Prokhorovka briefly. Battle of Prokhorovka

People learn history lessons poorly, and perhaps because there are no truthful and accurate textbooks. The views of domestic historians on some events of the past largely depend on the official point of view. Now there are more opportunities to express one’s own opinion, and heated debates are flaring up around global historical phenomena and individual episodes.

Some call the battle of Prokhorovka the decisive part of the defensive phase of the Battle of Kursk, while others call it an accidental skirmish of motorized units that ended in terrible losses for the Red Army.

Fire arc

The Stalingrad defeat shook the military machine of Nazi Germany, but its power still remained great. The main striking force of the Wehrmacht, which had not failed the Nazi command until now, was the tank corps, which included the elite - the SS armored divisions. It was they who were supposed to break through the echeloned Soviet defense during the liquidation of the Kursk salient; it was with their participation that the battle of Prokhorovka took place on the southern front of the Kursk Bulge (“front” is the side of the defensive fortifications facing the enemy).

The fact that the main events would take place near Kursk became clear to both sides by the spring of 1943. Intelligence data spoke of the concentration of powerful military groups in this area, but further showed that Hitler was surprised by the number and power of the defensive lines prepared by the Red Army, the number of Soviet “thirty-fours”, which became the main force of the tank armies of the Red Army, which influenced the course of the Battle of Kursk, progress of the battle near Prokhorovka.

The operation of the German troops, called “Citadel,” was aimed at returning Germany’s strategic initiative, but it was the result of the final turning point in the course of the war. The tactical plan of the German command was simple and logical and consisted of two converging attacks from Orel and Belgorod with a connection at Kursk. If successful, there would be one and a half million Soviet soldiers in the cauldron.

Participants in the confrontation

In the southern section of the Kursk Bulge, Soviet troops operated as part of the Voronezh Front, commanded by Army General N.F. Vatutin. The main force was armored units, which were used to cement the defense and launch counterattacks: the 1st Tank Army under the command of Lieutenant General M. E. Katukov and the 5th Guards Tank Army under Lieutenant General P. A. Rotmistrov, with the participation of The battle of Prokhorovka took place. In the 5th Guards Army under the command of Lieutenant General A. S. Zhadov, operating with the support of the 2nd Air Army of General S. A. Krasovsky, all Soviet infantry and anti-tank weapons were concentrated in this area.

They were opposed by two German tank corps - the 3rd and 2nd, which were part of the SS field troops, and the tank divisions "Adolf Hitler", "Das Reich" and "Totenkopf" ("Totenkopf") that were part of it were to the elite units of the German army.

Number of tanks and self-propelled guns

Different sources provide different information about the number of tanks and self-propelled artillery units involved in the battles near Prokhorovka. The official version, which was based on the memoirs of some Soviet commanders, depicted a great tank battle near Prokhorovka with the participation of one and a half thousand tanks, of which 700 were German, including the newest Tiger T-VI and Panther.

In any case, what happened in the field at Prokhorovka was a very extraordinary event in the history of armored forces, although more independent studies showed that the Wehrmacht tank corps included about 400 armored vehicles, of which 250 were light and medium tanks, heavy " "Tigers" - about 40. There were no "Panthers" near Prokhorovka, and the tank corps, which included 200 of the latest vehicles, operated in the northern section of the arc.

Rotmistrov's army included 900 tanks and self-propelled guns, including 460 T-34s and 300 light T-70s.

High-quality composition

Military factories evacuated to the rear began operating in record time. T-34 with a 76 mm gun - the main tanks of the battle of Prokhorovka. By 1943, German tank crews had already appreciated the Soviet “thirty-four”, and among them a call was born to the command: instead of expensive developments, simply copy the T-34, but make it in German factories and with a new gun. The insufficiency of the armament of the main Soviet tank was clear to our specialists, and especially clear after the battles on the Kursk Bulge. Only in 1944 did the T-34 gain the ability to confidently hit enemy tanks with a long-barreled 85 mm gun,

In addition to the fact that the battle of Prokhorovka showed the still tangible qualitative superiority of the enemy’s tank technology, shortcomings in the organization of the battle and in the management of crews became clear. The official instructions ordered the T-34 crews to use the main advantages of the tank: speed and maneuverability - to fire on the move, approaching the German vehicles at a lethal distance. It was impossible to achieve a reliable hit without special fire stabilizers, which appeared only thirty years later, which reduced the effectiveness of the combat use of tanks during an attack.

In addition to a more powerful weapon, which made it possible to hit targets at a distance of up to 2 km, Wehrmacht tanks were equipped with wireless communications, and it was poor coordination of actions in battle conditions that became one of the most important reasons for the huge losses in Rotmistrov’s army.

Southern section of the arc

The course of events on the southern front of the Kursk Bulge showed that the command of the Central Front (Colonel General K.K. Rokossovsky), defending the northern section of the Kursk salient, more accurately guessed the direction of the main attack. The Germans managed to overcome the defense lines to a depth of 8 km, and the defense of the Voronezh Front was penetrated in some areas by 35 km, although the Germans were unable to enter the operational space. The battle of Prokhorovka was the result of a change in the main direction of the German offensive.

Initially, the German tank corps rushed to the west of Kursk, towards Oboyan, but got stuck in the defensive formations of the 6th and 7th Guards Armies under powerful counterattacks from Katukov’s 1st Tank Army. The heroism and military skill of the tank crews of the 1st Army are considered by many historians to be underestimated, although it was in battles with them that the Germans lost the strength to further push towards Kursk.

The choice of Prokhorovka as a new target for the attack of the Nazi army is considered by some to be forced, and in some sources it is indicated as planned, foreseen during the development of Operation Citadel in the spring of 1943. The capture of the Prokhorovka railway station also led to a critical difficulty in supplying the troops of the Voronezh Front. The German division "Adolf Hitler" and the units of the 2nd SS Panzer Corps, which covered it from the flanks, reached the attack line on Prokhorovka by July 10.

To eliminate the threat of a breakthrough, Rotmistrov's 5th Guards Tank Army was sent against them, marching to the outskirts of Prokhorovka and engaging in combat with tank divisions under the command of P. Hausser - this is how the tank battle near Prokhorovka began. The date considered to be the day of the great tank battle - July 12, 1943 - cannot fully reflect the events; fierce fighting lasted for several days.

Different look

There are several options for describing what later became known as the battle of Prokhorovka. A brief summary of these descriptions shows the different attitudes of official Soviet historiography, Western European and American historians to the events of the Great Patriotic War. A special opinion is found in the memoirs of German generals, who laid all the blame for their military defeats on the inadequate decisions of the Fuhrer, who hindered them with his ambitions as a great commander. Where is the truth?

Rotmistrov’s memoirs depict the events of July 12, 1943 as a counter battle involving a huge number of tanks, during which irreparable damage was inflicted on the Nazis’ elite tank units, after which they retreated, without thinking about further advances towards a breakthrough from the north. Moreover, the battle of Prokhorovka can briefly be called the largest defeat of the Wehrmacht tank forces, from which they never recovered.

The ideological opponents of Soviet historians present events in their own way. In their presentation, the Red Army suffered a terrible defeat, losing a huge number of manpower and armored vehicles. German tanks and anti-tank guns, being in well-prepared positions, shot at Soviet tanks from afar, unable to inflict significant damage on the enemy, and the advance of the German troops was stopped by a balanced decision of the command, including due to the beginning of the offensive of the Allied forces in Italy.

Progress of the battle

Now it is difficult to restore in detail the true order of events, to discern it among the varnished pages of Soviet textbooks and among the memoirs of beaten Wehrmacht generals - subjectivity and politicization distort the historical view, aimed even at global events such as the Great Patriotic War. The tank battle near Prokhorovka can be presented in the form of specific facts.

The 2nd SS Panzer Corps under the command of P. Hausser, which was part of the 4th Panzer Army, following the order of its commander, General G. Hoth, goes to the vicinity of the Prokhorovka railway station to strike in the rear of the 69th Soviet Army and break out to Kursk.

German generals assumed that tank units from the reserve of the Voronezh Front might meet on their way, and chose the location of a possible collision taking into account the combat qualities of their armored vehicles.

The counterattack of the 5th Guards Tank Army hit tangentially, almost head-on. The tank battle near Prokhorovka (date - July 12 - the day of the culmination of the battles) began on July 10 and lasted about a week.

The meeting with the elite SS tank divisions came as a surprise, and the battlefield did not allow the Soviet tanks to be deployed in a single avalanche - deep ravines and the bank of the Psel River prevented this. Therefore, German tanks and self-propelled guns with long-range guns that had taken up convenient positions could first shoot groups of 30-35 combat vehicles coming at them. The greatest damage to the German tank corps was caused by the high-speed T-34s, which managed to get within striking distance.

Having lost a large amount of equipment, Rotmistrov’s army retreated from the battlefield, but Prokhorovka was not captured by the bloodless Germans, who by July 17 began to retreat to the positions they occupied before the start of the Battle of Kursk.

Losses

The exact number of losses suffered is a matter of dispute for everyone who wrote about the history of tank battles, which abounded in the Great Patriotic War. The battle of Prokhorovka became the bloodiest of them. The latest research says that on July 12, Soviet troops lost 340 tanks and 19 self-propelled guns, and the Germans lost 163 combat vehicles. The difference in the number of irretrievable losses is even greater: 193 tanks for Rotmistrov and 20-30 for the 2nd SS Panzer Corps. This is explained by the fact that the battlefield remained with the Germans and they were able to send most of their damaged equipment for repairs, while mining and blowing up Soviet tanks.

The 5th Guards Tank Army was to become the main force of the Soviet counteroffensive planned after the end of the defensive phase of the battle in the south near Kursk. Therefore, when in one day - July 12 - more than half of the tanks and self-propelled guns burned down in the battle near Prokhorovka, Stalin ordered the creation of a commission of the State Defense Committee designed to find the reasons for such losses.

Results

Recent publications by military historians, based on research into archives that have become available only recently, destroy the myths of Soviet history of World War II. The Battle of Prokhorovka does not look like the largest confrontation between the armored units of the two armies, in which the Wehrmacht lost the main forces of this type of troops, which was the main reason for subsequent defeats. But the conclusion about the complete defeat of the Soviet tank army, which accidentally stumbled upon selected SS divisions, looks unjustified.

The Germans drove the enemy out of the “tank field”, knocked out most of the Soviet armored vehicles, but did not complete the main task - they did not capture Prokhorovka, did not meet the northern group of their troops in order to close the encirclement. Of course, the battle at Prokhorovka was not the main reason that forced the Germans to retreat; it did not become the final turning point in the Great War. It is known that the decision to end Operation Citadel was announced at a meeting with Hitler on July 13, and Field Marshal Manstein names in his memoirs the main reason for the landing of Allied troops in Sicily. However, he points out that only one SS Panzer division was sent to Italy, which gives this reason minimal significance.

It is more logical to conclude that the German offensive in the area of ​​the Kursk salient was stopped by the successful defensive actions of the Soviet fronts and a powerful counter-offensive, which began in the Central Front zone in the northern section of the arc, and was soon supported in the Belgorod region. The battle of Prokhorovka also made a great contribution to the collapse of Operation Citadel. The year 1943 was the year of the final transfer of strategic initiative to the Soviet troops.

Memory

An event of real historical significance does not need additional ideological justification. In 1995, during the celebration of the half-century anniversary of the Victory, at an altitude of 252.2, in the Belgorod region, a memorial complex was opened.

Its main topic was the tank battle near Prokhorovka. A photo of a tall, 60-meter belfry is sure to be present in the gadgets of tourists passing by this memorable field. The monument turned out to be worthy of the greatness of courage and perseverance shown on the legendary Russian field.

USSR

Germany Germany

Commanders Losses Audio, photo, video on Wikimedia Commons

Direct command of the tank formations during the battle was carried out by: Lieutenant General Pavel Rotmistrov from the Soviet side and SS Oberstgruppenführer Paul Hausser from the German side.

Neither side managed to achieve the goals set for July 12: German troops failed to capture Prokhorovka, break through the defenses of Soviet troops and gain operational space, and Soviet troops failed to encircle the enemy group.

The situation on the eve of the battle

Initially, the main German attack on the southern front of the Kursk Bulge was directed to the west - along the Yakovlevo-Oboyan operational line. On July 5, in accordance with the offensive plan, German troops as part of the 4th Panzer Army (48th Panzer Corps and 2nd SS Panzer Corps) and Army Group Kempf went on the offensive against the troops of the Voronezh Front, in position 6- On the first day of the operation, the Germans sent five infantry, eight tank and one motorized divisions to the 1st and 7th Guards armies. On July 6, two counterattacks were launched against the advancing Germans from the Kursk-Belgorod railway by the 2nd Guards Tank Corps and from the Luchki (northern) - Kalinin area by the 5th Guards Tank Corps. Both counterattacks were repelled by the 2nd SS Panzer Corps.

Strengths of the parties

Traditionally, Soviet sources indicate that about 1,500 tanks took part in the battle: about 800 from the Soviet side and 700 from the German side (eg TSB). In some cases, a slightly smaller number is indicated - 1200.

Many modern researchers believe that the forces brought into the battle were probably significantly smaller. In particular, it is indicated that the battle took place in a narrow area (8-10 km wide), which was limited on one side by the Psel River, and on the other by a railway embankment. It is difficult to introduce such significant masses of tanks into such an area.

It must be said that the overestimation of enemy forces also took place at the preliminary stage. So Shtemenko S.M. in his work points out: “ By April 8, the enemy concentrated 15-16 tank divisions with 2,500 tanks against the Voronezh and Central Fronts. ... On April 21, N.F. Vatutin already counted up to 20 infantry and 11 tank divisions just in front of the Voronezh Front in the Belgorod region.“G.K. Zhukov assesses the situation more realistically. We read from him: " In the Battle of Kursk, the troops of the Central and Voronezh Fronts, as I have already said, were somewhat superior to the enemy in strength and means. ... in people - 1.4 times, in guns and mortars - 1.9 times, in tanks - 1.2 times, in airplanes - 1.4 times. However, placing the main emphasis on tank and motorized troops, the German command grouped them in narrow areas..."There is a version that the command of the Voronezh Front also tried to group tank forces near Prokhorovka.

Germany

From the western direction, the 2nd SS Panzer Corps (2 SS Tank Corps) was advancing on Prokhorovka, while the SS Division “Adolf Hitler” was operating in the zone between the Psel River and the railway, and from the southern direction - the 3rd Panzer Corps (3 Tank Corps) . Known for the presence of tanks and assault guns without self-propelled guns: Grille, Vespe, Hummel and Marder 2, the data for which is being clarified, in the divisions of the 2nd SS Tank as of the evening of July 11 and 3rd Tank as of the morning of July 12 is indicated in the table.

The strength of units and formations of the 2nd SS Panzer Corps 4 TA and the 3rd Panzer Corps AG "Kempf" on July 11, 1943
Pz.II Pz.III
50/L42		 Pz.III
50/L60		 Pz.III
75 mm		 Pz.IV
L24		 Pz.IV
L43 and L48		 Pz.VI "Tiger" T-34 StuG III Bef.Pz. III Total tanks and StuG
2nd SS Panzer Corps
TD Leibstandarte SS "Adolf Hitler" (at 19.25 11.07) 4 - 5 - - 47 4 - 10 7 77
TD SS "Das Reich" (at 19.25 11.07) - - 34 - - 18 1 8 27 7 95
TD SS "Totenkopf" (at 19.25 11.07) - - 54 - 4 26 10 - 21 7 122
2nd SS Panzer Corps, total 4 - 93 - 4 91 15 8 58 21 294
3rd Tank Corps
6th Panzer Division (on the morning of July 11) 2 2 11 ? - 6 - - - 2 23 (?)
7th Panzer Division (on the morning of July 12) - - 24 2 1 9 - - - 3 39
19th Panzer Division (on the morning of July 12) - - 7 4 - 3 - - - 1 15
503rd separate heavy tank battalion (on the morning of July 11) - - - - - - 23 - - - 23
228th separate battalion of assault guns (on the morning of July 12) - - - - - - - - 19 - 19
3rd Tank Corps, total 2 2 42 6 1 18 23 - 19 6 119
Total armored units 6 2 135 6 5 109 38 8 77 27 413

It should be noted that “Panther” tanks did not take part in the Battle of Prokhorovka on July 12, continuing to operate as part of the “Great Germany” division in the Oboyan direction. In the post-war press, instead of the company of captured T-34 tanks that actually participated in the battle near Prokhorovka (8 units as part of the 2nd SS Panzer Division "Das Reich"), Panther tanks were indicated. About the “Panthers” allegedly operating against his 5th Guards. TA, said P. A. Rotmistrov.

USSR

Commander of the Voronezh Front, General of the Army, Representative of the Supreme High Command Headquarters A. M. Vasilevsky - until 07/14/43. From July 14, Zhukov G.K. was already involved in coordinating the actions of the front with Headquarters.

The Soviet group included the following forces:

  • 2nd Air Army (2nd VA, Aviation Lieutenant General Krasovsky S.A.);
  • 5th Guards Army (5th Guards A, Lieutenant General Zhadov A.S.);
  • 5th Guards Tank Army (5th Guards TA, Lieutenant General t/v Rotmistrov P.A.) consisting of:
    • 18th Tank Corps (18 Tank Corps, Major General T/V Bakharov B.S.), 148 tanks:
Part T-34 T-70 "Churchill"
110th Tank Brigade (110th Tank Brigade, Lieutenant Colonel M. G. Khlyupin) 24 21
170th Tank Brigade (170 Tank Brigade, Lieutenant Colonel Tarasov V.D.) 22 17
181st Tank Brigade (181st brigade, Lieutenant Colonel Puzyrev V.A.) 24 20
36th Separate Guards Heavy Tank Breakthrough Regiment (36 Separate Guards TPP) 0 0 20

32nd Motorized Rifle Brigade (32nd Motorized Rifle Brigade, Colonel I. A. Stukov).

    • 29th Tank Corps (29 Tank Corps, Major General T/V Kirichenko I.F.), 192 tanks and 20 self-propelled guns:
Part T-34 T-70 SU-122 SU-76
Units of equipment combat-ready and temporarily under repair as of July 11
25th Tank Brigade (25th Tank Brigade, Colonel Volodin N.K.) 26 32
31st Tank Brigade (31st Tank Brigade, Colonel Moiseev S.F.) 32 38
32nd Tank Brigade (32nd Tank Brigade, Colonel Linev A.A.) 64 0
1446th self-propelled artillery regiment (1146 glanders) 12 8

53rd Motorized Rifle Brigade (53rd Motorized Rifle Brigade, Lieutenant Colonel Lipichev N.P.). 1529th heavy self-propelled artillery regiment SU-152 (1529 tsap. The regiment, consisting of 11 vehicles out of 12, arrived at the site only in the evening of July 12 without shells. Did not take part in the tank battle on July 12).

    • 5th Guards Mechanized Corps (5th Guards Mk, Major General t/v Skvortsov B.M.)
Part T-34 T-70 SU-122 SU-76
10th Guards Mechanized Brigade (10th Guards Mechanized Brigade, Colonel Mikhailov I.B.) 29 12
11th Guards Mechanized Brigade (11th Guards Mechanized Brigade, Colonel N.V. Grishchenko) 42 22
12th Guards Mechanized Brigade (11th Guards Mechanized Brigade, Colonel Borisenko G. Ya.)
24th Guards Separate Tank Brigade (24th Guards Separate Tank Brigade, Lieutenant Colonel Karpov V.P.) 51 0
1447th self-propelled artillery regiment (1147 glanders) 12 8
  • 5th Guards The TA was reinforced by formations that became part of it from July 10:
    • 2nd Guards Tatsinsky Tank Corps (2nd Guards Tank Corps, Colonel Burdeyny A.S.),
Part T-34 T-70 "Churchill"
Units of equipment combat-ready and temporarily under repair as of July 11, units
4th Guards Mechanized Brigade (4th Guards Mechanized Brigade, Colonel A.K. Brazhnikov) 28 19
25th Guards Mechanized Brigade (25th Guards Mechanized Brigade, Lieutenant Colonel Bulygin S.M.) 28 19
26th Guards Mechanized Brigade (26th Guards Mechanized Brigade, Lieutenant Colonel Nesterov S.K.) 28 14
47th Guards Separate Breakthrough Tank Regiment (47 Guards Separate TPP, Lieutenant Colonel Shevchenko M. T.) 0 0 21
    • 2nd Tank Corps (2nd Tank Corps, Major General T/V Popov A.F.):
      • 26th Tank Brigade (26 Tank Brigade, Colonel Piskarev P.V.) (as of 07/11/43 T-34 1 1 unit + 7 under repair and T-70 33 units + 2 under repair)
      • 99th Tank Brigade (99 Tank Brigade, Colonel L. I. Malov),
      • 169th Tank Brigade (169 Tank Brigade, Colonel I. Ya. Stepanov).
The state of the equipment and support of the 5th Guards Tank Army at 17:00 on July 11, 1943
Combat vehicles 29 tk 18 tk 2 tk 2nd Guards tk 5th Guards mk army units Total
T-34 120 68 35 84 120 36 463
T-70 81 58 46 52 56 8 301
"Churchill" - 18 4 3 - - 25
SU-122 12 - - - 10 - 22
SU-76 8 - - - 7 - 15
Total tanks and self-propelled guns 221 144 85 139 193 44 826
On the way to the station Prokhorovka 13 33 - - 51 4 101
Under repair 2 6 9 - 1 6 24
Total armored units 236 183 94 139 245 54 951

G. A. Oleynikov, as of July 10, has 790 tanks in the 5th Guards Tank Army - 260 T-70, 501 T-34, 31 Mk IV "Churchill" (modifications of Churchill IV). And 40 (two regiments) SU-122 self-propelled assault howitzers and light infantry support assault guns based on the T-70 SU-76.

Rotmistrov himself assessed the amount of equipment as follows: “ The 5th Guards Tank Army was reinforced by the 2nd Guards Tatsinsky and 2nd Tank Corps, 1529th Self-Propelled Artillery, 1522nd and 1148th Howitzer, 148th and 93rd Cannon Artillery Regiments, 16th and 80th guards mortar regiments. In general, in our army with attached tank formations there were about 850 tanks and self-propelled guns.»

The assessment of the forces of the parties is highly dependent on the assessment of the geographical scope of the battle. In the area of ​​the Oktyabrsky state farm, the 18th and 29th tank corps were advancing - a total of 348 tanks.

Plans of the parties

1. The enemy in the Belgorod direction, having brought large forces of tanks into battle, is trying to develop success in the north. direction - to Oboyan, Kursk (up to 400 tanks) and to the east. direction - to Aleksandrovsky, Skorodnoye, Stary Oskol (up to 300 tanks).

To the commander of the 29th Tank Tank, Lieutenant General T. Kirichenko

1. The task of the corps is the same...
2. Start of the attack - 8.30 July 12, 1943. Artillery preparation begins at 8.00.
3. I authorize the use of the radio from 7.00 on July 12, 1943. Commander of the 5th Guards. TA Lieutenant General P. A. Rotmistrov

2 SS tanks defeat the enemy in the south. Prokhorovka and thereby creates the preconditions for further advancement through Prokhorovka. Division assignments:

Division "MG" go on the offensive from the bridgehead at dawn, capture the heights of the north-east. and first of all go to the road Prokhorovka, Kartashevka. Take possession of the river valley. Psel attacked from the southwest, securing the left flank of the AG division.

The “AG” division, holding the occupied line on the left flank, occupied Storozhevoye and the forest to the north, the branch of the “Stalinskoe” state farm, etc. on the right flag. Pits, as well as heights of 2 km east. With the onset of a threat from the river valley. Psel, together with MG units, captured Prokhorovka and height 252.4.

Division "R", holding the achieved lines on the right flank, occupy Vinogradovka and Ivanovka. After capturing the right-flank units of the AG division Storozhevoye and the forest to the north, using their success, move the main efforts in the direction of the heights of the southwest. Right-handed. Hold the new line of Ivanovka, the heights of the southwest. Right, height 2 km east. Sentry (lawsuit).

Progress of the battle

There are different versions of this battle.

The first clash in the Prokhorovka area occurred on the evening of July 11. According to the memoirs of Pavel Rotmistrov, at 17:00, he and Marshal Vasilevsky, during reconnaissance, discovered a column of enemy tanks that were moving towards the station. The attack was stopped by two tank brigades.

At 8 am the next day, the Soviet side carried out artillery preparation and at 8:15 went on the offensive. The first attacking echelon consisted of four tank corps: 18th, 29th, 2nd and 2nd Guards. The second echelon was the 5th Guards Mechanized Corps.

At the beginning of the battle, the Soviet tank crews gained some advantage: the rising sun blinded the Germans advancing from the west. Very soon the battle formations were mixed. The high density of the battle, during which tanks fought at short distances, deprived the Germans of the advantage of more powerful and long-range guns. Soviet tank crews were able to target the most vulnerable spots of heavily armored German vehicles.

When Soviet tanks, during a counterattack, came within direct range of their guns and were met with heavy fire from German anti-tank guns, the tankers were simply stunned. Under hurricane fire, it was necessary not only to fight, but first of all to psychologically rebuild from a breakthrough deep into the enemy’s defense to positional combat with enemy anti-tank weapons.

To the east of the battle area, the German tank group Kempf was advancing, which sought to enter the advancing Soviet group on the left flank. The threat of envelopment forced the Soviet command to divert part of its reserves to this direction.

At about 1 p.m., the Germans withdrew the 11th Tank Division from reserve, which, together with the Death's Head division, struck the Soviet right flank, on which the forces of the 5th Guards Army were located. Two brigades of the 5th Guards Mechanized Corps were sent to their aid and the attack was repulsed.

By 2 p.m., Soviet tank armies began to push the enemy south. By evening, Soviet tankers were able to advance 10-12 kilometers, thus leaving the battlefield in their rear. The battle was won.

According to the memoirs of German generals

It is difficult to find a person who has never heard of Prokhorovka. The battles at this railway station, which lasted from July 10 to July 16, 1943, became one of the most dramatic episodes of the Great Patriotic War. For the next anniversary of the battle of Prokhorovka, Warspot is publishing a special project that will tell about the background and main participants of the battle, and also, using an interactive map, will introduce little-known battles that took place on July 12 to the west of the station.

West of Prokhorovka. Interactive map


Fighting in the area of ​​the Oktyabrsky state farm and height 252.2

On July 12, 1943, the main attack west of Prokhorovka station was carried out by the 18th and 29th Tank Corps of the 5th Guards Tank Army under Lieutenant General P. A. Rotmistrov. Their actions were supported by units of the 9th Guards Airborne and 42nd Guards Rifle Divisions from the 5th Guards Army under Lieutenant General A.S. Zhadov.

It was assumed that the forces of the Soviet troops would cover the area of ​​the Oktyabrsky state farm with simultaneous attacks from the north and south. After this, with quick and decisive actions in this place, our tanks, together with the infantry, were supposed to break through the enemy’s defenses and continue the offensive. But the events that followed looked somewhat different.

The two tank corps of the Red Army consisted of 368 tanks and 20 self-propelled guns. But it was not possible to use them simultaneously, bringing down an avalanche of steel machines on the enemy. The terrain made it difficult to deploy a large number of armored vehicles in this area. Blocking the path of the tanks, in front of the Oktyabrsky state farm, a deep ravine, supplemented by several spurs, stretched from the river towards Prokhorovka. As a result, the 31st and 32nd tank brigades of the 29th Corps advanced in an area up to 900 meters wide between the railway and the girder. And the 25th Tank Brigade attacked the enemy to the south, separated from the corps by a railway line.

The 181st Panzer became the forward brigade of the 18th Panzer Corps, advancing along the river. The beam prevented the 170th brigade from deploying, and it had to be sent to the railway area, placing it behind the 32nd brigade. All this led to the fact that the tanks of the brigades were brought into battle in parts, in groups of 35–40 vehicles, and not simultaneously, but at intervals of 30 minutes to an hour.

Who resisted the advancing tanks of the Red Army on this important section of the front near the Oktyabrsky state farm and height 252.2?

In the area between the Psel River and the railway, units of the German Leibstandarte division were located. At an altitude of 252.2, an infantry battalion was entrenched in armored personnel carriers from the 2nd Panzergrenadier Regiment. At the same time, German infantrymen were located in trenches, and armored personnel carriers were concentrated behind the heights. A division of self-propelled howitzers - 12 Vespes and 5 Hummels - took positions nearby. Anti-tank guns were installed at the height itself and on its reverse slopes.

Two other battalions of the 2nd Panzergrenadier Regiment, reinforced with assault and anti-tank guns, took up defense in the area of ​​the Oktyabrsky state farm. Behind the height of 252.2 and the state farm are located most of the combat-ready tanks from the division's tank regiment: about 50 Pz IV with a long-barreled 75-mm cannon and several other tanks of other types. Some of the tanks were allocated to reserve.

The division's flank between the river and the state farm was covered by a reconnaissance battalion with ten Marders. In the depths of the defense in the area of ​​\u200b\u200bheight 241.6 there were positions of howitzer artillery and six-barreled rocket mortars.

At 8:30 a.m. on July 12, after a Katyusha salvo, our tankers went on the offensive. The first to reach height 252.2, which was on their way, were 26 “thirty-fours” and 8 SU-76 of the 29th Tank Corps. They were immediately met by fire from German anti-tank guns. Several tanks were hit and caught fire. The tankers, having opened fire, began to actively maneuver and move towards the state farm. The crews of damaged tanks, without leaving their combat vehicles, fired at the enemy - until a new hit forced them to get out of the burning tank or die in it.

24 T-34 tanks and 20 T-70 tanks from the 181st brigade were advancing from the north in the direction of Oktyabrsky. Just like at height 252.2, our tanks were met with heavy fire and began to suffer losses.

Soon the remaining tanks of the 32nd brigade appeared in the area of ​​\u200b\u200bheight 252.2. The commander of the 1st tank battalion, Major P.S. Ivanov, seeing the burning tanks of the brigade, decided to bypass the dangerous area. With a group of 15 tanks, he crossed the railroad and, moving south of it, rushed to the Komsomolets state farm. As a group of our tanks appeared, the main forces entered the battle for the Oktyabrsky state farm, and part of the forces tried to knock down the Germans from a height of 252.2.

By 10 o'clock in the morning, tanks from four of our tank brigades and 12 self-propelled guns were already participating in the battle in the area of ​​the state farm. But it was not possible to quickly take Oktyabrsky - the Germans resisted stubbornly. Enemy assault, self-propelled and anti-tank guns fired heavily at numerous targets on the battlefield. Our tanks maneuvered, moving away from the state farm and approaching it, and from time to time stopping briefly to fire. At the same time, the number of destroyed Soviet tanks in the area of ​​the state farm and height 252.2 increased. The Germans also suffered losses. At 11:35, tanks of the 181st brigade were able to break into the Oktyabrsky state farm for the first time, but since the German defense was not suppressed, the battle continued.

By 10 o'clock German tanks began to pull up to the front line and engage in battle with our tanks. While repelling our first attacks at height 252.2, several German “fours” were shot down and burned. The German tank crews, having suffered losses, were forced to retreat to the reverse slopes of the heights.

By 13:30, through the joint actions of our tankers and motorized riflemen from the brigades of the 18th and 29th corps, the Oktyabrsky state farm was completely liberated from the enemy. However, there was no further development of the offensive of the 5th Guards Tank Army in the Oktyabrsky sector - height 252.2. To delay our tank corps, the Germans sent large air forces against them. The raids were carried out over several hours by groups of 8 to 40 aircraft.

In addition, the Germans carried out counterattacks with the participation of their tanks. Units of our troops that took up defensive positions in the area of ​​the state farm repelled several enemy counterattacks in the afternoon.

Both sides suffered heavy losses during the battle in this area, especially in equipment. About 120 tanks and self-propelled guns of the 18th and 29th tank corps were shot down and burned in the area of ​​the Oktyabrsky state farm and height 252.2. The Germans lost 50% of the tanks that took part in this battle, as well as two Grille self-propelled guns, five Vespes, one Hummel, more than 10 armored personnel carriers, and about 10 anti-tank guns. There were also losses among other types of weapons and equipment.

No less fierce battles took place near Prokhorovka and in other sectors of the front.

Fighting near the village of Storozhevoye

Fierce fighting in the area of ​​the Storozhevoye farmstead continued throughout the previous day (July 11). Stubbornly defending, units of the 169th Tank and 58th Motorized Rifle Brigades of the 2nd Tank Corps, together with the infantrymen of the 285th Infantry Regiment, repelled all enemy attacks. The Germans were unable to take Storozhevoye on July 11th. However, the infantry of the 1st Panzergrenadier Regiment, reinforced by approximately 12 Marders, managed to capture the forest and the heights north of Storozhevoy.

At 8:30 a.m., the 25th Tank Brigade of the 29th Tank Corps of the Red Army went on the offensive. In addition to the existing 67 tanks, it received eight self-propelled guns as reinforcement, including 4 SU-122 and 4 SU-76. The brigade's actions were supported by the infantry of the 9th Guards Division. According to the assigned task, the brigade was supposed to advance in the direction of the villages of Storozhevoye and Ivanovsky Vyselok, reach the depths of the enemy’s defense, and then be ready for further development of the offensive.

The first to go on the attack were about 30 "thirty-fours" with an infantry landing on board. Already at the very beginning of the movement, our tanks came under targeted and dense fire from the Marders and anti-tank guns of the 1st Panzergrenadier Regiment.

The infantry was covered with mortar salvos and lay down. Having lost several tanks damaged and burned out, the “thirty-fours” returned to their original positions.

At 10 a.m. the attack resumed, this time with the entire brigade. The battalion was advancing ahead with T-34s and 4 SU-122s. Following them were 36 T-70s and 4 SU-76s. When approaching Storozhevoye, the tanks and self-propelled guns of the brigade were again met by heavy fire from the eastern edge of the forest. The crews of German anti-tank guns and the crews of the Marders, hiding among the vegetation, fired destructive fire from ambushes. In a short time, many of our tanks and self-propelled guns were shot down and burned.

Some of the combat vehicles still managed to break into the depths of the enemy’s defenses, but failure awaited them here too. Having reached the area of ​​the Ivanovsky Vyselok farm, units of Volodin’s brigade were met by fire from tanks of the Reich division. Having suffered significant losses and lacking the support of their neighbors, the tankers were forced to retreat.

By noon, the remaining 6 T-34s and 15 T-70s were concentrated southeast of Storozhevoy. All self-propelled guns supporting the brigade had been knocked out or burned by this time. In this unsuccessful battle, the crews of our tanks and self-propelled guns acted courageously and desperately, as the episodes of the battle eloquently demonstrate.

One of the self-propelled guns under the command of Lieutenant V.M. Kubaevsky was hit and caught fire. Its crew continued to fire at the enemy until the shells ran out, after which the self-propelled gun, engulfed in flames, went to ram a German tank. At the moment of the collision, the self-propelled gun exploded.

Another self-propelled gun under the command of Lieutenant D. A. Erin had its track broken and its sloth broken as a result of being hit by German shells. Despite the fierce fire on the self-propelled gun, Erin got out and repaired the track, after which he took the damaged vehicle out of the battle and sent it to the repairmen's location. After 4 hours, the sloth was replaced with a new one, and Erin immediately went back into battle.

Lieutenants Vostrikov, Pichugin, Slautin and junior lieutenant Shaposhnikov, who fought on the T-70, died in battle while continuing to shoot at the enemy from burning tanks.

Having repelled all the attacks of the 25th Brigade, the Germans themselves went on the offensive on Storozhevoye, gradually increasing the strength of their attacks. Around one o'clock in the afternoon, from the southwestern direction, the farm was attacked by a battalion of the 3rd Panzergrenadier Regiment of the Reich Division with the support of ten assault guns. Later, 14 tanks and infantry from the Leibschatandarte division struck from the north in the direction of the farmstead. Despite the stubborn resistance of our troops, by 18 o'clock the Germans captured Storozhevoye. However, further advance of the enemy was stopped.

A small area in the Storozhevoye area turned out to be the only one where, during the day of July 12, units of two German divisions, Leibstandarte and Reich, managed to advance forward during attacks.

Fighting near the villages of Yasnaya Polyana and Kalinin

On July 12, the 2nd Guards Tank Corps advanced in the auxiliary direction south of Storozhevoy. Its commander, Colonel A.S. Burdein, was given a difficult task. The offensive actions of the brigade of his corps were supposed to pin down the forces of the Reich division in the Yasnaya Polyana - Kalinin sector and deprive the enemy of the opportunity to transfer troops to the direction of the main attack of the 5th Guards Tank Army.

The rapidly changing situation made changes in the preparation of the corps for the offensive. At night, divisions of the German 3rd Tank Corps south of Prokhorovka managed to break through the defenses of the 69th Army and reach the area of ​​the village of Rzhavets. To block the German breakthrough, formations and units of the 5th Guards Tank Army that were in reserve or preparing to attack west of Prokhorovka began to be used.

At 7 am, one of the three tank brigades was withdrawn from the 2nd Guards Corps and transferred to counter the German 3rd Tank Corps. Of the 141 tanks, only about a hundred remained at Burdeyny's disposal. This weakened the corps' combat capabilities and deprived it of a reserve commander.

The Reich division opposing the guards had more than a hundred tanks and self-propelled guns, as well as 47 anti-tank guns. And in terms of the number of personnel, the Reich division was twice as large as the tank corps that was about to attack it.

Part of the forces of the Reich Division took up defensive positions, while the other part was in a state of anticipation. The division's armored group, consisting of tanks, self-propelled guns and infantry in armored personnel carriers, was withdrawn from the front line and was ready to act depending on the situation.

Understanding the complexity of the situation, Burdeyny asked to postpone the start of the corps' transition to the offensive and received permission to do so. Only at 11:15 am the two corps tank brigades, numbering 94 tanks, began to attack the Reich division.

The 25th Guards Tank Brigade struck in the direction of Yasnaya Polyana. Having encountered strong enemy resistance, our tankers were able to capture only the forest south of the village. Further advance of the brigade was stopped by fire from anti-tank guns.

Having attacked from the Belenikino area through the infantry positions of the 4th Panzergrenadier Regiment, 28 T-34s and 19 T-70s from the 4th Guards Tank Brigade entered the battle for Kalinin. Here our tankers encountered approximately 30 tanks of the 3rd battalion of the 2nd SS Panzer Regiment. Among the enemy tanks were eight captured "thirty-fours" used in the "Reich" division. After the loss of several tanks, the commander of the Red Army brigade stopped the attack and ordered his tankers to take up defensive positions 600 meters southeast of Kalinin.

To the south of Kalinin, at the border of the Ozerovsky and Sobachevsky farms, battalions of the 4th Guards Motorized Rifle Brigade of Burdeyny's corps broke through. Further advance of our infantrymen was stopped by mortar fire.

The transition of the Reich units to the attack on the right flank of the division and their capture of Storozhevoy seriously affected the position of the 2nd Guards Tank Corps. The 25th Brigade was the first to receive the order to retreat back and cover the exposed right flank of the corps. And after the report that the Germans had captured Storozhevoy at 18:00, Burdeyny ordered the Guards 4th Tank and 4th Motorized Rifle Brigades to retreat to their original positions. By the end of the day on July 12, the 2nd Guards Tank Corps was forced to go on the defensive at the Belenikhin-Vinogradovka line it had previously occupied.

By their actions during the day, the brigades of Burdeyny’s corps pinned down and diverted the attention of a number of units of the Reich division. Thus, they did not allow the use of the larger forces of the Reich division to carry out an offensive and help its neighbor, the Leibstandarte division, which was repelling attacks from two of our tank corps.

Battle for the Komsomolets state farm

At approximately 9 a.m., the 1st battalion of the 32nd tank brigade reached the area of ​​height 252.2. Its commander, Major P.S. Ivanov, saw in front of him the damaged and burning “thirty-fours” of the 2nd battalion of the brigade advancing in front of him. Wanting to preserve the tanks and trying to complete the task assigned to him, Ivanov decided to make a maneuver and go around the height on the left. Ordering the crews of 15 tanks to follow him, the major crossed the railway and continued his advance along the railway embankment. The Germans, who did not expect such a maneuver from our tank crews, did not have time to do anything. The tanks of the first battalion, led by the commander's "thirty-four", continued to advance at high speed into the depths of the enemy's defense.

By 9 o'clock our tanks reached the Komsomolets state farm and captured it. Following the tankers, infantrymen of the first battalion of the 53rd motorized rifle brigade broke through to the state farm. Having quickly defeated the few German forces located on the state farm, our tank crews and motorized riflemen took up defensive positions in Komsomolets and its environs.

This was the first success and the deepest breakthrough of the defense of the Leibstandarte division over a distance of 5 kilometers, achieved by our tankers on the morning of July 12.

In an effort to eliminate the emerging threat, the Germans, using nearby units of their troops, cut off a group of our tankers and motorized riflemen from the main forces of the 29th Tank Corps with a strike from the north.

Soon the area of ​​the state farm was covered with artillery and mortar fire. The enemy infantry went on the attack, trying to recapture the Komsomolets state farm. Gradually, the strength of the German attacks increased, and armored vehicles were introduced into the battle. Having competently organized the defense at the occupied line in the fortifications and dug in the tanks, our soldiers were able to repel the first enemy attacks.

Finding himself surrounded, Major Ivanov reported this by radio to the brigade commander. A group of tanks immediately went to help the defenders of the state farm. They also crossed the railway and moved towards the state farm, bypassing height 252.2. But they failed to get to Komsomolets. All tanks were knocked out by enemy fire on the approach to the state farm.

Left without support, units of the 29th Corps were able to hold out in Komsomolets for several hours. The Germans constantly attacked, and our tankers and motorized riflemen fought off one attack after another. The state farm changed hands five times.

Gradually, the inequality in power began to make itself felt. After all the tanks were knocked out, including the battalion commander’s tank, the motorized riflemen were forced to leave the state farm and fight back to the Yamka area, breaking out of the encirclement.

The forces of the 29th Tank Corps failed to build on the success achieved by capturing the Komsomolets state farm at the very beginning of the offensive. However, while the battle for the state farm continued, it diverted attention and part of the forces of the Leibstandarte division from the fighting on the front line.

After two o'clock in the afternoon, the commander of the 5th Guards Tank Army pinned his main hopes for the further development of the offensive on the actions of the 18th Tank Corps...

Fight near the village of Andreevka

Around one o'clock in the afternoon, the brigade commanders of the 18th Tank Corps received the task from General B.S. Bakharov to continue developing the offensive along the southern bank of the Psel River. The 110th Tank Brigade, previously in reserve, was targeting Mikhailovka. The 181st and 170th brigades, in joint actions with the Churchill regiment and with the support of the infantry of the 9th and 42nd Guards Divisions and the 32nd Motorized Rifle Brigade of the Corps, were to capture Andreevka. Then the two tank brigades had to turn south and strike deep into the defense of the Leibstandarte division.

The 181st Tank Brigade advanced to Mikhailovka. Here she joined up with a group of Churchill tanks from the 36th Separate Guards Regiment and the infantry of the 127th Regiment of the 42nd Guards Rifle Division.

At the same time, tanks of the 170th Tank Brigade along with the infantry of the 23rd Guards Regiment of the 9th Guards Airborne Division advanced towards Andreevka from the Oktyabrsky state farm area.

On the German side, resistance to our troops was provided by units of the reconnaissance battalion of the Leibstandarte division and the 6th Panzergrenadier Regiment of the Death's Head division.


MK tanks. IV "Churchill" 36th Guards Separate Tank Regiment

The advance of our group of troops along the river proceeded at a slow pace. The enemy covered the Soviet infantry with volleys of howitzers and mortars, forcing them to lie down. The crews of the Churchill tanks, the number of which by this time numbered from 10 to 15 units, had to act independently.

To turn the situation in his favor, Major General Bakharov brought the 32nd Motorized Rifle Brigade into battle. By joint actions of formations and units of the 18th Tank Corps and the rifle regiment of the 42nd Guards Division, Avdeevka was liberated by three o’clock in the afternoon.

The 170th and 181st brigades turned south and began to advance in the direction of height 241.6. With this strike, the brigades sought to cut through the defenses of the Leibstandarte division in the area between the Psel River and the railway.

The remaining forces of the 18th Tank Corps, with the support of the infantrymen of the 42nd Guards Division, continued to advance along the river. By six o'clock in the evening they managed to capture Vasilyevka.

At this point, the offensive of our troops was stopped. The Death's Head commander, Hermann Pris, sent some of the division's tanks and assault guns to reinforce the infantry of the 6th Panzergrenadier Regiment. Having received reinforcements, the Germans began to launch counterattacks and tried to recapture the villages they had abandoned. However, units of the 18th Tank Corps and the 42nd Guards Division firmly held the achieved lines in the Vasilievka area.

Battle in the area of ​​height 241.6

The 181st and 170th brigades, deployed in the area between two ravines, began to advance in a southerly direction. Having overcome the curtain put up by units of the reconnaissance battalion of the Leibstandarte division, our tanks, together with the infantrymen, began to move deeper into the enemy’s defenses. The commander of the Leibstandarte division, Wisch, who was at that moment at an altitude of 241.6, clearly saw what was happening. He ordered a group of reserve tanks led by four Tigers to move towards the approaching Soviet tanks and counterattack to stop their advance. A firefight began between German and Soviet tanks. Several tanks of two of our brigades were knocked out.

Skillfully maneuvering on the battlefield and using the folds of the terrain, most of our tanks still managed to break through to the area of ​​height 241.6. Here the crews of the T-34 and T-70 saw the positions of howitzer batteries of the Leibstandarte artillery regiment. Taking advantage of the opportunity, the tankers began to destroy the German guns located nearby. The German artillerymen were shocked by the sudden appearance of our tanks and began to hide in shelters.

The picture of the events that took place is well conveyed by the memories of one of the participants in those events - Muterlose, a soldier from the 3rd division, equipped with 150-mm howitzers:

“The T-34 turret appeared again. This tank moved relatively slowly. Against the background of the horizon, the silhouettes of the Red Army soldiers riding on it were clearly visible. At a distance of 20 or 30 meters from him followed the second, then the third and fourth. Perhaps their crews did not believe that our two 150 mm guns could open fire on them. Two separated artillery pieces were facing these nimble tanks. But the soldiers on these tanks also did not fire for some time. The T-34 reached the edge of the forest. It seemed to me that I simultaneously heard the clear commanding voice of the officer of our battery, UnterSturmführer Protz, and the dull roar of our guns. Who could believe this? Russian tanks continued to move. Not one of them took off into the air, or was even shot down. Not a single shot! Not even a single scratch! Even the soldiers were still sitting on top. Then they attacked and jumped down. This meant that the battle was now practically lost for our two guns. This time luck was not on our side. And before our gunners could reload their guns and fire again, all the tanks turned their turrets and opened fire on our positions with their fragmentation shells without pause or compassion. It was as if they were combing every trench with a hail of their shells. The fragments simply swarmed over our shelter. The sand covered us. What protection was the trench in the ground! We felt safe, hidden in this Russian land. The earth hid everyone: both its own and its enemies. The fire stopped suddenly. No commander's shouts and orders, no screams and groans were heard. Silence… "

Soviet tanks managed to destroy several German heavy howitzers along with part of their crews. This was one of the deepest and most effective breakthroughs of tanks of the 5th Guards Tank Army into the depths of enemy defenses on July 12. However, this time it was not possible to build on the success.

By bringing up reserves, including from the neighboring Reich division, the Germans were able to stop the advance of Soviet tanks and inflict losses on them. The tanks of our two brigades were forced to return to the Andreevka area.

Fighting near the village of Klyuchi

On July 12, fierce battles between formations of the 5th Guards Army and units of the Death's Head division took place in the area north of the Psel River.

The fighting began at dawn. Already at 4 in the morning, moving out from the area of ​​the Vesely farm in the direction of the south, a combined battalion from units of the 51st and 52nd Guards Rifle Divisions attacked the enemy. Our infantrymen, supported by mortar and Katyusha fire, quickly reached German positions in the barracks area, north of the Klyuchi village. The guardsmen entered into close combat with German infantrymen from the 1st battalion of the 5th Panzergrenadier Regiment. The commander of the Death's Head division, Hermann Pris, urgently ordered tanks to be brought into battle to eliminate the threat to the crossings and secure the area for the upcoming offensive. By that time, the Germans had managed to transfer the 1st tank battalion of the 3rd SS tank regiment (about 40 tanks) to the other side of the river.

The Germans divided their forces. The first group of 18 tanks, together with the grenadiers, counterattacked our combined battalion. The second group of 15 tanks, accompanied by infantry, headed to the area of ​​height 226.6.

Having broken through the battle formations of the combined battalion, the Germans tried to capture Vesely, but met stubborn resistance. In this area, two of our rifle regiments from the 52nd and 95th Guards Rifle Divisions defended themselves with the support of artillery and Katyusha rockets.

Having come under rifle, machine-gun and mortar fire, the German infantry lay down. Our guns opened fire on the tanks that were left without infantry. Several German tanks were knocked out and two were burned. The impact of fire on the Death's Head units participating in the attack intensified - they were soon covered by several volleys of Katyusha rockets. After this, the Germans had to stop the attack and retreat to their original positions.

At the same time, a battle raged for several hours in the vicinity of Klyuchi. The combined battalion, having let tanks pass through its positions, did not retreat, but defended itself in the area of ​​the barracks. The resistance of the guards was so fierce and stubborn that even the crews of destroyed, burned-out German tanks were thrown in to fight them as ordinary infantry. Only by 9 am the Germans were able to knock out our riflemen and capture the barracks.

This ended the fighting directly in the Klyuchi area.

The Germans continued to transfer armored vehicles to the bridgehead and concentrated their striking forces south of Hill 226.6. The primary goal of the upcoming offensive of the Death's Head division, bypassing Prokhorovka from the flank, was to capture command heights 226.6 and 236.7 and the settlements located next to them.

Battle for height 226.6

Hill 226.6 was closest to the bridgehead and was important for both sides. Maintaining the heights allowed our troops to observe the crossings of the Psyol and the movement of enemy forces in the area. For the Germans, capturing the heights was a decisive condition for developing the offensive.

The first battles for the heights began early in the morning.

At 5:25 a.m., a group of 15 German tanks (1st battalion of the 3rd tank regiment), with the support of infantry, moved east from the Klyuchi village area to height 226.6. Having broken through the front line of defense of the 155th Guards Rifle Regiment, tanks and grenadiers rushed to the heights. Our guardsmen entered into close combat, which in some places turned into hand-to-hand combat in the trenches. After a fierce two-hour battle, the Germans were forced to retreat. At the same time, the German tanks did not retreat far, but positioned themselves on the southwestern slopes and began firing from the spot at the defenders of the height.

While the battle was ongoing, the main German forces accumulated to the south of the heights, ready to go on the offensive as they concentrated. Tanks of the 2nd battalion of the 3rd tank regiment and armored personnel carriers with grenadiers and sappers were pulled into this area. They were also in a hurry to be joined by the tanks of the 1st battalion that remained on the move after the morning battle at Vesely.

The concentration of German troops was carried out in full view of our soldiers and did not go unpunished. While the German tanks stood waiting to attack, many of their crews left their combat vehicles to rest. Suddenly, the area south of the height was covered with salvoes of Katyusha rockets. The tankers were lucky: they managed to hide from the fragments flying around under the tanks. The German sappers, who were in their armored personnel carriers at that moment, had nowhere to hide, and they suffered heavy losses. The start of the attack was delayed.

Only at 10:30 am an attack on the heights began with 42 tanks supported by infantry. The battle immediately became fierce. Units of the 155th Guards Rifle Regiment and the 11th Motorized Rifle Brigade opened fire on the German infantry and forced them to lie down. However, not having a sufficient number of anti-tank weapons, our riflemen found it difficult to fight German tanks. An hour later, by 11:30, most of the German tanks broke through to the crest of the height. German tank crews began firing point blank from cannons and machine guns at the positions of our troops at a height. Finding themselves under pressure from superior enemy forces, the infantry of the 155th Guards Regiment began to fight back from the heights. The Germans began to pull up additional forces to the heights.

For three hours, being surrounded and semi-encircled, the battalions of the 11th Motorized Rifle Brigade fought a difficult battle at an altitude of 226.6. By three o'clock in the afternoon, under enemy pressure and having used up ammunition, motorized rifles in small groups, under the cover of gun and mortar fire, began to emerge from the heights in the northern and eastern directions.

Having lost several tanks destroyed and suffered casualties in the infantry, the Germans captured the heights. At the same time, having captured only the height closest to the river in the afternoon, the Germans were losing precious time, missing the chance to break through the defense of the 5th Guards Army in the bend of the Psel River.

Having pulled up additional forces of infantry and tanks to the area of ​​​​height 226.6, units of the Death's Head division continued the offensive. In this case, the main blow was delivered to the north at height 236.7 and bypassing the height in the north-east direction. The target of the auxiliary attack was the Vesely village.

Fighting near the village of Vesely

A few hours after repelling the morning attack by German tanks and infantry, fierce fighting resumed in the area of ​​the Vesely village.

At 15:15, thirteen German tanks, breaking through the defenses of the 155th Guards Rifle Regiment at height 226.6, attacked the positions of the 151st Regiment on the outskirts of Vesyoly. Having encountered intense fire from our artillery, the crews of the German tanks stopped the attack and, turning around, retreated back to the height area.

At 16:10 there was another attack by German tanks. This time, six German tanks, supported by infantry, managed to break through into the regiment's battle formations. A battle ensued between the infantry of both sides in the trenches, sometimes turning into hand-to-hand combat. The crews of German tanks fired at point-blank range with cannons and machine guns and ironed the positions of the guardsmen with their tracks. Under enemy pressure, units of the 155th Guards Regiment began to retreat. At this moment the Germans were close to capturing Vesely.

However, this did not happen. The enemy attack was repulsed by the joint efforts of the infantrymen of the 290th Guards Rifle Regiment and the fire of the guns of the 95th Guards Rifle Division supporting them.

Having never taken the village of Vesely, the Germans were forced to stop attacks in its direction and retreated to height 226.6.

Battle near height 236.6

Height 236.6 was the highest point from which the entire area of ​​​​combat operations that unfolded in the bend of the Psel River was perfectly visible. Already from early morning, the commander of the 5th Guards Army, Lieutenant General A.S. Zhadov, was at the observation post equipped at a height. He personally followed the events taking place on the battlefield. After the Germans captured height 226.6 and accumulated forces in this area, the situation here became increasingly dangerous. There was a threat of a breakthrough in the defense of the 5th Guards Army.

Zhadov made every effort to prevent the Death's Head division from escaping from the bridgehead. He understood perfectly well that enemy tanks could be stopped only by creating a strong anti-tank barrier in their path. In the area of ​​height 237.6 and to the west of it, all the guns of the artillery regiment and anti-tank battalion of the 95th Guards Rifle Division deployed. Additional forces were pulled up to the breakthrough site. North of height 237.6, the 6th Guards Airborne Division, which was in the army reserve, took up defense. All its guns were placed in open positions in readiness to fight German tanks. Already at 13:00, eight 45-mm guns of the 6th Guards Airborne Division deployed at an altitude of 237.6. Over the next four hours they took part in a battle with German tanks. At the same time, 122-mm howitzers of the 6th Guards Division fired at the enemy infantry advancing behind the tanks.

The commander of the Death's Head division, Hermann Pris, decided in the afternoon to still try to complete the task assigned to his division: to capture command heights and break through to the road approaching Prokhorovka from the north-west. By 16:00, in the area of ​​\u200b\u200bheight 226.6, the Germans concentrated more than 70 tanks and assault guns, several dozen armored personnel carriers and up to an infantry regiment. German aviation was preparing to actively support the actions of tanks and infantry.

Soon, about 30 tanks and assault guns, supported by infantry, attacked height 236.7. About 30 more tanks, accompanied by armored personnel carriers with infantry, struck in a north-eastern direction, trying to reach the Prokhorovka-Kartashovka road. Our artillerymen entered into a fierce battle with German tanks.

At the beginning of the battle, the artillery of the 95th Guards Rifle Division took the brunt of the German tanks. The picture of the events that took place is well conveyed by the memoirs of the artillery commander of the 95th Guards Division, Colonel N. D. Sebezhko:

“Understanding the current situation, the division commander threw all his available resources and reserves into battle: a penal company, a company of machine gunners and other units, and most importantly, he brought in all the artillery to fight the tanks. The entire 233rd Guards was withdrawn for direct fire. ap under the command of Guards. Lieutenant Colonel A.P. Revin. The regiment commander managed to quickly withdraw and open fire with all cannon batteries, leaving only howitzer batteries in closed firing positions. The entire 103rd Guards was also thrown into battle. oiptad under the command of Major P. D. Boyko. ...Major Boyko was always in the thick of battle, skillfully led units and inspired soldiers and commanders with his personal example.”

In addition to tanks, the positions of our artillery batteries were attacked by German bombers.

By the joint actions of the artillery of the 95th Guards Division and other units, by eight o'clock in the evening all attacks by German tanks had been repulsed. Despite the use of significant forces of tanks, operating with the support of infantry and aviation, the Death's Head division was unable to completely break through the defenses of the 5th Guards Army troops and break out of the bridgehead. Thus, the implementation of the German plan to break through to Prokhorovka was completely disrupted. At the same time, the “Dead Head” division suffered serious losses in tanks during the battle in the bend of the Psel River.

During July 12, 24 German tanks were knocked out and three were burned by artillery fire alone from the 95th Guards Rifle Division.

Background and participants in the battle

On July 5, 1943, the Battle of Kursk began. The troops of Army Group South of the Wehrmacht dealt a powerful blow to the southern front of the Kursk Bulge. Initially, the Germans, with the forces of the 4th Tank Army, sought to advance in a northern direction along the Belgorod-Kursk highway. The troops of the Voronezh Front under the command of Nikolai Fedorovich Vatutin met the enemy with stubborn defense and were able to stop his advance. On July 10, the German command, trying to achieve success, changed the direction of the main attack to Prokhorovka.

Three panzergrenadier divisions of the 2nd SS Panzer Corps advanced here: “Totenkopf”, “Leibstandarte” and “Reich”. They were opposed by the troops of the Voronezh Front, to strengthen which the 5th Guards Tank and 5th Guards Armies were transferred from the Headquarters reserve.

To stop the enemy’s advance and defeat his formations, on July 12 N.F. Vatutin decided to launch a powerful counterattack on German positions. The main role was assigned to two new armies. The main blow in the area west of Prokhorovka was to be delivered by the 5th Guards Tank Army.

However, on July 10 and 11, events occurred that complicated preparations for the counterattack. In particular, the 2nd SS Panzer Corps was able to approach Prokhorovka, and one of its divisions, the “Dead Head”, managed to create a bridgehead on the northern bank of the Psel River. Because of this, part of the forces intended to participate in the counterattack had to be brought into battle prematurely by Vatutin. On July 11, two divisions (95th Guards and 9th Guards Airborne) from the 5th Army entered into battle with the 2nd SS Panzer Corps, blocking its path to Prokhorovka and blocking the German forces on the bridgehead. Due to the advance of the Germans, the initial areas of army formations for participation in the counterattack had to be moved to the east. This had the greatest impact on the troops of the 5th Guards Tank Army - the tanks of its two tank corps (18th and 29th) had to deploy in a close area between the Psel River and the railway. In addition, the action of the tanks at the very beginning of the upcoming offensive was hampered by a deep ravine stretching from the river to Prokhorovka.

By the evening of July 11, the 5th Guards Tank Army, taking into account the two tank corps assigned to it (2nd Guards and 2nd Tank), had more than 900 tanks and self-propelled guns. However, not all of them could be used in the battles west of Prokhorovka - the Second Tank Corps was putting itself in order after participating in intense battles on July 11 and could not take an active part in the upcoming counterattack.

The changing situation at the front also left its mark on preparations for the counterattack. On the night of July 11-12, divisions of the German 3rd Tank Corps managed to break through the defenses of the 69th Army and reach the Prokhorovka direction from the south. If success developed, German tank divisions could reach the rear of the 5th Guards Tank Army.

To eliminate the threat created, already on the morning of July 12, it was necessary to allocate and send a considerable part of the forces to the breakthrough site, including 172 tanks and self-propelled guns of the 5th Guards Tank Army. This scattered the army's forces and left its commander, General Pavel Rotmistrov, with an insignificant reserve of 100 tanks and self-propelled guns.

On July 12, by 8:30 am - the time the counterattack began - only about 450 tanks and self-propelled guns were ready to go on the offensive west of Prokhorovka, of which about 280 were in the area between the Psel River and the railway.

From the side of the 5th Guards Army on July 12, two divisions were to support the actions of the tankers. Two other divisions of A.S. Zhadov’s army were going to attack units of the “Dead Head” division on the northern bank of the Psel River.

The 2nd SS Panzer Corps, despite the losses suffered in previous battles, still remained quite strong and was ready for active action, both defensive and offensive. As of morning, the two divisions of the corps each had 18,500 personnel, and the Leibstandarte had 20,000 personnel.

For a whole week, the 2nd Tank Corps had been continuously engaged in fierce battles, and many of its tanks had been damaged and were being repaired. However, the corps still had a significant amount of combat-ready armored vehicles and was ready for active operations, both defensive and offensive. On July 12, the corps divisions could use about 270 tanks, 68 assault guns and 43 Marders in battle.

The corps was preparing to deliver the main blow from the bridgehead on the Psel River. The Death's Head division, using most of its 122 combat-ready tanks and assault guns as a ram, with the support of aviation, was supposed to capture the bend of the Psel River and reach Prokhorovka from the north-west. Located in the area between the Psel River and the Storozhevoye village, the Leibstandarte division was to hold its positions on the left flank and in the center, capture Storozhevoye with an attack on the right flank, and then be ready to support the actions of the Dead Head division to capture Prokhorovka with a blow from the south -west. The Reich Division, located south of the Leibstandarte, was given the task of holding its positions in the center and on the right flank and attacking on the left flank.

On July 12, troops of the Voronezh Front carried out a counterattack. This event became the culmination of the Prokhorov battle.

The main battles west of Prokhorovka took place in the following areas:

  • on the section between the Psel River and the railway on our side, the main forces of the 18th, 29th Tank Corps of the 5th Guards Tank Army, as well as the 9th and 42nd Guards Divisions of the 5th Guards Army took part in them, and from the German part of the Lebstandarte and Death's Head divisions;
  • in the area south of the railway in the Storozhevoy area, on our side, they involved the 25th Tank Brigade of the 29th Tank Corps, units and units of the 9th Guards and 183rd Rifle Divisions, as well as the 2nd Tank Corps, and from the German part of the Leibstandarte and Death's Head divisions;
  • in the area of ​​Yasnaya Polyana and Kalinin, Sobachevsky and Ozerovsky, brigades of the 2nd Guards Tank Corps participated on our side, and the Reich division on the German part;
  • To the north of the Psel River, formations and units of the 5th Guards Army took part on our side, and units of the Death’s Head division participated on the German side.

The constant change in the situation and the difficulties that arose in preparing the counterattack led to the fact that it did not proceed according to a pre-planned scenario. On July 12, fierce battles broke out west of Prokhorovka, in which in some areas Soviet troops attacked and the Germans defended, while in others everything happened exactly the opposite. In addition, attacks were often accompanied by counterattacks from both sides - this continued throughout the day.

The counterattack that day did not achieve its main goal - the enemy strike forces were not defeated. At the same time, the advance of the troops of the German 4th Tank Army in the direction of Prokhorovka was finally stopped. Soon the Germans stopped carrying out Operation Citadel, began to withdraw their troops to their original positions and transfer part of their forces to other sectors of the front. For the troops of the Voronezh Front, this meant victory in the Battle of Prokhorov and the defensive operation they carried out.

A detailed picture of the fighting west of Prokhorovka on July 12 is reflected on the interactive map.

Sources and literature:

  1. TsAMO RF.
  2. BA-MA Germany
  3. NARA USA.
  4. Materials from the site Memory of the People https://pamyat-naroda.ru/
  5. Materials from the site Feat of the People http://podvignaroda.mil.ru/
  6. Vasilyeva L.N., Zheltov I.G. Prokhorovka in sight. In 2 volumes. T. 2. - Moscow; Belgorod; Prokhorovka: Constanta, 2013.
  7. Zamulin V.N. The secret Battle of Kursk. Unknown documents testify. - M.:, 2008
  8. Isaev A.V. Liberation 1943. “The war brought us from Kursk and Orel...”. - M.: Eksmo, Yauza, 2013
  9. Nipe, George M. Blood, Steel, and Myth: The II.SS-Panzer-Korps and the Road to Prochorowka. Stamford, CT: RZM Publishing, 2011
  10. Vopersal W. Soldaten - Kämpfer - Kameraden - Marsch und Kämpfe der SS-Totenkopf-Division - Band IIIb, 1987
  11. Lehmann R. The Leibstandarte. Vol. III.Winnipeg: J.J. Fedorowicz, 1993.
  12. Weidinger O. Das Reich. Vol. IV. 1943. Winnipeg: J.J. Fedorowicz, 2008.

July 12th, 2013

Exactly 70 years ago, in 1943, on the same days when this note is being written, one of the largest battles in the entire history of mankind took place in the area of ​​Kursk, Orel and Belgorod. The Kursk Bulge, which ended with the complete victory of the Soviet troops, became a turning point in the Second World War. But assessments of one of the most famous episodes of the battle - the tank battle of Prokhorovka - are so contradictory that it is very difficult to figure out who actually emerged victorious. They say that the real, objective history of any event is written no earlier than 50 years after it. The 70th anniversary of the Battle of Kursk is an excellent occasion to find out what really happened near Prokhorovka.

The “Kursk Bulge” was a protrusion on the front line about 200 km wide and up to 150 km deep, which was formed as a result of the winter campaign of 1942-1943. In mid-April, the German command developed an operation code-named “Citadel”: it was planned to encircle and destroy Soviet troops in the Kursk region with simultaneous attacks from the north, in the Orel region, and from the south, from Belgorod. Next, the Germans had to advance east again.

It would seem that it is not so difficult to predict such plans: a strike from the north, a strike from the south, envelopment in pincers... In fact, the “Kursk Bulge” was not the only such protrusion on the front line. In order for the German plans to be confirmed, it was necessary to use all the forces of Soviet intelligence, which this time turned out to be on top (there is even a beautiful version that all the operational information was supplied to Moscow by Hitler’s personal photographer). The main details of the German operation near Kursk were known long before it began. The Soviet command knew exactly the day and hour appointed for the German offensive.

Battle of Kursk. Scheme of the battle.

They decided to greet the “guests” accordingly: for the first time in the Great Patriotic War, the Red Army built a powerful, deeply echeloned defense in the expected directions of the enemy’s main attacks. It was necessary to wear down the enemy in defensive battles, and then go on a counter-offensive (Marshals G.K. Zhukov and A.M. Vasilevsky are considered the main authors of this idea). The Soviet defense, with an extensive network of trenches and minefields, consisted of eight lines with a total depth of up to 300 kilometers. Numerical superiority was also on the side of the USSR: more than 1,300 thousand personnel against 900 thousand of the Germans, 19 thousand guns and mortars against 10 thousand, 3,400 tanks against 2,700, 2,172 aircraft against 2,050. However, here we must take into account the fact that the German army received significant “technical” replenishment: Tiger and Panther tanks, Ferdinand assault guns, Focke-Wulf fighters of new modifications, Junkers-87 D5 bombers. But the Soviet command had a certain advantage due to the favorable location of the troops: the Central and Voronezh fronts were supposed to repel the offensive, if necessary, troops of the Western, Bryansk and Southwestern fronts could come to their aid, and another front was deployed in the rear - Stepnoy, the creation of which Hitler’s military leaders, as they later admitted in their memoirs, completely missed.

The Junkers 87 bomber, modification D5, is one of the examples of new German technology near Kursk. Our plane received the nickname “laptezhnik” for its non-retractable landing gear.

However, preparing to repel an attack is only half the battle. The second half is to prevent fatal miscalculations in combat conditions, when the situation is constantly changing and plans are being adjusted. To begin with, the Soviet command used a psychological technique. The Germans were scheduled to launch their offensive at 3 a.m. on July 5th. However, at exactly that hour, massive Soviet artillery fire fell on their positions. Thus, already at the very beginning of the battle, Hitler’s military leaders received a signal that their plans had been revealed.

The first three days of the battle, for all their magnitude, can be described quite briefly: German troops were bogged down in dense Soviet defense. On the northern front of the “Kursk Bulge”, at the cost of heavy losses, the enemy managed to advance 6-8 kilometers in the direction of Olkhovatka. But on July 9 the situation changed. Having decided that it was enough to hit the wall head-on, the Germans (primarily the commander of Army Group South, E. von Manstein) tried to concentrate all their forces in one, southern direction. And here the German offensive was stopped after a large-scale tank battle at Prokhorovka, which I will consider in detail.

The battle is perhaps unique in its own way in that the points of view on it among modern historians differ literally in everything. From the recognition of the unconditional victory of the Red Army (the version enshrined in Soviet textbooks) to talk about the complete defeat of the 5th Guards Army of General P.A. Rotmistrov by the Germans. As evidence of the last thesis, the figures for the losses of Soviet tanks are usually cited, as well as the fact that the general himself almost ended up in court for these losses. However, the position of the “defeatists” cannot be accepted unconditionally for several reasons.

General Pavel Rotmistrov - commander of the 5th Guards Tank Army.

Firstly, the battle of Prokhorovka is often considered by supporters of the “defeatist” version outside the overall strategic situation. But the period from July 8 to July 12 was the time of the most intense fighting on the southern front of the “Kursk Bulge”. The main target of the German offensive was the city of Oboyan - this important strategic point made it possible to combine the forces of Army Group South and the German 9th Army advancing in the north. To prevent a breakthrough, the commander of the Voronezh Front, General N.F. Vatutin concentrated a large tank group on the enemy’s right flank. If the Nazis had immediately tried to break through to Oboyan, Soviet tanks would have hit them from the Prokhorovka area to the flank and rear. Realizing this, the commander of the 4th German Panzer Army, Hoth, decided to first take Prokhorovka and then continue moving north.

Secondly, the very name “battle of Prokhorovka” is not entirely correct. The fighting on July 12 took place not only directly near this village, but also to the north and south of it. It is the clashes of tank armadas across the entire width of the front that make it possible to more or less objectively assess the results of the day. Tracing where the popular name “Prokhorovka” came from (in modern terms) is also not difficult. It began to appear on the pages of Russian historical literature in the 50s, when Nikita Khrushchev became the General Secretary of the CPSU, who - what a coincidence! — in July 1943, he was on the southern front of the Kursk salient as a member of the military council of the Voronezh Front. It is not surprising that Nikita Sergeevich needed vivid descriptions of the victories of Soviet troops in this sector.

Scheme of the tank battle near Prokhorovka. The three main German divisions are designated by abbreviations: "MG", "AG" and "R".

But let's return to the fighting on July 10-12. By the 12th, the operational situation at Prokhorovka was extremely tense. The Germans had no more than two kilometers to reach the village itself - it was just a matter of a decisive attack. If they managed to take Prokhorovka and gain a foothold in it, part of the tank corps could easily turn north and break through to Oboyan. In this case, a real threat of encirclement would hang over the two fronts - Central and Voronezh. Vatutin had at his disposal the last significant reserve - the 5th Guards Tank Army of General P.A. Rotmistrov, which numbered about 850 vehicles (tanks and self-propelled artillery guns). The Germans had three tank divisions, which included a total of 211 tanks and self-propelled guns. But when assessing the balance of forces, one must keep in mind that the Nazis were armed with the latest heavy Tigers, as well as modernized fourth Panzers (Pz-IV) with enhanced armor protection. The main strength of the Soviet tank corps was the legendary “thirty-four” (T-34) - excellent medium tanks, but for all their advantages, they could not compete on equal terms with heavy equipment. In addition, Hitler's tanks could fire over long distances and had better optics and, accordingly, shooting accuracy. Taking into account all these factors, Rotmistrov’s advantage was very insignificant.

The Tiger heavy tank is the main strike unit of the German tank forces near Kursk.

However, one cannot write off several mistakes made by Soviet generals. The first was done by Vatutin himself. Having set the task of attacking the Germans, at the last moment he moved the time of the offensive from 10 a.m. to 8.30 a.m. The question inevitably arises about the quality of reconnaissance: the Germans stood in positions in the morning and themselves waited for the order to attack (as it later became known, it was planned for 9.00), and their anti-tank artillery was deployed in battle formation in case of Soviet counterattacks. To launch a pre-emptive strike in such a situation was a suicidal decision, as the further course of the battle showed. Surely Vatutin, if he had been accurately informed about the German disposition, would have preferred to wait for the Nazis to attack.

The second mistake, made by P.A. Rotmistrov himself, concerns the use of T-70 light tanks (120 vehicles in two corps of the 5th Guards Army that launched the morning attack). Near Prokhorovka, the T-70s were in the front ranks and suffered especially hard from the fire of German tanks and artillery. The roots of this error are rather unexpectedly revealed in the Soviet military doctrine of the late 1930s: it was believed that light tanks were intended primarily for “reconnaissance in force,” and medium and heavy ones for the decisive blow. The Germans acted exactly the opposite: their heavy wedges broke through the defense, and light tanks and infantry followed, “cleaning up” the territory. Undoubtedly, by Kursk, Soviet generals were thoroughly familiar with the Nazi tactics. What made Rotmistrov make such a strange decision is a mystery. Perhaps he was counting on the effect of surprise and hoped to overwhelm the enemy with numbers, but, as I wrote above, the surprise attack did not work out.

What really happened near Prokhorovka, and why did Rotmistrov barely manage to escape the tribunal? At 8.30 am, Soviet tanks began to advance on the Germans, who were in good positions. At the same time, an air battle ensued, where, apparently, neither side gained the upper hand. The first ranks of Rotmistrov's two tank corps were shot by fascist tanks and artillery. Towards noon, during fierce attacks, some of the vehicles broke through to the Nazi positions, but they failed to push back the enemy. Having waited for the offensive impulse of Rotmistrov’s army to dry up, the Germans themselves went on the attack, and... It would seem that they should have easily won the battle, but no!

General view of the battlefield near Prokhorovka.

Speaking about the actions of Soviet military leaders, it should be noted that they wisely managed their reserves. On the southern sector of the front, the SS Reich division advanced only a couple of kilometers and was stopped mainly by anti-tank artillery fire with the support of attack aircraft. The Adolf Hitler division, exhausted by attacks by Soviet troops, remained in its original place. North of Prokhorovka, the “Dead Head” tank division operated, which, according to German reports, did not encounter Soviet troops at all that day, but for some reason only covered 5 kilometers! This is an unrealistically small figure, and we can rightfully assume that the delay of the “Dead Head” is on the “conscience” of Soviet tanks. Moreover, it was in this area that a reserve of 150 tanks of the 5th and 1st Guards Tank Armies remained.

And one more point: the failure in the morning clash near Prokhorovka does not in any way detract from the merits of the Soviet tank crews. The tank crews fought until the last shell, showing miracles of courage, and sometimes pure Russian ingenuity. Rotmistrov himself recalled (and it is unlikely that he invented such a vivid episode) how the commander of one of the platoons, Lieutenant Bondarenko, towards whom two “tigers” were moving, managed to hide his tank behind a burning German vehicle. The Germans decided that Bondarenko’s tank had been hit, turned around, and one of the “tigers” immediately received a shell on its side.

Attack of Soviet "thirty-fours" with infantry support.

The losses of the 5th Guards Army on this day amounted to 343 tanks. The Germans, according to modern historians, lost up to 70 vehicles. However, here we are talking only about irrecoverable losses. Soviet troops could bring up reserves and send damaged tanks for repairs. The Germans, who had to attack at all costs, did not have such an opportunity.

How to evaluate the results of the battle at Prokhorovka? From a tactical point of view, and also taking into account the ratio of losses - a draw, or even a slight victory for the Germans. However, if you look at the strategic map, it is obvious that the Soviet tankers were able to complete their main task - to slow down the German offensive. July 12 was a turning point in the Battle of Kursk: Operation Citadel failed, and on the same day the Red Army counteroffensive began north of Orel. The second stage of the battle (Operation Kutuzov, carried out primarily by the Bryansk and Western fronts) was successful for the Soviet troops: by the end of July the enemy was driven back to their original positions, and already in August the Red Army liberated Orel and Kharkov. The military power of Germany was finally broken, which predetermined the victory of the USSR in the Great Patriotic War

Broken Nazi equipment near Kursk..

Interesting fact. It would be unfair not to give the floor to one of the initiators of the Soviet operation near Kursk, so I give the version of events of Marshal of the Soviet Union Georgy Zhukov: “In his memoirs, the former commander of the 5th Tank Army P. A. Rotmistrov writes that he played a decisive role in the defeat of the armored forces The “South” armies were played by the 5th Tank Army. This is immodest and not entirely true. The troops of the 6th and 7th Guards and 1st Tank armies, supported by the reserve artillery of the High Command and the air army, bled and exhausted the enemy during the fierce battles of July 4-12. The 5th Panzer Army was already dealing with an extremely weakened group of German troops, which had lost faith in the possibility of a successful fight against the Soviet troops.”

Marshal of the Soviet Union Georgy Zhukov.

After five days of defensive battles south of Kursk, the command of the Voronezh Front reported to Headquarters that the German offensive was running out of steam and the moment had come to take active action.

In the evening, the command of the Voronezh Front received an order from Headquarters to conduct a counterattack against a large group of German search forces. Clustered in the Mal area. Beacons, Ozerovsky. To carry out a counterattack, the front was reinforced by two armies, the 5th Guards, under the command of A. Zhadov, and the 5th Guards Tank, under the command of P. Rotmistrov. transferred from the Steppe Front. The plan for carrying out a counterattack, developed at the headquarters of the Voronezh Front with the participation of the representative of the Headquarters A. Vasilevsky VI army commanders, was as follows. The main core of the 5th Guards Tank Army, reinforced by two breakthrough tank regiments, was supposed to, with the support of two self-propelled artillery regiments and a regiment of guards rocket mortars and all available attack aircraft, cut in two the SS tank corps, whose forces seemed to have dried up in the previous laziness. At the same time, it was planned to reach the Pokrovka-Yakovlevo line. then turn to the East and West, cutting off the retreat routes for the German troops and encircling the resolved groups with the assistance of units of the 5th Guards Army, as well as the 2nd Tank Corps and the 2nd Guards Tank Corps.

However, preparations for a counterattack, which began on July 10-11, were thwarted by the Germans, who themselves inflicted powerful blows on our defense in this section of the bottom. One is in the direction of Oboyan, and the second is towards Prokhorovka. The first strike, according to the Germans, was more of a distracting nature, and nevertheless, its strength and surprise led to the fact that some units of the 1st Tank and 6th Guards Armies retreated 1-2 km in the direction of Oboyan.

The offensive began in different sectors in the direction of Prokhorovka, when the 2nd battalion of the SS tank regiment “Leibstandarte Adolf Hitler” (LSSAH), together with the 3rd battalion under the command of I. Peiper, with a sudden attack captured the height of 252.2, dominating the Teterevino-Prokhorovka road. After 10 minutes, the Tiger company of the Totenkopf division began to cross the Psel River, trying to expand the bridgehead between the villages of Krasny Oktyabr and Mikhailovka.

South-West of Prokhorovka in the direction of the village. Yasnaya Polyana led the attack from the SS division Das Reich. Due to the sudden disorganized withdrawal of some infantry units of the 5th Guards Army and the 2nd Tank Corps, the artillery preparation of the Soviet counteroffensive, which began on July 10, was disrupted. Many batteries were left without infantry cover and suffered losses both in deployment positions and on the move. The front found itself in a very difficult situation.

Only the quick introduction of the 42nd Infantry Division into the battle, as well as the transfer of all available artillery to direct fire, made it possible to stop the advance of German tanks.

Group "Kempf" consisted of the 6th and 19th Panzer Divisions, which had about 180 tanks, which were opposed by 100 domestic tanks. On the night of July 11, the Germans launched a surprise attack from the Melekhovo area to the north and northwest with the goal of breaking through to Prokhorovka. The infantry units of the 9th Guards and 305th Rifle Divisions defending in this direction, who did not expect such a powerful blow, retreated. To cover the exposed section of the front, on the night of July 11-12, 10 IPTABr from the Stanki reserve were transferred. In addition, the 1510th IPTAP and a separate anti-tank rifle battalion were involved in this area. These forces, together with infantry units of the 35th Guards Rifle Corps, did not allow the development of an offensive in the direction of Art. Prokhorovka. In this area, the Germans managed to break through only to the Sev River. Donets in the Novo-Oskonnoye region.

July 12, 1943. Decisive day.

Opponents' plans for the decisive day.

The commander of the SS Panzer Corps, Paul Hausser, assigned the following tasks to his three divisions:

LSSAH - bypass the village. Storozhevoye from the north and reach the line Petrovka - st. Prokhorovka. at the same time strengthening its position at an altitude of 252.2.

Das Reich - push back the opposing Soviet troops to the line east of Ivanovka.

Totenkopf - conduct an offensive along the Prokhorovka-Kartashevka road.

This was an offensive in the direction of the station. Prokhorovka from three directions in order to overcome the last line of Soviet defense and prepare the “gate” for entering the reserves of Army Group “South” into the breakthrough.

At the same time, the Command of the Voronezh Front, considering the German offensive thwarted and the crisis overcome, was about to launch a planned counter-offensive on Luchki and Yakovleve. At this point, the 5th hectare tank army began to concentrate two tank corps, which included about 580 tanks, P. Rotmistrov chose the line of deployment of the first echelon of the army to the west and southwest of the station. Prokhorovka at the front 15 km. Units of the 2nd Guards Tank Corps and the 5th Guards Tank Corps also prepared for snowflakes.

By 5 o'clock in the morning. A diversionary strike by the Germans from the south.At this time, the German troops of the Kempf group, trying to develop their offensive in a northern direction, struck in the defense zone of the 69th Army. By 5 o'clock in the morning, units of the 81st and 92nd Guards Rifle Divisions of the 69th Army were thrown back from the defensive line near the river. Northern Donets - Cossack and the Germans managed to capture the villages of Rzhavets, Ryndinka, Vypolzovka. A threat arose to the left flank of the deploying 5th Guards Tank Army and, by order of Headquarters representative A. Vasilevsky, front commander N. Vatutin gave the order to send the mobile reserve of the 5th Guards Tank Army to the defense zone of the 69th Army.

At 8 a.m.A reserve group under the command of General Trufanov launched a counterattack on the units of the German troops of the Kempf group that had broken through.

Thanks to the persistent defense of the Red Army units, the Germans' 3rd Tank Corps (300 tanks and 25 assault guns) never managed to break through to Rotmistrov's positions from the south.

At 7:45.Immediately after dawn on July 12, light rain began, which slightly delayed the start of the German offensive on Prokhorovka, but did not prevent the Soviet 18th Tank Corps under General Bakharov from launching an attack on the 2nd LSSAH battalion on the outskirts of the Oktyabrsky state farm with the forces of one tank brigade. Up to 40 Soviet tanks launched an attack on the village of Mikhailovka, but were repulsed by a division of assault guns and retreated.

From 8 o'clock in the morningLuftwaffe aircraft began intensive bombing of Soviet positions near Prokhorovka.

AT 8.30 AMthe main forces of the German troops as part of the tank divisions Leibstandarte Adolf Hitler, Das Reich and Totenkonf. numbering up to 500 tanks and self-propelled guns (including 42 Tiger tanks), went on the offensive in the direction of Art. Prokhorovka in the highway and railway zone. This grouping was supported by all available air forces. However, in the first phase of this offensive, only up to half of the armored forces available to the German troops were involved - one battalion each of the LSSAH and Das Reich divisions, two Tiger companies and one T-34 company, with a total of about 230 tanks. 70 assault guns and 39 Marder anti-tank self-propelled guns.

At 9:00After a 15-minute artillery barrage, the German group was in turn attacked by the main forces of the 5th Guards Tank Army. The 18th Tank Corps of General Bakharov broke into the Oktyabrsky state farm at high speed, and despite heavy losses, captured it. However, near the villages of Andreevka and Vasilyevka, he met an enemy tank group, which included 15 Tiger tanks and a battalion of assault guns. Two platoons of "Tigers" (H. Wendarf and M. Wittmann) opened fire on Soviet tanks from a standing position from a distance of 1000-1200 m. The assault guns, maneuvering, fired from short stops. Having lost about 40 tanks, units of the 18th. were able to capture Vasilyevka, but were unable to develop the offensive further and at 18 o’clock they went on the defensive. From their fire, the Germans lost one Tiger and seven assault guns burnt out, as well as three Tigers, six medium tanks and up to 10 self-propelled guns knocked out and damaged.

At approximately 11:30The 29th Panzer Corps began the battle for height 252.5, where it was met by tanks of the SS Division “Leibstandarte Adolf Hitler”. Throughout the day, the corps fought a maneuver battle, but after 16 hours it was pushed back by the approaching tanks of the SS Totenkopf division and, with the onset of darkness, went on the defensive.

At 14.30The 2nd Guards Tank Corps, advancing in the direction of Kalinin, suddenly encountered the advancing SS tank division Das Reich. Because. that the 29th Tank Corps was stuck in battles for height 252.5. The Germans struck the 2nd Guards Tank Corps on its exposed flank and forced it to retreat to its original position. During these battles, the 2nd Guards Tank Corps lost 24 of the 41 tanks brought into battle knocked out and damaged. Of these, 12 cars burned down.

The 2nd Tank Corps, which provided the junction between the 2nd Guards Tank Corps and the 29th Tank Corps, was able to somewhat push back the German units in front of it, but came under fire from assault and anti-tank guns pulled up from the second line, suffered losses and stopped.

12 a.m. German attack from the north.

By noon on July 12, it became clear to the German command that the frontal attack on Prokhorovka had failed. Then they decided, having crossed Psel, to go with part of their forces north of Prokhorovka to the rear of the 5th Guards Tank Army, for which the 11th Tank Division and the remaining units of the extra SS Totemkopf * tank (96 tanks and self-propelled guns. motorized infantry regiment, up to 200) were allocated MOTORCYCLISTS). The group broke through the battle formations of the 52nd Guards Rifle Division and by 1 p.m. captured height 226.6.

But on the northern slopes of the heights, the Germans ran into stubborn resistance from Colonel Lyakhov’s 95th Guards Rifle Division. The division was hastily reinforced with an anti-tank artillery reserve, consisting of one IPTAP and two separate DIVISIONS of captured guns (one division was equipped with 88 mm anti-aircraft guns). Until 6 p.m., the division successfully defended itself against advancing tanks. But at 20:00. After a massive air raid, due to the lack of ammunition and large losses of personnel, the division, under the attacks of approaching German motorized rifle units, retreated beyond the village of Polezhaev. Artillery reserves had already been deployed here and the German offensive was stopped.

The 5th Guards Army also failed to complete its assigned tasks. Faced with massive fire from German artillery and tanks, the infantry units advanced forward to a distance of 1-3 km, after which they went on the defensive. In the offensive zones of the 1st Tank Army, 6th Guards Army. The 69th Army and the 7th Guards Army also did not achieve decisive success.

From 13 to 15 JulyGerman units continued to conduct offensive operations, but by that time they had already lost the battle. On July 13, the Fuhrer informed the commanders of Army Group South (Field Marshal von Manstein) and Army Group Center (Field Marshal von Kluge) that he had decided to abandon the continuation of Operation Citadel. This decision was also influenced by the successful landing of the Allies in Sicily, which took place during the Battle of Kursk.

CONCLUSIONS:

The battles near Prokhorovka in the post-war years were declared “the largest tank battle of the Second World War.” At the same time, most authors, when describing it, agreed that “more than 1000 tanks came to hand-to-hand combat in a small field not far from Prokhorovka.” Today this field is even shown to passing tourists, but analysis of even domestic wartime documents proves that this legend correlates with them, to put it mildly, very roughly.

The so-called “tank battle near Prokhorovka did not take place on any separate field, as was commonly believed. The operation was carried out on a front with a length of more than 35 km (and taking into account the southern direction - even more) and consisted of a number of separate battles with the use of tanks by both sides. In total, according to estimates from the command of the Voronezh Front, 1,500 tanks and self-propelled guns from both sides took part here. Moreover, the 5th Guards Tank Army, operating in a zone with a length of 17-19 km, together with attached units, at the beginning of the battles, numbered from 680 to 720 tanks and self-propelled guns. and the German group - up to 540 tanks and self-propelled guns.

The main events here took place on July 12, which accounted for the maximum losses of equipment and personnel on both sides. In the battles of July 11-13, the Germans lost to the west and southwest of Prokhorovka, according to reports from the front command, about 320 tanks and assault guns (according to other sources - from 180 to 218) knocked out, abandoned and destroyed, the Kempf group - 80 tanks, and the 5th Guards Tank Army (excluding the losses of General Trufanov’s group) - 328 tanks and self-propelled guns (see table). For unknown reasons, the front's report does not contain accurate information about the losses of the 2nd Guards Tank Corps and the 2nd Tank Corps operating here, which are estimated at 55-70 vehicles damaged and destroyed. Despite the large concentration of tanks on both sides, the main losses were inflicted not by enemy tanks, but by enemy anti-tank and assault artillery.

The counterattack of the troops of the Voronezh Front did not end in the destruction of the wedged German group and therefore was considered a failure immediately after completion, but since it allowed the German offensive to bypass the city of Oboyan to Kursk to be thwarted, its results were later considered a success. In addition, it is necessary to take into account the fact that the number of German tanks participating in the battle and their losses, given in the report of the command of the Voronezh Front (commander N. Vatutin, member of the military council - N. Khrushchev), are very different from the reports of the commanders of the units subordinate to them . And from this we can conclude that the scale of the so-called “Prokhorov Battle” could have been greatly inflated by the front command. to justify the large losses of personnel and equipment of front units during the failed offensive.



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