ships passed through.

Evil tongues then accused Foreign Minister Vladimir Lamzdorf of weakness of character, seeing the reason in his non-traditional sexual orientation...

The main reason was the initially wrong decision to locate the main naval base in Port Arthur. This is more than nine hundred kilometers from the Korea Strait, which was and still is a hub for ship routes between Russia, China, Korea, Japan and other countries South-East Asia. It was not for nothing that the sailors did not like this city, calling it a “hole.” Therefore, the naval command, in order to sweeten the pill, formally considered the entire Pacific Fleet... Pacific squadron Baltic Fleet. The situation of the main base was aggravated by the fact that it was connected to the metropolis by a thin “thread” of the railway, the final part of which ran through Manchuria, a territory that then had an incomprehensible status - it seemed that it was not Chinese, but not completely Russian. But naval strategists persisted - we need an ice-free harbor on Pacific Ocean, period.

The most realistic position on this issue, oddly enough, was taken by the then Minister of War, General Alexei Kuropatkin. At the very end of 1903, he sent a note to the authorities, in which, in particular, he wrote that Port Arthur, “being aloof from our natural defensive line walking along the shore Sea of Japan, and being at a distance from it from 600 to 1000 miles, it cannot serve as a support for our maritime operations along this coast, leaving it completely open to enemy attack; in particular, the entire southeastern coast of Korea with the Japanese outpost of Fuzan existing here remains open to unpunished capture, and, being located at a distance of 600 to 1200 miles from the northern ports of our main enemy - Japan, our fleet in Port Arthur would be completely deprived of the opportunity to prevent and even threaten the advance of the Japanese fleet towards the Korean or our coast. This base doesn't even cover west coast Korea and the approaches to Seoul, for it is located 350 km before the entrance to the Yellow Sea, that is, in front of the front of the enemy offensive, which will also be firmly based on all the ports of the southern and southwestern coast of Korea. Finally, being 1080 miles from our main base - Vladivostok, Port Arthur remains completely cut off from it, because the line of communication, on the one hand, has no intermediate strong points, on the other hand, along its entire length it is susceptible to attack by the Japanese fleet.”

The war that then broke out completely confirmed his fears.

Moreover, in his note A. Kuropatkin went much further - he proposed leaving not only Port Arthur, but also the whole of Southern Manchuria, citing arguments - we may simply not have enough forces to simultaneously defend Port Arthur and conduct large-scale military operations with the Japanese in Manchuria and Korea. Anticipating possible objections, the general argued that industrial enterprises there are not too many in these parts, and therefore the costs of possible departure will not be too great. In total, he gives more than a dozen arguments in favor of our leaving Southern Manchuria.

Well-versed in all the intricacies of the functioning of the state machine, A. Kuropatkin was well aware that his innovative plan had little chance of being implemented. That's why he sent it out like a fan, in the hope of at least gaining support somewhere. But everyone remained silent.

And so the war begins. Kuropatkin is appointed to the post of commander of the Manchurian army. And then strange things begin to happen - the Russian army suffers humiliating defeats one after another, and, as it seems to an outside observer, completely empty space. For example, near Luoyang, we retreated before the panicked Japanese, who were preparing to retreat, and simply gave up victory. Almost the same thing happened at Mukden at the beginning of 1905: Kuropatkin refused to bring Russian reserves into battle at a critical moment for the Japanese, for which he was publicly insulted by another Russian military leader. Doesn't this speak of Kuropatkin's stubborn, fatal desire to nevertheless implement his plan to abandon Southern Manchuria? After all, that’s what ultimately happened. It turns out that the commander expected that even in the event of defeat he would remain in the highest echelons of power - which is what happened.

Finally, one more frequently asked question: could Russia continue the war after the Battle of Tsushima? The same Vladimir Linevich, appointed to the post of commander of the Russian army after the removal of Kuropatkin, later stated that he could defeat the Japanese. He is echoed in his memories and future leader White movement in the south of Russia Anton Denikin, saying that we could put the squeeze on the Japanese. But these are the opinions of generals who do not have a very good understanding of the role of the fleet.

It should be understood: after the defeat of the Russian squadron, the Japanese controlled the sea. And this meant that they could easily and quickly land troops wherever they wanted - for example, they were already testing the waters for an invasion of Kamchatka.

We were unable to do anything in response - we were only able to concentrate troops at the end points of our railways.

Of course, the Russo-Japanese War, despite claims that all the facts about it are known, remains so far not fully studied. To more or less clarify the situation, work is needed in both Russian and Japanese, Chinese and Korean archives. And this is not a task for one generation of researchers.

One thing is clear - assurances of invincibility Japanese army and the genius of its military leaders is simply a myth.

Truth and myths about the Russian-Japanese War of 1904-1905.

The thesis, familiar from Soviet times, that the conflict with the samurai was lost due to the rottenness of tsarism, the “general backwardness of Russia” completely coincides with the conclusions that are contained in many Western publications. Their essence boils down to a simple thing - they say, “corrupt tsarism could not effectively wage war.” The views of our and Western historians rarely coincide, what is the reason for such a unity of opinions?

To what extent were the officers and soldiers of the Land of the Rising Sun ready to sacrifice themselves, as they now like to claim? How much did their fighting spirit exceed the patriotism of our soldiers and sailors? After all, the Russians are credited with a tendency to revolt not only in the rear - this is about the battleship Potemkin, but even at the front - let us remember the description of a small riot on the battleship Orel before the Battle of Tsushima. How sharply this contrasts with the description of the life of Japanese sailors, which became public thanks to the pen of French journalists: crew members of a Japanese armored cruiser wove woolen socks for their army colleagues in their free time!

In order to dot all the i's, let's turn to Japanese sources. We are talking about feature films created in the Land of the Rising Sun itself. And not for the purpose of instilling pacifist feelings among the emperor’s subjects, but, as they say, as an example for descendants.

Talking about the life of ordinary sailors on the flagship ship of the Japanese squadron "Mikasa", the filmmakers show all its ins and outs - mass fights, theft, disobedience to orders, hazing.

Now - about readiness for self-sacrifice. We, as well as the majority of the world, have a completely false idea of all Japanese as kamikaze pilots. It is also necessary to take into account the following: the courage of the Japanese was blown away by the wind as soon as they began to suffer failures in battle. As historians remind us, in 1904, after several unsuccessful attempts to storm Port Arthur, the 8th Infantry Regiment refused to obey orders right on the front line, and many Japanese officers were going to desert and flee to Shanghai for fear of dying.

Another argument in favor of the exceptionalism of the Japanese is as follows: they acted exceptionally competently in battle, due to which they won. Let us even remember the famous poem of those times: “In Manchuria, Kuroki in practice gives Kuropatkin lessons in tactics.” This quality supposedly allowed the Japanese to gain the upper hand. In fact, this is just a diligently fanned myth. What kind of literacy can we talk about when the Russian fortifications in Port Arthur were stormed head-on through well-targeted terrain several times? And the same Admiral Heihachiro Togo, proclaimed almost a military genius of that war, was never able to explain to his admirers why in August 1904 he did not attack the Russian squadron, which had huddled together after the failure of the flagship “Tsarevich”. Another question: why did he suddenly expose his flagship ship to the concentrated fire of the most powerful Russian ships at the initial stage of the Battle of Tsushima, almost dying himself?

The actions of our enemies were not particularly distinguished by the coherence of the various units.

We were in some ways inferior to the Japanese in the design of artillery systems, but the Japanese were also not good at everything: their Arisaka rifle was noticeably inferior to the Russian rifle of Sergei Mosin in a number of important characteristics. The samurai simply cannot compete with the best Russian cavalry in the world, and, most importantly, our opponents could not compete in physical strength with our warriors.

Another reason is the peculiarity of the Russian spirit. After all, we are accustomed to waging war with the expectation of gradually gathering forces for a subsequent crushing blow to the enemy. An example is the Patriotic War of 1812, when we retreated to Moscow, and the Great Patriotic War. As they say, Russians harness slowly, but drive quickly. So in those years, statements were heard like “The Japanese will inevitably be defeated, if not at Luoyang, then at Mukden, not at Mukden, then at Harbin, not at Harbin, then at Chita.” History has not given us this chance.

But there was also the lack of will of Russian diplomacy. The department at Pevchesky was unable to use the fact of the attack on Port Arthur without declaring war to isolate Tokyo internationally.

Diplomats were also unable to resolve the issue of allowing the most powerful battleships of the Black Sea Fleet through the Turkish-controlled straits. Instead, the foreign policy department preferred to make up horror stories about a possible war with England, Afghanistan and Turkey if our ships passed through.

Evil tongues then accused Foreign Minister Vladimir Lamzdorf of weakness of character, seeing the reason in his non-traditional sexual orientation...

The main reason was the initially wrong decision to locate the main naval base in Port Arthur. This is more than nine hundred kilometers from the Korea Strait, which was and still is a hub for ship routes between Russia, China, Korea, Japan and the countries of Southeast Asia. It was not for nothing that the sailors did not like this city, calling it a “hole.” Therefore, the naval command, in order to sweeten the pill, formally considered the entire Pacific Fleet... the Pacific squadron of the Baltic Fleet. The situation of the main base was aggravated by the fact that it was connected to the metropolis by a thin “thread” of the railway, the final part of which ran through Manchuria, a territory that then had an incomprehensible status - it seemed that it was not Chinese, but not completely Russian. But naval strategists persisted - we need an ice-free harbor on the Pacific Ocean, period.

The most realistic position on this issue, oddly enough, was taken by the then Minister of War, General Alexei Kuropatkin. At the very end of 1903, he sent a note to the authorities, in which, in particular, he wrote that Port Arthur, “being away from our natural defensive line running along the coast of the Sea of Japan, and being at a distance from it from 600 to 1000 miles, it cannot serve as a support for our naval operations along this coast, leaving it completely open to enemy attack; in particular, the entire southeastern coast of Korea with the Japanese outpost of Fuzan existing here remains open to unpunished capture, and, being located at a distance of 600 to 1200 miles from the northern ports of our main enemy - Japan, our fleet in Port Arthur would be completely deprived of the opportunity to prevent and even threaten the advance of the Japanese fleet towards the Korean or our coast. This base does not even cover the western coast of Korea and the approaches to Seoul, for it is located 350 km before the entrance to the Yellow Sea, that is, in front of the front of the enemy offensive, which will also be firmly based on all the ports of the southern and southwestern coast of Korea . Finally, being 1080 miles from our main base - Vladivostok, Port Arthur remains completely cut off from it, because the line of communication, on the one hand, has no intermediate strong points, on the other, along its entire length it is subject to attack by the Japanese fleet.

The war that then broke out completely confirmed his fears.

Moreover, in his note A. Kuropatkin went much further - he proposed leaving not only Port Arthur, but also the whole of Southern Manchuria, citing arguments - we may simply not have enough forces to simultaneously defend Port Arthur and conduct large-scale military operations with the Japanese in Manchuria and Korea. Anticipating possible objections, the general argued that there were not too many industrial enterprises in these parts, and therefore the costs of a possible departure would not be too great. In total, he gives more than a dozen arguments in favor of our leaving Southern Manchuria.

And so the war begins. Kuropatkin is appointed to the post of commander of the Manchurian army. And then strange things begin to happen - the Russian army suffers humiliating defeats one after another, and, as it seems to an outside observer, completely out of nowhere. For example, near Luoyang, we retreated before the panicked Japanese, who were preparing to retreat, and simply gave up victory. Almost the same thing happened at Mukden at the beginning of 1905: Kuropatkin refused to bring Russian reserves into battle at a critical moment for the Japanese, for which he was publicly insulted by another Russian military leader. Doesn't this speak of Kuropatkin's stubborn, fatal desire to nevertheless implement his plan to abandon Southern Manchuria? After all, that’s what ultimately happened. It turns out that the commander expected that even in the event of defeat he would remain in the highest echelons of power - which is what happened.

Finally, one more frequently asked question: could Russia continue the war after the Battle of Tsushima? The same Vladimir Linevich, appointed to the post of commander of the Russian army after the removal of Kuropatkin, later stated that he could defeat the Japanese. The future leader of the White movement in southern Russia, Anton Denikin, echoes him in his memoirs, saying that we could put the squeeze on the Japanese. But these are the opinions of generals who do not have a very good understanding of the role of the fleet.

It should be understood: after the defeat of the Russian squadron, the Japanese controlled the sea. This meant that they could easily and quickly land troops wherever they pleased - for example, they were already testing the waters for an invasion of Kamchatka.

We were unable to do anything in response - we were only able to concentrate troops at the end points of our railways.

One thing is clear - assurances about the invincibility of the Japanese army and the genius of its military leaders are simply a myth.

Large-scale fighting The Russo-Japanese War began on January 26, 1904 with the treacherous attack of Japanese destroyers on external roadstead Port Arthur to the Russian squadron.

The Japanese torpedoed and temporarily disabled the best Russian battleships Tsesarevich and Retvizan, as well as the cruiser Pallada. Measures to protect ships in the outer roadstead turned out to be clearly insufficient. It must be admitted that none of the Russian ships received fatal damage, and after an artillery battle on the morning of January 27, the Japanese fleet was forced to retreat. The moral factor played a fatal role - Japanese fleet managed to seize the initiative. Our squadron began to suffer ridiculous and unjustified losses in the following days due to weak interaction and management. So, just two days after the start of the war, the minelayer "Yenisei" and the cruiser "Boyarin" were killed by their own mines.

The war was going on with with varying success and was marked by the heroism of Russian sailors and soldiers, who amazed even the enemy with their fighting spirit. Like, for example, Private Vasily Ryabov, who was detained by the Japanese during a reconnaissance mission. Dressed as a Chinese peasant and wearing a wig with a pigtail, Ryabov ran into a Japanese patrol behind enemy lines. Ryabov's interrogation did not break him, he preserved military secret and, being sentenced to death, behaved with dignity. Everything happened strictly according to the ritual. They shot from rifles from fifteen paces. The Japanese were delighted with the Russian's courageous behavior and considered it their duty to bring this to the attention of his superiors.

A note from a Japanese officer sounds like a presentation for an award: “Our army cannot help but express our sincere wishes respected army, so that the latter educates more such truly wonderful warriors worthy of full respect.”

The peace treaty, signed on August 23, 1905, is still a very controversial document, some historians consider it big mistake Russian diplomacy. Not the last negative role Lieutenant General Anatoly Stessel played a role in resolving the negotiation issue. In literature he is often called the commandant of the fortress, although this is not so. Stessel was the head of the Kwantung fortified region; after the abolition of the latter in June 1904, he, contrary to orders, remained in Port Arthur. How the military leader did not show himself by sending reports with exaggerated data on Russian losses and numbers Japanese troops.

Stoessel is also known for a number of very shady financial affairs in the besieged fortress. On January 2, 1905, contrary to the opinion of the military council, he began negotiations with the Japanese on the surrender of Port Arthur. After the war under pressure public opinion He was put on trial and sentenced to 10 years of imprisonment in a fortress, but six months later he was released by decision of the emperor and hastened to go abroad.

Russo-Japanese War 1904-1905 - one of the main events of the reign of Nicholas II. This war, unfortunately, ended in the defeat of Russia. This article briefly outlines the causes, main events of the Russo-Japanese War and its results.

In 1904-1905 Russia fought an unnecessary war with Japan, which ended in defeat due to command errors and underestimation of the enemy. The main battle is the defense of Port Arthur. The war is over Portsmouth Peace, according to which Russia was losing the southern half of the island. Sakhalin. The war has intensified revolutionary situation in the country.

Causes of the war

Nicholas II understood that Russia's further advance in Europe or Central Asia impossible. Crimean War limited further expansion in Europe, and after the conquest of the Central Asian khanates (Khiva, Bukhara, Kokand), Russia reached the borders of Persia and Afghanistan, which were in the sphere of influence British Empire. Therefore, the king decided to focus on the Far East foreign policy. Relations between Russia and China were developing successfully: with the permission of China, the CER (Chinese-Eastern Railway) was built Railway), connecting the lands from Transbaikalia to Vladivostok.

In 1898, Russia and China entered into an agreement under which the Port Arthur fortress and the Liaodong Peninsula were transferred to Russia for 25 years on a free lease basis. On Far East Russia met with a new enemy - Japan. This country had undergone rapid modernization (the Meiji reforms) and was now setting itself up for an aggressive foreign policy.

The main reasons for the Russo-Japanese War are:

The struggle between Russia and Japan for dominance in the Far East.
The Japanese were outraged by the construction of the Chinese Eastern Railway, as well as the strengthening economic influence Russia to Manchuria.
Both powers sought to bring China and Korea into their sphere of influence.
Japanese foreign policy had a pronounced imperialist tone; the Japanese dreamed of establishing their dominance in everything Pacific region(the so-called “Great Japan”).
Russia was preparing for war not only because of foreign policy goals. There were internal problems, from which the government wanted to distract the people by staging a “small victorious war.” This name was invented by the Minister of Internal Affairs Plehve. It means that by defeating a weak enemy, people’s trust in the king will increase and contradictions in society will weaken.

Unfortunately, these expectations were not at all justified. Russia was not ready for war. Only Count S.Yu. Witte was an opponent the coming war, offering peaceful economic development of the Far Eastern part Russian Empire.

Chronology of the war. Course of events and their description

The war began with an unexpected Japanese attack on the Russian fleet on the night of January 26-27, 1904. On the same day, an unequal and heroic battle between the cruiser "Varyag", which was commanded by V.F. Rudnev, and gunboat"Korean" against the Japanese. The ships were blown up so as not to fall to the enemy. However, the Japanese managed to gain naval superiority, which allowed them to further transfer troops to the continent.

From the very beginning of the war, the main problem for Russia was revealed - the inability to quickly transfer new forces to the front. The population of the Russian Empire was 3.5 times more Japan, but it was concentrated in the European part of the country. Trans-Siberian Railway, built shortly before the war, could not ensure the timely dispatch of fresh forces to the Far East. It was much easier for the Japanese to replenish the army, so they had superiority in numbers.

Already in February-April 1904. The Japanese landed on the continent and began to push back Russian troops.

31.03.1904 a terrible thing happened, fatal for Russia and further progress war tragedy - Admiral Makarov, a talented, outstanding naval commander who commanded the Pacific squadron, died. On the flagship Petropavlovsk he was blown up by a mine. V.V. died together with Makarov and Petropavlovsk. Vereshchagin is the most famous Russian battle painter, author of the famous painting “The Apotheosis of War.”

IN May 1904. General A.N. Kuropatkin takes command of the army. This general has done a lot fatal errors, and all his military actions were characterized by indecision and constant hesitation. The outcome of the war would have been completely different if this mediocre commander had not been at the head of the army. Kuropatkin’s mistakes led to the fact that the most important fortress in the region, Port Arthur, was cut off from the rest of the army.

IN May 1904. The central episode of the Russian-Japanese War begins - the siege of Port Arthur. Russian troops heroically defended this fortress from the superior forces of Japanese troops for 157 days.

Initially he led the defense talented general R.I. Kondratenko. He took competent actions, and inspired the soldiers with his personal courage and valor. Unfortunately, he died early December 1904., and his place was taken by General A.M. Stoessel, who shamefully surrendered Port Arthur to the Japanese. Stessel was noted for similar “feats” more than once during the war: before the surrender of Port Arthur, which could still fight the enemy, he surrendered the port of Dalny without offering any resistance. From Dalny, the Japanese supplied the rest of the army. Surprisingly, Stoessel was not even convicted.

IN August 1904. A battle took place near Liaoyang, in which Russian troops led by Kuropatkin were defeated and then retreated to Mukden. In October of the same year, an unsuccessful battle took place on the river. Shahe.

IN February 1905. Russian troops were defeated near Mukden. It was a large, difficult and very bloody battle: both troops suffered huge losses, our troops managed to retreat to in perfect order, and the Japanese had finally exhausted their offensive potential.

IN May 1905 took place last Stand Russian-Japanese War: Battle of Tsushima. The Second Pacific Squadron, led by Admiral Rozhestvensky, was defeated at Tsushima. The squadron did long haul: she came out Baltic Sea, circumnavigated all of Europe and Africa.

Each defeat had a painful impact on the state of Russian society. If at the beginning of the war there was a general patriotic upsurge, then with each new defeat confidence in the tsar fell. Moreover, 09.01.1905 The First Russian Revolution had begun, and Nicholas II needed immediate peace and an end to hostilities in order to suppress protests within Russia.

08/23/1905. A peace treaty was concluded in the city of Portsmouth (USA).

Portsmouth World

After the Tsushima disaster, it became obvious that peace had to be made. Russian Ambassador became Count S.Yu. Witte. Nicholas II persistently demanded that Witte adamantly defend Russia's interests during the negotiations. The Tsar wanted Russia to make no territorial or material concessions under the peace treaty. But Count Witte realized that he would still have to give in. Moreover, shortly before the end of the war, the Japanese occupied the island of Sakhalin.

The Treaty of Portsmouth was signed on the following terms:

Russia recognized Korea in the Japanese sphere of influence.
The fortress of Port Arthur and the Liaodong Peninsula were ceded to the Japanese.
Japan occupied South Sakhalin. The Kuril Islands remained with Japan.
The Japanese were granted the right to fisheries along the shores of the Sea of Okhotsk, Japan and Bering Sea.

It is worth saying that Witte managed to conclude a peace agreement for quite a long time mild conditions. The Japanese did not receive a penny of indemnity, and the concession of half of Sakhalin was of little significance for Russia: at that time this island was not actively being developed. A remarkable fact: for this territorial concession S.Yu. Witte received the nickname “Count of Polus-Sakhalinsky”.

Reasons for Russia's defeat

The main reasons for the defeat were:

Underestimating the enemy. The government was committed to a “small victorious war” that would end in a quick and triumphant victory. However, this did not happen.
Support for Japan by the USA and England. These countries supported Japan financially and also supplied it with weapons.
Russia was not ready for war: there were not enough troops concentrated in the Far East, and the transfer of soldiers from the European part of the country was long and difficult.
The Japanese side had a certain superiority in military-technical equipment.
Command errors. It is enough to recall the indecision and hesitation of Kuropatkin, as well as Stessel, who betrayed Russia by surrendering Port Arthur to the Japanese, which could still defend itself.

These points determined the loss of the war.

Results of the war and its significance

The Russo-Japanese War had the following results:

Russia's defeat in the war, first of all, “added fuel” to the fire of the revolution. The people saw in this defeat the inability of the autocracy to govern the country. It was not possible to arrange for the “little one” victorious war" Confidence in Nicholas II dropped significantly.
Russia's influence in the Far Eastern region has weakened. This led to the fact that Nicholas II decided to shift the vector of Russian foreign policy towards the European direction. After this defeat royal Russia no longer accepted any operations to strengthen its political influence in the Far East. In Europe, Russia participated in the First World War.
The unsuccessful Russo-Japanese War led to instability within Russia itself. The influence of the most radical and revolutionary parties, which gave critical characteristics, increased autocratic power, accusing her of inability to lead the country.

Event	Participants	Meaning
Japanese attack on the Russian fleet on January 26-27, 1904. Battle at Chemulpo	V.F.Rudnev.	The Japanese achieved naval superiority, despite the heroic resistance of the Russian fleet.
The death of the Russian fleet 03/31/1904	S.O. Makarov.	The death of a talented Russian naval commander and a strong squadron.
May-December 1904 – defense of Port Arthur.	R.I. Kondratenko, A.M. Stoessel.	Port Arthur was taken after a long and bloody struggle
August 1904 – Battle of Liaoyang.	A.N.Kuropatkin.	Defeat of Russian troops.
October 1904 – battle near the river. Shahe.	A.N.Kuropatkin.	The defeat of the Russian troops and their retreat to Mukden.
February 1905 – Battle of Mukden.	A.N.Kuropatkin.	Despite the defeat of our soldiers, the Japanese had exhausted their offensive potential.
May 1905 – Battle of Tsushima.	Z.P.Rozhestvensky.	The last battle of the war: after this defeat the Treaty of Portsmouth was concluded.