Russian paratroopers in Kosovo. Pristina throw

Paratroopers rush to Pristina

Yugoslavia. A formerly powerful country that split into many smaller states in 1999. It was divided not without the participation of US troops in particular and NATO troops in general. NATO ordered the withdrawal of Serbian troops from Albanian territory, to which they received a negative response. This largely served as the beginning of the bombing of the country. On June 12, 1999, the landing of the ground forces of NATO allies was planned for the invasion of Serbian territory. The invasion was planned through the territory of Macedonia, or rather, the Slatina airport, which is international, was to be used. The airport was located 15 km from the city of Pristina and was able to accommodate flights of various types of complexity.

Russia was initially against such a decision. By decree of the President of the Russian Federation, Boris Yeltsin, the task was set to capture this airport. This operation was classified and did not benefit NATO in any way, which could lead to the 3rd World War. Therefore, it was necessary to carry out a rush of paratroopers to Pristina as soon as possible. The airborne force's march into Kosovo was unique.

The march of paratroopers to Pristina began on June 10. Before this, there was painstaking preparation for the operation. The deployment of NATO troops was planned for June 12, i.e. Russian paratroopers were supposed to capture the airport before this date. A group of 18 paratroopers secretly entered the territory of Kosovo, and then the airport. The surrounding Albanians and Serbs were not aware of how the operation was carried out, but it ended successfully. Only 18 paratroopers, under various pretexts, captured the Slatina international airport.

To the 15th of the now legendary forced march


How they did this is still unknown and classified. Russian paratroopers were quickly invisible in Kosovo, which led to success; all that remained was to wait for support. Already on June 10, an order was received to transfer airborne troops, numbering 200 people, from Bosnia to the airport. NATO troops did not know about this maneuver and thought that they had everything under control. The forward detachment, which included armored personnel carriers, vehicles and personnel, were prepared in the shortest possible time. The most interesting thing is that until the very last moment the personnel did not know where they would have to go.

On the night of June 11-12, the advance detachment of the Airborne Forces in an armored personnel carrier advanced to the border of Bosnia and Yugoslavia. They passed it without any problems. Russian flags were hung on the armored personnel carriers, and local residents happily greeted the airborne troops. This was especially clearly expressed when the troops entered the territory of Serbia.

The army was greeted as their saviors, whom they had been waiting for for a very long time. Tanks and combat vehicles were showered with flowers, and soldiers were given food and drink. Because of this, the movement of the column slowed down slightly. But soon the paratroopers found themselves in Pristina. Local residents poured out into the street and were very happy to see the Russians. Immediately after Pristina, the column stopped in a field. There they awaited clarification on further actions.

After a short stop, the column continued on its way and in the shortest possible time all the airport premises were under the control of the paratroopers. On the way to the airport, they met sleeping Serbs who, in small groups, dejectedly wandered home. The march of paratroopers to Pristina was completed successfully. The soldiers took up a perimeter defense, taking control of the entire airport. Block posts were set up for the arrival of the first NATO columns. At 7 am on June 12, 1989, the task of capturing the Slatina international airport was completed. The airborne forces in Pristina were ready for anything, not knowing what awaited them in the future.

Approach of a column of British troops


At approximately 11:00 the first reconnaissance plane flew over the airport and almost immediately columns of NATO troops approached the airport from both sides. These were British troops: there were Jeeps on one side and tanks on the other. The columns stopped in front of the Russian checkpoints. Several NATO helicopters tried to land at the airport, but armored personnel carriers prevented them from doing so.

General Michael Jackson ordered his troops to occupy the airport and the columns moved to the checkpoints, but the paratroopers were determined and showed this by putting out their weapons and taking aim at the British soldiers. The Russian troops were serious, so the NATO troops had to stop. The commander of NATO forces in Europe ordered to continue moving, not to stop, but General Jackson said that he was not going to start World War 3.

As a result, the airfield was surrounded by NATO troops. This is where the active actions ended. Further developments of events are presented differently in different sources. Some say that the soldiers of the Russian army were starving while they were surrounded and they were given water during the NATO wars, and also helped with provisions. Others say there was plenty of food and water as civilians helped, and there was a warehouse on the airport grounds that contained provisions. Problems with provisions arose due to the fact that Hungary did not allow a Russian plane to fly through its airspace to the airport. As a result, only 200 paratroopers were left 1 on 1 with the approaching NATO forces.

The first small victory of a renewing Russia

As a result, the main goal was achieved. The Slatina airport came under the full control of Russia and NATO troops could not use it for any purpose. Many other decisions were made thanks to this operation. Russian airborne forces could now be in Kosovo legally. Soon, the airport again assumed international status and began to accept a variety of flights.

The paratroopers stayed in Pristina for a very long time and we can safely say that the operation went perfectly. The participants in this operation were awarded a specially established medal. Russian peacekeepers were stationed on the territory of Kosovo until 2003, and then were withdrawn from there, since their maintenance was very expensive for the Russian Federation. Based on the results of the entire stay of the peacekeepers in Kosovo and adjacent territories, we can safely say that they helped the fraternal people cope with the current situation, and the timely operation undoubtedly saved a single life.

Illustration copyright AP

The night from June 11 to 12 in Russia falls on the eve of the holiday. 15 years ago, citizens, as always, rested peacefully, not knowing that the country was suddenly on the brink of war.

Many historians consider the “throw on Pristina” to be the most dangerous aggravation of relations between Moscow and the West since the Caribbean crisis. As it turned out later, there were generals on both sides who were not afraid of the conflict.

For a moment it seemed like the spring of 1945 had returned, when Russians and Americans raced across Europe in tanks, competing to see who could capture the most cities.

Russia's loud military demonstration did not, and could not, give anything but moral satisfaction.

Quickly and secretly

On June 3, after 78 days of NATO bombing, Serbian President Slobodan Milosevic, without informing Russia, accepted the alliance's demand to withdraw its troops and police from Kosovo.

Operation Allied Force officially ended on June 10. On the 12th, the entry of international forces into Kosovo from the south, from Macedonia, was planned.

The Russian side wanted to have its own sector of about a brigade of paratroopers. Our contingent had to maintain a certain autonomy or be under the command of the UN, but not subordinate to NATO. Personally, I have always defended this point of view: Russia has its own special interests in Yugoslavia. Since it is not a member of NATO, its contingent should not be subordinate to the command of the North Atlantic bloc. Viktor Chernomyrdin,
special representative of the President of the Russian Federation

Russia insisted on providing it with a separate sector of responsibility, as in post-war Germany and Austria. Moreover, it demanded the north of Kosovo, where there was a significant Serbian population. If this plan were implemented, the matter would most likely end with the dismemberment of the region and the Russian zone coming under the control of Belgrade.

When the West rejected this idea, Moscow decided to act unilaterally.

After the expansion of NATO and the bombing of Serbia, resentment reigned in the political and military leadership of Russia: they don’t take us into account in anything, enough patience!

The idea was to get to Kosovo before NATO and take control of the Slatina airport, 15 kilometers southeast of the regional capital Pristina - the only one in Kosovo capable of receiving heavy military transport aircraft.

North of Kosovo, in Bosnia and Herzegovina, in the area of ​​the town of Ugljevik, a Russian airborne brigade was stationed since 1995, part of a peacekeeping division headed by an American general.

On June 10, brigade commander Colonel Nikolai Ignatov received an order, secretly from his partners, to prepare a combined battalion of 200 people and “with lightning speed, secretly and unexpectedly for NATO” to make a 600-kilometer march to Slatina.

According to NATO, the Russians deceived the joint command and left their place of duty without permission.

We discussed the possibility of an armed clash with NATO even at the stage of making the decision to launch into Kosovo. There was another option, a backup: to fly to Belgrade and, in the event of a clash with NATO, hold blitz negotiations on jointly countering the threat to our peacekeepers. We knew well the mood of the Serbian military: the Yugoslav army would gladly take revenge on the aggressors both for the victims and for the violated honor. Moreover, in a fraternal alliance with the Russians. This argument became decisive Leonid Ivashov,
Head of the International Cooperation Department of the Russian Ministry of Defense

The personnel assigned to participate in the forced march did not know until the last moment where and why they were preparing to go.

To get to Kosovo, the battalion had to pass through Serbian territory. It is not known whether Moscow warned the Belgrade authorities, but most analysts believe that preliminary discussions took place - most likely through the Serbian ambassador to Russia, the brother of President Borislav Milosevic.

According to available data, even before the main forces arrived at the airfield, 18 Russian special forces arrived at the airfield, led by the current president of Ingushetia, and then airborne officer Yunus-bek Evkurov. The details of the operation have not been disclosed to this day.

A column of 15 armored personnel carriers and 35 Ural trucks reached the target at about two in the morning. Immediately after crossing the border between Bosnia and Serbia, Russian flags were raised above the cars.

On Serbian territory, the population threw flowers at the column and offered food and drinks to the military personnel, which is why, according to the recollections of the participants in the operation, “the movement slowed down slightly.”

Near Belgrade, Ignatov’s command was taken over by Lieutenant General Viktor Zavarzin, the future chairman of the Duma Defense Committee, who had flown in from Moscow.

In Pristina, local Serbs took to the streets to greet the column, firecrackers were set off, and machine gun fire was heard in the air.

The decision was made privately, not even at the level of top officials. So that no one would notice, they formed a column at the old airfield. There were doubts. Colonel Ignatov came to me and said he had not received any written orders, what should I do? I take responsibility, I say, forward Nikolai Staskov,
Chief of Staff of the Airborne Forces

At about 11 am, the advanced British units appeared, entering Kosovo from the territory of Macedonia - two companies consisting of 250 people. 350 troops of the French battalion were approaching.

British helicopters appeared in the air, but when they tried to land, Russian armored personnel carriers drove onto the airfield and began to maneuver, interfering with the landing.

British tanks advanced towards Russian checkpoints. The paratroopers aimed their grenade launchers at them.

The commander of NATO forces in the Balkans, British General Michael Jackson, who arrived at the scene of the events, stood with his back to the Russian positions and began using hand movements to order the tankers to go forward. An interpreter approached him and, threatening to use weapons, told him not to do that.

My headquarters assumed that the Russians intended to seize the airport and wait for reinforcements. I did not want our troops to ask the Russians for permission to use the airfield. The danger was that they would demand a separate sector for themselves. They said that Milosevic wanted to keep northern Kosovo for the Serbs Wesley Clark,
Commander of NATO Forces in Europe

They reported to the commander of NATO forces in Europe, American General Wesley Clark. He told Jackson to act decisively and take control of the airport, not stopping, if necessary, from using force. Jackson replied that he had no intention of starting World War III.

Clark called Deputy Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Joe Rolston in Washington, but did not receive approval for further escalation.

In the end, everyone remained in their places. The British surrounded the airport. The situation has temporarily stabilized.

Who ordered?

There was no written order to prepare a combined battalion and move to Pristina.

With the thoughtless advances of some politicians, we actually provoked the Yugoslav leadership to continue a war that was murderous for this country and certainly did not contribute to ending the bloodbath Viktor Chernomyrdin

Colonel Ignatov received an oral instruction by telephone from Moscow from the Chief of Staff of the Airborne Forces, Lieutenant General Nikolai Staskov, who made it clear that it was necessary to confront not only NATO members with a fait accompli, but also Moscow.

There is a widespread version according to which the whole matter was almost single-handedly started and carried out by the head of the international cooperation department of the Ministry of Defense, Colonel General Leonid Ivashov, who allegedly subjugated the weak-willed minister Igor Sergeev.

A former assistant to Dmitry Yazov, Ivashov was really eager to fight, and, unlike many, he did not maneuver and did not hide his views. Representing the Ministry of Defense as part of the Russian delegation headed by Viktor Chernomyrdin in negotiations with the West during Operation Allied Force, he more than once made harsh statements, walked out of the hall in protest and refused to sign documents. Chernomyrdin ironically called him “Comrade Commissar.”

However, most researchers are confident that a figure of Ivashov’s level could not make such a decision completely independently if he knew that his superiors were categorically against it. And if he had shown arbitrariness of this magnitude, he would have been fired immediately, which, as we know, did not happen.

All combat orders are in writing only. I was not given a written order. I would also find a way not to give written orders. But there were my people in Bosnia. The brigade commander asked: will there be an order to transfer the battalion to Pristina? “I won’t let you down,” I said to Nikolai Staskov

As Ivashov himself later claimed, the plan was previously discussed with Sergeev, and with Foreign Minister Igor Ivanov, and with Boris Yeltsin. Another thing is that pronouncing some theses hypothetically is one thing, but a specific team is another.

Probably, in a certain sense, the situation was repeated on the eve of the August 1991 coup, when Mikhail Gorbachev told future GKAC members that it was possible, if necessary, to introduce a state of emergency, but did not give the immediate go-ahead.

What can be stated with a high degree of certainty is that the Chief of the General Staff, Anatoly Kvashnin, was not informed. Having learned about what was happening, he contacted General Zavarzin and ordered the column to be deployed.

To be honest, the balance of power in Moscow did not guarantee that any official from the General Staff, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs or the presidential administration would not try to interfere with Zavarzin’s actions. Viktor Mikhailovich, remembering our conversation, acted clearly and firmly, taking responsibility for completing the assigned task Leonid Ivashov

Zavarzin, instead of following the order, began to call Ivashov, who assured him: everything had been agreed upon, so “no turns or stops, just forward!” And he advised the general to turn off his mobile phone.

Kvashnin tried to contact Yeltsin. The head of the Kremlin administration, Alexander Voloshin, said that the president was sleeping, and on his own behalf gave the go-ahead for the march to continue.

According to observers who know political mores, it was not a matter of Yeltsin's sound sleep. Voloshin covered for his patron so that he could, if there was any embarrassment, declare that he learned about what happened from television news, as Gorbachev did after the Tbilisi and Vilnius events.

Forced confession

US Deputy Secretary of State Strobe Talbott completed negotiations in Moscow on Friday, June 11, and flew home. The plane was over Belarus when Bill Clinton's national security aide Sandy Berger called, told about the attack on Pristina, and told him to return.

We were informed that Russian troops had entered the territory of Kosovo, and the Serbs were greeting them in Pristina as heroes. We contacted Strobe Talbott, who was just on his way from Moscow. Madeleine Albright, US Secretary of State, advised him to fly back

Talbott's aerial turn is often compared to Yevgeny Primakov's famous "turn over the Atlantic". However, as historian Leonid Mlechin notes, the difference was significant: the Russian prime minister turned around not to talk to the Americans, Talbott - to try to come to an agreement.

In Moscow, the diplomat found complete confusion. When he entered the office of Foreign Minister Igor Ivanov, he was talking on the phone with Secretary of State Madeleine Albright, assuring that there had been a misunderstanding and there was no attack on Pristina: he had just called the Ministry of Defense.

For the Americans, the only question was who was lying: Ivanov to them, or the Russian military to Ivanov.

Ivanov and Talbott went to the Ministry of Defense. According to the memoirs of the Deputy Secretary of State, Igor Sergeev felt clearly out of place, whispered all the time with Kvashnin and Ivashov, saying that the Russian paratroopers did not cross the border, but were only ready to enter Kosovo synchronously with NATO.

Ivashov’s deputy, General Mazurkevich, came in and said something in the minister’s ear (as it turned out later, he reported that CNN was reporting live from Pristina).

Of course, it was not an idyll that reigned, but what Talbott writes about in his memoirs did not exist either. Of course, no one broke the furniture, but the atmosphere was working and tense. Ivanov scolded us in his hearts: they say, as soon as you get involved with you, the military, you will definitely get into trouble Leonid Ivashov

The Russian representatives apologized and went into the next room. Through the closed door, Talbott could hear the sounds of a conversation in raised voices and, allegedly, even “the roar of objects being thrown at the wall.”

Finally Ivanov returned to the office.

"I regret to inform you that a column of Russian troops accidentally crossed the border and entered Kosovo. The Minister of Defense and I regret this development," he said.

Talbott was subsequently told in confidence that Igor Sergeev was allegedly “furious that he had been lied to by his own people” and was awkward because he “couldn’t look his partners in the eye.” Whether this is so is difficult to say.

Conversation with Putin

Putin kept a low profile, avoided conflicts and publicity, and therefore remained on the periphery of our panorama of Russian politics. When I met him, I was amazed at how unobtrusively he was able to instill a sense of self-control and self-confidence. Outwardly, he was very different from the country's leadership - short, thin and physically developed; the rest were taller than him, and most looked overfed. Putin exuded managerial competence, the ability to achieve results without fuss and unnecessary friction Strobe Talbott

A few hours before the events began, on June 11, Talbott met in Moscow with the Secretary of the Russian Security Council, Vladimir Putin, for the first time in his life.

Talbott said that of all the Russian officials, Putin made the best impression on him. He clearly thoroughly prepared for the conversation, expressed satisfaction that the armed conflict in the Balkans had finally ended, and by the way noted that he himself had made a contribution to this.

When Talbott complained about Ivashov, Putin asked: “Who is this Ivashov?”

Once on the plane, Talbott offered one of his employees a bet that Ivashov would be removed from his post before they reached Washington.

As you know, it happened differently. It is unknown whether Putin really did not know about the upcoming action, or whether he was lulling the vigilance of the Americans.

Thunder of victory, ring out!

Under the cover of darkness, a battalion of paratroopers literally rushed across the territory of Yugoslavia to Kosovo and took up positions near the most important strategic facility - Slatina airport, causing both bewilderment and surprise on the NATO side, because in the negotiations the issue of transferring the brigade was not touched upon at all Viktor Chernomyrdin

“In the morning I realized what kind of scam I was in,” recalled General Staskov. “No one gave written orders. A commission from the General Staff was already on its way to the Airborne Forces headquarters to sort it out. But then Boris Nikolaevich woke up, and he liked everything. In a word, we won.”

Alexander Voloshin, who knew the president’s mood better than Staskov, was not mistaken.

At 11 am the military leadership gathered.

After listening to Igor Sergeev’s report, Yeltsin said with a characteristic drawling intonation: “Well, finally, I clicked on the nose...”.

Someone chimed in: “You, Boris Nikolaevich, didn’t click - you hit me in the face!”

Yeltsin embraced Sergeev.

Viktor Zavarzin soon received another rank of Colonel General and the star of Hero of Russia. All participants in the operation were awarded a special medal.

I thought: either I’m dreaming, or this is the worst movie I’ve ever seen. In just one day we have slipped from celebrating victory to a ridiculous replay of the Cold War. I was also worried that Ivanov himself no longer knew what was happening in his own government. It is obvious that there was some kind of mismatch between the civil and military authorities, and no one could be sure what order Yeltsin might have given to Madeleine Albright

Meanwhile, the contingent of 200 people was unable to carry out any tasks independently. It turned out to be technically impossible to supply the battalion by air, much less transport reinforcements, since Romania, Hungary and Bulgaria closed their airspace to Russian transport aircraft.

Leonid Ivashov, in his words, hoped that Slobodan Milosevic, having received at least symbolic support from Russia, would refuse to withdraw troops from Kosovo, and the forces of the North Atlantic Alliance would be involved in ground battles, which, in his words, “they were terribly afraid of,” but from it didn't work out.

It ended up that five days later, when supplies ran out, the isolated paratroopers began to be fed and provided with drinking water by the British located nearby.

At the negotiations in Helsinki, it was decided that the Russian military would remain in Slatina, but everyone would use the airfield.

The bulk of Russian peacekeepers arrived in Kosovo by sea through the Greek port of Thessaloniki and Macedonia, as envisaged by the original plan.

One hawk general is normal. But if the entire Ministry of Defense believes that NATO countries are war criminals, and regrets that they did not allow direct confrontation, this makes a frightening impression Leonid Mlechin, historian

The director of the 2004 documentary “Russian Tanks in Kosovo,” Alexey Borzenko, argued that only the West benefited from the march on Pristina: a mass exodus of Serbian refugees from Kosovo was brewing, which would have to be dealt with, but they believed in Russia and stayed.

In 2003, Moscow withdrew its peacekeepers from Kosovo and Bosnia (650 and 320 people, respectively). The last train left for home on July 23.

As Anatoly Kvashnin said at a press conference, Russia has no real interests left in the Balkans, and the $28 million a year spent on maintaining the contingent would be better spent on other needs of the armed forces.

The night from June 11 to 12 in Russia falls on the eve of the holiday. 15 years ago, citizens, as always, rested peacefully, not knowing that the country was suddenly on the brink of war.

Many historians consider the “throw on Pristina” to be the most dangerous aggravation of relations between Moscow and the West since the Caribbean crisis. As it turned out later, there were generals on both sides who were not afraid of the conflict.

For a moment it seemed like the spring of 1945 had returned, when Russians and Americans raced across Europe in tanks, competing to see who could capture the most cities.

Russia's loud military demonstration did not, and could not, give anything but moral satisfaction.

From the very beginning of the bombing of Yugoslavia, the Russian Federation tried to resist NATO countries in a political way.

On June 3, after 78 days of NATO bombing, Serbian President Slobodan Milosevic, without informing Russia, accepted the alliance's demand to withdraw its troops and police from Kosovo.

Operation Allied Force officially ended on June 10. On the 12th, the entry of international forces into Kosovo from the south, from Macedonia, was planned.

Russia insisted on providing it with a separate sector of responsibility, as in post-war Germany and Austria. Moreover, it demanded the north of Kosovo, where there was a significant Serbian population. If this plan were implemented, the matter would most likely end with the dismemberment of the region and the Russian zone coming under the control of Belgrade.

When the West rejected this idea, Moscow decided to act unilaterally.

After the expansion of NATO and the bombing of Serbia, resentment reigned in the political and military leadership of Russia: they don’t take us into account in anything, enough patience!

The idea was to get to Kosovo before NATO and take control of Slatina airport, 15 kilometers southeast of the regional capital Pristina - the only one in Kosovo capable of receiving heavy military transport aircraft.

North of Kosovo, in Bosnia and Herzegovina, in the area of ​​the town of Ugljevik, a Russian airborne brigade was stationed since 1995, part of a peacekeeping division headed by an American general.

On June 10, brigade commander Colonel Nikolai Ignatov received an order, secretly from his partners, to prepare a combined battalion of 200 people and “with lightning speed, secretly and unexpectedly for NATO” to make a 600-kilometer march to Slatina.

According to NATO, the Russians deceived the joint command and left their place of duty without permission.

The personnel assigned to participate in the forced march did not know until the last moment where and why they were preparing to go.

To get to Kosovo, the battalion had to pass through Serbian territory. It is not known whether Moscow warned the Belgrade authorities, but most analysts believe that preliminary discussions took place - most likely through the Serbian ambassador to Russia, the brother of President Borislav Milosevic.

According to available data, even before the main forces arrived at the airfield, 18 Russian special forces arrived at the airfield, led by the current president of Ingushetia, and then airborne officer Yunus-bek Evkurov. The details of the operation have not been disclosed to this day.

On the night of June 11-12, 1999, the advance detachment of the Airborne Forces in armored personnel carriers and vehicles moved towards the border of Bosnia and Yugoslavia. The Russian Airborne Forces column crossed the border without difficulty. Until this moment, the NATO command did not have information about the start of the forced march of Russian paratroopers to Pristina.

Even before crossing the border, the markings of Russian military and transport equipment were changed from “SFOR” to “KFOR”. The personnel were given the task of covering more than 600 kilometers in the shortest possible time and capturing the Slatina airfield before the arrival of NATO forces. Russian flags were hung on armored personnel carriers and vehicles. While passing through the territory of Serbia, including the territory of Kosovo, the local population joyfully greeted Russian soldiers, throwing flowers at the equipment, passing on food and drinks. In this regard, the movement of the column slowed down slightly. A column of Russian paratroopers arrived in Pristina at approximately 2 a.m. on June 12, 1999. The population of the city took to the streets to greet the column, using firecrackers, flares, and machine gun fire in some places. The column passed through Pristina in 1.5 hours. Immediately after Pristina, the airborne convoy entered Kosovo Field, where it stopped for a short time to clarify tasks and receive information from intelligence.

As the column advanced, it encountered numerous retreating units of the Serbian army. The paratroopers quickly captured all the premises of the Slatina airport, took up a perimeter defense, set up checkpoints and prepared for the appearance of the first NATO columns, which were already on their way. The task of capturing Slatina was completed by 7 a.m. on June 12, 1999.

Arrival of British armored column

At about 11 am, the advanced British units appeared, entering Kosovo from the territory of Macedonia - two companies consisting of 250 people. 350 troops of the French battalion were approaching.

An unmanned reconnaissance aircraft appeared in the sky above the airfield, then from the checkpoint at the entrance to Slatina airport the battalion command received a message about the arrival of the first column of NATO forces. These were British jeeps. On the other hand, British tanks were approaching the airfield.

Both columns stopped in front of Russian checkpoints. Landing helicopters appeared in the sky. British helicopter pilots made several attempts to land at the airfield, but these attempts were thwarted by the crews of Russian armored personnel carriers. As soon as the helicopter came in to land, an armored personnel carrier immediately rushed towards it, thus preventing its maneuver. Having failed, the British pilots flew away.

General Michael Jackson, the commander of the NATO forces in the Balkans, came out in front of the tank column and, turning his back to the Russian soldiers, began to gesture to the tanks forward, moving with his back to the checkpoint. One of the officers at the checkpoint demanded that General Jackson not do this, under threat of gunfire. At the same time, Russian soldiers took aim at British tanks with hand-held grenade launchers. Thus, the seriousness of the intentions of the Russian soldiers was shown. British tanks remained in their positions, stopping attempts to break into the territory of the Slatina airport.

Although the commander of NATO forces in Europe, American General Wesley Clark ordered British General Michael Jackson to capture the airfield before the Russians, the British replied that he had no intention of starting World War III.

Subsequently, the famous British singer James Blunt, who served in the NATO group in 1999, testified about General Clark’s order to recapture the airfield from Russian paratroopers. Blunt said that he would not shoot at the Russians even under the threat of a court martial. In addition, Blunt said:

“About 200 Russians were stationed at the airfield... General Wesley Clark's direct order was to "put them down." Clark used expressions that were unusual for us. For example - “destroy”. There were political reasons for the seizure of the airfield. But the practical consequence would be an attack on the Russians.”

In the end, the commander of the British group in the Balkans, Michael Jackson, said that he “would not allow his soldiers to start the Third World War.” He gave the command “instead of attacking, surround the airfield.”

Having completed a forced march, the Russian battalion was left without supplies, hoping to receive it by air by plane. In the first days, when Russian soldiers had problems with water, NATO members came to the rescue with mineral water. Finding themselves surrounded, the Russians, according to the same Blunt, said a couple of days later: “Listen, we have no food or water left. Maybe we can share the airfield?

After capture


According to the operation plan, after the capture of the Slatina airport, military transport planes of the Russian Air Force were to land there soon, with which at least two airborne regiments and heavy military equipment were to be transferred. However, Hungary (a NATO member) and Bulgaria (a NATO ally) refused to provide Russia with an air corridor, as a result of which 200 paratroopers were practically left alone for several days with all the arriving NATO forces.

Negotiations and consensus

For several days, negotiations between Russia and NATO (represented by the United States) at the level of foreign and defense ministers took place in Helsinki (Finland). All this time, Russian and British troops in the area of ​​the Slatina airport were in no way inferior to each other, although a small delegation led by General Michael Jackson was allowed into the airport.

During complex negotiations, the parties agreed to deploy a Russian military peacekeeping contingent in Kosovo within areas controlled by Germany, France and the United States. Russia was not allocated a special sector for fear on the part of NATO that this would lead to the actual division of the region. At the same time, the Slatina airport was under the control of the Russian contingent, but was also supposed to be used by NATO forces for the transfer of their armed forces and other needs.

During June-July 1999, several Il-76 military transport aircraft with the Russian peacekeeping contingent (Airborne Forces), military equipment and equipment arrived in Kosovo from airfields in Ivanovo, Pskov and Ryazan. However, a larger number of Russian military personnel entered Kosovo along the sea route, disembarking in the Greek port of Thessaloniki from large landing ships - "Nikolai Filchenkov", "Azov" (BDK-54), Tsezar Kunikov (BDK-64) and "Yamal" (BDK- 67), and subsequently made a forced march to Kosovo through the territory of Macedonia.
Starting from October 15, 1999, Slatina Airport began to receive and dispatch international passenger flights, once again receiving the status of an international airport.

The Russian Federation, having control of the only airport in the region, was able to dictate its position to NATO, which ultimately led to NATO allocating areas of responsibility to the Russian peacekeeping forces, including the Slatina airport itself remaining under Russian control.

Madeleine Albright, the US Secretary of State at the time, believed it was possible that Milosevic had made a deal with the Russian military (perhaps through his brother, who was Yugoslavia's ambassador to Moscow) to achieve the de facto fragmentation of Kosovo. After seizing the bridgehead, six Russian Air Force transport planes were supposed to deliver serious reinforcements to the region for the small contingent holding Pristina airport. And if the airspace for them had not been promptly blocked, then “the brewing crisis could have resulted in something that the Cold War did not know - a direct clash between NATO troops and Russian troops.”

“It all ended with NATO forces feeding the food-starved Russians at Pristina airport,” wrote Madeleine Albright. “President Yeltsin called President Clinton and suggested that the two of us take refuge on “a ship, a submarine or some island where no one will disturb us” in order to calmly solve the problem.”

However, information about the lack of food is refuted by Russian sources and direct participants in the events on the Russian side, since the paratroopers had a five-day supply of food with them. In addition, the Serbs left them the contents of a food warehouse, and even local residents helped the soldiers. The Serbs left the contents of a clothing warehouse, half bombed by NATO, to the paratroopers. Russian peacekeepers were in Kosovo until 2003 and were eventually withdrawn. In April 2003, Chief of the General Staff Anatoly Kvashnin remarked: “We have no strategic interests left in the Balkans, and by withdrawing the peacekeepers we will save twenty-five million dollars a year.”

Photo archive

British tank blocked by Russian airborne troops

Call home

Airport building

The same commander of the British group, Michael Jackson (only he was not black before)

Night duty with a case of beer

Serbian warriors. Judging by their age and appearance, these are representatives of the technical personnel servicing the underground facility.

Serbian teenagers and a slightly drunk Russian. The photo was taken from the side hatch of the armored personnel carrier, the so-called “ramp”.

French wheeled tank. The legionnaires willingly showed off their weapons and equipment.

Six o'clock in the morning. On the territory of the Slatina airfield.

Famous British singer James Blunt told the BBC in an interview how he refused to attack the Russian military at the head of a detachment of paratroopers when he served in Kosovo in 1999. But American General Wesley Clark ordered his subordinates from the NATO contingent to “destroy the Russians at any cost.”
Today, Blunt is known as an extremely peaceful person - and became famous for his hit "You're beautiful."

Who ordered?

There was no written order to prepare a combined battalion and move to Pristina.

Colonel Ignatov received an oral instruction by telephone from Moscow from the Chief of Staff of the Airborne Forces, Lieutenant General Nikolai Staskov, who made it clear that it was necessary to confront not only NATO members with a fait accompli, but also Moscow.

There is a widespread version according to which the whole matter was almost single-handedly started and carried out by the head of the international cooperation department of the Ministry of Defense, Colonel General Leonid Ivashov, who allegedly subjugated the weak-willed minister Igor Sergeev.

A former assistant to Dmitry Yazov, Ivashov was really eager to fight, and, unlike many, he did not maneuver and did not hide his views. Representing the Ministry of Defense as part of the Russian delegation headed by Viktor Chernomyrdin in negotiations with the West during Operation Allied Force, he more than once made harsh statements, walked out of the hall in protest and refused to sign documents. Chernomyrdin ironically called him “Comrade Commissar.”

However, most researchers are confident that a figure of Ivashov’s level could not make such a decision completely independently if he knew that his superiors were categorically against it. And if he had shown arbitrariness of this magnitude, he would have been fired immediately, which, as we know, did not happen.

As Ivashov himself later claimed, the plan was previously discussed with Sergeev, and with Foreign Minister Igor Ivanov, and with Boris Yeltsin. Another thing is that pronouncing some theses hypothetically is one thing, but a specific team is another.

Probably, in a certain sense, the situation was repeated on the eve of the August 1991 coup, when Mikhail Gorbachev told future GKAC members that it was possible, if necessary, to introduce a state of emergency, but did not give the immediate go-ahead.

What can be stated with a high degree of certainty is that the Chief of the General Staff, Anatoly Kvashnin, was not informed. Having learned about what was happening, he contacted General Zavarzin and ordered the column to be deployed.

Zavarzin, instead of following the order, began to call Ivashov, who assured him: everything had been agreed upon, so “no turns or stops, just forward!” And he advised the general to turn off his mobile phone.

Kvashnin tried to contact Yeltsin. The head of the Kremlin administration, Alexander Voloshin, said that the president was sleeping, and on his own behalf gave the go-ahead for the march to continue.

According to observers who know political mores, it was not a matter of Yeltsin's sound sleep. Voloshin covered for his patron so that he could, if there was any embarrassment, declare that he learned about what happened from television news, as Gorbachev did after the Tbilisi and Vilnius events.

Forced confession

US Deputy Secretary of State Strobe Talbott completed negotiations in Moscow on Friday, June 11, and flew home. The plane was over Belarus when Bill Clinton's national security aide Sandy Berger called, told about the attack on Pristina, and told him to return.

Talbott's aerial turn is often compared to Yevgeny Primakov's famous “turn over the Atlantic.” However, as historian Leonid Mlechin notes, the difference was significant: the Russian prime minister turned around not to talk to the Americans, Talbott - to try to come to an agreement.

In Moscow, the diplomat found complete confusion. When he entered the office of Foreign Minister Igor Ivanov, he was talking on the phone with Secretary of State Madeleine Albright, assuring that there had been a misunderstanding and there was no attack on Pristina: he had just called the Ministry of Defense.

For the Americans, the only question was who was lying: Ivanov to them, or the Russian military to Ivanov.

Ivanov and Talbott went to the Ministry of Defense. According to the memoirs of the Deputy Secretary of State, Igor Sergeev felt clearly out of place, whispered all the time with Kvashnin and Ivashov, saying that the Russian paratroopers did not cross the border, but were only ready to enter Kosovo synchronously with NATO.

Ivashov’s deputy, General Mazurkevich, came in and said something in the minister’s ear (as it turned out later, he reported that CNN was reporting live from Pristina).

The Russian representatives apologized and went into the next room. Through the closed door, Talbott could hear the sounds of a conversation in raised voices and, allegedly, even “the roar of objects being thrown at the wall.”

Finally Ivanov returned to the office.

“I regret to inform you that a column of Russian troops accidentally crossed the border and entered Kosovo. The Minister of Defense and I regret this development,” he said.

Talbott was subsequently told in confidence that Igor Sergeev was allegedly “furious that he had been lied to by his own people” and was awkward because he “couldn’t look his partners in the eye.” Whether this is so is difficult to say.

Conversation with Putin

A few hours before the events began, on June 11, Talbott met in Moscow with the Secretary of the Russian Security Council, Vladimir Putin, for the first time in his life.

Talbott said that of all the Russian officials, Putin made the best impression on him. He clearly thoroughly prepared for the conversation, expressed satisfaction that the armed conflict in the Balkans had finally ended, and by the way noted that he himself had made a contribution to this.

When Talbott complained about Ivashov, Putin asked: “Who is this Ivashov?”

Once on the plane, Talbott offered one of his employees a bet that Ivashov would be removed from his post before they reached Washington.

As you know, it happened differently. It is unknown whether Putin really did not know about the upcoming action, or whether he was lulling the vigilance of the Americans.

Thunder of victory, ring out!

“In the morning I realized what kind of scam I was in,” recalled General Staskov. — Nobody gave written orders. A commission from the General Staff was already on its way to the Airborne Forces headquarters to sort things out. But then Boris Nikolaevich wakes up, and he liked everything. In a word, we won.”

Alexander Voloshin, who knew the president’s mood better than Staskov, was not mistaken.

At 11 am the military leadership gathered.

After listening to Igor Sergeev’s report, Yeltsin said with a characteristic drawling intonation: “Well, finally, I clicked on the nose...”.

Someone chimed in: “You, Boris Nikolayevich, didn’t click—you punched me in the face!”

Yeltsin embraced Sergeev.

Viktor Zavarzin soon received another rank of Colonel General and the star of Hero of Russia. All participants in the operation were awarded a special medal.

Meanwhile, the contingent of 200 people was unable to carry out any tasks independently. It turned out to be technically impossible to supply the battalion by air, much less transport reinforcements, since Romania, Hungary and Bulgaria closed their airspace to Russian transport aircraft.

Leonid Ivashov, in his words, hoped that Slobodan Milosevic, having received at least symbolic support from Russia, would refuse to withdraw troops from Kosovo, and the forces of the North Atlantic Alliance would be involved in ground battles, which, in his words, “they were terribly afraid of,” but from it didn't work out.

The director of the 2004 documentary “Russian Tanks in Kosovo,” Alexey Borzenko, argued that only the West benefited from the march on Pristina: a mass exodus of Serbian refugees from Kosovo was brewing, which would have to be dealt with, but they believed in Russia and stayed.

In 2003, Moscow withdrew its peacekeepers from Kosovo and Bosnia (650 and 320 people, respectively). The last train left for home on July 23.

As Anatoly Kvashnin said at a press conference, Russia has no real interests left in the Balkans, and the $28 million a year spent on maintaining the contingent would be better spent on other needs of the armed forces.

The original article is on the website InfoGlaz.rf Link to the article from which this copy was made - http://infoglaz.ru/?p=49030

Blue vests, berets and a parachute. Elite troops of Russia. Historical excursions give us food for thought. There are many of them, examples of the incredible courage of the Russian landing force.

Mozhaisk landing

The first military winter highlighted examples of fearless attacks and selfless courage of the Russian paratroopers. The Siberian soldiers died near Mozhaisk, but did not take a step back. Aviation reconnaissance reported that armored vehicles were moving towards Moscow, but there were no Soviet troops in that direction.

The command proposed landing paratroopers without a parachute, from a low-flying aircraft, into deep snow. There were fears that the paratroopers would be shot in the air. The Germans were stunned when soldiers in white sheepskin coats rained down on their heads from the open hatches of the planes.

The planes flew and flew, and people kept pouring out of the hatches. You can't see fighters in white in the white snow. It seemed that they were rising out of the ground. Fierce attacks came one after another. On the road leading to Moscow, the battle was in full swing. And the soldiers kept pouring out of the shaving planes. Russian landing without parachutes...

They say this is a made-up story. But I think that it could be so. The unparalleled courage of the paratroopers does not allow one to doubt the veracity of the story. Paratrooper Ivan Storchak himself landed in a similar manner behind enemy lines.

He said: “These are not fanatics. They love their land on which they grew up, exalting it with their work. They love a country where they consider themselves masters. And they fight for their Motherland with high civil and military valor.” Storchak published a book entitled “From the Sky to Battle,” where he described the events of his landing life.

Vyazemsky landing

To support the Kalinin and Western fronts, an operational landing was carried out in the winter of 42 near Vyazma. The landing party became part of the active forces.

Along with manpower amounting to tens of thousands of people, 350 mortars, 540 machine guns, and anti-tank rifles were landed.


The paratroopers, armed only with small arms, were able to hold out behind enemy lines for several months. The Nazis feared the paratroopers like fire. Among the paratroopers there was an opinion that “death is better than captivity.”

It's a shame to be captured. A German officer wrote that Russian paratroopers were frozen to the ground in 40-degree frost. Aviation and self-propelled guns were used against the Russians. Having smoothed the area, the Germans were able to destroy the Russian landing force. Nobody stepped back.

Maravar company

April 21, 1985, Afghanistan. In the Maravara Gorge, the special forces were surrounded. They were always learning. The training mission cost them their lives. Having noticed the Mujahideen in the gorge, the fighters began pursuit.

But the dushmans bypassed the company from the rear and blocked the fighters’ road to Daridam, where help was located. Unequal forces and a small set of ammunition, which was enough for ten minutes of battle. The fighters were not abandoned alone.


Reinforced armored vehicles came to the rescue. But...several kilometers turned out to be a huge path through a minefield. Only one car broke through. She was unable to help the dying company, but saved those who remained in Daridama.

A terrible picture appeared before the soldiers when they were able to get to the dead commandos. Enraged by the stubborn resistance, the Mujahideen ripped open the bellies of living fighters, gouged out their eyes, and burned them alive. The dead soldiers were collected. Nobody gave up. They lay tied to wicker couches where they were tortured.

Better death

The old city of Herat remembers the courage of the Russian landing. In the exploded armored personnel carrier, only four guys remained with junior sergeant V. Shimansky.

The soldiers knew that they could not surrender. They will torture you alive. The Dushmans only wanted prisoners. And the fighters accepted an unequal battle. We hoped that help would come. Out of ammo. And then the commander ordered them to shoot themselves. The commander was twenty years old. They hugged.

Help arrived late. But one fighter, Teplyuk, was lucky. His bullets missed a millimeter from the heart. The guy who remained alive spoke about the last moments of the lives of the paratrooper heroes.

9th company

The talented Fyodor Bondarchuk created a film where guys die. This battle was the last for many paratroopers. Afghanistan... And 39 boys thrown into the millstones of a strange war. They occupied height 3234, which turned out to be on the road to Gardes Khost.


400 inveterate thugs wanted to open the road to Gardes-Khost. Armed with grenade launchers and mortars, the Mujahideen went on the attack. The paratroopers accepted the battle. In 18 hours, the Mujahideen launched 12 attacks.

The enemy came very close. And the paratroopers received reinforcements. The guys made their way to them, delivering ammunition. The Russian landing force won without retreating a step back.

6th company

March 1, 2000 will forever go down in the history of the Russian landing as selfless, desperate courage. The militants, numbering 2,500, led by Khattab, attempted to pass through the Argun Gorge into Dagestan.


90 paratroopers took part in the battle. 84 young boys died. The 6th company closed the embrasure of the Argun Gorge. Half-dead, he crawled into the thick of the enemy and blew himself up with grenades.

What these boys went through, we, who remained in warm homes, can only guess. But the question is why? - sounds among people for a long time. Why hasn't there been even simple messages about the guys for so long?

Our boys valued their lives dearly. They killed more than 2,000 militants. Dying, each of them sought to kill the enemy. 22 soldiers of the 6th company became Heroes of Russia, 21 posthumously. The rest of the children became holders of the Order of Courage.

Several pages about the exploits of the Russian landing force. This is the pride of the country and respect from the enemy. Even when killed, they do not give up, “these Russians in blue vests.”

After the collapse of the Soviet Union, Russia's position in world politics was extremely weakened. As a rule, instead of defending their own geopolitical interests, Russian diplomats supported the position of Western powers, no matter how much it contradicted the interests of Russia itself.

Bombs for Belgrade

It is characteristic that Russian Foreign Minister in the early 1990s Andrei Kozyrev went down in history as “Mr. Yes” in contrast to his Soviet predecessor Andrey Gromyko, known as "Mr. No."

At the end of the 1990s, the situation began to change. One of the first fundamental confrontations between Russia and the West in the modern history of our country was the “Kosovo conflict.”

Kosovo armed separatists in the territory of the region, which is part of Yugoslavia, have waged a war against the Serbs since 1996, seeking the creation of an independent state for the Albanian population of this territory.

To suppress terrorist activities in Kosovo, units of the Yugoslav Armed Forces were introduced, which carried out operations to destroy illegal armed groups.

Since 1998, NATO countries have actually sided with the Albanian separatists, blaming official Belgrade exclusively for the escalation of violence.

Western countries tried to achieve the right to use force through the UN Security Council, but ran into strong objections from Russia, which did not agree with assigning responsibility to only one of the parties to the conflict.

As a result, the operation was carried out under the auspices of NATO forces. On March 24, 1999, for the first time since World War II, a large-scale armed conflict began in Europe. NATO aircraft subjected massive bombing attacks to the positions of Yugoslav troops in Kosovo, Belgrade and other cities of the country. Prime Minister of the Russian Federation Yevgeny Primakov, at that moment on his way to visit the United States, turned the plane over the Atlantic and urgently returned to Russia.

The bombing of Yugoslavia lasted from March 24 to June 10, 1999, and led to great destruction and mass casualties.

Playing ahead

The Yugoslav authorities were forced to agree to UN Security Council Resolution 1244, according to which Yugoslav troops were withdrawn from Kosovo, and a NATO peacekeeping contingent took their place.

The position of Russia, which spoke out in defense of the territorial integrity of Yugoslavia and the interests of the Serbian population of the region, was not taken into account.

Under these conditions, the political and military leadership decided to conduct an extremely daring and unexpected “advance” operation.

On June 10, 1999, Russian paratroopers, part of the international peacekeeping force in Bosnia (SFOR), received a secret order: to form a mechanized column and a detachment of 200 people, cover 600 kilometers in an accelerated march and occupy the Slatina airfield, located near the administrative center of Kosovo city ​​of Pristina, ahead of NATO forces. The entry of NATO units into Kosovo was scheduled for June 12, and the Slatina airfield was to be the main transport hub for NATO forces in the region.

Any leak of information about the plans of the Russian military put the operation in danger of failure. But the Russians managed to hide their plans - the Western powers had already become accustomed to Russia’s inability to take decisive action.

The Russian column under the command of Lieutenant General Viktor Zavarzin began its forced march. On armored vehicles, the letters SFOR were changed to KFOR - the official name of the peacekeeping forces in Kosovo. On the night of June 12, 1999, Russian paratroopers entered the territory of the rebellious region. The Serbian population greeted Russian soldiers with flowers as saviors and liberators.

By 7 a.m. on June 12, a Russian Airborne Forces column occupied the Slatina airfield and organized a perimeter defense there.

General Jackson's Moonwalk

Further plans of the Russian leadership provided for the airlift of an airborne division from Russia, the presence of which was to ensure the defense of the political interests of our country, in particular, obtaining its own separate peacekeeping sector of responsibility in Kosovo.

This plan, however, could not be implemented, since NATO allies Hungary and Bulgaria refused to provide Russia with an “air corridor.”

200 Russian soldiers found themselves surrounded by several thousand heavily armed NATO troops.

At about 11:00 on June 12, NATO advanced forces approached the Slatina airfield occupied by paratroopers. Several RAF helicopters attempted to land but were blocked by Russian armored personnel carriers.

The British commander of NATO forces in the Balkans arrived at the Russian checkpoint. General Michael Jackson gave the order for NATO tanks to enter the airfield. At the same time, the general himself, turning his back to the Russian paratroopers, began to direct the movement of the tanks with gestures, moving closer and closer to the checkpoint a la his famous namesake singer.

The commander of the Russian checkpoint ordered his subordinates to take aim at the tanks with grenade launchers and asked the NATO general to stop his actions. The tanks stopped.

According to NATO soldiers, at that moment the commander of NATO forces in Europe, General Wesley Clark, went into a real frenzy, demanding to destroy the Russians by occupying the airfield.

However, General Jackson, who was personally under the gun of Russian grenade launchers, told Clark that he was not going to start World War III.

There was no assault on the airfield - its systematic siege began. The paratroopers, deprived of reinforcements, however, were not going to capitulate.

Clark and the heroes

While the military stood opposite each other, the politicians negotiated. Alas, Russia's weak political positions in the early 1990s did not allow it to achieve what it wanted.

The Russian peacekeeping contingent received the right to be present in Kosovo, however, not in a separate sector, but in the zone of responsibility of Germany, France and the United States. The Slatina airfield remained under Russian control, but was shared.

Russian soldiers were in Kosovo until 2003. Due to the fact that Russia never received its own sector of control, Russian peacekeepers were unable to prevent the expulsion of the Serbian population of the region from Kosovo. Based on this, a “conspiracy theory” was put forward, according to which the forced march to Pristina was inspired by the United States, which tried by any means to stop the exodus of Serbs from the region and the subsequent humanitarian catastrophe. The authors of this version believe that Russia “deceived” the Kosovo Serbs by not providing them with protection.

No matter how one feels about the political outcome of those events, one must pay tribute to the courage of the Russian paratroopers, who carried out the most difficult task with honor and did not flinch in the face of a formidable enemy. To commemorate the military operation, the medal “Participant in the forced march of 12 June 1999 Bosnia-Kosovo” was established, which was awarded to the participants of the forced march and those who were responsible for ensuring it.

A General Wesley Clark, who demanded the destruction of Russian paratroopers at the Slatina airfield, soon after those events lost his post. The Pentagon considered that such a commander did not meet the requirements of modern times. In 2004, Clark tried to become the US presidential candidate from the Democratic Party, but was defeated, losing John Kerry, who, in turn, lost the election George W. Bush. In a 2010 interview, businessman and teacher Wesley Clark said, "Looking back 11 years ago, I'm all for it - we did the right thing." So the Pentagon's decision turned out to be wise - some people never grow wiser.