Fights around the building of the former Republican Committee of the CPSU ("Presidential Palace") in Grozny, January 1995
The First Chechen War (officially called “Restoration of Constitutional Order in the Chechen Republic”, other names - “Chechen Conflict”, “First Chechen Campaign”) - the common name for the fighting on the territory of Chechnya and the border regions of the North Caucasus between Russian troops (Armed Forces and Ministry of Internal Affairs) and the unrecognized Chechen Republic of Ichkeria with the aim of taking control of the territory of Chechnya, on which the Chechen Republic of Ichkeria was proclaimed in 1991.
Officially, the conflict was defined as “measures to maintain constitutional order”; military actions were called the “first Chechen war”, less often the “Russian-Chechen” or “Russian-Caucasian war”. The conflict and the events preceding it were characterized big amount victims among the population, military and law enforcement agencies, facts of ethnic cleansing of the non-Chechen population in Chechnya were noted.
Background to the conflict
With the beginning of perestroika in various republics of the Soviet Union, including in Checheno-Ingushetia, various nationalist movements. One of such organizations was the National Congress of the Chechen People (NCCHN), created in 1990, which set as its goal the secession of Chechnya from the USSR and the creation of an independent Chechen state. It was headed by former Soviet Air Force General Dzhokhar Dudayev.
"Chechen Revolution" 1991
On June 8, 1991, at the II session of the OKCHN, Dudayev proclaimed the independence of the Chechen Republic of Nokhchi-cho, thus creating dual power in the republic.
During the events of August 19-21, 1991 in Moscow, the leadership of the Chechen Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic supported the State Emergency Committee. Having assessed the situation, on September 6, 1991, Dudayev announced the dissolution of the republican government agencies, accusing Russia of “colonial” policies. On the same day, Dudayev’s supporters stormed the building Supreme Council, television center and Radio House. More than 40 deputies were beaten, and the chairman of the Grozny City Council, Vitaly Kutsenko, was killed by being thrown out of a window. On this issue, the head of the Chechen Republic Zavgaev D.G. spoke in 1996 at a meeting of the State Duma:
“...The war began when Vitaly Kutsenko, chairman of the Grozny City Council, was killed in broad daylight...”
The Chairman of the Supreme Council of the RSFSR, Ruslan Khasbulatov, then sent them a telegram: “Dear fellow countrymen! I was pleased to learn about the resignation of the Chairman of the Supreme Council of the Republic. A favorable political situation has finally emerged, when the democratic processes taking place in the republic are freed from obvious and secret fetters...”
After the collapse of the USSR, Dzhokhar Dudayev announced the final secession of Chechnya from the Russian Federation.
On October 27, 1991, presidential and parliamentary elections were held in the republic under the control of separatists, and Dzhokhar Dudayev became the President of the republic. November 2, 1991 by the Fifth Congress people's deputies RSFSR these elections were declared illegal. Later, the Chairman of the Constitutional Court V.D. Zorkin expressed the same opinion.
On November 7, 1991, Russian President Boris Yeltsin signed the Decree “On the introduction of a state of emergency in the Chechen-Ingush Republic (1991).”
Separatist supporters surrounded the buildings of the Ministry of Internal Affairs and the KGB, military camps, and blocked railway and air hubs. In the end, the introduction of a state of emergency was thwarted; the Decree “On the introduction of a state of emergency in the Chechen-Ingush Republic (1991)” was canceled on November 11, three days after its signing, after a heated discussion at a meeting of the Supreme Council of the RSFSR and from the republic The withdrawal of Russian military units and units of the Ministry of Internal Affairs began, which was finally completed by the summer of 1992. The separatists began seizing and looting military warehouses.
In June 1992, Russian Defense Minister Pavel Grachev ordered the transfer of half of all weapons and ammunition available in the republic to the Dudayevites. According to him, this was a forced step, since a significant part of the “transferred” weapons had already been captured, and there was no way to remove the rest due to the lack of soldiers and trains. First Deputy Prime Minister of the Government Oleg Lobov at a plenary meeting of the State Duma explained the situation with the appearance of a large number of weapons among the population of Chechnya:
“...in 1991, a huge amount of weapons was partially transferred, and partially (and mostly) seized by force during the withdrawal of troops from the Chechen Republic. It was a period of reorganization. The number of these weapons amounts to tens of thousands of units, and they are dispersed throughout the Chechen Republic...”
Collapse of the Chechen-Ingush Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic (1991-1993)
The victory of the separatists in Grozny led to the collapse of the Chechen-Ingush Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic. Malgobek, Nazranovsky and most of the Sunzhensky district of the former Chechen Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic formed the Republic of Ingushetia within the Russian Federation. Legally, the Chechen-Ingush Republic ceased to exist on January 9, 1993.
The exact border between Chechnya and Ingushetia has not been demarcated and has not yet been determined (2017). During Ossetian-Ingush conflict in November 1992 in the Prigorodny district North Ossetia Russian troops were brought in. Relations between Russia and Chechnya have deteriorated sharply. The Russian high command proposed at the same time solving the “Chechen problem” by force, but then the deployment of troops into the territory of Chechnya was prevented by the efforts of Yegor Gaidar.
Period of de facto independence (1991-1994)
As a result, Chechnya became a virtually independent state, but not legally recognized by any country, including Russia. The republic had state symbols - the flag, coat of arms and anthem, authorities - the president, parliament, government, secular courts. It was planned to create the Armed Forces, as well as the introduction of its own state currency - nahar. In the constitution adopted on March 12, 1992, the CRI was characterized as an “independent secular state”; its government refused to sign a federal agreement with the Russian Federation.
In fact, government system CRI turned out to be extremely ineffective and rapidly became criminalized in the period 1991-1994.
In 1992-1993, over 600 intentional murders were committed on the territory of Chechnya. During the period of 1993, at the Grozny branch of the North Caucasus Railway, 559 trains were subjected to an armed attack with the complete or partial looting of about 4 thousand cars and containers worth 11.5 billion rubles. Over 8 months of 1994, 120 armed attacks were carried out, as a result of which 1,156 wagons and 527 containers were looted. Losses amounted to more than 11 billion rubles. In 1992-1994, 26 railway workers were killed as a result of armed attacks. The current situation forced the Russian government to decide to stop traffic through the territory of Chechnya from October 1994.
A special trade was the production of false advice notes, from which more than 4 trillion rubles were received. Hostage-taking and slave trade flourished in the republic - according to Rosinformtsentr, a total of 1,790 people have been kidnapped and illegally held in Chechnya since 1992.
Even after this, when Dudayev stopped paying taxes to the general budget and banned employees of the Russian special services from entering the republic, the federal center continued to transfer funds from the budget to Chechnya. In 1993, 11.5 billion rubles were allocated for Chechnya. Russian oil continued to flow into Chechnya until 1994, but it was not paid for and was resold abroad.
1993 political crisis
In the spring of 1993, the contradictions between President Dudayev and the parliament sharply worsened in the CRI. On April 17, 1993, Dudayev announced the dissolution of parliament, the constitutional court and the Ministry of Internal Affairs. On June 4, armed Dudayevites under the command of Shamil Basayev seized the building of the Grozny City Council, where meetings of the parliament and the constitutional court were held; Thus, a coup d'état took place in the CRI. The constitution adopted last year was amended and a regime of Dudayev's personal power was established in the republic, which lasted until August 1994, when legislative powers were returned to parliament.
Formation of the anti-Dudaev opposition (1993-1994)
After coup d'etat On June 4, 1993, in the northern regions of Chechnya, not under the control of the separatist government in Grozny, an armed anti-Dudaev opposition was formed, which began an armed struggle against the Dudayev regime. The first opposition organization was the National Salvation Committee (KNS), which carried out several armed actions, but soon defeated and disintegrated. It was replaced by the Provisional Council of the Chechen Republic (VCCR), headed by Umar Avturkhanov, which declared itself the only legitimate authority on the territory of Chechnya. The VSChR was recognized as such by the Russian authorities, who provided it with all kinds of support (including weapons and volunteers).
Beginning of the Civil War (1994)
Since the summer of 1994, fighting has unfolded in Chechnya between troops loyal to Dudayev and forces of the Provisional Council of the Chechen Republic opposed to Dudayev, unofficially supported by Russia. Troops loyal to Dudayev carried out offensive operations in the Nadterechny and Urus-Martan regions controlled by opposition troops. They were accompanied by significant losses on both sides; tanks, artillery and mortars were used.
The forces of the parties were approximately equal, and neither of them was able to gain the upper hand in the fight.
On November 26, the opposition unsuccessfully stormed Grozny for the third time. At the same time, a number of Russian military personnel who “fought on the side of the opposition” under a contract with Federal service counterintelligence.
Progress of the war
Deployment of troops (December 1994)
At that time, the use of the expression “the entry of Russian troops into Chechnya,” according to journalist Alexander Nevzorov, was, to a greater extent, caused by journalistic terminological confusion - Chechnya was part of Russia. At a meeting of the Security Council on November 29, Minister of Nationalities Nikolai Egorov said that 70% of Chechens would support the entry of troops and would sprinkle flour on the road for Russian soldiers, while the remaining 30% would be neutral.
Even before any decision was announced by the Russian authorities, on December 1, Russian aviation attacked the airfields of Kalinovskaya and Khankala and disabled all the aircraft at the disposal of the separatists. On December 11, President of the Russian Federation Boris Yeltsin signed Decree No. 2169 “On measures to ensure legality, law and order and public safety on the territory of the Chechen Republic.” Later the Constitutional Court of the Russian Federation recognized most decrees and government resolutions that justified the actions of the federal government in Chechnya in accordance with the Constitution.
The president's decision caused a split in the de facto coalition between the government and the largest parliamentary force at that time - the Democratic Choice of Russia party, led by Yegor Gaidar. The majority of members of the Far Eastern Republic supported Gaidar’s decision to join the opposition and protest against the outbreak of hostilities. Several protests against the start of the war took place in December.
On the day of signing Decree No. 2169, December 11, 1994, units of the United Group of Forces (OGV), consisting of units of the Ministry of Defense and Internal Troops of the Ministry of Internal Affairs, entered the territory of Chechnya. The troops were divided into three groups and entered from three different sides- from the west from North Ossetia through Ingushetia, from the northwest from the Mozdok region of North Ossetia, directly bordering Chechnya, and from the east from the territory of Dagestan. Command of the operation in Chechnya was offered to First Deputy Commander-in-Chief of the Ground Forces Eduard Vorobyov, but he refused to lead the operation “due to its complete unpreparedness” and submitted his resignation from the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation.
The eastern group was blocked in the Khasavyurt region of Dagestan by local residents - Akkin Chechens. The western group was also blocked by local residents and came under fire near the village of Barsuki, but using force, they nevertheless broke through into Chechnya. The Mozdok group advanced most successfully, already on December 12 approaching the village of Dolinsky, located 10 km from Grozny.
Near Dolinskoye, Russian troops came under fire from a Chechen Grad rocket artillery system and then entered into battle for this populated area.
A new offensive by OGV units began on December 19. The Vladikavkaz (western) group blocked Grozny from the western direction, bypassing the Sunzhensky ridge. On December 20, the Mozdok (northwestern) group occupied Dolinsky and blocked Grozny from the northwest. The Kizlyar (eastern) group blocked Grozny from the east, and paratroopers of the 104th Airborne Regiment blocked the city from the Argun Gorge. At the same time, the southern part of Grozny was not blocked.
Thus, at the initial stage of hostilities, in the first weeks of the war, Russian troops were able to occupy the northern regions of Chechnya practically without resistance.
On December 20, the first deputy head of the Main Operations Directorate became the commander of the United Group of Russian Forces in Chechnya General Staff Armed Forces of the Russian Federation Anatoly Kvashnin. Pavel Grachev later recalled:
...It so happened that some generals - my assistants, deputies - various reasons refused or were unable to lead the group or conduct combat operations. I don’t want to give their names... Therefore, I am grateful to the same Army General Kvashnin, who then came up to me and said: “Comrade Minister, if you allow, I am ready to take command...”
In mid-December, federal troops began artillery shelling of the suburbs of Grozny, and on December 19 the first bomb attack in the city center.
Despite the fact that Grozny still remained unblocked on the southern side, on December 31, 1994, the assault on the city began. About 250 armored vehicles entered the city, extremely vulnerable in street battles. Russian troops were poorly prepared, there was no interaction and coordination between various units, many soldiers did not have combat experience. The troops had aerial photographs of the city, outdated plans of the city in limited quantities. The communications facilities were not equipped with closed-circuit communications equipment, which allowed the enemy to intercept communications. The troops were given an order to occupy only industrial buildings and areas and not to invade the homes of the civilian population.
The western group of troops was stopped, the eastern also retreated and did not take any action until January 2, 1995. In the northern direction, the 1st and 2nd battalions of the 131st separate Maikop motorized rifle brigade(more than 300 people), a motorized rifle battalion and tank company The 81st Petrakuvsky motorized rifle regiment (10 tanks), under the command of General Pulikovsky, reached railway station and the Presidential Palace. Federal forces were surrounded - the losses of the battalions of the Maykop brigade, according to official data, amounted to 85 people killed and 72 missing, 20 tanks were destroyed, the brigade commander Colonel Savin was killed, more than 100 military personnel were captured. The reinforced battalion of the Petrakuvsky Motorized Rifle Regiment also suffered heavy losses - by the end of January 1, 30% of its payroll remained.
The eastern group under the command of General Rokhlin was also surrounded and bogged down in battles with separatist units, but nevertheless, Rokhlin did not give the order to retreat.
On January 7, 1995, the Northeast and North groupings were united under the command of General Rokhlin, and Ivan Babichev became commander of the West grouping.
Russian troops changed tactics - now, instead of the massive use of armored vehicles, they used maneuverable air assault groups supported by artillery and aviation. Fierce street fighting broke out in Grozny.
Two groups moved to the Presidential Palace and by January 9 occupied the building of the Oil Institute and the Grozny airport. By January 19, these groups met in the center of Grozny and captured the Presidential Palace, but the troops Chechen separatists retreated across the Sunzha River and took up defense on Minutka Square. Despite the successful offensive, Russian troops controlled only about a third of the city at that time.
By the beginning of February, the strength of the OGV was increased to 70,000 people. General Anatoly Kulikov became the new commander of the OGV.
Only on February 3, 1995, the “South” group was formed and the implementation of the plan to blockade Grozny from the south began. By February 9, Russian units reached the line of the Rostov-Baku federal highway.
On February 13, in the village of Sleptsovskaya (Ingushetia), negotiations were held between the commander of the OGV Anatoly Kulikov and the chief of the General Staff of the Armed Forces of the ChRI Aslan Maskhadov on concluding a temporary truce - the parties exchanged lists of prisoners of war, and both sides were given the opportunity to remove the dead and wounded from the streets of the city. The truce, however, was violated by both sides.
In the 20th of February, street fighting continued in the city (especially in its southern part), but the Chechen troops, deprived of support, gradually retreated from the city.
Finally, on March 6, 1995, a detachment of militants of the Chechen field commander Shamil Basayev retreated from Chernorechye, the last area of Grozny controlled by the separatists, and the city finally came under the control of Russian troops.
A pro-Russian administration of Chechnya was formed in Grozny, headed by Salambek Khadzhiev and Umar Avturkhanov.
As a result of the assault on Grozny, the city was virtually destroyed and turned into ruins.
Destroyed Russian infantry fighting vehicle in Grozny, January 1995
Establishing control over the lowland regions of Chechnya (March - April 1995)
After the assault on Grozny, the main task of the Russian troops was to establish control over the lowland areas of the rebellious republic.
The Russian side began to conduct active negotiations with the population, convincing local residents to expel the militants from their settlements. At the same time, Russian units occupied commanding heights above villages and cities. Thanks to this, Argun was taken on March 15-23, and the cities of Shali and Gudermes were taken without a fight on March 30 and 31, respectively. However, the militant groups were not destroyed and freely left populated areas.
Despite this, in western regions There were local battles in Chechnya. On March 10, fighting began for the village of Bamut. On April 7-8, a combined detachment of the Ministry of Internal Affairs, consisting of the Sofrinsky brigade of internal troops and supported by SOBR and OMON detachments, entered the village of Samashki (Achkhoy-Martan district of Chechnya). It was alleged that the village was defended by more than 300 people (the so-called “Abkhaz battalion” of Shamil Basayev). After Russian soldiers entered the village, some residents who had weapons began to resist, and shootouts broke out on the streets of the village.
According to a number international organizations(in particular, the UN Commission on Human Rights - UNCHR) many died during the battle for Samashki civilians. This information, disseminated by the separatist agency Chechen Press, however, turned out to be quite contradictory - thus, according to representatives of the Memorial human rights center, this data “does not inspire confidence.” According to Memorial, the minimum number of civilians killed during the clearing of the village was 112-114 people.
One way or another, this operation caused a great stir in Russian society and strengthened anti-Russian sentiment in Chechnya.
On April 15-16, the decisive assault on Bamut began - Russian troops managed to enter the village and gain a foothold on the outskirts. Then, however, Russian troops were forced to leave the village, since the militants had now occupied the commanding heights above the village, using the old missile silos Strategic Missile Forces designed to conduct nuclear war and invulnerable to Russian aviation. A series of battles for this village continued until June 1995, then the battles were suspended after terrorist attack in Budyonnovsk and resumed in February 1996.
By April 1995, Russian troops occupied almost the entire flat territory of Chechnya and the separatists focused on sabotage and guerrilla operations.
Establishing control over the mountainous regions of Chechnya (May - June 1995)
From April 28 to May 11, 1995, the Russian side announced a suspension of hostilities on its part.
The offensive resumed only on May 12. The attacks of Russian troops fell on the villages of Chiri-Yurt, which covered the entrance to the Argun Gorge, and Serzhen-Yurt, located at the entrance to the Vedenskoye Gorge. Despite significant superiority in manpower and equipment, Russian troops were bogged down in enemy defenses - it took General Shamanov a week of shelling and bombing to take Chiri-Yurt.
Under these conditions, the Russian command decided to change the direction of the attack - instead of Shatoy to Vedeno. The militant units were pinned down in the Argun Gorge and on June 3 Vedeno was taken by Russian troops, and on June 12 the regional centers of Shatoy and Nozhai-Yurt were taken.
As well as in lowland areas, the separatist forces were not defeated and they were able to leave the abandoned settlements. Therefore, even during the “truce”, the militants were able to transfer a significant part of their forces to the northern regions - on May 14, the city of Grozny was shelled by them more than 14 times.
On June 14, 1995, a group of Chechen militants, numbering 195 people, led by field commander Shamil Basayev, entered the territory of the Stavropol Territory in trucks and stopped in the city of Budyonnovsk.
The first target of the attack was the building of the city police department, then the terrorists occupied the city hospital and herded captured civilians into it. In total, there were about 2,000 hostages in the hands of terrorists. Basayev put forward demands to the Russian authorities - a cessation of hostilities and the withdrawal of Russian troops from Chechnya, negotiations with Dudayev through the mediation of UN representatives in exchange for the release of hostages.
Under these conditions, the authorities decided to storm the hospital building. Due to an information leak, the terrorists managed to prepare to repel the assault, which lasted four hours; As a result, the special forces recaptured all buildings (except the main one), freeing 95 hostages. Special forces losses amounted to three people killed. On the same day, an unsuccessful second assault attempt was made.
After the failure of forceful actions to free the hostages, negotiations began between the then head of the Russian government, Viktor Chernomyrdin, and field commander Shamil Basayev. The terrorists were provided with buses, on which they, along with 120 hostages, arrived in the Chechen village of Zandak, where the hostages were released.
Total losses Russian side, according to official data, amounted to 143 people (of which 46 were employees security forces) and 415 wounded, terrorist losses - 19 killed and 20 wounded.
The situation in the republic in June-December 1995
After the terrorist attack in Budennovsk, from June 19 to 22, the first round of negotiations between the Russian and Chechen sides took place in Grozny, at which it was possible to achieve the introduction of a moratorium on military operations in indefinite term.
From June 27 to 30, the second stage of negotiations took place there, at which an agreement was reached on the exchange of prisoners “all for all,” the disarmament of the CRI detachments, the withdrawal of Russian troops and the holding of free elections.
Despite all the agreements concluded, the ceasefire regime was violated by both sides. Chechen detachments returned to their villages, but no longer as members of illegal armed groups, but as “self-defense units.” Local battles took place throughout Chechnya. For some time, the tensions that arose could be resolved through negotiations. Thus, on August 18-19, Russian troops blocked Achkhoy-Martan; the situation was resolved at negotiations in Grozny.
On August 21, a detachment of militants of the field commander Alaudi Khamzatov captured Argun, but after heavy shelling by Russian troops, they left the city, into which Russian armored vehicles were then introduced.
In September, Achkhoy-Martan and Sernovodsk were blocked by Russian troops, since militant detachments were located in these settlements. The Chechen side refused to leave their occupied positions, since, according to them, these were “self-defense units” that had the right to remain in accordance with previously reached agreements.
On October 6, 1995, an assassination attempt was made on the commander of the United Group of Forces (OGV), General Romanov, as a result of which he ended up in a coma. In turn, “retaliation strikes” were carried out against Chechen villages.
October 8 taken unsuccessful attempt liquidation of Dudayev - an air strike was carried out on the village of Roshni-Chu. More than 40 houses were destroyed in the village, 6 were killed and 15 local residents were injured.
The Russian leadership decided before the elections to replace the leaders of the pro-Russian administration of the republic, Salambek Khadzhiev and Umar Avturkhanov, with the last chairman of the Supreme Council of the Chechen-Ingush Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic, Doku Zavgaev.
On December 10-12, the city of Gudermes, occupied by Russian troops without resistance, was captured by the detachments of Salman Raduev, Khunkar-Pasha Israpilov and Sultan Gelikhanov. On December 14-20, there were battles for this city; it took Russian troops about another week of “cleansing operations” to finally take control of Gudermes.
On December 14-17, elections were held in Chechnya, which were held with a large number of violations, but were nevertheless recognized as valid. Separatist supporters announced in advance their boycott and non-recognition of the elections. Doku Zavgaev won the elections, receiving over 90% of the votes; At the same time, all UGA military personnel participated in the elections.
On January 9, 1996, a detachment of militants numbering 256 people under the command of field commanders Salman Raduev, Turpal-Ali Atgeriyev and Khunkar-Pasha Israpilov carried out a raid on the city of Kizlyar. The militants' initial target was a Russian helicopter base and weapons depot. The terrorists destroyed two Mi-8 transport helicopters and took several hostages from among the military personnel guarding the base. The Russian military began to approach the city and law enforcement agencies, so the terrorists captured the hospital and maternity hospital, driving about 3,000 more civilians there. This time Russian authorities they did not give the order to storm the hospital, so as not to strengthen anti-Russian sentiments in Dagestan. During the negotiations, it was possible to agree on providing the militants with buses to the border with Chechnya in exchange for the release of the hostages, who were supposed to be dropped off at the very border. On January 10, a convoy with militants and hostages moved towards the border. When it became clear that the terrorists would go to Chechnya, the bus convoy was stopped with warning shots. Taking advantage of the confusion of the Russian leadership, the militants captured the village of Pervomaiskoye, disarming the police checkpoint located there. Negotiations took place from January 11 to 14, and an unsuccessful assault on the village took place on January 15-18. In parallel with the assault on Pervomaisky, on January 16, in the Turkish port of Trabzon, a group of terrorists seized the passenger ship "Avrasia" with threats to shoot Russian hostages if the assault was not stopped. After two days of negotiations, the terrorists surrendered to the Turkish authorities.
The losses of the Russian side, according to official data, amounted to 78 people killed and several hundred wounded.
On March 6, 1996, several militant groups attacked from various directions Grozny, controlled by Russian troops. The militants captured the Staropromyslovsky district of the city, blocked and fired at Russian checkpoints and checkpoints. Despite the fact that Grozny remained under the control of the Russian armed forces, the separatists took with them supplies of food, medicine and ammunition when they retreated. The losses of the Russian side, according to official data, amounted to 70 people killed and 259 wounded.
On April 16, 1996, a column of the 245th motorized rifle regiment of the Russian Armed Forces, moving to Shatoy, was ambushed in the Argun Gorge near the village of Yaryshmardy. The operation was led by field commander Khattab. The militants knocked out the leading and trailing column of the vehicle, so the column was blocked and suffered significant losses - all armored vehicles and half of the personnel were lost.
From the very beginning of the Chechen campaign Russian intelligence services They repeatedly tried to eliminate the President of the Chechen Republic of Ichkeria, Dzhokhar Dudayev. Attempts to send assassins ended in failure. It was possible to find out that Dudayev often talks on a satellite phone of the Inmarsat system.
On April 21, 1996, a Russian A-50 AWACS aircraft, which was equipped with equipment for bearing a satellite phone signal, received an order to take off. At the same time, Dudayev’s motorcade left for the area of the village of Gekhi-Chu. Unfolding his phone, Dudayev contacted Konstantin Borov. At that moment, the signal from the phone was intercepted, and two Su-25 attack aircraft took off. When the planes reached the target, two missiles were fired at the motorcade, one of which hit the target directly.
By a closed decree of Boris Yeltsin, several military pilots were awarded the title of Hero of the Russian Federation.
Negotiations with the separatists (May-July 1996)
Despite some successes of the Russian Armed Forces (the successful liquidation of Dudayev, the final capture of the settlements of Goiskoye, Stary Achkhoy, Bamut, Shali), the war began to take a protracted character. In the context of the upcoming presidential elections, the Russian leadership decided to once again negotiate with the separatists.
On May 27-28, a meeting of the Russian and Ichkerian (headed by Zelimkhan Yandarbiev) delegations was held in Moscow, at which it was possible to agree on a truce from June 1, 1996 and an exchange of prisoners. Immediately after the end of the negotiations in Moscow, Boris Yeltsin flew to Grozny, where he congratulated the Russian military on their victory over the “rebellious Dudayev regime” and announced the abolition of conscription.
On June 10, in Nazran (Republic of Ingushetia), during the next round of negotiations, an agreement was reached on the withdrawal of Russian troops from the territory of Chechnya (with the exception of two brigades), the disarmament of separatist detachments, and the holding of free democratic elections. The question of the status of the republic was temporarily postponed.
The agreements concluded in Moscow and Nazran were violated by both sides, in particular, the Russian side was in no hurry to withdraw its troops, and the Chechen field commander Ruslan Khaikhoroev took responsibility for the explosion of a regular bus in Nalchik.
On July 3, 1996, the current President of the Russian Federation, Boris Yeltsin, was re-elected to the presidency. The new Secretary of the Security Council, Alexander Lebed, announced the resumption of hostilities against militants.
On July 9, after the Russian ultimatum, hostilities resumed - aircraft attacked militant bases in the mountainous Shatoi, Vedeno and Nozhai-Yurt regions.
On August 6, 1996, detachments of Chechen separatists numbering from 850 to 2000 people again attacked Grozny. The separatists did not aim to capture the city; they were blocked administrative buildings in the city center, and checkpoints and checkpoints were also fired upon. The Russian garrison under the command of General Pulikovsky, despite significant superiority in manpower and equipment, was unable to hold the city, suffering significant losses (over 2,000 military personnel killed, missing and wounded).
Simultaneously with the assault on Grozny, the separatists also captured the cities of Gudermes (they took it without a fight) and Argun (Russian troops only held the commandant’s office building).
According to Oleg Lukin, it was the defeat of Russian troops in Grozny that led to the signing of the Khasavyurt ceasefire agreements.
On August 31, 1996, representatives of Russia (Chairman of the Security Council Alexander Lebed) and Ichkeria (Aslan Maskhadov) signed a truce agreement in the city of Khasavyurt (Dagestan). Russian troops were completely withdrawn from Chechnya, and the decision on the status of the republic was postponed until December 31, 2001.
Peacekeeping initiatives and activities of humanitarian organizations
On December 15, 1994, the “Mission of the Commissioner for Human Rights in the North Caucasus” began to operate in the conflict zone, which included deputies of the State Duma of the Russian Federation and a representative of Memorial (later called the “Mission of Public Organizations under the leadership of S. A. Kovalev”). . “Kovalyov’s Mission” did not have official powers, but acted with the support of several human rights public organizations; the work of the Mission was coordinated by the Memorial human rights center.
Since December 1994, the Democratic Choice of Russia party and its leader Yegor Gaidar have taken an active anti-war position. A number of anti-war rallies are being held in Moscow with calls to curtail the military operation, and various military appeals are being signed. Including E. Gaidar (who, in the days before the start of the war, according to his own statement, for the first time could not get through to B. Yeltsin), wrote a letter to the president on December 17, 1994, where he states that “the assault and bombing of Grozny will lead to huge sacrifices"and calls supreme commander in chief“to prevent an escalation of hostilities in Chechnya.” On December 20, Yegor Gaidar also initiated the collection of letters from all those opposed to the war in Chechnya in the hope that a large volume of statements from citizens could influence the president’s decision. The newspaper published a text with a “template” letter to the president.
On December 31, 1994, on the eve of the storming of Grozny by Russian troops, Sergei Kovalev, as part of a group of State Duma deputies and journalists, negotiated with Chechen militants and parliamentarians in the presidential palace in Grozny. When the assault began and Russian tanks and armored personnel carriers began to burn in the square in front of the palace, civilians took refuge in the basement of the presidential palace, and soon the wounded and prisoners began to appear there Russian soldiers. Correspondent Danila Galperovich recalled that Kovalev, being among the militants at Dzhokhar Dudayev’s headquarters, “almost all the time was in a basement room equipped with army radio stations,” offering Russian tank crews “an exit from the city without shooting if they indicate the route.” According to journalist Galina Kovalskaya, who was also there, after they were shown burning Russian tanks in the city center,
Sergei Kovalev took a walkie-talkie from Dudayev’s guards and used it to call on Russian military personnel to surrender. For this, Kovalev will later be declared a “traitor”, Defense Minister Pavel Grachev will persuade him and General Troshev will remember him with an unkind word in his book. However, at that moment all of us, including Kovalev, saw one thing: our guys were burning in tanks in vain. Captivity is the only way for them to survive.
Kovalev himself denies the veracity of Kovalskaya’s testimony: “I technically could not do this, because in order to tell these tanks by radio, you need to have a radio tuned to the wavelength of these tanks.”
According to the Institute of Human Rights, headed by Kovalev, this episode, as well as the entire human rights and anti-war position Kovalev, became the reason for a negative reaction from the military leadership, government officials, as well as numerous supporters of the “state” approach to human rights. In January 1995, the State Duma adopted a draft resolution in which his work in Chechnya was recognized as unsatisfactory: as Kommersant wrote, “due to his “unilateral position” aimed at justifying illegal armed groups.”
In March 1995, the State Duma removed Kovalev from the post of Commissioner for Human Rights in Russia, according to Kommersant, “for his statements against the war in Chechnya.”
As part of the “Kovalyov mission”, representatives of different non-governmental organizations, deputies, journalists. The mission was collecting information about what was happening in the Chechen war and searching for missing persons and prisoners; contributed to the release of Russian military personnel captured by Chechen militants. For example, the Kommersant newspaper reported that during the siege of the village of Bamut by Russian troops, the commander of militant detachments, Khaikharoev, promised to execute five prisoners after each shelling of the village by Russian troops, but under the influence of Sergei Kovalev, who participated in negotiations with field commanders , Khaikharoev abandoned these intentions.
Since the beginning of the conflict, the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) has launched an extensive relief program, providing more than 250,000 internally displaced people with food parcels, blankets, soap, warm clothing and plastic coverings in the first months. In February 1995, of the 120,000 residents remaining in Grozny, 70,000 were completely dependent on ICRC assistance.
In Grozny, the water supply and sewer systems were completely destroyed, and the ICRC hastily began organizing supplies for the city drinking water. In the summer of 1995, approximately 750,000 liters of chlorinated water were delivered daily by tanker truck to meet the needs of more than 100,000 residents at 50 distribution points throughout Grozny. Over the next year, 1996, more than 230 million liters of drinking water were produced for residents of the North Caucasus.
In Grozny and other cities of Chechnya, free canteens were opened for the most vulnerable segments of the population, in which 7,000 people were provided with hot food every day. More than 70,000 schoolchildren in Chechnya received books and school supplies from the ICRC.
During 1995-1996, the ICRC implemented a number of assistance programs for victims of the armed conflict. Its delegates visited about 700 people detained by federal forces and Chechen militants in 25 places of detention in Chechnya itself and neighboring regions, delivered more than 50,000 letters to the recipients on Red Cross message forms, which became the only opportunity for separated families to establish contacts with each other, so how all forms of communication were interrupted. The ICRC provided medicines and medical supplies to 75 hospitals and medical institutions in Chechnya, North Ossetia, Ingushetia and Dagestan, participated in the reconstruction and provision of medicines to hospitals in Grozny, Argun, Gudermes, Shali, Urus-Martan and Shatoy, provided regular assistance homes for the disabled and orphanages.
In the fall of 1996, in the village of Novye Atagi, the ICRC equipped and opened a hospital for war victims. During the three months of operation, the hospital received more than 320 people, 1,700 people received outpatient care, and almost six hundred surgical operations were performed. On December 17, 1996, an armed attack was carried out on a hospital in Novye Atagi, as a result of which six of its foreign employees were killed. After this, the ICRC was forced to withdraw foreign employees from Chechnya.
In April 1995, American humanitarian specialist Frederick Cuney, together with two Russian doctors from the Russian Red Cross Society and a translator, was organizing humanitarian aid in Chechnya. Cuney was trying to negotiate a truce when he went missing. There is reason to believe that Cuney and his Russian associates were captured by Chechen militants and executed on the orders of Rezvan Elbiev, one of the heads of counterintelligence of Dzhokhar Dudayev, because they were mistaken for Russian agents. There is a version that this was the result of a provocation by the Russian special services, who thus dealt with Cuney at the hands of the Chechens.
Various women's movements ("Soldiers' Mothers", "White Shawl", "Women of the Don" and others) worked with military personnel - participants in combat operations, released prisoners of war, wounded, and other categories of victims during military operations.
Journalist and human rights activist Viktor Popkov contributed to the release of captured Russian soldiers by the Chechens; in March 1995, he took part in organizing the “peace march,” when several dozen people, mostly mothers of dead soldiers, drove and marched under anti-war slogans from Moscow to Chechnya. In May 1995, he was arrested by Chechen special services on suspicion of espionage for federal forces and spent about a month in prison. In the summer of the same year, he was a mediator and observer in the negotiation process that had begun.
Yuri Shevchuk and his rock band DDT gave three big concerts in Chechnya: in Khankala, Grozny and Severny airport for Russian military personnel and Chechens, trying to achieve reconciliation.
Foreign military assistance to Chechen separatists
Chechen anti-government formations began receiving military assistance even before the start of hostilities in Chechnya.
In 1991, the first shipment was delivered from Turkey under the guise of “humanitarian aid” to Chechnya. small arms Soviet models (mainly weapons produced by the GDR, previously received by Turkey from Germany under the NATO assistance program).
Results
The result of the war was the signing of the Khasavyurt agreements and the withdrawal of Russian troops. Chechnya again became a de facto independent state, but de jure not recognized by any country in the world (including Russia).
Destroyed houses and villages were not restored, the economy was exclusively criminal, however, it was criminal not only in Chechnya, so, according to former deputy Konstantin Borovoy, bribes in the construction business under contracts of the Ministry of Defense, during the First Chechen War, reached 80% from the contract amount. Due to ethnic cleansing and fighting, almost the entire non-Chechen population left Chechnya (or was killed). The interwar crisis and the rise of Wahhabism began in the republic, which later led to the invasion of Dagestan, and then to the beginning of the Second Chechen War.
Losses
According to data released by the OGV headquarters after the end of hostilities, the losses of Russian troops amounted to 4,103 killed, 1,231 missing/deserted/prisoned, and 19,794 wounded. According to updated data collected by a group of researchers led by Colonel General G.F. Krivosheev, the losses of the federal forces amounted to 5,042 killed, 510 missing, and 16,098 wounded. According to the Committee of Soldiers' Mothers, the losses amounted to at least 14,000 people killed (documented deaths according to the mothers of deceased servicemen). However, it should be borne in mind that the data from the Committee of Soldiers’ Mothers includes only the losses of conscript soldiers, without taking into account the losses of contract soldiers, special forces soldiers, etc.
The losses of the militants, according to the Russian side, amounted to 17,391 people. According to the chief of staff of the Chechen units (later President of the ChRI) A. Maskhadov, the losses of the Chechen side amounted to about 3,000 people killed. According to the human rights organization Memorial, the losses of the militants did not exceed 2,700 people killed, and the number of civilian casualties was up to 50 thousand people killed. Secretary of the Security Council of the Russian Federation A.I. Lebed estimated the losses of the civilian population of Chechnya at 80,000 dead.
At the beginning of the operation, the combined group of federal forces numbered over 16.5 thousand people. Since the majority of motorized rifle units and formations had a reduced composition, consolidated detachments were created on their basis. A single governing body, common system rear and technical support The combined group had no troops. Lieutenant General Anatoly Kvashnin was appointed commander of the United Group of Forces (OGV) in the Chechen Republic.
On December 11, 1994, the movement of troops began in the direction of the Chechen capital - the city of Grozny. On December 31, 1994, troops, by order of the Minister of Defense of the Russian Federation, began the assault on Grozny. About 250 armored vehicles entered the city, extremely vulnerable in street battles. Russian armored columns were stopped and blocked by Chechens in different areas of the city, and the combat units of the federal forces that entered Grozny suffered heavy losses.
After this, Russian troops changed tactics - instead of the massive use of armored vehicles, they began to use maneuverable air assault groups supported by artillery and aviation. Fierce street fighting broke out in Grozny.
By the beginning of February, the strength of the Joint Group of Forces was increased to 70 thousand people. Colonel General Anatoly Kulikov became the new commander of the OGV.
On February 3, 1995, the “South” group was formed and the implementation of the plan to blockade Grozny from the south began.
On February 13, in the village of Sleptsovskaya (Ingushetia), negotiations were held between the commander of the OGV Anatoly Kulikov and the chief of the general staff of the armed forces of the ChRI Aslan Maskhadov on concluding a temporary truce - the parties exchanged lists of prisoners of war, and both sides were also given the opportunity to remove the dead and wounded from the streets of the city. The truce was violated by both sides.
At the end of February, street fighting continued in the city (especially in its southern part), but Chechen troops, deprived of support, gradually retreated from the city.
On March 6, 1995, a detachment of militants from the Chechen field commander Shamil Basayev retreated from Chernorechye, the last area of Grozny controlled by the separatists, and the city finally came under the control of Russian troops.
After the capture of Grozny, the troops began to destroy illegal armed groups in other settlements and in the mountainous regions of Chechnya.
On March 12-23, OGV troops carried out a successful operation to eliminate the enemy’s Argun group and capture the city of Argun. On March 22-31, the Gudermes group was liquidated; on March 31, after heavy fighting, Shali was occupied.
Having suffered a number of major defeats, the militants began to change the organization and tactics of their units; illegal armed groups united into small, highly maneuverable units and groups focused on carrying out sabotage, raids, and ambushes.
From April 28 to May 12, 1995, according to the decree of the President of the Russian Federation, there was a moratorium on the use of armed force in Chechnya.
In June 1995, Lieutenant General Anatoly Romanov was appointed commander of the OGV.
On June 3, after heavy fighting, federal forces entered Vedeno; on June 12, the regional centers of Shatoi and Nozhai-Yurt were taken. By mid-June 1995, 85% of the territory of the Chechen Republic was under the control of federal forces.
Illegal armed groups redeployed part of their forces from mountainous areas to the locations of Russian troops, formed new groups of militants, fired at checkpoints and positions of federal forces, and organized terrorist attacks of unprecedented scale in Budennovsk (June 1995), Kizlyar and Pervomaisky (January 1996) .
On October 6, 1995, the commander of the OGV, Anatoly Romanov, was seriously wounded in a tunnel near Minutka Square in Grozny as a result of a clearly planned terrorist act - the detonation of a radio-controlled landmine.
On August 6, 1996, federal troops, after heavy defensive battles, having suffered heavy losses, left Grozny. INVFs also entered Argun, Gudermes and Shali.
On August 31, 1996, cessation of hostilities agreements were signed in Khasavyurt, ending the first Chechen campaign. The Khasavyurt Treaty was signed by Secretary of the Security Council of the Russian Federation Alexander Lebed and Chief of Staff of the separatist armed formations Aslan Maskhadov; the signing ceremony was attended by the head of the OSCE assistance group in the Chechen Republic, Tim Guldiman. The decision on the status of the Chechen Republic was postponed until 2001.
After the conclusion of the agreement, federal troops were withdrawn from the territory of Chechnya in an extremely short period of time from September 21 to December 31, 1996.
According to data released by the OGV headquarters immediately after the end of hostilities, the losses of Russian troops amounted to 4,103 killed, 1,231 missing/deserted/prisoned, and 19,794 wounded.
According to statistical research"Russia and the USSR in the wars of the 20th century" under general edition G.V. Krivosheeva (2001), The Armed Forces of the Russian Federation, other troops, military formations and bodies that took part in hostilities on the territory of the Chechen Republic lost 5,042 people killed and dead, 510 people were missing and captured. Sanitary losses amounted to 51,387 people, including: wounded, shell-shocked, and injured 16,098 people.
Irrevocable losses personnel illegal armed groups in Chechnya are estimated at 2500-2700 people.
According to expert estimates from law enforcement agencies and human rights organizations, the total number of civilian casualties was 30-35 thousand people, including those killed in Budennovsk, Kizlyar, Pervomaisk, and Ingushetia.
The material was prepared based on information from RIA Novosti and open sources
(Additional
1. The First Chechen War (Chechen conflict 1994-1996, First Chechen campaign, Restoration of constitutional order in the Chechen Republic) - fighting between Russian troops (Armed Forces and Ministry of Internal Affairs) and the unrecognized Chechen Republic of Ichkeria in Chechnya, and some settlements in neighboring regions of the Russian North Caucasus, with the aim of taking control of the territory of Chechnya, on which the Chechen Republic of Ichkeria was proclaimed in 1991.
2. Officially, the conflict was defined as “measures to maintain constitutional order”; military actions were called the “first Chechen war”, less often the “Russian-Chechen” or “Russian-Caucasian war”. The conflict and the events preceding it were characterized by a large number of casualties among the population, military and law enforcement agencies, and facts of ethnic cleansing of the non-Chechen population in Chechnya were noted.
3. Despite certain military successes of the Armed Forces and the Ministry of Internal Affairs of Russia, the results of this conflict were the withdrawal of Russian units, mass destruction and casualties, de facto independence of Chechnya before the Second Chechen War and a wave of terror that swept across Russia.
4. With the beginning of perestroika in various republics of the Soviet Union, including Checheno-Ingushetia, various nationalist movements intensified. One of such organizations was the National Congress of the Chechen People (NCCHN), created in 1990, which set as its goal the secession of Chechnya from the USSR and the creation of an independent Chechen state. It was headed former general Soviet Air Force Dzhokhar Dudayev.
5. On June 8, 1991, at the II session of the OKCHN, Dudayev proclaimed the independence of the Chechen Republic of Nokhchi-cho; Thus, a dual power arose in the republic.
6. During the “August putsch” in Moscow, the leadership of the Chechen Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic supported the State Emergency Committee. In response to this, on September 6, 1991, Dudayev announced the dissolution of republican government structures, accusing Russia of “colonial” policies. On the same day, Dudayev's guards stormed the building of the Supreme Council, the television center and the Radio House. More than 40 deputies were beaten, and the chairman of the Grozny City Council, Vitaly Kutsenko, was thrown out of a window, as a result of which he died. The head of the Chechen Republic, D. G. Zavgaev, spoke on this issue in 1996 at a meeting of the State Duma."
Yes, on the territory of the Chechen-Ingush Republic (today it is divided) the war began in the fall of 1991, it was the war against a multinational people, when the criminal regime, with some support from those who today also show an unhealthy interest in the situation, flooded this people with blood. The first victim of what was happening was the people of this republic, and the Chechens first of all. The war began when Vitaly Kutsenko, chairman of the Grozny City Council, was killed in broad daylight during a meeting of the Supreme Council of the republic. When Besliev, vice-rector, was shot on the street state university. When Kancalik, the rector of the same state university, was killed. When every day in the fall of 1991, up to 30 people were found killed on the streets of Grozny. When, from the autumn of 1991 until 1994, the morgues of Grozny were filled to the ceiling, announcements were made on local television with a request to take them away, to establish who was there, and so on.
8. The Chairman of the Supreme Council of the RSFSR, Ruslan Khasbulatov, then sent them a telegram: “I was pleased to learn about the resignation of the Armed Forces of the Republic.” After the collapse of the USSR, Dzhokhar Dudayev announced the final secession of Chechnya from the Russian Federation. On October 27, 1991, presidential and parliamentary elections were held in the republic under the control of separatists. Dzhokhar Dudayev became the president of the republic. These elections were declared illegal by the Russian Federation
9. On November 7, 1991, Russian President Boris Yeltsin signed the Decree “On the introduction of a state of emergency in the Chechen-Ingush Republic (1991).” After these actions by the Russian leadership, the situation in the republic sharply worsened - separatist supporters surrounded the buildings of the Ministry of Internal Affairs and the KGB, military camps, and blocked railway and air hubs. In the end, the introduction of a state of emergency was thwarted; the Decree “On the introduction of a state of emergency in the Checheno-Ingush Republic (1991)” was canceled on November 11, three days after its signing, after a heated discussion at a meeting of the Supreme Council of the RSFSR and from the republic The withdrawal of Russian military units and units of the Ministry of Internal Affairs began, which was finally completed by the summer of 1992. The separatists began seizing and looting military warehouses.
10. Dudayev’s forces got a lot of weapons: Two operational-tactical launchers missile complex in battle-ready condition. 111 L-39 and 149 L-29 trainer aircraft, the aircraft converted into light attack aircraft; three MiG-17 fighters and two MiG-15 fighters; six An-2 aircraft and two Mi-8 helicopters, 117 R-23 and R-24 aircraft missiles, 126 R-60 aircraft; about 7 thousand GSh-23 aerial shells. 42 tanks T-62 and T-72; 34 BMP-1 and BMP-2; 30 BTR-70 and BRDM; 44 MT-LB, 942 vehicles. 18 Grad MLRS and more than 1000 shells for them. 139 artillery systems, including 30 122-mm D-30 howitzers and 24 thousand shells for them; as well as self-propelled guns 2S1 and 2S3; anti-tank guns MT-12. Five air defense systems, 25 missiles various types, 88 MANPADS; 105 pcs. S-75 missile defense system. 590 anti-tank weapons, including two Konkurs ATGMs, 24 Fagot ATGM systems, 51 Metis ATGM systems, 113 RPG-7 systems. About 50 thousand small arms, more than 150 thousand grenades. 27 wagons of ammunition; 1620 tons of fuels and lubricants; about 10 thousand sets of clothing, 72 tons of food; 90 tons of medical equipment.
12. In June 1992, Russian Defense Minister Pavel Grachev ordered the transfer of half of all weapons and ammunition available in the republic to the Dudayevites. According to him, this was a forced step, since a significant part of the “transferred” weapons had already been captured, and there was no way to remove the rest due to the lack of soldiers and trains.
13. The victory of the separatists in Grozny led to the collapse of the Chechen-Ingush Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic. Malgobek, Nazranovsky and most of the Sunzhensky district of the former Chechen Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic formed the Republic of Ingushetia within the Russian Federation. Legally, the Chechen-Ingush Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic ceased to exist on December 10, 1992.
14. The exact border between Chechnya and Ingushetia was not demarcated and has not been determined to this day (2012). During the Ossetian-Ingush conflict in November 1992, Russian troops were introduced into the Prigorodny region of North Ossetia. Relations between Russia and Chechnya have deteriorated sharply. The Russian high command proposed at the same time solving the “Chechen problem” by force, but then the deployment of troops into the territory of Chechnya was prevented by the efforts of Yegor Gaidar.
16. As a result, Chechnya became a virtually independent state, but not legally recognized by any country, including Russia. The republic had state symbols - the flag, coat of arms and anthem, authorities - the president, parliament, government, secular courts. It was planned to create a small Armed Forces, as well as the introduction of its own state currency - nahar. In the constitution adopted on March 12, 1992, the CRI was characterized as an “independent secular state”; its government refused to sign a federal agreement with the Russian Federation.
17. In reality, the state system of the CRI turned out to be extremely ineffective and rapidly became criminalized in the period 1991-1994. In 1992-1993, over 600 intentional murders were committed on the territory of Chechnya. During the period of 1993, at the Grozny branch of the North Caucasus Railway, 559 trains were subjected to an armed attack with the complete or partial looting of about 4 thousand cars and containers worth 11.5 billion rubles. During 8 months of 1994, 120 armed attacks were carried out, as a result of which 1,156 wagons and 527 containers were looted. Losses amounted to more than 11 billion rubles. In 1992-1994, 26 railway workers were killed as a result of armed attacks. The current situation forced the Russian government to decide to stop traffic through the territory of Chechnya from October 1994
18. A special trade was the production of false advice notes, from which more than 4 trillion rubles were received. Hostage-taking and slave trade flourished in the republic - according to Rosinformtsentr, a total of 1,790 people have been kidnapped and illegally held in Chechnya since 1992.
19. Even after this, when Dudayev stopped paying taxes to the general budget and banned employees of the Russian special services from entering the republic, the federal center continued to transfer funds from the budget to Chechnya. In 1993, 11.5 billion rubles were allocated for Chechnya. Russian oil continued to flow into Chechnya until 1994, but it was not paid for and was resold abroad.
21. In the spring of 1993, the contradictions between President Dudayev and the parliament sharply worsened in the Chechen Republic of Ichkeria. On April 17, 1993, Dudayev announced the dissolution of parliament, the constitutional court and the Ministry of Internal Affairs. On June 4, armed Dudayevites under the command of Shamil Basayev seized the building of the Grozny City Council, where meetings of the parliament and the constitutional court were held; Thus, a coup d'état took place in the CRI. Amendments were made to the constitution adopted last year; a regime of Dudayev’s personal power was established in the republic, which lasted until August 1994, when legislative powers were returned to parliament
22. After the coup d'etat on June 4, 1993, in the northern regions of Chechnya, not controlled by the separatist government in Grozny, an armed anti-Dudaev opposition was formed, which began an armed struggle against the Dudayev regime. The first opposition organization was the Committee of National Salvation (KNS), which carried out several armed actions, but was soon defeated and disintegrated. It was replaced by the Provisional Council of the Chechen Republic (VCCR), which declared itself the only legitimate authority on the territory of Chechnya. The VSChR was recognized as such by the Russian authorities, who provided it with all kinds of support (including weapons and volunteers).
23. Since the summer of 1994, fighting has unfolded in Chechnya between troops loyal to Dudayev and the forces of the opposition Provisional Council. Troops loyal to Dudayev carried out offensive operations in the Nadterechny and Urus-Martan regions controlled by opposition troops. They were accompanied by significant losses on both sides; tanks, artillery and mortars were used.
24. The forces of the parties were approximately equal, and none of them was able to gain the upper hand in the fight.
25. In Urus-Martan alone in October 1994, the Dudayevites lost 27 people killed, according to the opposition. The operation was planned by the Chief of the Main Staff of the Armed Forces of the ChRI Aslan Maskhadov. The commander of the opposition detachment in Urus-Martan, Bislan Gantamirov, lost from 5 to 34 people killed, according to various sources. In Argun in September 1994, the detachment of the opposition field commander Ruslan Labazanov lost 27 people killed. The opposition, in turn, carried out offensive actions in Grozny on September 12 and October 15, 1994, but retreated each time without achieving decisive success, although it did not suffer large losses.
26. On November 26, oppositionists unsuccessfully stormed Grozny for the third time. At the same time, a number of Russian military personnel who “fought on the side of the opposition” under a contract with the Federal Counterintelligence Service were captured by Dudayev’s supporters.
27. Deployment of troops (December 1994)
At that time, the use of the expression “the entry of Russian troops into Chechnya,” according to deputy and journalist Alexander Nevzorov, was, to a greater extent, caused by journalistic terminological confusion - Chechnya was part of Russia.
Even before any decision was announced by the Russian authorities, on December 1, Russian aviation attacked the Kalinovskaya and Khankala airfields and disabled all aircraft at the disposal of the separatists. On December 11, President of the Russian Federation Boris Yeltsin signed Decree No. 2169 “On measures to ensure legality, law and order and public safety on the territory of the Chechen Republic.” Later, the Constitutional Court of the Russian Federation recognized most of the decrees and resolutions of the government that justified the actions of the federal government in Chechnya as consistent with the Constitution.
On the same day, units of the United Group of Forces (OGV), consisting of units of the Ministry of Defense and Internal Troops of the Ministry of Internal Affairs, entered the territory of Chechnya. The troops were divided into three groups and entered from three different directions - from the west from North Ossetia through Ingushetia), from the northwest from the Mozdok region of North Ossetia, directly bordering Chechnya, and from the east from the territory of Dagestan).
The eastern group was blocked in the Khasavyurt region of Dagestan by local residents - Akkin Chechens. The western group was also blocked by local residents and came under fire near the village of Barsuki, but using force, they nevertheless broke through into Chechnya. The Mozdok group advanced most successfully, already on December 12 approaching the village of Dolinsky, located 10 km from Grozny.
Near Dolinskoye, Russian troops came under fire from a Chechen Grad rocket artillery system and then entered into battle for this populated area.
A new offensive by OGV units began on December 19. The Vladikavkaz (western) group blocked Grozny from the western direction, bypassing the Sunzhensky ridge. On December 20, the Mozdok (northwestern) group occupied Dolinsky and blocked Grozny from the northwest. The Kizlyar (eastern) group blocked Grozny from the east, and paratroopers of the 104th Airborne Regiment blocked the city from the Argun Gorge. At the same time, the southern part of Grozny was not blocked.
Thus, at the initial stage of hostilities, in the first weeks of the war, Russian troops were able to occupy the northern regions of Chechnya practically without resistance
In mid-December, federal troops began shelling the suburbs of Grozny, and on December 19 the first bomb attack was carried out on the city center. The artillery shelling and bombing killed and injured many civilians (including ethnic Russians).
Despite the fact that Grozny still remained unblocked on the southern side, on December 31, 1994, the assault on the city began. About 250 armored vehicles entered the city, extremely vulnerable in street battles. Russian troops were poorly prepared, there was no interaction and coordination between various units, and many soldiers had no combat experience. The troops had aerial photographs of the city, outdated plans of the city in limited quantities. The communications facilities were not equipped with closed-circuit communications equipment, which allowed the enemy to intercept communications. The troops were given an order to occupy only industrial buildings and areas and not to invade the homes of the civilian population.
The western group of troops was stopped, the eastern also retreated and did not take any action until January 2, 1995. In the northern direction, the 1st and 2nd battalions of the 131st separate Maykop motorized rifle brigade (more than 300 people), a motorized rifle battalion and a tank company of the 81st Petrakuvsky motorized rifle regiment (10 tanks), under the command of General Pulikovsky, reached the railway station and the Presidential Palace. Federal forces were surrounded - the losses of the battalions of the Maykop brigade, according to official data, amounted to 85 people killed and 72 missing, 20 tanks were destroyed, the brigade commander Colonel Savin was killed, more than 100 military personnel were captured.
The eastern group under the command of General Rokhlin was also surrounded and bogged down in battles with separatist units, but nevertheless, Rokhlin did not give the order to retreat.
On January 7, 1995, the Northeast and North groupings were united under the command of General Rokhlin, and Ivan Babichev became commander of the West grouping.
Russian troops changed tactics - now, instead of the massive use of armored vehicles, they used maneuverable air assault groups supported by artillery and aviation. Fierce street fighting broke out in Grozny.
Two groups moved to the Presidential Palace and by January 9 occupied the building of the Oil Institute and the Grozny airport. By January 19, these groups met in the center of Grozny and captured the Presidential Palace, but detachments of Chechen separatists retreated across the Sunzha River and took up defensive positions on Minutka Square. Despite the successful offensive, Russian troops controlled only about a third of the city at that time.
By the beginning of February, the strength of the OGV was increased to 70,000 people. General Anatoly Kulikov became the new commander of the OGV.
Only on February 3, 1995, the “South” group was formed and the implementation of the plan to blockade Grozny from the south began. By February 9, Russian units reached the line of the Rostov-Baku federal highway.
On February 13, in the village of Sleptsovskaya (Ingushetia), negotiations were held between the commander of the OGV Anatoly Kulikov and the chief of the General Staff of the Armed Forces of the ChRI Aslan Maskhadov on concluding a temporary truce - the parties exchanged lists of prisoners of war, and both sides were given the opportunity to remove the dead and wounded from the streets of the city. The truce, however, was violated by both sides.
In the 20th of February, street fighting continued in the city (especially in its southern part), but the Chechen troops, deprived of support, gradually retreated from the city.
Finally, on March 6, 1995, a detachment of militants of the Chechen field commander Shamil Basayev retreated from Chernorechye, the last area of Grozny controlled by the separatists, and the city finally came under the control of Russian troops.
A pro-Russian administration of Chechnya was formed in Grozny, headed by Salambek Khadzhiev and Umar Avturkhanov.
As a result of the assault on Grozny, the city was virtually destroyed and turned into ruins.
29. Establishing control over the lowland regions of Chechnya (March - April 1995)
After the assault on Grozny, the main task of the Russian troops was to establish control over the lowland areas of the rebellious republic.
The Russian side began to conduct active negotiations with the population, convincing local residents to expel the militants from their settlements. At the same time, Russian units occupied commanding heights above villages and cities. Thanks to this, Argun was taken on March 15-23, and the cities of Shali and Gudermes were taken without a fight on March 30 and 31, respectively. However, the militant groups were not destroyed and freely left populated areas.
Despite this, local battles took place in the western regions of Chechnya. On March 10, fighting began for the village of Bamut. On April 7-8, a combined detachment of the Ministry of Internal Affairs, consisting of the Sofrinsky brigade of internal troops and supported by SOBR and OMON detachments, entered the village of Samashki (Achkhoy-Martan district of Chechnya). It was alleged that the village was defended by more than 300 people (the so-called “Abkhaz battalion” of Shamil Basayev). After Russian soldiers entered the village, some residents who had weapons began to resist, and shootouts broke out on the streets of the village.
According to a number of international organizations (in particular, the UN Commission on Human Rights - UNCHR), many civilians died during the battle for Samashki. This information, disseminated by the separatist agency Chechen Press, however, turned out to be quite contradictory - thus, according to representatives of the Memorial human rights center, this data “does not inspire confidence.” According to Memorial, the minimum number of civilians killed during the clearing of the village was 112-114 people.
One way or another, this operation caused a great resonance in Russian society and strengthened anti-Russian sentiments in Chechnya.
On April 15-16, the decisive assault on Bamut began - Russian troops managed to enter the village and gain a foothold on the outskirts. Then, however, Russian troops were forced to leave the village, as the militants now occupied commanding heights above the village, using old missile silos of the Strategic Missile Forces, designed for waging a nuclear war and invulnerable to Russian aircraft. A series of battles for this village continued until June 1995, then the battles were suspended after the terrorist attack in Budyonnovsk and resumed in February 1996.
By April 1995, Russian troops occupied almost the entire flat territory of Chechnya and the separatists focused on sabotage and guerrilla operations.
30. Establishing control over the mountainous regions of Chechnya (May - June 1995)
From April 28 to May 11, 1995, the Russian side announced a suspension of hostilities on its part.
The offensive resumed only on May 12. The attacks of Russian troops fell on the villages of Chiri-Yurt, which covered the entrance to the Argun Gorge, and Serzhen-Yurt, located at the entrance to the Vedenskoye Gorge. Despite significant superiority in manpower and equipment, Russian troops were bogged down in enemy defenses - it took General Shamanov a week of shelling and bombing to take Chiri-Yurt.
Under these conditions, the Russian command decided to change the direction of the attack - instead of Shatoy to Vedeno. The militant units were pinned down in the Argun Gorge and on June 3 Vedeno was taken by Russian troops, and on June 12 the regional centers of Shatoy and Nozhai-Yurt were taken.
Just as in the lowland areas, the separatist forces were not defeated and they were able to leave the abandoned settlements. Therefore, even during the “truce”, the militants were able to transfer a significant part of their forces to the northern regions - on May 14, the city of Grozny was shelled by them more than 14 times
On June 14, 1995, a group of Chechen militants numbering 195 people, led by field commander Shamil Basayev, entered the territory of the Stavropol Territory in trucks and stopped in the city of Budennovsk.
The first target of the attack was the building of the city police department, then the terrorists occupied the city hospital and herded captured civilians into it. In total, there were about 2,000 hostages in the hands of terrorists. Basayev put forward demands to the Russian authorities - a cessation of hostilities and the withdrawal of Russian troops from Chechnya, negotiations with Dudayev through the mediation of UN representatives in exchange for the release of hostages.
Under these conditions, the authorities decided to storm the hospital building. Due to an information leak, the terrorists managed to prepare to repel the assault, which lasted four hours; As a result, the special forces recaptured all buildings (except the main one), freeing 95 hostages. Special forces losses amounted to three people killed. On the same day, an unsuccessful second assault attempt was made.
After the failure of military action to free the hostages, negotiations began between the then Chairman of the Russian Government Viktor Chernomyrdin and field commander Shamil Basayev. The terrorists were provided with buses, on which they, along with 120 hostages, arrived in the Chechen village of Zandak, where the hostages were released.
The total losses of the Russian side, according to official data, amounted to 143 people (of which 46 were law enforcement officers) and 415 wounded, terrorist losses - 19 killed and 20 wounded
32. The situation in the republic in June - December 1995
After the terrorist attack in Budyonnovsk, from June 19 to 22, the first round of negotiations between the Russian and Chechen sides took place in Grozny, at which it was possible to achieve the introduction of a moratorium on hostilities for an indefinite period.
From June 27 to 30, the second stage of negotiations took place there, at which an agreement was reached on the exchange of prisoners “all for all,” the disarmament of the CRI detachments, the withdrawal of Russian troops and the holding of free elections.
Despite all the agreements concluded, the ceasefire regime was violated by both sides. Chechen detachments returned to their villages, but no longer as members of illegal armed groups, but as “self-defense units.” Local battles took place throughout Chechnya. For some time, the tensions that arose could be resolved through negotiations. Thus, on August 18-19, Russian troops blocked Achkhoy-Martan; the situation was resolved at negotiations in Grozny.
On August 21, a detachment of militants of the field commander Alaudi Khamzatov captured Argun, but after heavy shelling by Russian troops, they left the city, into which Russian armored vehicles were then introduced.
In September, Achkhoy-Martan and Sernovodsk were blocked by Russian troops, since militant detachments were located in these settlements. The Chechen side refused to leave their occupied positions, since, according to them, these were “self-defense units” that had the right to remain in accordance with previously reached agreements.
On October 6, 1995, an assassination attempt was made on the commander of the United Group of Forces (OGV), General Romanov, as a result of which he ended up in a coma. In turn, “retaliation strikes” were carried out against Chechen villages.
On October 8, an unsuccessful attempt was made to eliminate Dudayev - an air strike was carried out on the village of Roshni-Chu.
The Russian leadership decided before the elections to replace the leaders of the pro-Russian administration of the republic, Salambek Khadzhiev and Umar Avturkhanov, with former leader Chechen-Ingush Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic Dokku Zavgaeva.
On December 10-12, the city of Gudermes, occupied by Russian troops without resistance, was captured by the detachments of Salman Raduev, Khunkar-Pasha Israpilov and Sultan Gelikhanov. On December 14-20, there were battles for this city; it took Russian troops about another week of “cleansing operations” to finally take control of Gudermes.
On December 14-17, elections were held in Chechnya, which were held with a large number of violations, but were nevertheless recognized as valid. Separatist supporters announced in advance their boycott and non-recognition of the elections. Dokku Zavgaev won the elections, receiving over 90% of the votes; At the same time, all UGA military personnel participated in the elections.
On January 9, 1996, a detachment of militants numbering 256 people under the command of field commanders Salman Raduev, Turpal-Ali Atgeriyev and Khunkar-Pasha Israpilov carried out a raid on the city of Kizlyar. The militants' initial target was a Russian helicopter base and weapons depot. The terrorists destroyed two Mi-8 transport helicopters and took several hostages from among the military personnel guarding the base. Russian military and law enforcement agencies began to approach the city, so the terrorists seized the hospital and maternity hospital, driving about 3,000 more civilians there. This time, the Russian authorities did not give the order to storm the hospital, so as not to strengthen anti-Russian sentiments in Dagestan. During the negotiations, it was possible to agree on providing the militants with buses to the border with Chechnya in exchange for the release of the hostages, who were supposed to be dropped off at the very border. On January 10, a convoy with militants and hostages moved towards the border. When it became clear that the terrorists would go to Chechnya, the bus convoy was stopped with warning shots. Taking advantage of the confusion of the Russian leadership, the militants captured the village of Pervomaiskoye, disarming the police checkpoint located there. Negotiations took place from January 11 to 14, and an unsuccessful assault on the village took place on January 15-18. In parallel with the assault on Pervomaisky, on January 16, in the Turkish port of Trabzon, a group of terrorists seized the passenger ship "Avrasia" with threats to shoot Russian hostages if the assault was not stopped. After two days of negotiations, the terrorists surrendered to the Turkish authorities.
The losses of the Russian side, according to official data, amounted to 78 people killed and several hundred wounded.
On March 6, 1996, several groups of militants attacked Grozny, controlled by Russian troops, from various directions. The militants captured the Staropromyslovsky district of the city, blocked and fired at Russian checkpoints and checkpoints. Despite the fact that Grozny remained under the control of the Russian armed forces, the separatists took with them supplies of food, medicine and ammunition when they retreated. The losses of the Russian side, according to official data, amounted to 70 people killed and 259 wounded
On April 16, 1996, a column of the 245th motorized rifle regiment of the Russian Armed Forces, moving to Shatoy, was ambushed in the Argun Gorge near the village of Yaryshmardy. The operation was led by field commander Khattab. The militants knocked out the leading and trailing column of the vehicle, so the column was blocked and suffered significant losses - almost all the armored vehicles and half of the personnel were lost.
From the very beginning of the Chechen campaign, Russian special services have repeatedly tried to eliminate the President of the Chechen Republic, Dzhokhar Dudayev. Attempts to send assassins ended in failure. It was possible to find out that Dudayev often talks on a satellite phone of the Inmarsat system.
On April 21, 1996, a Russian A-50 AWACS aircraft, which was equipped with equipment for bearing a satellite phone signal, received an order to take off. At the same time, Dudayev’s motorcade left for the area of the village of Gekhi-Chu. Unfolding his phone, Dudayev contacted Konstantin Borov. At that moment, the signal from the phone was intercepted, and two Su-25 attack aircraft took off. When the planes reached the target, two missiles were fired at the motorcade, one of which hit the target directly.
By a closed decree of Boris Yeltsin, several military pilots were awarded the titles of Heroes of the Russian Federation
37. Negotiations with the separatists (May - July 1996)
Despite some successes of the Russian Armed Forces (the successful liquidation of Dudayev, the final capture of the settlements of Goiskoye, Stary Achkhoy, Bamut, Shali), the war began to take a protracted character. In the context of the upcoming presidential elections, the Russian leadership decided to once again negotiate with the separatists.
On May 27-28, a meeting of the Russian and Ichkerian (headed by Zelimkhan Yandarbiev) delegations was held in Moscow, at which it was possible to agree on a truce from June 1, 1996 and an exchange of prisoners. Immediately after the end of the negotiations in Moscow, Boris Yeltsin flew to Grozny, where he congratulated the Russian military on their victory over the “rebellious Dudayev regime” and announced the abolition of conscription.
On June 10, in Nazran (Republic of Ingushetia), during the next round of negotiations, an agreement was reached on the withdrawal of Russian troops from the territory of Chechnya (with the exception of two brigades), the disarmament of separatist detachments, and the holding of free democratic elections. The question of the status of the republic was temporarily postponed.
The agreements concluded in Moscow and Nazran were violated by both sides, in particular, the Russian side was in no hurry to withdraw its troops, and the Chechen field commander Ruslan Khaikhoroev took responsibility for the explosion of a regular bus in Nalchik.
On July 3, 1996, the current President of the Russian Federation, Boris Yeltsin, was re-elected to the presidency. The new Secretary of the Security Council, Alexander Lebed, announced the resumption of hostilities against militants.
On July 9, after the Russian ultimatum, hostilities resumed - aircraft attacked militant bases in the mountainous Shatoi, Vedeno and Nozhai-Yurt regions.
On August 6, 1996, detachments of Chechen separatists numbering from 850 to 2000 people again attacked Grozny. The separatists did not aim to capture the city; They blocked administrative buildings in the city center, and also fired at checkpoints and checkpoints. The Russian garrison under the command of General Pulikovsky, despite significant superiority in manpower and equipment, was unable to hold the city.
Simultaneously with the assault on Grozny, the separatists also captured the cities of Gudermes (they took it without a fight) and Argun (Russian troops only held the commandant’s office building).
According to Oleg Lukin, it was the defeat of Russian troops in Grozny that led to the signing of the Khasavyurt ceasefire agreements
On August 31, 1996, representatives of Russia (Chairman of the Security Council Alexander Lebed) and Ichkeria (Aslan Maskhadov) signed a truce agreement in the city of Khasavyurt (Dagestan). Russian troops were completely withdrawn from Chechnya, and the decision on the status of the republic was postponed until December 31, 2001.
40. The result of the war was the signing of the Khasavyurt agreements and the withdrawal of Russian troops. Chechnya again became a de facto independent state, but de jure not recognized by any country in the world (including Russia).
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42. Destroyed houses and villages were not restored, the economy was exclusively criminal, however, it was criminal not only in Chechnya, so, according to former deputy Konstantin Borovoy, kickbacks in the construction business under contracts of the Ministry of Defense, during the First Chechen War, reached 80% of the contract amount. . Due to ethnic cleansing and fighting, almost the entire non-Chechen population left Chechnya (or was killed). The interwar crisis and the rise of Wahhabism began in the republic, which later led to the invasion of Dagestan, and then to the beginning of the Second Chechen War."
43. According to data released by the OGV headquarters, the losses of Russian troops amounted to 4,103 killed, 1,231 missing/deserted/prisoned, 19,794 wounded
44. According to the Committee of Soldiers' Mothers, the losses amounted to at least 14,000 people killed (documented deaths according to the mothers of deceased servicemen).
45. However, it should be borne in mind that the data from the Committee of Soldiers’ Mothers includes only the losses of conscript soldiers, without taking into account the losses of contract soldiers, special forces soldiers, etc. The losses of militants, according to the Russian side, amounted to 17,391 people. According to the chief of staff of the Chechen units (later President of the ChRI) A. Maskhadov, the losses of the Chechen side amounted to about 3,000 people killed. According to the Memorial Human Rights Center, the militants’ losses did not exceed 2,700 people killed. The number of civilian casualties is not known for certain - according to the human rights organization Memorial, they amount to up to 50 thousand people killed. Secretary of the Russian Security Council A. Lebed estimated the losses of the civilian population of Chechnya at 80,000 dead.
46. On December 15, 1994, the “Mission of the Commissioner for Human Rights in the North Caucasus” began to operate in the conflict zone, which included deputies of the State Duma of the Russian Federation and a representative of Memorial (later called the “Mission of Public Organizations under the leadership of S. A. Kovalev "). “Kovalyov’s Mission” did not have official powers, but acted with the support of several human rights public organizations; the work of the Mission was coordinated by the Memorial human rights center.
47. On December 31, 1994, on the eve of the assault on Grozny by Russian troops, Sergei Kovalev, as part of a group of State Duma deputies and journalists, negotiated with Chechen militants and parliamentarians in the presidential palace in Grozny. When the assault began and Russian tanks and armored personnel carriers began to burn in the square in front of the palace, civilians took refuge in the basement of the presidential palace, and soon wounded and captured Russian soldiers began to appear there. Correspondent Danila Galperovich recalled that Kovalev, being among the militants at Dzhokhar Dudayev’s headquarters, “almost all the time was in a basement room equipped with army radio stations,” offering Russian tank crews “an exit from the city without shooting if they indicate the route.” According to journalist Galina Kovalskaya, who was also there, after they were shown burning Russian tanks in the city center,
48. According to the Institute of Human Rights, headed by Kovalev, this episode, as well as Kovalev’s entire human rights and anti-war position, became the reason for a negative reaction from the military leadership, government officials, as well as numerous supporters of the “state” approach to human rights. In January 1995, the State Duma adopted a draft resolution in which his work in Chechnya was recognized as unsatisfactory: as Kommersant wrote, “because of his “unilateral position” aimed at justifying illegal armed groups.” In March 1995, the State Duma removed Kovalev from the post of Commissioner for Human Rights in Russia, according to Kommersant, “for his statements against the war in Chechnya”
49. The International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) launched an extensive relief program since the beginning of the conflict, providing more than 250,000 internally displaced people with food parcels, blankets, soap, warm clothing and plastic coverings in the first months. In February 1995, of the 120,000 residents remaining in Grozny, 70,000 were completely dependent on ICRC assistance. In Grozny, the water supply and sewer systems were completely destroyed, and the ICRC hastily began organizing the supply of drinking water to the city. In the summer of 1995, approximately 750,000 liters of chlorinated water were delivered daily by tanker truck to meet the needs of more than 100,000 residents at 50 distribution points throughout Grozny. Over the next year, 1996, more than 230 million liters of drinking water were produced for residents of the North Caucasus.
51. During 1995-1996, the ICRC carried out a number of programs to assist those affected by the armed conflict. Its delegates visited about 700 people detained by federal forces and Chechen fighters in 25 places of detention in Chechnya itself and neighboring regions, delivered more than 50,000 letters to the recipients on Red Cross message forms, which became the only opportunity for separated families to establish contacts with each other, so how all forms of communication were interrupted. The ICRC provided medicines and medical supplies to 75 hospitals and medical institutions in Chechnya, North Ossetia, Ingushetia and Dagestan, participated in the reconstruction and provision of medicines to hospitals in Grozny, Argun, Gudermes, Shali, Urus-Martan and Shatoy, and provided regular assistance to homes for the disabled and orphanages shelters.
The collapse of the USSR caused a series of crises in the space of the once united power, often taking the form of armed conflicts. One of the bloodiest and most protracted of them flared up in Chechnya. Former Major General of the Soviet Air Force Dzhokhar Dudayev, who came to power in the republic in the fall of 1991 as a result of a coup, established on its territory a brutal military-political dictatorship of a nationalist nature, organically merging with crime. By provoking the authorities of the Russian Federation to use force, Dudayev pursued the goal not only of creating an independent Chechen state, but also, by uniting all the North Caucasian republics on an anti-Russian basis, to achieve their subsequent separation from Russia and ultimately become a regional leader. Chechnya has become a hotbed of instability and banditry. Negotiations with the separatists did not produce results. There is a threat to the territorial integrity and security of the Russian Federation. In the republic itself, a real genocide unfolded against the non-Chechen population - according to some sources, 45,000 people were killed, another 350,000 left their homes in search of salvation and became refugees, whose fate was not much interested in either the authorities or “human rights activists” like S. Kovalev, who a little later they will zealously defend the militants. Many residents were subjected to robbery, rape, insults and humiliation. The Dudayevites unleashed formal terror against Chechens who disagreed with the regime. Chechnya plunged into chaos and lawlessness. By the end of 1994, Dudayev's power found itself in a state of deep crisis. A balanced and thoughtful policy was required on the part of the federal center in order to bring down the rebellious government and win the favor of the Chechens and ultimately restore order and protect its citizens. Instead, the Kremlin supported an ill-considered plan of attack by the forces of the opposition of the Chechen capital, Grozny, formed against Dudayev. The result of the adventure was the defeat of the anti-Dudaev opposition forces on November 26, 1994, and the rebellious regime received a second wind, rallying the population of Chechnya around itself on the platform of the “Russian threat.” It was quite obvious that the use of federal troops/FV in the current situation would be a reckless act, as the military warned about, contrary conventional wisdom. It took time and extremely careful policy. But the authorities decided to do their own thing.
On November 29, 1994, the “Address of the President of the Russian Federation to the participants in the armed conflict in the Chechen Republic” was published, demanding a ceasefire. On the same day, the Russian Security Council decided to hold military operation in the Chechen Republic, and in the evening, Defense Minister P. Grachev gathered the leadership of the ministry and announced it to representatives of the military department, instructing the General Staff to develop a plan for the operation and its support and preparation.
On November 30, Yeltsin signed Decree No. 2137c “On measures to restore constitutional legality and order in the territory of the Chechen Republic,” according to which, in accordance with Art. 88 of the Constitution of the Russian Federation, the laws “On the State of Emergency” and “On Security” prescribed measures to restore Russia’s sovereignty over Chechnya.
On December 9, Yeltsin issued Decree No. 2166 “On measures to suppress the activities of illegal armed groups on the territory of the Chechen Republic and in the zone of the Ossetian-Ingush conflict,” and the Government of the Russian Federation adopted Resolution No. 1360 “On ensuring state security and the territorial integrity of the Russian Federation, legality, rights and freedoms of citizens, disarmament of illegal armed groups on the territory of the Chechen Republic and adjacent regions of the North Caucasus." These acts assigned a number of ministries and departments the responsibility for introducing and maintaining a special regime similar to an emergency on the territory of Chechnya or martial law without their formal declaration. Legally, the measures designed to implement the introduction of the FV are still ambiguously assessed. In fact, military actions were launched contrary to the law.
On December 11 at 7.00 am, the FV was given the order to enter the territory of Chechnya and. According to the directive of the Minister of Defense N 312/1/006ш, they were given the task, under the cover of aviation, to advance in three directions to Grozny, block it and create conditions for the voluntary disarmament of illegal armed groups, and in case of refusal, carry out an operation to capture the city with subsequent stabilization of the situation and transfer of responsibility from the army to the internal troops/VV of the Ministry of Internal Affairs. According to the original plans, the operation was planned to be carried out in 4 stages over 3 weeks. The plan did not take into account either the degree of resistance of the Dudayevites or the combat readiness of the Russian troops, which were in a deplorable state. In fact, on the same day, Yeltsin signed Decree No. 2169 “On measures to ensure legality, law and order and public safety on the territory of the Chechen Republic,” thereby formalizing the beginning of the special operation.
At the beginning of the operation, the Combined Group of Forces/OGV consisted of 34 battalions (20 of them were explosives), 9 divisions, 7 batteries, 80 tanks, 208 armored vehicles and 182 guns and mortars. L/s - 23,800 people, of which 19,000 are from the Ministry of Defense and 4,700 are from the Internal Troops of the Ministry of Internal Affairs.
The Chechen illegal armed groups opposing it numbered, according to the most frequently found data, up to 15,000 people. in the “regular” army and 30,000-40,000 militias, i.e. the total number of militants reached approx. 50,000 people However, these figures are questionable. Thus, according to a number of data, the number of “cadre” separatist troops, together with units of the Ministry of Internal Affairs, the State Security Service, the presidential guard/regiment, etc., fluctuated between 7,000-10,000 people. (in Troshev’s memoirs: 5,000-6,000 people). The figure of 15,000 most likely owes its appearance to the general payroll of the army of the Chechen Republic of Ichkeria/ChRI (as the separatist state began to be called in 1994), where all units and subdivisions of Dudayev’s army were indicated, including those that were understaffed and not ready for combat (according to Troshev, their complement could be completed within 5-7 days). By the end of 1994, a group of armed formations (the “regular” army, the Ministry of Internal Affairs, the National Guard, the militia and mercenaries) numbering approx. 5500 people, in other districts of the Chechen Republic there were units of Dudayev’s army and militia total number St. 4,000 people, and in most villages self-defense units numbering more than 3,000 people were formed. By adding these available forces we get a figure of 13 - 15,000 people. This, most likely, is the real number of all Chechen illegal armed groups at the beginning of the First Chechen War. As for the number of 30,000-40,000 militants in the militia/self-defense units, this is perhaps the POTENTIAL number of fighters that Dudayev could field against the FV. At the beginning of the war, the illegal armed formations were in service with 42 tanks, approx. 80 armored vehicles, up to 153 artillery pieces and mortars, including 18 installations of 18 BM-21 Grad MLRS, 278 aircraft and 3 helicopters, as well as a significant number of small arms (40,000-60,000 units). In addition, the militants had 44 units. air defense systems. Later, during the war, illegal armed groups numbered approx. 4,000 people, from 4 to 10 tanks, from 5-7 to 12-14 armored vehicles, from 15-16 to 25 guns and mortars, from 3 to 6-8 MLRS BM-21 "Grad", up to 20 MANPADS and 11-15 ZSU/ZU. In general, the FV was opposed by a well-armed, ideologically motivated and supported unit local population and world, as well as partly Russian public opinion, is an opponent. At the same time, the militant detachments included military professionals and mercenaries.
Initially, the forces and means of the FV allocated for the special operation turned out to be small, so they were gradually built up. By December 30, the OGV numbered 37,972 people. and had 230 tanks, 454 armored vehicles and 388 guns and mortars. As of February 1, 1995, the size of the federal forces/FS group reached 70,509 people, of which 58,739 people. - from the Ministry of Defense, 322 tanks, 2104 armored vehicles, 627 guns and mortars. Subsequently, the number of l / s OGV, renamed the Provisional Joint Forces / VOS, was at the level of approx. 50,000 people
The aviation component also grew. At the beginning of the war, 269 combat aircraft were involved, and 79 helicopters from different departments (55 from the Ministry of Defense, 24 from the Federal Guard Service, the Ministry of Emergency Situations and the Internal Troops of the Ministry of Internal Affairs). Subsequently, the number of aircraft of all types increased to 518 aircraft (274 of them from front-line aviation, 14 Tu-22MZ from Long-Range [strategic] aviation and 230 support aircraft), and 104 helicopters.
Conceived as a short-term action, the FS special operation to “restore legality and constitutional order” resulted in a full-scale intrastate local armed conflict, in fact a war, the main content of which was the struggle Federal Center with national-radical separatists, who relied on the support of part of the population of the republic, objectively aimed at preserving the territorial integrity and strengthening the state security of Russia. The form of use of forces and means of law enforcement agencies in the conflict was a special military operation.
The first Chechen war, in my opinion, can be divided into three stages, each of which is characterized by the peculiarities of combat operations and military-political results.
1st stage: December 11, 1994 - July 30, 1995.
The most fierce period of the war, the main content of which on the part of the FV was the establishment of control over the territory of the republic and the defeat of the main groups of illegal armed groups.
The illegal armed formations were characterized by active armed confrontation, reaching the point of conducting positional battles and massive counterattacks using military equipment, a combination of tactics of regular military units with partisan methods of struggle.
The central events at this stage were the battles for Grozny, which began with the infamous New Year's assault, the capture of the FV settlements on the plain (Gudermes, Shali, Argun, Urus-Martan, etc.) and operations in the mountains, which ended with the capture of Vedeno and Shatoy, the terrorist attack in Budennovsk .
The result of the 1st stage, during which the FS took control of most of Chechnya (up to 80% of the territory), was the cessation of hostilities by Russian troops after the events in Budennovsk and the beginning of the negotiation process with the militants, which ended with the signing in Grozny on July 30, 1995 Agreements on a block of military issues. Its terms provided:
- immediate cessation of hostilities;
- separation of FV and illegal armed groups at 4 km;
- withdrawal of the FV from the territory of the Chechen Republic and disarmament of illegal armed groups;
- exchange of prisoners and other forcibly held persons on the principle of “all for all”;
- suppression of terrorist attacks and sabotage;
- the creation of a Special Monitoring Commission/SNK, co-chaired by the Deputy Commander of the Military Forces of the Ministry of Internal Affairs, Lieutenant General A. Romanov, appointed as the commander of the Military Forces, and the Chief of the Main Staff of the Armed Forces of the ChRI A. Maskhadov.
The concluded truce led to the fact that the militants received a respite and managed to save their formations from complete defeat. Thus, the successes of the FV, achieved by considerable losses, were leveled, which, according to the former Minister of Internal Affairs. commander of the OGV (and VV) General A. Kulikov, as of July 31, 1995 amounted to 1,867 people. killed, 6,481 wounded, 252 missing and 36 captured.
2nd stage: July 31, 1995 - June 10, 1996.
After a five-month truce, accompanied by repeated violations of the ceasefire, attacks and sabotage by Chechen illegal armed groups (for example, on August 8-9, militants attacked the airfield in Khankala, on September 20 they made an attempt on the life of the plenipotentiary representative of the President of the Russian Federation in the Chechen Republic O. Lobov, on October 25 they attacked a convoy 506 MRR in the area of the village of Tsa-Vedeno; on average in August 1995 alone, 2 military personnel per day were killed), disruption of the process of surrender of weapons by the separatists, hostilities were resumed in December 1995. By this time, the losses of the FS in Chechnya, according to some sources, amounted to 2,022 people. killed and 7,149 wounded.
In fact, the negotiations were suspended after the terrorist attack carried out by militants against the commander of the VOS, Mr. A. Romanov, on October 6, 1995. The general received seriously injured and fell into a coma, from which he has not emerged to this day. Following this, Russian aircraft launched strikes on the village. Roshni-Chu, Dargo, Belgatoy, Kharsenoy. However, a new round of escalation of the conflict occurred in December, when, in response to the election of the pro-Russian head of the republic, militants carried out a series of attacks on the village. Shatoy, Achkhoy-Martan, Urus-Martan, Novogroznensky and Gudermes. Then in January, S. Raduev’s detachment carried out a terrorist raid in Dagestan on Kizlyar, which resulted in battles in the village. Pervomayskoe. In response, the FV began to actively offensive operations. Military actions broke out throughout the republic.
At this stage of the conflict, Chechen illegal armed formations were characterized by the use of predominantly guerrilla methods and methods of combat while maintaining the potential for conducting positional confrontation and the use of military forms of combat operations. At the same time, a number of territories and settlements were under the control of the separatists. republic and retained the support of part of the local population. The most high-profile actions of the militants, in addition to those mentioned above, were the raid on Grozny on March 6-9 and the destruction of the rear column of the 245th Motorized Rifle Regiment on April 16, 1996.
For the FS, the main way to carry out tasks, after occupying most of Chechnya, was the actions of troops in areas of responsibility, raid detachments from base centers (in June, 12 of them were created from the VV and 8-MO), as well as formed military maneuver groups / VMG (in total there were such 5 groups were organized, which were a combination army units, explosive and special forces units). From February to May 1996, VMG carried out successful destruction operations strong points and militant bases in Novogroznensky, Sernovodsk, Stary Achkhoy, Orekhovo, Samashki, Urus-Martan, Nozhai-Yurtovsky, Vedeno and Shatoy districts. At the end of May, Bamut, which had been stormed twice unsuccessfully and was considered impregnable by the militants, was captured. A serious propaganda success was the liquidation of the formal leader of the illegal armed formation at that time, Dzhokhar Dudayev, on April 21, 1996, according to the official version - as a result of an airstrike aimed at the signal of his satellite phone in the vicinity of the village. Gekhi-Chu.
The achieved successes of the FS should have been developed by completing the destruction of the remaining illegal armed groups and ensuring full control over the territory of the republic, however, the approaching presidential elections against the backdrop of the unpopularity of the war among public opinion led to the resumption of the negotiation process. May 27 in Moscow (!), at a meeting of the separatist delegation led by acting. O. President of Ichkeria Z. Yandarbiev and Yeltsin signed another agreement - an agreement “On a ceasefire, hostilities and measures to resolve the armed conflict on the territory of the Chechen Republic.” According to its terms, all hostilities ceased from June 1. Yeltsin, who arrived in Chechnya on May 28, speaking to the 205th Motorized Rifle Brigade, said: “The war is over, you won, victory is yours, you defeated the rebellious Dudayev regime.”
On June 4 - 6 in Nazran (Ingushetia), in development of the Moscow agreements, negotiations were held between the Russian and Chechen delegations, which ended with the signing on June 10, 1996 of two protocols - on a ceasefire, hostilities, the implementation of measures to resolve the armed conflict in Chechnya and the release of all prisoners . The agreements reached provided for:
- cessation of all hostilities and the use of any weapons;
- elimination of FS roadblocks in the period from June 11 to July 7;
- disarmament of illegal armed groups from July 7 to August 7;
- prohibition of terrorist attacks, sabotage, kidnappings, robberies and murders of civilians and military personnel;
- liquidation of filtration points and other places of detention of detained/detained persons;
- exchange of prisoners and forcibly held persons on the principle of “all for all”;
- carry out and complete the withdrawal of the VOS from the territory of the Chechen Republic by the end of August 1996 (it was planned to leave a number of Russian units in Chechnya on a permanent basis).
The militants regarded the outcome of the Nazran negotiations as their success. They were again, as in the previous year, given a break. The achievements of the FS, paid for with considerable blood, were again under threat.
Ever since the beginning of Gorbachev’s “perestroika,” nationalist groups began to “raise their heads” in many republics. For example, the National Congress of the Chechen People, which appeared in 1990. He set himself the task of achieving Chechnya's exit from the Soviet Union. The primary goal was the creation of a completely independent state entity. The organization was headed by Dzhokhar Dudayev.
When the Soviet Union collapsed, it was Dudayev who announced the secession of Chechnya from Russia. At the end of October 1991, elections for the executive and legislative bodies authorities. Dzhokhar Dudayev was elected President of Chechnya.
Internal divisions in Chechnya
In the summer of 1994, military clashes began in public education. On one side were troops who swore allegiance to Dudayev. On the other are the forces of the Provisional Council, which is in opposition to Dudayev. The latter received unofficial support from Russia. The parties found themselves in a difficult situation, the losses were huge.
Deployment of troops
At a meeting of the Russian Security Council at the end of November 1994, Russia decides to send troops into Chechnya. Then Minister Egorov stated that 70% of the Chechen people would be for Russia on this issue.
On December 11, units of the Ministry of Defense and Internal Troops of the Ministry of Internal Affairs entered Chechnya. Troops entered from 3 sides at once. The key blow was from the Western and eastern directions. The northwestern group advanced best of all. Already on December 12, it came very close to settlements located just 10 kilometers from the city of Grozny. Other units of the Russian Federation advanced successfully at the initial stage. They occupied the north of the republic almost unhindered.
Storm of Grozny
The assault on the capital of Chechnya began a few hours before the chiming clock, which marked the beginning of the New Year 1995. About 250 pieces of equipment were involved. The problem was that:
- The troops were initially poorly prepared.
- There was no coordination between departments.
- The soldiers did not have any combat experience.
- Maps and aerial photographs of the city are long out of date.
At first, armored vehicles were used en masse, but then the tactics changed. The paratroopers went into action. Grueling street battles broke out in Grozny. Only on March 6, the last separatist detachment, led by Shamil Basayev, retreated from the city. A new pro-Russian administration was immediately formed in the capital. These were “elections on the bones”, because the capital was completely destroyed.
Control over lowland and mountainous areas
By April, federal troops occupied almost the entire flat territory of Chechnya. Because of this, the separatists switched to sabotage and partisan attacks. In the mountainous regions it was possible to take control of a number of the most important settlements. It is noted that many separatists managed to escape. The militants often redeployed part of their forces to other areas.
After the terrorist attack in Budennovsk, where a large number of people were injured and killed on both sides, it was possible to achieve the introduction of an indefinite moratorium on further hostilities.
At the end of June 1995 we agreed:
- on the exchange of prisoners according to the formula “all for all”;
- about the withdrawal of troops;
- about holding elections.
However, the truce was violated (and more than once!). Small local clashes took place throughout Chechnya, and so-called self-defense units were formed. In the second half of 1995, cities and villages changed hands. In mid-December, Russian-backed elections were held in Chechnya. They were nevertheless recognized as valid. The separatists boycotted everything.
In 1996, militants not only attacked various cities and villages, but also made attempts to attack Grozny. In March of that year, they even managed to subjugate one of the districts of the capital. But federal troops managed to repel all attacks. True, this was done at the cost of the lives of many soldiers.
Liquidation of Dudayev
Naturally, from the very beginning of the conflict in Chechnya, the Russian special services were faced with the task of finding and neutralizing the separatist leader. All attempts to kill Dudayev were in vain. But the special services received important information that he likes to talk on a satellite phone. On April 21, 1996, two Su-25 attack aircraft, having received coordinates thanks to the bearing of a telephone signal, fired 2 missiles at Dudayev’s motorcade. As a result, he was liquidated. The militants were left without a leader.
Negotiating with separatists
As you know, presidential elections were supposed to take place in Russia itself in 1996. Yeltsin needed victories in Chechnya. As the war dragged on, it aroused distrust among Russians. Our young soldiers died on “foreign” soil. After the May negotiations, a truce and prisoner exchange were announced on June 1.
Based on the results of consultations in Nazran:
- elections were to take place on the territory of Chechnya;
- militant groups had to be completely disarmed;
- Federal troops will be withdrawn.
But this truce was violated again. Nobody wanted to give in. Terrorist attacks began again, blood flowed like a river.
New fights
After Yeltsin's successful re-election, fighting in Chechnya resumed. In August 1996, the separatists not only shelled checkpoints, but also stormed Grozny, Argun and Gudermes. More than 2,000 Russian troops died in the battles for Grozny alone. How much more could you lose? Because of this, the authorities in the Russian Federation agreed to sign the famous agreements on the withdrawal of federal troops.
Khasavyurt agreements
August 31 was the last day of summer and the last day of hostilities. In the Dagestan city of Khasavyurt, sensational truce agreements were signed. Final decision the future of the republic was put on the back burner. But the troops had to be withdrawn.
Results
Chechnya remained an independent republic, but no one legally recognized it as a state. The ruins remained as they were. The economy was extremely criminalized. Due to ongoing ethnic cleansing and intense fighting, the country was “crucified.” Almost everyone left the republic civilians. There was not only a crisis in politics and economics, but also an unprecedented growth of Wahhabism. It was he who caused the invasion of militants into Dagestan, and then the start of a new war.