Leningrad-Novgorod operation commanders. The first “Stalinist blow”: complete elimination of the siege of Leningrad

Strategic will come operation of the troops of Leningrad, Volkhov (until February 15), 2nd Baltic. fr. and Balt. fleet, held on January 14. - March 1 with the goal of defeating the Nazis. Army Group North, complete lifting of the blockade of Leningrad and liberation of Leningrad. region from the Nazi occupiers; part of the Battle of Leningrad 1941-44. To the beginning operations of the Leningrad army. (2nd Shock, 42nd, 67th A, 13th VA; Army General L.A. Govorov), Volkhovsky and 2nd Baltic. fr. (total 1.252 thousand people, 20.183 guns and mortars, 1580 tanks and self-propelled guns) occupied the defense on the Oranienbaum bridgehead, to the south. and southeast approaches to Leningrad, further along the Gontovaya Lipka line, lake. Ilmen, lake Nescherdo (southwest of Nevel). Sov. troops deeply covered the flanks of the opposing German fascists. Army Group North (18th and 16th A; a total of 44 divisions and 4 brigades; 741 thousand people, over 10 thousand guns and mortars, 385 tanks and assault guns, 370 aircraft; field general G. Küchler, from the end of January, General-Regiment V. Model). Pr-k, using the wooded and swampy terrain, in 2.5 years created a powerful defense near Leningrad and Novgorod, with its flanks resting on Fin. hall. and lake Ilmen (so-called Northern Wall). The total depth of the avenue's defense reached 230-260 km. All settlements and important railway junctions. and highways were turned into strongholds.

The idea of ​​the owls. command provided simultaneously. blows by Leningrad troops. and Volkhov fr. near Leningrad and Novgorod, defeat the 18th A, pinning down the troops of the 2nd Baltic States with active actions. fr. basic forces of the 16th A and operational. Army Group North reserves. Subsequently, the troops of three fronts were to, advancing in the Narva, Pskov and Idritsa directions, defeat the 16th A and complete the liberation of Leningrad. region and create conditions for the liberation of the Soviets. Baltic states. Balt. The fleet (Adm. V.F. Tributs) was tasked with supporting Leningrad with naval and coastal artillery fire and air strikes. fr. in breaking through the defense of pr. The offensive of the owls. In addition to front-line aviation, the troops from the air were to be supported by long-range aviation (Air Marshal A. E. Golovanov) and Leningrad aviation. air defense army (total 1386 aircraft). To participate in L.-N. O. Partisans were also involved (13 brigades, 35 thousand people in total).

12-14 Jan. formations of the 3rd Shock, 10th Guards. and 22nd A of the 2nd Balt. fr. They attacked the avenue in the Novosokolnikov region, where fierce battles broke out. 14 Jan Leningrad troops went on the offensive. and Volkhovsky fr., who played Ch. role in the operation. Leningrad troops. fr. with the support of naval and coastal artillery, Baltic aviation. fleet, long-range aviation and Leningrad. The air defense armies carried out the Krasnoselsko-Ropshinsky operation of 1944, as a result of which the Nazis were thrown back. troops from Leningrad to the south. and southwest directions at 60-100 km and towards the end. Jan. came out ch. forces to the river line Meadows. Troops of the Volkhov fr. During the Novgorod-Luga operation of 1944, by this time they had advanced 50-80 km from Novgorod to the west. and southwest directions. Through the joint efforts of the two fronts, Oktyabrskaya Railway was cleared from the avenue. 2nd Balt. fr. With the offensive in the Novosokolnikov region, he pinned down the 16th A Avenue and did not allow the transfer of its forces to Leningrad and Novgorod. 31 Jan - 15 Feb. Leningrad troops. and Volkhov fr., developing an offensive in the Narva and Luga directions, captured the Luga fortified strip of the avenue and, having advanced another 100-120 km, reached the river. Narva and to the east. shore of Lake Peipus Leningrad troops. fr., seizing a bridgehead to the west. bank of Narva, entered the territory. Est. SSR. Defeat of the German-Fasc. The 18th A created a threat to the flank and rear of the 16th A, which forced the Nazi command to withdraw its formations to the west. Due to the reduction of the front line, the Supreme High Command Headquarters February 15. abolished the Volkhov fr., transferring its connections to Leningrad. and 2nd Baltic. fr.

16 Feb - March 1, Leningrad troops. fr. by the forces of rights. wings expanded the bridgehead on the river. Narva, and the troops are a lion. The wing continued to pursue the aircraft in the Pskov and Ostrovsky directions. Ch. forces of the 2nd Baltic. fr. pursued the retreating formations of the 16th A. By the end of February. both fronts reached the Pskov-Ostrovsky fortified district of the avenue and south of it to the line Novorzhev, Pustoshka. March 1 Leningrad troops. and 2nd Baltic. fr. By order of the Headquarters, the Supreme High Command went on the defensive.

As a result, L.-N. O. owls The troops, having broken into the enemy's defenses at a front of up to 60 km, threw him back 220-280 km from Leningrad, and to the south of Lake. Ilmen - 180 km, completely lifted the blockade of Leningrad, liberated almost the entire Leningrad and part of the Kalinin region, entered the territory. Sov. Estonia, marking the beginning of the liberation of the Baltic states from the occupiers. republics The defeat of Army Group North (26 divisions were defeated, 3 divisions were completely destroyed) undermined the positions of the Nazis. Germany in Finland and other Scandinavian countries. For military distinctions, 180 formations and units received honorary names in honor of the cities they liberated; many formations and units were awarded orders.

Lit.: Kazakov M., Great victory near Leningrad, "VIZH", 1964, No. 1, Kozlov L., A crushing blow to the enemy, "VIZH", 1969, No. 1.

It was carried out with the aim of defeating the German Army Group North, completely lifting the blockade of Leningrad and liberating the Leningrad region by troops of the Leningrad, Volkhov and part of the forces of the 2nd Baltic Front. During the fighting, commands of the 3rd Shock, 10th Guards and 22nd armies, thirty divisions and six brigades were additionally introduced. As part of this operation, the Krasnoselsko-Ropshinskaya, Novgorodsko-Luga, Kingiseppsko-Gdovskaya and Starorussko-Novorzhevskaya frontal offensive operations were carried out.

Duration - 48 days. The width of the combat front is 600 km. The depth of advance of Soviet troops is 220-280 km. The average daily rate of advance is 5-6 km.

Composition of the opposing sides' troops

The Soviet troops prepared for the offensive were opposed by formations and units of the German Army Group North (commander Field Marshal G. Küchler, since the end of January - Colonel General V. Model). The defending German forces included the 18th and 16th armies, a total of 44 divisions and 4 brigades; 741 thousand people, over 10 thousand guns and mortars, 385 tanks and assault guns, 370 aircraft.

By the beginning of the operation, the front troops included:

Leningradsky (commander General of the Army L.A. Govorov) - 2nd shock, 42nd, 67th and 13th air armies;

Volkhovsky (commander General of the Army K.A. Meretskov) - 8th, 54th, 59th armies and 1st shock army (from February 2), 14th air army;

2nd Baltic (commander Army General M.M. Popov) - 1st shock (until February 2), 22nd, 6th Guards (until February 7), 3rd shock and 10th Guards (until January 26) army and the 15th Air Army.

In total, the group consisted of 822 thousand personnel, 20,183 guns and mortars, 1,580 tanks and self-propelled guns.

The Baltic Fleet (commanded by Admiral V.F. Tributs) was tasked with naval and coastal artillery fire and air strikes to assist the Leningrad Front in breaking through the enemy’s defenses.

The offensive of the Soviet troops from the air was supported, in addition to the front line, by long-range aviation (commander Marshal of Aviation A.E. Golovanov) and aviation of the Leningrad Air Defense Army (1386 aircraft in total).

Partisans also took part in the operation (13 brigades, 35 thousand people in total).

Progress of the operation

On January 12-14, 1944, formations of the 3rd Shock, 10th Guards and 22nd Armies of the 2nd Baltic Front attacked the enemy in the Novosokolniki area, where fierce fighting ensued.

On January 14, the troops of the Leningrad and Volkhov fronts went on the offensive. They played a major role in the operation. The troops of the Leningrad Front, with the support of naval and coastal artillery, aviation of the Baltic Fleet, long-range aviation and the Leningrad Air Defense Army, carried out the Krasnoselsko-Ropshinsky operation, as a result of which they pushed back enemy troops from Leningrad in the southern and south-western directions by 60-100 km and by the end January, the main forces reached the line of the Luga River.

During the Novgorod-Luga operation, troops of the Volkhov Front advanced 50-80 km from Novgorod in the western and southwestern directions. Through the joint efforts of the two fronts, the Oktyabrskaya Railway was cleared of the enemy.

The 2nd Baltic Front, with its offensive in the Novosokolniki area, pinned down the enemy's 16th Army and prevented the transfer of its forces to Leningrad and Novgorod.

In the period from January 31 to February 15, the troops of the Leningrad and Volkhov fronts, developing an offensive in the Narva and Luga directions, captured the enemy’s Luga fortified zone and, having advanced another 100-120 km, reached the Narva River and the eastern shore of Lake Peipsi. The troops of the Leningrad Front, having seized a bridgehead on the western bank of Narva, entered the territory of Estonia.

In connection with the reduction of the front line, the Supreme High Command Headquarters abolished the Volkhov Front on February 15, transferring its formations to the Leningrad and 2nd Baltic fronts.

From February 16 to March 1, the troops of the Leningrad Front expanded the bridgehead on the Narva River with the forces of the right wing, and the troops of the left wing continued to pursue the enemy in the Pskov and Ostrovsky directions. The main forces of the 2nd Baltic Front pursued the retreating formations of the enemy 16th Army.

By the end of February, both fronts reached the enemy’s Pskov-Ostrovsky fortified area and, south of it, to the Novorzhev, Pustoshka line.

On March 1, the troops of the Leningrad and 2nd Baltic fronts, by order of the Supreme High Command Headquarters, went on the defensive.

Combat strength, number of Soviet troops and casualties

Name of associations and terms of their participation in the operation	Combat composition and number of troops at the beginning of the operation		Casualties in the operation
	number of connections	number	irrevocable	sanitary	Total	daily average
Leningrad Front; without the 23rd Army (entire period)	sd - 30, sbr - 3, otbr - 4, ur - 3	417600	56564	170876	227440	4738
Volkhov Front (14.01.-15.02.44)	sd - 22, sbr - 6, otbr - 4, ur - 2	260000	12011	38289	50300	1524
1st Shock Army of the 2nd Baltic Front (14.0l.-10.02.44)	SD -5; sbr - 1	54900	1283	3759	5042
2nd Baltic, front (10.02.-1.03.44)			6659	23051	29710	1485
Baltic Fleet (entire period)		89600		1292	1461
Total	Divisions - 57, brigades - 18, UR-5	822100	76686 9,3%	237267	313953	6541

Results of the operation

During the offensive battles, Soviet troops inflicted a major defeat on the German Army Group North, completely lifted the blockade of Leningrad, liberated almost the entire Leningrad and Novgorod regions, the main part of the Kalinin region from the occupiers, and entered the territory of Estonia. The offensive of Soviet troops in the northwestern direction deprived the German command of the opportunity to use the forces of Army Group North to transfer to the south, where our Armed Forces delivered the main blow in the winter campaign.

The most favorable conditions for the complete defeat of the Nazi troops near Leningrad developed by the beginning of 1944. As a result of the victories of the Red Army in the Battles of Stalingrad and Kursk, in Left Bank Ukraine and the Donbass, in the Battle of the Dnieper, the German command could not pay due attention to the northwestern direction. Here, Soviet troops occupied an advantageous operational position, covering the enemy group near Leningrad and Novgorod. The position of Army Group North (16th and 18th German armies, commanded by Field Marshal G. Küchler), which suffered significant losses in the battles of 1943, significantly worsened. It was not possible to strengthen it either through strategic reserves or through the transfer of part of the forces from other army groups, constrained by the powerful offensive of Soviet troops in the western and southwestern directions. Moreover, starting in July 1943, the Wehrmacht high command replaced the seven most combat-ready infantry and one motorized divisions with weaker ones from other directions. Based on the current situation, the fascist German command was forced to set a purely defensive goal for Army Group North - to firmly hold its positions, continue the blockade of Leningrad, the occupation of the Baltic states and ports on the eastern coast of the Baltic Sea, and maintain interaction with the Finnish army.
Therefore, having begun the construction of defensive lines back in 1941, German troops continued to improve them. By the beginning of 1944, along a huge arc, with its flanks resting on Lake Ilmen and the Gulf of Finland, a powerful defense in depth, well equipped in engineering terms, was created, which enemy propaganda called the “Northern Wall”. Its basis was made up of strongholds and resistance nodes, saturated with a large number of artillery and machine-gun wood-earth, reinforced concrete and armored firing points. They were equipped in almost all populated areas, at important junctions of highways and railways, at dominant heights and had a developed system of main and cut-off positions, covered by fire, mines and wire barriers. Forest debris was widely used.
The enemy prepared two defense lines in the tactical zone and a number of intermediate lines in the operational depth. Between the Gulf of Finland and Lake Peipus along the Narva River, along the western shore of the lake and further in the area of ​​Pskov, Ostrov, Idritsa and further south along the Velikaya River, the rear defensive line “Panther” was hastily erected. The total depth of the prepared defense reached 230-260 km. The most powerful fortifications were created south of the Pulkovo Heights in the zone of the 42nd Army of the Leningrad Front and north of Novgorod in the zone of the 59th Army of the Volkhov Front.
Forested areas allowed the enemy to secretly concentrate forces and weapons in threatened areas. These same forests and numerous swamps, which hardly froze in the winter of 1943/44, made it possible to conduct a defense with rather limited forces. The German 16th Army, operating in the zone from Lake Ilmen to Pskov, had 21 divisions and one brigade. One division constituted the commander's reserve, the remaining divisions occupied the tactical defense zone. The operational density was 23 km per division. The troops of the 18th German Army defended north from Lake Ilmen to the Gulf of Finland. It consisted of 19 divisions and 3 brigades. All of its formations, with the exception of one infantry division - the reserve of the army commander, were also located in the tactical defense zone. The division accounted for an average of 17 km. The army included two special-purpose artillery groups (75 batteries of heavy and 65 batteries of light artillery), which systematically shelled Leningrad. The reserve of the commander of Army Group North had three security divisions and one field training division.
Assessing the general situation on the entire Soviet-German front and in the northwestern direction in particular, the Soviet Supreme High Command decided to conduct an operation with the goal of completely defeating the enemy group in the Leningrad and Novgorod region and finally lifting the blockade of Leningrad. Troops of three fronts were involved in the operation: Leningrad (commander - Army General L.A. Govorov), Volkhovsky (commander - Army General K.A. Meretskov) and part of the forces of the 2nd Baltic (commander - Army General M.M. Popov). The Red Banner Baltic Fleet (commander - Admiral V.F. Tributs), Ladoga (commander - Rear Admiral V.S. Cherokov) and Onega (commander - Captain 1st Rank N.V. Antonov) military flotillas, aviation were to participate in the operation long-range (commander - Air Marshal A. E. Golovanov) and partisan formations.
Given the complexity of the situation, the Soviet command took care of achieving overall superiority over the enemy. The Leningrad, Volkhov and 2nd Baltic fronts in December 1943 - January 1944 were replenished with personnel, weapons and military equipment. And although at that time a major offensive was unfolding in Right Bank Ukraine, the Supreme High Command Headquarters considered it possible to allocate part of the long-range aviation forces to help the fronts, as well as reinforce them with self-propelled artillery and engineering troops. Tank units and air armies were also replenished, and some were re-equipped with new equipment. The measures taken made it possible to create superiority over the enemy in personnel 1.7: 1 (1,241 thousand people versus 741 thousand), in guns and mortars 2: 1 (21,600 versus 10,070), in tanks and self-propelled guns 3.8: 1 (1475 versus 385) and for aircraft 4:1 (1500 versus 370).
The plan of the operation included coordinated simultaneous attacks by the Leningrad and Volkhov fronts to defeat the troops of the 18th German Army, and with the active actions of the 2nd Baltic Front to pin down the main forces of the 16th German Army and the operational reserves of Army Group North. Subsequently, the troops of the three interacting fronts were supposed to develop an offensive in the Narva, Pskov and Idritsa directions, defeat the troops of the 16th Army, complete the liberation of the Leningrad region and create conditions for the expulsion of the fascist occupiers from the Soviet Baltic states.
The main feature of the SVGK plan was that it was planned to deliver strikes not only from the outside, but also from inside the besieged city, as well as from the limited Oranienbaum bridgehead. This form of the operation turned out to be somewhat unexpected for the enemy, because the German command did not expect attacks of such force both from the city and from the bridgehead. Although it was not possible to achieve complete concealment of the plan for the upcoming offensive.
Due to a very long period of preparation for the operation (about four months, starting in September 1943), weak organization and unclear conduct of regroupings, poor camouflage of the areas of concentration of strike groups of the Leningrad and Volkhov fronts, the Nazis were able to reveal the plan of the Soviet command for the offensive operation near Leningrad. Back on December 12, 1943, the command of Army Group North noted: “Preparations for the offensive of the Volkhov and Leningrad fronts have long been discovered. The areas of Novgorod - Volkhov Front, the bridgehead in the Oranienbaum area and south of Leningrad - Leningrad Front are currently most clearly identified as the proposed areas of attack.” This circumstance allowed the German command to take a number of measures in advance. First of all, as the former chief of staff of the 18th Army, General F. Ferch, pointed out, the defense in the probable directions of attacks was significantly strengthened, a number of intermediate defensive strips and a rear defensive line were equipped, and a plan for the possible sequential withdrawal of troops to these strips was developed.
The loss of surprise affected both the pace of the offensive and the achieved, or rather, not fully achieved, results of the offensive. The German command failed to hold the occupied areas, but it was able to withdraw part of the forces of the 18th Army.
But this became known later. And in December 1943, the question of how to defeat the enemy near Leningrad was being decided. The superiority of Soviet troops in forces and means over the enemy created favorable preconditions for achieving success in the operation. However, the nature of the enemy’s defense, terrain conditions, and time of year required careful and comprehensive preparation, which had a number of features.
Firstly, the front commanders in their decisions sought to defeat the enemy piecemeal. Secondly, carry out operations to encircle the enemy. Thirdly, a low rate of attack was envisaged (4–5 km per day), hence the long duration of operations (25–30 days).
The commander of the Leningrad Front decided to break through the enemy’s defenses by striking two armies - the 2nd strike from the Oranienbaum bridgehead and the 42nd from the Pulkovo area - towards each other, with the goal of encircling and destroying the enemy group in the Ropsha, Krasnoe Selo, Strelna area. Subsequently, these armies will develop an offensive against Narva, Kingisepp, and in the Luga direction, attack with troops of the 67th Army.
The commander of the Volkhov Front decided to break through the enemy’s defenses with the forces of the 59th Army alone, but in two sectors - north and south of Novgorod, to encircle and destroy his Novgorod group. Subsequently, in cooperation with the troops of the left wing of the Leningrad Front, complete the defeat of the main forces of the 18th German Army. At the same time, at the beginning of the operation, the troops of the 8th and 54th armies were supposed to conduct pinning actions, and with the retreat of the enemy, proceed to pursue him in the Luga direction.
According to the decision of the commander of the 2nd Baltic Front, the troops of the 1st Shock, 22nd, 6th Guards and 3rd Shock armies were to defeat the enemy north of Nevel, and then advance on Idritsa.
The next feature of the preparation was planning the use of artillery. The experience of breaking through the blockade of Leningrad and subsequent battles in the summer of 1943, especially near Sinyavin, showed that for the success of an infantry attack it is not enough to gain fire superiority over the enemy and suppress his firing points, but it is also necessary to destroy trenches and communication lines in order to deprive the enemy of the opportunity to use them as for both combat and maneuver.
On the Leningrad Front, in order to solve the problem of breaking through the enemy’s defenses, 77% of the front’s cannon and 93% of the howitzer artillery, and all the rocket artillery, were concentrated in the breakthrough areas, which accounted for 16.7% of the total length of the front line. The density reached 180 in the 42nd Army, and 130 guns and mortars per 1 km of the breakthrough area in the 2nd Shock Army. To increase the number of artillery involved in defeating the ground enemy, even anti-aircraft artillery was brought in. Artillery support for the operation included a period of destruction of defensive structures lasting one day to a depth of 4 km; artillery preparation for an attack lasting 100 minutes in the 42nd Army and 65 minutes in the 2nd Shock Army; artillery support for the attack using the “creeping fire” method, a single barrage of fire and sequential concentration of fire; participation in breaking through the second defensive line; ensuring the entry of mobile army groups into battle.
Numerous artillery groups were created. For example, in the 42nd Army, artillery was distributed among eight groups. Close combat groups were created in the rifle regiments, which included 50-, 82- and 120-mm mortars of the regiments and infantry support groups at the rate of an artillery battalion for each first-echelon battalion. General purpose groups were created in the first echelon divisions. In the rifle corps, counter-mortar groups were created from howitzer artillery brigades of breakthrough artillery divisions and 120-mm mortar regiments. Directly in the army there were destruction groups created from heavy howitzer brigades and high-power brigades from the same breakthrough artillery divisions. In addition, long-range groups, guards mortar units and anti-aircraft artillery groups were created. Some of the latter's cannons were used to fire at ground targets.
Battalion, regimental and anti-tank artillery were supposed to operate with direct fire at a density of 28.5 guns per 1 km. 261 of the 492 guns had the task of making passages in the wire barriers, and the rest were to destroy and suppress 206 firing points on the front line of the enemy’s defense.
The coastal, railway and naval artillery of the Red Banner Baltic Fleet, consolidated into five groups, was involved in artillery support for the offensive of the 2nd Shock and 42nd Armies.
Captain 1st Rank L. E. Rodichev, at that time commander of the destroyer “Svirepy”, recalled that their ship was included in the second artillery group of the fleet, which included ships stationed on the Neva, or rather, frozen in its ice: battleship "October Revolution", cruisers "Kirov", "Maxim Gorky", "Tallinn", leader "Leningrad". To conduct accurate fire, a correction post was created near the front edge. Only on the first day of the operation that began, shells from 130-mm main-caliber guns destroyed two artillery batteries, destroyed the headquarters of an infantry regiment, and suppressed several long-term firing points. For such effective shooting, the commander of the destroyer and the commander of its artillery combat unit, Senior Lieutenant M. Ponomarev, were awarded the Order of the Red Banner.
In the Leningrad-Novgorod operation, mobile groups of tank troops began to be created for the first time. Breakthrough tank regiments and tank flamethrower battalions (about half of all tanks) were assigned to rifle divisions as direct infantry support tanks. Tank brigades remained at the disposal of corps commanders or army commanders to develop success in the depths of enemy defenses.
The troops of the 2nd Shock Army were transferred to the Oranienbaum bridgehead. The difficulties of the regrouping were the need to achieve secrecy, the impossibility of using large-capacity transport due to shallow water, the beginning of the formation of ice cover and the need to break through a navigable fairway in it. And all this is in the enemy’s observation zone and within the reach of his artillery. Despite this, the transport of troops was carried out without losses. Enemy batteries, as soon as they opened fire, were quickly suppressed by the artillery of the Kronstadt naval defensive region and the Leningrad naval base. In total, the ships delivered to the bridgehead about 53 thousand people, 2300 cars and tractors, 241 tanks and armored vehicles, 700 guns and mortars, 5800 tons of ammunition, 4 thousand horses and 14 thousand tons of cargo.
The Leningrad-Novgorod offensive operation took place in three stages. The first stage - from January 14 to 30 - the defeat of the flanks of the 18th German Army and the development of an offensive along the entire front. The second stage - from January 31 to February 15 - development of the offensive in the Narva and Luga directions, defeat of the Luga enemy group. The third stage - from February 15 to March 1 - the offensive of Soviet troops in the Pskov and Ostrovsky directions and the completion of the defeat of the main forces of the 18th Army.
In accordance with the developed plans, on January 10, the troops began to occupy their starting positions for the offensive. The infantry began to move out two days before the start of the offensive, the artillery took up firing positions at the same time, and the infantry support tank units took up wait-and-see positions the night before the attack. In the 59th Army of the Volkhov Front they had to be transported across the Volkhov River. On the night before the offensive, more than a hundred aircraft attacked an enemy artillery group in the Bezabotny area.
The offensive on the Leningrad Front began on January 14 (Krasnoselsko-Ropshinsky operation). After powerful artillery preparation, the troops of the 2nd Shock Army (commander - Lieutenant General I. I. Fedyuninsky) went on the offensive from the Oranienbaum bridgehead. In the zone of the 42nd Army (commander - Colonel General I. I. Maslennikov) on this day, artillery destroyed the most durable enemy defensive structures. The troops of the 42nd Army began the offensive on January 15. To mislead the enemy, artillery preparation was also carried out in the zone of the 67th Army, which was supposed to go into active action later.
As a result of the artillery preparation, the enemy suffered significant losses, and its fire system and control were disrupted. Aviation operations were very limited due to unfavorable weather conditions. And yet the enemy offered stubborn resistance.
During the first two days of the offensive, troops of the 2nd Shock Army broke through the main enemy defense line south of Oranienbaum and advanced 6 km. Troops of the 42nd Army with formations of the 30th Guards Rifle Corps (commander - Major General, from February 22 - Lieutenant General N.P. Simonyak) in a 5-kilometer sector during the first day of the offensive, penetrated into the enemy’s defenses south of Pulkovo by 4 km. The rest of the army corps were not successful.
Increasing efforts by bringing second echelons of corps into battle, the troops of the front strike group on January 16 continued to expand the breakthrough along the front and in depth. To break through the second line of defense, on January 17, mobile groups (two reinforced tank brigades) were introduced into the battle. The successful advance of the troops of the 2nd Shock and 42nd Armies threatened the enemy group located north of Ropsha and Krasnoe Selo. The command of the 18th Army, having used up all its reserves, was forced on January 17 to begin the withdrawal of its troops.
Pursuing the retreating enemy, the troops of the 2nd Shock Army liberated Ropsha on January 19, and the troops of the 42nd Army liberated Krasnoe Selo. By the end of January 19, mobile army groups united in the Russko-Vysotskoye area (south of Ropsha) and completed the encirclement of the remnants of the defeated enemy group. The lag of the rifle units from the mobile groups allowed the enemy troops to continue breaking out of the encirclement during the night of January 20, infiltrating in small groups. With the approach of rifle formations, the encirclement ring became denser, and on January 21, 1944, the encircled group was completely destroyed.
Already in the first battles near Leningrad, Soviet soldiers showed high skill, mass heroism and self-sacrifice. “Never before has the heroism of frontline soldiers been as universal and massive as in these battles,” noted the commander of the Leningrad Front, General L. A. Govorov. On the first day of the offensive near Pulkovo, a heroic feat was performed by junior lieutenant A.I. Volkov, who rushed to the bunker embrasure and, at the cost of his life, enabled his unit to complete the combat mission. The feat of A. I. Volkov was repeated in subsequent battles by Leningrader I. N. Kulikov, senior sergeant I. K. Skuridin, and Red Army soldier A. F. Tipanov.
On the night of January 21, the troops of the 67th Army (commander - Lieutenant General V.P. Sviridov) went on the offensive, pursuing the enemy, who had begun to withdraw troops from the Mginsky ledge. On the same day, they liberated the city and the large railway junction of Mga, which the Nazis called the “eastern castle” of the blockade of Leningrad.
Building on the success achieved, the armies of the Leningrad Front began advancing in the western and southwestern directions towards Kingisepp and Krasnogvardeysk (Gatchina). On January 22, the Nazis were able to shell Leningrad for the last time. Already on January 24, the cities of Pushkin and Slutsk (Pavlovsk) were liberated, and on January 26, Krasnogvardeysk was captured. With the fall of the Gatchina resistance center, the entire fascist German Northern Wall of defense collapsed. The siege of Leningrad was completely lifted. In honor of the complete liberation of Leningrad from the enemy blockade on January 27, 1944, a festive fireworks display thundered over the city - 24 salvos from 324 guns.
Moving forward, liberating the long-suffering native land, by January 30, the troops of the Leningrad Front, having advanced 70 - 100 km, reached the line of the Luga River in its lower reaches, and in some areas crossed it.
On the Volkhov Front, the 59th Army (commanded by Lieutenant General I.T. Korovnikov) launched an offensive on January 14, conducting the Novgorod-Luga operation. The main strike group, advancing from a bridgehead on the Volkhov River north of Novgorod, on the first day only managed to wedge into the enemy’s defenses to a depth of 600–1000 m. Such little progress is explained by the following reasons. Firstly, due to insufficiently clear planning, the tanks in direct support of the infantry were late in reaching the attack line. Secondly, due to poor engineering support for the advance, a significant part of them got stuck in swamps, fell into snow-covered craters and did not reach the front line of the enemy’s defense. Due to bad weather, the aviation of the 14th Army operated only with limited forces. In a number of formations, a significant gap was allowed between the end of the artillery preparation and the beginning of the attack. The first echelon formations of the 6th and 14th Rifle Corps attacked non-simultaneously.
Events developed much more successfully south of Lake Ilmen in the auxiliary direction. On the night of January 14, taking advantage of inclement weather, a group of Major General T. A. Sveklin (Deputy Commander of the 59th Army) consisting of the 58th separate rifle brigade and the 225th rifle division, reinforced by two snowmobile battalions, crossed the fragile ice crossed the lake. With a sudden night attack, they captured several enemy strongholds and by the end of January 14 they had created a bridgehead up to 6 km along the front and up to 4 km in depth. To develop success, the 372nd Infantry Division and an armored battalion from the second echelon were transferred to this bridgehead. To increase the efforts of the main strike group, the second echelon and mobile formations of the 6th Rifle Corps were brought into the battle.
On January 16, the troops of the 54th Army went on the offensive in the Lyuban direction, preventing the enemy command from transferring troops from Mga and Chudov to the breakthrough sites.
Advancing in a difficult wooded area with unfrozen swamps, breaking enemy resistance, the troops of the strike group managed to break through the enemy’s main defense line north of Novgorod in an area of ​​up to 20 km in three days of stubborn fighting. By this time, it was possible to break through the enemy’s defenses south of Novgorod. Advancing knee-deep in mud, carrying guns, mortars and ammunition on their hands, Soviet soldiers, having overcome all difficulties, broke the enemy’s resistance, and on January 20, both groups of the 59th Army united, surrounding the remnants of enemy units that did not have time to retreat. On the same day, Novgorod was liberated and the encircled enemy troops were liquidated. The troops of the Volkhov Front were able to develop an offensive on Luga in order to enter the retreat route of the enemy group, which was retreating to Pskov under the attacks of the troops of the Leningrad Front.
From January 21, the armies of the front's right wing began pursuing the retreating enemy. The army's offensive line expanded more and more, as the corps moved in diverging directions. Troop control has become more complicated. In order to improve control, the field control of the 8th Army was transferred from the right to the left wing of the front. Having transferred its formations to the 54th Army, it took over part of the formations and the offensive zone on the left flank of the 59th Army. Thus, all the armies of the Volkhov Front - the 54th, 59th and 8th - attacked Luga. The enemy managed to withdraw his troops to previously prepared rear positions along the Luga River. Pursuing the retreating enemy, the troops of the Volkhov Front reached the Luga defensive line by January 30, completing the first stage of the strategic operation.
Thus, the troops of the Leningrad and Volkhov fronts at the first stage of the operation solved the most difficult problems: they broke through the prepared defenses of the enemy, who knew about the impending offensive and took the necessary measures to repel it, advanced 30–90 km, inflicted a heavy defeat on his 12 divisions, and completely liberated Leningrad from the siege. The conditions were created for the final defeat of the 18th Army.

Veliky Novgorod was abandoned by Soviet troops on August 19, 1941. The path to the desired victory was long and difficult. The German occupation lasted 883 days. The most important part of the strategic Leningrad-Novgorod offensive operation was the Novgorod-Luga operation, which began on January 14. It was carried out by the Volkhov Front in full force and part of the forces of the Leningrad Front. On January 20, 1944, soldiers of the Red Army hoisted a red banner on the ancient Kremlin wall of Novgorod. In the Soviet capital, a fireworks display was given in honor of the liberation of the ancient Russian city.

On January 14, 1944, simultaneously with the troops of the Leningrad Front, the 59th Army of the Volkhov Front went on the offensive. Thus began the Novgorod-Luga offensive operation. The 59th Army under the command of Ivan Korovnikov received the task of defeating the German group in the Novgorod region and liberating Novgorod and the Oktyabrskaya Railway. The army struck with the forces of two groups in directions converging on Lyuboliady. The main forces advanced from a bridgehead on the left bank of the Volkhov, 30 kilometers north of Novgorod, and auxiliary forces - in the area of ​​Lake Ilmen, south of Novgorod. Subsequently, after the liberation of Novgorod, it was planned to develop success in the western and southwestern directions, capture the city of Luga and cut off the Nazis’ retreat towards Pskov. The 8th and 54th armies of the Volkhov Front were supposed to distract the enemy in the Tosno and Lyuban directions so that the Germans could not transfer them to help the Novgorod group.

The Soviet troops were opposed by units of the 38th, 26th and 28th Army Corps of the 18th German Army (6 infantry divisions and 2 infantry brigades, 3 airfield divisions). The Germans relied on a network of strong resistance centers, among which Novgorod, Chudovo, Lyuban, Tosno, Mga and Luga stood out. In the direction of the main attack of the Red Army, the Germans had two defensive lines: the main one along the Novgorod-Chudovo highway, the second along the Kerest River. In addition, the city itself was directly protected by three defensive lines. In Novgorod itself, many stone buildings were turned into long-term firing points.

German PzKpfw IV tank moves into position, Army Group North, February 1944.

At the beginning of the operation, the Volkhov Front numbered about 298 thousand people (according to other sources, about 260 thousand people). The 59th Army, which played the main role in the offensive, numbered about 135 thousand people, the 8th Army - 45 thousand people, the 54th Army - 67 thousand people, the 14th Air Army - more than 16 thousand people, more than 33 thousand people were in formations of front-line subordination. The VF had 3,633 guns and mortars, about 400 tanks and self-propelled guns, and 257 aircraft.

On the first day of the offensive, Korovnikov's 59th Army did not achieve noticeable success. The Germans, relying on a powerful defense, desperately fought back. In addition, snowfall and blizzards excluded aviation support, and made artillery assistance ineffective. The armored vehicles were stopped by the swamps. Soviet troops advanced only 600-1000 meters. The auxiliary, “southern group” of the 59th Army under the command of Major General T. A. Sviklin advanced more successfully. Soviet soldiers were able to cross the ice of Lake Ilmen at night and, with a surprise attack, captured a number of enemy strongholds and occupied a bridgehead.

The German command, fearing encirclement of the Novgorod group, sent additional forces to this area (units of the 290th and 24th infantry divisions, and the Nord cavalry regiment).

The commander of the 59th Army, in order to increase the strength of the attacks, introduced additional forces from the second echelon in the northern and southern directions. As a result of fierce battles on January 15-16, the Red Army broke through the enemy's main defense line. The Novgorod - Chudovo railway was cut. In the following days, the troops of the 59th Army continued their slow advance. On January 18, the southern group cut the highway and railway Novgorod - Shimsk. On January 20, units of the northern group reached the Novgorod-Batetsky railway. The resistance of the German troops was strong, so the pace of the offensive was low - 5-6 km per day. It is also necessary to take into account the factor of off-road conditions and wooded and swampy areas. This did not allow the Novgorod enemy group to be encircled in a short time. The German command retained the ability to maneuver reserves and transfer troops from unattacked sectors of the front.

The German command, trying to rectify the situation, transferred new troops - units of the 21st, 121st Infantry and 8th Jaeger Divisions and some other units. However, the situation could not be saved. To avoid encirclement of units of the 38th Army Corps, the commander of the 18th Army Lindeman gave the order to leave Novgorod. The Germans, abandoning their heavy weapons, retreated towards Batetsky. On the morning of January 20, Soviet troops occupied Novgorod without a fight.

The Novgorod group - formations of the 28th Jaeger, 1st Air Field Divisions and the SS Cavalry Regiment "Nord" - was unable to leave. Two groups of the 59th Soviet Army have already united. Having repelled all attempts to break out of the encirclement, as well as German attacks from outside the ring, parts of Korovnikov’s army, together with the 7th Rifle Corps from the front reserve, destroyed scattered enemy groups in the forests west of Novgorod. About 3 thousand Germans were captured.

On January 16, 1944, the 54th Army under the command of Sergei Roginsky went on the offensive in the Chudovo-Luban direction. It pinned down units of the 26th and 28th German Army Corps. Fierce fighting raged for several days. Roginsky's army was able to advance only 5 km. The German command ordered to hold the area of ​​Chudovo and Lyuban at any cost, since important communications passed here - the Oktyabrskaya Railway and the Leningrad-Moscow highway. The Mga group was retreating to this area; the intermediate defense line “Avtobahn” passed here.

On January 21, the 8th Army of the Volkhov Front liberated Mga. The retreat of German troops from the Mginsk-Sinyavinsky ledge forced the Soviet command to adjust their plans. The 67th Army of the Leningrad Front and the troops of the Volkhov Front received the task of liberating the area of ​​the Oktyabrskaya Railway and Krasnogvardeysk. On January 22, the Military Council of the VF presented to Headquarters a plan for the development of the operation. Units of the 59th Army were to liberate Luga, and troops of the 8th and 54th Armies were to liberate the Tosno and Lyuban area. The 54th Army was strengthened by units of the 8th and 67th armies and front reserves. Fierce fighting lasted for several days. Only on January 26 did Soviet troops take Tosno, on January 28 did they liberate Lyuban and on January 29 did they liberate Chudovo. The Oktyabrskaya Railway and Leningradskoe Highway were cleared of the enemy.

By the end of January, the troops of the Volkhov Front, having overcome 60-100 km with heavy fighting, reached the Luga River. However, the German command was able to quickly strengthen its forces in the Luga area and gain a foothold on a previously prepared line. The Germans also transferred the 12th Panzer Division here.

On January 31, units of the 2nd Shock Army of the Leningrad Front crossed Luga and began the assault on Kingisepp. On February 1, Kingisepp was released. Developing success, the army captured small bridgeheads on the left bank of the river. Narva. By January 27, 1944, the 42nd Army of the Leningrad Front reached the Luga line. Having crossed the river, the army took Gdov on February 4 and reached Lake Peipsi.

The main task of the Volkhov Front was still the liberation of Luga. The 59th and 8th armies attacked the city from the east, and the 54th army from the northeast. The Soviet offensive on Luga developed slowly. The German command gathered all available forces and reserves of the 18th and 16th armies in the area of ​​Pskov and Luga. The commander of Army Group North, Walter Model, gave the order to hold this area at any cost. Model was appointed commander of Army Group North on 31 January, replacing Georg von Küchler, who began a general retreat despite Adolf Hitler's outright prohibition. As a result, Soviet troops were able to liberate Luga only on February 12.

Due to the fact that the troops of the Volkhov Front were unable to solve the problem of capturing the Luga knot of enemy resistance, the front was disbanded. On February 13, 1944, the Headquarters transferred the 54th, 59th and 8th armies to the Leningrad Front, the 1st Shock Army (it was part of the VF from February 2 to 15) to the 2nd Baltic Front. The front control was transferred to the reserve of the Supreme Command Headquarters.

Thus, during the Novgorod-Luga operation, Soviet troops won a victory, which largely predetermined the success of the entire Leningrad-Novgorod strategic offensive operation (the first “Stalinist strike”). By February 15, the troops of the Volkhov Front and the LF army had pushed the enemy back 50-120 km and reached the southern coast of Lake Peipsi. 779 cities and towns were liberated, including Novgorod and Luga. The liberation of such strategic communications as the Oktyabrskaya Railway and Leningradskoe Highway was of great importance.

German troops were unable to cling to the Luga line, establishing a new front line between the Ilmen and Peipsi lakes. The German command had to withdraw troops to the Panther line of defense.

But the Red Army’s offensive did not develop as rapidly as originally planned. It was not possible to capture Luga in a short time and only with the forces of the VF. To solve this problem it was necessary to attract the forces of the 42nd and 67th armies of the Leningrad Front. This weakened the onslaught of the Leningrad Front in the Narva region. Therefore, although the German 18th Army was defeated, it was still not completely defeated and retained its combat effectiveness. As a result, this did not allow the Soviet armies to defeat the main forces of Army Group North by the spring of 1944, break through the Panther Line and begin to liberate Estonia and Latvia.

Destruction of Novgorod

During the occupation, the Nazis almost completely destroyed the city. Of the 2,346 residential buildings existing in Novgorod before the war, only 40 remained. Almost all industrial enterprises were destroyed, including a foundry, mechanical, ship repair, two brick and tile factories and a sawmill. A shipyard, a railway depot, a meat processing plant, a bread plant, a shoe and furniture factory were also destroyed. The Nazis destroyed the city infrastructure: water supply, water and water pumping stations, telephone exchange, post office, telegraph, radio center and electrical facilities. The Germans attacked scientific, educational and cultural institutions. Before the war, Veliky Novgorod was a major Soviet scientific and cultural center. The Nazis destroyed the museum building and its art gallery; they robbed a scientific library, a photo library containing rare data and a bibliographic card file of a branch of the Institute of the USSR Academy of Sciences; They burned a pedagogical institute, technical schools, a pedagogical school, medical schools, 3 hospitals, a maternity hospital, a children's clinic, the main building of a psychiatric hospital, the House of the Red Army, a city theater, 2 cinemas, 5 clubs, etc. According to the data of the Extraordinary Commission on the atrocities of the fascist invaders, material damage to the city amounted to more than 11 billion rubles.

Painting “Flight of the Nazis from Novgorod”, Kukryniksy, 1944-1946.

Many unique sights and monuments were completely destroyed or severely damaged. From the Novgorod museum, which was not evacuated in time, valuable collections on the history of archeology and art were stolen. The destruction and losses were so great that they became an irreparable loss of part of Russian national culture. St. George's Cathedral, built at the beginning of the 12th century, was badly damaged. St. Sophia Cathedral, built in the 11th century and being one of the oldest monuments of Russian architecture, a treasure of Russian culture, which had frescoes and icons of the 12th century, was destroyed. The interior of the cathedral was looted. The Church of the Annunciation on Arkazh of the 12th century, with frescoes of the same century, was turned into a pillbox and a barracks building. The church was badly damaged. The Church of the Assumption on Volotovo Field, a monument of northern Russian architecture of the 14th-15th centuries, was turned into a pile of rubble. The Church of the Transfiguration on Ilyin Street, a monument of 14th-century Novgorod architecture, also famous for its paintings by the great master Theophan the Greek, was badly damaged. Most of the frescoes were destroyed, and the remaining ones were damaged. The Church of the Savior-Nereditsa, a monument of ancient Russian art of the 12th century, famous for Byzantine and Russian painting, was barbarically destroyed. The Novgorod Kremlin, its towers and internal structures were badly damaged. By order of the commander of the 18th German Army, Colonel General Lindemann, the Nazis dismantled and prepared the monument to the 1000th anniversary of Russia for sending to the German Empire. The monument was dismantled, many unique sculptural images of the most prominent Russian state, military, public and cultural figures were destroyed.

The Soviet government paid special attention to the restoration of Veliky Novgorod. On November 1, 1945, the city was included in the list of fifteen settlements that were subject to priority restoration. Particular attention was paid to the restoration and restoration of historical monuments. One of the first to be restored was the “Millennium of Russia” monument, erected in Veliky Novgorod in 1862 in honor of the millennium of Russian statehood. Already on November 5, 1944, the second grand opening of the monument took place.

Captured German soldiers on the streets of Leningrad

	Leningrad and Kalinin regions of the RSFSR, eastern part of Estonia.
	Victory of the Red Army
Opponents
	Germany
Commanders
L. A. Govorov	Georg von Küchler
K. A. Meretskov	Walter Model
V. F. Tributs
M. M. Popov
Strengths of the parties
Leningrad, Volkhov, 2nd Baltic Fronts and the Red Banner Baltic Fleet - a total of 1,252,000 people (according to other sources, about 900,000 soldiers and officers).	The 16th and 18th armies of Army Group North - about 500,000 people in total.
76,686 killed and missing. Total: 313,953 soldiers	From 01/01/44 to 02/28/44 Army Group “North” killed 13,410, wounded: 52,237, missing 11,329, total 76,976. According to Soviet data, in just one month of fighting, more than 90,000 killed, 7,200 prisoners and 464 tanks

(January 14 - March 1, 1944) - a strategic offensive operation of the Soviet troops of the Leningrad, Volkhov and 2nd Baltic fronts, carried out in cooperation with the Baltic Fleet and long-range aviation, with the aim of defeating the German Army Group North, completely lifting the blockade of Leningrad and liberation of the Leningrad region.

As a result of the operation, Soviet troops inflicted a heavy defeat on the 16th and 18th German armies, threw the enemy back from Leningrad by 220-280 kilometers, and south of Lake Ilmen by 180 kilometers, almost completely liberated the Leningrad region, the western part of the Kalinin region and entered the territory of Estonia.

Strengths of the parties

USSR

Leningrad Front- Commander: Army General L. A. Govorov, Chief of Staff Lieutenant General D. N. Gusev:

• 2nd Shock Army - Commander: Lieutenant General I. I. Fedyuninsky.
• 42nd Army - Commander: Colonel General I. I. Maslennikov, from March 14 to 24 V. Z. Romanovsky, from the end of March - V. P. Sviridov.
• 67th Army - Commander: Lieutenant General V.P. Sviridov, from the end of March - Lieutenant General V.Z. Romanovsky.
• 13th Air Army - Commander: Aviation Colonel General S. D. Rybalchenko.

Volkhov Front(from 02/15/1944 - disbanded) - commander: Army General K. A. Meretskov, chief of staff, Lieutenant General F. P. Ozerov:

• 54th Army - Commander: Lieutenant General S.V. Roginsky.
• 8th Army - Commander: Lieutenant General F.N. Starikov.
• 59th Army - Commander: Lieutenant General I.T. Korovnikov.
• 14th Air Army (since the end of February - in the reserve of the Supreme Command Headquarters) - commander: Lieutenant General of Aviation I.P. Zhuravlev.

2nd Baltic Front- Commander: Army General M. M. Popov, Chief of Staff Lieutenant General L. M. Sandalov.

• 1st Shock Army (from 02/02/1944 to 02/15/1944 - as part of the Volkhov Front) - commander: Lieutenant General G.P. Korotkov, from April 1, com. Colonel General N. E. Chibisov.
• 3rd Shock Army - Commander: Colonel General N. E. Chibisov, from April 1, com. Lieutenant General V. A. Yushkevich.
• 22nd Army - Commander: Lieutenant General V.A. Yushkevich, from April 1, com. G. P. Korotkov.
• 6th Guards Army (as part of the front - until February 6) - commander: Colonel General I.M. Chistyakov.
• 10th Guards Army - Commander: Lieutenant General A.V. Sukhomlin, since January 21, Lieutenant General M.I. Kazakov.
• 15th Air Army - Commander: Aviation Lieutenant General N. F. Naumenko.

Baltic Fleet- Commander: Admiral V.F. Tributs.

Long-range aviation- Commander: Air Marshal A. E. Golovanov.

Germany

Army Group North- Commander: Field Marshal Georg von Küchler, from February 1, Colonel General Walter Model, from the end of March - Cavalry General Georg Lindemann.

• 18th Army - Commander: Cavalry General Georg Lindemann, from the end of March - Artillery General Herbert Loch: 3rd SS Panzer Corps, 26th, 28th, 38th, 50th, 54th Army Corps.
• 16th Army - Commander: Colonel General H. Hansen: 1st, 2nd, 8th, 10th, 43rd Army Corps and 6th SS Corps.
• 1st Air Fleet - Commander: General K. Pflugbeil.

Front-line operations as part of a strategic operation

• Krasnoselsko-Ropshinskaya (14.01.-30.01.1944) - Leningrad Front;
• Novgorod-Luga (14.01-15.02.1944) - Volkhov Front;
• Kingiseppsko-Gdovskaya (01.02-01.03.1944) - Leningrad Front;
• Starorussko-Novorzhevskaya (02/18-03/01/1944) - 2nd Baltic Front.

In German historiography, the fighting of Army Group North in the period from February 2 to August 10, 1944 is referred to as the “battle for the Narva bridgehead” (German. Schlacht um den Brückenkopf von Narva).

The situation before the start of the operation

In 1943, as a result of a series of operations, Soviet troops, breaking through the blockade, seized the initiative in the northwestern direction, but failed to completely liberate Leningrad from the enemy siege.

In the fall of 1943, after the victory in the Battle of Kursk, the Supreme Command Headquarters outlined a series of major strategic offensive operations with the goal of completely liberating Soviet territory. It was also planned to launch a large-scale offensive in the North-Western direction. The goals of this operation, which was supposed to involve the troops of the Leningrad, Volkhov, North-Western, Kalinin and Western fronts, were the defeat of the German Army Group North and the liberation of the Baltic states. The offensive of the Leningrad and Volkhov fronts, which were faced with the task of completely liberating Leningrad from the enemy blockade, was to become part of this strategic plan.

Realizing that the general situation on the Eastern Front was not in favor of the German troops and it would be extremely difficult to repel the next offensive of the Soviet troops, the command of Army Group North in the fall of 1943 began developing a plan for retreat to new defensive positions. At the turn of the Narva River - Lake Peipus - Pskov - Ostrov - Idritsa, a powerful defense line was built, which received the name “Panther”. The command of Army Group North planned to retreat from Leningrad in several stages from mid-January to spring 1944. For this purpose, a number of intermediate defense lines were prepared in the depths of the 18th Army’s defense (Avtostrada, Oredezhskaya, Ingermanlandskaya, Luzhskaya, etc. lines).

However, the continuation of the blockade was of great importance for Germany, since it made it possible to continue to pin down significant forces of Soviet troops and the Baltic Fleet, firmly cover the approaches to the Baltic states and its naval bases, maintain freedom of action for the German fleet in the Baltic Sea and ensure sea communications with Sweden and Finland .

For this reason, at the end of 1943, Army Group North was ordered to continue the siege of Leningrad. In addition, A. Hitler believed that the Soviet troops did not have enough forces for a large-scale operation near Leningrad, and the commander of the 18th Army G. Lindemann assured him that the troops would be able to repel a new Soviet offensive.

Leningrad offensive plan

In early September, the Military Councils of the Leningrad and Volkhov Fronts began developing plans for a large-scale joint offensive, which were presented at meetings at the Supreme Command Headquarters on September 9 and 14.

It was planned to conduct two operations with the goals of defeating the flank groups of the 18th German Army, encircling the main enemy forces and preventing their withdrawal to new defensive lines.

According to the proposals of the Military Council of the Leningrad Front, the main blow was to be delivered by the 42nd Army from the Pulkovo area and the Primorsky operational group from the Oranienbaum bridgehead in the general direction of Krasnoye Selo, where it was supposed to unite and form a common front. Subsequently, after the 67th Army went on the offensive, it was planned to liberate Krasnogvardeysk and continue the offensive in the directions to Luga and Kingisepp.

The Military Council of the Volkhov Front planned to deliver the main blow from the Novgorod region in the direction of Luga, where it was planned to link up with the troops of the Leningrad Front and thus encircle the main forces of the 18th Army. In the future, it was planned to develop an offensive against Pskov and Ostrov.

Considering that, according to intelligence information in the fall of 1943, the German troops of the 18th Army were preparing to retreat to new defensive lines, the Leningrad, Volkhov and Northwestern Fronts were ordered to be ready, if necessary, to immediately go on the offensive in order to pursue the enemy and prevent his organized departure. Subsequently, the Soviet command, taking into account the possibility of such a development of events, developed two versions of the offensive plan. According to the first option, codenamed “Neva-1,” Soviet troops near Leningrad were supposed to constantly probe the enemy’s defenses, actively conduct reconnaissance and immediately begin pursuing the enemy in the event of his withdrawal. The second version of the plan, called Neva-2, was developed taking into account the fact that German troops would continue to hold their positions.

Encirclement plan for Army Group North

Preparations for the offensive of the troops of the Leningrad and Volkhov fronts began at the very beginning of September 1943. At the same time, the Supreme High Command Headquarters and the General Staff were preparing a plan for a larger-scale operation with the main attack on the southern and south-eastern approaches to the Baltic States with the aim of encircling the entire Army Group North. The implementation of this plan would greatly facilitate the task of Soviet troops in the battles to liberate Leningrad from the enemy blockade.

Taking into account the possibility of the retreat of the 18th German Army to the Panther Line, in October 1943 it was decided to conduct an operation at the junction of the German Army Groups North and Center in order to cut off German troops in the North-Western direction from the rest of the enemy forces in land and from the territory of East Prussia. The newly formed Baltic Front was given the task of attacking in the Idritsa direction, and the troops of the Kalinin Front were tasked with attacking Vitebsk. Directive of the Supreme Command Headquarters No. 30218 of October 8, 1943 stated in particular:

At the same time, orders were given to prepare for an offensive by the troops of the Northwestern Front in the direction of Dno - Pskov, and the Volkhov Front was to strike at Novgorod, and then at Luga. Ultimately, it was planned, through the joint efforts of several fronts, to destroy the entire Army Group North piece by piece and liberate the Leningrad region, Estonia and Latvia.

However, the offensive of the Kalinin (Nevelskaya operation) and Baltic fronts achieved only local successes and did not receive further development. On October 20, 1943, the Kalinin and Baltic fronts were renamed the 1st and 2nd Baltic fronts (the Northwestern Front was disbanded), which until the end of 1943 fought in the Vitebsk and Idritsa directions. The Soviet command hoped that after regroupings and significant reinforcement, the troops of the two fronts would still be able to capture Gorodok and Vitebsk, and then rush to Polotsk, Dvinsk, and Riga. Despite some successes (the Gorodok operation), it was not possible to implement the plan of the Supreme Command Headquarters and the General Staff. Soviet troops were never able to defeat the enemy in this direction and create an advantageous operational position for subsequent offensive actions.

The final plan of the Leningrad-Novgorod operation

At the end of 1943, when it became completely clear that it was not possible to implement the large-scale plan for encircling Army Group North, the Soviet command decided to launch the main attack in the North-Western direction near Leningrad, especially since the offensive plan for the Leningrad and Volkhov fronts had long been developed and the troops systematically prepared for its implementation. The Soviet command hoped that the liquidation of the blockade of Leningrad would finally change the situation in the Baltic direction in favor of the Soviet troops.

The Supreme Command Headquarters decided, along with the Leningrad and Volkhov fronts, to involve the 2nd Baltic Front in the upcoming operation. The troops of this front were tasked with defeating the enemy in the Nevel area, and then, developing an offensive towards Idritsa and north of Novosokolniki, cutting off the enemy’s main communications, pinning down the main forces of the 16th Army and preventing their transfer to reinforce the 18th Army. Subsequently, it was planned to launch an offensive in the direction of Opochka and Sebezh. If the offensive in the Idritsa direction against the 16th German Army was successful, it would be possible to encircle the entire Army Group North and end the operation with the liberation of Latvia and Estonia.

Thus, according to the final plan of the Soviet command, the troops of the Volkhov and Leningrad fronts at the first stage of the operation were supposed to defeat the enemy’s 18th Army, and the 2nd Baltic Front was supposed to pin down the forces of the 16th Army and the operational reserves of Army Group North through active actions. . Subsequently, troops of three fronts, advancing in the Narva, Pskov and Idritsa directions, were supposed to defeat the 16th German Army, complete the liberation of the Leningrad region and create conditions for a further offensive in the Baltic states.

Balance of power

USSR

At the beginning of 1944, German troops, without having begun to retreat to the Panther Line, continued to firmly hold the defenses near Leningrad, relying on a powerful defensive system that had been improved for more than two years. Under these conditions, Soviet troops could achieve success only by concentrating forces and means in narrow areas of breaking through enemy defenses and carefully planning the operation. Since the troops of Leningrad and Volkhov had more than four months to prepare the operation, by the beginning of 1944 they managed to create a significant superiority over the enemy in manpower and equipment.

Troops Leningrad Front occupied defenses around Leningrad from the Gulf of Finland to the Neva, as well as on the Oranienbaum bridgehead (where the transfer of the 2nd Shock Army began in the fall of 1943) and along the southern coast of Lake Ladoga from Moscow Dubrovka to Gontovaya Lipka. Before the start of the operation, the 2nd shock, 42nd, 67th armies included 30 rifle divisions, 3 rifle brigades, 4 tank brigades and 3 fortified areas, as well as a large number of artillery and engineering units with a total number of 417,600 soldiers and officers. In addition, the units and subunits of the Baltic Fleet, which was tasked with supporting the offensive of the front forces, numbered 89,600 people.

Troops Volkhov Front occupied the line from Gontovaya Lipka to Lezno, and then along the Volkhov River to Lake Ilmen. By the time the operation began, the 59th, 8th and 54th armies included 22 rifle divisions, 6 rifle brigades, 4 tank brigades, 14 tank and self-propelled artillery regiments and battalions, 2 fortified areas, as well as a large number of artillery and mortar formations - a total of about 260,000 soldiers and officers (according to other sources, 297,860 people).

By the beginning of 1944, troops 2nd Baltic Front occupied the line from Lake Ilmen to Lake Nescherda. The 6th, 10th Guards, 1st, 3rd Shock and 22nd armies included 45 rifle divisions, 3 rifle brigades, 4 tank brigades, 1 fortified area, as well as artillery and engineering units. The 1st Shock Army alone consisted of 54,900 soldiers and officers.

In total, Soviet troops before the start of the operation numbered 1,252,000 people (according to other sources, about 900,000 soldiers and officers), 20,183 guns and mortars, 1,580 tanks and self-propelled guns. Air support for the upcoming offensive was to be provided by the 13th (including aviation of the Baltic Fleet and the Leningrad Air Defense Army), 14th and 15th Air Armies - a total of 1,386 aircraft, including 330 long-range aviation aircraft.

For the first time, numerous partisan formations were supposed to actively support the offensive of regular units in the northwestern direction. In the Leningrad region alone, there were 13 partisan brigades with a total number of about 35,000 fighters and commanders, who were tasked with “expanding centers of popular uprisings”, “destroying local governing bodies of the occupation authorities”, “saving the population from extermination and deportation to Germany”, intensifying military operations on enemy highways and railway communications.

Germany

The troops of the Leningrad and Volkhov fronts were opposed by the 18th German Army, and the troops of the 2nd Baltic Front were opposed by the 16th Army.

The 18th Army, which occupied the defense near Leningrad from the Gulf of Finland to Lake Ilmen, consisted of 19 divisions and 3 brigades consisting of 6 army corps. Occupying the lines from Lake Ilmen to Nevel, the 16th German Army consisted of 21 divisions and 1 brigade consisting of 5 army corps.

According to Soviet data, the entire Army Group North consisted of 741,000 soldiers and officers, 10,070 guns and mortars, 385 tanks and self-propelled guns, as well as 370 aircraft of the 1st Air Fleet.

According to German sources, on October 14, 1943, Army Group North consisted of 601,000 people, 146 tanks, 2,389 field guns (not counting anti-tank and mortars).

Progress of hostilities, January 1944

Advance of the Leningrad Front

On January 14, units of the 2nd Shock Army were the first to attack the enemy from the Oranienbaum bridgehead, and a day later the troops of the 42nd Army joined the offensive, striking from the Pulkovo area. Both Soviet armies advanced in the general direction towards Krasnoe Selo and Ropsha.

In the first days of the offensive, Soviet troops achieved only minor successes, meeting stubborn resistance from German troops of the 3rd SS Panzer Corps and the 50th Army Corps. Despite this, the formations of the two armies, gradually introducing additional forces into battle, stubbornly advanced towards each other and by January 20 united in the Ropsha area. The German units that did not have time to retreat were destroyed or captured.

On January 21, German units of the 26th Army Corps in the Mgi area, fearing encirclement, began to retreat to an intermediate defensive line on the railway line and the Leningrad-Moscow highway (Avtostrada line). Having discovered the enemy's retreat, the 67th Army of the Leningrad Front and the 8th Army of the Volkhov Front launched an offensive and by the evening of January 21 took Mga, and soon completely took control of the Kirov Railway. However, it was not immediately possible to develop an offensive in this area. German troops gained a foothold at the temporary line and put up fierce resistance.

The retreat of German troops from the Mga area forced the command of the Leningrad Front to somewhat change the plan for the further offensive and abandon the operation to encircle the enemy group in Mga. The main task of the front, according to the adjusted plan, was the capture of Krasnogvardeysk. Then it was planned to deliver the main blow in the direction of Kingisepp and Narva with the forces of the 2nd Shock and 42nd Army. At the same time, the 67th Army, in cooperation with the troops of the Volkhov Front, was supposed to take control of the Oktyabrskaya Railway and then facilitate the attack on Krasnogvardeysk.

Continuing the offensive, the troops of the 42nd Army, after several days of fierce fighting, liberated Krasnogvardeysk on January 26 and, developing the offensive, by January 30 advanced forward 50 kilometers, reached the Luga River and took a bridgehead on its western bank in the Ivanovskoye - Bolshoi Sabsk region .

A little earlier, on January 24, units of the 42nd Army, with the assistance of the 67th Army, liberated the cities of Pushkin and Slutsk (Pavlovsk). Pursuing the retreating enemy, units of the 67th Army advanced along the line Tosno - Vyritsa - Siversky, but only on January 29 they captured Vyritsa, and on January 30 - Siversky.

The 2nd Shock Army, having bypassed Krasnogvardeisk, began advancing in the direction of Narva on January 21. Pursuing the retreating enemy, army formations reached the Luga River in the Kingisepp and Kotlov areas by January 30 and captured a number of bridgeheads on its left bank.

Advance of the Volkhov Front

On January 14, units of the 59th Army of the Volkhov Front went on the offensive, delivering the main blow from a bridgehead on the Volkhov River 30 kilometers north of Novgorod, and a secondary blow south of Novgorod, crossing Lake Ilmen across the ice. After several days of fierce fighting, by January 17, Soviet troops had broken through the enemy’s main line of defense and continued to develop the offensive. On January 20, units of the 59th Army liberated Novgorod and on the same day closed the encirclement ring around the German units that did not have time to retreat west in the direction of Batetsky.

On January 16, in the Chudovo-Luban area, units of the 54th Army went on the offensive. Despite the fact that by January 20, army units managed to advance only 5 kilometers, with their active actions they pinned down significant forces of German troops and forced the 26th German Army Corps, under the threat of encirclement, to begin withdrawing from the Mgi area.

On January 22, the Military Council of the Volkhov Front presented to the Supreme Command Headquarters a “plan for the development of the Novgorod-Luga operation.” The main goals of the front troops were the liberation of Luga by the forces of the 59th Army, as well as the October Railway by joint actions of the 8th and 54th Army.

Having approved the proposed plan, the Supreme Command Headquarters ordered the front troops to capture Luga no later than January 29-30, and Lyubanya - January 23-24. For more effective actions, the front commander was allowed to transfer units of the 8th Army to the 54th Army, and the headquarters was transferred to the left flank of the front in the area of ​​Lake Ilmen.

The rapid offensive on Luga gave Soviet troops a chance to encircle a significant part of the 18th Army, which was retreating from the areas of Chudovo, Lyuban, and Tosno. For this reason, the 59th Army, immediately after the liberation of Novgorod, immediately continued the offensive, delivering the main blow along the Novgorod-Luga railway through the Batetskaya station, and auxiliary ones in the directions of Fineva Luga (on the right flank) and Shimsk (on the left flank).

The German command, understanding the seriousness of the situation, managed to quickly strengthen its group in the Luga area. Having encountered stubborn resistance, the main forces of the 59th Army were unable to liberate Luga by the end of January, as prescribed by the Supreme Command Headquarters. The left-flank units of the army achieved much greater success (since January 25, under the command of the headquarters of the 8th Army), which, over several days of fierce fighting, significantly advanced forward in the western and southwestern directions, cut the Leningrad-Dno railway in the area of ​​Peredolskaya station and the Luga highway - Shimsk in the area of ​​​​the village of Medved, and also cleared the northern coast of Lake Ilmen from the enemy and reached the outskirts of Shimsk.

At the same time, fighting continued on the line of the Oktyabrskaya Railway, where, after uniting all the troops operating in this area, under the command of the headquarters of the 54th Army, Soviet troops liberated Tosno, Lyuban, Chudovo and by January 29 completely took control of this strategically important railway.

Two days before the start of the offensive of the Leningrad and Volkhov fronts, on January 12, the formation of the 2nd Baltic Front began its part of the operation, attacking the positions of the 16th German Army.

Units of the 3rd Shock Army were tasked with breaking through enemy defenses in the Pustoshka area and developing an offensive towards Opochka, and units of the 22nd Army were tasked with bypassing Novosokolniki from the north and reaching the Nasva-Maevo line. In addition, the 10th Guards Army, transferred from the Western Front, was redeployed to the left flank of the front. The army had to strike from the line Lake Nescherdo - Gusino in the direction of Zilupe, bypassing Idritsa from the south and southwest.

At the end of 1943, troops of the 2nd Baltic Front carried out a number of local operations in the Nevel area and did not have time to properly prepare for the January offensive. The armies had to advance on unfamiliar and difficult to pass wooded and swampy terrain, without knowledge of the situation, system and features of the enemy’s defense. Moreover, by the time the offensive began, the 10th Guards Army was on the march and was brought into battle in parts. All these factors predetermined the unsuccessful development of the front's military operations.

By the end of January 16, units of the 10th Guards Army, which included 9 rifle divisions, as well as a large number of artillery and tank units, managed to advance only 5-10 kilometers. The German units opposing them (one regiment of the 132nd Infantry Division, two separate penal battalions and six artillery batteries), despite their small numbers, offered fierce resistance.

The offensive of the 3rd Shock Army in the Pustoshka area and the 6th Guards and 22nd Armies in the Novosokolniki area also developed with great difficulty. The only significant success was the capture of Naswa station by units of the 22nd Army, which drove out the 331st German Infantry Division from there on January 14. Building on their success, by January 18, army units captured a 10-kilometer section of the Novosokolniki-Dno railway, which was the main line of communication of the 16th German Army.

On January 16, the Supreme Command Headquarters expressed to M. M. Popov its extreme dissatisfaction with the slow development of the offensive of the front formations and especially with the unsuccessful actions of the 10th Guards Army. Soon, the army commander A.V. Sukhomlin was removed from his post “as having failed to do his job,” and General M.I. Kazakov was appointed in his place.

Front commander M. M. Popov explained the failure of the operation in his report to I. V. Stalin:

Front commander M. M. Popov proposed not to continue the operation in the offensive sector of the 10th Guards Army, but to concentrate all the efforts of the front in the direction of Nasva - Novorzhev with the aim of quickly connecting with the troops of the Volkhov Front. The Supreme High Command headquarters approved this proposal, giving the front troops a week to regroup their forces.

The position of the parties at the end of January 1944

By the end of January, through joint efforts, the troops of the Leningrad and Volkhov fronts pushed the enemy back from the city 70-100 kilometers and freed the main communications of the city with the country. These successes made it possible on January 27 to announce to the whole world that Leningrad was completely liberated from the enemy blockade. Although the operation did not develop as rapidly as planned, troops on two fronts created the preconditions for a further successful offensive.

At the same time, the troops of the 2nd Baltic Front did not achieve success in January, but still, through their active actions, they pinned down the main forces of the 16th German Army, which contributed to the success of the offensive near Leningrad and Novgorod.

The German units of the 18th Army, although they suffered heavy losses, managed to avoid encirclement by retreating from one intermediate line to another and retained a significant part of their combat potential. At the same time, the position of the 18th Army remained threatening. The loss of Krasnogvardeysk led to the collapse of a continuous front of German defense - the “main grouping” of the army (about 14 divisions) retreated from the east, northeast and north to Luga, and the “Western grouping” (about 5-6 divisions), breaking up into separate unrelated small battle groups among themselves retreated west to Narva.

For this reason, the defense of Luga became a top priority for the German command, which concentrated significant forces in the area (12th Panzer, 4 infantry divisions, 6 combat groups of infantry divisions and the remnants of 6 divisions and brigades), which made it possible to stop the Soviet offensive. However, realizing that it was impossible to hold this line for a long time, the commander of Army Group North, G. von Küchler, on January 30, at a meeting with A. Hitler, asked for permission to withdraw troops to the Panther Line, but was refused. A. Hitler believed that it was necessary to hold the “Luga line” and stabilize the front. Since G. von Küchler considered the order impossible to implement, he was dismissed. V. Model was appointed new commander of Army Group North.

Progress of hostilities, 1-15 February 1944

The offensive of the Leningrad and Volkhov fronts on Luga

In early February, troops on two fronts continued their offensive. The Leningrad Front attacked Narva with the forces of the 2nd Shock and 42nd Armies, and with the forces of the 67th Army - on Luga from the north and northwest. The main task of the Volkhov Front was still the capture of Luga, which was attacked by the 59th and 8th armies from the east, and the 54th from the northeast. In addition, the 1st Shock Army of the 2nd Baltic Front was included in the front on February 2.

The commander of the Leningrad Front, L. A. Govorov, believed that the main efforts should be concentrated in the Narva direction, as this would allow the liberation of Estonia to begin immediately. However, fierce fighting in the Luga area forced the command of the Leningrad Front on February 1 to slightly change the task of the 2nd Army, which now had to, advancing in the direction of Gdov - Pskov, bypass Luga from the west and cut off the enemy’s communications.

The offensive of the 42nd Army, which continued in early February, developed successfully. Army formations, encountering virtually no resistance, advanced significantly, liberated Lyady, Sara-Gora, Gdov, and on February 4 reached the coast of Lake Peipsi. From these positions, the army had to carry out a roundabout maneuver, take Plyussa, Strugi Krasnye, cut the Luga-Pskov road and, together with the 67th Army, destroy the Luga enemy group.

The successful offensive of the 42nd Army west of Luga again threatened to encircle a significant part of the forces of the 18th German Army. Realizing this, the commander of Army Group North, V. Model, gave the order to the 18th Army to hold communications between Luga and Pskov at any cost. To accomplish this task, all available forces and reserves were assembled, including those from the 16th Army.

German troops failed to fully implement the planned plan, but during the fierce battles that ensued they managed to slow down the advance of the 42nd Army and maintain communications on the Luga-Pskov line.

At this time, the troops of the 67th Army of the Leningrad Front, as well as the troops of the 54th, 59th and 8th armies of the Volkhov Front continued their attack on Luga. In addition, the 1st Shock Army was tasked with breaking through the enemy’s defenses south of Staraya Russa, connecting with the troops of the 8th Army and encircling part of the forces of the 16th German Army southwest of Lake Ilmen.

The offensive of the Soviet troops on Luga continued to develop with great difficulty - the enemy offered fierce resistance and launched constant counterattacks. Despite the fact that Soviet troops failed to encircle German troops either in the Luga area or in the area southwest of Lake Ilmen, the main forces of the 18th Army were put in a critical situation. In the current situation, V. Model was forced to give the order to his troops to begin a retreat from Luga towards Pskov.

On February 12, Luga was finally taken by units of the 67th and 59th armies. After the completion of the battles for the city of Luga, on February 13, 1944, by directive of the Supreme Command Headquarters No. 220023, the Volkhov Front was disbanded. The 54th, 59th and 8th armies were transferred to the Leningrad Front, and the 1st Shock Army was transferred to the 2nd Baltic Front. The front control was transferred to the reserve of the Supreme Command Headquarters.

The offensive of the 2nd Shock Army on Narva

On the night of February 1, units of the 109th Rifle Corps (transferred to the 2nd Shock Army from the 42nd Army), with the support of the 152nd Tank Brigade, attacked after artillery preparation and, thanks to a skillful flanking maneuver, took Kingisepp by storm. Despite the fact that German troops were unable to organize defense along the Luga River, the rearguard detachments were able to slow down the advance of Soviet troops with the stubborn defense of Kingisepp, which allowed the main forces of the 54th Army Corps and the 3rd SS Panzer Corps to take up a strong defense along the western bank of the Narva River .

Pursuing the retreating enemy, two corps of the 2nd Shock Army reached the Narva River by February 3. The 43rd Rifle Corps crossed the river north of the city of Narva and occupied two bridgeheads on its opposite bank, and the 122nd Rifle Corps, having crossed the river, captured two bridgeheads south of the city. Having repulsed all enemy counterattacks, the Soviet units firmly established themselves in the bridgeheads. However, the German troops, who received the Feldhernhalle Panzer-Grenadier Division from Army Group Center and one regiment of the 58th Infantry Division to strengthen the defense in this area, managed to retain a bridgehead on the eastern bank of the Narva River in the Ivangorod region. .

On February 11, troops of the 2nd Shock Army launched a large-scale offensive with the aim of expanding the bridgeheads on the western bank of the Narva River, reaching the Jõhvi - Atsalama - Kaupsi line and a subsequent offensive in the direction of Rakvere. The army units were reinforced by the 30th Guards Rifle Corps. In addition, to support the main attack, it was planned to use the Baltic Fleet to land troops consisting of the 115th and 260th Marine Brigades northwest of Narva.

The German high command considered Narva the “gateway to Germany” and attached great importance to this section of the front. For this reason, German troops, united under a single command in the Sponheimer task force (named after the commander of the 54th Army Corps, Otto Sponheimer), prepared to defend the line on the Narva River to the last possible opportunity.

Over several days of fierce fighting, Soviet troops were able to achieve only local successes. Units of the 43rd Rifle Corps, striking northwest of Narva, managed to move forward 2 kilometers on a 4-kilometer section of the front. Further advances were stopped by stubborn resistance from the 227th Infantry Division and the SS Netherlands Brigade. To the southwest of the city, units of the 109th and 122nd Rifle Corps were advancing, and together they managed to advance up to 12 kilometers, but were unable to achieve more. German units of the 17th Infantry Division, the Panzergrenadier Division Feldherrnhalle and the SS Division Norland managed to stop the advance of the Soviet troops in this direction. The offensive of the 30th Guards Rifle Corps developed more successfully, units of which by February 17 cut the railway and the Narva-Jõhvi highway and took Auvere by storm. However, here too, stubborn resistance and constant enemy counterattacks forced the Soviet troops to suspend the offensive.

The attempt to land troops north of Auvere on the night of February 13-14 (Meriküla landing) ended tragically. Only about 450 people were able to land ashore. Finding themselves without communications and fire support, the small landing party was surrounded and after 4 days almost completely destroyed - the few survivors managed to break through to their own.

The Supreme High Command headquarters was extremely dissatisfied with the failure near Narva. On February 14, directive No. 220025 ordered the commander of the Leningrad Front to take the city of Narva no later than February 17, 1944, since “the situation, both military and political, requires this.”

Having received reinforcements from the 124th Rifle Corps from the front reserve and regrouped forces, the troops of the 2nd Shock Army again went on the offensive. Fierce fighting continued until the end of February, but Soviet troops only managed to expand the bridgehead south of Narva to 35 kilometers wide and 15 kilometers deep. It was not possible to completely break through the German defenses and achieve decisive success. The German units of the Sponheimer task force (from February 23 - the Narva task force under the command of J. Friesner) managed to repel all attacks of the Soviet troops.

At the end of February, in addition to the 2nd Shock Army, the commander of the Leningrad Front, with the permission of the Supreme High Command Headquarters, transferred the 8th and 59th armies to the Narva direction. On February 22, by directive No. 220035, the Supreme High Command Headquarters set the task, concentrating the group into 9 rifle corps, to go on the offensive again, break through the German defenses in the Narva area and develop an offensive with one army towards Pärnu, and with two armies - south in the direction of Viljandi - Valga - Tartu - Vyra.

Advance of the 2nd Baltic Front

At the end of January, three armies of the 2nd Baltic Front were given the task of defeating the enemy group in the Novosokolniki area and reaching the line east of the Uscho-Ale-Bolshoi Elm lakes. If successful, the Soviet troops, bypassing Pustoshka and Idritsa, would be able to continue the offensive on Opochka.

The main blow was delivered by the 10th Guards Army in the Shisherino-Antonovo sector (south of the Novosokolniki-Maevo highway). On the right flank of the general offensive in the direction of Maevo, the 6th Guards Army was advancing, and on the left flank, south of Nasva, units of the 22nd Army were advancing towards units of the 10th Guards Army.

Soviet troops had absolute superiority over the enemy in manpower and firepower. For example, the 10th Guards Army, which consisted of 14 rifle divisions and a large number of tank and artillery units, was opposed by parts of the 83rd and 23rd German infantry divisions and several separate battalions. However, the German troops were able to organize a strong defense, the basis of which was a well-organized system of resistance centers in populated areas and on the dominant heights in the area.

On the morning of January 31, after artillery preparation on a narrow section of the front, only 7.5 kilometers wide, units of three rifle corps of the 10th Guards Army went on the offensive. On the first day of the offensive, the first line of enemy defense was broken through along its entire length, and units of the 15th Guards Rifle Corps, moving forward 6 kilometers, reached the Novosokolniki-Maevo highway. In the following days, the offensive of the 10th Guards Army units developed less successfully, largely due to the fact that the 6th Guards Army, operating on the right, was unable to achieve any significant successes. Only on February 7, having brought the second echelon into battle, units of the 15th Guards Rifle Corps managed to build on their success and connect with units of the 22nd Army in the area of ​​the Minkino state farm. Fearing encirclement, German troops were forced to hastily abandon their positions in the area of ​​the “Novosokolniki salient.”

According to the commander of the 10th Guards Army M.I. Kazakov, a further offensive according to the previous plan was futile, since the German troops, having received significant reinforcements, firmly occupied new defensive lines. However, front commander M. M. Popov insisted on continuing the operation. Having concentrated the main forces in the Shetkovo area, on February 11, units of the 10th Guards Army continued the offensive in a northwestern direction. In the following days, Struga, Veshnyaya, Ivanovo and other settlements were liberated, but the offensive did not develop further and was stopped on February 16. Thus, in the first half of February, the main forces of the 2nd Baltic Front, having advanced 15-20 kilometers and liberating the city of Novosokolniki, reached the Nasva-Maevo line.

Progress of hostilities, February 16 - March 1, 1944

The offensive of the Leningrad Front on Pskov and Ostrov

After the fall of the “Luga line,” the main forces of the 18th German Army began to retreat in the direction of Pskov. Since for this reason there was a threat of Soviet troops entering the flank and rear of the 16th Army, V. Model was forced to give the order to begin a general retreat to the Panther line. For an organized retreat, units of the 18th Army had to hold the line for some time on the line Pskov Lake - Strugi Krasnye - Shimsk, and only after the withdrawal of units of the 16th Army to the west, gradually retreat to Pskov and Ostrov. The task of securing the flanks at the junction of the two armies was assigned to the Frisner task force.

A particularly great threat to the German troops was the ongoing offensive of the 42nd Army, whose 123rd Rifle Corps was advancing on Pskov, and the 116th on Plyussa and Strugi Krasnye. At the same time, the 108th Corps remained on the eastern shore of Lake Pskov to protect the right flank of the army. However, the offensive of the 42nd Army in different directions and on a wide section of the front led to the dispersion of forces, which allowed the German units of the 126th Infantry, 12th Tank and 9th Air Field Divisions to contain the Soviet offensive at the Lochkina - Lyubotezh - Gridino River line. Moreover, on February 16, units of the 11th Infantry Division and Task Force Krocher managed to dislodge the 129th, 90th Infantry Divisions and the 5th Ski Brigade from the bridgehead on the western shore of Lake Peipus.

In the current situation, the 116th Rifle Corps, which was separated from the main forces of the 42nd Army by more than 40 kilometers, was transferred to the 67th Army, which was advancing along the Luga-Pskov railway. The formations of the 67th Army, although slowly but persistently moved forward, overcoming the resistance of the 24th Infantry, 12th and 13th Air Field Divisions of the 28th Army Corps. On February 18, the 46th Rifle Division, together with the 9th and 6th partisan brigades, liberated Plyussa after several days of fierce fighting, and on February 23, units of the 67th Army, together with the 6th and 11th partisan brigades, captured the regional center of Strugi Krasnye.

On February 22, the Supreme Command Headquarters, by directive No. 220035, set the task for the three armies of the left wing of the Leningrad Front to cross the Velikaya River and capture the Island, and then develop an offensive against Riga.

After the capture of Struga Krasny, the last intermediate line of defense of the 18th Army in front of the Panther line was broken through and German troops were forced to accelerate their retreat to Pskov and Ostrov.

Continuing the offensive, formations of the 67th Army advanced 90 kilometers by the end of February, crossed the Cheryokha River, cut the Pskov-Opochka railway and reached the northeastern and eastern edge of the German defense of the Pskov-Ostrov fortified area.

At the same time, pursuing the retreating enemy, the troops of the 42nd Army liberated Seredka on February 24 and on February 29 reached the main defensive line of the enemy’s Pskov-Ostrov fortified area, where they were forced to suspend the offensive.

In connection with the beginning of the retreat of the 16th Army, combat operations at the junction of two German armies in the area west of Lake Ilmen acquired special significance. The 8th and 54th armies operated in this area. The troops of the 54th Army were tasked with reaching the Utorgosh - Soltsy - Shimsk line no later than February 19, and the 8th Army was tasked with cutting the Medved - Nikolaevo road. The common goal of the two armies was to establish contact with the troops of the 2nd Baltic Front as quickly as possible and prevent the organized retreat of the 16th Army.

The German units of the Friessner task force, operating at the junction of the two armies and covering the withdrawal of units of the 16th Army, put up stubborn resistance for several days. Thus, the 28th Jaeger Division held back the advance of the 8th Army in the Bolshoi Utorgosh-Nikolaevo area for five days, and units of the 10th Army Corps held back the advance of the 54th Army on the Shelon and Mshaga rivers for three days. Only after several days of fierce fighting did the Soviet units force the enemy to retreat to the west.

Pursuing the hastily retreating enemy, on February 24, units of the 54th Army, joining forces with the troops of the 1st Shock Army of the 2nd Baltic Front, after two days of fierce fighting captured the city of Dno, and on February 26 they liberated the city of Porkhov. Developing the offensive, army units over the next three days advanced another 65 kilometers and reached the eastern part of the Pskov-Ostrov fortified area.

Advance of the 2nd Baltic Front

By mid-February, the most favorable situation had been created for the offensive of the troops of the 2nd Baltic Front. The fall of the “Luga line” and the advance of the troops of the Leningrad Front to Pskov and Ostrov created a real threat to the left flank and rear of the 16th Army.

Taking into account the current situation, the Supreme Command Headquarters decided to undertake a large-scale operation with the forces of the 1st and 2nd Baltic Fronts at the junction of Army Groups “North” and “Center”. The 2nd Baltic Front was tasked with delivering the main blow in the direction of Opochka-Zilupe, and then, advancing on Karsava, defeating the enemy’s island group together with the left wing of the Leningrad Front.

According to the offensive plan, the main attack of the front was to be delivered by the 3rd Shock and 10th Guards Armies, and the 1st Shock and 22nd Armies were tasked with pinning down enemy forces in secondary sectors. However, the beginning of the retreat of the 16th German Army forced the Soviet troops to go on the offensive ahead of schedule. On February 18, having belatedly discovered the withdrawal of enemy troops, units of the 1st Shock in the Staraya Russa area went on the offensive, and a day later - the 22nd Army in the Kholm area. The remaining armies, which had not yet completed the regrouping, joined the offensive later.

Pursuing the retreating enemy, units of the 1st Shock Army liberated Staraya Russa and, having established an elbow connection with the 54th Army of the Leningrad Front, continued the offensive and took Dno on February 24, and Novorzhev on February 29. At the same time, units of the 22nd Army liberated Kholm on February 21, and Dedovichi on February 25.

On February 26, part of the forces of the 10th Guards and 3rd Shock Armies joined the offensive, which, having moved forward up to 18 kilometers, liberated Pustoshka, but could not achieve more.

Thus, by the beginning of March, the troops of the 2nd Baltic Front reached the Panther line. In total, in the second half of February, the 1st Shock Army advanced 180 kilometers from Staraya Russa to the Velikaya River, the 22nd Army - 125 kilometers from Kholm to Novorzhev, and units of the 10th Guards and 3rd Shock - 30 kilometers from Maev to Pustoshka. However, the German troops of the 16th Army, having managed to remove most of the manpower and equipment from the attack, took up a strong defense at the Ostrov - Pushkin Mountains - Idritsa line and stopped the further advance of the Soviet armies.

Position of the parties by the beginning of March 1944

By the beginning of March 1944, Soviet troops of the Leningrad and 2nd Baltic fronts reached the line Narva - Lake Peipsi - Pskov - Island - Idritsa. Having pulled all available forces to the Panther line, parts of the German 16th and 18th armies took up a strong defense and intended to stop the Soviet advance into the Baltic states.

March 1, 1944 is considered the day of the end of the entire Leningrad-Novgorod strategic offensive operation, since, as is often stated, Soviet troops by this day, by order of the Supreme High Command Headquarters, went on the defensive at the achieved lines. However, the troops of two Soviet fronts continued the offensive without an operational pause. In official historiography, only the “Pskov offensive operation” (March 9 - April 15, 1944) of the Leningrad Front was noted, which was carried out by the forces of the 42nd, 67th, 54th and 13th Air Armies (total strength 173,120 people) with the goal of liberating Pskov and Ostrov. Operations of the troops of the 2nd Baltic Front, units of which tried to break through the Panther line at the Ostrov - Idritsa line in March - April, and the Leningrad Front (2nd Shock, 8th and 59th Armies) in the Narva region in the list of front-line no operations noted.

It can be argued that the Soviet command, not having complete information about the power of the Panther line, hoped to immediately break through the German defenses and continue the offensive into the Baltic states. However, by early March, Soviet troops, after almost two months of continuous offensive, were in dire need of rest and reinforcements. For example, in many rifle divisions of the Leningrad Front, by this time the number had been reduced to 2500-3500 people. The chief of staff of the 2nd Baltic Front, L.M. Sandalov, in his memoirs noted the following result of the unsuccessful military operations of the Soviet troops in March - April:

Progress of hostilities, March - April 1944

Combat actions of the Leningrad Front in the Narva region

Having failed to achieve success in the Narva direction in the second half of February, the troops of the Leningrad Front suspended hostilities. However, the Soviet command did not intend to abandon the original plans and, after regrouping forces and means, intended to continue the offensive, break through the enemy’s defenses between Lake Peipus and the Gulf of Finland and develop an offensive into Estonia. It was planned to begin the operation with the forces of the 2nd Shock Army on February 25, and on February 28 to strike with the forces of the 59th Army. Then, to develop the initial success, it was planned to bring into battle units of the 8th Army and the 3rd Guards Tank Corps, which was transferred from the reserve of the Supreme High Command Headquarters.

Since the 59th and 8th armies did not have time to complete their concentration by the scheduled date, a new offensive began only on March 1. Units of the 2nd Shock Army went on the offensive, from the eastern front of the "Auvere Bridgehead" in the direction of Narva, and units of the 59th Army, striking with the forces of the 43rd and 109th Rifle Corps in the direction of the Narva-Tallinn railway with the aim of exiting to the rear of the entire Narva enemy group.

Artillery support for the offensive was insufficient and Soviet units were met with heavy enemy fire. The offensive stalled, and after several days of fierce fighting it was suspended in the offensive zone of the 2nd Shock Army. At the same time, the 59th Army continued to try to break through the enemy's defenses, but was unable to achieve significant success. Moreover, on the night of March 7, German troops liquidated the bridgehead north of Narva near the village of Vepskylä, which was defended by the 378th Infantry Division and the 34th Artillery and Machine-Gun Battalion. The last Soviet bridgehead north of Narva was thus lost.

On March 18, having received reinforcements from the 6th Rifle Corps from the 8th Army, the 2nd Shock Army again went on the offensive. The only significant success was achieved by the 256th Infantry Division, which managed to cut the strategically important railway to Tallinn west of Narva. In other areas, no noticeable results were achieved.

On March 24, front commander L.A. Govorov requested permission from the Supreme Command Headquarters to suspend the offensive for 3-4 weeks to thoroughly prepare a new operation. At this time, the German command, concerned about another Soviet offensive, decided to launch a counterattack and completely drive out Soviet troops from the western bank of the Narva River.

On March 26, the Narva operational group with the forces of the 227th, 11th, 170th and 58th infantry divisions suddenly went on the offensive. Fierce fighting continued for more than two weeks until April 10-12 and, despite repeated enemy attacks, units of the 59th and 2nd Shock Armies basically held their positions on the “Auvere Bridgehead” southwest of Narva.

On April 19, the 3rd SS Panzer Corps and parts of the 54th Army Corps launched a new offensive with the goal of eliminating the Soviet bridgehead south of Narva in the Auvere region. Units of the 8th Army, which replaced units of the 59th Army in this area on April 10, repelled 17 German attacks on the first day of the offensive alone, but still, after five days of fierce fighting, they were forced to abandon part of the bridgehead between Auvere and Vanamõisa.

Despite the fact that the German counteroffensive did not achieve its goal, the command of the Leningrad Front was forced to abandon the offensive in the Narva direction for a long time - until July 1944. Moreover, it was decided to create a reserve line of defense along the Luga River.

The commander of the 2nd Shock Army, I. I. Fedyuninsky, noted in his memoirs, explaining the unsuccessful actions in the battles for Narva:

The offensive of the Leningrad and 2nd Baltic fronts on Pskov, Ostrov and Idritsa.

At the beginning of March 1944, the 42nd and 67th armies of the Leningrad Front received orders to “liberate Pskov and Ostrov no later than March 10.”

However, the front troops failed to complete the assigned task. The fighting, which became extremely fierce, continued for several weeks. The commander of the 46th Infantry Division of the 110th Corps of the 67th Army, S.N. Borshchev recalled:

On March 1, the 176th and 314th regiments of the division, after a short artillery preparation, went on the offensive. Overcoming strong enemy resistance and repelling counterattacks, they fought for literally every meter of their native land. The settlements of Volkovo, Gorushka-Rodionovo and Letnevo changed hands several times. In 3 days of stubborn fighting, units of our division advanced only 10 kilometers and reached the line of the Mnoga River - to the very front edge of the enemy’s heavily fortified, deeply echeloned defense, which he called the “Panther” line.

The only relative success the Soviet troops achieved was south of Pskov, where they managed to break through the enemy’s defenses, move forward 13 kilometers and cut the Pskov-Ostrov railway.

At the end of March, Soviet troops again tried to go on the offensive. For example, the 110th Rifle Corps of the 67th Army was tasked with breaking through the defenses in the Dyakovo-Kuznetsovo sector, cutting the railway and highway, crossing the Velikaya River and seizing a bridgehead on its western bank. However, the offensive launched on the night of March 31 again ended without significant results.

Simultaneously with the Leningrad Front, in March 1944, troops of the 2nd Baltic Front with the forces of 4 armies launched an offensive with the aim of breaking through the Panther line between Ostrov and Idritsa.

At the end of February, troops of the 2nd Baltic Front, pursuing the 16th German Army, tried to immediately break through the German defenses east of Idritsa, but were unsuccessful. On March 3, by the decision of Marshal S.K. Timoshenko, the representative of the Supreme Command Headquarters for coordinating the actions of the 1st and 2nd Baltic Fronts, the offensive was suspended.

S.K. Timoshenko and S.M. Shtemenko presented their plan for a further offensive to the Supreme Command Headquarters, proposing to expand the width of the front of the upcoming offensive. Having made noticeable adjustments to the proposed plan, the Supreme High Command Headquarters set the task for the troops of the 2nd Baltic Front to reach the left bank of the Velikaya River north of Idritsa and, together with the 1st Baltic Front, liquidate the enemy’s Idritsa group. The offensive was planned to begin on March 7-8.

Only on March 10, having completed the regrouping and received reinforcements, the front troops resumed the offensive. By March 18, the front troops managed to advance 7-9 kilometers on two sectors of the front, but they could not achieve more and the offensive was suspended again.

At the end of March, the troops of the 2nd Baltic Front again began active operations. The greatest success was achieved by formations of the 44th Rifle Corps of the 22nd Army, which on the night of March 26 crossed the Velikaya River north-west of the Pushkin Mountains and captured the so-called “Strezhnevsky bridgehead”. By March 26, the 33rd, 26th and 115th rifle divisions managed to expand the bridgehead to 5 kilometers along the front and up to 6 kilometers in depth.

On March 28–29, units of the 10th Guards Army were transferred to the bridgehead and were tasked with expanding the bridgehead and entering operational space. Fierce fighting continued until mid-April, but Soviet troops only managed to expand the “Strezhnevsky bridgehead” to 8 kilometers along the front.

The commander of the 10th Guards Army M.I. Kazakov recalled:

On April 18, the Supreme High Command Headquarters, in its directive, ordered “in view of the unsuccessful offensive” the 2nd Baltic Front “to go on a strong defense on all sectors of the front.” On the same day, recognizing the fallacy of the decision to disband the Volkhov Front, the Supreme Command Headquarters, by its directive, divided the Leningrad Front into two parts. The Leningrad Front included the 2nd Shock, 59th, 8th (in the Narva direction) and 23rd Army (on the Karelian Isthmus), and the new 3rd Baltic Front included the 42nd, 67th and the 54th Army, operating in the Pskov-Ostrovsky direction. On April 19, these two fronts were ordered to go on the defensive. The troops of all three fronts were ordered to prepare a defense in depth of at least three lines 30-40 kilometers deep.

Results of the operation

During the Leningrad-Novgorod operation, troops of three Soviet fronts inflicted a heavy defeat on the German 18th and 16th armies, throwing the enemy 220-280 kilometers from Leningrad, and 180 kilometers south of Lake Ilmen.

In January, the troops of the Leningrad and Volkhov fronts, having knocked the enemy out of positions that he had occupied for more than two years, completely liberated Leningrad from the enemy blockade. Continuing the offensive, Soviet troops forced the enemy to retreat to the Panther line. Thus, almost the entire Leningrad region and the western part of the Kalinin region were cleared of the enemy. Many cities and towns were liberated, including Novgorod, Gatchina, Chudovo, Lyuban, Tosno, Luga, Kingisepp, Gdov, Porkhov, Staraya Russa, Novorzhev.

The main reasons for the successes of the Soviet troops in January - February 1944 were the careful preparation of the operation, the sufficient concentration of forces and means, especially in the directions of the main attack, and the well-developed interactions of infantry, artillery, tank units and aviation.

At the same time, the 18th and 16th German armies, despite the heavy defeat and heavy losses, were not defeated. German troops managed to avoid encirclement and retreated in an orderly manner to previously prepared positions, retaining a significant part of their combat potential. This made it possible to stop the Soviet offensive on the Panther Line. Attempts made by Soviet troops in March-April to break through the heavily fortified enemy defenses ended with virtually no results. Thus, Soviet troops were unable to successfully continue the offensive and solve additional tasks set by the Supreme Command Headquarters - to capture Narva, Pskov, Ostrov, and begin the liberation of Estonia and Latvia. The Supreme High Command headquarters was especially dissatisfied with the actions of the 2nd Baltic Front. Front commander M. M. Popov was demoted in rank and no longer commanded fronts.

The main reason for this development of events was the exhaustion of the Soviet troops, who by the end of February had been fighting continuously for almost two months in difficult weather conditions in wooded and swampy areas and were in dire need of rest and reinforcements. In addition, a large number of regroupings and reshuffles had an extremely negative impact on command and control and on the interaction of armies and fronts.

Despite the fact that the final stage of the offensive did not bring the desired result, the victory of the Soviet troops in the entire Leningrad-Novgorod operation was unconditional and was of great importance.

German historian, and during the Second World War - General of the Wehrmacht, K. Tippelskirch noted:

Losses

USSR

According to the statistical study “Russia and the USSR in the Wars of the 20th Century,” the total losses of Soviet troops in the Leningrad-Novgorod offensive operation amounted to 313,953 people (irretrievable losses - 76,686, and sanitary losses - 237,267). At the same time, the losses of the troops of the Leningrad Front and the Baltic Fleet for the entire period of the operation amounted to 227,440 and 1,461 people, respectively (of which irretrievable losses were 56,564 and 169), the Volkhov Front from 14.01. until 15.02. - 50,300 (of which irretrievable losses - 12,011), 2nd Baltic Front from 10.02. until 01.03. - 29,710 people (of which 6,659 were irretrievable losses), 1st Shock Army from 14.01. to 10.02. - 5042 people (of which 1283 are irretrievable losses). In addition, during the operation, Soviet troops lost 462 tanks and self-propelled guns, 1,832 guns and mortars, and 260 combat aircraft.

The figures given are apparently not complete and the losses of Soviet troops during the operation were more significant. For example, the above figures take into account the losses of the 2nd Baltic Front only from February 10, although in January the front troops fought fierce battles against units of the 16th German Army and the 10th Guards Army alone lost about 9,000 people.

In addition, according to the “report on the Novgorod-Luga operation” compiled by the headquarters of the Volkhov Front, the losses of units of this front for the period from January 14 to February 11, 1944 (including the losses of the 1st Shock Army in the period from February 1 to 10) were more significant compared to those indicated above, and amounted to 62,733 people (of which 16,542 were irretrievable losses).

The exact data on the losses of the Leningrad and 2nd Baltic fronts in combat operations in March - April 1944 are unknown, since the statistical study “Russia and the USSR in the Wars of the 20th Century” shows only the losses of the Leningrad Front in the “Pskov offensive operation” - 42,133 people ( of which 10,453 are irrecoverable losses). According to historian G. A. Shigin, in the battles for Pskov, Ostrov and Idritsa in March - April, Soviet troops on two fronts lost 110,000-120,000 people (irretrievable losses - about 30,000), and according to the American historian D. Glanz - about 200,000 killed and wounded (including losses in the battles for Narva).

Germany

The losses of Army Group North during the Leningrad-Novgorod operation can only be estimated approximately. Since at the beginning of 1944, German troops, fighting heavy defensive battles, hastily retreated to the west, the headquarters of the 18th and 16th German armies kept track of losses sporadically. However, it can be argued that the losses of German troops were very significant. For example, by January 29, the 18th Army had lost 14,000 killed and 35,000 wounded. According to the Russian historian A.V. Isaev, only the total losses of the 18th Army during the period of the Soviet operation to lift the siege of Leningrad amounted to 66,000 people.

According to Soviet data, during the operation 3 German divisions were completely destroyed, and 26 were defeated. In just a month of fighting, the troops of the Leningrad and Volkhov fronts destroyed 90,000 enemy soldiers and officers, and captured 7,200 people.