For those who served in the army, especially in officer positions, it is well known who the “special officers” are. These are representatives of the KGB (and now the FSB) in army units. Their main task at all times was to carry out work to prevent the intelligence activities of the enemy (actual and potential) in the army. Essentially, these are army counterintelligence agents.
Their activities were of a very specific nature, they quietly, unobtrusively carried out their work, only to them known methods. They were jokingly called “shut up, shut up.”
As a rule, ordinary military officers became “special officers”, as if “extracted” from the troops and returned back to army units after special training and those who already worked there as “special officers”.
They had fairly large powers, and in matters of their competence they went directly to the commanders of the units to which they were attached. The commanders were obliged to provide them with all possible assistance and assistance in solving special problems.
However, this in no way gave the right to “special officers” to interfere in issues of combat and political training, or to command personnel at any levels and units of the military body.
It must be said that they never did this, they had enough of their own worries, however, in any family there is a black sheep. Unfortunately, even in this environment there were overly ambitious or simply not smart officers who sometimes exceeded their powers.
“Grandfather Zhenya” once told me about one such incident from his life during our next meeting.
It was 1938. The situation in the Far East was extremely tense. The Japanese became completely insolent, provocations on the border became business as usual. In this situation, says Emelyan Filaretovich, the regiment mastered the new I-16 fighters that had just been received under the rearmament program. This car was special, in which aircraft designer Polikarpov tried to combine speed and maneuverability as much as possible, which he succeeded brilliantly, but nothing comes easy without loss. The machine turned out to be quite difficult to operate and required good flight training from the pilots.
The regiment intensively mastered the new aircraft, flights took place every day, with maximum tension, because there was no time for “relaxation”. Team to join fighting could be received at any time.
Technology always remains technology, especially new, not fully “broken-in”. Problems, naturally, arose, but where could you get away from them? Once during the flight, when landing with me, the general recalls, one of the landing gear wheels on the plane did not come out and I had to land the car on the only other one, but, thank God, everything worked out. However, fortunately, there were no serious accidents, let alone catastrophes.
On this day, one plane crashed during landing, i.e. after touching, he stuck his nose into the ground and damaged the propeller blades. This happens most often when, for one reason or another, the landing gear wheels jam after landing.
The case, of course, is not pleasant, but not from the category of “emergency”. My deputy was in charge of the flights that day. He informed me about the incident and I immediately hurried to the airfield. However, a few minutes earlier, the regimental “special officer”, Senior Lieutenant Krutilin, rode there on a bicycle.
He was a “lad”, I’ll tell you Kostya, not a pleasant one, he always “poked his nose” into things that weren’t his own and tried to command not only the flight and technical personnel, but even, sometimes, squadron commanders. More than once I had to carefully put it in place, but still smoothing out the “sharp corners”, trying to settle conflict situations as diplomatically as possible.
However, what happened this time drove me crazy!
I discovered that flights have been stopped. What’s the matter, I asked the deputy, why aren’t we flying?
- Senior Lieutenant Krutilin, the deputy reports, ordered to stop flights due to an accident on the airfield. I didn’t start a conflict and decided to wait for you.
Where is he, I ask?
- Yes, there he is with his bicycle standing to the side.
Send a soldier, tell him that I am calling him here.
Krutilin walked up with an untied gait, without saying a word, showing with all his appearance that he was the real master of the regiment.
Comrade senior lieutenant, weren’t you taught in the army how to approach and report to the senior commander when he calls you?
- And you are not my boss for me to report to you!
Everyone was taken aback, they didn’t even expect such “greyhound” from him, they were looking to see what I would do in response. It was clearly visible that Krutilin was provoking me to an inappropriate act, so that I would break loose and do something that I had no right to do, or give up in front of him in front of my subordinates.
Get out of here, and don't set foot on the airfield without my personal permission!
“Well, you, Major, will bitterly regret this,” Krutilin, who had turned white with anger and frustration, squeezed out, grabbed his bicycle and rode off from the airfield.
I gave the command to continue flying and went to regimental headquarters. No one else saw Krutilin in the regiment's disposition, and a day later I was summoned to the commander.
Blucher had the head of the political department of the Army and the head of the special department.
Reported his arrival as expected. The commander greeted him and, with a gesture of his hand, invited the head of the special department to ask questions.
- Comrade Major, explain why you expelled the representative of the special department from the regiment, or did you yourself decide to catch spies in the regiment?
- No, comrades colonel, no one expelled Krutilin from the regiment, but only from the airfield, where he has no right to enter during flights without the permission of his superior.
- Why didn’t he allow him?
“He didn’t ask permission from the flight director; moreover, he ordered the flights to stop.”
- So did he stop?
- Yes, before my arrival at the airfield.
- Who has the right to stop or continue flights?
- Only the flight director and I personally, the regiment commander.
- And what about Krutilin, how did he explain his actions to you?
- No way, he started to be rude in front of the personnel, so I kicked him out of the airfield and told him to appear at the airfield, if necessary, during flights with my personal permission.
- So you didn’t kick him out of the regiment?
- Of course, what right would I have to do this, and why, I understand that spies will still have to be caught, and that’s his business.
- Yes, that's for sure!
The head of the special department smiled, stood up, and turned to Blucher.
- Comrade commander, I have no more questions for the major.
“And even more so for me,” Vasily Konstantinovich answered. Do you have any questions for us?
“In working order, if you allow me,” I answered.
“Well, we’ve agreed,” Blucher summed up the conversation.
- May I go?
- Yes, of course, go and work.
Krutilin was removed from the regiment and was replaced by a captain, a good, intelligent officer, with whom he immediately found mutual language and all issues were resolved without any problems.
And fate brought Krutilin together again, this time during the war. He came to my regiment to ask, he didn’t want to go to the infantry, they say, we are old acquaintances from the Far East. Naturally, I put him out there, I knew what kind of goose he was.
- Emelyan Filaretovich, well, in general, this sore subject, repression, how did you manage to avoid all this?
- This is the year 1937, I fought in Spain then, and when I returned, everything had already passed. As you can see, even conflict situations with the “special officers” were resolved objectively, no one was arrested or brought to trial “for no reason.” And even more so during the war, it was necessary to fight, people died, every pilot, and especially the commander, was specially registered; they did not touch anyone without a serious reason. In my regiment and then in the division, no one was ever arrested through the special department.
What about Stalin, what was he like?
- I saw him quite closely several times at various events. He was a serious man and very authoritative. Something really unusual came from him. Glubokoye was respected. In any case, I personally can’t say anything bad about him. Well, there was no need to communicate; after all, the level is incomparably different. But I met Marshal Zhukov many times. It was he who personally asked me to go to China as the chief military adviser.
- What, you already asked?
- Yes, that’s right, because the work there had to be special. Of course, I perceived his request as an order, I didn’t think twice about it, it’s necessary, it means it’s necessary, but that’s a different story.
Okay, let's go have tea, Nila Pavlovna has already been waiting for us.
Kyiv. December 2011
Under the Council of People's Commissars of the RSFSR. Subsequently, with the formation of special departments of fronts, military districts, fleets, armies, flotillas and special departments under the provincial Chekas, a unified centralized system of security agencies in the troops was created. In 1934-38 military counterintelligence, as Special, then - 5th Department, is part of the Main Directorate state security(GUGB) NKVD of the USSR. In March 1938, with the abolition of the GUGB, the 2nd Directorate (special departments) of the NKVD of the USSR was created on the basis of the 5th Department. Already in September 1938, the Special Department was recreated as the 4th Department of the GUGB. Subordinate to special departments (DS) in the Red Army, the Red Army, and the NKVD troops.
Ranks, uniforms and insignia
In the Regulations on the special bodies of the GUGB NKVD of the USSR, announced on May 23, 1936 by joint order of the NKO/NKVD of the USSR No. 91/183, which established, among other things, insignia and uniforms for employees military counterintelligence, it was stipulated that in case of joint permission from the heads of the GUGB NKVD of the USSR and the Directorate of Command Staff of the Red Army, employees of special agencies who had a military or special military-technical education or army command experience were granted the right to wear uniforms and insignia of the command or military-technical personnel of the units they serve.
At the same time, the personnel of the central apparatus of the GUGB NKVD of the USSR and the apparatus of special departments of the UGB of territorial internal affairs bodies, as well as persons working outside the Red Army and the Navy and their subordinate institutions, are given the uniform of the NKVD state security command staff. Both before the formation of the People's Commissariat of Internal Affairs and after July 1934, operational workers of special bodies used uniforms and buttonholes (in the ground forces) or sleeve patches (in the navy) of those military units or institutions to which they were assigned for service.
Insignia
For employees of special departments, insignia were established by category in accordance with their position:
11th category (2 diamonds): - heads of department, part of the OGPU Center; - Secretary of the OGPU Center; - deputies and assistants to the heads of the regional PO OGPU/GPU; - heads of the OGPU corps, the regional navy, groups of troops and their deputies.
10th category (1 diamond): - employees for special assignments, detective officers of the OGPU Center; - heads of the branch of the OO regional PP OGPU/GPU, OO NKVD VO, army, navy, regional navy, group of troops; - heads of the OGPU division, separate brigade, flotilla.
9th category (3 rectangles): - authorized PA of the OGPU Center; - assistant department heads and detective officers of the regional PO OGPU/GPU; - detective officers of the OO OGPU VO, army, navy, group of troops, division, brigade, flotilla.
8th category (2 rectangles): - assistants to the commissioner, assistant secretary of the OGPU Center; - authorized representatives, secretaries of PA regional PP OGPU/GPU; - authorized OO OGPU VO, army, navy, group of forces, division, brigade, flotilla and regiment.
Form
After the introduction of personal ranks for the GUGB in the fall of 1935, the question of uniforms arose among the leaders of the NKVD. IN regulatory documents it was clearly noted that the employees of the special bodies of the GUGB NKVD “were assigned the uniform of the units they served,” it also contained a somewhat strange condition: “... and with the insignia of the GUGB.” A lively correspondence began between the People's Commissariat and the Authorities. The NKVD's reasoning was quite understandable. Finally, on May 23, 1936, the Regulations on the special bodies of the GUGB NKVD of the USSR were announced, according to which uniforms and uniforms were established for employees of OO corps, fleets, special sections of divisions, brigades, fortified areas, flotillas, as well as individual operatives attached to units and institutions of the Red Army. military insignia political composition the corresponding branches of the military according to the special ranks assigned to them by the state security agencies: - 2 diamonds - senior major of the State Security Service; - 1 diamond - major GB; - 3 rectangles - captain GB; - 2 rectangles - senior lieutenant of the State Security Service; - 1 rectangle - GB lieutenant; - 3 squares - junior lieutenant and sergeant of the State Security Service. Thus, the special officers, in the form of the political composition of the military branch to which the unit they served belonged, began to have, as it were, two ranks - the one actually assigned special rank GB and the rank by which they were known in the unit (for example, GB major - brigade commissar). The personnel of the central apparatus of the GUGB NKVD of the USSR and the apparatus of special departments of the UGB of territorial internal affairs bodies, as well as persons working outside the Red Army and the Navy and their subordinate institutions, were assigned uniforms of state security command personnel. This situation remained until 1941, when military counterintelligence a short time came under the jurisdiction of the People's Commissariat of Defense (The 3rd Directorate of NGOs was formed on the basis of the GUGB NKVD PA). In May-July 1941, employees of the PA (now 3 Directorates/departments) began to be certified in the ranks of political personnel. After the return of military counterintelligence to the NKVD (since August 1941 - the Directorate of Special Departments of the NKVD of the USSR), special officers again began to be recertified for special GB ranks. However, these re-certifications had no effect on the uniform.
Until February 1941, military counterintelligence officers directly in their units wore the uniform of the service branch with insignia of political personnel (the presence of sleeve stars of political personnel and the absence of sleeve insignia of state security) and were called either special ranks of state security or ranks of political personnel. The personnel of the 4th department of the Main Directorate of State Security of the People's Commissariat of Internal Affairs of the USSR (from September 29, 1938 to February 26, 1941 served as military counterintelligence) wore uniforms and state security insignia and had the rank of “GB Sergeant - GB Commissar General” " - special state security ranks. In the period from February 1941 to July-August 1941, military counterintelligence officers also wore the uniform of the service branch of the armed forces with insignia of political personnel and had only political personnel ranks. Employees of the central apparatus (3rd NPO Directorate) during the same period wore GB uniforms and GB special ranks (Head of the 3rd NPO Directorate, GB Major A. N. Mikheev, deputy chief - GB Major N. A. Osetrov, and so on) . On July 17, 1941, with the formation of the Directorate of Special Departments of the People's Commissariat of Internal Affairs of the USSR, counterintelligence officers in the troops switched to the special ranks of the GB (but also probably used the ranks of political personnel). The uniform remained the same - political personnel.
On April 19, 1943, on the basis of the Directorate of Special Departments of the People's Commissariat of Internal Affairs of the USSR, the Main Directorate of Counterintelligence "Smersh" was created and transferred to the jurisdiction of the People's Commissariat of Defense of the USSR. Former special officers came under the authority of the People's Commissar of Defense. In this regard, almost all of them were awarded general army ranks, that is, without the prefix “state security” in personal rank. On May 3, 1946, the GUKR "SMERSH" NGOs of the USSR were reorganized again into the MGB OO.
Functions of special departments
The functions of the Special Department of the NKVD (chief, deputy, detective officers) included monitoring the political and morale parts, identify state criminals(traitors, spies, saboteurs, terrorists, counter-revolutionary organizations and groups of people conducting anti-Soviet agitation, and others), conduct investigations into state crimes under the supervision of the prosecutor's office and transfer cases to military tribunals.
From the beginning of the war to October 1941, special departments and detachments of the NKVD troops detained 657,364 military personnel who lagged behind their units and fled from the front. Among this mass, 1,505 spies and 308 saboteurs were identified and exposed. As of December 1941, special departments arrested 4,647 traitors, 3,325 cowards and alarmists, 13,887 deserters, 4,295 distributors of provocative rumors, 2,358 self-shooters, and 4,214 for banditry and looting.
see also
In the late 70s - early 80s of the 20th century, the functions of special departments serving military units on the Soviet-Turkish border, rather unofficially, included the function of blocking breakthroughs from the side of the border deep into Soviet territory within the border zone. The operations were carried out in direct connection with border groups leading the pursuit from the border. In these operations, which do not have official confirmation, the most active participants were privates and sergeants of the so-called security departments of special departments, who sometimes came into fire contact with the violators who managed to overcome the border barriers and go deeper into the territory of the USSR up to 5-7 km. Operations of this kind were never made public and, perhaps, were not documented for a simple reason: the border is inviolable. Thanks to the officers of the special military counterintelligence departments, the soldiers and sergeants of the security departments had a very high individual combat training, allowing them to act effectively not only as part of small, 3-5 people, mobile groups, but also individually.
Notes
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Synonyms:See what “Special Officer” is in other dictionaries:
Employee, individualist Dictionary of Russian synonyms. specialist noun, number of synonyms: 2 individualist (3) ... Synonym dictionary
special officer- SPECIALIST, a, m. Employee of the Special Department (for example, in the army, in security agencies); about any person who behaves in a special way. Why don’t you drink, special officer or something? Give him a penalty as a special officer... Dictionary of Russian argot
special officer- , a, m. An employee of a special department, a special unit. ◘ I order you, the special officer shouted, and no joke to me. He clicked the shutter. Zhitkov, 1989, 188. The special officers and tribunal officers got out of captivity and zealously set about searching for the capture of the rebels: they caught ... Explanatory dictionary of the language of the Council of Deputies
M. coll. An employee of a special department dealing with issues of political reliability and state security (in the USSR). Ephraim's explanatory dictionary. T. F. Efremova. 2000... Modern Dictionary Russian language Efremova
special officer- especially ist, and... Russian spelling dictionary
A; m. Razg. An employee of a special department in a military unit, at an enterprise, etc., dealing with issues of protecting state secrets... encyclopedic Dictionary
On December 19, the Russian Federation celebrates Military Counterintelligence Day. This structure is engaged in activities that are very important for the security of the country and the armed forces: “special officers” identify individuals collaborating with foreign intelligence services, fight terrorism, crime and corruption, drug addiction and other deviant phenomena in the army. The current date for Russian military counterintelligence has great importance– marks 99 years since the creation of special departments within the Cheka of the RSFSR on December 19, 1918. Almost a century has passed, but military counterintelligence officers are still colloquially called “special officers.”
The path of military counterintelligence in Russia was thorny and difficult. This service repeatedly changed its name and underwent various organizational changes, but the essence of its work remained unchanged. Despite the fact that the first departments involved in counterintelligence in the army appeared in Russian Empire in 1911, the true formation of military counterintelligence in our country is entirely connected with Soviet period domestic. The revolution needed protection and issues of organizing structures capable of fighting saboteurs and spies, the Soviet government became concerned already in 1918. First, the Military Department of the Cheka and Military Control were created. The Military Control recruited a number of royal officers, who previously served in the counterintelligence departments of the army.
However, the duality in the system of organizing counterintelligence management did not contribute to its effectiveness. A proposal to eliminate duality was made by Viktor Eduardovich Kingisepp, an old Bolshevik, a member of the All-Russian Central Executive Committee, seconded to the Cheka. Felix Edmundovich Dzerzhinsky heeded Kingisepp's arguments. Already in December 1918. A Special Department of the Cheka was created under the Council of People's Commissars of the RSFSR.
The first head of the Special Department of the Cheka was Mikhail Sergeevich Kedrov. A Bolshevik with solid pre-revolutionary experience, Kedrov was included in the board of the People's Commissariat for Military Affairs of the RSFSR back in November 1917, becoming the commissar for the demobilization of the Russian army. In September 1918, Kedrov headed the Military Department of the Cheka, so it was not surprising that he was entrusted with the leadership of military counterintelligence agencies. On January 1, 1919, Kedrov issued an order ordering the merger of the Military Departments of the Cheka and Military Control within the framework of the Special Department of the Cheka. The duality of the military counterintelligence system was eliminated.
The most reliable personnel were sent to serve in special departments; preference was given to proven communists. The first congress of employees of special departments even adopted a special resolution, which emphasized that the requirements for party experience for security officers should be higher than for other Soviet party, military and civil servants. In 1919, the chairman of the Cheka, Felix Dzerzhinsky, became the head of the Special Department of the Cheka. Thus, he took direct control of the military counterintelligence agencies. Special departments The Cheka played a vital role in the fight against spies and saboteurs during the Civil War. During the Civil War, counterintelligence officers liquidated a large number of conspiracies in which opponents of Soviet power participated. 
An interesting episode in the history of military counterintelligence is the transfer of security duties to the Special Department of the Cheka state border RSFSR, which followed in November 1920. From July 1920 to July 1922 The special department of the Cheka was headed by Vyacheslav Rudolfovich Menzhinsky, who then replaced Dzerzhinsky as head of the OGPU. In January 1922, the Secret Operations Directorate (SOU) was created, which in July 1922 included two departments - counterintelligence, responsible for general counterintelligence in the country and the fight against counter-revolutionary organizations, and special, responsible for counterintelligence work in the army and in the navy. It was in the 1920s – 1930s that military counterintelligence agencies were further strengthened. In 1934, the Special Department became part of the Main Directorate of State Security (GUGB) of the NKVD of the USSR as the 5th department (since 1936), and in 1938, after the abolition of the GUGB, the 2nd department was created on the basis of the 5th department Directorate of Special Departments of the NKVD of the USSR. However, in 1938, on the initiative of Lavrentiy Beria, the Main Directorate of State Security was recreated. The 4th Special Department of the GUGB, responsible for military counterintelligence, was also revived within its composition.
The most serious test for military counterintelligence officers was the Great Patriotic War. In 1941, the Directorate of Special Departments was recreated, which included the 3rd Directorate of the People's Commissariat of Defense of the USSR and the Special Department of the NKVD of the USSR. On April 19, 1943, by decree State Committee Defense of the USSR, the legendary Main Counterintelligence Directorate "SMERSH" of the People's Commissariat of Defense of the USSR was created.
The slogan “Death to Spies!” was chosen as its name. SMERSH reported directly to the People's Commissar of Defense Joseph Stalin, and Viktor Semenovich Abakumov was appointed head of SMERSH, who previously held the position of Deputy People's Commissar of Internal Affairs of the USSR and head of the Directorate of Special Departments of the NKVD of the USSR, and before that headed the Directorate of the NKVD of the USSR for Rostov region. In addition to the GUKR "SMERSH" of the People's Commissariat of Defense, own management SMERSH was created in the People's Commissariat of the USSR Navy, and in the People's Commissariat of Internal Affairs of the USSR a SMERSH department was created under the leadership of Semyon Yukhimovich. For better secrecy, all SMERSH operatives were ordered to wear the uniform of the troops under which they served.
SMERSH bodies were entrusted with the responsibility of combating spies of enemy intelligence services, combating desertion and deliberate self-harm at the front, and abuses command staff, with military crimes. The very abbreviation SMERSH terrified not only the enemy, but also criminals and lawbreakers in the ranks of the Red Army, deserters and traitors of all stripes. As the occupied territories of the Soviet Union were liberated, SMERSH authorities began to clarify the events that took place during the occupation, including identifying individuals who collaborated with the Nazi occupation authorities. It was the SMERSH bodies that played the main role in identifying and detaining many war criminals - policemen, punishers and their accomplices from among Soviet citizens. Today, in some publications, SMERSH bodies are shown exclusively as ruthless “punishers” who allegedly shot their own soldiers in the back and persecuted Soviet soldiers for the smallest violations, sometimes on trumped-up charges.
Of course, in the activities of SMERSH, like any other structure, there were mistakes and excesses and, given the specifics, these mistakes could lead to broken destinies and cost someone their life. But blaming the entire SMERSH for these mistakes and even crimes is unacceptable. Smershevites fought in their hands against the Nazi occupiers, policemen, collaborators, participated in the liquidation of gangs of criminals and deserters who operated in forest areas, V rural areas and liberated cities. The contribution of SMERSH to the restoration of Soviet power, law and order in the liberated territories of the Soviet Union is invaluable. Many SMERSH counterintelligence officers died in battles with the enemy or fell while on duty in the rear. For example, during the battles for the liberation of Belarus, 236 SMERSH employees were killed and another 136 employees went missing. SMERSH operatives served on average for three to four months, after which they dropped out due to death on a combat mission or due to injury. SMERSH employees Senior Lieutenant Pyotr Anfimovich Zhidkov, Lieutenant Grigory Mikhailovich Kravtsov, Lieutenant Mikhail Petrovich Krygin, Lieutenant Vasily Mikhailovich Chebotarev were posthumously awarded the high title of Heroes of the Soviet Union. But many Smershevites did not receive gold stars, although they fully deserved them - the authorities were not particularly generous with awards to counterintelligence officers.
Group photo of soldiers and officers of the USSR SMERSH counterintelligence department of the 70th Army in Berlin
After defeating Hitler's Germany counterintelligence SMERSH was engaged in studying and filtering soldiers and officers returning from German captivity. In May 1946, SMERSH bodies were disbanded, and special departments were revived on their basis and transferred to the jurisdiction of the USSR Ministry of State Security. Subsequently, the special departments retained their functions as part of the USSR State Security Committee. On March 18, 1954, the Third Main Directorate of the KGB of the USSR was created within the KGB, which was responsible for military counterintelligence and the activities of special departments. From 1960 to 1982 it was called the Third Directorate, and in 1982 the status of the Main Directorate of the KGB of the USSR was returned. 
Special departments were created in all military districts and fleets. IN Soviet troops ah, stationed outside the country, the Directorates of special departments of the GSVG (Group of Soviet Forces in Germany), SGV (Northern Group of Forces in Poland), TsGV (Central Group of Forces in Czechoslovakia), YuGV ( Southern group troops in Hungary). A separate Directorate of Special Departments operated in Rocket Forces strategic purpose, and in 1983 the Directorate of Special Departments was created, which was responsible for counterintelligence work in Internal troops Ministry of Internal Affairs of the USSR.
from February 1974 to July 14, 1987 The Third Directorate was headed by Lieutenant General (since 1985 - Colonel General) Nikolai Alekseevich Dushin (1921-2001). He came to serve in the Red Army in 1940, after graduating from the Stalingrad Military-Political School he served as a company political instructor, commander rifle company on Far Eastern Front, and in 1943 he was transferred to the military counterintelligence agencies SMERSH. Nikolai Dushin served in military counterintelligence structures all his life - he devoted almost half a century to special departments. From December 1960 to June 1964, Nikolai Alekseevich headed the Directorate of Special Departments for the GSVG, then from June 1964 to August 1970. was the head of the 1st department of the Third Directorate of the KGB of the USSR. In 1987, Dushin was removed from his post - allegedly in connection with the revelation of violations in the work of special departments in military units on Far East. In fact, apparently, the 66-year-old Colonel General fell under the unfolding flywheel of the “cleansing” of state security agencies and the armed forces of the USSR from patriots - communists. Let us remember that it was in 1987-1989. the “liberation” of the Soviet security forces from the “old cadres” of the Stalinist draft, in which M.S. Gorbachev and his entourage could see a danger to their plans for “perestroika” and collapse Soviet state.
IN Soviet time“special officers” worked in every major military unit Soviet army and the Navy. IN peaceful conditions they were entrusted with the responsibility of monitoring the moral, psychological and ideological situation in military groups. Military counterintelligence officers played a very important role during the participation of the Soviet Union in the armed conflict in Afghanistan. Many military counterintelligence officers passed Afghan war, participated in hostilities and secret operations against the Mujahideen. These skills came in handy for them and the younger generation of military counterintelligence officers already in the post-Soviet era, when violence flared up in the territory of the former USSR whole line armed conflicts. 
Many people today know the name of Admiral German Alekseevich Ugryumov - Hero of the Russian Federation. The ship was named in honor of German Ugryumov Caspian flotilla(in which the officer began his service), streets in Astrakhan, Vladivostok, Grozny. Coming from the military counterintelligence agencies of the Navy, in which he served from 1975 to 1998, in the late 1990s German Ugryumov came to central office FSB of the Russian Federation - to the position of first deputy head of the Military Counterintelligence Directorate of the FSB of the Russian Federation, led the activities of military counterintelligence of the Russian Navy. In November 1999, German Ugryumov headed the Department for the Protection of the Constitutional System and the Fight against Terrorism of the FSB of the Russian Federation. He planned and developed numerous operations to combat terrorists in the North Caucasus, and on January 21, 2001, Vice Admiral Ugryumov was simultaneously appointed head of the Regional Operational Headquarters in the North Caucasus. Unfortunately, on May 31, 2001, at the age of only 52, German Ugryumov died suddenly in his office on the territory of the headquarters of the Russian military group in the village of Khankala (Check).
Today, employees of military counterintelligence agencies, no matter how society treats them, continue to carry out their difficult and dangerous service of protecting national security Russian state. On this significant day for them, all that remains is to congratulate the military counterintelligence officers and service veterans on the holiday, wish them more success and fewer losses.
There is in the history of the Great Patriotic War there is a lot of things that we, modern people, simply do not understand. We not only live in a different time, we live in a different dimension. We are accustomed to the fact that we are obliged to confirm the fact of our existence in this world. a whole mountain all kinds of documents and certificates, every day we prove that we are us. Bureaucrats of all kinds of offices and housing offices demand a photocopy of your passport for any reason. Few people know that in the first and most tough year During the war in the Red Army, at the front, privates and junior commanders generally did not have any documents confirming the identity of the serviceman, this seems incredible. And so, in order... The Red Army Book, as the main document, was introduced by NKO order No. 171 of April 20, 1940, but clause 7 of this order was canceled in the active army. With the outbreak of the war on June 22, 1941, a situation arose when millions of Red Army soldiers and junior commanders at the front did not have documents. The first months of the war are an endless series of retreats, encirclements and exits from the “ring”. Huge masses of people moved across the front line, and the majority did not have documents... If you imagine all this, then the attention of special departments to the “encirclement” no longer seems excessive and paranoid. The stereotype of the “special officer” was formed under the influence of perestroika and post-perestroika films and publications. The image that emerged was as follows: a stupid fanatic, a maniac, seeking to imprison anyone he could get his hands on, a Red Army soldier or commander at the slightest suspicion. In fact, an unbearable burden fell on the special departments: in the conditions of confusion and chaos that reigned, to identify enemy agents, despite the fact that it was impossible to reliably establish the identity of the serviceman. On the contrary, the task of infiltrating agents was easier than an orange; you didn’t even have to bother making fakes. And the Abwehr used this full program. The rear of the Red Army was flooded with saboteurs and spies. It is enough to read the memoirs of war participants and you will find lines about the “rocket men” who aimed German bombers at trains and warehouses with missiles, about pseudo-regulators who stood on the roads, etc. And the phrase familiar to everyone from movies: “Show your documents, comrade soldiers!” - a myth, there was nothing to present. It turned out that either his commander or his colleagues could actually verify the identity of a Red Army soldier, and the groups leaving the encirclement consisted of military personnel different parts. In order to restore order in the rear, barrage detachments were created.
Here is an excerpt from the instructions for special departments of the NKVD North Western Front to combat deserters, cowards and alarmists
... § 4 Special departments of a division, corps, army in the fight against deserters, cowards and alarmists carry out the following activities: a) organize a barricade service by setting up ambushes, posts and patrols on military roads, refugee roads and other traffic routes in order to exclude the possibility of any infiltration of military personnel who left their combat positions without permission;
b) carefully check every detained commander and Red Army soldier in order to identify deserters, cowards and alarmists who fled from the battlefield;
c) all identified deserters are immediately arrested and investigated for trial by a military tribunal. The investigation must be completed within 12 hours;
d) all servicemen lagging behind the unit are organized into platoons (teams) and, under the command of proven commanders, accompanied by a representative of a special department, sent to the headquarters of the corresponding division;
d) especially exceptional cases When the situation requires taking decisive measures to immediately restore order at the front, the head of the special department is given the right to shoot deserters on the spot. The head of a special department reports each such case to a special department of the army and front;
f) carry out the sentence of a military tribunal on the spot, and, if necessary, in front of the line;
g) keep a quantitative record of all those detained and sent to the unit and a personal record of all those arrested and convicted;
h) daily report to the special department of the army and the special department of the front about the number of detainees, arrested, convicted, as well as the number of commanders, Red Army soldiers and equipment transferred to the unit.
The functions of the barrier detachment were not to sit in the trenches with machine guns and shoot at their retreating units; this is another “perestroika” myth.
Their tasks were completely different, excerpt from the directive
on strengthening the work of barrage detachments to identify and expose enemy agents being transferred across the front line. One of the serious means of identifying German intelligence agents sent to us is organized barrage detachments, which must carefully check all, without exception, military personnel who unorganizedly make their way from the front to front line, as well as military personnel, in groups or alone, ending up in other units. However, the available materials indicate that the work of the barrage detachments is not yet sufficiently organized; checks of detained persons are carried out superficially, often without operational staff, but by military personnel. In order to identify and mercilessly destroy enemy agents in Red Army units, I propose:
1. Strengthen the work of barrage detachments, for which purpose assign experienced operational workers to the detachments. Establish, as a rule, that interviews with all detainees without exception should be carried out only by detectives.
2. All persons who returned from German captivity as detainees barrage detachments, as well as those identified through intelligence and other means, to arrest and thoroughly interrogate about the circumstances of captivity and escape or release from captivity. If the investigation does not obtain information about their involvement in German intelligence agencies, such persons will be released from custody and sent to the front in other units, establishing for them constant surveillance both from the authorities of the special department and from the commissar of the unit.
Particular attention was paid to commanders if they lost their documents while leaving the encirclement. There were enough cases when Red Army commanders wore the uniform of privates and destroyed their documents for fear of being captured. Let’s remember “The Living and the Dead” by K. Simonov, there was such a Colonel Baranov, emerging from encirclement in a Red Army uniform and without documents... Different, not at all literary character, General A.A. Vlasov performed the trick of changing clothes twice, in 1941 near Kiev and in the summer of 1942 near Novgorod.
Regarding this, the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command of the Red Army issued an order No. 270 dated August 16, 1941, marked “Without publication,” but to be read “in all companies, squadrons, squadrons, commands and headquarters,” quotes from the order:
"…1. Commanders and political workers who, during battle, tear off their insignia and desert to the rear or surrender to the enemy, are considered malicious deserters...
2. Those units and subunits who are surrounded by the enemy, selflessly fight to the last possible opportunity, take care of their material as the apple of their eye, fight their way to their own behind the rear of the enemy troops, defeating the fascist dogs. Oblige every serviceman, regardless of his official position, demand from a superior commander, if part of him is surrounded, to fight to the last opportunity in order to break through to his own, and if such a commander or part of the Red Army soldiers, instead of organizing resistance to the enemy, prefer to surrender to him, destroy them all means, both ground and air..."
The order, as we see, is unique. If you call a spade a spade, the order abolished the principle of unity of command in the army, this says a lot. Only on October 7, 1941 the order was issued
Order People's Commissar Defense USSR No. 330 October 7, 1941 Moscow “On the introduction of the Red Army book in wartime in the rear and at the front”
The Red Army book, introduced by NKO order No. 171 in 1940, was abolished for the active army by paragraph 7 of the same order. Because of this, Red Army soldiers and junior commanders found themselves at the front without documents proving their identity. The enemy took advantage of this disorder and sent his people dressed in our uniforms to some parts of the Red Army. In one of the divisions of the North-Western Front, a group of 7 such people sent by the enemy for espionage and sabotage purposes was discovered and shot. There can be no doubt that when complete absence identification documents of military personnel; such facts are also available in other parts of the Red Army. Further, there can be no doubt that many people hanging out in the rear of divisions and armies, dressed in Red Army uniforms, are enemy agents passing on information about our units, the fight against which is impossible due to the lack of documents among the Red Army soldiers so that they can distinguish their own people from enemy agents. And, finally, the lack of documents on hand for reinforcements sent to the front and sick and wounded soldiers and junior commanders leaving the front for evacuation made it impossible for supply authorities to check their provision of uniforms, weapons, equipment and other types of allowances.
In order to correct a mistake, free parts from hostile elements and streamline accounting personnel Red Army
I ORDER: 1. Immediately introduce in all units and institutions of the Red Army, both in the rear and at the front, a Red Army book with a photograph according to the announced model. Order of NKO No. 171 dated April 20, 1940 is cancelled.
2. The Red Army book should be considered the only document identifying the Red Army soldier and junior commander. To record the passage of military personnel in the Red Army book military service and their receipt of allowances (weapons, equipment and uniforms) from the military department.
3. Red Army books are issued to Red Army soldiers and junior commanders from the moment they are enrolled in the unit. The books should be kept by commanders or deputy commanders of companies, squadrons, batteries and teams. Chiefs of Staff military units to verify the recorded information, attach the official seal of the part to the books.
4. Red Army books should be issued strictly according to lists, against the personal receipts of Red Army soldiers and junior commanders.
5. Check the availability of Red Army books for Red Army soldiers and junior commanders: in units located in the rear - daily on morning examinations, in combat units - at the first opportunity at the discretion of company commanders, but at least once every three days.
6. Every Red Army soldier and junior commander should have a Red Army book with him at all times.
7. Red Army books are issued for the entire period of service of a Red Army soldier and junior commander in the Red Army. When transferring from one unit to another or to another unit, Red Army soldiers and junior commanders keep the Red Army books with them, presenting them at the new duty station. Red Army soldiers and junior commanders who do not have Red Army records are to be detained as suspicious and sent to the military commandant's office to determine their identity.
8. For the commanders of companies, squadrons, batteries and teams, any change in the service of Red Army soldiers and junior commanders, the issuance and surrender of military equipment received by them, should be noted in the book only in the presence of the Red Army soldier and the junior commander to whom the book belongs.
9. Upon dismissal from the Red Army, hand over Red Army books through unit commanders to unit headquarters for destruction. Instead of Red Army books, those being discharged will be given military ID cards.
10. Put into effect the announced “Instructions on the procedure for filling out and maintaining the Red Army book.”
11. Regardless of the Red Army books, maintain in companies, squadrons, batteries and commands established personal lists for recording personnel and summary reinforcement lists for recording military property issued to Red Army soldiers and junior commanders for individual use.
12. The Chief Quartermaster of the Red Army, within 15 days, to produce and provide an active army and interior districts Red Army books of the type approved by me, and also give instructions to the troops on the procedure for making photographic cards.
13. Inspectors of military branches and services, as well as all direct superiors, when visiting subordinate units, check that Red Army soldiers and junior commanders have Red Army books and that they are maintained correctly.
People's Commissar of Defense I. STALIN
The situation with the Red Army books began to change, but first of all they were issued to conscripts; in the active army, all military personnel received books only by June-July 1942. From the beginning of the war to October 1941, special departments and detachments of the NKVD troops detained 657,364 military personnel who lagged behind their units and fled from the front. Among this mass, 1,505 spies and 308 saboteurs were identified and exposed. As of December 1941, special departments arrested 4,647 traitors, 3,325 cowards and alarmists, 13,887 deserters, 4,295 distributors of provocative rumors, 2,358 self-shooters, and 4,214 for banditry and looting. After the liberation of the temporarily occupied territories, about 900 thousand people were conscripted into the Red Army. These people were surrounded in 1941-1942 and, naturally, had no documents. Such military personnel were checked in filtration camps, after which the majority were sent to the active army. This is not to say that all these measures were unnecessary...
Military counterintelligence is 90 years old
A month ago on sports festival At the State Security Committee, I witnessed a seemingly ordinary competition - a tug-of-war. The only unusual thing was that one team consisted entirely of officers from the KGB Military Counterintelligence Directorate. Looking at how easily these guys defeated their opponents, I caught myself thinking that this is not the first time for them: the entire counterintelligence service is a kind of intellectual tug of war, at the other end of which are foreign intelligence services. Just like on the sports field, victory in this fight lies with counterintelligence.
We talk in more detail about the activities of Belarusian military counterintelligence agents with the head of the KGB's Internal Affairs Directorate, Colonel Alexei ZAKHAROV.
Alexey Ivanovich, most people associate the words “military counterintelligence” mainly with the times of the Great Patriotic War...
Do you think I'm going to say that people are wrong? Quite the contrary, this association is natural. After all, it was during the war years that a wealth of experience was acquired, which we still use today. The conditions in which our counterintelligence found itself in wartime were completely new, and at first, absolutely unprofitable. In such difficult circumstances, a new formation of military counterintelligence officers emerged: these were people who came from the trenches and knew first-hand what the front line was like. In fact, those front-line officers created the foundation on which modern counterintelligence is built.
What role does it play in peacetime?
Traditionally the main and the most important task counteraction to the intelligence activities of foreign intelligence services remains. In addition, the KGB military counterintelligence department carries out tasks in the fight against corruption and organized crime, illegal drug trafficking and smuggling. Within your competence, of course. We also have special functions on the protection of the constitutional order and the fight against terrorism.
How does counterintelligence fight crime?
We must understand that first of all we prevent threats to national security. Including the threats that crime brings with it. Our main task in this area is to obtain proactive information: identifying and developing organized criminal groups, corrupt officials, and drug dealers. We are obliged to protect the country from crimes in the field of military-technical cooperation and to prevent the withdrawal of budget funds abroad. Together with the command of military units, we are taking measures to maintain the high combat readiness of the Armed Forces and prevent military personnel from being drawn into criminal activities.
I know that it was military counterintelligence that managed to identify an international criminal organization whose members were convicted in 2007. Was it a large group?
Yes, it included about 70 people. They were engaged in smuggling various goods to Belarus, hiding them from customs and border control. By the way, this year we managed to stop similar activities of several commercial firms: they hid large quantities of computer equipment from customs clearance. For example, as a result of the last three deliveries carried out under our control, the country’s budget did not receive about 80 million Belarusian rubles. Later these funds were returned to the state treasury.
Of course, these episodes, as well as the blocking of several drug supply channels from Lithuania and Poland, are only a small part of our daily activities. The main work is hidden from the public: counterintelligence does not tolerate publicity.
However, is it possible now to talk about the most successful operations from which the secrecy label has already been removed?
An example of classical development in best traditions counterintelligence may serve as an operation to suppress the activities of the Polish intelligence network military intelligence. In January 2007, at the Warsaw Bridge checkpoint, a resident of the special service, a former soldier of the Brest garrison, V. Russkin, was caught red-handed. On instructions from a foreign intelligence service, he tried to smuggle classified military information abroad. During the operation, electronic media containing information about the airspace security system were seized Union State on westward, other materials confirming Russkin’s espionage activities. Then, documentary evidence was obtained about other former military personnel belonging to the illegal intelligence station. various parts Brest garrison, who were collecting information about strategic military air defense facilities. All of them were detained and convicted.
How high, in your assessment, is the attention of foreign intelligence services to our country?
In my opinion, there is a direct proportionality between the growth of national consciousness and the activity of the intelligence services. Take a look at the map: our country is located in the center of Europe and occupies an important geopolitical situation, while the leadership of Belarus pursues an independent policy. We have established partnerships with Russian Federation, including in matters of ensuring military security, a unified system has been created air defense. Naturally, in these conditions, our country is the object of close attention for the intelligence services of many foreign countries. Suffice it to say that only in the last few years, in addition to the already mentioned Russkin group, agents of the German, Italian and Polish intelligence services Lec, Piu and Vitashchik, who were carrying out specific assignments to collect information of a military nature, have been exposed and subsequently convicted. They did not manage to achieve their goals: the Belarusian military counterintelligence took measures in time, and there was no leakage of strategic information, and no damage was done to the defense capability of our state.
Alexey Ivanovich, at the end of the conversation, a question from our young readers: how to become a military counterintelligence officer?
Of course, you can’t just come to our office and join the service. But if your desk book- “The Moment of Truth” by Bogomolov, which most truthfully reflects the realities of the operational work of military counterintelligence officers, if you have served in the army, have good physical training and high level education if you have an active life position, consider yourself a patriot, are partial to the concepts of “duty” and “Motherland”, then rest assured that you will be noticed and invited. First, to the Institute of National Security, after graduating from which you can completely devote yourself to serving in military counterintelligence.
History of military counterintelligence: from the revolution to the present day (Prepared by Pavel TRULKO, an employee of the press group of the KGB UVKR.)
January 26, 1918
The executive committee of the Western Front receives a telegram from the Cheka with a proposal to create a department to combat counter-revolution.
At a meeting of the Presidium of the Cheka, a decision was made to transfer to the jurisdiction of the Cheka the military counterintelligence apparatus remaining after demobilization old army. It was assumed that counterintelligence would be led by an “independent director.” This decision was not implemented due to dissenting opinion L.D. Trotsky.
The Supreme Military Council issued a directive on the organization of anti-espionage departments; it ordered the formation of an “anti-espionage department” at the headquarters of each Red Army detachment.
A counterintelligence body, the Military Control Department, was created as part of the Operations Department of the People's Commissariat of Military Affairs.
The Revolutionary Military Council of the Republic approved the “Regulations on Military Control,” which provided for the creation of district branches of Military Control and branches of Military Control at the headquarters of fronts and armies.
The Bureau of the Central Committee of the RCP(b) adopted a resolution “On the unification of the activities of the Cheka and Military Control.” M.S. Kedrov was appointed head of Military Control.
A Special Department of the Cheka was created under the chairmanship of M.S. Kedrov, which was entrusted with the fight against espionage and counter-revolutionary elements in all units and institutions of the Red Army.
Decree of the All-Russian Central Executive Committee(VTsIK) the functions of the Cheka were transferred to the People's Commissariat of Internal Affairs (NKVD). In its system, the State Political Administration (GPU) was created. In connection with the formation of the USSR on December 30, 1922, the GPU was renamed the United State Political Administration (OGPU). To carry out counterintelligence work in the Red Army, the Special Department of the OGPU, OGPU departments in military districts and armies, OGPU departments in corps, divisions and garrisons have been preserved.
By decree of the Central Executive Committee of the USSR, the OGPU was transformed into the Main Directorate of State Security (GUGB) with the corresponding local authorities. The GUGB was included in the system of the newly created all-Union NKVD. To manage special departments in the army and navy, a special department of the GUGB NKVD was created. IN Byelorussian SSR The Special Department of the NKVD of the BSSR was created.
By Decree of the Presidium Supreme Council USSR GUGB was separated from the NKVD system into an independent People's Commissariat for State Security (NKGB). A Special Department of the NKGB of the BSSR was created in the Byelorussian SSR.
To manage special departments, the Directorate of Special Departments of the NKVD of the USSR was created.
By decision of the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR, special departments were renamed into military counterintelligence departments and transferred from the NKVD to People's Commissariat defense, where the Main Counterintelligence Directorate “SMERSH” (GUKR “SMERSH” NPO USSR) was created. GUKR "SMERSH" was subordinate to the People's Commissar of Defense, and its chief was one of the deputy People's Commissars of Defense. Counterintelligence departments “SMERSH” were created at the fronts. Locally, counterintelligence agencies were called counterintelligence departments “SMERSH” of armies, corps, divisions, etc.
The counterintelligence departments of SMERSH were transferred from the USSR NPO to the Ministry of State Security (MGB USSR).
The USSR MGB merged with the USSR Ministry of Internal Affairs (MVD USSR). Special departments were also included in the united ministry system.
Special departments from the Ministry of Internal Affairs were transferred to the newly created State Security Committee under the Council of Ministers of the USSR.
December 1978
The Third Main Directorate was created in the KGB of the USSR. Special departments of districts, groups of troops, armies, etc. are subordinate to him.
September 1991
The KGB of the BSSR was transformed into the KGB of the Republic of Belarus, and the Special Department of the Belarusian Military District was transformed into the Counterintelligence Department of the Inter-Republican Security Service.
By resolution of the Presidium of the Supreme Council of the Republic of Belarus, the Military Counterintelligence Directorate of the KGB of the Republic of Belarus was created.