Tarutino maneuver of 1812 - a march-maneuver of the Russian army during the Patriotic War from Moscow to Tarutino (a village on the Nara River, 80 kilometers southwest of Moscow, now Kaluga region), carried out under the leadership of Field Marshal General Mikhail Illarionovich Kutuzov 5 - September 21 (September 17 - October 3, new style).
After the Battle of Borodino, when it became obvious that it was impossible to hold Moscow with the remaining forces, Mikhail Illarionovich Kutuzov outlined a plan, which was to break away from the Napoleonic army and take a flank position in relation to it, create a threat to French communications, and prevent the enemy from entering southern regions of Russia (not devastated by war and rich in supplies) and prepare the Russian army for a counteroffensive.
Kutuzov kept his plan a great secret. On September 2 (14), leaving Moscow, the Russian army headed southeast along the Ryazan road.
On September 4 (16), after crossing the Moscow River at Borovsky Perevoz (not far from the present city of Zhukovsky), Kutuzov, under the cover of the rearguard of General Nikolai Nikolaevich Raevsky, unexpectedly turned the main forces of the Russian army to the west.
The Cossacks of the rearguard managed to carry away the vanguard of the French army with a demonstrative retreat to Ryazan. It must be said that while covering the retreat, the Cossacks imitated a retreat two more times, and the French followed them along the Kashira and Tula roads.
The vanguard of General Mikhail Andreevich Miloradovich and the detachment of Nikolai Nikolaevich Raevsky were advanced towards Moscow; detachments were allocated for partisan actions.
Having lost sight of the Russian army, Napoleon sent strong detachments along the Ryazan, Tula and Kaluga roads. They searched for Kutuzov for several days, and only on September 14 (26) the cavalry of Marshal Joachim Murat discovered Russian troops in the Podolsk area.
Subsequently, Kutuzov secretly (mostly at night) retreated along the Old Kaluga Road to the Nara River.
On September 21 (October 3, new style), Russian troops stopped near the village of Tarutino, where they occupied a new fortified position. The brilliantly organized and executed Tarutino maneuver allowed the Russian army to break away from Napoleon's army and occupy an advantageous strategic position, which ensured its preparation for a counteroffensive.
As a result of the Tarutin maneuver, Kutuzov maintained communications with the southern regions of Russia, which made it possible to strengthen the army, cover the arms factory in Tula and the supply base in Kaluga, and maintain contact with the armies of Alexander Petrovich Tormasov and Pavel Vasilyevich Chichagov.
Napoleon was forced to abandon the attack on St. Petersburg and ultimately, leaving Moscow, retreat along the Old Smolensk Road, that is, through areas already devastated by the war. The Tarutino maneuver revealed Kutuzov’s outstanding leadership talent, his ability to impose his will on the enemy, put him in unfavorable conditions, and achieve a turning point in the war.
Tarutino camp
Tarutinsky camp is a fortified camp in the Tarutino region (a village on the Nara River, now Zhukovsky district of the Kaluga region, 80 kilometers southwest of Moscow), which was occupied by the Russian army from September 21 (October 3, new style) to October 11 (23) during the Patriotic War of 1812 after leaving Moscow.
The Tarutino camp was located on an area advantageous for defense, relying on which it was possible to keep under surveillance the roads from Moscow - Old Kaluga, Tula and Ryazan.
The front and left flank of the Tarutino camp were covered by rivers (Nara and others), earthen fortifications in the form of flashes and lunettes (14 in total) were built along the front, and the river banks were escarped.
In the forest area that covered the rear of the Tarutino camp, abatis and rubble were built. The army was located on both sides of the Old Kaluga Road: in the 1st line - the 2nd and 6th infantry corps, in the 2nd - 4,5,3 and 7th infantry and 1st cavalry corps, in the 3rd - 8th Infantry Corps and part of the cavalry, in the 4th - two cuirassier divisions and reserve artillery (about 400 guns).
Flashes are field (sometimes long-term) fortifications. They consist of two faces, each 20 - 30 meters long, at an obtuse angle. The corner has its apex facing the enemy.
Lunette is an open field or long-term fortification consisting of at least 3 faces. The field lunette usually housed 1 - 4 companies.
To cover the flanks of the battle formation, the following were advanced: left - 5, right - 2 ranger regiments; the vanguard of the army (2nd and 4th cavalry corps) was located 3 kilometers north of Tarutino.
Mikhail Illarionovich Kutuzov’s apartment and his headquarters were located first in Tarutino, and then in the village of Letashevka (currently the Maloye Litashovo tract, 3 km southwest of Tarutino).
In the Tarutino camp, the Russian army was reorganized, re-equipped, supplied with weapons, ammunition and food, and prepared for active offensive operations. Army partisan detachments were sent behind enemy lines.
In connection with the preparation of the counteroffensive, the number of cavalry in the army increased significantly. The troops carried out intensive combat training. Kutuzov used his stay in the Tarutino camp to prepare for the Russian army to launch a counter-offensive and already in the Tarutino battle on October 18 (October 6) he defeated the vanguard of the French army.
In 1834, with the money of the peasants of the village of Tarutino and nearby villages, a monument was erected at the entrance to the village with the inscription: “In this place, the Russian army under the leadership of Field Marshal Kutuzov, strengthened, saved Russia and Europe.”
By the way, it was in the Tarutino camp that the great Russian poet, and then lieutenant of the Moscow militia, Vasily Andreevich Zhukovsky wrote the poem “A Singer in the Camp of Russian Warriors,” which made him famous throughout Russia.
The Nara River in the Tarutino region. The river served as a natural strategic barrier that protected the Russian army.
From the high slopes of the river valley the surrounding area could be seen many miles ahead.
The clear edges of the lunettes are still clearly visible on the ground.
Here and there in the vicinity of Tarutin you can find ditches and ramparts of ancient fortifications.
Monument in Tarutino.
Battle of Tarutino
The Battle of Tarutino or the Battle of Tarutino is a battle between Russian and French troops on October 6 (October 18, new style) during the Patriotic War of 1812 near the Chernishnya River (a tributary of the Nara River) 8 kilometers north of the village of Tarutino. The participants themselves called the battle “The Battle of Chernishneya” (Kutuzov) or “The Battle of Vinkovo” (Caulaincourt). Vinkovo is the old name of the current village of Chernishnya.
Battle of Tarutino
At the beginning of October 1812, having completed the preparation of the Russian army for a counter-offensive, Mikhail Illarionovich Kutuzov directed the first blow against the French vanguard (28 thousand people, 187 guns, under the command of Marshal Joachim Murat), located on the banks of the Chernishnya River.
Kutuzov’s plan was to deliver the main blow with the group of General Leonty Leontyevich Bennigsen (3 infantry and 1 cavalry corps, 10 Cossack regiments) against the left flank, and the group of General Mikhail Andreevich Miloradovich (2 infantry corps, guard and reserve cavalry) together with the main forces of the Russian army - against the center of the French vanguard, in cooperation with the partisan detachments of Ivan Semenovich Dorokhov and Alexander Samoilovich Figner, advancing behind enemy lines, to encircle and destroy him.
At 7 o'clock in the morning on October 6 (18), the Cossack regiments of Vasily Vasilyevich Orlov-Denisov attacked the French in the village of Teterinka, creating a threat of enveloping their left flank. Behind them, the advanced units of the main forces of Bennigsen’s group began to attack. The position of the French avant-garde became critical. Murat retreated. Russian troops (Orlov-Denisov's Cossacks and Miloradovich's cavalrymen) pursued them to Spas-Kupli.
The main forces of the Russian army, which advanced to the Chernishnya River, were not brought into battle: Kutuzov, having received a report about the withdrawal of Napoleon’s troops from Moscow, stopped them and returned them to the Tarutino positions.
The result of the Tarutino battle was the partial defeat of the French vanguard, which lost about 2,500 (according to other sources - 4,000) people killed and wounded, 2,000 people captured, 38 guns and the entire convoy. Russian losses amounted to 300 people killed and 904 people wounded (according to Kutuzov’s report). According to the inscription on the wall of the Cathedral of Christ the Savior, the Russian army lost 1,183 people killed and wounded.
The Battle of Tarutino was the first major tactical victory of the Russian army after the Battle of Borodino, strengthening the morale of its troops on the eve of the counteroffensive.
Bust of Ataman Platov at the war memorial near the village of Kuzovlevo (not far from Chernishni).
The Cossacks of Ataman Platov accomplished many feats during the Battle of Tarutino. Near the village of Teterinki, the Cossacks captured a French battery of 18 guns. Captain Kostin especially distinguished himself by being the first to capture a French gun. The centurion of the Karps captured the golden standard of the 1st Cuirassier Regiment. Sergeant Filatov stabbed General Deri, the commander of Murat's guard. During the battle, more than 170 Cossacks were killed, but they themselves destroyed almost 2,000 French.
Although, there are other opinions about the Cossacks, such as, for example, the memoirs of General A.P. Ermolov: "...Rich carts were a tasty bait for our Cossacks: they took up robbery, got drunk and did not think of preventing the enemy from retreating".
Memorial sign near the village of Chernishnya.
Russian maneuver army from Moscow to the village. Tarutino (approx. 80 km southwest of Moscow) during the Patriotic War of 1812, completed according to plan and under hands. M.I. Kutuzova. Leaving 2 Sep. Moscow, Russian The army retreated along the Ryazan road and on September 4. reached Borovsky transportation, where she crossed onto the right. river bank Moscow. 5 Sep. Kutuzov unexpectedly turned the army from the Ryazan road to the west and with a forced flank march under the cover of the river. Pakhra sent her to Podolsk, where the Russians. troops arrived on September 6. 8 Sep. The army continued to move and, reaching the Old Kaluga Road, settled down on September 9. to rest at Krasnaya Pakhra. 15 Sep. the army moved to the southwest. and 21 Sep. stopped at the fortification. defensive positions at the village Tarutino, from where it could control all three roads leading from Moscow to the south through Kaluga. The implementation of T. m. was facilitated by the successful actions of the Russians. rearguards. False movements of the cavalry. detachment along the Vladimir road and Cossack regiments from the Borovsky transportation along the Ryazan road diverted the attention of the French. avant-garde. The enemy for several days was disoriented regarding the direction of movement and location of the Russian. army, believing that it is retreating to the southeast. from Moscow. Only 12 Sep. the vanguard of I. Murat discovered the Russian. troops, coming into contact with their rearguard at Podolsk. T. m. was an outstanding achievement of the military. lawsuit; as a result of his strategic The situation changed in favor of the Russians. army. Coming out from under the enemy's attack, she covered the south. province, where its resources and bases were concentrated, provided communication with the troops of P.V. Chichagov and A.P. Tormasov, and occupied a threatening position in relation to the enemy’s operational line, rear and communications in the Moscow-Smolensk region. Franz. The troops found themselves chained to Moscow, surrounded by a ring of flying detachments, and lost the opportunity to develop an attack on St. Petersburg. Rus. the troops received the necessary respite. During the T. m. and especially during the stay of the Russian. troops in the Tarutino camp (from September 21 to October 11), a huge amount of work was done to strengthen the army and prepare it for active combat operations. 1st and 2nd Zap. The armies were united into one Main Army, the officer corps was strengthened, the headquarters service was reorganized, the number of troops was replenished from 85 to 120 people, the proportion of cavalry increased significantly, ch. arr. at the expense of the Cossack regiments. Combat training and supply of troops were established, and sanitary conditions were improved. At the same time, Kutuzov launched a “small war” on a wide scale, including it in the implementation of the overall strategic plan. plan (see Partisan movement in the Patriotic War of 1812). As a result of the Tarutino period, the combat effectiveness of the Russians increased. army and the foundations were laid for going on the offensive.
Tarutino. 1812. Electronic reproduction from the Wikimedia Foundation repository.
Tarutino maneuver (Patriotic War, 1812). Transition of the Russian army under the command of Field Marshal M.I. Kutuzova from Moscow to the village of Tarutino September 5-21, 1812. After Battle of Borodino Kutuzov took upon himself the responsibility of surrendering Moscow to the French in order to preserve the army. “With the loss of Moscow, Russia is not yet lost... But if the army is destroyed, both Moscow and Russia will perish”, - Kutuzov told the generals at the military council in Fili. So the Russians left their ancient capital, which for the first time in 200 years found itself in the hands of foreigners.
Leaving Moscow, Kutuzov began to retreat in a south-eastern direction, along the Ryazan road. At the same time, Cossack units and corps N.N. Raevsky continued their retreat to Ryazan, and then “dissolved” in the forests. By this they misled the French vanguard of the marshal I. Murat , which followed on the heels of the retreating army, and the Russians broke away from the pursuit. Murat overtook the Russian army for the second time in the Podolsk region. However, attempts to attack it were stopped by the general's rearguard M.A. Miloradovich . He withstood a number of battles, not allowing the French cavalry to disrupt the ranks of the retreating army (see. Spas Kuplya ).
During the retreat, Kutuzov introduced strict measures against desertion, which began in his troops after the surrender of Moscow. Having reached the Old Kaluga Road, the Russian army turned to Kaluga and, crossing the Nara River, set up camp in the village of Tarutino. Kutuzov brought 85 thousand people there. available personnel (together with the militia). As a result of the Tarutino maneuver, the Russian army escaped the attack and took an advantageous position.
While in Tarutino, Kutuzov covered the southern regions of Russia, rich in human resources and food, the Tula military-industrial complex, and at the same time could threaten the communications of the French on the Smolensk road. The French could not freely advance from Moscow to St. Petersburg, having the Russian army in the rear. Kutuzov actually imposed the further course of the campaign on Napoleon. The main thing is that the Russian commander, having preserved the army, received all the advantages of his position - the owner of his own land.
In the Tarutino camp, the Russian army received reinforcements and increased its strength to 120 thousand people. One of the most significant additions was the arrival of 26 Cossack regiments from the Don region. The share of cavalry in the Kutuzov army increased significantly, reaching a third of its strength, which played an extremely important role during the period of persecution of Napoleonic troops. The issue of providing the cavalry with everything necessary was thought out in advance; in particular, more than 150 thousand horseshoes were delivered to the army.
In addition to human reserves, the army received significant logistical support in a short time. In August-September alone, the country's main weapons forge, the Tula Plant, produced 36 thousand guns for the army. Kutuzov also entrusted the Tula, Kaluga, Oryol, Ryazan and Tver governors with the responsibility of procuring 100 thousand sheepskin coats and 100 thousand pairs of boots for the army.
Despite all its tactical achievements, the French army in Moscow found itself in a strategic blockade. In addition to the Tarutino camp, where Kutuzov’s troops were stationed, a second army was actually created around Moscow, consisting of partisans and militias. Its number reached 200 thousand people. Having reached the ancient Russian capital, Napoleon's army found itself in a tight blockade ring. Napoleon, who came to a country deeply alien to him, was unable to create his base here and found himself in isolation. The only thread connecting the French with the familiar world was the Smolensk road, along which they carried out a constant supply of provisions, ammunition and fodder to Moscow. But it was under the control of partisan detachments and could be tightly blocked at any moment by an attack from Tarutino. At the same time, Napoleon's hopes that the capture of Moscow would force the Russians to make peace were not justified due to the tough position of Alexander I, who was determined to continue the fight.
During his stay in Moscow, Napoleon lost 26 thousand people. killed, missing, died from wounds and diseases, i.e. suffered losses comparable to a major battle. Gradually, the illusory nature of success from the French occupation of Moscow became quite obvious. All this forced Napoleon to leave Moscow. In 1834, in Tarutino, using funds raised by peasants, a monument was erected with the inscription: “In this place, the Russian army under the leadership of Field Marshal Kutuzov, strengthened, saved Russia and Europe” (see Chernishnya, Maloyaroslavets).
Book materials used: Nikolay Shefov. Battles of Russia. Military-historical library. M., 2002.
Tarutino maneuver of 1812, a march maneuver of the Russian army during the Patriotic War of 1812 from Moscow to Tarutino (a village on the Nara River, 80 km southwest of Moscow), carried out under the leadership of Field General. M.I. Kutuzova September 5-21 (Sept. 17 - Oct. 3). After the Battle of Borodino in 1812, when it became obvious that it was impossible to hold Moscow with the remaining forces, M.I. Kutuzov outlined a plan, which was to break away from the Napoleonic army and take a flank position in relation to it, to create a threat to the French. communications, prevent the enemy from entering the south. districts of Russia (not devastated by war) and prepare Russian. army to launch a counteroffensive. Kutuzov kept his plan a great secret. 2(14) September, leaving Moscow, Russian. the army headed to the south-east. along the Ryazan road. 4(16) Sept. after crossing the Moscow River at the Borovsky transportation of Kutuzov, under the cover of the rearguard of General. H.H. Raevsky unexpectedly turned the chapter. Russian forces army by 3. The Cossacks of the rearguard managed to carry away the French vanguard with a demonstrative retreat to Ryazan. army. 7(19) Sept. rus. the army arrived in Podolsk, and two days later, continuing the flank march-maneuver, in the region of the village of Krasnaya Pakhra. Riding the Old Kaluga Road, Russian. The army set up camp and stayed here until September 14 (26). The vanguard of the general was advanced towards Moscow. M.A. Miloradovich and the detachment of H.H. Raevsky; detachments were allocated for the partisans. actions. Having lost the Russian army out of sight, Napoleon sent strong detachments along the Ryazan, Tula and Kaluga roads. They searched for Kutuzov for several days, and only on September 14 (26). Marshal I. Murat's cavalry discovered the Russians. troops in the Podolsk region. Subsequently, Kutuzov secretly (mostly at night) retreated along the Old Kaluga Road to the river. Nara. 21 Sep. (Oct 3) rus. The troops stopped in the vicinity of the village. Tarutino, where they took a new fortified position (see Tarutino camp). The brilliantly organized and conducted T. m. allowed the Russian. army to break away from Napoleon's army and occupy an advantageous strategic position, which ensured its preparation for a counter-offensive. As a result, T. m. Kutuzov retained communication from the south. regions of Russia, which made it possible to strengthen the army, cover the arms factory in Tula and the supply base in Kaluga, and maintain contact with the armies of A.P. Tormasov and P.V. Chichagov. Napoleon was forced to abandon the attack on St. Petersburg and ultimately, leaving Moscow, retreat along the Old Smolensk Road, i.e. through the districts already devastated by the war. Kutuzov’s outstanding military leadership talent was revealed in T. m., his ability to impose his will on the commander, put him in unfavorable conditions, and achieve a turning point in the war.
D. V. Pankov
Materials from the Soviet Military Encyclopedia in 8 volumes, volume 7 were used.
Read further:
Patriotic War of 1812 (chronological table).
Tyrion. Tarutino. (memoirs of a participant).
Griois. Tarutino. (memoirs of a participant).
Patriotic War, 1812). The transition of the Russian army under the command of Field Marshal M.I. Kutuzov from Moscow to the village of Tarutino September 5-21, 1812. After the Battle of Borodino, Kutuzov took upon himself the responsibility of surrendering Moscow to the French in order to preserve the army. “With the loss of Moscow, Russia is not yet lost... But if the army is destroyed, both Moscow and Russia will perish,” Kutuzov told the generals at the military council in Fili. So the Russians left their ancient capital, which for the first time in 200 years found itself in the hands of foreigners. Leaving Moscow, Kutuzov began to retreat in a south-eastern direction, along the Ryazan road. At the same time, the Cossack units and the corps of N.N. Raevsky continued to retreat to Ryazan, and then “dissolved” in the forests. By this they misled the French vanguard of Marshal I. Murat, who followed on the heels of the retreating army, and the Russians broke away from the pursuit. Murat overtook the Russian army for the second time in the Podolsk region. However, attempts to attack it were stopped by the rearguard of General M.A. Miloradovich. He withstood a number of battles, not allowing the French cavalry to disrupt the ranks of the retreating army (see Spas Kuplya). During the retreat, Kutuzov introduced strict measures against desertion, which began in his troops after the surrender of Moscow. Having reached the Old Kaluga Road, the Russian army turned to Kaluga and, crossing the Nara River, set up camp in the village of Tarutino. Kutuzov brought 85 thousand people there. available personnel (together with the militia). As a result of the Tarutino maneuver, the Russian army escaped the attack and took an advantageous position. While in Tarutino, Kutuzov covered the southern regions of Russia, rich in human resources and food, the Tula military-industrial complex, and at the same time could threaten the communications of the French on the Smolensk road. The French could not freely advance from Moscow to St. Petersburg, having the Russian army in the rear. Kutuzov actually imposed the further course of the campaign on Napoleon. The main thing is that the Russian commander, having preserved the army, received all the advantages of his position - the owner of his own land. In the Tarutino camp, the Russian army received reinforcements and increased its strength to 120 thousand people. One of the most significant additions was the arrival of 26 Cossack regiments from the Don region. The share of cavalry in the Kutuzov army increased significantly, reaching a third of its strength, which played an extremely important role during the period of persecution of Napoleonic troops. The issue of providing the cavalry with everything necessary was thought out in advance; in particular, more than 150 thousand were delivered to the army. horseshoes In addition to human reserves, the army received significant logistical support in a short time. In August-September alone, the country's main weapons forge, the Tula Plant, produced 36 thousand guns for the army. Kutuzov also entrusted the Tula, Kaluga, Oryol, Ryazan Itver governors with the responsibility of procuring 100 thousand sheepskin coats and 100 thousand pairs of boots for the army. Despite all its tactical achievements, the French army in Moscow found itself in a strategic blockade. In addition to the Tarutino camp, where Kutuzov’s troops were stationed, a second army was actually created around Moscow, consisting of partisans and militias. Its number reached 200 thousand people. Having reached the ancient Russian capital, Napoleon's army found itself in a tight blockade ring. Napoleon, who came to a country deeply alien to him, was unable to create his base here and found himself in isolation. The only thread connecting the French with the familiar world was the Smolensk road, along which they carried out a constant supply of provisions, ammunition and fodder to Moscow. But it was under the control of partisan detachments and could be tightly blocked at any moment by an attack from Tarutino. At the same time, Napoleon's hopes that the capture of Moscow would force the Russians to make peace were not justified due to the tough position of Alexander I, who was determined to continue the fight. During his stay in Moscow, Napoleon lost 26 thousand people. killed, missing, died from wounds and diseases, i.e. suffered losses comparable to a major battle. Gradually, the illusory nature of success from the French occupation of Moscow became quite obvious. All this forced Napoleon to leave Moscow. In 1834, in Tarutino, using funds raised by peasants, a monument was erected with the inscription: “In this place, the Russian army under the leadership of Field Marshal Kutuzov, strengthened, saved Russia and Europe” (see Cherniishya, Maloyaroslavets).
There are small moments in history, seemingly insignificant at first glance, sometimes even curious, which in the future have a significant impact on the course of further events. These include the Tarutino battle, or rather not even a battle, but a clash that took place on October 18, 1812. near the village of Tarutino, the Russian army with the vanguard of the French army, where M.N. retreated. Kutuzov, leaving Moscow. This clash had more of a moral significance than a military one - the French vanguard under the leadership of Marshal Murat was not defeated, but it could have been.
In all sources, this episode is interpreted as the Tarutino battle, but as I said above, it is more like a collision with big blunders, where the principle “it was smooth on paper, but they forgot about the ravines!” was justified.
Kutuzov's main strategic success at Borodino was that the large French losses provided time for replenishment, supplies, and reorganization of the Russian army, which the commander-in-chief then launched into a formidable counter-offensive against Napoleon.
Napoleon did not attack the Russian army during its retreat from Borodino to Moscow, not because he considered the war to be won, but because he feared a second Borodino, after which he would have had to ask for a shameful peace.
While in Moscow and soberly assessing the situation, Napoleon sent his representatives to Alexander 1 and M.I. Kutuzov with a proposal to make peace. But he was refused. And realizing that Moscow was a trap for him, he gave the order to retreat.
And at this time, in the Tarutino camp, the Russian army received reinforcements and increased its strength to 120 thousand people. In 1834, a monument was erected in Tarutino with the inscription: “In this place, the Russian army, led by Field Marshal Kutuzov, saved Russia and Europe».
Although the Cossacks initially misled the French vanguard, which was following on the heels of the Russian army, Murat’s corps still discovered Kutuzov’s camp and stopped not far from Tarutino, observing the Russian army. The strength of the French corps was 26,540 people with artillery of 197 guns. Only the forest separated the Russian camp from the French positions.
It was a strange neighborhood. Enemy troops stood for two weeks without fighting. Moreover, according to the testimony of General A.P. Ermolova: “ Gentlemen generals and officers gathered at the front posts with expressions of politeness, which was the reason for many to conclude that there was a truce.”(Napoleon was waiting for an answer to peace - V.K.). By this time, the partisans reported that the French had no reinforcements at a distance from their position to Moscow. This caused the plan to encircle and destroy the French corps, but..., as I said above, the human factor is to blame for everything.
Murat apparently received information about the impending Russian attack the day before it began. The French were in full combat readiness all night, but the attack did not occur due to the fact that General Ermolov was at their dinner party. The next day, Murat ordered the withdrawal of artillery and convoys. But the adjutant who delivered the order to the chief of artillery found him sleeping and, unaware of the urgency, decided to wait until the morning. As a result, the French were unprepared to repel the attack.
In turn, mistakes were made on the Russian side. They were let down by the lack of cooperation among the detachments of Bennigsen, Miloradovich and Orlov-Denisov, allocated to attack the French. Only the Cossacks of Orlov-Denisov, who reached their initial positions in time, attacked the French camp, who took to their heels, and the Cossacks began to “shmon” their camp. This allowed Murat to stop the fleeing French and organize counterattacks, thereby saving his corps.
The goal of the Tarutino battle was not fully achieved, but its result was extremely successful: in no other battle during that war were so many guns captured (38).
But the significance of this battle lay not only in the success and effectiveness of the military component, this battle contributed to the rise of the spirit of the Russian army and marked a new stage of the Patriotic War - the transition to active offensive actions, which the army and the entire Russian society had dreamed of for so long. This battle showed that the Russians could beat the French, just as the Battle of Moscow in 1941 showed that Hitler’s army could be crushed.