Chechen Cossacks. Terek Cossacks and Chechens

How many times as a child did I drive along this highway to visit my mother’s sister, Aunt Lida. I really wanted to get to the Caspian Sea as soon as possible! Often I traveled alone - my parents put me on a train or bus, and my aunt met me in Makhachkala. There was no fear or fear that something would happen to the child. The names of settlements located along the route sounded like a song: Alpatovo, Kapustino, Mekenskaya, Ishcherskaya, Kalinovskaya, Staro-Shchedrinskaya, Chervlennaya-Uzlovaya, Naurskaya, Grebenskaya... Originally Russian, Cossack oxbows, still sung Leo Tolstoy in his “Cossacks”, in poems Pushkin, Lermontov.

Many famous figures of science and culture came from these places, for example, the great Russian pianist, conductor of the New York Philharmonic Orchestra Vasily Safonov, whose daughter Anna Timireva was a common-law wife Kolchak. Many talented military leaders also emerged from the Cossack lands. But, perhaps, the most famous was the ataman of Naursky, Ishchersky and Galyugaevsky Emelyan Pugachev, a monument to which is installed in one of the Mozdok parks. In 1771, he fled from the Mozdok guardhouse to soon lead a popular uprising.

In pre-revolutionary times, the territories of the current Naur and Shelkovsky districts were part of the Terek region and were part of the Cossack departments. The village of Naurskaya was part of the Azov-Mozdok line back in the 70s of the 18th century. However, in the early 1920s, the Terek region was abolished and fragmented into several parts for the “development” of national republics. Kabardino-Balkaria received the Prokhladnensky district, the Ingush - Sunzhensky, Karachay-Cherkessia - the village of Zelenchukskaya and a number of others. Dagestan has the Kizlyar district, and the Mozdok district was torn away from the Stavropol Territory in 1944 and attached to the North Ossetian Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic through a thin isthmus. But the most generous gift was made by Ch-I ASSR Secretary General Khrushchev, who gave the republic two of the richest Cossack regions - Naursky and Shelkovsky. With the collapse of the Chechen-Ingush Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic into two separate entities in 1992, these lands should have automatically returned to the Stavropol region. Instead, the then authorities of Chechnya began to resolve this issue according to the principle - no person, no problem. A real genocide began against the Russian and Cossack population.

Only according to official, greatly underestimated data, for example, the Ministry of Nationalities and Regional Policy of the Russian Federation that existed at that time, more than 21 thousand Russians were killed in Chechnya during the period from 1996 to 1998. And the number of those expelled cannot be calculated at all; it is approximately more than three hundred thousand people. And, if Chechens were given compensation in the amount of 360 thousand rubles for lost property, then Russian refugees were entitled to three times less - 120 thousand rubles. With this money, it’s not only impossible to settle down, but also to gain a foothold in a new place. Many Russians who fled from Chechnya, as well as Armenians, Ukrainians, and Kabardians, were unable to settle in their new lands, joined the ranks of the homeless or died before their time.

This tragedy, which is happening before our eyes, has never received a proper legal assessment. While Russian and Western human rights activists are constantly bawling about the “atrocities of the regime” against some Caucasian peoples, even recalling to Russia the Caucasian War of the 19th century, they prefer not to notice the true tragedy of the Cossacks and the Russian population of Chechnya.

Double standards, especially obvious when it comes to Russian interests. You often hear from such “ombudsmen” that Russians in the Caucasus are occupiers and there is nothing to feel sorry for them...

Especially for these gentlemen, I want to give a little historical background. I have also seen Russian settlements on the shores of the Caspian Sea Prince Oleg during their campaigns in 943−45. And the Cossacks, considered the descendants of Sarmatian tribes who mixed with the alien Huns, lived in these parts since time immemorial. There are reports about them in chronicles of the 10th–12th centuries. At the end of the 15th century, the “guard Cossacks” who fled to the Caucasus and the peasants of the Grand Duchy of Ryazan joined this people. Voivodes Ivan the Terrible after the conquest of the Astrakhan Khanate (1556), they met the Cossacks who had long lived there on the Terek and concluded a military alliance with them. And, since the Cossacks settled on the eastern and northern slopes of the Tersky Range, the so-called. "ridges", they were called "Grebensky". The Grebentsy provided considerable assistance to the tsarist military leaders during the construction of the border fortress of Terki (Tersky town), founded in 1567 at the mouth of the Sunzha River, and then in 1599 moved to the mouth of the Terek River near the confluence of the Tyumenka tributary. In the 16th century, the Don Cossacks also moved to these regions in the Kalitva rivers, and from the end of the 16th century many Cossacks arrived from the Volga and Khopr. They made up the “lower” Terek Cossacks, which arose later than the Grebensky Cossacks. The official date of formation of the Terek Cossack army is considered to be 1577.

Cossack settlements were repeatedly raided by mountain and nomadic tribes, who mercilessly exterminated the Cossacks and took them captive. In 1685, the Terek Cossacks were temporarily driven back from the mountains, and in 1707, most of the ancient Cossack towns were destroyed by the Kuban Sultan Kaib. In 1712, the surviving Grebens settled in the lower reaches of the Terek.

During the Persian campaign Peter I in 1722, Don Cossacks with their families were settled on the Astrakhan and Sulak rivers, which were called the Astrakhan army (later - the “family army”). In the same 1732, the Kizlyar fortress was founded. With the support of the Terek Cossacks, in the period from 1735 to 1850, a whole strip of villages and military fortifications was erected, such as Mozdok (this year my hometown will celebrate its 250th anniversary), the Grozny fortress, Vladikavkaz, Georgievskaya, Ust-Labinskaya, Ekaterinodar. In 1763 the Azov-Mozdok line was created, and in 1860 the Terek region was formed. Moreover, not only ethnic Russians considered themselves Cossacks, but also representatives of other nations who converted to Orthodoxy and formed the Mountain Cossack Regiment.

In 1894, the number of Terek Cossacks was 162 thousand people, and in 1916 there were already 255 thousand. They lived in 70 cities, villages and farmsteads of the Terek region, and were not only wonderful warriors, but also excellent farmers, winegrowers, hunters and fishermen. At the head of the army was the ataman, who was also the head of the Terek region.

But in the 20th century, the history of the Terek Cossacks was truly tragic. The Cossacks were subjected to merciless extermination and were expelled from their native land. As a result of “decossackization,” thousands of families were exiled to Siberia, and their houses were seized by mountain “proletarians,” that is, bandits. But when in 1944 the representatives of the mountain peoples themselves were deported, the authorities treated them much more humanely than the Cossacks, allowing them to take warm clothes and livestock with them. And, if the resettlement of the highlanders is considered to be a “crime of the regime” - and the descendants of the deportees received substantial compensation, their republics grew into primordial Cossack lands - then the genocide of the Cossacks and the Russian population of the Caucasus has still not received proper assessment. Likewise, the descendants of the Cossacks expelled from their native lands did not receive compensation for lost property.

Moreover, with the coming to power Dudaeva, the Russians were again subjected to merciless extermination. The Cossack villages were depopulated. The fate of the Russian residents of Grozny (let me remind you, a Russian fortress founded in 1818) and the inhabitants of the Naur and Shelkovsky districts is especially tragic. The thugs did not spare either children or old people. In my article “Russians on the Terek” (“Spetsnaz of Russia”, No. 10, 1999), I told how the last Russian resident of the village of Shelkovskaya was brutally killed. A 90-year-old man, who was unable to pay food tribute to the militants due to a complete lack of food, was stabbed to death by the brutal militants with sheep shears. Unfortunately, the facts of the mass extermination of the Russian population of Chechnya were hushed up in every possible way. Our media glorified the militants, presenting them almost as “freedom fighters.”

After signing the so-called “Khasavyurt peace” the extermination of Cossacks and Russians became a mass phenomenon. In fact, these lands became our Russian Kosovo, but it is not customary to remember or talk about this tragedy. Although unpunished evil, as is known, entails new crimes.

With the restoration of the so-called “constitutional order”, the miraculously surviving residents of these areas began to have hope that the extermination of Russians would finally stop. But it continued under the new government. In 2003, together with the residents of the village of Ishcherskaya, I buried a 47-year-old hereditary Cossack Nikolai Lozhkin, kidnapped and brutally killed by militants. This crime, like many others, was never solved. But our ruthless Themis punished Russian officers accused of killing “civilians” quickly and cruelly.

The Cossacks of the Naursky and Shelkovsky districts, after the abduction of Nikolai Lozhkin (at that time people did not yet know that he had already been killed), adopted an appeal to the Russian authorities, which even now, ten years after it was written, is impossible to read without emotion. This is truly a cry from the soul. I would like to quote excerpts from the text of the appeal.

“We, Russians, living to our misfortune and by the ill will of fate on the territory of Chechnya, immensely tired of the resigned expectation of our fate, accept this appeal in order to declare to everyone who is able to hear us that we are ceasing to be a part of the population convenient for the authorities, which it is customary not to notice in the name of momentary political plans... We regard the kidnapping of Ataman Lozhkin as a signal that those times have returned again when Russians were easy prey for bandits, our property was plundered with impunity, our labor was exploited without compensation, and people were easily deprived of their lives. This time has returned again with those who mocked us and now wear police uniforms, with those who have changed their colors, replacing gangster regalia with United Russia party cards and bureaucratic briefcases, with those who, crazy with impunity, are robbing the country, sucking on the hole in the budget called “restoration of Chechnya.” We are tired of looking for at least something in the big politics of the Kremlin and Grozny that we could regard as gratitude for the blood shed, maimed and lost lives, property stolen and taken from us, and peace of mind for the fate of children , for our help to the freezing "federals", for unwavering devotion to the Motherland, which, through the actions of the authorities, once again betrayed us, spitting in our souls. We are tired of looking at the comical attempts to apply all-Russian standards of living to Chechnya. It’s disgusting to watch how the amnestied gangs finish the division Chechnya...

We came to the conclusion that the law-abiding expectation of a bright future will ultimately lead to our complete squeezing out of our villages. We want at least someone from Moscow to tell us why we are here. We want the authorities to have the courage to say: “Our plans do not include taking care of the Russians, since at present it is politically unprofitable.” If we hear such words, we will demand that we be taken out of here in an organized manner, along with the names of our villages, and provided with housing and work. We do not want to wander around the country in search of shelter and bread, like our fellow countrymen who previously left. If you say that Russia needs us here, be prepared for honest dialogue, hard work, unpopular decisions...

We will not rest until we begin working with our representatives to resolve the problems of the Russians in Chechnya. We will not rest until the authorities officially recognize that in Chechnya there must be a special policy of the federal center towards Russians and begin to implement it. We are waiting for a response and reserve the right to protest if our demands are ignored once again."

That appeal had more than three hundred signatures. But a peculiar response to it was the murder of one of the authors - Mikhail Melnikov and his sick sister Faith. And people realized that they had nothing to expect from the authorities. Almost everyone who lived here, whose ancestors built houses and factories here, cultivated the land and raised livestock, left the villages. All the property of the original monasteries of the adjacent lands passed into the hands of the new owners. I wonder how they live in occupied houses, often stained with the blood of their owners? Aren't you tormented by pangs of conscience? However, it’s unlikely.

And now I’m driving along the familiar route again. The names of the villages are the same, but you can no longer see Russian faces on the streets of the villages. Their appearance also changed. Instead of traditional adobe huts and neat brick houses, there are palaces lined with expensive red brick with huge fences. Only in the village of Grebenskaya do I see a dilapidated Cossack house, the owner of which, most likely, suffered a tragic fate. There are no Russian churches left in the villages...

To be fair, it should be said that the current leader of the Chechen Republic, Ramzan Kadyrov, is showing some attention to the “Russian issue” and is trying to attract Russian specialists to the republic. Under him, the Temple of the Archangel Michael in Grozny, destroyed during the fighting, was restored. But there is no one there to pray there anymore. Only miraculously preserved Russian cemeteries remind us of the centuries-old Russian presence on this land. Probably, soon even these modest graves with Orthodox crosses will no longer remain. There will be only the former names of the villages on the Terek banks, reminiscent of the former greatness of the Terek Cossacks, but there will be no Russians and Cossacks themselves.

It’s time to understand that without the Russian people, their wise, unifying principle, there is no future for the living peoples who love to reproach Russia for its “imperial past.” Just let them know that instead of Russians leaving the region, endless inter-tribal slaughter will come here. And new masters who will manage these civil strifes. It’s time for local nationals, intoxicated by their “successes” and Russia’s weakness, to think about their future, which is unlikely to be rosy. For created evil tends to return like a boomerang.

If a building is damaged, special clamps are installed on the cracks, the so-called. “beacons”, the rupture of which signals the imminent collapse of the house. The Naursky and Shelkovsky districts are peculiar “beacons” warning the Russian people about the upcoming challenges of the time. Without maintaining the Russian presence in the Caucasus, there will be no Russia itself. To understand this, you need to visit the villages abandoned by the Cossacks.

Near the village of Kalinovskaya I notice a white stork suddenly flying out of the snow-covered reed thickets. The Chechen driver, in whose minibus I was returning from Makhachkala, saw the majestic bird with a sad look: “They probably wounded him, so he stayed and didn’t fly away.” And suddenly I thought that it was not a bird, but a rebellious Cossack soul that was circling over its native lands and did not want, could not leave them. For the Motherland, like the mother, is one.

North Ossetia-Chechnya-Dagestan

The word “Cossacks” appeared at the end of the 15th century. This was the name given to free people who worked for hire or performed military service on the border outskirts of Russia. Cossacks first appeared in the North Caucasus in 1578-1579, when, at the request of Turkey, the Russian fortress on the Sunzha River was demolished. To “monitor” the situation in the region, the Russian authorities sent Cossack detachments from the Volga here.

The arriving Cossacks were taken under the protection of the Chechen prince Shikh-Murza Okotsky (Akkinsky), who was in alliance with Moscow. In total, initially there were no more than 300-500 people. Since they were in temporary service, they arrived without families and did not start a household.

At first, the Chechen Cossacks were called Grebensky from the old Cossack word “comb” - “mountain”), and later they were renamed Terek (after the name of the Terek River, which flows in these parts). By the middle of the 17th century, the local Cossack population became sedentary.

The Cossack community was called an “army” and was governed by an elected ataman and a military circle. Fugitive serfs and townspeople from Central Russia, the Volga region, and Ukraine gradually flocked to the Cossack towns on the Terek. Among the newcomers were Circassians, Kabardians, Chechens, Kumyks, Georgians, and Armenians, who for one reason or another were forced to leave their homes.

There were many Christians among them, since before the adoption of Islam the mountain peoples actively professed pagan and Christian cults.

The multinational composition of the Cossack villages, as well as their proximity to mountain villages, contributed to the adoption of many customs and cultural and everyday traditions.

Like the mountaineers, in particular their closest neighbors the Chechens, the Cossacks were engaged in agriculture and cattle breeding. Also, together with the Chechens and Ingush, they guarded the borders of the Russian state and built military fortifications. The Cossacks, like the Chechens, held horse riding competitions, during which they practiced courage, resourcefulness and horsemanship. And Cossack women, like Chechen women, took care of horses.

The home life of the Terek Cossacks developed under the influence of their mountaineer neighbors. So, they often built saklas like the Chechen ones. The internal structure of Cossack dwellings differed little from mountain dwellings. Both of them were divided into two parts. The decoration of the rooms was also similar. Leo Tolstoy, who lived in these parts in his youth, wrote that the Greben Cossacks “arrange their homes according to Chechen custom.”

Traditionally, every Cossack dwelling, as well as a mountain dwelling, had a whole arsenal of weapons. Usually one of the walls was allocated for it. On it hung a pistol holster, a revolver, a Berdanka or double-barreled shotgun, several daggers, including those in leather or silver frames, as well as a saber with silver plaques.

The Cossacks ordered all this, as a rule, from Chechen gunsmiths. Ancient Cossack songs even talk about the famous Atagin blades.

Cossack clothing also differed little from Chechen clothing. Men wore Caucasian burkas, beshmets, hats, bashlyks, and Circassian coats. They certainly wore a Caucasian belt, and at the belts they carried daggers and gazyrs (gun charges) with tips made of silver or other metal. Boots, leggings, and leggings with braided or velvet stockings were put on the feet. Clothing, like the Chechens, was divided into simple and festive.

Of course, there were some culinary borrowings. And today in the cuisine of the Terek Cossacks there are Chechen national dishes - flatbread stuffed with cheese and vegetables, unleavened bread-pasta, dat-kodar - a mixture of cottage cheese with melted butter.

music and dancing

Quite quickly, mountain musical instruments - zurna, pipe, pondur - entered the life of the Terek Cossacks. And the Naur Lezginka turned into a Cossack national dance.

Language borrowings were also inevitable. Many everyday terms used by Chechens, for example those relating to clothing and weapons, entered the vocabulary of the Cossacks. In negotiations between Russians and indigenous inhabitants of the Caucasus, Terek Cossacks usually served as translators.

Common genes

Of course, both the Cossacks and the highlanders often became related to each other. Moreover, the Cossacks often became kunaks (brothers) of their neighbors. A Cossack could marry a Chechen woman - the sister of his kunak.

Chechnya for the third time gathered Cossacks for the interregional conference “From Terek to Don”. This time it was held modestly; there were no representatives of Don and Kuban.

Nevertheless, the Terek Cossacks are grateful that the republican authorities, despite financial difficulties, found the opportunity to organize an event and delve into the problems of the Cossacks. They just regretted that they were perceived as a national minority.

How to strengthen the Terek army in Chechnya?

The Cossack conference in Grozny, organized by the republican authorities, is an important event in terms of not so much content as the very fact of its holding.

After all, ten years ago it was difficult to imagine that Chechens were concerned about Cossack problems.

Now this is becoming the order of things, and for the third time the capital of the Chechen Republic, once founded by General Alexei Ermolov as the Grozny fortress, is hosting Cossack delegations to participate in the conference “From the Terek to the Don.”

This time, due to the economic crisis, according to Deputy Ataman of the Terek Military Cossack Society (TVKO) Valery Salishchev, the event was less representative than last year. Don and Kuban Cossacks.

But the Terek army was represented by Stavropol, Vladikavkaz, and Kizlyar Cossacks.

“I spoke at the plenary session with a report in which the achievements and problems that we have for the 26th anniversary of the revival of the Terek Cossack army were presented,” said Valery Alekseevich. - We include the formation of a registered Terek Cossack army, located in six constituent entities of the Russian Federation, as an achievement.

Our army covers the largest number of subjects of all 11 Cossack troops of Russia.

We consider the recent addition to the Terek army of the Cossacks of the Republic of Ingushetia as an achievement, because it was problematic - the recognition of the Cossacks by the state and the development of state regulatory documents.

But there are also problems, such as the creation of parallel Cossack societies, the inefficiency of the Cossack economy.”

At a round table meeting within the framework of the conference, Valery Salishchev made several proposals that could give a new impetus to strengthening the Cossacks in Chechnya.

He also asked to consider the possibility of introducing the ataman of the Cossack society of the republic, Georgy Reunov, into the executive authorities of the Chechen Republic and developing a regional program to support the registered Cossacks.

Deputy Chairman of the Republic's Parliament Shaid Zhamaldaev promised to work on these issues.

Deputy Chairman of the Chechen Parliament Shaid Zhamaldaev. Photo: minnac-chr.ru

“We are now well aware that due to the global crisis caused by the fall in energy prices, due to the sanctions imposed against our state, the economic situation is difficult, so we do not demand from the state, and in particular regional leaders, immediate adoption decisions.

But they must know and understand our problems and, as additional sources of funding appear and the economic situation improves, resolve them,” noted the deputy of the Terek Registered Troops.

Participants of the conference “From Terek to Don” in Grozny

There are less than a thousand Cossacks

For a long time, the Cossacks in Chechnya had the status of a district society. But at the same time it was not included in the state register.

The new ataman Georgy Reunov corrected this shortcoming, although he had to sacrifice district status: the republic did not have a thousand people to replenish the Cossack ranks.

“I was elected ataman in June of this year, and during this time we registered as a regional Cossack society, since 300 people are enough for it,” Georgy Reunov explained to KAVPOLIT. - At the end of August, I submitted papers to the Ministry of Justice to include us in the register, and on September 26 this event took place. We are now a legal entity."

According to him, the conference discussed the general problems of the Cossacks in the Northern Caucasus, because the conference was interregional in nature.

In some places there are acute problems of allocating land to the Cossacks, in others priority is given to interaction with military registration and enlistment offices and the preparation of conscripts for the army, in others it is necessary to help the Cossacks with employment.

Georgy Reunov himself, as a relatively new person in the Cossack movement, did not speak at the conference.

On behalf of the Cossack population, the head of the Naursky district, Dmitry Kashlyunov, spoke about the fact that residents of the republic of different nationalities need to live together, stand shoulder to shoulder.

Chechnya for everyone

Ataman of the Central District Cossack Society of the Stavropol District of the Terek Army, Alexander Pechnikov, was born and raised on the Terek-Sunzha land, so he tries not to miss Cossack events in his small homeland.

He was at the “Terek to Don” conference in Grozny last summer, and this time he asked whether anything had changed in relation to the Cossack population over the past year.

Alexander Pechnikov. Photo: sevkavportal.ru

“They told me that during this time three priests were provided with housing, they were given cars, and one family from the Stavropol Territory, who had previously lived in the Chechen Republic, was resettled and employed in the Naursky district,” said Alexander Borisovich. - Cossacks were encouraged to come up with initiatives.

To this I noticed that the Cossacks are in such a position in the Chechen Republic that it is difficult for them to even take the initiative.”

The cramped position of the Cossacks was also evident in other speeches.

For example, the rector of the Church of the Nativity of Christ in the village of Naurskaya, Father Ambrose, noted with satisfaction that the situation in the republic is stabilizing, but it hurts the ear when the Cossacks are called a small people, whose problems should be discussed at such events.

However, no sensitive topics were raised at the conference.

As Zalpa Bersanova, head of the ethnography sector of the Chechen Academy of Sciences, said, misunderstandings and even armed clashes between Cossacks and Chechens are a thing of the past. Now the task is to “build a common house.”

“Chechen society (and it includes all residents of the Chechen Republic - Russians, Cossacks, and representatives of other nationalities, of which more than 40 live in the region) must develop further - and, taking into account the lessons of the past, avoid confrontation - outlined the essence speeches by Zalpa Bersanova Valery Salishchev. - We need to make Chechnya a place comfortable for any nation to live, regardless of religion.

Head of the ethnography sector of the Chechen Academy of Sciences Zalpa Bersanova (right). Photo: t-chagaeva.livejournal.com

I liked this performance. It did not varnish reality; it pointed out mistakes that must be remembered so that they are not repeated.”

1

Continuation.
Part 1 “Cossacks-foreigners. Highlanders of the North Caucasus" is available at http://ksovd.ru/ksovd/380-kazaki-inorodcy-ch-1.html

Part 2 “Cossacks-foreigners. Ossetians" is available at the link

We have already noted that the Cossacks from the very beginning of their appearance were ethnically heterogeneous, and when they came to the Caucasus, various peoples living in this territory eventually joined its ranks. The Cossacks came to the Caucasus (according to various sources) in the 15th – 16th centuries. Despite the fact that those who came were sometimes greeted with hostile attacks, over time, friendly and even family relations were established between the indigenous and newly arrived populations.

Historical documents provide many examples of peaceful coexistence between Cossacks and highlanders. From the Cossacks, the highlanders adopted modern (at that time) methods of running their farms, cultural and everyday skills. In turn, the Cossacks adopted a lot from the highlanders. From Kabardins, Chechens, Dagestanis and other mountain peoples they borrowed the breeding of horses, livestock, horse equipment, national clothing, edged weapons, a two-wheeled cart, the cultivation of local varieties of fruit crops, even some customs...

Over time, the Cossacks began not only to be friends with the highlanders, but also to create joint families. It is no coincidence that many families of Terek Cossacks began not only to be considered relatives of the highlanders, but also to be included as associated members in teips (among the Chechens). To this day, good relations have been maintained between the Cossacks and the Chechens of the Guna and Varanda teips. These teips did not accept Islam for a long time and went to the mountains. Chechens “Okochen” were part of the guards in the city of Terki-2, which, after Astrakhan, was considered the largest settlement in the North Caucasus in the 17th century. In this city, Cossacks, Kabardians (Cherkasskaya Sloboda), Chechens “Okochen” (Okotskaya Sloboda), Kumyks (Tatarskaya Sloboda), Novokreschenskaya Sloboda, inhabited by highlanders who converted to Christianity lived peacefully. Among the newly baptized were representatives of almost all Caucasian peoples.

When the Grebensky Cossacks first arrived in the Caucasus, they settled on the right bank of the river. Terek. Chechens lived next door here. A short time passed, and good neighborly and friendly relations began to be established between them. Representatives of the Chechen teip Gunoi were especially closely related to the Cossacks. Among them there was a high percentage of mixed marriages. Three or four generations passed, and even outwardly it was difficult to distinguish the Grebens from the Chechens.

“Among the Terek Cossacks, even in the type of their appearance, features common to the mountaineers can be seen; These features are especially characteristic of Cossack women: along with the round, ruddy face of a Great Russian beauty, we find an elongated, pale, oval face with Chechen blood,” wrote one of L.N.’s contemporaries. Tolstoy.

An interesting observation about the mixture of Russian and Chechen blood was left in 1915 by local historian F. S. Grebenets. He described the woman of the village of Novogladkovskaya as follows: “She acquired a light figure from a Caucasian highlander, and from a Cossack she borrowed the height, muscular strength and sober character of a Russian woman.” According to ethnographers, already at the beginning of the 20th century, Chechen blood flowed in many women of the Greben Cossacks.

The active Islamization of Chechnya began in the 17th century. This process was extremely painful, especially for the Gunoians. One of the reasons for the Hunoians’ non-acceptance of Islam was their tradition of “pig eating,” which many did not want to give up. “Yes, we are Russian,” they said. “We eat pig.” The terms “Russian”, “Christian” and “pig eater” in those days sounded like synonyms to the Chechens. Some historians have noted that the division of Chechens into Muslims and non-Muslims was solely based on “pig eating.” It has been precisely established that Chechens in the 16th – 17th centuries. entire families and even clans adopted Christianity. This way they fit more organically into the Terek Cossack ethnic group, and their descendants eventually became full-fledged Cossacks. Although history also knows the opposite example, when the Gunoians, having gone to the mountains, converted to Islam.

Despite this, they retained knowledge of their genealogical roots for a long time. Many, despite the long Caucasian War, came to the villages, since their relatives also lived there and did not want to move to the mountains. Among the Cossacks of the village of Chervlennaya, according to researcher Nikolai Kuzin (1947), there lived Gunoyan Cossacks with Christian surnames: Grishins, Astashkins, Gulaevs, Deniskins, Polushkins, Paramerovs, Felipchenkins, Kuzins, Pronkins, Alyoshechkins, Tikhonovs, Mitroshkins, Mishchutishkins, Mityushkins, Khanovs, Andryushkins, Kurnosovs, Rogozhins...

In the Stavropol Territory, the “Cultural Center of Chechens and Ingush” was created, which is headed by a descendant of the Gunoic Cossacks, Ramazan Atamovich Dadakhanov. He never hid his ancestry associated with the Terek Cossacks, and was proud that he belonged to this glorious ethnic group.

Among the Terek Cossacks in the 17th century. Georgians and Armenians settled. It is known that in 1682, Tsar Archil left Imereti for Russia with his family and numerous retinue, seeking refuge from the persecution of the Turkish Sultan and the Persian Shah. From this time on, negotiations began between the Transcaucasian rulers (Georgia and Armenia) about the desire of a significant part of the population of Georgians and Armenians to move to Russia. In 1722, by decree of Peter I, it was founded at the mouth of the river. Agrahan fortress of the Holy Cross. 1000 families of Don Cossacks were transferred here and the Agrakhan Cossack Army was formed. In 1724, 450 Georgian and Armenian families settled near the fortress. The location for the fortress was poorly chosen, since a significant part of it was swamps and reeds. Among the Cossacks transferred from the Don, illnesses began, accompanied by a large number of deaths.

By decree of Empress Anna Ioannovna, the fortress was demolished in 1735, and the population was transferred to a new citadel - Kizlyar. Here, along with the Kizlyar Cossack army, the Terek-family Cossack army was formed. It was located not only in Kizlyar, but also in nearby villages: Borozdinskaya, Dubovskaya, Kargalinskaya. Georgians and Armenians also moved here, under the cover of the Cossacks. Over time, the Georgians founded a new settlement and called it Sasoply. Many residents of this settlement wanted to become Cossacks. Their wish was granted, and the settlement became known as the village of Alexander Nevskaya. At the end of the 19th century, there were over 120 households here - equally Terek and Georgian Cossacks. In terms of their way of life, the Georgians did not differ at all from the ancestral Cossacks. Georgian Cossacks also served in the regiment for four years, and then served for 21 years in the village. Many years of Cossack life developed from them a special Cossack type, so that a Georgian could no longer be distinguished from a generic Cossack. In their free time from service, they were engaged in cattle breeding, arable farming, viticulture, and winemaking. Georgian women also did not differ from Cossack women, both in clothing and appearance.

Terek region of the Caucasus region of the Russian Empire, 1896. Generalized fragment of the “Map of the Caucasian Territory” from the “Caucasian Calendar for 1897”

Some Georgians and Armenians eventually moved higher along the Terek, founding the village of Sarapani (now the village of Shelkozavodskaya). A silk factory was built here by the Armenian Khastatov, which produced six pounds of mulberry cocoons.

A century and a half passed, and there were practically no purely Georgian surnames among these Cossacks; all of them turned into Russians: the Otinoshvili became the Otinovs, the Shenshelishvili - the Shenshinovs, the Kitranishvili - the Kitranins, as well as the Dubinkovs, Karins, Dmitrievs, Bibilurovs and others, although there were also purely Georgian ones: Lomidze, Almadze, Bitadze, Zedgenidze, Sufradze.

Together with the Georgians, Armenians also joined the Cossack societies. But there were much fewer of them. The majority of Armenians were engaged in trade. For the life and economic activities of the Cossacks, trade and supplies with the Armenians were extremely necessary, since they spent most of their lives in military service.

Both Georgian Cossacks and Armenians over time became prominent officers, commanders of not only Cossacks, but also military units.

So, after graduating from the Stavropol Cossack Junker School, the Georgians: Ivan and Alexander Chkheidze, Pyotr Orbeliani, David Bebutov, David and Semyon Eristov; Armenians Nikolai Ter-Asaturov, Pavel Melik-Shakhnazarov became prominent commanders of Cossack hundreds and regiments. Many foreigners became prominent statesmen and atamans of the Cossack troops.

Perhaps the most significant contribution to the life of the Russian Cossacks and the Russian Empire as a whole was made by Mikhail Tarielovich Loris-Melikov.

He was born in 1825 into an Armenian family. His ancestors owned the city of Lori since the 16th century. One of his ancestors, Nazar Loris-Melikov, was forced to convert to Islam. Later, his descendants returned to the fold of the Armenian Church and were hereditary bailiffs and princes of the Lori steppe. Loris-Meliks were part of the highest Georgian nobility and were included in the VI part of the genealogical book of the Tiflis province. Mikhail's father lived in Tiflis and conducted quite a significant trade not only in Russia, but also abroad.

In 1836 Loris-Melikov M.T. was assigned to the Moscow Lazarev Institute of Oriental Languages; from 1841 he studied at the school of guards ensigns and cavalry cadets in St. Petersburg (Nikolaev Cavalry School).

In 1847, with the rank of lieutenant on special assignments, he served under the commander-in-chief of the Caucasian Corps, Prince M.S. Vorontsov. In the same year, he took part in the actions of Russian troops in Lesser Chechnya. For his bravery and fighting abilities he was awarded the Order of St. Anna 4th degree and a golden saber with the inscription “For bravery.”

In 1848, he showed heroism during the capture of the village of Gergebil and was promoted to staff captain for distinction. In 1851 he took part in a large winter expedition on the left flank of the Caucasian line. In August 1855 M.T. Loris-Medlikov was appointed to serve on special assignments under the new commander-in-chief, Count N.N. Muravyov, commanding the hunters. After the capture of Kars, he was appointed head of the Kars region. In 1856, Loris-Melikov was promoted to major general, and in 1858 he was appointed chief of troops in Abkhazia and inspector of line battalions of the Kutaisi General Government. In 1859, he was sent to Turkey to negotiate the admission of mountain migrants from the Terek region to Asian Turkey. He successfully completed this mission. Soon he received a new appointment - he became the military commander of Southern Dagestan and the mayor of Derbent.

In March 1863, he was appointed head of the Terek region, commander of the troops located in it and ataman of the Terek Cossack army. On April 17 of the same year he was promoted to lieutenant general.

Mikhail Tarielovich Loris-Melikov(on right)

For over 10 years he fulfilled these duties and devoted a significant part of his activities to introducing order and tranquility among the mountain population of the region, who continued to worry after the recent conquest of the Caucasus. At the same time, his attempts to openly protest against the authorities were very soon stopped. In addition, during his reign, many highlanders of the Terek region, who were in the power of the ruling princes and other persons, were freed from serfdom, and at the same time, many class land issues were resolved. He significantly increased the number of educational institutions, and M.T. Loris-Melikov, using his own funds, established a vocational school in Vladikavkaz.

On August 10, 1865, he was awarded the rank of adjutant general; on April 17, 1875, he was enlisted in the Terek Cossack Army with the awarded rank of “cavalry general” (the highest Cossack rank - Author). He took an active part in the Russian-Turkish war of 1877-1878, commanding a corps. Several important victories were won under his command; Kars and Erzurum were taken, which made it possible to soon conclude peace with Turkey. By a personal Highest decree of April 17, 1878, the commander of the active corps of the Caucasian Army, adjutant general, cavalry general Mikhail Tarielovich Loris-Melikov was elevated to the dignity of count of the Russian Empire.

With the appearance of the plague in Vetlyanka (Samara province) the following year, 1879, Loris-Melikov was appointed temporary Governor-General of Astrakhan, Saratov and Samara, with almost unlimited powers to combat this dangerous disease. And here Loris-Melikov showed his extraordinary administrative qualities. The plague was tamed.

On April 7, 1879, he was appointed temporary governor-general of the Kharkov province and commander of the troops of the Kharkov military district. Acting as the Kharkov governor-general, Loris-Melikov earned the respect of Kharkov residents by not resorting to indiscriminate repression. In February 1880, he was appointed Chief of the Supreme Administrative Commission, which was endowed with extensive powers; from March 3 - temporary head of the III Department of His Imperial Majesty's Own Chancellery.

In order to concentrate in one hand the highest management of all bodies called upon to protect state peace, he proposed to abolish Division III and transfer all its affairs and functions to the newly established Police Department under the Ministry of Internal Affairs.

Mikhail Tarielovich Loris-Melikov

On August 6, 1880 he was appointed Minister of the Interior. This year he proposed to the emperor a program for improving the administrative system of the state and changing socio-economic policy. She was approved by the sovereign. After the assassination attempt on Emperor Alexander II, M.T. Loris-Melikov retired and went abroad to France (Nice) for treatment.

Died on December 12, 1888 in Nice. His body was brought to Tiflis, where it was buried in the Armenian Vank Cathedral. After the destruction of this cathedral in 1957, the ashes of Loris-Melikov M.T. and the tombstone were moved to the courtyard of the Armenian Cathedral of St. George on Meydan.

Greeks were also appointed atamans of the Terek and Kuban Cossack troops.

Christopher Egorovich (correctly Georgievich) Popandopulo is the first ataman of the TKV. Born into a noble Greek family (from the famous Demipian family). He graduated from the Oryol Cadet School and enlisted in the Ryazhsky regiment, stationed in the Pregradny Stan fortress, transferred to the Crimean Infantry Regiment (1823), participated in the assault on the Anapa fortress (1829), served in the Tenginsky regiment with headquarters in the village of Temnolesskaya. He took part in campaigns against the highlanders. Major (1842), adjutant for special assignments at the headquarters of the commander of the Caucasian line. Lieutenant Colonel (1844), commander of the 4th battalion of the 1st brigade of the Caucasian Linear Cossack Army (KLKV) (1846), colonel (1855), commander of the KLKV brigade, chief of staff of the KLKV (1857-1859), major general (1859), head of the Terek region and ataman of the TKV (1860). Promoted to lieutenant general (1865). He retired this year. Lived in Stavropol, was a member of the noble society of the Stavropol province, Kuban and Terek regions. Popandopulo H.E. was buried. at the Assumption Cemetery in Stavropol.

Mikhail Argiryevich Tsakni was appointed ataman of the Kuban Cossack army on February 3, 1869. He came from the nobility of the Tauride province, began his service in 1834 as a non-commissioned officer in the Naschenburg infantry regiment, after the disbandment of which he served in the Black Sea battalions, and from 1850 as headquarters -an officer for special assignments under the head of the Black Sea coastline... In 1861, M. A. Tsakni was the chief of staff of the Kuban Cossack army, a year later he became assistant to the quartermaster general of the Caucasian army, in 1865 - assistant to the head of the Kuban region, and in 1870 he became the appointed ataman of the Kuban Cossack army.

Christopher Egorovich (Georgievich) Popandopulo

During the period of his atamanship in 1870, the “Regulations on public administration in the Cossack troops” were introduced, the first work on land delimitation began and forms of land ownership were established that lasted until 1917. M.A. Tsakni also took part in drawing up regulations on the liberation of dependent classes in the mountain societies of the Kuban region. He received most of his awards for military services.

The great merit of the Cossacks is that, having come to the Caucasus, they were able to pass on their best economic traditions and culture to the North Caucasian peoples and deeply perceive the best features of their foreign life. All this allowed them not only to live in peace and friendship, but also to create joint families. The role of the Cossacks and Caucasian peoples in the centuries-old joint life of the population of the South of Russia is multifaceted and significant. It needs to be studied, popularized and tried to be passed on to the younger generation in various ways.

Petr FEDOSOV, candidate of historical sciences.

(To be continued)

In the fall of 1917, a situation close to anarchy developed in the Caucasus. The region has turned into a boiling cauldron of contradictions. The Terek region, which had a very diverse national composition, found itself in the most unfavorable situation. The Bolsheviks attracted most of the Chechens to their side by pursuing a policy of genocide against the Terek Cossacks, transferring a significant territory of the Terek army to the highlanders and promising to grant independence.


In the late autumn of 1918, White Guard troops entered Chechnya. Here they were opposed by the combined forces of the Chechens and the Red Army. After a series of failures, on January 23, 1919, the White Guards took Grozny. General Shatilov was placed at the head of the operation against the Chechens and the remnants of the Red Army, who had taken refuge in villages across the Sunzha River. In February 1919, with the forces of the 1st Cavalry Division subordinate to him, he tried to capture the fortified village of Goyta, but suffered a heavy defeat and withdrew to Grozny with heavy losses. Wanting to personally familiarize himself with the area, Shatilov went on reconnaissance a few days later and was wounded. He was replaced by Colonel Pushkin, who exactly repeated Shatilov’s path, trying to take Goyty during a routine offensive operation. The idea, naturally, failed miserably; Pushkin himself was killed in battle. Attempts to capture the villages of Alkhan-Yurt, Gekhi, and Urus-Martan were unsuccessful. These battles showed that the Chechens are a serious enemy. The victories raised their morale.


Impossible task


The task of conquering Chechnya set by Denikin, according to many experts of that time, was almost impossible. Denikin could not withdraw troops from the front. The Don Cossacks were using their last strength to hold back the pressure of the Red Army near their capital Novocherkassk, and they needed urgent help. The Tsaritsyn direction also experienced a shortage of troops, which were necessary for the final defeat of the Red forces retreating from the Caucasus to Astrakhan and Tsaritsyn. It was impossible to abandon Chechnya in the state it was in: this meant leaving behind a very dangerous hotbed of instability, separatism and Bolshevism. In addition, the Terek Cossacks, whose regiments successfully fought with the Bolsheviks, would have refused to leave their native villages and go to war against the Bolsheviks outside the Terek region: they did not want to abandon their homes and families to the mercy of fate. At that time, everyone who could hold a weapon in their hands guarded their villages day and night, since the settlements of the Tertsy Sunzha Line were constantly subject to armed raids by the Chechens. Some of them, for example the village of Kakhaurovskaya, were burned, and the inhabitants were killed.


In Russia - brother against brother, in Chechnya - neighbor against neighbor

Major General Daniil Pavlovich Dratsenko, who was placed at the head of the troops to suppress Chechnya, came to the conclusion that the mountaineers could not be defeated by conventional operations. Especially considering that a typhus epidemic was raging in the region, which wiped out the White Army in the Caucasus by almost half.


The first thing Dratsenko did before the start of the special operation was to invite representatives of the Chechen intelligentsia to Grozny and try to find out what the Chechen movement was at that time. The intelligentsia directly stated that “the Chechen movement cannot be considered a phenomenon of Bolshevism, because the mountaineers, being Muslims, are by their nature hostile to atheistic communism.” At the same time, Chechen representatives did not consider the movement to be separatist: at that time they had no reason to hate the Russian government. The doors of higher and secondary schools were opened to Chechens. Freed from onerous military service, they could nevertheless serve in the Russian army at their own discretion. In a word, the mountaineers enjoyed all the rights of Russian citizens. During the consultations, Dratsenko understood the main thing: the resistance of the Chechens to the white forces is nothing more than a consequence of the civil war throughout Russia, but with its own specific characteristics - if in Russia “brother went against brother,” then in Chechnya it was “neighbor against neighbor” , largely due to land disputes. The role of such “neighbors” was played by the Chechens and Terek Cossacks themselves. In addition, the characteristics of the “Chechen national character” - a warlike, life-prone abrek, living in an atmosphere of “strong sensations” - also played an important role. To put it simply, in the absence of a strong central government, the Chechens felt themselves masters of the situation and began to organize their lives independently at the expense of their neighbors.


Rogue Suppliers


According to available data, the mountain population of Chechnya then exceeded 200 thousand people. Based on their mobilization capabilities, they could field an army of 20,000 against Dratsenko. However, the general was aware that the Chechens did not act as a single force at that time: they were divided into teips, sometimes at war with each other. At the same time, they had an important advantage - excellent knowledge of the area.


Colonel Pisarev, a participant in the special operation to subjugate Chechnya, paints us a “psychological portrait” of the highlanders of that time, which has hardly changed today: “Being gifted with a rich imagination, like most eastern peoples, the Chechens are impressionable, hence the slightest success inspires their hopes, but also a strong blow to this imagination could lead to quick and positive results. Their positive traits are courage and endurance, their negative traits are cunning and thievery. The Chechen's ideal is robbery, and they were indeed the suppliers of the most significant Caucasian brigands.
The mountaineers are conservative; until their last days, they had a blood feud. Religious cult has been carried to a high degree and among some it has reached a state of fanaticism.”


The Sunzha River then served as a kind of border between the Chechens and the White Guards. On its left bank there were Cossack villages, on the right - Chechen villages. By that time, Dratsenko had restored most of the railway destroyed by the highlanders, which they perceived as “a symbol of the enslavement of Chechnya by the Russians.” This road made it possible to quickly bring aid to garrisons that were attacked. In addition, the armored trains plying along it noticeably cooled the desire of the Chechens to carry out raids on the villages.


The main centers of the rebellion were the villages of Shali and Vedeno. The rebel leaders were hiding in them, as well as the Red Commissar Gikalo, through whom the highlanders maintained contact with Moscow.


They don't joke with us


Dratsenko’s actions were aimed at preparing troops for the upcoming punitive expedition, which aimed to “show the Chechens our strength and, by destroying several villages, prove to them that they are not joking with them, but speaking in the language of iron reality.”


The choice of strategy for fighting the rebels was determined by Dratsenko’s experience in the war against the Kurds in Iran in 1912 - 1913. At the same time, the general took into account that many Chechens were familiar with modern battle tactics, having gone through the school of the First World War. In addition, the fact was taken into account that a significant part of the territory of Chechnya was covered with dense bushes and was thus ideal for the secret movement of even large cavalry masses of the enemy, who could suddenly appear in one place or another at the most inopportune time. The experience of the first battles in such conditions showed that the Chechens used special guerrilla tactics of using small groups that used horses for rapid movement on the battlefield and were in constant live communication. Dratsenko took into account the experience of the Caucasian war and therefore refused to conduct long punitive expeditions, remembering the sad experience of the defeat in the last century of those military columns that moved long distances from their bases. As a result, the general settled on the following tactics: without scattering his forces, attack first one village, then another, with short strong blows, then return to base and try to achieve the desired results through negotiations, threatening to destroy village after village if the Chechens refuse. Dratsenko’s refusal from conventional military operations was due to the fact that “in the presence of even the strongest detachment, several times superior to the forces of the White Guards, the correct operation using all methods of modern tactics, at best, could lead to a protracted war, which would only embitter the highlanders. The invasion of our troops into Chechnya itself, leaving the captured villages intact, would be tantamount to hitting a whip into space.” The wisdom of General Dratsenko suggested a similar development of the situation back then, at the beginning of 1919, and forced him to find a more effective solution to the Chechen problem. Dratsenko abandoned the “correct attack” on the villages also because, in pursuit of taking them “safe and sound,” one should expect losses during the assault an order of magnitude higher than with the chosen new tactics. The general knew that during the assault on the villages, his squad would be waiting for mobile ambushes, well-aimed Chechen bullets and a flexible line of combat cavalry groups, fanatical and ready to die easily. This whole nightmare would relentlessly pursue the white troops even if the villages were captured intact. In this case, they would be in constant tension in a 360-degree front, since the bandits based in the “living” village would not have to go far from it in order to harm the “white infidels.” Therefore, Dratsenko immediately refused to occupy the villages - he decided to simply raze the bandit nests to the ground. The prospect of losing their “father’s home,” as Dratsenko knew, put the mountaineers in a state of shock and deprived them of the will to further resist. The general’s main conclusion about the mentality of the Chechens at the beginning of the special operation was as follows: “the highlanders, like all eastern peoples, despise weakness and deeply respect strength. The slightest manifestation of weakness in their eyes can ruin all plans, even those carried out in their favor. Excessive severity will never harm or make a Kurd or Chechen your enemy; on the contrary, it will elevate you in his eyes and, with a certain tact, can bind him to you and make him a loyal and devoted person.”


After the February defeats of Shatilov and Pushkin in 1919, the units were supplemented with recruits, who were intensively trained to fight in the mountains and foothills, and the Terek Cossacks were mobilized. As a result, by the 20th of March 1919, Dratsenko concentrated a strike group of troops in the village of Ermolovskaya, including the 1st cavalry and Terek Cossack divisions (3 cavalry regiments, Plastun foot battalion, Terek horse battery), 7th Kuban Plastun battalion, 2nd and 3rd horse batteries of the 1st horse artillery division, a separate horse mountain battery and a howitzer battery of 48-line howitzers. In total - up to 4 thousand people (of which less than 1 thousand infantry) with 12 guns and about 50 machine guns. Unlike the previous unsuccessful operations of the White Guards, the main force of the attack was to be provided by infantry and artillery, while the cavalry played a supporting role.


First hit


The target of the first attack was Alkhan-Yurt. On the night of March 23, 1919, the Plastun Cossacks built a bridge across the Sunzha and crossed it to the Chechen coast with a horse-mountain battery, which was supposed to ensure the infantry advance on the village from a short distance. Other batteries were positioned at the heights to shell Alkhan-Yurt. At this time, the cavalry units reliably blocked the village in order to prevent reinforcements from approaching it and to prevent escape from it. Even before the start of the operation, it was taken into account that Alkhan-Yurt is divided into two parts by a stream flowing into the Sunzha. This stream became the dividing line for the Kuban and Terek Cossack Plastun battalions. The Kubans, as they had more bayonets and machine guns in the battalion than the Terets, had to attack the main part of the village.


The defense of Alkhan-Yurt, according to the participants in the special operation, was superbly built. In front of the village, which was a scalene triangle, the 1st line of defense was placed 1.5-2 kilometers away; The 2nd line was located on the outskirts of Alkhan-Yurt. The first and main line was a highly open and well-suited chain of posts, well camouflaged.


At dawn the Plastuns began their offensive. They immediately met fierce resistance. Even watching the progress of the battle through the strongest Zeiss binoculars, the White Guards were unable to see a single Chechen from among those who fired destructive rifle fire at the Cossacks from a distance of 500 meters. The Chechen positions, skillfully equipped in relation to the folds of the terrain for cross-fire, were so well camouflaged that for a long time the White Guards’ artillery hit them “blindly,” apparently exerting only a “sound effect” on the defenders.


Soon, well-aimed Chechen fire slowed down the advance of the plastuns. They began to suffer heavy losses - almost all the wounds of the Cossacks were fatal. The soldiers now moved one at a time in quick short dashes, hiding from bullets where possible.


“Chechens from all sides...”


In order to simultaneously cover with fire the entire space from which the fire was fired, 3-4 times more guns than the available number were required. The artillery also could not fire accurately, again due to the inability to clearly determine the enemy’s positions; when asked by the artillerymen where the fire was coming from, the plastuns answered: “From all sides”... The Kuban soldiers, advancing in the most dangerous direction on the right, suffered especially heavy losses. Under these conditions, Colonel Dolgonov, the commander of the detachment’s artillery, massed artillery fire sequentially on one and then on the other sectors of the battalions’ advance. In this way it was possible to break the enemy's resistance. By 14:00 the Cossacks approached 250 - 300 meters to the northern outskirts of the village. The first line of defense of the Chechens was broken through and destroyed. What was striking was that the mountaineers died in their positions, but did not leave them, fighting to the end.


At 14:45 p.m. the plastuns attacked the northern and northeastern outskirts of the village. “The plastuns who burst into the village were ordered to light everything that could burn - the fire line was supposed to serve as an indication to the artillery of the location of our chains.” In many places on the outskirts of the village, short hand-to-hand battles began to boil. Here are some Chechens shouting “Allahu Akbar!” They rushed with sabers and daggers in their hands at entire groups of plastuns. Such attacks in most cases ended disastrously for the fanatics: the Cossacks, angry at the losses during the breakthrough of the 1st line of defense of the village, simply raised them on rifle bayonets, destroying them without mercy. No prisoners were taken.


By the evening of the same day, all of Alkhan-Yurt was in the hands of the White Guards. By order of Dratsenko, hundreds of horsemen released several Chechens from the village so that there would be someone to tell about the sad fate of those who persisted and thereby deal a “psychological blow” to the mood of the enemy. The entire village was set on fire and burned all night and the next day, illuminating the far plain of Chechnya at night, reminding the rebellious what awaited them.


"Psychic Attack"


The next day, early in the morning, the detachment carried out a demonstrative psychic attack on the neighboring village of Valerik. The artillery again occupied the dominant heights, but did not open fire. The cavalry blocked the village in the same way as Alkhan-Yurt. Plastun battalions went into battle in ranks, as if in a parade. Only from a distance of 200 meters did they open fire on them, which was many times weaker than during the attack on Alkhan-Yurt. It turned out that Valerik was defended by only a few volunteers from among its residents, while most of the population was against this and left the village on the eve of its assault. This time the Chechens were unable to detain the Plastuns, and the Cossacks quickly burst into the village, setting fire to everything that could burn. By noon, Valerik was finished. By the evening of the same day, Dratsenko’s detachment left the burned village and dispersed in Ermolovskaya and Grozny.


After this, there was a week-long break in hostilities, as negotiations began between the command of the Volunteer Army and the Chechens. This time the mountaineers themselves sent their representatives. Dratsenko’s detachment at this time was busy with combat training, exercises and working out interaction between different branches of the military. The cavalry of Dratsenko's detachment provided guard protection for Grozny from the villages of Gudermes and Ustar-Tardoy, which showed obvious hostility. The White Guard command, knowing the treachery of the highlanders, was afraid of provocations on their part.


Return all the loot!


In Grozny, on March 29, 1919, the Congress of the Chechen People was convened, to which Denikin and the British representative in Transcaucasia, General Briggs, addressed. Denikin called on the Chechens to submit to the power of the White Guards, hand over the Red commissars and the most odious bandit leaders, as well as the artillery and machine guns available here and there, and return everything plundered by the Red Terets, promising in this case to spare the authoritative Chechen leaders captured - Sugaib-Mullah and Ibrahim-hoja. In this case, Denikin was tactful. Speaking about the need to return looted property to the Cossacks, he formulated it this way: “Return to the residents of Grozny all their own property brought to Chechnya for safekeeping.” At the same time, the White Guard command placed responsibility for the robberies on the Bolsheviks, with whom it asked the Chechens to sever all relations, saying that the Reds “do not recognize either God, law, or order,” thereby reproaching the mountaineers for their connections with the atheistic International. Denikin promised the Chechens that, despite the supreme power of the Volunteer Army in the region, Chechnya would retain its internal self-government. The need to subordinate Chechnya to the White Guard command was emphasized by both Denikin and Briggs on the basis that in the Caucasus, in conditions of a relatively small territory and a large number of different nationalities living on it, in conditions of a huge number of mutual claims against each other, without the presence of a single powerful power playing At the same time, the role of a restraining force, the Caucasian peoples are threatened with self-destruction. As a result, the Chechens were promised and provided with maximum autonomous benefits: General Aliyev was elected ruler of Chechnya and at the same time assistant to the commander-in-chief of the region, Lieutenant General Lyakhov, under whom a kind of government operated - the Mountain Council, which monitored the interests of the Chechens.


As a result, all the demands of the White Guard command put before the congress were fulfilled. Representatives of the villages Misker-Yurt, Geremchuk, Belgatoy, New Atagi, Duba-Yurt, who came to the congress, organized a Chechen cavalry regiment from their residents, which was later deployed into a division. This division fought as part of the Caucasian Army and against Makhno's gangs.


Despite the success of these negotiations, a significant part of Chechnya refused to recognize Denikin’s demands. The villages of Tsatsen-Yurt and Gudermes showed the greatest hostility. A punitive expedition was required against them. According to counterintelligence data, the inhabitants of the villages south of Alkhan-Yurt and Valerik were greatly depressed by the defeat that Dratsenko inflicted on them, and took a wait-and-see attitude in the further struggle.


An excellent target for artillery


At the beginning of April 1919, Dratsenko’s detachment opposed Tsatsen-Yurt. By that time, the 3rd Cavalry Battery had been withdrawn from its composition and sent to the front of the fight against the Red Army. Fearing that he would be subjected to an unexpected enemy attack from Shali and Gudermes, Dratsenko was forced to move significant forces of his cavalry with a mounted mountain battery to these directions to cover. Thus, only 3 artillery batteries with a total number of 7 guns remained at the disposal of the main part of the detachment for the operation, which was almost two times less than during the assault on Alkhan-Yurt.


Taking all precautions in case of an unexpected attack by the Chechens, setting up a guard of mounted Terek Cossacks, the detachment moved towards Tsatsen-Yurt. The aul was a quadrangle, three sides of which were covered by a huge corn field, and only on one side was a meadow adjacent to Tsatsen-Yurt. According to intelligence data, the Chechens here wanted to repeat the defense of Alkhan-Yurt, considering the area near Tsatsen-Yurt very convenient for repelling the attack of the “white infidels,” and by inflicting heavy losses on the attackers, force them to abandon further operations of this kind. The Chechens did not take into account that Dratsenko’s detachment would not go through the corn to the breach, but would secretly advance through the forest, three kilometers short of Tsatsen-Yurt, and move through the meadow. Before the start of the operation, Dratsenko set up an observation post on a haystack, from where he directed the battle.


If near Alkhan-Yurt the Chechen positions were hidden from the eyes of the attackers, here their trenches were clearly visible in the open meadow, representing an excellent target for artillery. Within half an hour, the first line of defense of the village was swept away by gunfire. The howitzer battery worked especially well, each of whose shells smashed entire enemy trenches to smithereens along with the defenders in them. As a result, the chains of plastuns encountered very little resistance. In the same place where particularly heavy fire was coming from, the commanders stopped the plastuns and conveyed instructions on the targets of the artillery, which quickly destroyed the resisters. Thus, the Cossacks successfully captured the enemy’s first line of defense and continued their attack on the village, no longer encountering resistance. When examining the dead, it turned out that they were armed not only with rifles, but also with Berdan guns and even ancient flintlocks; all their bodies had checkers and daggers. The mountaineers, apparently, hoped for hand-to-hand combat... By all indications, the residents did not have time to leave the village - cattle were roaming around it, smoke was coming from the chimneys. Dratsenko stated that he would not stop at destroying the village along with its inhabitants in the event of further resistance. At this time, the artillery batteries were moved closer to the village so that the Chechens felt that Dratsenko was ready to bring the matter to the complete defeat of Tsatsen-Yurt. To the east of the village, from an observation post, the White Guards noticed a huge crowd of local residents demonstrating. 100 meters from the village, Dratsenko stopped the offensive - the highlanders sent out delegates, expressing complete submission. In this case, Dratsenko forbade anyone from entering the village and destroying anything there. Soon the detachment, observing all precautions, retreated to Grozny.


"Cunning" Gudermes


After this, negotiations continued for several days with the village of Gudermes. As it turned out, its residents deliberately delayed negotiations, while at the same time strengthening the village’s defenses. Realizing this, Dratsenko organized a punitive operation. The detachment, having set out from Grozny, spent the night in the village of Ilyinskaya and the next day appeared near Gudermes, passing the ruins of the village of Kakhaurovskaya, burned by the Chechens. Thus, the White Guard command carried out “visual agitation” of the personnel and turned them against the rebels,


Gudermes was the largest and richest of all the villages that Dratsenko’s detachment stormed. To the west of it there was a commanding height from which all approaches to the village were covered. It was equipped with trenches that met the requirements of contemporary fire tactics: “...in places where there was a likelihood of flanking fire from the White Guards, traverses were built. In general, it was clear that the construction was carried out under the supervision of an officer who was well versed in the requirements of modern tactics for engineering.” The Sunzha River, which was blocking the path to the village, at that time overflowed its banks, turning into a stormy stream, thus creating a natural and difficult-to-pass barrier. Everything suggested that a frontal attack on Gudermes would result in huge losses and, most likely, failure for the attackers. However, the Chechens did not take into account the capabilities of artillery and modern technology.


When the plastuns approached a kilometer distance, they began to shoot at them from above. At this time, artillery opened destructive fire along the heights. He was so accurate that soon the Chechens jumped out of the trenches and “scattered,” hoping that now the artillery fire would not reach them. However, they miscalculated: the slope of the height was facing the White Guard artillery, and the silhouettes of people were clearly visible on the almost bare surface. Under the cover of artillery, the Cossacks simply mowed down the mountaineers defending there to the last man. At the very moment when one part of the Plastuns occupied the heights, another burst into the outskirts of the village and set it on fire. Immediately after this, the defenders on poles raised white rags. Soon, two Chechen envoys were brought to Dratsenko blindfolded, and further destruction of Gudermes was stopped. As it turned out, the mountaineers agreed to all of Dratsenko’s conditions and begged for one thing: not to burn the village.


The Terek Cossacks, who spoke of Gudermes as something terrible, expecting the bloodiest battle in it, saw that everything turned out the other way around: the losses during its capture were minimal. The next day the detachment returned to Grozny. This operation completed the pacification of Chechnya, which fell at the feet of the little-known General Dratsenko in just 18 days. And this takes into account the fact that half of this time was spent on negotiations.


Results


Summing up the results of the special operation of March-April 1919 in Chechnya, the White Guard command noted: “If you recall the details of the battles with the Chechens, then in this case they showed the spirit of their ancestors, Alkhan-Yurt cost us dearly, but disproportionately it became more expensive for the Chechens, in This is the secret of further success. Alkhan-Yurt struck hard on the Chechen imagination; they experienced the striking force of the Good Army firsthand; they were convinced that the army leaders would not stop at the most extreme measures. We see how in each subsequent operation the strength of their resistance decreases.”


In addition, Dratsenko’s sensible diplomacy played a major role in the quick victory of the White Guards over Chechnya, as a result of which many villages refused to come to the aid of those Chechen villages that experienced the effects of the punitive expedition. Usually in such cases the emphasis was placed on the teip disunity of the Chechens. In addition, the fact that Dratsenko took hostages in every Chechen settlement contributed to keeping the villages subordinate to the White Guard command in obedience.