The change in the balance of power in the international arena is also associated with the process of revising the role of the participants in the anti-Hitler coalition in the victory over Nazi Germany. Not only in modern media, but also in a number of historical works, old myths are supported or new myths are created. The old ones include the opinion that the Soviet Union achieved victory only thanks to incalculable losses, many times greater than the losses of the enemy, and the new ones include the decisive role of Western countries, mainly the United States, in victory and the high level of their military skill. We will try, based on the statistical material available to us, to offer a different opinion.
The criterion used is total data, such as, for example, the losses of the parties during the entire war, which, due to their simplicity and clarity, confirm one or another point of view.
In order to select from sometimes contradictory data those that can be relied upon with a significant degree of reliability, it is necessary to use specific values in addition to total values. Such values may include losses per unit of time, for example, daily, losses falling on a certain section of the front length, etc.
A team of authors led by Colonel General G. F. Krivosheev in 1988-1993. a comprehensive statistical study of archival documents and other materials containing information about human losses in the army and navy, border and internal troops of the NKVD was carried out. The results of this major research were published in the work “Russia and the USSR in the Wars of the 20th Century.”
During the Great Patriotic War, 34 million people were drafted into the Red Army, including those drafted in June 1941. This amount is almost equal to the mobilization resource that the country had at that time. The losses of the Soviet Union in the Great Patriotic War amounted to 11,273 thousand people, that is, a third of the number conscripted. These losses are, of course, very large, but everything can be learned in comparison: after all, the losses of Germany and its allies on the Soviet-German front are also great.
Table 1 shows the irretrievable losses of Red Army personnel by year of the Great Patriotic War. Data on the magnitude of annual losses are taken from the work “Russia and the USSR in the Wars of the 20th Century”. This includes killed, missing, captured and those who died in captivity.
Table 1. Losses of the Red Army
The last column of the proposed table shows the average daily losses suffered by the Red Army. In 1941, they were the highest, since our troops had to retreat in very unfavorable conditions, and large formations were surrounded, in the so-called cauldrons. In 1942, losses were significantly less, although the Red Army also had to retreat, but there were no longer large cauldrons. In 1943 there were very stubborn battles, especially on the Kursk Bulge, but from that year until the end of the war, the troops of Nazi Germany had to retreat. In 1944, the Soviet High Command planned and carried out a number of brilliant strategic operations to defeat and encircle entire groups of German armies, so the losses of the Red Army were relatively small. But in 1945, daily losses increased again, because the tenacity of the German army increased, since it was already fighting on its own territory, and German soldiers courageously defended their fatherland.
Let us compare the losses of Germany with the losses of England and the USA on the Second Front. We will try to evaluate them based on the data of the famous Russian demographer B. Ts. Urlanis. In the book “History of Military Losses,” Urlanis, speaking about the losses of England and the United States, provides the following data:
Table 2. Losses of the British armed forces in World War II (thousands of people)
In the war with Japan, England lost “11.4% of the total number of dead soldiers and officers,” therefore, in order to estimate the amount of England’s losses on the Second Front, we need to subtract the losses for 4 years of war from the total amount of losses and multiply by 1 – 0.114 = 0.886:
(1,246 – 667) 0.886 = 500 thousand people.
Total US losses in World War II amounted to 1,070 thousand, of which approximately three quarters were losses in the war with Germany, thus
1,070 * 0.75 = 800 thousand people.
The total total losses of England and the USA are
1,246 + 1,070 = 2,316 thousand people.
Thus, the losses of England and the United States on the Second Front amount to approximately 60% of their total losses in World War II.
As mentioned above, the losses of the USSR amount to 11.273 million people, that is, at first glance, incomparable with the losses amounting to 1.3 million people suffered by England and the USA on the Second Front. On this basis, the conclusion is drawn that the Allied command fought skillfully and took care of people, while the Soviet High Command allegedly filled the enemy trenches with the corpses of its soldiers. Let us allow ourselves to disagree with such ideas. Based on the data on daily losses given in Table 1, it can be obtained that from June 7, 1944 to May 8, 1945, that is, during the existence of the Second Front, the losses of the Red Army amounted to 1.8 million people, which is only slightly higher than the losses of the Allies. As is known, the length of the Second Front was 640 km, and the Soviet-German Front was from 2,000 to 3,000 km, on average 2,500 km, i.e. 4-5 times greater than the length of the Second Front. Therefore, on a front section with a length equal to the length of the Second Front, the Red Army lost approximately 450 thousand people, which is 3 times less than the losses of the allies.
On the fronts of World War II, the armed forces of Nazi Germany itself lost 7,181 thousand, and the armed forces of its allies - 1,468 thousand people, a total of 8,649 thousand.
Thus, the ratio of losses on the Soviet-German front turns out to be 13:10, that is, for every 13 killed, missing, wounded, or captured Soviet soldiers, there are 10 German soldiers.
According to the Chief of the German General Staff F. Halder, in 1941-1942. The fascist army lost about 3,600 soldiers and officers every day, therefore, in the first two years of the war, the losses of the fascist bloc amounted to about two million people. This means that over the subsequent period, the losses of Germany and its allies amounted to about 6,600 thousand people. During the same period, the losses of the Red Army amounted to approximately 5 million people. Thus, in 1943-1945, for every 10 Red Army soldiers killed, there were 13 fascist army soldiers killed. These simple statistics clearly and objectively characterize the quality of troop leadership and the degree of care for soldiers.
General A.I.Denikin
“Be that as it may, no tricks could detract from the significance of the fact that the Red Army has been fighting skillfully for some time now, and the Russian soldier has been selflessly fighting. The successes of the Red Army could not be explained by numerical superiority alone. In our eyes, this phenomenon had a simple and natural explanation.
From time immemorial, Russian people were smart, talented and loved their homeland from the inside. From time immemorial, the Russian soldier was immensely resilient and selflessly brave. These human and military qualities could not drown out twenty-five Soviet years of suppression of thought and conscience, collective farm slavery, Stakhanovite exhaustion and the replacement of national self-awareness with international dogma. And when it became obvious to everyone that there was an invasion and conquest, and not liberation, that only the replacement of one yoke with another was foreseen, the people, postponing accounts with communism until a more opportune time, rose for the Russian land just as their ancestors rose during the invasions Swedish, Polish and Napoleonic...
Under the sign of the international, the inglorious Finnish campaign and the defeat of the Red Army by the Germans on the roads to Moscow took place; under the slogan of defending the Motherland, the German armies were defeated!”
Opinion of General A.I. Denikin is especially important for us because he received a deep and comprehensive education at the Academy of the General Staff, and had his own wealth of combat experience acquired in the Russo-Japanese, World War I and Civil Wars. His opinion is also important because, while remaining an ardent patriot of Russia, he was and until the end of his life remained a consistent enemy of Bolshevism, so one can rely on the impartiality of his assessment.
Let's consider the ratio of losses of the Allied and German armies. The literature provides the total losses of the German army, but data on German losses on the Second Front is not given, probably deliberately. The Great Patriotic War lasted 1418 days, the Second Front existed for 338 days, which is 1/4 of the duration of the Great Patriotic War. Therefore, it is assumed that Germany’s losses on the Second Front are four times less. Thus, if on the Soviet-German front German losses amount to 8.66 million people, then we can assume that German losses on the Second Front are about 2.2 million, and the loss ratio is approximately 10 to 20, which would seem to confirm point of view about the high military art of our allies in World War II.
We cannot agree with this point of view. Some Western researchers also disagree with her. “Against the inexperienced, albeit eager, Americans and the war-weary, cautious British, the Germans could field an army that, in the words of Max Hastings, “won a historical reputation for being undaunted and reaching its zenith under Hitler.” Hastings states: “Everywhere during the Second World War, whenever and wherever British and American troops met head-on with the Germans, the Germans won.”<…>What struck Hastings and other historians most was the loss ratio, which was two to one or even higher in favor of the Germans.”
American Colonel Trevor Dupuis conducted a detailed statistical study of German actions in the Second World War. Some of his explanations for why Hitler's armies were so much more effective than their opponents seem unfounded. But not a single critic questioned his main conclusion that on almost every battlefield during the war, including Normandy, the German soldier was more effective than his opponents.
Unfortunately, we do not have the data that Hastings used, but if there is no direct data on German losses on the Second Front, we will try to estimate them indirectly. Considering that the intensity of the battles waged by the German army in the West and in the East was the same, and that the losses per kilometer of front were approximately equal, we obtain that German losses on the Eastern Front should not be divided by 4, but, taking into account the difference in the length of the front line, at about 15-16. Then it turns out that Germany lost no more than 600 thousand people on the Second Front. Thus, we find that on the Second Front the ratio of losses is 22 Anglo-American soldiers to 10 German ones, and not vice versa.
A similar ratio was observed in the Ardennes operation, which was carried out by the German command from December 16, 1944 to January 28, 1945. As German General Melentin writes, during this operation the Allied army lost 77 thousand soldiers, and the German army lost 25 thousand, that is, we get a ratio of 31 to 10, even exceeding that obtained above.
Based on the above reasoning, it is possible to refute the myth about the insignificance of German losses on the Soviet-German front. It is said that Germany allegedly lost about 3.4 million people. If we assume that this value corresponds to the truth, then we will have to accept that on the Second Front German losses amounted to only:
3.4 million/16 = 200 thousand people,
which is 6-7 times less than the losses of England and the United States on the Second Front. If Germany fought so brilliantly on all fronts and suffered such insignificant losses, then it is unclear why it did not win the war? Therefore, assumptions that the losses of the Anglo-American army are lower than the German ones, as well as that the German losses are significantly lower than the Soviet ones, must be rejected, since they are based on incredible figures and are not consistent with reality and common sense.
Thus, it can be argued that the power of the German army was decisively undermined by the victorious Red Army on the Soviet-German front. With an overwhelming superiority in people and equipment, the Anglo-American command showed amazing indecisiveness and ineffectiveness, one might say mediocrity, comparable to the confusion and unpreparedness of the Soviet command in the initial period of the war in 1941-1942.
This statement can be supported by a number of pieces of evidence. First, we will give a description of the actions of the special groups, which were led by the famous Otto Skorzeny, during the offensive of the German army in the Ardennes.
“On the first day of the offensive, one of Skorzeny’s groups managed to get through the gap made in the allied lines and advance to Yun, which was located near the banks of the Meuse. There, having changed her German uniform to an American one, she dug in and fortified herself at the intersection of roads and observed the movement of enemy troops. The group commander, who spoke fluent English, went so far as to take a bold walk around the area to “get acquainted with the situation.”
A few hours later, an armored regiment passed near them, and its commander asked them for directions. Without blinking an eye, the commander gave him a completely wrong answer. Namely, he stated that these “German pigs have just cut off several roads. He himself received an order to make a big detour with his column.” Very happy that they were warned in time, the American tankers actually headed along the path that “our man” showed them.
Returning to their unit, this detachment cut several telephone lines and removed signs posted by the American quartermaster service, and also laid mines here and there. Twenty-four hours later, all the men and officers of this group returned to the lines of their troops in perfect health, bringing interesting observations about the confusion that reigned behind the American front line at the beginning of the offensive.
Another of these small detachments also crossed the front line and advanced all the way to the Meuse. According to his observations, the Allies could be said to have done nothing to protect the bridges in the area. On the way back, the detachment was able to block three highways leading to the front line by hanging colored ribbons on the trees, which in the American army means that the roads are mined. Subsequently, Skorzeny's scouts saw that the columns of British and American troops actually avoided these roads, preferring to make a long detour.
The third group discovered an ammunition depot. After waiting until dark; The commandos "removed" the guards and then blew up this warehouse. A little later they discovered a telephone collector cable, which they managed to cut in three places.
But the most significant story happened to another detachment, which on December 16 suddenly found itself directly in front of the American positions. Two GI companies prepared for a long defense, built pillboxes and installed machine guns. Skorzeny's men must have been somewhat confused, especially when an American officer asked them what was happening there on the front lines.
Pulling himself together, the detachment commander, dressed in the fine uniform of an American sergeant, told the Yankee captain a very interesting story. Probably, the Americans attributed the confusion that was visible on the faces of the German soldiers to the last skirmish with the “damned Boches.” The detachment commander, a pseudo-sergeant, stated that the Germans had already bypassed this position, both on the right and on the left, so that it was practically surrounded. The amazed American captain immediately gave the order to retreat."
Let us also use the observations of the German tankman Otto Carius, who fought against Soviet soldiers from 1941 to 1944, and against Anglo-American soldiers from 1944 to 1945. Let us cite an interesting event from his front-line experience in the West. “Almost all of our Kubel passenger cars were disabled. Therefore, one evening we decided to replenish our fleet with an American one. It never occurred to anyone to consider this a heroic act!
The Yankees slept in their houses at night, as “front-line soldiers” were supposed to do. There was at best one sentry outside, but only if the weather was good. Around midnight we set off with four soldiers and returned quite soon with two jeeps. It was convenient that they did not require keys. All you had to do was turn on the switch and the car was ready to go. Only when we returned to our positions did the Yankees open indiscriminate fire into the air, probably to calm their nerves."
Having personal experience of the war on the eastern and western fronts, Carius concludes: “In the end, five Russians posed a greater danger than thirty Americans.” Western researcher Stephen E. Ambrose says that casualties can be minimized “only by ending the war quickly, rather than by exercising caution during offensive operations.”
Based on the evidence given and the relationships obtained above, it can be argued that at the final stage of the war, the Soviet command fought more skillfully than the German and much more effectively than the Anglo-American, because “the art of warfare requires courage and intelligence, and not just superiority in technology and number of troops."
Russia and the USSR in the wars of the twentieth century. M. "OLMA-PRESS". 2001 p. 246.
B. Ts. Urlanis. History of military losses. St. Petersburg 1994 228-232.
O'Bradley. Notes of a soldier. Foreign literature. M 1957 p. 484.
Russia and the USSR in the wars of the twentieth century. M. "OLMA-PRESS". 2001 p. 514.
Colonel General F. Halder. War diary. Volume 3, book 2. Military publishing house of the USSR Ministry of Defense. P. 436
D. Lekhovich. Whites against reds. Moscow “Sunday”. 1992 p. 335.
F. Melentin. Tank battles 1939-1945. Test site AST. 2000
Otto Skorzeny. Smolensk Rusich. 2000 p. 388, 389
Otto Carius. "Tigers in the mud." M. Centropolygraph. 2005 p. 258, 256
Stephen E. Ambrose. D-Day AST. M. 2003. pp. 47, 49.
J. F. S. Fuller World War II 1939-1945 Publishing House of Foreign Literature. Moscow, 1956, p.26.
The number of dead Soviet people is still underestimated by several times.
The question of Soviet military losses, especially the irretrievable losses of the Red Army in the Great Patriotic War, remains a subject of political speculation today, 60 years after its end.
Russian generals estimate German losses in those killed on the Eastern Front at 3,605,000 people. Another 442 thousand died in captivity. Together with the losses of Germany's allies, the total is 4,273 thousand killed on the battlefield and 580 thousand dead in captivity.
With this calculation, the overall ratio of the number of dead soldiers of the Red Army and the Nazis (with their allies) turns out to be quite tolerable - only 1.8:1. Or 1.9:1, if we add to the Soviet losses 500 thousand of those whom the authors of the “Classified Classification...” never decided where to classify them - among the losses of the army or the civilian population.
The total irretrievable losses of the Soviet people are officially estimated at 26.6 - 27.0 million people, of which about 18 million are civilians.
It turns out that the Red Army fought quite well, given the suddenness of the German attack, as well as the fact that a significant part of the Red Army soldiers died in captivity. And Stalin, they say, was not such a bad commander.
Some Western researchers are also hypnotized by official figures. For example, the American Max Hastings in the book “Armageddon. Battle for Germany,” based on these figures, reproaches Eisenhower and other allied generals for not attacking as decisively as the Russians in the last months of 1944, trying to minimize their losses, and as a result prolonging the war for six months, which, they say , led to even greater losses. It does not take into account that the density of German troops on the Western Front was 2.5 times greater than on the Eastern Front. And most importantly, what did the decisiveness of their actions really cost the Russians?
But what is even more important is that the picture of the ratio of military losses that is favorable for the Red Army is the result of outright falsification. In cases where it becomes possible to check the data of the book “The Classification of Secrecy Has Been Removed,” they do not stand up to criticism. To a large extent, the reason is that the accounting of irretrievable losses of the Red Army was carried out very poorly.
In the order of the Deputy People's Commissar of Defense E.A. Shchadenko on April 12, 1942 said:
“The accounting of personnel, especially the accounting of losses, is carried out in the active army completely unsatisfactorily... The headquarters of the formations do not promptly send to the center the named lists of the dead. As a result of untimely and incomplete submission of lists of losses by military units (as in the document - B.S.), there was a large discrepancy between the data of numerical and personal accounting of losses. At present, no more than one third of the actual number of those killed is on personal records. The personal records of missing and captured people are even farther from the truth.”
And on March 7, 1945, Stalin, in an order to the People’s Commissariat of Defense, emphasized that “military councils of fronts, armies and military districts do not pay due attention” to issues of personal accounting of irretrievable losses.
It remains to count Soviet losses through estimates, since their underestimation in surviving documents is several times higher than the actual value.I considered the losses of the Red Army in several ways. Firstly, the monthly dynamics of Soviet losses in wounded throughout the war has been published (as a percentage of the monthly average). In addition, D.A. Volkogonov once published a monthly breakdown of the Red Army’s losses for 1942. A number of considerations led to the conclusion that in November alone, almost all irretrievable losses were related to the dead, and not to prisoners. Then irretrievable losses amounted to 413 thousand people, and the number of wounded was 83 percent of the monthly average during the war. Based on this proportion, the number of Red Army soldiers killed and those who died from other causes (except prisoners) during the entire war, from June 41 to May 45, can be estimated at 22.4 million people. According to my estimate, of the 6.2 million Soviet military personnel who were in German captivity, about 4 million died. Thus, the total losses of the Soviet Armed Forces can be estimated at 26.4 million people killed.
The total losses of the Wehrmacht in those killed on the battlefield and those who died from other causes, according to my assessment, compiled on the data contained in the book of General B. Müller-Hillebrand “German Land Army” (during the war he was in charge of personnel records), amounted to about 3.2 million people. About 0.8 million more died in captivity. Of these, about 500 thousand did not survive captivity in the East, where a total of almost 3.15 million German troops ended up. I estimate the number of German servicemen who died in the East at 2.1 million people - then, taking into account those who died in captivity, the figure is 2.6 million.
I note that the Müller-Hillebrand data are based on a centralized accounting of German losses up to November 1944 and on an assessment of losses over the last six months made by the German General Staff. Sometimes higher figures for German losses are also found (4.5 - 5 million people), based on higher estimates in the last six months of the war. They don't seem reliable to me. In the last six months, German casualties could not have been higher than in the previous year, since in recent months the number of the German army at the front had been significantly reduced, and its main losses were not in killed, but in prisoners.
The ratio of Soviet and German losses on the Eastern Front is therefore approximately 10:1. If we also take into account the losses of Germany’s allies and Soviet citizens who died on the side of the Wehrmacht, but were not included in German losses (according to various estimates, there were from 100 to 200 thousand), then the ratio will become approximately 7.5:1.
Of the approximately 5 thousand dead Soviet servicemen whose remains were found by Russian search engines in the mid-90s and whose identities were established, about 30% were not listed in the archives of the Ministry of Defense and therefore were not included in the computer data bank. If we assume that the 19 million included in this bank account for approximately 70% of all dead and missing, their total number should reach 27.1 million people. From this number we must subtract approximately 2 million surviving prisoners and approximately 900 thousand who returned to their encirclement. Then the total number of dead soldiers and officers can be calculated at 24.2 million. However, this calculation was made on the basis of those 5 thousand dead who were identified from the documents they had preserved. Consequently, these military personnel are more likely to be on the Department of Defense lists than the average killed person.D It is also possible to estimate the ratio of Soviet and German losses with relative accuracy based on the losses of officers, who always count more accurately than privates. According to data provided by Müller-Hillebrand, the German ground army lost 65.2 thousand officers in the East from June 41 to November 44, killed and missing. The total irretrievable losses of the Wehrmacht during the same period amounted to 2,417 thousand people. Thus, for one officer there are 36 privates and non-commissioned officers of irretrievable losses. The share of officers in these losses is 2.7%.
The irretrievable losses of officers of the Soviet ground forces, according to calculations completed only in 1963, amounted to 973 thousand. If we exclude from this figure sergeants and foremen who held officer positions, as well as the losses of 1945, then the irretrievable losses of officers of the Soviet ground forces for the years 1941 - 1944 (minus the political personnel absent from the Wehrmacht, as well as administrative and legal personnel, among the Germans represented by officials) will be about 784 thousand. It is these 784 thousand that must be compared with the 65.2 thousand German officer losses cited by Müller-Hillebrand.
The resulting ratio is 11.2:1. It is close to the ratio of losses between the armies of the USSR and Germany, determined by another method. If we accept the official figure of Soviet losses, it turns out that in the ground forces of the Red Army there were only 8 privates per killed officer. It turns out that our squads (the usual number of one squad is 9 people) were commanded by officers. Or that in the Red Army entire battalions and regiments of officers alone rushed into the attack.
The share of officers in the irretrievable losses of the two sides was approximately the same. Thus, independent Russian military historian V.M. Safir notes that “according to individual combat reports of the ground forces, the approximate level of officer losses ranges somewhere between 3.5 - 4.0%.” If we take, for example, the report on the losses of the 323rd Infantry Division for December 17 - 19, 1941, there were 458 soldiers and sergeants for 38 killed commanders, and 1181 missing sergeants and soldiers for 19 missing commanders. Here, the share of commanders in irretrievable losses is 3.36%. If we subtract from here political workers, who made up almost 10% of officer losses, and another 3% of losses of administrative and legal personnel, then the share of officers in losses will be reduced to 3% and will differ very little from the share of officers in German irretrievable losses.
All these calculations only prove what the few survivors of those front-line soldiers who had the opportunity to go on the attack already know. We overwhelmed the enemy with corpses and won only thanks to the large and resigned mass of untrained soldiers who obediently went into suicidal attacks. A well-trained soldier and an officer capable of reflection posed a greater danger to Stalin than the death of tens of millions of untrained soldiers.
As for the total Soviet losses, they significantly exceed the official 27 million. The fact is that the population of the USSR at the beginning of the war was not 194 million people, as many demographers believe, but, according to calculations carried out by the Central Statistical Office in June 1941, it should exceeded 200 million people. But then they only managed to carry out a preliminary calculation, and a repeat calculation was done only for Moldova and the Khabarovsk Territory. It gave figures 4.6% more than the original ones. Taking this into account, the population of the USSR in June 1941 can be estimated at 209.3 million people. And the total population loss as a result of the war from excess mortality (taking into account the fact that by the beginning of 1946 its number was estimated at 167 million people, as well as the birth rates of the last war years) is 43.3 million people. (Recall that the total losses of the Reich are estimated at 7 million dead.) Thus, civilian losses amounted to 16.9 million people.
I would like to emphasize that the accuracy here does not exceed plus or minus 5 million people, so the tenths of millions in numbers are quite arbitrary and reflect only the methods of calculation. But we are unlikely to ever calculate the losses more accurately.
Boris SOKOLOV, professor of the Russian State
social university
(in brackets – including officers)
* There are errors in the table when summing (Editor's note)
Germany was forced to capitulate by its losses in manpower. In principle, it had enough weapons and equipment, even the newest and most advanced models, such as, say, ballistic missiles, jet aircraft, powerful tanks, etc.
A coalition of allies fought against fascist Germany and its satellites: the USSR, England and the USA. And from the point of view of inflicting decisive losses on Germany, by looking at the tables, you can determine which of the allies played the main role in that war.
The losses of the German Navy were certainly determined by the combat operations of the fleets and air forces of England and the United States. And although by December 1944 the Baltic Fleet had not yet said its final word and Captain Marinescu had not yet sunk the entire school of the German submarine fleet and had not become the personal enemy of the Fuhrer, we will give the allies their due - probably in the end they determined the German losses at sea by almost 95%. But German human losses at sea by the beginning of 1945 amounted to just over 2% of their total recorded losses.
In the air, by the middle of the war, England and the United States were crushing the Germans with their numerical superiority; naturally, the main forces of the Luftwaffe were always defending the territory of Germany itself and here they suffered serious losses. However, if we sum up the Luftwaffe’s manpower losses only from combat operations (the first four sums of the final column), we get combat losses of 549,393, of which 218,960 are losses on the Eastern Front, or 39.8% of all combat losses of the German Air Force.
If we accept that the losses of Luftwaffe flight personnel on all fronts were proportional, then on the Eastern Front, the Germans would have lost 39.8% of all their pilots. The number of those killed among the missing is not known; let’s assume that half of the flight personnel listed as missing were captured, and half died. Then the estimated amount of dead flight personnel as of January 31, 1945 will be (43517 + 27240/2) = 57137 people, and 39.8% of this number will be 22740 people.
The Soviet Air Force lost 27,600 pilots throughout the war. If we take into account what kind of planes they had to fly in the initial period of the war (in the first 6 months we lost more than 20 thousand planes, and the Germans about 4 thousand), then the constantly circulated tales about some kind of super-superiority of German pilots over Soviet ones do not look convincing . After all, to these figures of German losses we must add the losses after 01/31/45, and the losses of the Finns, Hungarians, Italians and Romanians.
And finally, the losses of the ground forces of Nazi Germany on all fronts (the top six numbers of the final column of the corresponding part of the table) as of January 31, 1945 amounted to 7,065,239 people, of which the Germans lost 5,622,411 people on the Soviet-German front. This accounts for 80% of all their combat losses.
Since the Germans were reluctant to surrender to the troops of the Red Army, it is possible to calculate the proportion of German soldiers killed on the Eastern Front, of all those killed as of January 31, 1945. This proportion is more than 85%. This is for the period from September 1, 1939.
As of January 31, 1945, the Germans on all fronts in the air and at sea lost at least 7,789,051 people in battle (according to the Navy, let me remind you, losses are given as of December 31, 1944). Of these, in battles with the Red Army, Soviet Air Force and Navy - 5,851,804 people, or 75% of all German losses. One ally out of three suffered 3/4 of the entire war. Yes, there were people!
Before we go into explanations, statistics, etc., let’s immediately clarify what we mean. This article examines the losses suffered by the Red Army, the Wehrmacht and the troops of the satellite countries of the Third Reich, as well as the civilian population of the USSR and Germany, only in the period from 06/22/1941 until the end of hostilities in Europe (unfortunately, in the case of Germany this is practically unenforceable). The Soviet-Finnish war and the “liberation” campaign of the Red Army were deliberately excluded. The issue of losses of the USSR and Germany has been repeatedly raised in the press, there are endless debates on the Internet and on television, but researchers on this issue cannot come to a common denominator, because, as a rule, all arguments ultimately come down to emotional and politicized statements. This once again proves how painful this issue is in our country. The purpose of the article is not to “clarify” the final truth in this matter, but to attempt to summarize the various data contained in disparate sources. We will leave the right to draw conclusions to the reader.
With all the variety of literature and online resources about the Great Patriotic War, ideas about it largely suffer from a certain superficiality. The main reason for this is the ideological nature of this or that research or work, and it does not matter what kind of ideology it is - communist or anti-communist. The interpretation of such a grandiose event in the light of any ideology is obviously false.
It is especially bitter to read recently that the war of 1941–45. was just a clash between two totalitarian regimes, where one, they say, was completely consistent with the other. We will try to look at this war from the most justified point of view - geopolitical.
Germany in the 1930s, for all its Nazi “peculiarities,” directly and unswervingly continued that powerful desire for primacy in Europe, which for centuries determined the path of the German nation. Even the purely liberal German sociologist Max Weber wrote during World War I: “...we, 70 million Germans...are obliged to be an empire. We must do this, even if we are afraid of failure.” The roots of this aspiration of the Germans go back centuries; as a rule, the Nazis’ appeal to medieval and even pagan Germany is interpreted as a purely ideological event, as the construction of a myth mobilizing the nation.
From my point of view, everything is more complicated: it was the German tribes that created the empire of Charlemagne, and later on its foundation the Holy Roman Empire of the German nation was formed. And it was the “empire of the German nation” that created what is called “European civilization” and began the aggressive policy of the Europeans with the sacramental “Drang nach osten” - “onslaught to the east”, because half of the “original” German lands, up until the 8th–10th centuries, belonged to Slavic tribes. Therefore, giving the plan of war against the “barbaric” USSR the name “Plan Barbarossa” is not a coincidence. This ideology of German “primacy” as the fundamental force of “European” civilization was the original cause of two world wars. Moreover, at the beginning of World War II, Germany was able to truly (albeit briefly) realize its aspiration.
Invading the borders of one or another European country, German troops met resistance that was amazing in its weakness and indecisiveness. Short-term battles between the armies of European countries and the German troops invading their borders, with the exception of Poland, were more likely compliance with a certain “custom” of war than actual resistance.
Extremely much has been written about the exaggerated European “Resistance Movement,” which supposedly caused enormous damage to Germany and testified that Europe flatly rejected its unification under German leadership. But, with the exception of Yugoslavia, Albania, Poland and Greece, the scale of the Resistance is the same ideological myth. Undoubtedly, the regime established by Germany in the occupied countries did not suit large sections of the population. In Germany itself there was also resistance to the regime, but in neither case was it resistance of the country and the nation as a whole. For example, in the Resistance movement in France, 20 thousand people died in 5 years; Over the same 5 years, about 50 thousand Frenchmen died who fought on the side of the Germans, that is, 2.5 times more!
In Soviet times, the exaggeration of the Resistance was introduced into the minds as a useful ideological myth, saying that our fight with Germany was supported by all of Europe. In fact, as already mentioned, only 4 countries offered serious resistance to the invaders, which is explained by their “patriarchal” nature: they were alien not so much to the “German” order imposed by the Reich, but to the pan-European one, because these countries, in their way of life and consciousness, were largely not belonged to European civilization (although geographically included in Europe).
Thus, by 1941, almost all of continental Europe, one way or another, but without any major shocks, became part of the new empire with Germany at its head. Of the existing two dozen European countries, almost half - Spain, Italy, Denmark, Norway, Hungary, Romania, Slovakia, Finland, Croatia - together with Germany entered the war against the USSR, sending their armed forces to the Eastern Front (Denmark and Spain without a formal announcement war). The rest of the European countries did not take part in military operations against the USSR, but one way or another “worked” for Germany, or, rather, for the newly formed European Empire. Misconceptions about events in Europe have made us completely forget about many of the real events of that time. So, for example, the Anglo-American troops under the command of Eisenhower in November 1942 in North Africa initially fought not with the Germans, but with a 200,000-strong French army, despite the quick “victory” (Jean Darlan, due to the clear superiority of the Allied forces, ordered the surrender of the French troops), 584 Americans, 597 British and 1,600 French were killed in action. Of course, these are miniscule losses on the scale of the entire Second World War, but they show that the situation was somewhat more complicated than is usually thought.
In battles on the Eastern Front, the Red Army captured half a million prisoners, who were citizens of countries that did not seem to be at war with the USSR! It can be argued that these are “victims” of German violence, which drove them into Russian spaces. But the Germans were no more stupid than you and me and would hardly have allowed an unreliable contingent to the front. And while the next great and multinational army was winning victories in Russia, Europe was, by and large, on its side. Franz Halder, in his diary on June 30, 1941, wrote down Hitler's words: "European unity as a result of a joint war against Russia." And Hitler assessed the situation quite correctly. In fact, the geopolitical goals of the war against the USSR were carried out not only by the Germans, but by 300 million Europeans, united on various grounds - from forced submission to desired cooperation - but, one way or another, acting together. Only thanks to their reliance on continental Europe were the Germans able to mobilize 25% of the total population into the army (for reference: the USSR mobilized 17% of its citizens). In a word, the strength and technical equipment of the army that invaded the USSR was provided by tens of millions of skilled workers throughout Europe.
Why did I need such a long introduction? The answer is simple. Finally, we must realize that the USSR fought not only with the German Third Reich, but with almost all of Europe. Unfortunately, the eternal “Russophobia” of Europe was superimposed by the fear of the “terrible beast” - Bolshevism. Many volunteers from European countries who fought in Russia fought precisely against a communist ideology that was alien to them. No less of them were conscious haters of the “inferior” Slavs, infected with the plague of racial superiority. The modern German historian R. Rurup writes:
“Many documents of the Third Reich captured the image of the enemy - the Russian, deeply rooted in German history and society. Such views were characteristic even of those officers and soldiers who were not convinced or enthusiastic Nazis. They (these soldiers and officers) also shared ideas about “ "the eternal struggle" of the Germans... about the defense of European culture from the "Asian hordes", about the cultural vocation and right of domination of the Germans in the East. The image of an enemy of this type was widespread in Germany, it belonged to "spiritual values."
And this geopolitical consciousness was not unique to the Germans as such. After June 22, 1941, volunteer legions appeared by leaps and bounds, later turning into the SS divisions “Nordland” (Scandinavian), “Langemarck” (Belgian-Flemish), “Charlemagne” (French). Guess where they defended “European civilization”? That’s right, quite far from Western Europe, in Belarus, Ukraine, Russia. German professor K. Pfeffer wrote in 1953: “Most of the volunteers from Western European countries went to the Eastern Front because they saw this as a COMMON task for the entire West...” It was with the forces of almost all of Europe that the USSR was destined to face, and not just with Germany, and this clash was not “two totalitarianisms,” but “civilized and progressive” Europe with the “barbaric state of subhumans” that had frightened Europeans from the east for so long.
1. USSR losses
According to official data from the 1939 population census, 170 million people lived in the USSR - significantly more than in any other single country in Europe. The entire population of Europe (without the USSR) was 400 million people. By the beginning of World War II, the population of the Soviet Union differed from the population of future enemies and allies in its high mortality rate and low life expectancy. However, the high birth rate ensured significant population growth (2% in 1938–39). Also different from Europe was the youth of the USSR population: the proportion of children under 15 years old was 35%. It was this feature that made it possible to restore the pre-war population relatively quickly (within 10 years). The share of the urban population was only 32% (for comparison: in Great Britain - more than 80%, in France - 50%, in Germany - 70%, in the USA - 60%, and only in Japan it had the same value as in THE USSR).
In 1939, the population of the USSR increased noticeably after the entry into the country of new regions (Western Ukraine and Belarus, the Baltic States, Bukovina and Bessarabia), whose population ranged from 20 to 22.5 million people. The total population of the USSR, according to a certificate from the Central Statistical Office as of January 1, 1941, was determined to be 198,588 thousand people (including the RSFSR - 111,745 thousand people). According to modern estimates, it was still smaller, and on June 1, 1941 it was 196.7 million people.
Population of some countries for 1938–40
USSR - 170.6 (196.7) million people;
Germany - 77.4 million people;
France - 40.1 million people;
Great Britain - 51.1 million people;
Italy - 42.4 million people;
Finland - 3.8 million people;
USA - 132.1 million people;
Japan - 71.9 million people.
By 1940, the population of the Reich had increased to 90 million people, and taking into account the satellites and conquered countries - 297 million people. By December 1941, the USSR had lost 7% of the country's territory, where 74.5 million people lived before the start of the Second World War. This once again emphasizes that despite Hitler’s assurances, the USSR did not have an advantage in human resources over the Third Reich.
During the entire Great Patriotic War in our country, 34.5 million people put on military uniforms. This amounted to about 70% of the total number of men aged 15–49 years in 1941. The number of women in the Red Army was approximately 500 thousand. The percentage of conscripts was higher only in Germany, but as we said earlier, the Germans covered the labor shortage at the expense of European workers and prisoners of war. In the USSR, such a deficit was covered by increased working hours and the widespread use of labor by women, children and the elderly.
For a long time, the USSR did not talk about direct irretrievable losses of the Red Army. In a private conversation, Marshal Konev in 1962 named the figure 10 million people, a famous defector - Colonel Kalinov, who fled to the West in 1949 - 13.6 million people. The figure of 10 million people was published in the French version of the book “Wars and Population” by B. Ts. Urlanis, a famous Soviet demographer. The authors of the famous monograph “The Classification of Secrecy Has Been Removed” (edited by G. Krivosheev) in 1993 and in 2001 published the figure of 8.7 million people; at the moment, this is precisely what is indicated in most reference literature. But the authors themselves state that it does not include: 500 thousand persons liable for military service, called up for mobilization and captured by the enemy, but not included in the lists of units and formations. Also, the almost completely dead militias of Moscow, Leningrad, Kyiv and other large cities are not taken into account. Currently, the most complete lists of irretrievable losses of Soviet soldiers amount to 13.7 million people, but approximately 12-15% of the records are repeated. According to the article “Dead Souls of the Great Patriotic War” (“NG”, 06.22.99), the historical and archival search center “Fate” of the “War Memorials” association established that due to double and even triple counting, the number of dead soldiers of the 43rd and 2nd of the Shock Armies in the battles studied by the center was overestimated by 10-12%. Since these figures refer to a period when the accounting of losses in the Red Army was not careful enough, it can be assumed that in the war as a whole, due to double counting, the number of Red Army soldiers killed was overestimated by approximately 5–7%, i.e. by 0.2– 0.4 million people
On the issue of prisoners. American researcher A. Dallin, based on archival German data, estimates their number at 5.7 million people. Of these, 3.8 million died in captivity, that is, 63%. Domestic historians estimate the number of captured Red Army soldiers at 4.6 million people, of which 2.9 million died. Unlike German sources, this does not include civilians (for example, railway workers), as well as seriously wounded people who remained on the battlefield occupied by the enemy, and subsequently died from wounds or were shot (about 470-500 thousand). The situation of prisoners of war was especially desperate in the first year of the war, when more than half of their total number (2.8 million people) was captured, and their labor had not yet been used in interests of the Reich. Open-air camps, hunger and cold, illness and lack of medicine, cruel treatment, mass executions of the sick and unable to work, and simply all those unwanted, primarily commissars and Jews. Unable to cope with the flow of prisoners and guided by political and propaganda motives, the occupiers in 1941 sent home over 300 thousand prisoners of war, mainly natives of western Ukraine and Belarus. This practice was subsequently discontinued.
Also, do not forget that approximately 1 million prisoners of war were transferred from captivity to the auxiliary units of the Wehrmacht. In many cases, this was the only chance for prisoners to survive. Again, most of these people, according to German data, tried to desert from Wehrmacht units and formations at the first opportunity. The local auxiliary forces of the German army included:
1) volunteer helpers (hivi)
2) order service (odi)
3) front auxiliary parts (noise)
4) police and defense teams (gema).
At the beginning of 1943, the Wehrmacht operated: up to 400 thousand Khivi, from 60 to 70 thousand Odi, and 80 thousand in the eastern battalions.
Some of the prisoners of war and the population of the occupied territories made a conscious choice in favor of cooperation with the Germans. Thus, in the SS division “Galicia” there were 82,000 volunteers for 13,000 “places”. More than 100 thousand Latvians, 36 thousand Lithuanians and 10 thousand Estonians served in the German army, mainly in the SS troops.
In addition, several million people from the occupied territories were taken to forced labor in the Reich. The ChGK (Emergency State Commission) immediately after the war estimated their number at 4.259 million people. More recent studies give a figure of 5.45 million people, of whom 850-1000 thousand died.
Estimates of direct physical extermination of the civilian population, according to the ChGK data from 1946.
RSFSR - 706 thousand people.
Ukrainian SSR - 3256.2 thousand people.
BSSR - 1547 thousand people.
Lit. SSR - 437.5 thousand people.
Lat. SSR - 313.8 thousand people.
Est. SSR - 61.3 thousand people.
Mold. USSR - 61 thousand people.
Karelo-Fin. SSR - 8 thousand people. (10)
Such high figures for Lithuania and Latvia are explained by the fact that there were death camps and concentration camps for prisoners of war there. The population losses in the front line during the fighting were also enormous. However, it is virtually impossible to determine them. The minimum acceptable value is the number of deaths in besieged Leningrad, i.e. 800 thousand people. In 1942, the infant mortality rate in Leningrad reached 74.8%, that is, out of 100 newborns, about 75 babies died!
Another important question. How many former Soviet citizens chose not to return to the USSR after the end of the Great Patriotic War? According to Soviet archival data, the number of the “second emigration” was 620 thousand people. 170,000 are Germans, Bessarabians and Bukovinians, 150,000 are Ukrainians, 109,000 are Latvians, 230,000 are Estonians and Lithuanians, and only 32,000 are Russians. Today this estimate seems clearly underestimated. According to modern data, emigration from the USSR amounted to 1.3 million people. Which gives us a difference of almost 700 thousand, previously attributed to irreversible population losses.
So, what are the losses of the Red Army, the civilian population of the USSR and the general demographic losses in the Great Patriotic War. For twenty years, the main estimate was the far-fetched figure of 20 million people by N. Khrushchev. In 1990, as a result of the work of a special commission of the General Staff and the State Statistics Committee of the USSR, a more reasonable estimate of 26.6 million people appeared. At the moment it is official. Noteworthy is the fact that back in 1948, the American sociologist Timashev gave an assessment of the USSR's losses in the war, which practically coincided with the assessment of the General Staff commission. Maksudov’s assessment made in 1977 also coincides with the data of the Krivosheev Commission. According to the commission of G.F. Krivosheev.
So let's summarize:
Post-war estimate of Red Army losses: 7 million people.
Timashev: Red Army - 12.2 million people, civilian population 14.2 million people, direct human losses 26.4 million people, total demographic 37.3 million.
Arntz and Khrushchev: direct human: 20 million people.
Biraben and Solzhenitsyn: Red Army 20 million people, civilian population 22.6 million people, direct human 42.6 million, general demographic 62.9 million people.
Maksudov: Red Army - 11.8 million people, civilian population 12.7 million people, direct casualties 24.5 million people. It is impossible not to make a reservation that S. Maksudov (A.P. Babenyshev, Harvard University USA) determined the purely combat losses of the spacecraft at 8.8 million people
Rybakovsky: direct human 30 million people.
Andreev, Darsky, Kharkov (General Staff, Krivosheev Commission): direct combat losses of the Red Army 8.7 million (11,994 including prisoners of war) people. Civilian population (including prisoners of war) 17.9 million people. Direct human losses: 26.6 million people.
B. Sokolov: losses of the Red Army - 26 million people
M. Harrison: total losses of the USSR - 23.9 - 25.8 million people.
What do we have in the “dry” residue? We will be guided by simple logic.
The estimate of the losses of the Red Army given in 1947 (7 million) does not inspire confidence, since not all calculations, even with the imperfections of the Soviet system, were completed.
Khrushchev's assessment is also not confirmed. On the other hand, “Solzhenitsyn’s” 20 million casualties in the army alone, or even 44 million, are just as unfounded (without denying some of A. Solzhenitsyn’s talent as a writer, all the facts and figures in his works are not confirmed by a single document and it’s difficult to understand where he comes from took - impossible).
Boris Sokolov is trying to explain to us that the losses of the USSR armed forces alone amounted to 26 million people. He is guided by the indirect method of calculations. The losses of the officers of the Red Army are known quite accurately; according to Sokolov, this is 784 thousand people (1941–44). Mr. Sokolov, referring to the average statistical losses of Wehrmacht officers on the Eastern Front of 62,500 people (1941–44), and data from Müller-Hillebrandt , displays the ratio of losses of the officer corps to the rank and file of the Wehrmacht as 1:25, that is, 4%. And, without hesitation, he extrapolates this technique to the Red Army, receiving his 26 million irretrievable losses. However, upon closer examination, this approach turns out to be initially false. Firstly, 4% of officer losses is not an upper limit, for example, in the Polish campaign, the Wehrmacht lost 12% of officers to the total losses of the Armed Forces. Secondly, it would be useful for Mr. Sokolov to know that with the regular strength of the German infantry regiment being 3049 officers, there were 75 officers, that is, 2.5%. And in the Soviet infantry regiment, with a strength of 1582 people, there are 159 officers, i.e. 10%. Thirdly, appealing to the Wehrmacht, Sokolov forgets that the more combat experience in the troops, the fewer losses among officers. In the Polish campaign, the loss of German officers was −12%, in the French campaign - 7%, and on the Eastern Front already 4%.
The same can be applied to the Red Army: if at the end of the war the losses of officers (not according to Sokolov, but according to statistics) were 8-9%, then at the beginning of the Second World War they could have been 24%. It turns out, like a schizophrenic, everything is logical and correct, only the initial premise is incorrect. Why did we dwell on Sokolov’s theory in such detail? Yes, because Mr. Sokolov very often presents his figures in the media.
Taking into account the above, discarding the obviously underestimated and overestimated estimates of losses, we get: Krivosheev Commission - 8.7 million people (with prisoners of war 11.994 million, 2001 data), Maksudov - losses are even slightly lower than the official ones - 11.8 million people. (1977−93), Timashev - 12.2 million people. (1948). This can also include the opinion of M. Harrison, with the level of total losses indicated by him, the losses of the army should fit into this period. These data were obtained using different calculation methods, since Timashev and Maksudov, respectively, did not have access to the archives of the USSR and Russian Defense Ministry. It seems that the losses of the USSR Armed Forces in the Second World War lie very close to such a “heaped” group of results. Let's not forget that these figures include 2.6–3.2 million destroyed Soviet prisoners of war.
In conclusion, we should probably agree with Maksudov’s opinion that the emigration outflow, which amounted to 1.3 million people, which was not taken into account in the General Staff study, should be excluded from the number of losses. The losses of the USSR in the Second World War should be reduced by this amount. In percentage terms, the structure of USSR losses looks like this:
41% - aircraft losses (including prisoners of war)
35% - aircraft losses (without prisoners of war, i.e. direct combat)
39% - losses of the population of the occupied territories and the front line (45% with prisoners of war)
8% - rear population
6% - GULAG
6% - emigration outflow.
2. Losses of the Wehrmacht and SS troops
To date, there are no sufficiently reliable figures for the losses of the German army obtained by direct statistical calculation. This is explained by the absence, for various reasons, of reliable initial statistical materials on German losses.
The picture is more or less clear regarding the number of Wehrmacht prisoners of war on the Soviet-German front. According to Russian sources, Soviet troops captured 3,172,300 Wehrmacht soldiers, of which 2,388,443 were Germans in NKVD camps. According to the calculations of German historians, there were about 3.1 million German military personnel alone in Soviet prisoner-of-war camps. The discrepancy, as you can see, is approximately 0.7 million people. This discrepancy is explained by differences in estimates of the number of Germans who died in captivity: according to Russian archival documents, 356,700 Germans died in Soviet captivity, and according to German researchers, approximately 1.1 million people. It seems that the Russian figure of Germans killed in captivity is more reliable, and the missing 0.7 million Germans who went missing and did not return from captivity actually died not in captivity, but on the battlefield.
The vast majority of publications devoted to calculations of combat demographic losses of the Wehrmacht and SS troops are based on data from the central bureau (department) for recording losses of armed forces personnel, part of the German General Staff of the Supreme High Command. Moreover, while denying the reliability of Soviet statistics, German data are regarded as absolutely reliable. But upon closer examination, it turned out that the opinion about the high reliability of the information from this department was greatly exaggerated. Thus, the German historian R. Overmans, in the article “Human casualties of the Second World War in Germany,” came to the conclusion that “... the channels of information in the Wehrmacht do not reveal the degree of reliability that some authors attribute to them.” As an example, he reports that “... an official report from the casualty department at Wehrmacht headquarters dating back to 1944 documented that the losses that were incurred during the Polish, French and Norwegian campaigns, and the identification of which did not present any technical difficulties, were almost twice as high as originally reported." According to Müller-Hillebrand data, which many researchers believe, the demographic losses of the Wehrmacht amounted to 3.2 million people. Another 0.8 million died in captivity. However, according to a certificate from the OKH organizational department dated May 1, 1945, the ground forces alone, including the SS troops (without the Air Force and Navy), lost 4 million 617.0 thousand during the period from September 1, 1939 to May 1, 1945. people This is the latest report of German Armed Forces losses. In addition, since mid-April 1945, there was no centralized accounting of losses. And since the beginning of 1945, the data is incomplete. The fact remains that in one of the last radio broadcasts with his participation, Hitler announced the figure of 12.5 million total losses of the German Armed Forces, of which 6.7 million are irrevocable, which is approximately twice the data of Müller-Hillebrand. This happened in March 1945. I don’t think that in two months the soldiers of the Red Army did not kill a single German.
In general, the information from the Wehrmacht loss department cannot serve as the initial data for calculating the losses of the German Armed Forces in the Great Patriotic War.
There is another statistics on losses - statistics on the burials of Wehrmacht soldiers. According to the annex to the German law “On the Preservation of Burial Sites”, the total number of German soldiers located in recorded burial sites on the territory of the Soviet Union and Eastern European countries is 3 million 226 thousand people. (on the territory of the USSR alone - 2,330,000 burials). This figure can be taken as a starting point for calculating the demographic losses of the Wehrmacht, however, it also needs to be adjusted.
Firstly, this figure takes into account only the burials of Germans, and a large number of soldiers of other nationalities fought in the Wehrmacht: Austrians (270 thousand of them died), Sudeten Germans and Alsatians (230 thousand people died) and representatives of other nationalities and states (357 thousand people died). Of the total number of dead Wehrmacht soldiers of non-German nationality, the Soviet-German front accounts for 75-80%, i.e. 0.6–0.7 million people.
Secondly, this figure dates back to the early 90s of the last century. Since then, the search for German burials in Russia, the CIS countries and Eastern European countries has continued. And the messages that appeared on this topic were not informative enough. For example, the Russian Association of War Memorials, created in 1992, reported that over the 10 years of its existence it transferred information about the burials of 400 thousand Wehrmacht soldiers to the German Association for the Care of Military Graves. However, whether these were newly discovered burials or whether they had already been taken into account in the figure of 3 million 226 thousand is unclear. Unfortunately, it was not possible to find generalized statistics of newly discovered burials of Wehrmacht soldiers. Tentatively, we can assume that the number of graves of Wehrmacht soldiers newly discovered over the past 10 years is in the range of 0.2–0.4 million people.
Thirdly, many graves of dead Wehrmacht soldiers on Soviet soil have disappeared or were deliberately destroyed. Approximately 0.4–0.6 million Wehrmacht soldiers could have been buried in such disappeared and unmarked graves.
Fourthly, these data do not include the burials of German soldiers killed in battles with Soviet troops on the territory of Germany and Western European countries. According to R. Overmans, in the last three spring months of the war alone, about 1 million people died. (minimum estimate 700 thousand) In general, approximately 1.2–1.5 million Wehrmacht soldiers died on German soil and in Western European countries in battles with the Red Army.
Finally, fifthly, the number of those buried also included Wehrmacht soldiers who died a “natural” death (0.1–0.2 million people)
Articles by Major General V. Gurkin are devoted to assessing Wehrmacht losses using the balance of the German armed forces during the war years. His calculated figures are given in the second column of the table. 4. Here two figures are noteworthy, characterizing the number of those mobilized into the Wehrmacht during the war, and the number of prisoners of war of Wehrmacht soldiers. The number of those mobilized during the war (17.9 million people) is taken from the book by B. Müller-Hillebrand “German Land Army 1933–1945,” Vol. At the same time, V.P. Bohar believes that more were drafted into the Wehrmacht - 19 million people.
The number of Wehrmacht prisoners of war was determined by V. Gurkin by summing up the prisoners of war taken by the Red Army (3.178 million people) and the Allied forces (4.209 million people) before May 9, 1945. In my opinion, this number is overestimated: it also included prisoners of war who were not Wehrmacht soldiers. The book “German Prisoners of War of the Second World War” by Paul Karel and Ponter Boeddeker reports: “...In June 1945, the Allied Command became aware that there were 7,614,794 prisoners of war and unarmed military personnel in the “camps, of which 4,209,000 by the time capitulation were already in captivity." Among the indicated 4.2 million German prisoners of war, in addition to Wehrmacht soldiers, there were many other people. For example, in the French camp of Vitril-Francois among the prisoners, “the youngest was 15 years old, the oldest was almost 70.” The authors write about captured Volksturm soldiers, about the organization by the Americans of special “children’s” camps, where captured twelve- to thirteen-year-old boys from the “Hitler Youth” and “Werewolf” were collected. Mention is made of placing even disabled people in camps. In the article “My path to Ryazan captivity” (“ Map" No. 1, 1992) Heinrich Schippmann noted:
“It should be taken into account that at first, although predominantly, but not exclusively, not only Wehrmacht soldiers or SS troops were taken prisoner, but also Air Force service personnel, members of the Volkssturm or paramilitary unions (the Todt organization, the Service labor of the Reich", etc.) Among them were not only men, but also women - and not only Germans, but also the so-called "Volksdeutsche" and "aliens" - Croats, Serbs, Cossacks, Northern and Western Europeans, who "fought in any way on the side of the German Wehrmacht or were assigned to it. In addition, during the occupation of Germany in 1945, anyone who wore a uniform was arrested, even if it was a question of the head of a railway station."
Overall, among the 4.2 million prisoners of war taken by the Allies before May 9, 1945, approximately 20–25% were not Wehrmacht soldiers. This means that the Allies had 3.1–3.3 million Wehrmacht soldiers in captivity.
The total number of Wehrmacht soldiers captured before the surrender was 6.3–6.5 million people.
In general, the demographic combat losses of the Wehrmacht and SS troops on the Soviet-German front amount to 5.2–6.3 million people, of which 0.36 million died in captivity, and irretrievable losses (including prisoners) 8.2 –9.1 million people It should also be noted that until recent years, Russian historiography did not mention some data on the number of Wehrmacht prisoners of war at the end of hostilities in Europe, apparently for ideological reasons, because it is much more pleasant to believe that Europe “fought” fascism than to realize that that a certain and very large number of Europeans deliberately fought in the Wehrmacht. So, according to a note from General Antonov, on May 25, 1945. The Red Army captured 5 million 20 thousand Wehrmacht soldiers alone, of which 600 thousand people (Austrians, Czechs, Slovaks, Slovenes, Poles, etc.) were released before August after filtration measures, and these prisoners of war were sent to camps The NKVD was not sent. Thus, the irretrievable losses of the Wehrmacht in battles with the Red Army could be even higher (about 0.6 - 0.8 million people).
There is another way to “calculate” the losses of Germany and the Third Reich in the war against the USSR. Quite correct, by the way. Let’s try to “substitute” the figures relating to Germany into the methodology for calculating the total demographic losses of the USSR. Moreover, we will use ONLY official data from the German side. So, the population of Germany in 1939, according to Müller-Hillebrandt (p. 700 of his work, so beloved by supporters of the “filling up with corpses” theory), was 80.6 million people. At the same time, you and I, the reader, must take into account that this includes 6.76 million Austrians, and the population of the Sudetenland - another 3.64 million people. That is, the population of Germany proper within the borders of 1933 in 1939 was (80.6 - 6.76 - 3.64) 70.2 million people. We figured out these simple mathematical operations. Further: natural mortality in the USSR was 1.5% per year, but in Western European countries the mortality rate was much lower and amounted to 0.6 - 0.8% per year, Germany was no exception. However, the birth rate in the USSR was approximately the same proportion as it was in Europe, due to which the USSR had consistently high population growth throughout the pre-war years, starting from 1934.
We know about the results of the post-war population census in the USSR, but few people know that a similar population census was conducted by the Allied occupation authorities on October 29, 1946 in Germany. The census gave the following results:
Soviet occupation zone (without East Berlin): men - 7.419 million, women - 9.914 million, total: 17.333 million people.
All western zones of occupation (without western Berlin): men - 20.614 million, women - 24.804 million, total: 45.418 million people.
Berlin (all sectors of occupation), men - 1.29 million, women - 1.89 million, total: 3.18 million people.
The total population of Germany is 65,931,000 people. A purely arithmetic operation of 70.2 million - 66 million seems to give a loss of only 4.2 million. However, everything is not so simple.
At the time of the population census in the USSR, the number of children born since the beginning of 1941 was about 11 million; the birth rate in the USSR during the war years fell sharply and amounted to only 1.37% per year of the pre-war population. The birth rate in Germany even in peacetime did not exceed 2% per year of the population. Suppose it fell only 2 times, and not 3, as in the USSR. That is, the natural population growth during the war years and the first post-war year was about 5% of the pre-war population, and in figures amounted to 3.5–3.8 million children. This figure must be added to the final figure for the population decline in Germany. Now the arithmetic is different: the total population decline is 4.2 million + 3.5 million = 7.7 million people. But this is not the final figure; To complete the calculations, we need to subtract from the population decline figure the figure of natural mortality during the war years and 1946, which is 2.8 million people (let’s take the figure 0.8% to make it “higher”). Now the total population loss in Germany caused by the war is 4.9 million people. Which, in general, is very “similar” to the figure for irretrievable losses of the Reich ground forces given by Müller-Hillebrandt. So did the USSR, which lost 26.6 million of its citizens in the war, really “fill up with corpses” of its enemy? Patience, dear reader, let’s bring our calculations to their logical conclusion.
The fact is that the population of Germany proper in 1946 grew by at least another 6.5 million people, and presumably even by 8 million! By the time of the 1946 census (according to German data, by the way, published back in 1996 by the “Union of Expellees”, and in total about 15 million Germans were “forcibly displaced”) only from the Sudetenland, Poznan and Upper Silesia were evicted to German territory 6.5 million Germans. About 1 - 1.5 million Germans fled from Alsace and Lorraine (unfortunately, there are no more accurate data). That is, these 6.5 - 8 million must be added to the losses of Germany itself. And these are “slightly” different numbers: 4.9 million + 7.25 million (arithmetic average of the number of Germans “expelled” to their homeland) = 12.15 million. Actually, this is 17.3% (!) of the German population in 1939. Well, that's not all!
Let me emphasize once again: the Third Reich is NOT JUST Germany! By the time of the attack on the USSR, the Third Reich “officially” included: Germany (70.2 million people), Austria (6.76 million people), the Sudetenland (3.64 million people), captured from Poland “Baltic corridor”, Poznan and Upper Silesia (9.36 million people), Luxembourg, Lorraine and Alsace (2.2 million people), and even Upper Corinthia cut off from Yugoslavia, a total of 92.16 million people.
These are all territories that were officially included in the Reich, and whose inhabitants were subject to conscription into the Wehrmacht. We will not take into account the “Imperial Protectorate of Bohemia and Moravia” and the “Government General of Poland” here (although ethnic Germans were drafted into the Wehrmacht from these territories). And ALL of these territories remained under Nazi control until the beginning of 1945. Now we get the “final calculation” if we take into account that Austria’s losses are known to us and amount to 300,000 people, that is, 4.43% of the country’s population (which in %, of course, is much less than that of Germany). It would not be much of a stretch to assume that the population of the remaining regions of the Reich suffered the same percentage losses as a result of the war, which would give us another 673,000 people. As a result, the total human losses of the Third Reich are 12.15 million + 0.3 million + 0.6 million people. = 13.05 million people. This “number” is already more like the truth. Taking into account the fact that these losses include 0.5 - 0.75 million dead civilians (and not 3.5 million), we obtain the losses of the Third Reich Armed Forces equal to 12.3 million people irrevocably. If we consider that even the Germans admit the losses of their Armed Forces in the East at 75-80% of all losses on all fronts, then the Reich Armed Forces lost about 9.2 million (75% of 12.3 million) in battles with the Red Army. person irrevocably. Of course, not all of them were killed, but having data on those released (2.35 million), as well as prisoners of war who died in captivity (0.38 million), we can say quite accurately that those actually killed and those who died from wounds and in captivity, and also missing, but not captured (read “killed”, which is 0.7 million!), the Armed Forces of the Third Reich lost approximately 5.6-6 million people during the campaign to the East. According to these calculations, the irretrievable losses of the USSR Armed Forces and the Third Reich (without allies) are correlated as 1.3:1, and the combat losses of the Red Army (data from the team led by Krivosheev) and the Reich Armed Forces as 1.6:1.
The procedure for calculating the total human losses in Germany
The population in 1939 was 70.2 million people.
The population in 1946 was 65.93 million people.
Natural mortality 2.8 million people.
Natural increase (birth rate) 3.5 million people.
Emigration influx of 7.25 million people.
Total losses ((70.2 - 65.93 - 2.8) + 3.5 + 7.25 = 12.22) 12.15 million people.
Every tenth German died! Every twelfth person was captured!!!
Conclusion
In this article, the author does not pretend to seek out the “golden ratio” and “ultimate truth”. The data presented in it are available in the scientific literature and on the Internet. It’s just that they are all scattered and scattered across various sources. The author expresses his personal opinion: you cannot trust German and Soviet sources during the war, because your losses are underestimated by at least 2–3 times, while the enemy’s losses are exaggerated by the same 2–3 times. It is even more strange that German sources, unlike Soviet ones, are considered to be completely “reliable”, although, as a simple analysis shows, this is not the case.
The irretrievable losses of the USSR Armed Forces in the Second World War amount to 11.5 - 12.0 million irrevocably, with actual combat demographic losses of 8.7–9.3 million people. The losses of the Wehrmacht and SS troops on the Eastern Front amount to 8.0 - 8.9 million irrevocably, of which purely combat demographic 5.2-6.1 million people (including those who died in captivity) people. Plus, to the losses of the German Armed Forces proper on the Eastern Front, it is necessary to add the losses of the satellite countries, and this is no less than 850 thousand (including those who died in captivity) people killed and more than 600 thousand captured. Total 12.0 (largest number) million versus 9.05 (smallest number) million people.
A logical question: where is the “filling with corpses” that Western and now domestic “open” and “democratic” sources talk about so much? The percentage of dead Soviet prisoners of war, even according to the most gentle estimates, is no less than 55%, and of German prisoners, according to the largest, no more than 23%. Maybe the whole difference in losses is explained simply by the inhumane conditions in which the prisoners were kept?
The author is aware that these articles differ from the latest officially announced version of losses: losses of the USSR Armed Forces - 6.8 million military personnel killed, and 4.4 million captured and missing, German losses - 4.046 million military personnel killed, died from wounds, missing in action (including 442.1 thousand killed in captivity), losses of satellite countries - 806 thousand killed and 662 thousand captured. Irreversible losses of the armies of the USSR and Germany (including prisoners of war) - 11.5 million and 8.6 million people. The total losses of Germany are 11.2 million people. (for example on Wikipedia)
The issue with the civilian population is more terrible against the 14.4 (smallest number) million victims of the Second World War in the USSR - 3.2 million people (largest number) of victims on the German side. So who fought and with whom? It is also necessary to mention that without denying the Holocaust of the Jews, German society still does not perceive the “Slavic” Holocaust; if everything is known about the suffering of the Jewish people in the West (thousands of works), then they prefer to “modestly” remain silent about the crimes against the Slavic peoples. The non-participation of our researchers, for example, in the all-German “dispute of historians” only aggravates this situation.
I would like to end the article with a phrase from an unknown British officer. When he saw a column of Soviet prisoners of war being driven past the “international” camp, he said: “I forgive the Russians in advance for everything they will do to Germany.”
The article was written in 2007. Since then, the author has not changed his opinion. That is, there was no “stupid” inundation of corpses on the part of the Red Army, however, there was no special numerical superiority. This is also proven by the recent emergence of a large layer of Russian “oral history,” that is, memoirs of ordinary participants in the Second World War. For example, Elektron Priklonsky, the author of “The Diary of a Self-propelled Gun,” mentions that throughout the war he saw two “death fields”: when our troops attacked in the Baltic states and came under flanking fire from machine guns, and when the Germans broke through from the Korsun-Shevchenkovsky pocket. This is an isolated example, but nevertheless, it is valuable because it is a wartime diary, and therefore quite objective.
Estimation of the loss ratio based on the results of a comparative analysis of losses in wars of the last two centuries
The application of the method of comparative analysis, the foundations of which were laid by Jomini, to assess the ratio of losses requires statistical data on wars of different eras. Unfortunately, more or less complete statistics are available only for wars of the last two centuries. Data on irretrievable combat losses in the wars of the 19th and 20th centuries, summarized based on the results of the work of domestic and foreign historians, are given in Table. The last three columns of the table demonstrate the obvious dependence of the results of the war on the magnitude of relative losses (losses expressed as a percentage of the total army strength) - the relative losses of the winner in a war are always less than those of the vanquished, and this dependence has a stable, repeating character (it is valid for all types of wars), that is, it has all the signs of law.
This law - let's call it the law of relative losses - can be formulated as follows: in any war, victory goes to the army that has fewer relative losses.
Note that the absolute numbers of irretrievable losses for the victorious side can be either less (Patriotic War of 1812, Russian-Turkish, Franco-Prussian wars) or greater than for the defeated side (Crimean, World War I, Soviet-Finnish) , but the relative losses of the winner are always less than those of the loser.
The difference between the relative losses of the winner and the loser characterizes the degree of convincingness of the victory. Wars with similar relative losses of the parties end in peace treaties with the defeated side retaining the existing political system and army (for example, the Russo-Japanese War). In wars that end, like the Great Patriotic War, with the complete surrender of the enemy (Napoleonic Wars, Franco-Prussian War of 1870–1871), the relative losses of the winner are significantly less than the relative losses of the vanquished (by no less than 30%). In other words, the greater the losses, the larger the army must be in order to win a landslide victory. If the army's losses are 2 times greater than those of the enemy, then to win the war its strength must be at least 2.6 times greater than the size of the opposing army.
Now let’s return to the Great Patriotic War and see what human resources the USSR and Nazi Germany had during the war. Available data on the numbers of warring parties on the Soviet-German front are given in Table. 6.
From the table 6 it follows that the number of Soviet participants in the war was only 1.4–1.5 times larger than the total number of opposing troops and 1.6–1.8 times larger than the regular German army. In accordance with the law of relative losses, with such an excess in the number of participants in the war, the losses of the Red Army, which destroyed the fascist military machine, in principle could not exceed the losses of the armies of the fascist bloc by more than 10-15%, and the losses of regular German troops by more than 25-30 %. This means that the upper limit of the ratio of irretrievable combat losses of the Red Army and the Wehrmacht is the ratio of 1.3:1.
The figures for the ratio of irretrievable combat losses given in table. 6, do not exceed the upper limit of the loss ratio obtained above. This, however, does not mean that they are final and cannot be changed. As new documents, statistical materials, and research results appear, the figures for the losses of the Red Army and the Wehrmacht (Tables 1-5) may be clarified, change in one direction or another, their ratio may also change, but it cannot be higher than the value of 1.3 :1.
Sources:
1. Central Statistical Office of the USSR “Number, composition and movement of the population of the USSR” M 1965
2. “Population of Russia in the 20th century” M. 2001
3. Arntz “Human losses in the Second World War” M. 1957
4. Frumkin G. Population Changes in Europe since 1939 N.Y. 1951
5. Dallin A. German rule in Russia 1941–1945 N.Y.- London 1957
6. “Russia and the USSR in the wars of the 20th century” M. 2001
7. Polyan P. Victims of two dictatorships M. 1996.
8. Thorwald J. The Illusion. Soviet soldiers in Hitler,s Army N. Y. 1975
9. Collection of messages of the Extraordinary State Commission M. 1946
10. Zemskov. Birth of the second emigration 1944–1952 SI 1991 No. 4
11. Timasheff N. S. The postwar population of the Soviet Union 1948
13 Timasheff N. S. The postwar population of the Soviet Union 1948
14. Arntz. Human losses in the Second World War M. 1957; "International Affairs" 1961 No. 12
15. Biraben J. N. Population 1976.
16. Maksudov S. Population losses of the USSR Benson (Vt) 1989; “On the front-line losses of the SA during the Second World War” “Free Thought” 1993. No. 10
17. Population of the USSR over 70 years. Edited by Rybakovsky L. L. M 1988
18. Andreev, Darsky, Kharkov. "Population of the Soviet Union 1922–1991." M 1993
19. Sokolov B. “Novaya Gazeta” No. 22, 2005, “The Price of Victory -” M. 1991.
20. “Germany’s War against the Soviet Union 1941-1945” edited by Reinhard Rürup 1991. Berlin
21. Müller-Hillebrand. “German Land Army 1933-1945” M. 1998
22. “Germany’s War against the Soviet Union 1941-1945” edited by Reinhard Rürup 1991. Berlin
23. Gurkin V.V. About human losses on the Soviet-German front 1941–45. NiNI No. 3 1992
24. M. B. Denisenko. WWII in the demographic dimension "Eksmo" 2005
25. S. Maksudov. Population losses of the USSR during the Second World War. "Population and Society" 1995
26. Yu. Mukhin. If it weren't for the generals. "Yauza" 2006
27. V. Kozhinov. The Great Russian War. A series of lectures on the 1000th anniversary of the Russian wars. "Yauza" 2005
28. Materials from the newspaper “Duel”
29. E. Beevor “The Fall of Berlin” M. 2003
Our planet has known many bloody battles and battles. Our entire history consisted of various internecine conflicts. But only the human and material losses in the Second World War made humanity think about the importance of everyone’s life. Only after it did people begin to understand how easy it is to start a bloodbath and how difficult it is to stop it. This war showed all the peoples of the Earth how important peace is for everyone.
The importance of studying the history of the twentieth century
The younger generation sometimes does not understand the differences. History has been rewritten many times in the years since they ended, so young people are no longer so interested in those distant events. Often these people do not even really know who took part in those events and what losses humanity suffered in World War II. But we must not forget the history of our country. If you watch American films about World War II today, you might think that only thanks to the US Army did victory over Nazi Germany become possible. That is why it is so necessary to convey to our younger generation the role of the Soviet Union in these sad events. In fact, it was the people of the USSR who suffered the greatest losses in World War II.
Prerequisites for the bloodiest war
This armed conflict between two world military-political coalitions, which became the biggest massacre in human history, began on September 1, 1939 (in contrast to the Great Patriotic War, which lasted from June 22, 1941 to May 8, 1945 G.). It ended only on September 2, 1945. Thus, this war lasted 6 long years. There are several reasons for this conflict. These include: a deep global economic crisis, the aggressive policies of some states, and the negative consequences of the Versailles-Washington system in force at that time.
Participants in an international conflict
62 countries were involved in this conflict to one degree or another. And this despite the fact that at that time there were only 73 sovereign states on Earth. Fierce battles took place on three continents. Naval battles were fought in four oceans (Atlantic, Indian, Pacific and Arctic). The number of warring countries changed several times throughout the war. Some states participated in active military operations, while others simply helped their coalition allies in any way (equipment, equipment, food).
Anti-Hitler coalition
Initially, there were 3 states in this coalition: Poland, France, Great Britain. This is due to the fact that it was after the attack on these countries that Germany began to conduct active military operations on the territory of these countries. In 1941, countries such as the USSR, USA, and China were drawn into the war. Further, Australia, Norway, Canada, Nepal, Yugoslavia, the Netherlands, Czechoslovakia, Greece, Belgium, New Zealand, Denmark, Luxembourg, Albania, the Union of South Africa, San Marino, and Turkey joined the coalition. To one degree or another, countries such as Guatemala, Peru, Costa Rica, Colombia, the Dominican Republic, Brazil, Panama, Mexico, Argentina, Honduras, Chile, Paraguay, Cuba, Ecuador, Venezuela, Uruguay, Nicaragua also became coalition allies. , Haiti, El Salvador, Bolivia. They were also joined by Saudi Arabia, Ethiopia, Lebanon, Liberia, and Mongolia. During the war years, those states that had ceased to be allies of Germany joined the anti-Hitler coalition. These are Iran (since 1941), Iraq and Italy (since 1943), Bulgaria and Romania (since 1944), Finland and Hungary (since 1945).
On the side of the Nazi bloc were such states as Germany, Japan, Slovakia, Croatia, Iraq and Iran (until 1941), Finland, Bulgaria, Romania (until 1944), Italy (until 1943), Hungary (until 1945), Thailand (Siam), Manchukuo. In some occupied territories, this coalition created puppet states that had virtually no influence on the world battlefield. These include: the Italian Social Republic, Vichy France, Albania, Serbia, Montenegro, the Philippines, Burma, Cambodia, Vietnam and Laos. Various collaborationist troops created from among the inhabitants of the opposing countries often fought on the side of the Nazi bloc. The largest of them were RONA, ROA, SS divisions created from foreigners (Ukrainian, Belarusian, Russian, Estonian, Norwegian-Danish, 2 Belgian, Dutch, Latvian, Bosnian, Albanian and French). Volunteer armies of neutral countries such as Spain, Portugal and Sweden fought on the side of this bloc.
Consequences of the war
Despite the fact that over the long years of World War II the situation on the world stage changed several times, its result was the complete victory of the anti-Hitler coalition. Following this, the largest international organization, the United Nations (abbreviated as UN), was created. The result of victory in this war was the condemnation of fascist ideology and the prohibition of Nazism during the Nuremberg trials. After the end of this world conflict, the role of France and Great Britain in world politics decreased significantly, and the USA and the USSR became real superpowers, dividing new spheres of influence among themselves. Two camps of countries with diametrically opposed socio-political systems (capitalist and socialist) were created. After World War II, a period of decolonization of empires began throughout the planet.
Theater of Operations
Germany, for which World War II was an attempt to become the only superpower, fought in five directions at once:
- Western European: Denmark, Norway, Luxembourg, Belgium, the Netherlands, Great Britain, France.
- Mediterranean: Greece, Yugoslavia, Albania, Italy, Cyprus, Malta, Libya, Egypt, North Africa, Lebanon, Syria, Iran, Iraq.
- Eastern European: USSR, Poland, Norway, Finland, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Romania, Bulgaria, Austria, Yugoslavia, Barents, Baltic and Black Sea.
- African: Ethiopia, Somalia, Madagascar, Kenya, Sudan, Equatorial Africa.
- Pacific (in commonwealth with Japan): China, Korea, South Sakhalin, Far East, Mongolia, Kuril Islands, Aleutian Islands, Hong Kong, Indochina, Burma, Malaya, Sarawak, Singapore, Dutch East Indies, Brunei, New Guinea, Sabah, Papua, Guam, Solomon Islands, Hawaii, Philippines, Midway, Marianas and other numerous Pacific Islands.
The beginning and end of the war
They began to be calculated from the moment of the invasion of German troops into the territory of Poland. Hitler had been preparing the ground for an attack on this state for a long time. On August 31, 1939, the German press reported the seizure of a radio station in Gleiwitz by the Polish military (although this was a provocation of saboteurs), and already at 4 o’clock in the morning on September 1, 1939, the warship Schleswig-Holstein began shelling the fortifications in Westerplatte (Poland). Together with the troops of Slovakia, Germany began to occupy foreign territories. France and Great Britain demanded that Hitler withdraw troops from Poland, but he refused. Already on September 3, 1939, France, Australia, England, and New Zealand declared war on Germany. Then they were joined by Canada, Newfoundland, the Union of South Africa, and Nepal. This is how the bloody Second World War began to quickly gain momentum. The USSR, although it urgently introduced universal conscription, did not declare war on Germany until June 22, 1941.
In the spring of 1940, Hitler's troops began the occupation of Denmark, Norway, Belgium, Luxembourg and the Netherlands. Next I headed to France. In June 1940, Italy began to fight on Hitler's side. In the spring of 1941, it quickly captured Greece and Yugoslavia. On June 22, 1941, she attacked the USSR. On the side of Germany in these military actions were Romania, Finland, Hungary, and Italy. Up to 70% of all active Nazi divisions fought on all Soviet-German fronts. The defeat of the enemy in the battle for Moscow thwarted Hitler's notorious plan - “Blitzkrieg” (lightning war). Thanks to this, already in 1941 the creation of an anti-Hitler coalition began. On December 7, 1941, after the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor, the United States also entered this war. For a long time, the army of this country fought its enemies only in the Pacific Ocean. The so-called second front, Great Britain and the United States, promised to open in the summer of 1942. But, despite the fierce fighting on the territory of the Soviet Union, the partners in the anti-Hitler coalition were in no hurry to engage in hostilities in Western Europe. This is due to the fact that the USA and England were waiting for the complete weakening of the USSR. Only when it became obvious that not only their territory, but also the countries of Eastern Europe began to be liberated at a rapid pace, the Allies hastened to open a Second Front. This happened on June 6, 1944 (2 years after the promised date). From that moment on, the Anglo-American coalition sought to be the first to liberate Europe from German troops. Despite all the efforts of the allies, the Soviet Army was the first to occupy the Reichstag, where it erected its own. But even the unconditional surrender of Germany did not stop the Second World War. Military operations continued in Czechoslovakia for some time. Also in the Pacific, hostilities almost never ceased. Only after the bombing of the cities of Hiroshima (August 6, 1945) and Nagasaki (August 9, 1945) with atomic bombs by the Americans did the Japanese emperor realize the futility of further resistance. As a result of this attack, about 300 thousand civilians died. This bloody international conflict ended only on September 2, 1945. It was on this day that Japan signed the act of surrender.
Victims of the world conflict
The Polish people suffered the first large-scale losses in World War II. The army of this country was unable to withstand a stronger enemy in the form of German troops. This war had an unprecedented impact on all of humanity. About 80% of all people living on Earth at that time (more than 1.7 billion people) were drawn into the war. Military actions took place on the territory of more than 40 states. Over the 6 years of this world conflict, about 110 million people were mobilized into the armed forces of all armies. According to the latest data, human losses amount to about 50 million people. At the same time, only 27 million people were killed on the fronts. The remaining victims were civilians. Countries such as the USSR (27 million), Germany (13 million), Poland (6 million), Japan (2.5 million), and China (5 million) lost the most human lives. The human losses of other warring countries were: Yugoslavia (1.7 million), Italy (0.5 million), Romania (0.5 million), Great Britain (0.4 million), Greece (0.4 million). ), Hungary (0.43 million), France (0.6 million), USA (0.3 million), New Zealand, Australia (40 thousand), Belgium (88 thousand), Africa (10 thousand .), Canada (40 thousand). More than 11 million people were killed in fascist concentration camps.
Losses from international conflict
It is simply amazing what losses the Second World War brought to humanity. History shows the $4 trillion that went into military spending. For the warring states, material costs amounted to about 70% of national income. For several years, the industry of many countries was completely reoriented to the production of military equipment. Thus, the USA, USSR, Great Britain and Germany produced more than 600 thousand combat and transport aircraft during the war years. The weapons of World War II became even more effective and deadly in 6 years. The most brilliant minds of the warring countries were busy only with its improvement. The Second World War forced us to come up with a lot of new weapons. Tanks from Germany and the Soviet Union were constantly modernized throughout the war. At the same time, more and more advanced machines were created to destroy the enemy. Their number was in the thousands. Thus, more than 280 thousand armored vehicles, tanks, and self-propelled guns alone were produced. More than 1 million different artillery pieces rolled off the assembly lines of military factories; about 5 million machine guns; 53 million machine guns, carbines and rifles. The Second World War brought with it colossal destruction and destruction of several thousand cities and other populated areas. The history of mankind without it could have followed a completely different scenario. Because of it, all countries were set back in their development many years ago. Colossal resources and efforts of millions of people were spent eliminating the consequences of this international military conflict.
USSR losses
A very high price had to be paid for the Second World War to end quickly. USSR losses amounted to about 27 million people. (last count 1990). Unfortunately, it is unlikely that it will ever be possible to obtain accurate data, but this figure is the closest to the truth. There are several different estimates of USSR losses. Thus, according to the latest method, about 6.3 million are considered killed or died from their wounds; 0.5 million died from diseases, sentenced to death, died in accidents; 4.5 million missing and captured. The total demographic losses of the Soviet Union amount to more than 26.6 million people. In addition to the huge number of deaths in this conflict, the USSR suffered enormous material losses. According to estimates, they amounted to more than 2,600 billion rubles. During World War II, hundreds of cities were partially or completely destroyed. More than 70 thousand villages were wiped off the face of the earth. 32 thousand large industrial enterprises were completely destroyed. The agriculture of the European part of the USSR was almost completely destroyed. Restoring the country to pre-war levels took several years of incredible effort and enormous expense.