Military situation before the operation
Operation plan
By directive of the Headquarters of the Supreme Command, the Southwestern Front was created as part of the 5th Tank, 21st and 1st Guards Armies, deployed at the turn of the river. Don on the Verkhniy Mamon - Kletskaya front. The newly created front is reinforced by cavalry, rifle and tank troops, as well as artillery of the RGK (reserve of the Main Command) and special forces from the Headquarters reserve to carry out offensive actions in cooperation with the armies of the Don and Stalingrad fronts. The main idea of "Uran" is the encirclement and defeat of the German-Romanian troops operating in the Don Bend and in the Stalingrad direction. The immediate task of the Southwestern Front is the defeat of the 4th Romanian Army, reaching the rear of the German group at Stalingrad and encircling them with the aim of subsequent destruction. All preparations for the operation took place in the strictest secrecy.
Progress of the operation
- Thursday of the year, 7 o'clock in the morning - the beginning of Operation Uranus. Thick fog and snow. Due to bad weather, air support is not available.
Southwestern Front
- 7.30 – 8.48 – artillery preparation on the forward positions of the Romanian troops.
- 8.50 – start of attack on forward positions by ground infantry and tank formations. A large number of surviving firing positions, due to bad weather, greatly hampered the advance of the troops.
- 12.00 – the offensive advanced only 2-3 kilometers. The commander of the 5th Tank Army, Lieutenant General P. L. Romanenko, takes a great risk by ordering the 1st and 26th Tank Corps to enter the battle.
- 16.00 - the enemy defenses between the Tsutskan and Tsaritsa rivers are broken through by the 5th Tank Army. By this time, the advancing troops had already gone 16 km deep. Two tank corps of the Southwestern Front began moving east to the city of Kalach-on-Don, where, according to the plan, they were supposed to meet the troops of the Stalingrad Front.
- On the night of the 26th Tank Corps captured the village of Ostrov and reached the crossing of the Don. By evening the crossing was captured and the corps moved on. There were only a few kilometers left to our destination.
Stalingrad Front
- 1942 at 10.00 - artillery preparation began, after which the infantry units went on the offensive. By the afternoon, the enemy defenses had been broken through in several places. Then motorized formations went into battle, cutting off the retreat of German troops in the Chervlenaya area.
- In the morning, the 4th mechanized corps captured Tinguty station. Thus cutting off the railway connection with the 6th and 4th German armies. The 4th Cavalry Corps finally cut off the escape route, completing a 70-kilometer march and recapturing the village of Abganerovo from the enemy.
Compound
- at 16.00 - having defeated the 24th and 16th German tank divisions, the troops of the Southwestern and Stalingrad fronts united in the area of Kalach - Sovetsky farm. The ring closed. The entire 6th and part of the 4th tank armies were surrounded, that is, about 330 thousand German and Romanian soldiers.
"Thunderclap" (German: "Donnerkeil")
- fascist German troops attempted to withdraw the 6th Panzer Army from encirclement, under the code name “Thunderstrike”. Hastily arriving German units under the command of the Field Marshal struck the least protected, but quite long section of the ring in the Kotelnikovsky area. The blow was taken by the 51st Guards Army of General Trufanov, which heroically held its positions for a week until the approach of the 2nd Guards Army of the general. Manstein's troops managed to advance 40 km with huge losses. But, being only 6 hours ahead of the Nazis, the 2nd Army gave the enemy a tough rebuff in the area of the Myshkova River.
- The Red Army began its offensive against Manstein's defeated troops. Operation Thunderbolt was a complete failure.
Today is a special day in the history of our country.
Smooth 70 years ago, on a gloomy and cloudy morning, Operation Uranus began.
- which in its development ultimately led to the beginning of a radical turning point in the war. The Third Reich began to roll back in a strategic sense.
But on this day, its future success was still unknown to anyone and hidden in the fog of war: the Kharkov disaster under the leadership of Timoshenko - Khrushchev, for which large forces were also preparing, happened just six months ago. The wound of the lesions was bleeding. Therefore, now the measures to covertly concentrate, camouflage troops and encrypt negotiations at all levels were unprecedented - otherwise everything could have gone as it did in the summer, that is, catastrophically. Some Soviet commanders went into this operation with doubt and uncertainty - such as, say, tank general V.T. Volsky, who wrote a panicked letter to Stalin. Nevertheless, despite the possible risks, on November 13, at a meeting of the Supreme Command Headquarters, the operation was finally approved by Stalin and the flywheel of moving troops to their original positions was launched.
The counteroffensive of Soviet troops near Stalingrad began after a powerful artillery barrage on the morning of November 19 - troops of the Southwestern and Don Fronts in a number of sectors broke through the defenses of the 3rd Romanian Army (Hitler's satellite) and mobile tank units entered the resulting breakthrough. The next day, the 20th, on the other side, the strike force of the Stalingrad Front went on the offensive, breaking through the front of the 4th Panzer Army of Hoth. Both Soviet groups will unite four days later in the Kalach-on-Don area, closing the VI Army of Colonel General Paulus into a cauldron that will later become world famous.
The offensive really turned out to be completely unexpected for the Wehrmacht: the highest secrecy in preparing the operation fully justified itself. But the cauldron also turned out to be unexpected for the Red Army - a preliminary assessment of the troops in that area assumed their number was about 90-120 thousand, but in reality it turned out that there were three times more in the “bag” - 330 thousand people. But the Soviet commanders don’t know about this yet either. Just as the Germans do not know on this day that this is not a tactical offensive, but a large-scale one, pursuing strategic goals. The true force of the blow will be determined for them only after 2-3 days - precious days when it was necessary to act immediately and the clock was ticking.
Let's open the "Red Star" for this day. It is completely ordinary, and nothing betrays what began to happen on the fronts 3-4 hours after the issue was signed for printing. Is it possible that on the header there is a meaningful statement by Stalin with the idea that " every dog has his day". And that's it.
3. Those who are interested can study the message of the Sovinformburo for the previous day - I am posting it in full.
4. The next day, November 20, “Zvezdochka” actually posted a message about the strike. But not about this and not in this place of the front: the newspapers of the Soviet Union will remain silent about the Stalingrad breakthrough for another three whole days, and only when Headquarters receives a message about the connection of fronts in Kalach, will the command be given to print an emergency message about the counteroffensive.
So far, everything is going on in “silence” - the world does not know that epoch-making changes are already taking place on both sides of Stalingrad.
5. So, let's remember the feat of our ancestors on this significant day. They deserve it.
6. And here is a schematic map of "Stalingrad Cannes". This is how the boiler was formed.
But on November 19, the events lie in the fog of war - everything is still ahead.
* * *
My grandfather Vasily, unfortunately, did not live to see this day; he died on September 15, 1942. But his wife, Agrafena Stepanovna, my grandmother, at the very end of July 1942 crossed the Volga at the Stalingrad railway crossing, coming from the city of Shakhty, already occupied by the Germans, and having in her arms an 11-year-old daughter and a one-year-old baby (my father). Then she was evacuated further east, to Prokopyevsk. So that's why I have the opportunity to talk to you today. If I hadn’t had time, I wouldn’t have existed either.
But at the same time, the younger brother of my other grandfather, Anatoly, was on the Right Bank. He fought on the “hot” front in Stalingrad for only a month, being seriously wounded at the end of November, then he was discharged and, after hospitalization, in the spring of 1943 he left for his small homeland in Transbaikalia. And he was called up in the spring of 1942, and spent almost six months in the Volga field camps of the Red Army during formation.
Therefore, all the important Stalingrad dates (November 19, 23 and February 2) are dear to me and I remember and celebrate them.
7. After the war, November 19 deservedly became the Day of Artillery and Missile Forces, on which I congratulate the artillerymen and missilemen.
8. And in conclusion - the legendary march of Stalin’s artillerymen.
It is especially appropriate today. Listen and get inspired.
Once again, happy holiday to all those for whom this day is a holiday!
The code name of the plan for the offensive operation of the Southwestern, Stalingrad and Don fronts during the Great Patriotic War, during which the Stalingrad group of the Wehrmacht was surrounded.
Situation at the beginning of the operation
By the time the operation began, it had already been going on for four months. Repeated attempts by the 6th Army of the Wehrmacht (commander - Colonel General) to take Stalingrad by storm were unsuccessful. The 62nd and 64th armies held strong defenses on the outskirts of the city. The stubborn resistance of the Soviet troops, the stretched rear and the approach of winter led to the fact that the German army found itself in a difficult situation. The Wehrmacht command intended to hold the occupied positions until the onset of spring, and then carry out a decisive offensive.
Operation plan and preparation for it
The first discussions of the plan for the offensive operation near Stalingrad took place at the Headquarters of the Supreme Commander-in-Chief in early September 1942. During them, it was decided that the offensive should solve two main tasks - to encircle and isolate the German group operating in the city area from the main forces of the Wehrmacht, and then defeat it.
The plan of the operation, codenamed “Uranus,” was distinguished by its breadth and boldness of concept. Troops of three fronts were involved in it - Stalingrad (commander - Colonel General), Southwestern (commander - Lieutenant General, from December 1942 Colonel General) and (commander - Lieutenant General, from January 1943 Colonel General ). The total offensive area was 400 square meters. The northern group of troops had to overcome the German defenses and fight 120-140 kilometers, and the southern group - 100 kilometers, after which both groups had to meet, completing the encirclement of Paulus's army. When developing the operation, it was taken into account that German troops, in trying to take Stalingrad, had used up all their reserves - by mid-November, it had only six reserve divisions scattered over a large section of the front. The German command tried to strengthen them, but was too late.
To prepare for the offensive, the fronts were strengthened. The Southwestern Front included two tank divisions, a cavalry corps, and a number of artillery and tank units and formations; Stalingrad includes mechanized and cavalry corps, three mechanized and three tank brigades; Donskoy includes three rifle divisions. All these forces were transferred as quickly as possible - from October 1 to November 18, 1942. In total, at the beginning of the operation, the Soviet troops involved in it numbered about 1 million 135 thousand soldiers and commanders, about 15 thousand guns and mortars, more than 1.5 thousand tanks and self-propelled guns, more than 1.9 thousand aircraft. In this way, a decisive superiority was created over the enemy in this sector of the front: in personnel by 2-2.5 times, and in artillery and tanks by 4-5 times.
General management of the operation from Headquarters was carried out by the Chief of the General Staff, Colonel General (since January 1943 - Army General). Preparations for it were carried out with the participation of Army General and Colonel General of Artillery N. N. Voronov.
The Soviet command widely used methods of misinforming the enemy regarding the location and time of the attack. Thanks to the high-quality camouflage of troop movements, the enemy did not know until the very last moment what forces the Soviet troops had on the Stalingrad sector of the front. The construction of false objects was widely used - 17 bridges were built across the Don alone, 12 of which were false. All these measures led to the fact that the Wehrmacht command did not expect a counteroffensive at Stalingrad, thinking that the offensive operation would be undertaken in the Rzhev salient or in the Caucasus.
Progress of hostilities
The operation began on November 19, 1942. On this day, the Southwestern and right wing of the Don Front went on the offensive. Due to poor weather conditions, the command had to abandon air support and rely only on artillery. At 7:30, simultaneously in several areas, 3,500 guns and mortars began shelling enemy positions. The German troops, who did not expect the attack, suffered heavy losses. The first to attack were the 14th (commander - Guards Major General A. S. Gryaznov) and 47th (commander - Guard Colonel, from December 1942 Guards Major General F. A. Ostashenko) Guards, 119th ( commander - colonel, since January 1943, Major General M. M. Danilov) and 124th (commander - Major General A. I. Belov) rifle divisions. The enemy offered stubborn resistance - in the first four hours of the offensive, Soviet units advanced only 2-3 kilometers. The 1st (commander - Major General of Tank Forces M.E. Katukov) and 26th (commander - Major General of Tank Forces A.G. Rodin) tank corps were introduced into the breakthrough, which completed the task of breaking through the defense - enemy troops , most of which in this area were Romanian units, were partly pushed back, partly surrendered. By mid-day, the defense was finally broken through and further actions were being developed behind enemy lines. In an effort to push back the Soviet troops and restore the situation, the German command brought into action operational reserves - four divisions. However, they only managed to delay the advance of the Red Army units. The 63rd (commander - Colonel N.D. Kozin), 76th (commander - Colonel N.T. Tavartkiladze), 96th (commander - Major General I.M. Shepetov), 293 successfully operated in their sectors 1st (commander - Major General F.D. Lagutin) rifle divisions, 4th tank (commander - Major General of Tank Forces A.G. Kravchenko) and 3rd Guards Cavalry (commander - Major General I.A. . Pliev) housing. The mobile formations of the Southwestern Front rapidly moved south into the operational depth, destroying the enemy's reserves, headquarters and retreating formations. The Romanian troops suffered especially heavy losses here - two of their corps were completely destroyed, another one was surrounded.
On the Don Front, the main blow was delivered by the 65th Army (commander - Lieutenant General). By the end of the first day of the operation, it had advanced 4-5 kilometers, without being able to break through the defenses. However, the stubborn resistance of the enemy in this area could not save the situation - the gap created as a result of the breakthrough on the left flank of Paulus's army was rapidly growing. On November 20, 1942, units of the 26th Tank Corps stormed the strategically important highway junction of Perelazovskoye. On the same day, the troops of the Stalingrad Front were brought into action. The 57th (commander - major general) and 64th (commander - lieutenant general) armies simultaneously, after artillery preparation, struck enemy positions from two flanks. The enemy defenses were broken through in several sectors: the 57th Army by the forces of the 169th (commander - Colonel I.I. Melnikov) and 422nd (commander - Colonel I.K. Morozov) rifle divisions, and the 64th - by the forces of 36 1st Guards (commander - Major General M.I. Denisenko), 38th (commander - Colonel A.D. Korotkov) and 204th (commander - Colonel, since December 1942, Major General A.V. Skvortsov ) rifle divisions. The 13th Tank (commander - Colonel T.I. Tanaschishin), 4th Mechanized (commander - Major General V.T. Volsky) and 4th Cavalry (commander - Lieutenant General T.T.) were introduced into the resulting breakthroughs Shapkin) corps, which launched an offensive to the northwest and southwest. Unlike the attack in the north, the southern one was unexpected for the German command. Already on the second day of the operation, the enemy was forced to commit all of its remaining reserves. These measures could only delay the advance of the Red Army.
The command of the 6th Army and the Wehrmacht did not appreciate the scale of the threat to their Stalingrad group in time. It was only on the evening of November 20, 1942 that it became obvious to Paulus that the Soviet units were carrying out a major operation. Realizing that the threat of complete encirclement loomed over him, he transferred part of his reserves, but many of them failed to break through. Seeing this, Paulus suggested that the command break through to the southwest, leaving the Stalingrad lines, but Hitler did not agree to this. The offensive of the Soviet troops led to the fact that the command post of the 6th Army was under threat of attack, and Paulus transferred it deeper to the rear, to the village of Nizhne-Chirskaya. Panic began to grow in the ranks of the German units, and especially among their allies - Romanians, Hungarians, Italians.
On November 23, 1942, the 26th Tank Corps liberated the city of Kalach. On the same day, near the Sovetsky farm, its units met with the 4th Mechanized Corps, which marked the unification of the troops of the Southwestern and Stalingrad fronts and the closure of the encirclement. It included about 330 thousand enemy soldiers and officers (22 divisions, 160 separate and auxiliary units). The next day, the defeat of the Romanian units in the area of the village of Raspopinskaya was completed - about 30 thousand soldiers and officers surrendered. In the shortest possible time, an encirclement front was created, protected both from attack from within and from attack from without - it was obvious that the enemy would soon try to break through it. On November 24, 1942, Paulus suggested that Hitler leave Stalingrad and break through to the southwest to join the main forces, but he again responded with a categorical refusal.
Over the next week, the Stalingrad and Don Front completed the encirclement, throwing back parts of the 6th Army and thereby reducing the front to 80 kilometers from west to east and to 40 from north to south. Having consolidated his battle formations, Paulus was able to organize an effective defense, including using those fortified lines on which Soviet troops held the defense throughout the summer-autumn of 1942. This significantly delayed the Soviet troops and delayed the defeat of the Stalingrad group.
The German command tried to organize a breakthrough with the forces of the shock army group "Goth" (commander - G. Goth), which was part of Army Group "Don" (commander -) and consisted of 9 infantry and 4 tank divisions. Manstein intended to carry it out in the area of the city of Kotelnikovo. On December 12, 1942, the troops involved went on the offensive and pushed back the Soviet troops. However, on December 15, 1942, beyond the Aksai River, as a result of stubborn resistance by Soviet troops, this offensive was stopped. The enemy had 40 kilometers left to the front line on the inside of the ring. On December 16, 1942, units of the Southwestern Front went on the offensive and over the next three days broke through its defenses. The Hotha group, which also included one Italian army, suffered heavy losses, its front completely crumbled. As a result of the counterattack, the outer line of the encirclement ring was moved away from the inner line by 200-250 kilometers, which finally deprived the 6th Army of any hope of breaking through in the near future.
By January 1943, the position of the Stalingrad group had completely deteriorated. On January 8, the Soviet command presented Paulus with an ultimatum to surrender, but Hitler categorically prohibited surrender. Then the Soviet troops launched an offensive operation to completely defeat the 6th Army (code name - Operation “Ring”), as a result of which Stalingrad was liberated, and the enemy soldiers and officers who were still alive by that time, led by Paulus himself, surrendered to captivity.
Results of the operation
As a result of Operation Uranus, German, Romanian, Hungarian, Italian, and Croatian units suffered a severe defeat. Their irretrievable losses amounted to more than 800 thousand soldiers and officers. During the fighting, more than 155 thousand soldiers and commanders of the Red Army were killed, and more than 300 thousand people were wounded. This operation demonstrated to the whole world the operational and tactical skill of the Red Army command and had a huge political effect - in the countries of the anti-Hitler coalition and in the occupied territories, the victory on the Volga caused a general upsurge. In Germany, the defeat of the Stalingrad group was met with three days of mourning. In Italy, Hungary and Romania, which lost a significant part of their armed forces, the defeat became one of the causes of the internal political crisis, which subsequently resulted in the overthrow of the leaders of these states and their withdrawal from the alliance with Hitler.
The November steppe was covered with snow. The weather turned bad, the snowstorm hid the outlines of hills, gullies - and hundreds of tanks and guns, frozen in anticipation of a command. Soon a steel avalanche fell on the enemy's heads. On November 19, 1942, the Red Army's counteroffensive near Stalingrad began - Operation Uranus.
In the summer of 1942, the Wehrmacht launched a series of attacks that shook the Soviet-German front. The defeats suffered by the Red Army were not as devastating as in 1941, but too much had already been lost and another retreat could have catastrophic consequences. For some time it seemed that only a miracle could save the world from Nazi rule. There are no miracles, so the world was saved by the Soviet 62nd Army. She managed to retreat into the streets of Stalingrad in an organized manner, and instead of the 10 days planned for the assault, the Wehrmacht was stuck for two months, fighting for the ruins. The strongest of the German field armies, the 6th under the command of General Paulus, was drawn into the battle. However, the desperate defense of the 62nd in the city could have become useless if the Headquarters had not taken advantage of the weeks given to it.
While a battle that defies any description was going on in the city, in Moscow they were racking their brains over how to turn its tide in their favor. The Germans very slowly, with heavy losses, but confidently drove its defenders out of Stalingrad. The bridgehead on the western bank of the Volga became smaller and smaller. Of course, the constant introduction of reserves made it possible to slow down the retreat and prevent the Germans from throwing the army into the river, but more and more new neighborhoods passed into the hands of the Germans.
Already in September, counterattacks followed on the steppe, designed to break through a corridor to Stalingrad from the north, near the Kotluban station. These attacks remained almost unknown, and yet the Red Army suffered severe losses in them, trying to ease the fate of the city’s defenders. The blows failed one after another. The Germans bombed the trains approaching from the north, tank brigades and rifle battalions were burned out in attacks in a matter of days. The Germans were so far superior to the Soviet troops in their ability to conduct positional combat. The same thing happened over and over again. The infantry was cut off by fire, the tanks left without cover were burning, and the lying riflemen were mowed down by machine guns and mortars. There was less and less hope of saving Stalingrad with a direct blow. One could only guess how the battle in the city would turn out next. The first attacks failed due to lack of time to prepare them. It seemed that with more careful preparations a better result would be achieved. However, the Wehrmacht withstood all the blows.
Another solution
In September, a landmark meeting took place at Headquarters. Georgy Zhukov and Alexander Vasilevsky, in the presence of Stalin, discussed the search for some “other solution” to the Stalingrad problem. Stalin, who heard this, asked what “other” solution was in mind, and offered to report on it the next day. Both generals were of the same opinion. Since it is not possible to break through the German defenses in the Kotluban area, it is necessary to increase the swing, embrace Paulus’ army attacking Stalingrad from the flanks and encircle it, advancing through the positions of Germany’s weak Romanian allies.
When looking at the map, this idea seems obvious. As Stalingrad magnetically attracted the infantry and tank divisions of the Wehrmacht, the Romanians began to cover the increasingly long front to the left and right of Paulus’s troops. They did not have the discipline, tactical training and excellent weapons that distinguished the Germans. However, in reality it was a much more difficult plan to implement than it might seem.
The fact is that the Germans perfectly understood the real combat value of the Romanians. They assigned to the allies those sections of the front that passed through the wild, almost uninhabited, and most importantly, roadless steppe. An offensive requires ammunition, fuel, medicine, food, spare parts - these are thousands and thousands of tons of cargo. If you drive numerous armies into the wasteland and begin to advance, after a while they will simply stop: they will run out of consumables, and new ones will not be brought across the steppe in sufficient quantities. And if you use small forces, then even the Romanians will be able to withstand the blow and push back the attackers. It is interesting that two opposing plans were considered as an alternative to the actually adopted plan.
Konstantin Rokossovsky proposed, since the terrain far to the west and south of Stalingrad was inconvenient, to still try to break through to Stalingrad via a short route and cut off the nearest German divisions in a small pocket. General Andrei Eremenko proposed something different: his plan included an attack on the Romanians with small forces and a giant raid on their rear with the help of cavalry and small mechanized units. Both of these plans contained sound ideas, but both had huge flaws. Rokossovsky proposed to break the Germans with a brutal onslaught where they were strong and expected a blow. It is not a fact that this could be done. Eremenko's plan would have helped stop the Germans for a few days, but it did not solve the problem. Of course, the Wehrmacht would quickly clear its rear of weak raiding groups.
Thus, the most ambitious plan was adopted. This meant that it was necessary to be able to carry out an offensive with large forces in an inconvenient terrain, and to complete all preparations before the Germans finally defeated the Stalingrad garrison. This required truly nerves of steel. Stalingrad was in a desperate situation, emotions demanded to take all the divisions in reserve and immediately throw them into Stalingrad itself or near Kotluban - to cut a corridor along the shortest route. However, Headquarters held out and did not follow the lead of emotions.
Over the next few weeks, a number of problems had to be solved. While battles raged in the streets, railway lines stretched into the steppes blown by the autumn winds. Enormous reserves of fuel and ammunition were transported to their original positions. From the north, a completely new formation was advancing to the front - a tank army. The Germans detected activity on their flanks, but did not attach much importance to it. The Romanians were slightly reinforced by separate German units. However, an offensive in these wastelands, which were recently devoid of roads, was considered unrealistic. Well, a fresh tank division, sent to help Paulus from the west, was prosaically late.
The general offensive was coordinated by Vasilevsky. The operation was codenamed "Uranus". A strike on Romanian troops from both sides was scheduled for November 19. At this moment, the Germans were already extremely weakened by the fighting in the city. The German 6th Army remained a powerful, cyclopean-sized army, but many wounded had accumulated in the rear, combat units had been seriously worn down in battle, and reserves had been drained to the bottom. It took her very little time to regain her strength before the final push to the Volga - literally two to three weeks. It was at this moment that the Headquarters threw its accumulated reserves onto the scales. It is difficult to imagine what feelings Vasilevsky experienced during more and more assaults on Stalingrad, when Headquarters drip-dropped the reserves that supported the defenders. Now all doubts were cast aside.
Punch in the gut
Heavy snowfall hampered aviation operations, but it also kept the Luftwaffe confined to the airfields. The first to go on the offensive was the northern “claw” - the front of General Nikolai Vatutin, which included a tank army. Hurricane artillery fire and an avalanche of several hundred tanks made the attack irresistible. This offensive was in no way reminiscent of the hopeless attacks on German positions at Kotlubani. Soviet troops passed through Romanian positions like a knife through butter. The Romanian front line was swept away, and in some places tanks immediately drove into division command posts and even corps headquarters.
It is interesting that on the first day Paulus did not yet believe that any significant events were taking place. He had no idea about the state of the Romanian troops and did not know that the allies were throwing down their weapons in droves and surrendering. He considered an offensive with large forces west of Stalingrad impossible and on the first day he sent his only reserve - one German and one Romanian tank divisions. There is a curious incident associated with German tank crews. The bulk of the equipment of this mobile reserve was unable to move. According to the official version, the wiring in the tanks... was chewed by mice.
The joke about the mouse saboteurs became known throughout the army, but the tankers themselves were not amused at all. It is difficult to explain this miraculous phenomenon, but the fact is that approximately two-thirds of the division’s tanks never went anywhere. However, the fact that the remaining third still started was of little use. Much to the amazement of the Wehrmacht commanders, all the circumstances that played a fatal role in the fate of the Soviet troops in 1941 now turned against them. In the chaos, the German and Romanian divisions were unable to establish communication with each other, fought discordantly, came under attack in marching columns, could not orient themselves, and were defeated in a couple of days.
The corps commander who united Paulus's armored reserves lost his position and then his freedom: Hitler ordered him to be imprisoned. In reality, the general simply experienced all the delights of commanding a counterattack in the midst of general collapse. The remnants of the two divisions made their way to the southwest in agony. They lost almost all their equipment, their soldiers - especially the Romanians - were demoralized, so the two divisions posed no threat for the next few days.
Bad weather continued to linger over the battlefield, so the formidable German aircraft could not participate in the battle. Moreover, Soviet units began to capture airfields with planes chained to the ground. Due to the defeat of the Romanian units on the front line, their remnants fled into the zone of the German 6th Army.
In the rear of the Germans themselves, a tremendous disorder reigned. The modern army is not only front-line units, but also hundreds of rear units. Now they were all rushing along the icy roads. Some went south, away from the tanks with red stars on board, others went east, into the emerging cauldron, many went straight into captivity. Paulus's only success was the rapid collapse of the flank. The German group across the Don was able to retreat into the cauldron in an organized manner and build a new line of defense. However, most of the rear units turned into an unmanageable mess.
The offensive took even those units that were not supposed to be here by surprise. For example, an Estonian police battalion came under attack while marching on the road to Donetsk. Paulus simply did not have reliable information about what was happening in his own rear. The advancing tankers and riflemen walked through complete chaos. Abandoned horses were running along the roads, somewhere there was a car with an empty gas tank, and just a few kilometers away there was an abandoned fuel warehouse. The military police could not regulate traffic, and kilometer-long traffic jams arose on the roads. Fights broke out near river crossings and road junctions, sometimes with shooting. Some even drowned trying to escape west across the Don on the ice. German field hospitals were filled with patients, but due to constant marches they could not even open dugouts there. The infirmaries were more like meat processing plants.
At this time, the remnants of the 3rd Romanian Army were dying near the village of Raspopinskaya. Its main forces were commanded by the division commander, General Laskar. All higher-ups either had no contact with the troops or were already in captivity. Laskar tried to act like his German colleagues and organize a breakthrough to the west. However, on November 22, he was captured after an unexpected attack by the Russians and did not participate in the events anymore, and by the 25th, the remnants of the Romanian army - 27 thousand hungry and frozen people - laid down their arms.
Only a small group led by General Sion escaped from the encirclement, but it did not go far. The Romanians met with the German unit, but literally a few hours later the Germans transferred their guns to another area. The Romanians settled down for the night in a village. For the first time in several days, the soldiers, who had found themselves warm and had eaten, went to sleep in full force, not excluding the sentries. At night, Soviet units entered the village and killed or captured everyone they found.
On November 20, the southern “claw” went on the offensive. Here things were even worse with roads and landmarks than in the north. Therefore, there were fewer troops overall, but the share of mobile units was greater. The condition of the Romanian troops was no better than in the north. The first day was spent fighting the positional defense of the Romanians. Over the long weeks of standing, they managed to create an impressive line of field fortifications, but it quickly turned out that on its own it was not capable of holding back a powerful blow.
The German motorized division that came out to meet them was met on the march and driven inside the planned encirclement ring - to the north. A huge problem for the Soviet troops was the complete lack of landmarks. Due to the snowstorm in the first days, it was impossible to conduct aerial reconnaissance; there were no residents in rare villages. Therefore, the two mechanized corps in the vanguard rushed for some time in the void, vaguely imagining where the enemy was. Even communication with the command had to be done through couriers on motorcycles.
However, the very next day an excellent landmark was found - the railway to Stalingrad. The pliable rear of the German 6th Army was also discovered there. Within two days, only one of the vanguard mechanized corps took seven thousand prisoners at the cost of losing only 16 people.
This phenomenon should be discussed separately. The huge number of captured Soviet soldiers in the 1941 campaign is often explained by reluctance to fight, mass cowardice and similar unimportant reasons. In fact, as we see, in a similar situation, the Germans began to surrender in droves, offering almost no resistance.
This did not happen because the Germans, until recently terrible opponents, suddenly became unwilling to fight. However, during deep breakthroughs, a huge number of logisticians find themselves on the front line: builders, drivers, repairmen, signalmen, doctors, loaders in warehouses, etc. and so on. They almost never have tactical training for proper combat, and often even weapons. Moreover, the Germans constantly lost contact, and in addition to the infantry, tanks fell on them. Vasily Volsky, commander of the 4th Mechanized Corps, even sent headquarters guards on motorcycles and armored cars to collect a bountiful harvest of prisoners and trophies.
On November 21, one mechanized wedge was driven into the positions of the Germans and Romanians from the north, another from the east. Between them remained the armada of the German 6th Army. The culmination of Operation Uranus was the capture of the bridge over the Don near the town of Kalach. The crossing was captured by the brigade of Lieutenant Colonel Filippov, advancing from the north. Filippov acted with considerable impudence. In the darkness of the night, a small column with headlights on moved forward. In addition to Soviet ones, it also consisted of several captured German vehicles, so the bridge guards saw familiar silhouettes and were not worried. The Thirty-fours were mistaken for German trophies. When the imaginary Germans jumped from the tanks and opened fire, it was already too late. Soon Kalach himself was busy. On November 23 at four in the afternoon, Soviet groups met near Kalach. The largest army of the Wehrmacht, 284 thousand soldiers and officers, was surrounded.
The pictures of the defeat of the German and Romanian rear areas were inspiring. In the terrible summer of 1942, even the most steadfast soldiers hesitated. Now fear and humiliation have become the lot of the opposite side. The crowds of exhausted prisoners, many of whom were wounded or frostbitten, aroused pity rather than hatred. Mountains of broken and abandoned equipment rose along the roadsides like monuments to victory. True, here and there there were constant outbursts of rage.
The retreating Wehrmacht units mercilessly shot prisoners captured in the summer and autumn, whom they could not take with them. In one of the camps they found a mountain of frozen corpses and only a few emaciated living people. Now that most of the prisoners were Germans and Romanians, such a spectacle could easily cost the lives of soldiers captured nearby. And yet the moral upsurge of Soviet soldiers and officers was unprecedented. The taste of victory was intoxicating. Some of the fighters later said that they did not experience such strong feelings even after the capture of Berlin.
Operation Uranus turned the tide of the entire Second World War. In just a few days, the roles were reversed. In the coming months, the Wehrmacht will have to patch up holes in the front, try to successfully or unsuccessfully break through encirclement rings and throw reserves under the tracks of tanks without any visible effect. November 1942 became the real finest hour of the Red Army.
An avenue in Brussels, a metro station, a square in Paris, a highway in England, streets in Poland, the Czech Republic, Slovakia and even India.
Stalingrad. This city is immortalized in the memory of Europeans with names and, every day, pronouncing them, the inhabitants of Europe involuntarily pay a small tribute to the memory of those who died under it.
Stalingrad is the city where the turning point in the Great Patriotic War took place. In the fall of 1942, at the cost of huge losses, Soviet troops stopped the offensive on the Volga. It was impossible for the Soviet command to lose the city that bore the name of Stalin. In addition, Stalingrad was of enormous strategic importance - having captured it, the Nazis would have made it difficult to supply the most important resources to the Soviet army - fuel, ammunition, food.
Preparing for surgery
The front of the German army in the fall of 1942 was stretched over a distance of over 2 thousand kilometers. The Nazis' plans included holding the current strategic positions until the spring of 1943, and then continuing the offensive. The attack flanks were poorly strengthened - the Wehrmacht command believed that the Red Army was exhausted by previous bloody battles, and therefore would not dare to launch a counteroffensive.
This confidence played into the hands of the Soviet command, which already in September 1942 began preparing Operation Uranus. Its goal was to carry out two strategic strikes - the Southwestern Army under the leadership of N.F. Vatutina was supposed to advance 120 km in the area of \u200b\u200bthe village of Serafimovich, the Stalingrad Front - to launch an offensive towards the Sarpinsky lakes.
The Headquarters planned to close the shock groups of the two armies in the Kalach-Sovetsky area and thus encircle the German units. The Don Front was tasked with assisting the offensive by attacking enemy positions in the area of the villages of Kachalinskaya and Kletskaya.
The Soviet army had an advantage in the number of troops: 1,103,000 soldiers versus 1,011,000, as well as in guns, mortars, tanks and aircraft. For example, the Nazis had 1,240 aircraft in the fall of 1943, and the Red Army had 1,350.
On November 13, 1943, Stalin approved the operation plan, and on November 19, a powerful artillery barrage fell on the Germans near Stalingrad. Initially, it was planned to strike enemy positions with Soviet aircraft, but weather conditions prevented this.
The 3rd Romanian Army, which found itself under heavy fire and a fierce attack from the 5th Tank Army of the Don Front, quickly retreated, but in the rear of the Romanians stood the Germans, who began to put up serious resistance. The 1st Tank Corps under the leadership of V.V. came to the aid of the 5th Panzer. Butkov and the 2nd Tank Corps under the command of A.G. Homeland. Having crushed the Germans, they began to move towards the goal set by Headquarters - Kalach.
Divisions of the Stalingrad Front launched a counteroffensive
On November 20, divisions of the Stalingrad Front launched a counteroffensive. The blow was so strong that it not only broke through the defenses, but also advanced the troops 9 kilometers. As a result of this attack, 3 German divisions were destroyed. The Nazis, having recovered from the first shock, decided to save the situation by strengthening their positions. Two tank divisions were transferred from the North Caucasus.
The commander of the 6th Army, Field Marshal Paulus, was so confident in his ability to repel the offensive of the Soviet army that, right up to falling into the “cauldron,” he sent Hitler full of optimistic reports, in which he convinced Headquarters of the unshakability of his positions on the banks of the Volga.
Meanwhile, the Soviet units were moving towards the village of Manoilin, and having reached it, on November 21 they turned east towards the Don. Trying to stop their movement, the German 24th Panzer Division entered the battle, which was defeated as a result of the fighting.
The first stage of Operation Uranus ended on November 23, 1942 with the capture of the village of Kalach by the Soviet army. The circle around the 330 thousand German soldiers remaining in the areas of Stalingrad closed.
The plans of the commander of the encircled 6th Panzer Army, Paulus, included a breakthrough to the southeast, but Hitler forbade him to leave the city.
We found ourselves outside the “cauldron”
From those units that found themselves outside the “cauldron”, Army Group “Don” was hastily formed. She was given the task of breaking through the encirclement with the help of parts of Paulus’s army and holding Stalingrad.
Operation Winter Storm was developed at Hitler's Headquarters. Its implementation was entrusted to Field Marshal Erich von Manstein. The main crushing force in the defeat of the Soviet units was to be Hermann Hoth's 4th Tank Army.
Manstein’s “iron fist” struck the area of the village of Kotelnikov on December 12, 1942. The Red Army foresaw the Nazis' plans to break through Paulus's encirclement from the outside, but the area that Hoth attacked turned out to be poorly prepared. The Germans defeated the 302nd Infantry Division, thereby breaking through the defenses of the 51st Army. December 19 could have been fatal for the Soviet troops at Stalingrad - the Nazis brought up fresh reserves. The five-day heroic resistance of the Soviet units saved the situation - by this time the Red Army command had strengthened their positions with the forces of the 2nd Guards Army.
At one of the most critical moments - December 20, 1942 - the forces of the armies and Paulus were close to reunification. They were separated by only 40 kilometers. But in desperate battles, the advancing fascists lost half of their personnel. Paulus, who was eager to help Manstein, received a strict order from Hitler from Headquarters - not to leave the city. After which the Germans had no chance to escape the encirclement.
Meanwhile, the Italian and Romanian units defending the left flank of the German army, unable to withstand the intense fighting, began to quickly leave their positions. The flight became widespread, and this allowed the Soviet units to move towards Kamensk-Shakhtinsky, simultaneously occupying airfields that were strategically important for the Germans.
Don Front
Seeing the catastrophic nature of the situation, Manstein decided to retreat, fearing the loss of important communication facilities by the army. The German front turned out to be stretched and weakened, and the front commander R. Malinovsky was able to take advantage of this factor. On December 24, the Red Army again occupied the village of Verkhne-Kumsky, and then units of the Stalingrad Front went on the offensive in the Kotelnikovo area.
On January 8, 1943, the Soviet command put forward a proposal to surrender to Field Marshal Paulus. And it received a decisive refusal. Paulus understood that Hitler would regard his agreement to surrender as treason. But the position of the surrounded Germans was already hopeless. In addition, the Soviet command decided to maximally intensify the offensive against the encircled group.
The Don Front began to liquidate it. The approximate number of Germans caught in the “cauldron” was 250 thousand. Soviet troops divided those surrounded into two parts, thereby weakening their resistance and demoralizing the Nazis. On January 31, the field marshal and his inner circle surrendered. And over the next two days, all the troops that were surrounded surrendered. And February 2, 1943 went down in history as the day of victory of Soviet troops in the Battle of Stalingrad.